IP-003

X SIMPSIO DE ESPECIALISTAS EM PLANEJAMENTO DA OPERAO E EXPANSO ELTRICA

X SEPOPE
21 a 25 de maio de 2006 May 21st to 25th 2006
FLORIANPOLIS (SC) BRASIL

X SYMPOSIUM OF SPECIALISTS IN ELECTRIC OPERATIONAL AND EXPANSION PLANNING

REACTIVE POWER AND DEREGULATION: SYSTEM ENGINEERING, BEST PRACTICES, RELIABILITY, AND SIMPLICITY Carson W. Taylor Bonneville Power Administration USA
SUMMARY I provide an engineering perspective on reactive power in restructured power systems, emphasizing overall power system engineering, reliability and best practices. Switchable (dynamic) capacitor banks with automatic controls, coordinated with power plant controls, help ensure economic and reliable power system design. Power plants should operate with substantial reactive power reserves during normal operation, and transmission voltage profiles should be relatively high and flat for high load conditions. In the U.S., deregulation and restructuring (unbundling of generation, transmission, distribution) have produced mixed results at best. To make matters worse, economists and others promote unbundling of reactive power and reactive power markets. Bizarre and overly complex practices result.

KEYWORDS reactive power, voltage control, voltage stability, wide-area measurements and control, capacitor banks, system engineering, deregulation

252 NW Seblar Court, Portland, OR 97210 USA, cwtaylor@ieee.org (retired from BPA January 2006).

1. Introduction
In the paper title, deregulation is in quotes because it seems that there is more regulation and complexity. Restructuring or re-regulation are better terms. With or without electric power industry restructuring, reactive power and voltage control are important aspects of power systems. The U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) report Principles for Efficient and Reliable Reactive Power Supply and Consumption, 4 February 2005 [1] provides background on the importance of reactive power in large electric power systems. Many issues, however, require comment. Contrasted to the economics and commercial orientation of the report, I discuss engineering aspects. Economic factors, however, are integral to engineering. Restructured power systems fundamentally consist of generation companies (gencos), transmission companies, (transcos), distribution companies (discos), and loads. Each is a subsystem of power systems. Reactive power exchange at the point of interchange (PoI) is of interest, particularly between gencos and transcos. The gencotransco PoI is usually at the transmission side of generator step-up transformers. As a starting point for planning and operations, reliability standards, contracts, and regulations, a reactive power exchange bandwidth around unity power factor at the PoI is often appropriately suggested. Voltage magnitude and reactive power are closely related. Especially for gencotransco PoIs, voltage schedules are the independent variables (scheduled and controlled variables), with reactive power flows the dependent variables. Transcos provide the voltage schedules at power plant switchyards, and also at substations. Good starting points for reactive power practices are the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) reliability standards and FERC Order 2003-A. For example, NERC standards, developed in response to the 1996 western interconnection blackouts requires synchronous generators to regulate voltage. Section 9.6 of the FERC order has the same requirement [2]. The standards help ensure reliability and a level playing field for all participants. First, I recommend a basic framework for voltage control and reactive power interchange. Principles are power system engineering, system reliability, best practices, and simplicity. Subsequent sections explain and defend the recommendations.

2. Main Recommendations
A standard power factor design capability for power plants at the PoI should be defined. For example, Order 2003-A specifies 0.95 lead and lag. This means that reactive power design capability is at least 33% of the active power design capability. The target for normal operation should usually be close to unity power factor at the PoI. This applies to gencotransco, transcotransco, and transcodisco interconnections. There should be a free range of power plant reactive power for regulation of voltage at the PoI [3,4]. For example if 0.98 lead to lag power factor is defined as the free range bandwidth, the reactive power injection range is 20% of active power. For 0.99 lead to lag power factor, the free range is 14%. The quite low genco reactive power cost can simply be bundled with the real power/energy price. Payments by transcos to gencos for MVAr-hours outside the free range should be relatively high. This compensates gencos for higher active power losses and provides incentive for transcos to install capacitor and reactor banks at effective locations to minimize payments. With capacitor/reactor banks installed, generators will operate with substantial reactive power reserve for emergencies. Reliability will be improved, and August 14, 2003 type blackouts may be avoided.1 Payments to gencos could be location based, but in a well-designed network there should not be many excessively overdesigned (strong) or underdesigned (weak) locations.
The initial outage on August 14 was because of the Eastlake 5 generator being loaded near its reactive power limit. Even before the initial outage and with only about 80% of peak load, reactor power reserves at Cleveland-area generators were very low.
1

During heavy load conditions, a high, flat transmission network voltage profile is close to optimal. Generators regulate sending-end voltages, and substation switchable capacitor/reactor banks regulate receiving-end voltages. Gross violation of this best practice was a major contributor to the 14 August blackout. A high, flat voltage profile reduces both active power losses (think energy conservation and reduced line sagging) and reactive power losses. Reduced reactive power losses by keeping voltages high reduce the reactive power output of all generators. Capacitor/reactor banks should provide much of the base reactive power needs of transmission and distribution [5]. BPA, for example, has over 14,000 MVAr of shunt capacitor banks at 500-kV, 230kV and 115-kV (automatically switchable, considered dynamic). The three largest BPA banks are rated 550-kV, 460 MVAr. Tokyo Electric Power Company has 18,000 MVAr of shunt capacitor banks (automatically switchable, considered dynamic).

3. Transmission and Distribution Reactive Power Control Concepts

The FERC report does not emphasize network reactive power compensation, and propagates misconceptions on network capacitor/reactor banks. Reactive power needs are supplied by both generators and capacitor/reactor banks. Reactive power flow varies with loading (e.g., on-peak versus off-peak) and on voltage profile [6]. With equal voltage at each end of a transmission line or transmission path, reactive power injection is zero at both the sending and receiving ends at surge impedance loading. With equal voltage at both ends, transmission lines consume reactive power from both ends when loaded above SIL, and produce reactive power when loaded below SIL. Transformers, however, always consume reactive power so transmission of reactive power between voltage levels should not be excessive, and capacitor banks should be considered at all voltage levels where lines are loaded above SIL. Network capacitor and reactor banks are controllable (not static) and are only a few percent of generator cost per MW. Installed costs are in the range of $5/$20/$10 per kVar for distribution, switched distribution, and switched transmission capacitor banks, respectively [7]. Payback of capacitor bank investments from reduced losses often are only a few years. Modern fuseless capacitor banks are reliable and very low loss [8]. Advanced two-step capacitor banks are available, with either continuous or short-time rating in the boost configuration [9]. Performance has increased and cost has decreased over the years for vacuum and SF6 switchgear. Capacitor/reactor banks can be switched in 50100 ms, and can hardly be considered static. Capacitor/reactor banks are automatically switched by local voltage relays and wide-area controls such as special protection systems, and by SCADA operators. Appendix I provides an example of fast automatic and SCADA switching during an emergency. Power electronic devices (SVCs and STATCOMs) are also available. They may be needed for angle stability and for short-term voltage stability problems associated with certain types of loads such as residential air conditioning [10]. Best practice is coordinated control of power electronic and mechanically switched equipment, with reactive power reserve kept on the power electronic devices during normal operation [30]. Often short-time ratings of power electronic devices can be exploited to reduce cost [31]. Compared to power plants, capacitor/reactor banks can be optimally sized and sited at various voltage levels at many substation locations. The discontinuous nature of mechanical switching of capacitor/reactor banks is a relatively minor issue with todays advanced digital controls, especially when coordinated with continuously controlled devices.

4. Power Plants
Excitation equipment is inherently part of the synchronous generators and is required even for connection to a unity power factor isolated load [11]. The many attempts to allocate a portion of generator investment to reactive power production are ludicrous. 3

A power factor rating of 0.85 is a common manufacturers offering that results in around 0.9 power factor at the PoI. Non-standard higher power factor ratings might be more expensive. Generator reactive power capability can be mapped to the PoI, accounting for bus-fed load (e.g., station service) and step-up transformer impedance and tap setting. Figure 1 shows the mapping of a 590 MVA, 0.95 power factor generator with bus load of 30 MW and 15 MVAr. There may be other limits on generator capability more restrictive than the basic generator design [1214]. In the FERC report, reducing generator active power to produce additional reactive power is frequently mentioned. Because of increases I 2X losses from importing more active power, this should only rarely be considered during emergency conditions [15]. If required frequently, more capacitor banks are needed. Simulations for the 12 July 2004 blackout in Greece showed that reducing active power was counterproductive [16]. A more common problem is a turbine uprate without generator uprate. Figure 2 shows that increase in active power above the rated value reduces reactive power capability. Considering the design and operating power factor bandwidth values mentioned above, this may not be a major concern for 0.85 power factor generators, but could be for higher power factor generators.

5. System Engineering
Unchanged from vertically integrated companies, power system engineering is required. Gencos, transcos, discos, and loads form a system. As a body is one though it has many parts, and all the parts of the body, though many, are one body If one member suffers, all suffer together; if one member is honored, all rejoice together [17]. Generators are part of the system, create I2X transmission losses by their active power transmission, and have a synchronous stability problem when connected in parallel with other generators.2 In business terms, the synergies and logic of vertical integration should be respected. Power system planning and operation should follow best practices that reflect economy, reliability, and simplicity, with a level playing field for all participants in other words, system engineering.

We see statements about transmission system stability. Transmission is a subsystem that is quite stableexcept for occasional galloping conductors.

6. Reliability and Best Practices

6.1. Line Drop Compensation and High Side Voltage Control
Voltage at the PoI should be automatically regulated. For gencotransco interconnections this is often done slowly by power plant SCADA-type controls. Tight regulation of transmission-side voltage improves reliability and stability [18,19]. Several options are available for high-speed regulation.3 Line drop compensation, a generator AVR feature, is available for tighter regulation of transmission voltage. There is no additional equipment cost, and control speed is the same as terminal voltage regulation. Several large Pacific Northwest power plants have line drop compensation installed or planned, including generators sharing the same step-up transformer winding [20]. BPA and Mitsubishi successfully tested advanced line drop compensation that regulates transmissionside voltage to a schedule using measured generator terminal voltage and current [21]. This is attractive since it eliminates a gencos need for voltage measurements from the transmission switchyard. Similar to SVCs, a droop ensures stability with parallel generators and power plants.

6.2.

Best PracticesTEPCO

Following the 1987 Tokyo blackout, Tokyo Electric Power Company adopted new power plant and substation microprocessor voltage controls [22]. Around 80 generators have a high-speed high side voltage control termed PSVR. Its functionally similar to the reference 21 design, except that the transmission-side voltage is directly measured rather than computed from terminal measurements. Most transmission substations (over 200) have capacitor bank and autotransformer tap changing control termed VQC. Control is similar to an inverse-time voltage relay, with capacitor bank switching occurring in 12 seconds. TEPCO considers shunt capacitor banks to be dynamic devices. TEPCOs voltage schedules are high and relatively flat. At power plants, transmission side voltage schedules are 545 kV for normal conditions and 550 kV for summer peak. Substation voltage schedules are 525 kV for normal conditions and 535 kV for summer peak. (BPAs on-peak voltage schedules are 540545 kV at power plants, with substation voltages in the 535550 kV range).

6.3.

Best PracticesVirginia Power

Virginia Power got it right in the 1980s when voltage stability became an industry concern [5]. Under normal operating conditions all reactive requirements should be supplied by capacitor banks located on both the transmission and distribution systems. The prudent control of these capacitor banks allows all generating units to operate at or near unity power factor at all times, thereby allowing emergency or dynamic reactive capability to be stored in the many generators operating throughout the system. The system should be operated on a voltage schedule that permits each level of transmission voltage to be relatively independent of the others to minimize Mvar flow through the transmission transformers. The scheduled voltages are also selected to minimize Mvar flows between busses of the same voltage. This voltage schedule gives the system operator a means for determining system reactive requirements at any time. This is accomplished by maintaining scheduled voltage and monitoring power station Mvar output which is controlled at the station site automatically by voltage regulators. The various capacitor banks are keyed to those units that have maximum interaction between the unit and the capacitor bank. By selective switching of capacitor banks, the operator is able to maintain near unity power factor on all units. In effect, system reactive is block loaded through the switching of large capacitor banks, with the generators providing

In some cases, the genco owns a radial line from the power plant to the PoI. In this case the power plant transmission side voltage rather than the PoI voltage can be regulated.

control signals and reactive fine tuning. Generator deviation from unity power factor may be required during system load extremes to maintain scheduled voltages. By controlling the capacitor banks in this manner it is possible to maintain a reactive reserve stored in the various generators on the system. These practices allowed Virginia Power and PJM to easily ride through a large disturbance during heavy load on 1 June 1989. As a caution, there are situations related to angle stability or short-term voltage stability where operating generation overexcited may be advantageous.

6.4.

August 1996 and August 2003 Blackouts

A contributing factor to the 10 August 1996 cascading failure in the western North American interconnection was improper voltage control at three power plants [2325]. Also, reactive power capabilities at many power plants were less than expected. These and other problems directly led to the development of the NERC Planning Standards, and to power plant testing requirements. Several poor practices contributed to the 14 August 2003 cascading blackout. For that afternoon, Figure 3 shows the voltage profile across northern Ohio and Figure 4 shows power plant reactive power production [26]. Ive added a possible desired voltage profile at 103%. Many would consider the conditionseven at 13:00 before any outages and with only 80% or so of peak loadto be unacceptable.

[26].

[26].

The first outage, Eastlake 5 at 13:31, was because of excitation equipment problems at high reactive power output. It would not have occurred with a policy of operating near unity power factor, with capacitor banks providing base reactive power. Also, the outage resulted in a large loss of both active and reactive power production. Treat the generators tenderly and keep them away for reactive power limits. Over the next few hours, many transmission lines sagged into trees. Transmission line heating due to load is given by: I 2 R = ( P 2 + Q 2 ) / V 2

Keeping voltages high and flat reduces heating (flat voltage profile minimizes reactive power flow which also contributes to heating). Recalling that many lines tripped becauss or sagging and referring to Figure 3, raising voltage from 335 to 355 kV or 5.8% would reduce heating by around 11%. Best practice would dictate additional capacitors banks (transco cost recovery should be allowed). Referring to Figure 3, there is a transcotransco interconnection at South Canton with a 765-kV infeed. It would be interesting to investigate why the 345-kV voltage was so low, and the potential for sale of surplus reactive power from the 765-kV line.

Costs of these blackouts were measured in the billions of dollars, showing the importance of system engineering, best practices, and reliability standards for reactive power and voltage control.

6.5.

Potential for Wide-Area Controls

Capacitor/reactor banks can be even more effectively controlled by wide-area feedback controls. The August 14, 2003 blackout showed the need for control based on a combination of low voltage and high generator reactor power outputs (Figures 3 and 4). BPA is developing the Wide-Area stability and voltage Control System (WACS), with on-line demonstration [27]. Phasor measurements from many substations and power plant switchyards are real-time controller inputs. Special protection system transfer trip outputs are available for 500-kV capacitor/reactor bank switching and generator or load tripping. One algorithm (Vmag) is based on twelve voltage magnitude measurements at seven 500-kV stations. We compute a weighted average voltage. A non-linear accumulator (integrator) computes volt-seconds below a threshold setting. Accumulation is blocked for voltage recovery. Control action results when the volt-second accumulation reaches a setpoint similar to an inverse-time undervoltage relay. Beneficially, faster operation results for more severe disturbances. The second algorithm (VmagQ) combines voltage magnitude measurements and generator reactive power measurements using fuzzy logic. Similar to the Vmag algorithm, we compute a weighted average 500-kV voltage magnitude from 12 phasor measurements at seven locations. We also compute weighted average reactive power from 15 transmission lines emanating from six large power plants. A crisp fuzzy logic output value above a threshold enters an accumulator. With accumulator setpoint reached, capacitor/reactor bank switching or generator tripping is commanded. Capacitor/reactor bank switching occurs first, with subsequent generator or load tripping commanded in more severe situations. Control action may take place in a one-second time frame. Compared to local control, WACS has improved observability and controllability. Compared to special protection systems that directly detect certain outages, WACS will respond to disturbances anywhere in an interconnection.

7. Conclusions
In the U.S., deregulation and restructuring (forced unbundling of generation, transmission, distribution) have produced mixed results at best. Free market advocates as well as many engineers disdain deregulation as implemented (performance-based rates without forced unbundling is an alternative). A central implication of our analysis is that vertical intergration may be the most efficient organizational structure for the electricity industry [29]. To make matters worse, economists and others promote unbundling of reactive power and reactive power markets. Bizarre and overly complex practices result. Principles for reactive power should reflect system engineering, reliability, and best practices. Unbundling of reactive power makes even less sense than unbundling of generation and transmission. Switchable (dynamic) capacitor banks with automatic controls, coordinated with power plant controls, help ensure economic and reliable power system design. Where long-term voltage stability is a concern, power plants should operate with substantial reactive power reserves during normal operation, and transmission voltage profiles should be relatively high and flat for high load conditions. Controls should be automatic.

APPENDIX: BPA REACTIVE POWER SWITCHING FOR 4600 MW GENERATION OUTAGE IN ARIZONA At 07:40:56 on Monday morning June 14, 2004 a short circuit occurred near the Palo Verde Nuclear Plant west of Phoenix, Arizona. The fault was not completely cleared for almost 39 seconds! Approximately 4589 MW of generation tripped, at and near Palo Verde in the southern part of the western North American interconnection. All three Palo Verde units tripped. 7

Pacific intertie stability was threatened, but maintained. With one line between Oregon and California out of service, the intertie limit prior to the event was 3200 MW. North to south intertie flow swung from the initial 2750 MW to 5500 MW and settled at 4500 MW several minutes later. Malin and Captain Jack voltages near the OregonCalifornia border swung from the initial 548 kV to 443 kV at 07:41:21.6. BPA series capacitors and shunt capacitor/reactor banks switched during the swings and the subsequent intertie power increase either automatically within one second, or by SCADA operators within 12 minutes. The power increase is from governor action at Pacific Northwest hydro plants, which carry large amounts of spinning reserve. Figure 5 shows the first and largest voltage swing. Malin and Hanford 500-kV capacitor banks were switched by local voltage relays, and the Fort Rock series capacitors were inserted by a responsebased special protection system. Figure 6 shows subsequent 500-kV shunt reactor switching by SCADA operators. Without operator actions, automatic switching by local undervoltage relay would have occurred at voltages around 520 kV.

Yes mechanically switched capacitor/reactor banks are dynamic. BIBLIOGRAPHY [1] FERC, Principles for Efficient and Reliable Reactive Power Supply and Consumption, Staff Report Docket No. AD05-1-000, 4 February 2005, http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/ 20050310144430-02-04-05-reactive-power.pdf. FERC Order No. 2003-A, Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, 5 March 2005, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/gi/stnd-gen/order2003a.pdf. R. Hirvonen, R. Beune, L. Mogridge, R. Martinez, K. Roudn, and O. Vatshelle (CIGR JWG 39/11), Is There Market for Reactive Power Services Possibilities and Problems, CIGR, paper 39-213, 2000. R. Beune and L. Mogridge (CIGR JWG 39/11), Contracting for Ancillary Generation Services, CIGR, paper 39-211, 2000. P. Nedwick, A. F. Mistr, Jr., and E. B. Croasdale, Reactive Management: A Key to Survival in the 1990s, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 10361043, May 1995. C. W. Taylor, Power System Voltage Stability, McGraw-Hill, 1994. S.-M. Hsu, H. J. Holley, W. M. Smith, and D. G. Piatt, Voltage Profile Improvement Project at Alabama Power Company: A Case Study, Proceedings of the IEEE/PES 2000 Summer Meeting, Seattle, pp. 20392044, July 2000. P. H. Thiel, J. E. Harder, and G. E. Taylor, "Fuseless Capacitor Banks," IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 1009-1015, April 1992. D. P. Bruns, G. R. Newcomb, S. A. Miske, C. W. Taylor, G. E. Lee, and A. Edris, Shunt Capacitor Bank Series Group Shorting (CAPS) Design and Application, IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 16, pp. 2432, January 2001. Discussion/closure in October 2001 issue.

[2]

[3]

[4] [5] [6] [7]

[8] [9]

[10] J. A. Diaz de Leon II, and C. W. Taylor, "Understanding and Solving Short-Term Voltage Stability Problems," Proceedings of IEEE/PES 2000 Summer Meeting, invited paper for panel session on Power System Stability Controls using Power Electronic Devices. [11] C. W. Taylor, discussion of Reactive Power Pricing and Management by S. Hao and A. Papalexopoulos, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 12, No. 1, February 1997. [12] M. M. Adibi and D. P. Milanicz, Reactive Capability Limitation of Synchronous Machines, IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 2940, February 1994. [13] N. E. Nilsson and J. Mercurio, Synchronous Generator Capability Curve Testing and Evaluation, IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 414424, January 1994. [14] A. Panvini and T. J. Yohn, Field Assessment of Generators Reactive Capability, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 10, No. 1, February 1995. [15] S. G. Johansson, Mitigation of Voltage Collapse Caused by Armature Current Protection, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 591599, May 1999. [16] C. Vournas, Technical Summary of the Athens and Southern Greece Blackout of July 12, 2004. Available at www.pserc.wisc.edu. [17] Paul of Tarsus, I Corinthians 12, which might be called the Bibles system engineering chapter. [18] C.W. Taylor, Line Drop Compensation, High Side Voltage Control, Secondary Voltage Controlwhy not control a generator like a static var compensator?, Panel session on Power Plant Secondary (High Side) Voltage Control, Proceedings of IEEE/PES 2000 Summer Meeting, 1620 July 2000, Seattle. [19] C. W. Taylor, Shunt Compensation for Voltage Stability, Proceedings of IFAC Symposium on Power Plants and Power System Control, 1618 September 2003, Seoul. [20] D. Kosterev, Design, Installation, and Initial Operating Experience with Line Drop Compensation at John Day Powerhouse, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, May 2001. [21] J. J. Paserba, S. Noguchi, M. Shimomura, and C. W. Taylor, Improvement in the Performance and Field Verification of an Advanced High Side Voltage Control (HSVC), Proceedings of IX Symposium of Specialists in Electric Operational and Expansion Planning (IX SEPOPE), 2327 May 2004, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. [22] S. Koishikawa, S. Ohsaka, M. Suzuki, T. Michigami, and M. Akimoto, Adaptive Control of Reactive Power Supply Enhancing Voltage Stability of a Bulk Power Transmission System and a New Scheme of Monitor on Voltage Security, CIGR 38/39-01, 1990. [23] C. W. Taylor, Improving grid behavior, IEEE Spectrum, pp. 4045, June 1999. [24] D. M. Kosterev, C. W. Taylor, and W. A. Mittelstadt, Model Validation for the August 10, 1996 WSCC System Outage, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 967 979, August 1999. [25] J. D. Hurley, L. N. Bize, and C. R. Mummert, The Adverse Effects of Excitation System Var and Power Factor Controllers, IEEE Transactions on Energy Conversion, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 16361645, December 1999. [26] U.S.Canada Power System Outage Task Force, Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations, April 2004. [27] C. W. Taylor, D. C. Erickson, K. E. Martin, R. E. Wilson, and V. Venkatasubramanian, WACSWide-Area Stability and Voltage Control System: R&D and On-Line Demonstration, Proceedings of the IEEE, special issue on Energy Infrastructure Defense Systems, May 2005. [28] C. W. Taylor and R. Ramanathan, BPA Reactive Power Monitoring and Control following the August 10, 1996 Power Failure, Proceedings of VI Symposium of Specialists in Electric Operational and Expansion Planning, Salvador, Brazil, May 2429, 1998. [29] P. Van Doren and J. Taylor, Rethinking Electricity Restructuring, Policy Analysis, No. 530 Cato Institute, 30 November 2004, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa530.pdf. [30] J. J. Paserba, Secondary Voltage-VAr Controls Applied to Static Compensators (STATCOMs) for Fast Voltage Control and Long Term VAr Management, Proceedings of IEEE-PES 2002 Summer Meeting. [31] G. Sybille, P. Giroux, S. Dellwo, R. Mazur, and G. Sweezy, Simulator and Field Testing of Forbes SVC, IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 15071514, July 1996. 9