1 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Perez v. CA
Romero, J. Facts: Ray Perez, private respondent, and Nerissa, his wife who is petitioner herein were married in Cebu. Petitioner gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York. Petitioner became a resident alien in February 1992. Private respondent stayed with her in the U.S. twice and took care of her when she became pregnant. the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and that they all had round-trip tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother and promised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and continued working. She was supposed to come back immediately after winding up her affairs there. When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray IIs first birthday, the couple was no longer on good terms. Petitioner did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her husbands meager income of P5,000.00.1 On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where he could raise his son even as he practiced his profession. Petitioner was forced to move to her parents home on Guizo Street in Mandaue. The couple failed to reconcile. Nerissa Z. Perez filed a petition for habeas corpus3 asking respondent Ray C. Perez to surrender the custody of their son, Ray Z. Perez II, to her. the court a quo issued an Order awarding custody of the one-year old child to his mother, Nerissa Perez, citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts order and awarded custody of the boy to his father Issue: Who between petitioner and respondent should have custody of the child?--> MOTHER Ratio: When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the applicable law. It provides: ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. (Italics supplied)

255 SCRA 661 (1996)

Since the Code does not qualify the word separation to mean legal separation decreed by a court, couples who are separated in fact, such as petitioner and private respondent, are covered within its terms. a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word shall in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character. Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify the courts awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. (Examples: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable diseases) In the case at bench, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have demonstrated that they have ample means. Respondent court stated that petitioner has no permanent place of work in the U.S.A. and has taken this point against her. The records, however, show that she is employed in a New York hospital and was, at the time the petition was filed, still abroad. o HOWEVER her present work schedule is not so unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time for Ray II. o many a mother, finding herself in such a position, has invited her own mother or relative to join her abroad, providing the latter with plane tickets and liberal allowances, to look after the child until he is able to take care of himself o the fact that private respondent lives near his parents and sister is not crucial in this case. o petitioners work schedule cited in the respondent courts decision is not necessarily permanent o it does not follow that petitioner values her career more than her family simply because she wants to work in the United States.

2 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Republic v. Hernandez
Regalado, J. Nature: Appeal by Certiorari Facts: Respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the first name of said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition, and by which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents residence. After considering the evidence and arguments of the contending parties, the trial court ruled in favor of herein private respondents Issue/Held (1) whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the change of the registered proper or given name of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption- YES; and (2) whether or not there was lawful ground for the change of name.- NO Ratio: A party is generally not required to join in one suit several distinct causes of action. The joinder of separate causes of action, where allowable, is permissive and not mandatory in the absence of a contrary statutory provision, even though the causes of action arose from the same factual setting and might under applicable joinder rules be joined.Modern statutes and rules governing joinders are intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the efficient administration of justice wherever this may be done without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. To achieve these ends, they are liberally construed. While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between them. While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized

253 SCRA 509 (1996)

Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express prohibition against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of name, we do not believe that there is any relation between these two petitions, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any common question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant their joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules. The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception from the Rules under the policy of liberal construction thereof in general, and for change of name in particular, as proposed by private respondents and adopted by respondent judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in situations wherein there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. We do not perceive any injustice that can possibly be visited upon private respondents by following the reglementary procedure for the change in the proper or given name that they seek for their adopted child. We are hard put to descry the indispensability of a change of the first name of the adoptee to his welfare and benefit. Nor is the said change of such urgency that would justify an exemption from or a relaxation of the Rules. It is the State that stands to be prejudiced by a wanton disregard of Rule 103 in this case, considering its natural interest in the methodical administration of justice and in the efficacious maintenance of a system of identification of its citizens. The danger wrought by non-observance, of the Rules is that the violation of or failure to comply with the procedure prescribed by law prevents the proper determination of the questions raised by the parties with respect to the merits of the case and makes it necessary to decide, in the first place, such questions as relate to the form of the action. The rules and procedure laid down for the trial court and the adjudication of cases are matters of public policy. Respondent judges unmindful disregard of procedural tenets aimed at achieving stability of procedure is to be deplored. He exceeded his prerogatives by granting the prayer for change of name, his order being unsupported by both statutory and case law. The novel but unwarranted manner in which he adjudicated this case may be characterized as a regrettable abdication of the duty to uphold the teachings of remedial law and jurisprudence. Petitioner avers that it was error for the lower court to grant the petition for change of name without citing or proving any lawful ground. Indeed, the only justification advanced for the change of name was the fact of the adoptees baptism unde r the name Aaron Joseph and by which he has been known since he came to live with private respondents. It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a persons name is a word or combination of words by which he is known and identified, and distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of

3 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name. The name of an individual has two parts: he given or proper name and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a persons birth must be entered in the c ivil register. The official name of a person is that given him in the civil register. That is his name in the eyes of the law. And once the name of a person is officially entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the same Code seals that identity with its precise mandate: no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. This statutory restriction is premised on the interest of the State in names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed legally is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. For purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code and correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register. A etition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance with all the requisites therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is essential, and failure therein renders the proceedings a nullity. It must likewise be stressed once again that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Before a person can be authorized to change his name, that is, his true or official name or that which appears in his birth certificate or is entered in the civil register, he must show proper and reasonable cause or any convincing reason which may justify such change. Apart from suffusing their pleadings with sanctimonious entreaties for compassion, none of the justified grounds for a change of name has been alleged or established by private respondents. The legal bases chosen by them to bolster their cause have long been struck down as unavailing for their present purposes. For, to allow the adoptee herein to use his baptismal name, instead of his name registered in the civil register, would be to countenance or permit that which has always been frowned upon. The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading up to adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of adoption and ensures to the adopted child the rights and privileges arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its proper context. It should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. The practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to select the proper or given name of the child presupposes that no other name for it has theretofore been entered in the civil register. Once such name is registered, regardless of the reasons for such choice and even if it be solely for the purpose of identification, the same AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN constitutes the official name. This effectively authenticates the identity of the person and must remain unaltered save when, for the most compelling reasons shown in an appropriate proceeding, its change may merit judicial approval. While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-called right of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably considered. To repeat, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name. Furthermore, factual realities and legal consequences, rather than sentimentality and symbolisms, are what are of concern to the Court. Finally, it is understood that this decision does not entirely foreclose and is without prejudice to, private respondents privilege to legally change the proper or given name of their adopted child, provided that the same is exercised, this time, via a proper petition for change of name. Of course, the grant thereof is conditioned on strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements and satisfactory proof of the compelling reasons advanced therefor.

4 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Sy v. CA
Tinga, J. Facts: MERCEDES Uy-Sy filed a petition for habeas corpus against WILSON Sy before the RTC Manila. MERCEDES prayed that WILSON be ordered to produce their minor children (Vanessa and Jeremiah) before the court and that after hearing, their care and custody be awarded to her as their mother In his answer, WILSON prayed that the custody of the minors be awarded to him. He maintained that MERCEDES was unfit to take custody of the minors, because: (1) she abandoned her family in 1992; (2) she is mentally unstable; and (3) she cannot provide proper care to the children RTC issued the writ of habeas corpus and awarded custody of the children to MERCEDES. WILSON appealed to the CA. RTC affirmed. Both the RTC and CA held that WILSON was not able to substantiate his contention that MERCEDES was unfit to have custody of the children. Instead of the supposed abandonment of the family, it was found that MERCEDES had been driven away by WILSONs family because of religious differences. That MERCEDES stayed in Taiwan could hardly be called abandonment as she had gone there to earn money for her children. Neither could MERCEDESs act of praying outdoors in the rain be considered as evidence of insanity as it may as well be her very expression of her faith. And finally, MERCEDESs proof of her financial ability to provide her children with the necessities of life has been sufficiently shown. CA further held that questions as to care and custody of children may be properly raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. And that WILSON was properly heard on the matter of support. His MR with the CA was denied~ hence, this petition. Issues/Held/Ratio: 1) WON the CA erred in awarding the custody of the minor children to their mother, MERCEDES NO. Art. 213, Family Code: In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent is unfit. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. Sec. 6, Rule 99 (Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated)t: xxx No child under seven years of age shall be separated from its mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefor. 3)

541 SCRA 371 (2007)

IF parents are legally separated, the custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, unless otherwise directed by the court in the interest of the minor children. IF parents are living apart without decree of legal separation, the court shall award the custody of the child as will be for his best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent he prefers to live with if he is over 7 years of age unless the parent so chosen be unfit by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness or poverty In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents The law favors the mother if she is a fit and proper person to have custody of her child so that the child may not only receive her attention, care, supervision but also have the advantage and benefit of a mothers love and devotion for which there is no substitute. The love, solicitude and devotion of a mother are worth more to a child of tender years than all other things combined. 2) WON the CA had jurisdiction to award custody and support in a habeas corpus case YES! Sec. 6, Rule 99 expressly acknowledges and authorizes that the matter of care and custody of the children may be raised and adjudicated as an incident to any proceeding, such as a case for habeas corpus! With no compelling reason to the contrary, the lower courts were correct in restoring the custody of the children to the mother, MERCEDES, since the children were less than seven years of age at the time the case was decided. Moreover, WILSONs contention that MERCEDES is unfit has not been substantiated as found by both courts below. WON the award of P50K as support is arbitrary, unjust NO! Art. 203, Family Code: the obligation to give support is demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. Support includes what is necessary for the education and clothing of the person entitled thereto. But support must be demanded and the right to it established before it becomes payable. The right to support does not arise from the mere fact of relationship but from imperative necessity. The need/demand for support cannot be presumed. WILSON here contends that since MERCEDESs petition did not include a prayer for support, the trial court was not justified in awarding support. WILSON further claims that he did not give consent at trial for the threshing out of the issue of support as it was not raised in the pleadings UNTENABLE Contrary to WILSONs assertions, MERCEDES testified during trial, without any objection, regarding the need for support for the childrens education and other necessities

5 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 Moreover, based on the records, WILSON was clearly made aware that the issue of support was being deliberated upon. The trial court judge even propounded questions to WILSON regarding his sources of income for the purpose of determining the amount of support to be given to the children! Applying Sec 5, Rule 10, since the issue of support was tried with the implied consent of the parties; it should be treated in all respects as if it had been raised in the pleadings. Thus, even if motion has been filed, or that no amendment (of the pleadings) had been ordered, the trial court validly rendered a judgment on the issue of support. The rule on amendment (of pleadings) need not be applied rigidly, particularly where no surprise or prejudice is caused the objecting party. FINALLY, the award of P50K as support for the minor children is proper. WILSONs capability to provide for his family is supported by evidence of his good financial standing. In any event, this award of support is merely provisional as the amount may be modified or altered in accordance with the increased or decreased needs of the needy party and with the means of the giver. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN