1 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Tapuz v. del Rosario

Brion, J.: Facts: Spouses Sanson filed with the MCTC of Buruanga-Malay, Aklan a complaint for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the PETITIONERS (Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly Tapuz Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and Marian Timbas) and other John Does numbering about 120. They allege that: 1. they are the registered owners of a 1.0093-hectare parcel of land located at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay, Malay, Aklan 2. they were the disputed land's prior possessors when the petitioners - armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and together with unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the disputed land by force and intimidation and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure. Petitioners answer - denied the material allegations of the complaint. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages. They essentially claimed that: 1. they are the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; 2. Sps. Sansons certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. MCTC decided in favour of Sps. Sanson. It found prior possession in the Sps. Sansons favor Appeal before RTC Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan. Judge granted the Sps. Sansons motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction with the issuance conditioned on the private respondents' posting of a bond. The writ (authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC decision) was actually issued after Sps. Sanson had complied with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; Sps. Sanson filed a motion for demolition. Judge subsequently denied the MR and to Defer Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Judge issued via a Special Order a writ of demolition to be implemented 15 days after the Sheriff's written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the Sps. Sanson to effectively take actual possession of the land. The petitioners filed with CA Petition for Review of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition. The sheriff issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition.

554 SCRA 768 (2008)

Petitioners filed the present petition. The petition prays for three remedies, namely: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65; the issuance of a writ of habeas data; and the issuance of the writ of amparo. To support the petition, they present factual positions diametrically opposed to the MCTC's findings and legal reasons. They maintain their claims of prior possession of the disputed land and of intrusion into this land by the private respondents. MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry that the private respondents filed below. The forcible entry case in fact involves issues of title to or possession of real property or an interest therein, with the assessed value of the property involved exceeding P20,000; thus, the case should be originally cognizable by the RTC.

Issues/Held: WON the petition for certiorari is fatally defective. YES, both in substance and form. The petition has been filed out of time. Petitioners have been guilty of willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping. By the petitioners' own admissions, they filed a petition with the CA for the review of the orders now also assailed in this petition, but brought the present recourse to us, allegedly because "the CA did not act on the petition up to this date and to seek relief in the CA would be a waste of time and would render the case moot and academic since the CA refused to resolve pending urgent motions and the Sheriff is determined to enforce a writ of demolition despite the defect of LACK OF JURISDICTION."Petitioners' counsel while making this claim in the body of the petition - at the same time represented in his Certificate of Compliance the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION because it held that the ORDER TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION OF THE HOMES OF PETITIONERS is not capable of being the subject of a PETITION FOR RELIEF. The required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is defective as 1 of the 7 petitioners - Ivan Tapuz - did not sign. Of those who signed, only 5 exhibited their postal identification cards with the Notary Public. In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the basis of the supporting attachments, to be devoid of merit. The MCTC correctly assumed jurisdiction, which specifically alleged a cause for forcible entry. WON the petition for issuance of a writ of habeas data is fatally defective. YES, both in substance and in form. Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of ultimate facts: (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent; (b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party; (c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;

2 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 (d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known; (e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent . In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and (f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable. Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that: 1. a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the PNP may release the report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence employed against them by the private respondents, furnishing the Court and the petitioners with copy of the same; 2. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the PNP to produce the police report pertaining to the burning of the houses of the petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the investigation report if an investigation was conducted by the PNP." These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the " fishing expedition" that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits; (d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report; (e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and (f) The relief prayed for. The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs. The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed. The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations supported by the following documents: (a) Joint Affidavit of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting the factual positions of the petitioners, id., petitioners' prior possession, private respondents' intrusion and the illegal acts committed by the private respondents and their security guards. (b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts (firing of guns, etc.) committed by a security guard against minors - descendants of Antonio Tapuz; (c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially corroborating Nemia's affidavit; (d) Certification issued by Police Officer Jackson Jauod regarding the incident of petitioners' intrusion into the disputed land; (e) Certification issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis, narrating the altercation between the Tapuz family and the security guards of the private respondents, including the gun-poking and shooting incident involving one of the security guards; (f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that a house owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by a certain Jorge Buenavente, was accidentally burned by a fire." What is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. Issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing. A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them are practically identical and unsworn. The Certification by Police Officer Jackson Jauod simply

WON the petition for issuance of the writ of amparo is fatally defective. YES with respect to content and substance. The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo - in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands - requires that every petition for the issuance of the Pwrit must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit: (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner; (b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation; (c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such

3 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 narrates what had been reported by one Danny Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that the burning of two residential houses was "accidental." As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in the forcible entry case which rejected all the petitioners' factual claims. These findings are significantly complete and detailed, as they were made under a full-blown judicial process. Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely propertyrelated and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Petitioners' present recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate the assailed orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before the appellate court because of the use of an improper remedial measure.

4 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo
Perez, J. Facts: Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent. While in the United States, petitioner enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member. During the course of her immersion, petitioner toured various provinces and towns of Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYANTarlac in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical mission. In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines. After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions, Juanito Carabeo (Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo) in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac. At around 1:30 in the afternoon, however, petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding that they open up. Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and ordered petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face down. The armed men were all in civilian clothes and, with the exception of their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces. Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men ganged up on her and tied her hands. At this juncture, petitioner saw the other armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to shout her name. Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner towards the van bruising her arms, legs and knees. Once inside the van, but before she can be blindfolded, petitioner was able to see the face of one of the armed men sitting beside her. The van then sped away. After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped. Petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc were ordered to alight. After she was informed that she is being detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated from her companions and was escorted to a room that she believed was a jail cell from the sound of its metal doors. From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing and some construction bustle.[21] She inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with torture. The thrust of the interrogations was to convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to the fold. The torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and suffocating the petitioner.

630 SCRA 210 (2010)

Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in blindfolds even in her sleep.[26] Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds when she was allowed to take a bath, during which she became acquainted with a woman named Rose who bathed her. There were also a few times when she cheated her blindfold and was able to peek at her surroundings. Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the names of three of her interrogators who introduced themselves to her as Dex, James and RC. RC even told petitioner that those who tortured her came from t he Special Operations Group, and that she was abducted because her name is included in the Order of Battle. On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncles house in Quezon City. Before being released, however, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM card, a slip of paper containing an e-mail address with password, a plastic bag containing biscuits and books, the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes. Petitioner was also sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her family.[36] Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular phone given to her. Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family, petitioner threw away the cellular phone with a SIM card. Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any existing government files or records linking her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June 2009. Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was government agents who were behind her abduction and torture. Petitioner likewise included in her suit Rose, Dex and RC. The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays: (1) respondents be enjoined from harming or even approaching petitioner and her family (2) an order be issued allowing the inspection of detention areas in the 7 th Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents be ordered to produce documents relating to any report on the case of petitioner including, but not limited to, intelligence report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during and subsequent to 19 May 2009; (4) respondents be ordered to expunge from the records of the respondents any document pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be ordered to return to petitioner her journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and her P15,000.00 cash.

5 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs and referred the case to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action. The Resolution also directed the respondents to file their verified written return. On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Return of the Writs on behalf of the public officials impleaded as respondents. We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents. o The public respondents label petitioners alleged abduction and torture as stage managed. In support of their accusation, the public respondents principally rely on the statement of Mr. Paolo, as contained in the Special Report of the La Paz Police Station. In the Special Report, Mr. Paolo disclosed that, prior to the purported abduction, petitioner and her companions instructed him and his two sons to avoid leaving the house. From this statement, the public respondents drew the distinct possibility that, except for those already inside Mr. Paolos house, nobody else has any way of knowing where petitioner and her companions were at the time they were supposedly abducted. This can only mean, the public respondents concluded, that if ever there was any abduction it must necessarily have been planned by, or done with the consent of, the petitioner and her companions themselves[48] o Public respondents also cited the Medical Certificate of the petitioner, as actually belying her claims that she was subjected to serious torture for five (5) days. The public respondents noted that while the petitioner alleges that she was choked and boxed by her abductorsinflictions that could have easily produced remarkable bruisesher Medical Certificate only shows abrasions in her wrists and knee caps. o public respondents conclude that the claims of abduction and torture was no more than a charade fabricated by the petitioner to put the government in bad light, and at the same time, bring great media mileage to her and the group that she represents. o They also insist on the dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas Data petition on the following grounds: (a) as against respondent President Gloria MacapagalArroyo, in particular, because of her immunity from suit, and (b) as against all of the public respondents, in general, in view of the absence of any specific allegation in the petition that they had participated in, or at least authorized, the commission of such atrocities. o Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in their duty to ascertain the truth behind the allegations of the petitioner. [54] In both the police and military arms of the government machinery, inquiries were set-up with regard to petitioners case [I omitted the details, though some are in the dispositif. Basta ang point is they did everything there is to do to investigate whatever really happened] CA: believed in petitioners version of facts, but since it was only a hunch that it was the military behind the abduction, it absolved the public respondents o recognized the existence of an ongoing threat against the security of the petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of RC to contact and monitor her, even after she was released. This threat, according to the Court of Appeals, AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN is all the more compounded by the failure of the police authorities to identify the material perpetrators who are still at large. o The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to informational privacy of the petitioner, noting the existence of records of investigations that concerns the petitioner as a suspected member of the CPP-NPA. The appellate court derived the existence of such records from a photograph and video file presented in a press conference by party-list representatives Jovito Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor Alcover (Alcover), which allegedly show the petitioner participating in rebel exercises. The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not convinced that the military or any other person acting under the acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner.[89] The appellate court stressed that, judging by her own statements, the petitioner merely believed that the military was behind her abduction.[90] Thus, the Court of Appeals absolved the public respondents from any complicity in the abduction and torture of petitioner. [91] The petition was likewise dismissed as against public respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her immunity from suit.[92] WRIT OF AMPARO Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command responsibility as the justification in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a partyrespondent in an amparo petition. Rubrico v. Arroyo: The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, command responsibility, in its simplest terms, means the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict.[103] In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,[104] foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is an omission mode of individual criminal liability, whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered). Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself

6 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 o The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpiredthe writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law. o The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo: x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleadednot actually on the basis of command responsibilitybut rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability. Razon v. Tagitis the distinct, but interrelated concepts of responsibility and accountability were given special and unique significations in relation to an amparo proceeding, to wit: Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. Responsibility of Public Respondents At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner in impleading the public respondents is to ascribe some form of responsibility on their part, based on her assumption that they, in one way or the other, had condoned her abduction and torture. To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was government agents who were behind her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls attention to the AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN circumstances surrounding her abduction and torturei.e., the forcible taking in broad daylight; use of vehicles with no license plates; utilization of blindfolds; conducting interrogations to elicit communist inclinations; and the infliction of physical abusewhich, according to her, is consistent with the way enforced disappearances are being practiced by the military or other state forces. Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military camp Fort Magsaysaya conclusion that she was able to infer from the travel time required to reach the place where she was actually detained, and also from the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes she heard while thereat. We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay. o First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. We opine that insofar as the present case is concerned, the perceived similarity cannot stand as substantial evidence of the involvement of the government. In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain. In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of Exhibits, the cartographic sketches of several of her abductors whose faces she managed to see. To the mind of this Court, these cartographic sketches have the undeniable potential of giving the greatest certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioners abductors. Unfortunately for the petitioner, this potential has not been realized in view of the fact that the faces described in such sketches remain unidentified, much less have been shown to be that of any military or police personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be part of either the military or the police chain of command. o Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not adequately established by her mere estimate of the time it took to reach the place where she was detained and by the sounds that she heard while thereat. We are not inclined to take the estimate and observations of the petitioner as accurate on its facenot only because they were made mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a mere sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the travel time required to reach it is in itself doubtful.

7 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her abductors were actually affiliated, whether formally or informally, with the military or the police organizations. Neither does the evidence at hand prove that petitioner was indeed taken to the military camp Fort Magsaysay to the exclusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually impossible to determine whether the abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact committed with the acquiescence of the public respondents. On account of this insufficiency in evidence, a pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, therefore, cannot be made. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do. HABEAS DATA The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. The writ operates to protect a persons right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do. The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no evidence on record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other reports about the petitioners ties with the CPP -NPA, was not adequately provenconsidering that the origin of such records were virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents had access to such video or photograph. In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the public respondents from distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers relative to the petitioners alleged ties with the CPP -NPA, appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the first place, it was not proven to have.

Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings To the mind of this Court, the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her belongings is doomed to fail regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public respondents responsible for the abduction of the petitioner. In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability are not determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding. But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact that a persons right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general rubric of property rightswhich are no longer protected by the writ of amparo Section 1 of the Amparo Rule,[120] which defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property rights.

The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of Appeals of her prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court that a contrary stance would be equivalent to sanctioning a fishing expedition, which was never intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of inspection order. Contrary to the explicit position espoused by the petitioner, the Amparo Rule does not allow a fishing expedition for evidence. An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision. o A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does not require that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in

DISPOSITIF Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner was not able to adduce substantial evidence proving her allegations of government complicity in her abduction and torture, may be attributed to the incomplete and one-sided investigations conducted by the government itself. o This awkward situation, wherein the very persons alleged to be involved in an enforced disappearance or extralegal killing are, at the same time, the very ones tasked by law to investigate the matter, is a unique characteristic of these proceedings and is the main source of the evidentiary difficulties faced by any petitioner in any amparo case.

8 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent safeguard requiring the respondent who is a public official or employee to prove that no less than extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulati ons was observed in the performance of duty. Thus, unless and until any of the public respondents is able to show to the satisfaction of the amparo court that extraordinary diligence has been observed in their investigations, they cannot shed the allegations of responsibility despite the prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect. With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule, was not fully observed in the conduct of the police and military investigations in the case at bar. o A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Task Group CAROJAN shows modest effort on the part of the police investigators to identify the perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said reports are replete with background checks on the victims of the abduction, but are, at the same time, comparatively silent as to other concrete steps the investigators have been taking to ascertain the authors of the crime. Although conducting a background investigation on the victims is a logical first step in exposing the motive behind the abductionits necessity is clearly outweighed by the need to identify the perpetrators, especially in light of the fact that the petitioner, who was no longer in captivity, already came up with allegations about the motive of her captors. o Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations solely on the cooperation or non-cooperation of the petitionerwho, they claim, was less than enthusiastic in participating in their investigative efforts. While it may be conceded that the participation of the petitioner would have facilitated the progress of Task Group CAROJANs investigation, this Court believes that the formers reticence to cooperate is hardly an excuse for Task Group CAROJAN not to explore other means or avenues from which they could obtain relevant leads. Indeed, while the allegations of government complicity by the petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold up as adequate evidence before a court of lawthey are, nonetheless, a vital source of valuable investigative leads that must be pursued and verified, if only to comply with the high standard of diligence required by the Amparo Rule in the conduct of investigations. o Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group CAROJANs reports still failed to explain why it never considered seeking the assistance of Mr. Jesus Paolowho, along with the victims, is a central witness to the abduction. The reports of Task Group CAROJAN is silent in any attempt to obtain from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the abductors or, at the very least, of the one who, by petitioners account, was not wearing any mask. o The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative material to the sketches included in petitioners offer of exhibits that, it may be pointed out, were prepared under the direction of, and first submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the latters independent investigation on the abduction and torture of the petitioner. But as mentioned earlier, the CHR sketches remain to be unidentified as of this date. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We hereby render a decision: 1. AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioners prayer for the return of her personal belongings; 2. AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioners prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay. 3. REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice, however, to any modification that this Court may make on the basis of the investigation reports and recommendations submitted to it under this decision. 4. MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken, as follows a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the Commission on Human Rights shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioners abduction and torture. b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the Commission on Human Rights, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioners abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws. c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision. d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights (a) to furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and (b) to provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court. 5. REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for the following purposes: a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by the PNP, AFP, and the CHR; b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and recommendations of the CHR, the abduction and torture of the petitioner was committed by persons acting under any of the public respondents; and on the basis of this determination c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of the report and recommendation of the Commission on Human Rightsits own report, which shall include a recommendation either for the DISMISSAL of the petition as against the public respondents who were found not responsible

9 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 and/or accountable, or for the APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL MEASURES, AS MAY BE ALLOWED BY THE AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE UNDERTAKEN as against those found responsible and/or accountable. Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to answer for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies. Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA that are not contrary to this decision are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

10 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo
Velasco, Jr., J.: (Krizel: I just included the writ of amparo parts) Facts: armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron (AISS, for short) based in Fernando Air Base in Lipa City abducted Lourdes D. Rubrico (Lourdes), then attending a Lenten pabasa in Bagong Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, and brought to, and detained at, the air base without charges. Following a week of relentless interrogation - conducted alternately by hooded individuals - and what amounts to verbal abuse and mental harassment, Lourdes, chair of the Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan, was released at Dasmarias, Cavite, her hometown, but only after being made to sign a statement that she would be a military asset. A week after Lourdes release, another daughter, Jean R. Apruebo (Jean), was constrained to leave their house because of the presence of men watching them; Lourdes has filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and administrative complaint for gross abuse of authority and grave misconduct against Capt. Angelo Cuaresma (Cuaresma), Ruben Alfaro (Alfaro), Jimmy Santana (Santana) and a certain Jonathan Karapatan conducted an investigation on the incidents. The investigation would indicate that men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), namely Capt. Cuaresma of the Philippine Air Force (PAF), Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan and Maj. Darwin Sy/Reyes, led the abduction of Lourdes; that unknown to the abductors, Lourdes was able to pilfer a mission order which was addressed to CA Ruben Alfaro and signed by Capt. Cuaresma of the PAF. petition prayed that a writ of amparo issue, ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended part Issue 1: Presidents purported lack of immunity from suit during her term of office Ratio: Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution.

613 SCRA 233 (2010)

Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to what specific presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners protected rights.

Issue 2: correctness of the assailed dismissal of the petition with respect to Gen. Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Razon, P/Supt. Roquero, P/Insp. Gomez, and the OMB. Ratio: dismissal by the CA of the case as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon is incorrect if viewed against the backdrop of the stated rationale underpinning the assailed decision vis--vis the two generals, i.e., command responsibility. According to Fr. Bernas, command responsibility, in its simplest terms, means the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict. it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. The writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and effective procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however, is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liability requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. In their petition for a writ of amparo, petitioners asked, as their main prayer, that the Court order the impleaded respondents to immediately desist from doing any acts that would threaten or seem to threaten the security of the Petitioners and to desist from approaching Petitioners, x x x their residences and offices where they are working under pain of contempt of [this] Court. Petitioners, however, failed to adduce the threshold substantive evidence to establish the predicate facts to support their cause of action, i.e., the adverted harassments and threats to their life, liberty, or security, against responding respondents, as responsible for the disappearance and harassments complained of. This is not to say, however, that petitioners allegation on the fact of the abduction incident or harassment is necessarily contrived. The reality on the ground, however,

11 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 is that the military or police connection has not been adequately proved either by identifying the malefactors as components of the AFP or PNP; or in case identification is not possible, by showing that they acted with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government. For this reason, the Court is unable to ascribe the authorship of and responsibility for the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the harassment and threats on her daughters to individual respondents. To this extent, the dismissal of the case against them is correct and must, accordingly, be sustained. At this stage, two postulates and their implications need highlighting for a proper disposition of this case. First, a criminal complaint for kidnapping and, alternatively, for arbitrary detention rooted in the same acts and incidents leading to the filing of the subject amparo petition has been instituted with the OMB, docketed as OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. The usual initial steps to determine the existence of a prima facie case against the five (5) impleaded individuals suspected to be actually involved in the detention of Lourdes have been set in motion. It must be pointed out, though, that the filing[44] of the OMB complaint came before the effectivity of the Amparo Rule on October 24, 2007. Second, Sec. 22[45] of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an amparo petition should a criminal action have, in the meanwhile, been commenced. The succeeding Sec. 23,[46] on the other hand, provides that when the criminal suit is filed subsequent to a petition for amparo, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action where the Amparo Rule shall nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under the Rule. Under the terms of said Sec. 22, the present petition ought to have been dismissed at the outset. But as things stand, the outright dismissal of the petition by force of that section is no longer technically feasible in light of the interplay of the following factual mix: (1) the Court has, pursuant to Sec. 6[47] of the Rule, already issued ex parte the writ of amparo; (2) the CA, after a summary hearing, has dismissed the petition, but not on the basis of Sec. 22; and (3) the complaint in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E named as respondents only those believed to be the actual abductors of Lourdes, while the instant petition impleaded, in addition, those tasked to investigate the kidnapping and detention incidents and their superiors at the top. Yet, the acts and/or omissions subject of the criminal complaint and the amparo petition are so linked as to call for the consolidation of both proceedings to obviate the mischief inherent in a multiplicity-of-suits situation. Given the above perspective and to fully apply the beneficial nature of the writ of amparo as an inexpensive and effective tool to protect certain rights violated or threatened to be violated, the Court hereby adjusts to a degree the literal application of Secs. 22 and 23 of the Amparo Rule to fittingly address the situation obtaining under the premises. [48] Towards this end, two things are at once indicated: (1) the consolidation of the probe and fact-finding aspects of the instant petition with the investigation of the criminal complaint before the OMB; and (2) the incorporation in the same criminal complaint of the allegations in this petition bearing on the threats to the right to security. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

12 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Salcedo v. Bollozos
Brion, J.: Nature: Resolution of a verified letter-complaint charging a judge with grave misconduct and ignorance of the the law Facts: The complaint arose from a verified handwritten petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Writ of Amparo (the petition) filed by Jose Tanmalack, Jr. against the Police Officers of Police Precinct No. 3, Agora, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, and Inspector Wylen Rojo Complainant alleged that he is a co-owner of a parcel of land While the complainant (together with his niece Rebecca R. Lumbay and his nephew Alan Jose P. Roa) was supervising an on-going construction over the disputed property, Tanmalack and heavily armed men arrived and forced themselves inside the fenced premises of the disputed property. The complainant averred that Tanmalack and his companions harassed and threatened to kill and to harm him and his workers; that Tanmalack uttered defamatory statements and accused him of land-grabbing; and that Tanmalack and his companions occupied the property and destroyed building materials. The complainant forthwith reported the incident to the nearby police station. The police promptly responded and arrested Tanmalack and brought him in for questioning. That same afternoon at around 4:45 p.m., Tanmalack, represented by his sister, Jocelyn Tanmalack Tan, filed the petition on his behalf while Tanmalack was detained by the police for employing "self-help in preventing squatters from putting up improvements in their titled property." Based on the petition and answers to the clarificatory questions propounded to Tanmalacks representative and counsel, the respondent judge immediately issued a Writ of Amparo dated January 23, 2008, directing "the police officers of Agora Police Station 3 or Insp. Wylen Rojo x x x to release immediately upon receipt of [the] writ but not later than 6:00 P.M. today, petitioner Jose Tanmalack, Jr., to the custody of Atty. Francis V. Ku." The respondent judge also directed the police officers to file their verified return to the petition within five (5) working days, together with supporting affidavits, in conformity with Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Around 5:30 p.m., the Writ of Amparo was served upon SPO3 Aener O. Adajar, PNP Chief Investigator. At six oclock in the evening of that same day, th e police released Tanmalack to the custody of Atty. Francis Ku.

623 SCRA 27 (2010)

In his complaint, the complainant questions the issuance of the Writ of Amparo which he claims had been unusually issued with haste. The complainant claims that the handwritten petition did not give any ground to warrant the issuance of the Writ of Amparo; that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion, bias, and obvious partiality, and in grave disregard of the Rules and the rule of law when he acted upon and granted the letter-petition for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The complainant also alleges that the respondent judge "accommodated" the issuance of the Writ of Amparo because he and Atty. Francis Ku (Tanmalacks counsel) are members of the Masonic fraternity. The OCA recommended that the administrative complaint against the respondent judge be dismissed for lack of merit.

Issue/Held: WON the judge is guilty of gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law NO Ratio: At the outset, we agree with the complainant that the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo in Tanmalacks favor. Had he read Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo more closely, the respondent judge would have realized that the writ, in its present form, only applies to "extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof." The present case involves concerns that are purely property and commercial in nature concerns that we have previously ruled are not covered by the Writ of Amparo. Whether the respondent judge could be held administratively liable for the error he committed in the present case, is, however, a question we must answer in the negative. Plainly, the errors attributed to respondent judge pertain to the exercise of his adjudicative functions. As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, and corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability civil, criminal, or administrative for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. Settled is the rule that errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through judicial remedies.7 In the present case, the propriety of the issuance of the Writ of Amparo cannot be raised as an issue in the present administrative case. The proper recourse for the complainant should have been to file an appeal, from the final judgment or order of the respondent judge, to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil,

13 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed. Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and functions; and it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and that exceptionally, prosecution of the judge can be had only if "there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and ** also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order" or under the stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code. We note, too, that although the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo, we find, as the OCA did, that there is no evidence on record that supports the complainants allegation that the issuance was tainted with manifest bias and partiality, bad faith, or gross ignorance of the law. The fact that the respondent judge and Atty. Francis Ku are members of the Masonic fraternity does not justify or prove that the former acted with bias and partiality. Bias and partiality can never be presumed and must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. While palpable error may be inferred from respondent judges issuance of the Writ of Amparo, there is no evidence on record that would justify a finding of partiality or bias. The complainants allegation of partiality will not suffice in the absence of a clear and convincing proof that will overcome the presumption that the respondent judge dispensed justice according to law and evidence, without fear or favor.11 of simple, elementary and well-known rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with laws and procedural rules. They must know the law and apply it properly in good faith. They are likewise expected to keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence. For, a judge who is plainly ignorant of the law taints the noble office and great privilege vested in him. We find that the respondent judges error does not rise to the level of gross ignorance of the law that is defined by jurisprudence. We take judicial notice of the fact that at the time he issued the Writ of Amparo on January 23, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo has been effective for barely three months (The Rule on the Writ of Amparo became effective on October 24, 2007). At that time, the respondent judge cannot be said to have been fully educated and informed on the novel aspects of the Writ of Amparo. Simply stated, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo at that time cannot be said to be a simple, elementary, and well-known rule that its patent disregard would constitute gross ignorance of the law. More importantly, for full liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found to be erroneous; it must be established that he was motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motive. In the present case, the AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN complainant failed to prove by substantial evidence that the respondent judge was motivated by bad faith and bias or partiality in the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. We take this occasion, however, to remind the respondent judge that under Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge must be "the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence." A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He owes to the public and to this Court the duty to be proficient in the law. He is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Judges must not only render just, correct, and impartial decisions, resolutions, and orders, but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality, and integrity, for good judges are men who have mastery of the principles of law and who discharge their duties in accordance with law. We mentioned all these to emphasize to the respondent judge the need to be more judicious and circumspect in the issuance of extraordinary writs such as the Writ of Amparo. We also reiterate that in an administrative proceeding, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint by substantial evidence. We cannot give credence to charges based on mere suspicion or speculation. Hence, when the complainant relies on mere conjectures and suppositions, and fails to substantiate his claim, as in this case, the administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit.

14 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Razon et. al. v. Tagitis 606 SCRA 598 (2009)

15 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Yano et. al v. Sanchez et. al

Carpio-Morales, J. Facts: Cleofas Sanchez filed with SC a petition for issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Motion for Production and Inspection directed against Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, the then Chief of Staff of the AFP. SC resolved to issue a Writ of Amparo and ordered Gen. Esperon to make a verified return of the writ before CA Justice Sundiam, who was ordered to hear and decide the case. Cleofas amended her petition to include Marciana Medina as additional petitioner, and to implead other military officers including Lt. Sumangil and (Sgt. Villalobos) as additional respondents. They allege that: Their respective sons Nicolas Sanchez and Heherson Medina were catching frogs outside their home; the next day, the wives of Nicolas heard gunshots and saw armed men in soldiers uniforms passing by; when the wives went out to check on Nicolas and Heherson but only saw their caps, slippers, pana and airgun for catching frogs, as well as bloodstains; and that they immediately reported the matter to the barangay officials. They proceeded to the Capas Station of the PNP. Accompanied by officials of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, they also tried to search for Nicolas and Heherson at the Camp Detachment of the Army and at the Camp of the Bravo Company of the Army inside Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City, but to no avail. The niece of a neighbor later informed them that she had seen two men inside Camp Servillano Aquino of the Northern Luzon Command; and that Josephine informed them that she saw the victims again at the Camp of the Bravo Company. Respondents filed a case before the CHR, which endorsed the same to the Ombudsman for appropriate action. Contending that the victims life, liberty and security had been and continue d to be violated on account of their forced disappearance, respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ of Amparo, the production of the victims bodies during the hearing on the Writ, the inspection of certain military camps, the issuance of temporary and permanent protection orders, and the rendition of judgment under Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. A consolidated Return of the Writ verified by Gen. Esperon, Lt. Sumangil, Sgt. Villalobos, Maj. Gen. Gomez as Commander of the Armys 7th Infa ntry Division, and Lt. Col. Bayani as Camp Commander of Camp Servillano Aquino of the Nolcom in Tarlac City, was filed with the CA. Lt. Gen. Yano, Commanding General of the Army, filed a Return of the Writ upon his return from an official trip abroad.

612 SCRA 347 (2010)

Denied having custody of the victims. They posited that the proper remedy of respondents was to file a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus, since the petitions ultimate objective was the production of the bodies of th e victims, as they were allegedly abducted and illegally detained by military personnel; that the petition failed to indicate the matters required by paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), Section 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, such that the allegations were incomplete to constitute a cause of action, aside from being based on mere hearsay evidence, and are, at best, speculative; that respondents failed to present the affidavits of some other competent persons which would clearly validate their claim that the military violated the victims right to life, liberty or security by abducting or detaining them; and that the petition did not allege any specific action or inaction attributable to the military officers with respect to their duties; or allege that respondents took any action by filing a formal complaint or visiting the military camps adverted to in order to verify Josephines claim that she saw the victims on two different occasions inside the camps, or that they took efforts to follow up on the PNP Capas Stations further action on their complaint. In opposing the request for issuance of inspection and production orders, the military officers posited that apart from compromising national security should entry into these military camps/bases be allowed, these orders partook of the nature of a search warrant, such that the requisites for the issuance thereof must be complied with prior to their issuance. CA absolved Gen. Esperon, Lt. Gen. Yano, Maj. Gen. Gomez, and Lt. Col. Bayani for lack of evidence linking them to the disappearances, and further ruled as follows: petitioners have not adequately and convincingly established any direct or indirect link between respondents individual military officers and the disappearances of Nicolas and Heherson. Neither did the concerned Philippine Army Units have exerted fully their efforts to investigate and unearth the truth and bring the culprits before the bar of justice. The concerned Philippine Army unitsshould exert extraordinary diligence to follow all possible leads to solve the disappearances of Nicolas and Heherson. The Philippine Army should be reminded of its constitutional mandate as the protector of the people and the State. While as we could not find any link between respondents individual military officers to the disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson, nonetheless, the fact remains that the two men are still missing. Hence We find it equitable to grant petitioners some reliefs in the interest of human rights and justice as follows: (1) Inspections of the camps (2) Thorough and Impartial Investigation Gen. Alexander Yano, Lt. Gen. Victor Ibrado, and Maj. Gen. Ralph Villanueva (petitioners) filed the present petition for review.

Issue/Held: WON the grant of the RELIEFS by CA after finding want of substantial evidence are valid and proper. NO

16 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 Sections 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule lay down the requisite standard of proof necessary to prove either partys claim. The requisite standard of proof substantial evidence - speaks of the clear intent of the Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in resolving amparo petitions. To the appellate court, the evidence adduced in the present case failed to measure up to that standard substantial evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Since respondents did not avail of any remedy against the adverse judgment, the appellate courts decision is, insofar as it concerns them, now beyond the ambit of review. In ruling in favor of Lt. Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos, the appellate court resolved the case on the basis of the credibility of Josephine as a witness. While Josephines story of how she saw the subject two missing persons (Nicolas and Heherson) appeared initially as plausible, however, her credibility as a witness had been successfully destroyed by other witnesses presented by the respondents. To be noted also is that even the two wives of Nicolas did not make an express attestation that they saw Nicolas and Heherson in the company of those armed men who passed their place. Meanwhile, the requirement for a government official or employee to observe extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty stresses the extraordinary measures expected to be taken in safeguarding every citizens constitutional rights as well as in the investigation of cases of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances. The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. The omission or inaction on the part of the public official provides, however, some basis for the petitioner to move and for the court to grant certain interim reliefs. Section 14 of the Amparo Rule provides for interim or provisional reliefs that the courts may grant in order to, inter alia, protect the witnesses and the rights of the parties, and preserve all relevant evidence such as Temporary Protection Order, Inspection Order and Production Order. These provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition. For the appellate court to, in the present case, still order the inspection of the military camps and order the army units to conduct an investigation into the disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson after it absolved petitioners is thus not in order. The reliefs granted by the appellate court to respondents are not in sync with a finding that petitioners could not be held accountable for the disappearance of the victims. At this late stage, respondents can no longer avail themselves of their stale remedies in the guise of praying for affirmative reliefs in their Comment. No modification of judgment could be granted to a party who did not appeal. If respondents believed that the Decision of the appellate court was merely interlocutory, they had every opportunity to question the conclusion of said court, but they did not. They could have opposed petitioners motion for reconsideration filed with the appellate court, it being a prohibited pleading under the A mparo Rule, but they did not. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

17 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Castillo v. Cruz
Carpio-Morales, J: Facts: Petitioners are employees and members of the local police force of the City Government of Malolos Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects. The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Spouses Cruz before the then Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bulacan, Bulacan. MTC rendered judgment against the Spouses Cruz, which judgment, following its affirmance by the RTC, became final and executory. The finality of the decision in the ejectment case notwithstanding, the spouses Cruz refused to vacate the property. They thereupon filed cases against the Province and the judges who presided over the case . Those cases were dismissed except their petition for annulment of judgment lodged before Branch 18 of the RTC of Malolos, and a civil case for injunction 833-M-2004 lodged before Branch 10 of the same RTC Malolos. The Spouses Cruz sought in the case for injunction the issuance of a permanent writ of injunction to prevent the execution of the final and executory judgment against them. o By Order of July 19, 2005, the RTC, finding merit in the Spouses Cruzes allegation that subsequent events changed the situation of the parties to justify a suspension of the execution of the final and executory judgment, issued a permanent writ of injunction Finding that the fallo of the RTC July 19, 2005 Order treats, as a suspensive condition for the lifting of the permanent injunction, the determination of the boundaries of the property, the Province returned the issue for the consideration of the MTC. In a Geodetic Engineers Report submitted to the MTC on August 31, 2007, the metes and bounds of the property were indicated. The MTC, by Order of January 2, 2008, approved the Report and ruled that the permanent injunction which the RTC issued is ineffective. On motion of the Province, the MTC, by Order of January 21, 2008, thus issued a Second Alias Writ of Demolition. On receiving notice of the January 2, 2008 MTC Order, the Spouses Cruz filed a motion before Branch 10 of the RTC for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) which it set for hearing on January 25, 2008 on which date, however, the demolition had, earlier in the day, been implemented. Such notwithstanding, the RTC issued a TRO. The Spouses Cruz, along with their sons-respondents Nixon and Ferdinand, thereupon entered the property, placed several container vans and purportedly represented themselves as owners of the property which was for lease.

605 SCRA 628 (2009)

February 21, 2008 petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property, entered the property. Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the RTC July 19, 2005 Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats. Respondents later filed on March 3, 2008 a Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 53-M2008, which was coincidentally raffled to Branch 10 of the RTC Malolos. o Respondents averred that despite the Permanent Injunction, petitioners unlawfully entered the property with the use of heavy equipment, tore down the barbed wire fences and tents, and arrested them when they resisted petitioners entry; and that as early as in the evening of February 20, 2008, members of the Philippine National Police had already camped in front of the property On the basis of respondents allegations in their petition and the supporting affidavits, the RTC, by Order of March 4, 2008, issued writs of amparo and habeas data. o Petitioners have shown by preponderant evidence that the facts and circumstances of the alleged offenses examined into on Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data that there have been an on-going hearings on the verified Petition for Contempt, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 306-M-2006, before this Court for alleged violation by the respondents of the Preliminary Injunction Order dated July 16, 2005 [sic] in Sp. Civil Action No. 833-M-2002, hearings were held on January 25, 2008, February 12 and 19, 2008, where the respondents prayed for an April 22, 2008 continuance, however, in the pitch darkness of February 20, 2008, police officers, some personnel from the Engineering department, and some civilians proceeded purposely to the Pinoy Compound, converged therein and with continuing threats of bodily harm and danger and stonethrowing of the roofs of the homes thereat from voices around its premises, on a pretext of an ordinary police operation when enterviewed [sic] by the media then present, but at 8:00 a.m. to late in the afternoon of February 21, 2008, zoomed in on the petitioners, subjecting them to bodily harm, mental torture, degradation, and the debasement of a human being, reminiscent of the martial law police brutality, sending chill in any ordinary citizen, Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, pursuant to Section 19 of The Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC), which is essentially reproduced in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC).

18 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 Issue/Held/Ratio: Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the writ of amparo and habeas data. YES. The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. In view of the heightening prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued and took effect on October 24, 2007 which coincided with the celebration of United Nations Day and affirmed the Courts commitment towards internationalization of human rights. More than three months later or on February 2, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data was promulgated. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides: Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security. And the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions. Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo: As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law. To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners entry into the property. [court cited Tapuz v del Rosario; just see the digest on this one] AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN It bears emphasis that respondents petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations that petitioners in unison, conspiracy and in contempt of court, there and then willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the use of force and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and arrested the herein petitioners (respondents) will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest. Although respondents release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the writ of amparo, absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified. That respondents are merely seeking the protection of their property rights is gathered from their Joint Affidavit. Oddly, respondents also seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is not even alleged that petitioners are gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding their person, family, home and correspondence. As for respondents assertion of past incidents wherein the Province allegedly violated the Permanent Injunction order, these incidents were already raised in the injunction proceedings on account of which respondents filed a case for criminal contempt against petitioners. More. Respondent Amanda and one of her sons, Francisco Jr., likewise filed a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data before the Sandiganbayan, they alleging the commission of continuing threats by petitioners after the issuance of the writs by the RTC, which petition was dismissed for insufficiency and forum shopping. It need not be underlined that respondents petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in a property dispute.

AT ALL EVENTS, respondents filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the writs may, however, be made available to the aggrieved party by motion in the criminal proceedings.

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Meralco v. Lim
Carpio-Morales, J. Facts: Held:

632 SCRA 195 (2010)

Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO). On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads: Cherry Lim: MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB

By Memorandum3 dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS Clerk," effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of " reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and security." Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President and Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the "punitive" nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition 5 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan By respondents allegation, petitioners unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure and refusalto provide her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly receivedconcerning threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data.

The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology. It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondents reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of ones employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters. In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security

Issue: define the evolving metes and bounds of the writ of habeas data. - May an employee invoke the remedies available under such writ where an employer decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof?

20 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Oposa v. Factoran 224 SCRA 792 (1993)

(FROM SCRIBD) Facts: Petitioners, minors represented by their parents, filed a complaint in the RTC; it was a taxpayers class suit representing themselves, the countless multitudes, and future generationsof those who are entitled to the benefits of the country s virgin tropical forests. The plaintiffs complaint was specified as follows: that a balanced and healthful ecology in thePhilippines is evidenced by 54% forest cover and 46% everything else. Twenty five years ago, tropical virgin forests amounted to 53% of our land area but in 1987,satellite images showed that only four percent of the land was covered by forests. Recentsurveys, in the meantime, show that only 2.8% of the countrys land area is composed of tropical virgin rainforests. Public records reveal that at the present rate of deforestation, the Philippine Islands will be bereft of national resources after the end of the decade, if not earlier. Plaintiffs assert their constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and claim that they are entitled to protection of this right by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. The complaint was filed against Factoran, then head of the DENR; it would order the DENR to cancel all existing timber licensing agreements (TLAs) in the country, and cease and desist from accepting, processing, renewing, and approving TLAs. The trial court dismissed the complaint and the judge stated that the relief sought for (cancellation of TLAs) cannot be done because it would not allow due process. The amended petition to the SC repeated its earlier right to a sound environment, and added that (a) TLAs were not contracts and even if they were considered protected by the non-impairment clause, the State may still revoke such agreements when public interest demands it; and (b) in granting more TLAs to cover more areas of land than what is available is an act constituting grave abuse of discretion, and is therefore subject to judicial scrutiny. Issue/Held: (1) WON petitioners have standing YES (2) Is there a specific right violated that would serve a the petitioner s cause of action YES. (3) Are the TLAs contracts? Are they protected by the non-impairment clause? NO.

224 SCRA 792 (1993)

Ratio: The petitioners, minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right ,as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility tothe next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come Sec. 16, Article II of the Constitution provides the right. A cause of action is therefore present but as far as cancellation of TLAs is concerned, there is a need to implead the guarantees of the same for they are indispensable parties Even if a law is passed mandating cancellation/modification of the TLAs, the same cannotbe stigmatized as a violation of non-impairment clause because it is within the States exercise of police power to protect its ecology. Feliciano, Concurring: Although the petitioners are in fact entitled to a balanced and healthful ecology as stressed by the Constitutional right, one cannot classify such a right as specific without doing excessive violence to the language. The implications of making the Sections in Article II self-executory are not the subject of this case. Petitioners should seek a specific legal right. It is his understanding that the Courts decision implies that within the collection of statutes, there is a specific right which the petitioners can use.

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Hernandez v. Placer Dome Inc. G.R. No. 195482 (2011)

22 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Dais v. Garduo
Ostrand, J. Facts: Altavas filed a motion in the intestate proceedings of Serapion Dais asking that the administrator of the estate be ordered to pay him the sum of P5,000 in settlement of his fees for legal services rendered and to be rendered in the said intestate proceedings and other cases. Judge issued an order approving the amount of P5, 000 that the administration should pay Altavas, and it being understood that such amount should cover the fees of Altavas until the termination of the cases pending before this Court. Another Judge, upon motion of Altavas for immediate payment of the fees, issued an order in which he said that the amount, even when they are already established, should not be paid in full for now because the intestate proceedings is still pending. Altavas may collect a portion of fees for services already rendered on account of such P5, 000. The Judge issued another order authorizing the to sell at public auction private property described in the brief filed by the administrator. Petitioners excepted alleging that it was contrary to law and issued without jurisdiction, and asked for a reconsideration and new hearing. Judge denied the motion for reconsideration and ordered that the administrator proceed immediately with the sale of the parcels. Petitioners filed an exception to the order and gave notice of their intention to appeal from the orders, requesting at the same time that the court fix the amount of the appeal bond. Judge denied the motion on the ground that the orders were merely interlocutory and not appealable. Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to admit an appeal interposed in a probate case. The parcels of land, without further notice to said petitioners, were sold by private sale for P4,000 and on the following day the proceeds of the sale were paid over to the Altavas, who thereupon moved for the dismissal of the present proceedings on the ground that the matters at issue had become moot questions. Issue/Held: WON the appeal from the orders was premature. NO An interlocutory order is one which does not of itself definitely settle or conclude any of the rights of the parties to the action. Applying this test it is clear that the orders here in question were not of that kind; if carried out they would operate to divest the estate of important property rights and amount to a final determination of these rights. The court below may possibly have been misled by the provision in section 123 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that no ruling, order or judgment shall "be the subject of appeal to the Supreme Court until final judgment is rendered for one party or the other." This provision applies to ordinary civil action, but that it cannot be accepted literally in regard to probate proceedings, is best shown by the extensive provisions for special appeals contained in sections 773 to 783 of the same Code."

49 Phil 165 (1926)

The failure to admit the appeal in the case in question may in the end lead to unfortunate results. In the order, the fees of Altavas were fixed at P5,000 with the understanding that this amount would be considered full compensation for his services until the termination of the cases mentioned in the order and still pending. No provision was made for prepayment of fees and it can therefore not be argued that they were due until after the services were rendered. Notwithstanding the fact that so far there appears to have been no complete termination of the litigation in any of the cases referred to, Altavas has nevertheless been paid practically his entire fee, and in order to satisfy his claim the court has authorized the sale of real property pertaining to the estate. Whether such would have been necessary if the payment had been deferred until the fees were due, we do not know; if the cases pending are terminated favorably to the estate, the amounts recovered may perhaps be sufficient for the payment of the fees, or the greater part thereof, and the sale of land may prove to have been unnecessary. The the petition for a writ of mandamus is granted, and it is ordered that the respondent judge fix the amount of the bond for the petitioners' appeal and that upon filing and approval of such bond, said appeal be admitted. It is further ordered that the Altavas turn over to the clerk of the CFI of Capiz the sum of P4,000, the amount of the proceeds of the sale of the real property above mentioned and paid to him by the administrator, said sum to be held in deposit by said clerk until the termination of the litigation aforementioned. It is further ordered that the administrator of the estate be not discharged before the termination of the pending litigation relating to the estate and the payment to Altavas of such fees as may then de due him.

RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION It appearing that the cases in which he is counsel representing the estate are now approaching their final determination, it is hereby ordered that part of the dispositive clause in our decision, in which it is ordered the said respondent turn over to the clerk the sum of P4,000, modified to the extent of permitting Altavas, in lieu of immediate payment, to file a bond with sufficient with the clerk, conditioned upon payment to said estate of said sum of P4,000, or any part thereof whenever ordered to do so by the CFI in the probate proceedings of the estate.

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Testate Estate of Vda. de Biascan v. Biascan

Gonzaga-Reyes, J. Facts: June 3, 1975 private respondent Rosalina J. Biascan filed a petition at the then CFI of Manila, Br. 4, praying for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Florencio Biascan and Timotea Zulueta. In an Order dated August 13, 1975, private respondent was appointed as regular administratrix of the estates. October 10, 1975 Maria Manuel Vda. De Biascan, the legal wife of Florencio Biascan entered her appearance as Oppositor-Movant. Simultaneous with her appearance, she filed a pleading containing several motions including a motion for intervention, a motion for the setting aside of private respondents appointment as special administratrix and administratrix, and a motion for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of Florencio Biascan. After an exchange of pleadings between the parties, Judge Serafin Cuevas issued an Omnibus Order dated November 13, 1975 which, among others, granted Marias intervention and set for trial the motion to set aside the Orders appointing respondent as administratrix. April 2, 1981 the trial court issued an Order resolving that: (1) Maria is the lawful wife of Florencio; (2) respondent and her brother are the acknowledged natural children of Florencio; (3) all three are the legal heirs of Florencio who are entitled to participate in the settlement proceedings; (4) the motion to set aside the order appointing private respondent as administratrix is denied; and (5) (5) the motion to approve inventory and appraisal of private respondent be deferred. Fifty-eight (58) days after the receipt of the April 2, 1981 Order, Maria filed her motion for reconsideration which private respondent opposed. November 15, 1981 the fourth floor of the City Hall of Manila was completely gutted by fire. The records of the settlement proceedings were among those lost in the fire. Thus, on January 2, 1985, private respondent filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the said records. Due to the delay caused by the fire and the reconstitution of the records, it was only on April 30, 1985 that the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 issued an Order denying Marias June 6, 1981 Motion for Reconsideration. Sometime thereafter, Maria died and her testate estate also became the subject of settlement proceedings. Atty. Marcial F. Lopez was appointed as interim special administrator and engaged the services of the Siguion Reyna Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Offices on Behalf of the estate.

347 SCRA 621 (2000)

August 21, 1996 the law firm was allegedly made aware of and given notice of the April 30, 1985 Order when its associate visited Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to inquire about the status of the case. The associate checked the records if there was proof of service of the April 30, 1985 Order to the former counsel of Maria, Atty. Marcial F. Lopez, but he discovered that there was none. He was able to secure a certification from the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 which stated that there was no proof of service of the Order dated April 30, 1985 contained in the records of SP. Proc. No. 98037. A Notice of Appeal dated April 22, 1996 was filed by petitioner from the Orders dated April 2, 1981 and April 30, 1985 of the trial court. While the said notice of appeal was dated April 22, 1996, the stamp of the trial court on the first page of the notice clearly indicated that the same was received by the trial court on September 20, 1996. A Record of Appeal dated September 20, 1996 was likewise filed by petitioner. October 22, 1996: TC issued an Order denying petitioners appeal on the ground that the appeal was filed out of time. The trial court ruled that the April 2, 1981 Order which was the subject of the appeal already became final as the Motion for Reconsideration thereof was filed sixty-five (65) days after petitioner received the same. In addition, the court ruled that the notice of appeal itself was filed manifestly late as the same was filed more than 11 years after the issuance of the June 11, 1985 Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The Motion for Reconsideration dated November 13, 1996 of petitioner was likewise denied by the trial court in an Order dated February 12, 1997. CA denied the petition for certiorari of petitioner.

Issue/Held/Ratio: Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in denying petitioner. NO. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the orders and judgments in special proceedings which may be the subject of an appeal. Thus: Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken . An interested person may appeal in a special proceeding from an order or judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court or a Juvenile and domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment: (a) Allows or disallows a will; (b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive shares of the estate to which such person is entitled; (c) Allows, or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it; (d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;

24 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 (e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special administrator; and (f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for new trial or for reconsideration. An appeal is allowed in these aforesaid cases as these orders, decrees or judgments issued by a court in a special proceeding constitute a final determination of the rights of the parties so appealing. In contrast, interlocutory orders are not appealable as these are merely incidental to judicial proceedings. In these cases, the court issuing such orders retains control over the same and may thus modify, rescind, or revoke the same on sufficient grounds at any time before the final judgment. The ruling of the trial court that Maria, private respondent Rosalina Biascan and German Biascan were entitled to participate in the settlement proceedings falls squarely under paragraph (b), Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court as a proper subject of appeal. By so ruling, the trial court has effectively determined that the three persons are the lawful heirs of the deceased. As such, the same may be the proper subject of an appeal. Similarly, the ruling of the trial court denying petitioners motion to set aside the order appointing private respondent as the regular administratrix of the estate of Florencio Bisacan is likewise a proper subject of an appeal. o We have previously held that an order of the trial court appointing a regular administrator of a deceased persons estate is a final determination of the rights of the parties thereunder, and is thus, appealable. o This is in contrast with an order appointing a special administrator who is appointed only for a limited time and for a specific purpose. Because of the temporary character and special character of this appointment, the Rules deem it not advisable for any party to appeal from said temporary appointment. Considering however that private respondent has aleready been appointed as regular administratrix of the estate of Florencio Biascan, her appointment as such may be questioned before the appellate court by way of appeal. It is thus clear that the Order dated April 2, 1981 may be the proper subject of an appeal in a special proceeding. In special proceedings, such as the instant proceeding for settlement of estate, the period of appeal from any decision or final order rendered therein is thirty (30) days, a notice of appeal and a record on appeal being required. The appeal period may only be interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. Once the appeal period expires without an appeal or a motion for reconsideration or new trial being perfected, the decision or order becomes final. Petitioner admits that Maria Manuel Vda. De Biascan, its predecessor-in-interest, received a copy of the same of April 9, 1981. Applying these rules, Maria or her counsel had thirty (30) days or until May 9 within which to file a notice of appeal with record on appeal. She may also file a motion for reconsideration, in which case the appeal period is deemed interrupted. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN Considering that it was only June 6, 1981, or a full fifty-eight (58) days after receipt of the order, that a motion for reconsideration was filed, it is clear that the same was filed out of time. As such, when the said motion for reconsideration was filed, there was no more appeal period to interrupt as the Order had already become final. Petitioner insists, however, that the order dated April 2, 1981 of the trial court did not become final and executory as no opposition on its timeliness was filed and no ruling as regards its timeliness was made. Petitioner argues that although its motion for reconsideration was denied in the Order dated April 30, 1985, the denial was made on grounds other than its failure to ask for a reconsideration within the period prescribed by law. As such, petitioner concludes, any procedural defect attending the Motion for Reconsideration was deemed cured when the trial court, in its Order dated April 30, 1985, took cognizance of the same and rendered its ruling thereon. o It is well-settled that judgment or orders become final and executory by operation of law and not by judicial declaration. Thus, finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed. The trial court need not even pronounce the finality of the order as the same becomes final by operation of law. In fact, the trial court could not even validly entertain a motion for reconsideration filed after the lapse of the period for taking an appeal. As such, it is of no moment that the opposing party failed to object to the timeliness of the motion for reconsideration or that the court denied the same on grounds other than timeliness considering that at the time the motion was filed, the Order dated April 2, 1981 had already become final and executory. Being final and executory, the trial court can no longer alter, modify, or reverse the questioned order. The subsequent filing of the motion for reconsideration cannot disturb the finality of the judgment or order. o Even if we assume that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner had the effect of suspending the running of the appeal period for the April 2, 1981 Order, it is clear that petitioners notice of appeal of the orders of the trial court was still filed out of time. o Under Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court then applicable, the time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for a new trial shall be deducted from the period from which to make an appeal. The rule further states that where the motion was filed during office hours of the last day of the appeal period, the appeal must be perfected within the day following that in which the party appealing received notice of the denial of said motion.

25 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Miranda v. CA
Teehankee, J. (Krizel: ang dami kong hindi sinama, ang haba kasi masyado) Facts: In Special Proceedings No. 2205-R of the Cebu court of first instance for the settlement of the intestate estate of Hilarion Dydongco, deceased, (a Philippine resident who died in China sometime in 1941) petitioner Vicente Miranda was appointed as administrator. In 1962, petitioner as such administrator filed Civil Case No. R-7793 in the same Cebu court of first instance against the private respondents (or their predecessors) for recovery of properties of the decedent alleged to have been fraudulently and in bad faith and in breach of their fiduciary trust, concealed, appropriated and converted as their own by respondents. The suit for recovery had been filed by petitioner-administrator after the principal respondents pursuant to Rule 88, section 6 had been cited by the intestate court to appear and to be examined as to documents, papers, properties, funds and other valuables deposited and left in trust with them by the decedent before his death. Petitioner-administrator prayed that "judgment be rendered declaring that said business, assets, income and other property, are in the possession and under the management and control of said defendants as mere trustees thereof, and sentencing them to turnover and deliver the same to him, as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Hilarion Dydongco as well as to render accounts and to execute the corresponding deeds of conveyance, in addition to paying damages and the costs. After a protracted trial, Hon. Jose M. Mendoza rendered a sixty-nine page decision finding that most of petitioner- administrator's allegations had been duly proven and sentenced respondents (as defendants) to deliver to petitioner-administrator "all properties found by the court to belong to the estate," "to render full, accurate and correct accounting of all the fuits and proceeds of (such) properties" during their period of possession ("from 1935 until the present date") and to pay P60,000 exemplary damages to the two heiresses found to have been defrauded and P30,000 attorney's fees and costs. 5 Respondents (as defendants) took steps to perfect their appeal from Judge Mendoza's adverse decision within the reglementary thirty-day period. After submitting their record on appeal, however, they filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial which was heard and denied per Judge Mendoza's order of October 18, 1965, Respondents thereafter sought to revive their record on appeal and submit additional pages thereof but Judge Mendoza held that their filing of their motion for reconsideration was an abandonment of their proposed earlier appeal and that his decision had become final and executory.

71 SCRA 295 (1976)

Reconsideration having been denied, herein respondents then filed on December 21, 1965 a petition with this Court for the issuance of writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to annul Judge Mendoza's orders disallowing their appeal with mandatory injunction to give due course to their appeal and this Court meanwhile enjoined the enforcement and execution of the challenged orders. The case was docketed as Dy Chun et al. vs. Mendoza. o This Court declared, in Fuentebella v. Carrascoso that a decision of such nature is interlocutory in character, because it does not dispose of the action in its entirety and leaves something to be done to complete the relief sought and that, accordingly, it is not appealable, until after the adjudications necessity the completion of said relief shall have been mad. Indeed, the very counsel for petitioners herein now accept this view and concede that petitioners' appeal had been taken prematurely." case was remanded to the Cebu court of first instance as the court of origin for the rendition of "a full, accurate and complete of all the fruits and proceeds" of the properties declared in Judge Mendoza's July 26, 1965 decision to belong to the decedent's estate, i.e. for "the adjudications necessary for the completion of said relief(as granted in the decision)", to use the very language of this Court in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza, supra. Respondent Judge Tantuico altered and changed his predecessor Judge Mendoza's original decision of July 26, 1965 in his amended decision of October 4, 1969 by excluding certain valuable properties from the estate of the decedent and absolving certain respondents from the obligation of turning. owner the possession to petitioner,reversing Judge Mendoza's judgment holding respondent Dy Suat Hong to be a builder in bad faith, and reducing the P60,000 exemplary damages to P30,000. Petitioner assailed in an action for certiorari 19, respondent judge's authority to issue such amended decision substantially changing his predecessor's original decision (which merely awaited the rendition of accounting for completion of the relief therein adjudicated of declaring the properties in possession of respondents to belong to the decedent's estate) Argument of petitioners: the first decision that of Judge Mendoza, is not interlocutory in nature, but is one which is final in character and which left nothing to be done except for the requisite matter ofaccounting Argument of respondents: the original decision of the former presiding judge is merely interlocutory in nature, as there remains something also to be done, citing therein for main support of this contention, the decision . . . of the Supreme Court ... in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza."

Issue: whether respondent appellate court correctly read and applied or not this Court's 1968 judgment in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza.

Did this mean, as held by the appellate court, that respondent Judge Tantuico as Judge Mendoza's successor had the authority, four years later and beyond the

26 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 thirty-day reglementary period and for as long as the final accounts have not been rendered and approved by him, to review, revise or reverse the original decision on the merits or to "promulgate another decision" as if it were a mere interlocutory order which affects preliminary or incidental matters and does not determine the dispute between the parties on its merits, or Rather, did it mean that respondents' appeal from the decision on the merits granting petitioner the principal relief of recovery of real properties (which was final and definitive in character) had to await the rendition of theaccounting and the court's approval thereof as a secondary and incidental relief and hence the only remaining orresidual authority of the lower court in the premises (no matter whether it be presided by Judge Mendoza, respondent Judge Tantuico or still another presiding judge) was and is to enforce, consider and act on theaccounting ordered in the decision, so that respondents' appeal from both aspects of the decision (for recovery of properties with accounting of fruits and proceeds) may then take its course? AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN injunctions, or deferring action on, or denying, motions to dismiss or provisional remedies applied for, instead of a definitive determination, of the main dispute between the parties. Hence, it was always been taken for granted from the lead case of Fuentebella (and all other cases adhering to it) assuming its applicability here, that the remand of the case to the trial court for rendition of the accounting of the fruits of the properties adjudged in favor of the prevailing party in order to complete the relief and have a single appeal including the accounts was for no other purpose than to render the accounting and by no means to change, alter, revise or reverse the basic judgment which ordered the accounting in the first place. In the case at bar, this Court in remanding the case for the rendition of the accounting "for the completion of said relief' awarded in Judge Mendoza's judgment further ordered the dissolution of the preliminary injunction it had granted against enforcement and execution of his orders declaring his judgment final and executory. This signified that the trial court was left free under Rule 39, section 2 to order execution of his judgment on the merits for recovery of the properties pending appeal. Hence, petitioner after the remand properly filed his motion for execution of the portion of the judgment ordering delivery of the properties, supra, 31 while awaiting the accounting yet to be rendered and acted upon by the trial court. Respondent judge in the exercise of his authority could either grant or deny such motion for execution pending appeal and he opted to deny the same, since he reversed the original decision on three major points but in effect granted the same as to "all other properties not affected by [his] amendments" by ordering their delivery to-petitioner within 45 days 32 (since recovery and delivery of the properties was the principal relief sought by petitioner with the accounting as a mere incident and necessary consequence and without delivery, the accounting of the fruits would be a never ending process and the case would never be ready for appeal!) But respondent judge exceeded and went beyond his authority and Jurisdiction when he amended his predecessor's judgment on the merits in major particulars and issued an amended decision, and notwithstanding that the case involves properties undisputedly (as far as both judges were concerned) fraudtlently concealed,misappropriated and absconded from the decedent's estate (as a consequence of which P60,000exemplarydamages were awarded in Judge Mendoza's original decision and retained in hal the amount by respondent judge in his amended decision), ordered the exclusion of several valuable properties from those ordered delivered to the estate on the basis of his own substituted impression (from his reading of the record) of the credibility of witnesses seen, heard and observed by Judge Mendoza as the trial judge and found by the latter to be totally discredited (having shown in the record "their utter disregard and disrespect not only to truth but also to the meaning and value of the oath required of witnesses" 33 and their being "sadly wanting ... in their sense of truth, probity and sacredness of an oath. To commit a lie is but human, this court realizes, but to lie brazenly and knowingly is humanly unforgivable". 34

3.

4.

Held: The Court holds that respondent appellate court misread and misapplied this Court's 1968 judgment in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza and erred in holding that respondent Judge Tantuico could change, alter and amend his predecessor's decision on the merits for recovery of properties with accounting as if it were a mere interlocutoryorder or process, when all this Court held (applying Fuentebella, supra) was that the decision was "not appealable" until after the accounting also ordered was rendered and approved so as to complete the relief granted whereafter respondents' "premature appeal" could then be given due course from both aspects of the decision for recovery of properties and accounting of the fruits. Hence, the only remaining or residual authority of respondent judge in the premises was not to review, revise or reverse Judge Mendoza's original decision of July 26, 1965 (by submitting his own appreciation of the evidence and impression of the witnesses' credibility or lack thereof from a mere reading of the record for that of Judge Mendoza who tried the case and saw and heard the witnesses first hand) but to enforce, receive and act on the accounting as ordered in the decision for the completion of the relief therein granted. Ratio: 1. The original decision of July 26, 1965 of Judge Mendoza is manifestly a judgment determining the merits of the case, in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him and filed with the clerk of court as defined in and required by Rule 36, section 1. 2. This Court in thus remanding the case for the rendition of the accounting "for the completion of said relief" awarded in Judge Mendoza's judgment on the merits could not conceivably be misconstrued, as did appellate court, to give respondent judge or whoever presides the lower court carte blanche to exercise reviewing if not supervisory authority over the judicial determination and findings on the merits of his predecessor and to "promulgate another decision" in lieu thereof as if Judge Mendoza's basic decision on the merits were a mereinterlocutory order dealing with postponements, extensions, temporary restraining orders or preliminary

27

DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 The Court holds that there is no precedent nor justification for the course of action sustained by respondent appellate court, since a judge who succeeds another as presiding judge does not assume reviewing and appellate authority over his predecessor's judgment on the merits including the credibility of the witnesses (which is thesubject of an appeal to the appellate courts but has been remanded merely to complete the relief of accounting so that such accounting may be threshed out together with the principal relief of recovery in a single appeal) and it may be added that the appellate courts on appeal are called upon to review and pass upon a single decision and not two decisions (the original and the amended). And it should deserve merely passing mention that such successor judge (prescinding from the principle of comity of judges.) should be equally if not more bound by the settled doctrine binding upon this Court itself and the appellate courts that the trial judge's findings of fact and on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight and respect and will be upheld in the absence of a clear and convincing showing of taint, mistake or arbitrariness. Here, we have a case of definitive judgment on the merits rendered after trial ordering the recovery of properties as prayed for in petitioner's complaint with payment of exemplary damages and attorney's fees as well as the accounting of the fruits of the properties wrongfully possessed for so long by respondents. The mere incident that accounting since 1941 of the fruits of the properties adjudged to rightfully belong to the decedent's estate has been ordered as a necessary consequence of the judgment on the merits which is merely toimplement the judgment, by no means makes the judgment an interlocutory one subject to change, alteration and reversion at the discretion and will of the trial judge!

AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

28 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Dael et. al v. IAC

Regalado, J.: Nature: appeal by certiorari Facts: Basically, this is a fight between 2 sets of heirs (children of first wife v mga pamangin ng 2nd wife) Husband, Wife 1, and Wife 2 all died. There was an extrajudicial settlement entered into by the heirs and also a deed of sale of some properties of wife 2 in favour of heirs of wife 1. =The administratrix of wife2s estate submitted to the court an inventory. Private respondents moved for the disapproval of said inventories claiming that the properties listed therein were either acquired during the first marriage of Cesario Cabutihan or were merely the products or fruits of the properties of said first union or otherwise acquired through the funds thereof. The probate court thereby disapproved both inventories and annulled the extrajudicial settlement and deed of sale. The latter two were annulled for being simulated or fictitious and for involving conjugal properties of the first marriage, including properties of Bienvenida, to which Victorina is not an heir. IAC affirmed decision of probate court. Issue/Held: WON the decision of IAC and the probate court is correct- NO Ratio: It may be conceded that the factual findings of the trial court were based on substantial documentary and testimonial evidence and are entitled to the corresponding weight and respect. Such established facts notwithstanding, We are not as equally disposed to yield assent to the conclusions drawn by both the court a quo and the respondent court which Would so simplistically adjudicate and consider the properties involved as belonging in their entirety to the first marriage. When Bienvenida Durana died, the first conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved. That conjugal partnership was then converted into an implied ordinary coownership. It was also at this point in time that the inheritance was transmitted to the heirs of Bienvenida. Thus, her heirs, Cesario, Nonilon Carmencita Romulo, Lermo and Bienvenido, acquired respective and definite rights over one-half (1/2) of the conjugal partnership property which pertained to Bienvinida. Consequently, whatever fruits or income may thereafter be derived from the properties, including the copra business, would no longer be conjugal but would belong in part to the heirs in proportion to their respective shares. The fruits and income of the other half of the property of the conjugal partnership would exclusively belong to Cesario. The marriage of Cesario and Victorina on April 6, 1952 also produced the corresponding legal consequences. From that moment on, the fruits or income of the separate properties of the spouses would be conjugal, including those acquired through their industry.

171 SCRA 524 (1989)

Hence, the fruits and income of Cesario's share in the inheritance from Bienvenida and of his conjugal share in the property of the first conjugal partnership would form part of the conjugal partnership properties of the second marriage. The fruits and income derived or acquired through these last-mentioned properties would likewise be conjugal in nature. It would have been ideal had there been a liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties of the first marriage between Cesario and Bienvenida. Unfortunately, We cannot determine from the records the amount of such properties at the time of Bienvenida's demise. There is a dearth of proof on this matter. What appears evident, however, is that, considering the continuity in the operation of the two businesses during the marital coverture between Cesario and Victorina which spanned a period of fourteen (14) years, and the fact that after Cesario's death Victorina still actively engaged in the same business until her own death five (5) years later, the properties enumerated in the aforesaid inventories submitted to the probate court could not all have been properties of the first marriage. Inevitably, the problem is how to apportion the properties involved between the two conjugal partnerships. On this score, guidance should be sought from the provisions of the Civil Code to the effect that whenever the liquidation of the partnership of two or more marriages contracted by the same person should be carried out at the same time and there is no evidence to show the capital or the conjugal property belonging to each of the partnerships to be liquidated, the total mass of the partnership property shall be divided between the different partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and to the property belonging to the respective spouses. The first marriage existed for approximately fifteen (15) years (1942 to 1957), while the second marriage lasted for about fourteen (14) years (1958 to 1972). Applying the aforestated rule, the first conjugal partnership will be prorated a share of fifteen twenty-ninths (15/29) of the properties included in the inventory submitted on August 30, 1978, while the second conjugal partnership will get fourteen twenty-ninths (14/29) thereof. Not to be included, however, are the real properties listed in the supplementary inventory filed on January 16, 1979, because they definitely belong to the estate of Cesario as the latter's inheritance from his parents, Bartolome Cabutihan and Natividad Daelo. One-half (1/2) of the properties that pertain to the first conjugal partnership belong to Cesario as his conjugal share therein, while the other half shall be considered as inherited by him and his five children as the heirs of Bienvenida. The properties pertaining to the second partnership shall also be equally divided, one-half (1/2) to belong to Cesario and the other to Victorina as their respective shares in their conjugal partnership properties. The share of Cesario should then be divided among his heirs, namely, Victorina and his five (5) children. To recapitulate, the estate of Victorina for distribution to her heirs shall consist of her one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal properties of the aforesaid second marriage and her one-sixth (1/6) share in the estate of Cesario as an heir. Petitioners also question the approval of the claims of Democrito Honesto and David Cabutihan. Petitioners' effete opposition is anchored on their allegation that said

29 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 claim "was approved primarily on the basis of the testimony of claimant Democrito Cabutihan" which, according to them, is inadmissible under the Dead Man's Statute or the survivorship disqualification rule. 28 While petitioners' arguments may have a juris tantum plausibility if considered alone, We see no reason to dwell on this issue. It would be pointless since, as correctly observed by the trial court, "even assuming the applicability of the dead man's rule concerning the testimony of Democrito Cabutihan, the testimony of Urbano Prado and Tirso Linosa are more than sufficient to establish the claim and to bolster the documentary evidence in support thereof as indicated on Exhibits 'B', 'B-1', to 'B-82-claim', 'C' and 'C-1' inclusive." Also challenged by petitioners is the order of the court below, allowing the withdrawal of funds for distribution to the heirs as advance inheritance. Said order is, however, within the contemplation and authority of Rule 109, Section 2 whereof provides that "(n)otwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these rules'. Said Rule 90, on the other hand, provides in part that "(n)o distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs." It is true that "partial distribution of the decedent's estate pending the final termination of the testate or intestate proceedings should as much as possible be discouraged by the courts and, unless in extreme cases, such form of advances of inheritance should not be countenanced. The reason for this strict rule is obvious courts should guard with utmost zeal and jealousy the estate of the decedent to the end that the creditors thereof be adequately protected and all the rightful heirs assured of their shares in the inheritance." Nevertheless, after duly considering the foregoing rules, We sustain the validity of the questioned order. The respondent court correctly held than "(i)f oppositors would stand to share more in the inheritance than what was fixed for them in the appealed judgment, We believe the estate has sufficient assets to ensure an equitable distribution of the inheritance in accordance with law and final judgment in the proceedings." Also, it does not appear that there are unpaid obligations, as contemplated in Rule 90, for which provisions should have been made or a bond required. It is clear that the provisions of the Rules of Court, as well as the jurisprudence thereon, were followed in this particular incident. With respect to the propriety of the alleged payment of the claims of the Cabutihan brothers before the decision is this case became final and executory, We are not in a position to rule on such issue because this Court is not a trier of facts. Such issue requires the prior resolution of basic factual questions, that is, whether or not such payment had actually been made to the claimants and the circumstances under which the same was effected. The probate court had not yet ruled on petitioners' "Motion to Order the Return of the Amount Paid for Claim", when the instant petition was filed. Based on the AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN records of this appeal, the last action taken in the lower court was its order that the private respondents comment on said motion, but no response thereto or any subsequent development on this matter is reflected or reported. If the petitioners have sufficient basis to complain on this matter, the same should consequently be pursued and threshed out in the court below.

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Republic v. Nishina 634 SCRA 716 (2010)