The Social Psychology

of the Origins Debate

A Weblog Series published on An Evangelical Dialogue on Evolution

Author:
Marlowe C. Embree

Edited by:
Steve Martin

Document Version: 1.1

Last Updated: April 7, 2009

This document is a compilation of weblog posts; the individual articles remain the property of the author. You are
free to share, copy, or distribute this document in full within the limitations of the Creative Commons Attribution-
Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License and the Creative Commons Attribution-
Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 2.5 Canada License. To view copies of these licenses, visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/us/ and http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ca/.
 The Social Psychology of the Origins Debate

Table of Contents

I. Overview of the Author and Series ..................................................................................................................3

II. The Social Psychology of the Origins Debate: Introduction............................................................................4
III. The Origins Debate through the Lens of Piagetian Theory .............................................................................5
IV. Ingroup-outgroup Bias in the Origins Debate: Part One .................................................................................7
V. Ingroup-outgroup Bias in the Origins Debate: Part Two.................................................................................8
VI. Personality Diversity and Cognitive Modes in the Origins Debate: Part One.................................................9
VII. Personality Diversity and Cognitive Modes in the Origins Debate: Part Two..............................................11
VIII. The Social Psychology of the Origins Debate: Conclusion ...........................................................................12

2
 The Social Psychology of the Origins Debate

I. Overview of the Author and Series

Marlowe C. Embree teaches psychology at the University of Wisconsin Colleges. He is currently conducting some
original research on whether personality differences affect a person’s conclusions regarding creation and evolution,
and how likely they are to change their views. Between September 14, 2008 and October 5, 2008, he published a
seven-part series on "The Social Psychology of the Origins Debate" on the weblog An Evangelical Dialogue on
Evolution. Articles in the series included:

1. The Social Psychology of the Origins Debate: Introduction published on September 14, 2008.
2. The Origins Debate through the Lens of Piagetian Theory published on September 16, 2008.
3. Ingroup-outgroup Bias in the Origins Debate: Part One published on September 21, 2008.
4. Ingroup-outgroup Bias in the Origins Debate: Part Two published on September 24, 2008.
5. Personality Diversity and Cognitive Modes in the Origins Debate: Part One published on September 28,
2008.
6. Personality Diversity and Cognitive Modes in the Origins Debate: Part Two published on October 1, 2008.
7. The Social Psychology of the Origins Debate: Conclusion published on October 5, 2008.

3
 The Social Psychology of the Origins Debate
II. The Social Psychology of the
Origins Debate: Introduction
Historically, the field of psychology has seemed as
threatening to many Christians as the field of biology.
This is due, in no small measure, to the influence of
early watershed figures like Sigmund Freud and John
Watson, who made no secret of their atheism and
failed to separate their personal views on religion from
their professional theorizing and research. As an
unfortunate result, despite the attempts of individuals
like William James and Gordon Allport to bridge the
gap, roughly the first half of the history of academic
psychology was characterized by the perception that
psychology and religion were at odds, providing
conflicting or even diametrically opposed views of the
human condition.
Positive Interaction Between Psychology and
Religion
Contemporary psychology views religion very
differently. Interest in the psychology of religion is
very much on the rise, and the emerging consensus
within that subfield is that religion is a force for good,
not for evil, in the world - though obviously religion,
like any other human activity or institution, can be
subverted and used for destructive ends. There can be
little doubt that, in most situations, religious faith and
mental health are positively, not negatively, correlated.
Similarly, faith appears to facilitate physical health
(including recovery from illness), social cohesion, and
even tolerance for diversity. Contrary to the stereotype
that a committed faith means bigotry, one writer has
coined an opposite motto - “The more orthodox, the
more tolerant” - to summarize what emerging research
actually indicates.
Psychology and the Origins Debate
As a result, psychology may be able to offer
considerable insights into how individuals and groups
address and respond to the “origins debate”. The focus
of the discipline of psychology is not to seek a
resolution of that debate, of course, although modern
psychology is forging increasingly powerful and
important links to mainstream biology and the
importance of evolutionary psychology is on the
upswing. Rather, psychology’s contribution lies in
helping us understand why and how people continue to
disagree about matters of this kind.
Despite an overwhelming consensus about the question
among the mainstream scientific community, the
origins debate rages unabated within the wider culture,
with few signs of any significant resolution. Perhaps
4
the reason lies, not in the nature of the evidence as
such, but rather in the nature of human psychology -
particularly, the social psychology of how conflicts of
this sort are generated and managed. Students of so-
called “intractable conflict” note that there are certain
kinds of conflicts that can seem almost irresolvable by
ordinary means, disputes that take on a seemingly
permanent life of their own.
Series Overview
Over the next few weeks I will be posting a series of
articles that will examine the origins debate through
three different “psychological lenses”. My hope is that
this will shed light on the conflict and offer
constructive suggestions about how it might be
possible to work toward the beginnings of a resolution.
For the record, I am an evangelical Christian who has a
Ph.D. in social psychology from a secular institution
and who is comfortable with the conclusions and
theories of mainstream science. I attended a college
whose official motto was pro scientia et religione - and
believe it is entirely possible to affirm both without
reservation.
This first article in the series will consider the question
of how attitudes and beliefs are formed in the normal
process of intellectual growth, as seen through the lens
of Jean Piaget’s classic formulation of cognitive
development. The next two articles will ponder the
formation of biases and prejudices, with a view to
understanding psychological forces that generate
stereotypic understandings of social groups. The
following two articles will examine the potential role
of differing thinking styles and related personality
factors on the question of why some people become
evolutionists and others become creationists, or why
some people change their minds about such matters
while others do not. I will then wrap up the series with
a modern-day parable.
Since most of the readers of this series may not have a
strong background in psychology, I’ll do my best to
avoid academic jargon. Yet, expect an introduction to a
few multisyllabic, potentially larynx-choking technical
terms like schemata, assimilation, accommodation,
normative influence, cognitive modes, hemispheric
lateralization, and such like. They’ll come your way in
manageable doses, and will help you to stretch your
vocabulary, which is good for everyone (research
indicates that a good vocabulary helps prevent the risk
of Alzheimer’s disease in later life).
Feedback Welcomed
Since the spirit of this Web resource is to generate
dialogue, I’m ending each of these articles with some
 The Social Psychology of the Origins Debate
questions that I hope will serve as a springboard for
discussion. I invite regular contributors and Web
lurkers to respond to these questions or to generate
additional questions of their own. I’ll make a serious
attempt to reply in a timely manner. My philosophy of
education is well summed up in the pop culture phrase,
“we may not have it all together, but together we have
it all” - as a member of a community of equals, I’m
eager to learn from you and to pool our resources to
explore these issues further.
Questions for Discussion
1. Do you agree with my perception that many
Christians find psychology as threatening as biology?
Why or why not? If so, why do you think this is so?
2. Contemporary psychology is increasingly wedded to
the materialist (epiphenomenalist) idea that
consciousness can be fully explained in material terms
– that we are “just computers made of meat”. This is
(or at least seems) incompatible with traditional
Christian assertions (though not necessarily with the
idea of the physical resurrection). Any thoughts about
this?
I look forward eagerly to your responses, trusting that
you will be charitable! As the stereotypic sheriff once
told a group of would-be voters at election time, “If
you like me, I want you to go to the voting booth
tomorrow and put a big X in front of my name. If you
don’t like me, use a small x.”
III. The Origins Debate through
the Lens of Piagetian Theory
To understand how people form and maintain a point
of view on the origins debate, it may help to step back
and ponder how they form and maintain positions on
anything. This can help distinguish content issues
(what do you think?) from process issues (how do you
think?) to avoid problems that emerge when the two
levels are confused – as in the famous instance of the
schizophrenic who ate the restaurant menu and then
complained that it was not, as advertised, “tasty and
nutritious”. Piaget’s famous theory of intellectual
development, outlined below, is an important and
classic take on this set of issues.
Schemata and Intellectual Development
To a Piagetian theorist, intellectual growth and
development come through the refinement of so-called
schemata. A schema is a way of thinking about or
understanding the world, a “lens” or “window”
through which one views reality. Thus, schemata are
5
like “mini-theories” or “mini-paradigms”, and can
include so-called “metanarratives” or “superstories”
that provide a comprehensive explanation of all of
reality. As such, religious (and secular) views of the
nature of ultimate, metaphysical reality are types of
schemata.
What differentiates adults from children, to Piaget, is
the development of increasingly sophisticated,
increasingly nuanced, increasingly fruitful, and
increasingly effective schemata. There is a detailed set
of age-based predictions (a so-called stage theory) that
outlines how Piaget believes all of us develop our
schemata as we move from infancy to adulthood,
though this isn’t our primary concern here.
Interestingly, the Apostle Paul hinted at a similar idea
when he wrote, “When I was a child, I thought like a
child, but when I became a man, I gave up childish
ways”.
Schemata are internal and mental abstractions, but they
are developed to enable us to deal effectively with
concrete events of an external and phenomenal nature.
This interplay between schemata (our pre-existing
understandings or conceptualizations of reality) and the
data of concrete experience is the way in which,
according to Piaget, our schemata grow and mature.
Assimilation
Two different processes describe how schemata and
experience interact. In the first of these, assimilation,
pre-existing schemata are “imposed” upon the data of
experience. In simple terms, we see what we expect to
see, paying attention to relevant information (that
which confirms or supports an existing schema) and
discount (or fail even to notice) irrelevant or
disconfirming evidence (particularly that which calls a
prior schema into question).
While an overemphasis on assimilation can lead to
closed-mindedness or rigidity of thought, as well as
prejudice and bias, in more moderate doses it plays a
very important role in intellectual development.
Without assimilation, our ideas would be subject to
change without notice at any time and would manifest
no stability - in theological terms, we would be subject
to “every wind of doctrine”. Without assimilation, we
could not make use of the schemata we have, and
indeed might well experience total disorientation. In
the famous words of William James, the world might
seem to us, as James hypothesized it did to an infant,
“a bloomin’, buzzin’ confusion”. Without schemata
(and the process of assimilation that underlies and
supports it), we could not think or reason at all.
 The Social Psychology of the Origins Debate
Accommodation
As long as the data of experience (or other indirect
forms of data, such as those drawn from the experience
of others whom we have reason to trust) confirms our
existing schemata, there is no reason to alter our
schemata or to move out of “assimilation mode”.
Sooner or later, however, all of us encounter
anomalous information that cannot easily be
assimilated to an existing schema. (Think of a person
who believes, for whatever reason, that red-haired
people are evil, but who then meets an altogether
admirable and saintly redhead.) While anomalies in
small numbers can be explained away with relative
ease (maybe she is a skilled hypocrite, or maybe she
has simply dyed her hair red and thus isn’t a “real”
redhead), if the number and gravity of anomalies
mount, the discrepancy between schemata and
experience increase to the point that there is increasing
pressure to come to terms with the storehouse of
anomalous data.
When the pressure to do this becomes intolerable, a
person shifts - often with surprising suddenness - to the
opposite process of accommodation. This represents an
adjustment in (if not a wholesale abandonment of) an
existing schema to bring it in alignment with
anomalous information. If sufficiently radical (in
situations where one overarching schema is abandoned
in favor of a dramatically different or
incommensurable one), this change may take on the
outward features of a sudden “conversion”.
“Conversion”
While, as an evangelical, I believe that true conversion
in the Scriptural sense of the term - call this big-C
Conversion -- is not humanly explicable and requires a
supernatural referent, there is little doubt that dramatic
viewpoint shifts of various kinds, which we might call
little-c conversions, have an obvious Piagetian
explanation. Thus, there are political “conversions”,
conversions to atheism or agnosticism, and the like.
Some gay rights activists talk about “gay conversions”
as a metaphor for the radical self-redefinition that may
precede or accompany “coming out”. In essence these
are all schematic or paradigm shifts of a dramatic and
sudden nature; they are typically preceded by a long
period of hidden struggle as the two Piagetian
processes battle for supremacy. Even true religious
conversion partakes of these processes, though from a
supernaturalist perspective they are not fully or
reductionistically explained by them.
Since intellectual development (the ongoing
enhancement of our schemata) depends on a delicate
balance between assimilation (mental stability) and
6
accommodation (mental flexibility), Piaget’s theory
predicts that people faced with distressing anomalies
will initially resist a change to their schemata (since
maintaining relative stability in our thinking is
essential both to good mental health and to our ability
to maneuver in a complex world), but will then -- after
a “delay” or “gap” during which the balance between
assimilation and accommodation is on a knife-edge --
will suddenly, sometimes even catastrophically, shift
perspectives and alter one’s prior schemata. This
alternation between “stubborn adherence” to a new
schema and “radical abandonment” to the challenge of
a new schema is characteristic of all mental
development, Piagetians believe.
Implications for the Origins Debate
The battle between creationist and evolutionary models
of biological (including human) origins can be seen
through the lens of this Piagetian framework. (Hence,
of course, Piaget’s model is itself a schema - or, as he
might have suggested had he thought of it, a “meta-
schema” or “super-schema” that explains the
development of all other schemata.) The theory itself is
neutral about the direction of probable attitude change,
but given the fact that the creationist framework is
more likely to play the role of the pre-existing schema
for believers, as well as the current overall state of the
empirical data base (though ID theorists might
disagree!), the “evolutionary conversion” is probably
the more likely of the two. (I have no direct data to
support this contention and would welcome replies
from anyone who might have such data: given that
movement in both directions probably does occur, how
frequent is either type of change?)
It can be argued that the theological schemata of faith
(belief in an eternally sovereign and personal God, in
the universality and intractability of human sin, in the
unique redemption offered by Christ, in the necessity
of individual salvation, and in a “high” view of
Scripture) can be kept logically distinct from the
scientific schemata that involve proximal and
mechanistic questions of secondary causation as
related to biological origins. In short, believing (as I
do) in the God of the Bible does not, in itself,
necessitate either belief or disbelief in evolution,
though atheists presumably have no choice but to
accept the evolutionary paradigm: the EC position need
not be a “way station” on the road to skepticism,
nihilism, and irreligion. As a result, updating one’s
schemata with respect to the biology of origins may
have no inevitable impact on one’s theology of origins
- a topic to be explored in a subsequent article.
 The Social Psychology of the Origins Debate
Questions for Discussion
1. For those among the readership who have changed
their minds about biological origins over the years, do
you see evidence in your own intellectual narrative that
Piaget’s concepts can explain your experience? Were
your changes in belief or attitude initially fostered by
awkward, anomalous information that you could not
easily explain? Did you initially resist the implications
of that information? Did you experience a sudden shift
in viewpoint at some later time, perhaps showing the
“straw that broke the camel’s back” effect in your own
life?
2. Do you experience or perceive this process to be
irreversible, for yourself or for others you have
observed? Piaget might argue that it is rare (if not
impossible) for a person to move backwards in this
process of intellectual development, since schemata
always become more comprehensive and complex
(never less so). Is there anyone among the readership
who “veered and tacked” back and forth between
creationist and evolutionist postures?
3. Do you agree with me that biological (scientific)
schemata can be kept distinct from theological
schemata, in that beliefs in one realm do not directly or
necessarily dictate one’s views in the other realm?
“Distinct” does not mean “entirely separate”, of course.
How, in your view or your experience, do the two sets
of schemata best inform or influence one another?
IV. Ingroup-outgroup Bias in the
Origins Debate: Part One
Many social analysts would agree that we live in an
increasingly polarized culture. Signs of social
fragmentation are not difficult to observe, such as the
much-vaunted phenomenon of “Red vs. Blue
America”. William Strauss and Neil Howe have
borrowed the term “cultural unraveling” to summarize
their view of this increasingly disentangled, tribalistic
cultural trajectory (a pattern that, incidentally, they
believe recurs every eight decades or so, right before
the emergence of a significant crisis experience that
reunites the culture - stay tuned over the next decade to
discover whether they were right).
In examining the origins debate, the contributions of
social psychologists who have extensively studied the
origins of prejudice and stereotyping should not be
neglected. Most readers would probably agree that
“creationists” and “evolutionists” rarely seem to
understand (let alone value and respect) each other.
7
Yet, without an attempt to understand another’s
viewpoint “from the inside”, and without unconditional
respect for the other’s humanity and fundamental
dignity, little intellectual or social progress can be
anticipated. Visser t’Hoeft had it right, in my view,
when he wrote, “The essence of dialogue is not that we
relativize our convictions, but that we agree to accept
one another as persons.” Yet the social psychology of
how we perceive those who differ from us very easily
gets in the way of that essential attitude. In this article
(and part 2 to be published later this week) we will
examine the processes that lead to prejudice and
discrimination.
Ingroups and outgroups: The Basics
Social psychologists have, for decades, utilized terms
like “ingroup-outgroup bias” to explore the ways in
which we perceive and respond to people who are
either similar to or different from us. In one classic
study college students were shown two abstract
paintings and asked which they preferred. Most
students had only a slight preference and probably did
not have much, if any, emotional investment in this
question. Yet, when divided into groups on the
supposed basis of this preference, they showed biases
against those who had chosen the other painting and
preferential treatment toward those who had chosen the
same painting as they had. If such minimalist
influences can shape behaviors and attitudes so
dramatically, imagine the potential impact of
discovering that someone is -- like or unlike you -- a
“creationist” or an “evolutionist”, especially if these
are matters of great importance to you!
Group membership can drive the formation of
prejudicial attitudes in two different ways. First, we
can understandably come to believe that those in
groups to which we belong are valid sources of insight
and information. Because we know and trust those who
we see as similar to ourselves, we invest their views
with a greater degree of certainty, validity, and
objectivity than they perhaps deserve. This includes
their views of those who belong to other groups.
Conversely, we tend to be skeptical of information
presented to us by those who differ from ourselves.
(Every semester at the university, I face some students
- usually a minority - who are deeply skeptical of
anything I say because, after all, I am a teacher - and
all teachers are suspect.)
Second, all social groups have informal social rules
and norms, which are often more powerful than
formally written and enforced rules. These informal
expectations reflect “the way we do things” (from this
it is only a small step to “the way everyone ought to do
 The Social Psychology of the Origins Debate
things”) and, because these are often unarticulated and
unexamined, are all the more powerful (fish don’t
know they are wet). Thus, we become prejudiced
because we trust those who are like us (so-called
“informational influence”) and also because we want to
fit in with those who are like us (“normative
influence”).
Perceptual effects
Perhaps most frighteningly, our ability to be accurate
in perceiving others - never mind conceptualizing
about or acting upon our perceptions - depends heavily
on these group membership factors. The classic terms
“leveling and sharpening” have often been used to
characterize these tendencies. We are aware of the
diversity among groups to which we belong, and
readily recognize the individuality and uniqueness of
those who are fellow members of an ingroup. But,
when looking at those who are different from us
(members of an outgroup), we can easily lump them all
together without intending consciously to do so. We
have a strong tendency to see these people as “all
alike” and to be relatively blind to distinctions between
them that would be obvious to those inside that group.
Even if we do not take the further step of emphasizing
the negative ways in which outgroup members are
alike, these tendencies can strongly shape our attitudes.
Research on eyewitness testimony has repeatedly
shown that witnesses to a crime (or other event) who
belong to a distinctly different social group than the
suspect (or other target person) are much less reliable
in remembering and reporting that individual’s
appearance and behavior than are members of the same
social group. In the most extreme instance, outgroup
members can go completely unnoticed except for times
when they violate the rules or confirm prejudicial
expectations. (As the Hallmark card jokingly puts it,
“One of the great things about turning 50 is that you
can go to the mall and be invisible to anyone under
25.” I’ve had more than one teenager actually try to
walk through me and then express astonished surprise
that there actually was a human being there at all.)
Questions for Discussion
This week’s questions have a bit of an inevitably
moralistic - perhaps even preachy - tone. As Don
Adams used to annoyingly repeat, sorry about that.
Yet, I’m holding my own feet to the fire as much as I
am anyone else’s. One of the things I most appreciate
about the pastor of my church is that, whenever he asks
similar application questions in a sermon, he always
ends with, “What about you? What about me?”
1. To what extent would you say that you can enter
8
sympathetically into the world of the “other” (those
who hold sharply differing views about matters you
hold dear, perhaps including your perspective on the
origins debate)? Setting aside the question of whether
you think they are right or even whether you think their
views are defensible, can you borrow a leaf from the
counselor’s notebook and use “active listening”
methods to be accurate in summarizing their views in a
way the others would accept and affirm, using terms
and mental frameworks acceptable to them? (It’s
harder than it sounds!)
2. Mortimer Adler once famously wrote,
“Comprehension should always precede criticism.”
Yet, it’s easy to confuse a stereotypic understanding of
another’s views, as seen from the safety of an
outsider’s vantage point, with a thoroughgoing and
honestly compassionate insider’s understanding. David
Thompson calls this being a “moral tourist” - flitting
(with some unknown mixture of curiosity and
condescension) across the surface of another’s world
without engaging it seriously as an equal, “one heart to
another”. Where would you say you are on this
continuum?
3. Given that Evolutionary Creationists (EC) have
experienced a mental paradigm shift – whether (no pun
intended) evolutionary or revolutionary in character –
why doesn’t this group do a better job of serving as a
bridge between the other, more polemic groups in this
social debate? It would seem that ECs are uniquely
qualified as mediators and “translators”, but it also
doesn’t seem to be happening. Why not, in your view?
V. Ingroup-outgroup Bias in the
Origins Debate: Part Two
In the previous article, the basics of the social
psychology of ingroups and outgroups was covered. In
this follow-up, we’ll be taking a more in-depth look at
some of the reasons why social groups sometimes fail
to understand or empathize with one another.
Ingroup Bias and Outgroup Bias: Two Separate
Phenomena
The work of contemporary social psychologists like
Brewer and Stephan suggest important cautions about
how we view these effects. They remind us that
ingroup bias and outgroup bias are two separate
phenomena, not mere flip sides of the same coin.
While these two processes often operate in tandem,
they do not always do so: it is possible to identify
strongly with a certain group, to draw meaning from
my membership in that group and to see it as a central
element of my self-definition, without disparaging
 The Social Psychology of the Origins Debate
those in other groups and without believing that all
others should be “just like me” at the risk of second-
class citizenship or dehumanized status. In some cases,
I can affirm who I am while simultaneously affirming
the value of those who are unlike me (“everybody’s
beautiful in their own way”). In their research, they
examine the questions, “Under what conditions will
ingroup preference lead to negative attitudes about
those who are different?”
Polarization Factors
At least three factors may be responsible for the
tendency to polarize the social world (like me = good,
unlike me = bad) or to view outgroup members
prejudicially or unfavorably. These factors are
described as 1) realistic threat 2) symbolic threat and 3)
ingroup anxiety. Factors two and three seem pertinent
to the origins debate, while the first is likely less
relevant. Realistic threat describes a social interaction
where the outgroup is competing with me and my
group for scarce resources. While this element may
underlie many geopolitical conflicts (it is a likely cause
of many wars), it seems rather tangential in importance
to the origins debate (unless one views academic
respectability and cultural influence as “scarce
resources” of this type).
Polarization Factors Relevant to the Origins Debate
Both symbolic threat and intergroup anxiety seem
pertinent to the origins discussion. First, the outgroup
can be a source of symbolic threat in that the very
existence of their different ways and ideas challenge
the validity and legitimacy of my own. One common
response to symbolic threat is an attempt to
delegitimize opposing ideas (through caricature or
thinly veiled sarcasm, for instance) or to drive them
underground in some fashion; this seems to closely
describe the actual conduct of the origins debate on
both sides of the divide.
Second, intergroup anxiety stems from the fear that I
will be unable to handle direct contact or interaction
with outgroup members: that I will not be able to “hold
my own” (intellectually, emotionally, or otherwise),
that my inadequacies will be publicly revealed, and so
forth. This too seems relevant to the contemporary
origins debate, as neither side seems readily willing to
acknowledge gaps, flaws, or problems in their ideas.
(Indeed, one wonders how many social conflicts would
go away if we would all just memorize the phrase,
“There is much I don’t know, and I have a great deal to
learn from you”?)
Finally, these researchers intriguingly find that ingroup
members who are most likely to show these effects are
9
those who feel marginalized by their own group or
who may feel as if they don’t quite fit even within their
own circles. Such people may be most eager to
demonstrate to themselves and others that “I really am
one of you”. I can’t help wondering, by extension, if
evolutionary creationists (though often seeing
themselves as a bridge between the extremists) might
sometimes fall prey to these tendencies. It can be
wearing to have to try to prove to mainstream
evolutionists our scientific credentials, while also
defending our theological credentials to our co-
religionists!
Questions for discussion
1. What are your existing prejudices with respect to the
origins debate? It’s easy to find extreme examples of
prejudicial statements by extremists on both sides of
this debate, and to give oneself a clean bill of health on
the grounds that “I’m not like that”. But, for most of
us, prejudice comes in milder forms - so-called
“implicit prejudice” that lurks in the subconscious
mind. It’s hard to ferret these out, of course, yet
essential to try. Are you holding to your remaining
prejudices in the same way that an alcoholic justifies
his drinking - “I can stop any time I want to”?
2. What steps might be helpful to reduce your own
prejudice quotient? For some, biting your tongue
before you speak, or gluing your fingers together
before you email, might be a useful beginning. For
others, meaningful (non-combative) dialogue with
someone with whom you disagree might be a good
start. Those of you who disagree violently with me are
free to pick me as a dialogue partner. Post away!
VI. Personality Diversity and
Cognitive Modes in the Origins
Debate: Part One
The fact that we differ from one another is such an
obvious one that it hardly needs to be stated, yet much
of academic psychology until recent decades has
somewhat ignored that reality. The terms often used in
scholarly discourse are “nomothetic” versus
“idiographic” psychology. Nomothetic theorists focus
on the similarities between persons (what we have in
common, what makes us all alike) and, in the extreme,
can mistakenly view human beings as entirely
equivalent, so that understanding one of us generates a
full understanding of any of us. Idiographic theorists,
in contrast, focus on the differences between persons
(what differentiates us, what makes us each unique)
 The Social Psychology of the Origins Debate
and, in the extreme, can mistakenly view each of us as
so irreducibly unique as to render any general
understanding of human psychology impossible.
As in most life situations, the truth likely lies
somewhere in between. However, my personal bias is
in favor of idiographic psychology. My favorite book
on the subject is one whose title says it all (which
conveniently absolves you of the responsibility of
reading it): I’m Not Crazy, I’m Just Not You. The
failure to identify and work within one’s own personal
uniqueness is, from a counseling standpoint, a major
challenge; as Lily Tomlin once self-mockingly put it,
“I always wanted to be somebody, but now I see that I
should have been more specific.”
In this article, and one to follow later this week, I will
be examining the role of personality differences, as
well as the related issue of diversity in how we think
and process information (so-called “cognitive modes”),
in influencing how we perceive questions relating to
creation and evolution. I am currently in the early
stages of conducting research directly addressing this
question. While the canons of research ethics prohibit
me from directly divulging the results of these early
pilot studies, I will at a few points hide my light under
a bushel in the hope that astute readers will be able to
find the bushel and kick it to one side, thus revealing
the illumination underneath.
Models of Personality Diversity: The Pioneering
Work of William James
About a century ago, the early psychologist William
James wrote and published his now-classic work The
Varieties of Religious Experience, still considered
among the “must-read” classic works on that topic. As
part of that work, James introduced and elucidated the
distinction between “tough-minded” and “tender-
minded” individuals. The former, as the name implies,
were no-nonsense types with their feet firmly planted
on the ground, people who were most interested in
hard-headed practical realities and not given to
introspection, internal analysis, or self-doubt. By
temperament, they were realists and empiricists who
believed in the world presented to them through their
five senses and in the role of impersonal, objective
logic. By contrast, the latter inhabited a world in which
compassion, connection to others (including, perhaps,
an unseen and nonhuman world), hidden meanings,
transcendent purposes, and the like took center stage.
These individuals were prone to believe that “the
unexamined life is not worth living” but, in their
tendency to question themselves and to be harsh self-
critics, may have been more prone to self-doubt, guilt,
and personal recriminations. In his book, James
10
explored possible connections between this personality
characteristic and two contrasting forms of religion that
he styled “once-born” versus “twice-born” religious
experiences.
Models of Personality Diversity: Other Important
Additions
Possibly influenced (at least indirectly) by James’
work, many subsequent personality theorists have
developed this same theme. The great-grandfather of
them all, Carl Jung, developed his famous theory of
psychological types on the basis of the idea that people
differ in three important ways: in their focus on the
outer world of action and interaction versus the inner
world of reflection and introspection (extraversion vs.
introversion), in their emphasis on practical concrete
realities or on imaginative abstract possibilities
(sensing vs. intuition), and in their use of either
impersonal logic or personal values to make important
decisions (feeling vs. thinking). (Devotees of the
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator will know that later
theorists added a fourth dimension to yield the famous
sixteen psychological type designators.) Heather
Cattell wrote extensively about these same notions
using a different vocabulary and methodology, but also
agreed that these fundamental differences largely
reflected James’ original notion. Still more recently,
McCrae and Costa developed and promoted their now
influential Big Five model of personality diversity,
again signifying that most if not all of these dimensions
have at least implicit links to James’ formulation.
Can Personality Profiles Predict Views on the
Origins Debate?
My research is focusing in part on the question of
whether students’ personality profiles can statistically
predict either their existing views on the origins debate
(dividing students, by means of an original
questionnaire, into creationist, theistic evolutionist, and
secular evolutionist groups) and/or the likelihood that
their views will change as the result of exposure to a
secular education, either in general or specifically in
terms of course content relating to evolutionary
science. My original hypothesis was that secular
evolutionists would be more “tough-minded” (prone to
adopt a more reductionistic view of reality, in that only
what can be scientifically established is real), while
other groups would be more “tender-minded” (prone to
view reality in less reductionistic terms that allowed for
the possibility of nonempirical realities and
nonscientific ways of knowing). Over time, students
with different personality profiles might tend to
diverge from one another in predictable ways even if
they started their college experience with similar
attitudes and beliefs about the origins debate.
 The Social Psychology of the Origins Debate
In the next article, we’ll explore further implications of
these differences with a more detailed emphasis on
different modes of thinking.
Questions for Discussion
1. In your experience, do you agree with me that
creationists and evolutionists (particularly
reductionistic or secular evolutionists) differ in how
they think as much as in what they think? In other
words, to what extent is the dispute one about
methodology or epistemology (what truth is and how it
might best be determined or evaluated)?
2. If this is true, how might the gap best be bridged?
VII. Personality Diversity and
Cognitive Modes in the Origins
Debate: Part Two
In the previous article, the possibility that the origins
debate stems in part from personality or cognitive
differences was introduced. This article will focus in a
more technical way on the possible roots of those
differences and their implications.
Cognitive Modes
The links between personality (who we are and what
motivates us) and cognition (how we think and process
information) are complex and multifaceted. However,
it would be rational to expect a connection between
them, since both motivation and cognition are
undergirded by one and the same neural apparatus!
Much theorizing on the phenomenon of hemispheric
lateralization (the fact that our higher brain centers are
divided into mirror-image opposite halves or
hemispheres, which appear to process information in
radically different ways) has led to speculations, some
more scientifically grounded than others, about how
the personality-cognition linkage might work in
practice.
Most experts, with varying degrees of skepticism about
these notions, probably now agree that the left
hemisphere processes information in a more linear,
detail-minded, logic-driven manner (asking narrower
or more concrete questions, and being more verbally
driven), as compared to the more nonlinear, big-
picture, intuitive processing of the right hemisphere
(asking broader or more abstract questions, and being
more visually driven). Since, to a greater or lesser
extent, all of have a more dominant hemisphere (the
11
world can be divided into left-hemisphere and right-
hemisphere types), some would go further beyond the
evidence to speculate about personality and
motivational differences between these two types of
individuals. Some authors call them the “safeguarding
self” and the “experimenting self”, for instance.
Different Colored Thinking Hats
Perhaps influenced by these ideas, consulting
psychologist Edward de Bono has postulated six
different cognitive modes or ways of using one’s mind,
which he believes are learnable skill sets that can be
enhanced through targeted practice. He uses the
metaphor of putting on different “thinking hats” to
characterize the shift between cognitive modes; thus,
he talks about detailed observation (White Hat),
emotional expression and empathy (Red Hat),
creativity and humor (Green Hat), logical critiquing
and troubleshooting (Black Hat), and so forth. Linking
these ideas to the previous paragraph, it seems likely
that left-hemisphere persons specialize more in White
and Black Hat thinking, as opposed to the Green and
Red Hat emphases of the right-hemisphere thinker.
Again, my research on student views of the origins
debate is beginning to examine the influence of
cognitive mode differences on student views of
creation and evolution. (Note: Readers of this series
will have the opportunity to examine my research
instrument in the concluding article of this series).
Somewhat in line with the previous hypothesis, I
expect to find that evolutionists (and particularly
secular evolutionists) will show more evidence of
White and Black Hat thinking (“just the facts, ma’am,”
as Jack Webb used to intone each week on Dragnet),
while creationists and perhaps also theistic
evolutionists to a lesser extent will show more
evidence of Green and Red Hat thinking (“there is
more in heaven and earth than is dreamed of in your
philosophy”).
Further Implications
If the intractable divide between creationists and
evolutionists in the wider world is, in fact, driven in
part by fundamentally different ways of thinking and
processing information, it is no surprise that opponents
routinely talk past one another and fail to understand
the meanings and motivations of each other. (It doesn’t
take a rocket scientist - which is convenient for me,
since I’m not one - to observe, along with Christian
psychiatrist Paul Tournier, that most of the origins
debate has been yet another example of “dialogues of
the deaf”.)
A good first step in bridging the divide may be an
 The Social Psychology of the Origins Debate
explicit recognition of the fact that there are multiple
gateways to truth (or at least to the conviction that
something is true), and that many of the classic
disputes really are, as children of the Vietnam War era
are still prone to put it, “arguments about the shape of
the table”. Those who are cognitively prone to restrict
themselves to direct empirical evidence often fail to
understand how anyone can doubt evolutionary science
or, more radically, why anyone would need to assert
any level of kind of explanation other than the
reductionistic and proximal. On the other hand, those
whose natural cognitive tendency is to place empirical
data in a wider context (or, in more extreme cases, to
disparage the role of the merely empirical) can’t easily
understand how anyone could be satisfied with an
explanatory framework that failed to ask the wider
questions of meaning, purpose, and ultimate
metaphysical causality. Colin Chapman’s famous work
on the six ways of knowing is a good framework for
bridging these differences, and I recommend it
(particularly its exposition in Christianity on Trial, a
work that remains cogent though now rather dated).
Questions for Discussion
1. What do you think of De Bono’s idea that factual-
logical thinkers (White and Black Hat) may differ
dramatically in outlook and motivation from intuitive-
subjective thinkers (Green and Red Hat)? Might these
differences, in part, underlie the origins debate? Where
on this continuum do you think you fall, and why?
2. From an evolutionary standpoint, why might both
styles of thinking have persisted throughout human
(pre)history? (This is a very speculative question, but I
would be interested in readers’ thoughts about it.)
Presumably both styles are functional and adaptive in
some fashion. How and why?
VIII. The Social Psychology of the
Origins Debate: Conclusion
Like any good narrative psychologist, let me close this
series with a parable, or at least the broad outlines of
one. An engaged couple was separated geographically
through no fault of their own; he ended up in Miami,
while she landed in Anchorage. Undaunted, they made
plans to rectify the problem. They agreed that on a
certain date he would start driving north and west from
Miami (within the limits of geography and available
roads) and she would begin driving south and east
from Anchorage. Each would drive the same number
of hours each day, and their plan was to meet in the
middle of the country, get married, buy a house, and
12
raise a family.
One notes two things about this story. First, it is
theoretically possible that the plan would work.
Second, without more specific tactics and a good
awareness of the intervening landscape, the odds of the
couple actually meeting are astonishingly low.
The Historical Relationship Between Science and
Religion
In my view, even at its best the historical relationship
between science and religion is something like this.
(The parable is based on the short story The Place of
Telling I wrote in 1992). Once upon a time, these two
ways of knowing were united (there was a unity of
knowledge), but for complex reasons, the two went
their separate ways, with unfortunate results. In today’s
culture, some people believe that one or the other is
unnecessary or even detrimental. Others attach such
primacy to their preferred approach that (to continue
with the analogy) they refuse to leave their state of
origin (Florida or Alaska respectively).
A Hope for Unity once more
In contrast, I have the hope – and, indeed, the currently
unsubstantiated faith commitment – that, when all is
said and done and, in the words of W. B. Yeats, “all
that story’s told”, the two can and will meet without
contradiction, and the unity of knowledge will again be
restored. As Eliyahu Rips puts it, “I think that finally,
when we understand both well enough, religion and
science will come together, and we will at last have a
unified field theory.” We’re a long way from that as I
write; the driver of the science vehicle is somewhere in
Georgia, and the religious traveler has just crossed into
Canada.
As the Amy Grant lyrics my wife and I chose for our
wedding put it, “We’re caught in between the now and
the not yet.” This creative tension between the way the
world is now and the way the world one day will be is,
I think, an inevitable part of the Christian experience. It
colors everything, including how we think about both
science and faith. But one day all things will be united
in Christ. Although in context Paul was talking about a
different kind of separation, it is perhaps not an
inappropriate application to note that one of Christ’s
ministries was that of uniting the hopelessly divided:
“For he himself is our peace, who has made the two
one and has destroyed the barrier, the dividing wall of
hostility” (Eph. 2:14).
While many people do affirm both science and religion
in principle, the historical relationship between them
has often been rife with conflict. This series has
 The Social Psychology of the Origins Debate

attempted to explore some of the psychologically based

reasons for the ongoing conflict: the resistance we all
have to changing our established ways of thinking;
group polarization processes that make it difficult to
regard perspectives of other, “opposing” social groups
fairly; and cognitive style differences that may cause
different persons to process and evaluate the same
information in strikingly incommensurable ways.
While these concepts are not a panacea that will
resolve the cultural disputes once and for all – if I were
able to do that, I would hope for a Nobel Prize or at
least immediate tenure – they do represent a “tool kit”
that may enable us to respond to those with whom we
disagree with a greater degree of understanding,
respect, and dignity. If we can’t always agree about
conclusions, perhaps we can find ways to agree about
process or about motives.

Reinhold Neibuhr once famously said, “Nothing that is

worth doing can be achieved in our lifetime; therefore
we must be saved by hope.” My hope is that this series
has been a small contribution towards that end –
looking forward to the day when “we shall know, even
as we are known.”

Thanks again for the privilege of contributing to this

series.

Take the Survey

I invite readers to participate in my online survey on
attitudes about origins. The survey contains 85
questions, 55 having to do with issues related directly
or indirectly to the origins debate, 30 involving normal
personality diversity. I have, of course, some specific
research hypotheses that I would be happy to share,
along with preliminary research results as they emerge,
with those who complete the survey and email me to
inform me that they have done so. The survey is
anonymous (I will not know whose responses are
whose).

13