Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia: A Scenario Planning Exercise

The following is merely hypothetical and was done as an exercise in scenario planning.

Somalia is on the verge of emerging from its notorious failed state status to the much preferred failing state status.1 This is a big deal for a country that has been in the throes of civil war, dysfunction, and complete collapse for over 20 years.2 In 2012, Somalia created a new parliament, adopted a new constitution, and elected a President.3 This dramatic shift in liberalization opens the door to US aid, and it increases the likelihood that the U.S. military will soon provide humanitarian assistance. The U.S. military should prepare for four possible intervention scenarios (Figure 1) derived from two critical factors: the proportion of women in parliament and the inflow/outflow of refugees.4 The participation of women in a state system is an indicator of inclusiveness in the political process (Figure 2). The inflow/outflow ratio of refugees indicates the extent to which disenfranchised population groups feel secure within their own state (Figure 3). Given Somalias recent aggressive pursuit of internal extremist organizations and the Somali governments aggressive adoption of a system of law, the likely future scenario is that refugee inflows increase as participation in the political process increases (Figure 1) putting pressure on the central government to provide aid to needing citizens. The most troublesome scenario occurs when refugee inflows increase but political participation decreases rendering the central government incapable of managing a refugee problem that hosts transnational terrorist groups. In the likely event that refugees return en masse to Somalia, the central Somali government will lack the capacity to manage both increased refugee populations and the distribution of aid to those refugees.5 The U.S. military may provide assistance to Somalia, primarily to distribute aid. The U.S. military could facilitate widespread, decentralized distribution of aid by extending the reach and distribution means to the greatest number of refugee centers possible. The military objective would be to facilitate the positive momentum of Somalias renewed government efforts and legitimize the Somali government as capable of managing domestic problems. If the security deteriorates, however, and the central Somali government fails to manage a refugee problem, then refugee populations will stimulate increased criminal activity. The most troublesome criminal risk is that disenfranchised refugee centers may host transnational terrorist groups, such as alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The U.S. military would need to secure key refugee centers and conduct intelligence operations aimed at countering terrorist activities. This scenario poses the greatest security risk to forces, causing the military to centralize aid operations. The military objective would be to prevent a significant rise in criminal activity that destabilizes the central political process. The return of refugees is a good problem and a potentially bad one. It is, ultimately, the critical factor that will demand U.S. military assistance. Somalia lacks the capacity to manage refugees. The U.S. military can assist Somalia with the distribution of aid and with securing refugee centers. By providing humanitarian assistance, the United States can legitimize the central Somali government which reduces the growth potential for threats to U.S. national security.
1

In a soon to be published monograph, Major Joseph Royo discusses various state conditions, identifying Somalia as currently failed but on the verging of improving to failing. See, SOF in Unlit Spaces, a SAMS monograph available in May 2013. 2 Royo, Joseph. "Afghanistan Part II: the Reoccurrence of International Terrorism in Somalia." Small Wars Journal. August 30, 2010. http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/519-Royo.pdf (accessed September 7, 2011). 3 Mosley, Jason. End of the Roadmap: Somalia After the London and Istanbul Conferences. Africa Programme Paper AFP PP2012/04, London: June, 2012. See also, Federal Republic of Somalia Provisional Constitution adopted on August 1, 2012. 4 Future scenarios are modeled after Peter Schwartz scenario planning construct. 5 Dagne, Ted. Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace. CRS Report for Congress, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2011, 10.

Figure 1 U.S. Military Humanitarian Response Scenario to Somalia 2013-2015

Source: Author Created. Images of Somalia are derived from the BBC.6
6

http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/media/images/58658000/gif/_58658468_som_controlled_areas_624map.gif

References Dagne, Ted. Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace. CRS Report for Congress, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2011. Mosley, Jason. End of the Roadmap: Somalia After the London and Istanbul Conferences. Africa Programme Paper AFP PP2012/04, London: June, 2012. Royo, Joseph. "Afghanistan Part II: the Reoccurrance of International Terrorism in Somalia." Small Wars Journal. August 30, 2010. http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/519-Royo.pdf (accessed September 7, 2011). Schwartz, Peter. "The Art of the Long View: Appendix Steps to Developing Scenarios." In The Art of the Long View, by Peter Schwartz, Appendix. New York: Doubleday, 1991. "The Federal Republic of Somalia Provisional Constitution (Translation)." Mogadishu: The Federal Republic of Somalia, August 1, 2012.

Appendix1 Figure 2 Proportion of Seats Held by Women in National Parliaments

Source: Created by the author using Google Public Data Tool

Appendix 2 Figure 3 Refugee Population by Country or Territory of Origin

Source: Created by the author using Google Public Data Tool