A.

It is consistent with Morrison and Lopez in that it technically does not comport with one of the 4 categories since Congress is attempting to regulate the absence of commerce, however the Court has never stated that Congress does not possess such power, and Congress has compelled people to do things before (such as the draft) a. The Court always looked at "activity" as a prerequisite in all precedent b. In all prior Commerce Clause cases, Congress has regulated preexisting economic activity - it has never been permitted to anticipate the activity itself B. It is inconsistent with Raich in that, in refusing to uphold the ACA on Commerce Clause grounds, it undermines the idea that a statute may be upheld on commerce clause grounds if economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce when the class of activities, taken in the aggregate, has some substantial effect on interstate commerce. Congress had a great deal of data showing this correlation, thus the decision is also inconsistent because it denies Congress its "rational basis" deference (Katzenbach) a. Sebelius is more like Raich than Morrison, however the court strikes down the provision in Sebilius and upheld the provision in Raich over concern that, otherwise, precedent would allow Congress to force its citizens to do something any time enough of them are not doing something and consequently affecting the economy b. Further, the individual mandate unquestionably bears a "reasonable connection" to Congress' goal of protecting the healthcare market (Raich) C. It is inconsistent with Lopez and Morrison in that it is counter to the idea that Congress has the power to regulate economic activity that is not necessarily interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause, based on the aggregation, substantial effect theory a. It is difficult to argue that health insurance is not economic in nature, however A. if you don't categorize health insurance as economic, you have the inverse result b. Sebelius is more like Wickard (sale of wheat) than Morrison (violence against women) because the sale of wheat, like health insurance, is economic in nature; the link between the activity and the economy is not attenuated in nature D. It is consistent with traditional notions of federalism in that it prevents Congress from usurping the state's traditional police powers except where explicit interstate commerce issues arise to regulate classes of activities that have the substantial effect E. It is consistent with Morrison in that it reiterates the notion that the link between the activity and interstate commerce cannot be too attenuated. Otherwise, you run the risk of a slippery slope. F. It is consistent with Raich in that it reinforces that while Congress does have the power to regulate classes of activities, it does not have the power to regulate classes of individuals, which the government sought to do here a. Government sought to define the class as "those engaged in the healthcare market" but the Court deemed this too broad and Congress was effectively trying to regulate everyone G. It is consistent with Wickard in that it is a recognition that Wickard is the high watermark of congressional power under the Commerce Clause and to take it to the level proposed by the government would far exceed the standard in Wickard H. In a sense it is consistent with early 20th century commerce clause jurisprudence because it seeks to inject rigid analysis into the commerce clause (activity vs. inactivity is akin to direct/indirect effects or commerce/manufacturing distinction) - EC Knight, Carter Coal, Schechter Poultry - this rigid formalism has proven unworkable in the past a. As such, it is inconsistent with Hammer, which states that regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause b. Further, it is inconsistent with many prior Commerce Clause cases (Wickard, Lopez, Jones & Laughlin, etc) in that the majority in Sebelius rejects the notion that Congress should have the ability to legislate based on practical considerations and espouses rigid formalism instead

I. It is consistent with New York, Printz, Lopez and Morrison in reflecting the notion that the Commerce Clause is not carte blanche for doing whatever will help achieve the ends Congress seeks by the regulation of commerce J. It comports with Raich in that Raich dealt with marijuana, a fungible good with no other practical means of regulation; here Congress had other means available to it less repugnant to state's rights that it could employ K. It is consistent with earlier Commerce Clause cases, such as Hammer, that neglect to consider the severe consequence that the "race to the bottom" could have on the interstate economy. Even though it is a traditional state police power concern, states will not do so out of fear that uninsured individuals from states that do not mandate health care insurance will flock there to take advantage L. It is inconsistent with Wickard and Raich in that it contradicts the notion that Congress can dictate the conduct of an individual today because of prophesied future activity a. It undermines Congress' ability to determine the market from long-term perspective, as it did in those cases b. Congress was explicitly legislating based on expected future effects of marijuana entering the interstate market c. So, it can be argued that the provisions in Sabelius are even more certain to occur because the chances that someone will enter the healthcare market are far higher than the chances that someone will enter the market for marijuana M. If it truly is a certainty that everyone will enter the healthcare market at some time, then Congress really isn't mandating that everyone enter the healthcare market, but rather regulating the means by which they do so (Heart of Atlanta)