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Classical Era

453-221 BC Chinese Philosophy of Conflict Period of the Warring States (China) - War is an evil, a departure from the Tao. Tao can only be restored by Tao. The army possessing the greatest Virtue (or Tao) will be victorious. Intelligence or short bursts of force used intelligently are preferable to total warfare (Clausewitz says maximum employment of force is compatible with highest intelligence). Chinese strategists suggest ignoring personal considerations of either love or hate or moral compunctions about deception or morality; however, there is an underlying humanism and concern for the commonwealth. Once grasp the great form without a form/and you will roam where you will/with no evil to fear,/calm, peaceful, at ease./The hub of the wheel runs upon the axle./In a jar, it is the hole that holds water./So advantage is had/from whatever there is;/but usefulness rises from whatever is not. van Creveld applies this as follows: ... the best war is that which is never fought. ( van Creveld 41) Sun Tzu - Chinese commander and author of The Art of War - held that war is an evil/emphasized deceit and stratagems - the commander should have a store of alternative plans to execute - the army must flow over the landscape like water (Taoist metaphor) - the best work on war ever (224) (van Creveld 2000) BC Spartan hegemony broken at the battle of Leuctra Aneas the Tactician - comprehensive/pedestrian guide to siege warfare - main question: how to defend a city under attack BC Han dynasty unites China BC Romans extend rule over Carthage and Corinth: Rome controls Mediterranean Asclepiodotus - Outline of Tactics - pedantic discussion of tactics/possibly a rhetorical exercise - describes Macedonian phalanx in an age when the Roman legion was preeminent Battle of Actium: Roman Empire established

Taoism and War

Mid 5th

371 BC Mid third century 210 146 First Century

29

Christian Era
Mid First Century Frontinus, Sextus Julius - Roman administrator - Strategemata: compendium of tricks used by commanders at different points of history - popular in the Middle Ages. Onasander - O Strategos (The General) - wrote a philosophical treatise on the qualities of a good general. Furthest extent of the Roman Empire Vegetius, Renatus Flavius - Things Military (Epitoma Rei Militaris) - emphasizes organization and tactics - typically Roman: emphasizes training, discipline, hard work, and careful planning - classic used in Middle Ages and Renaissance Fall of the Western Roman Empire Belisarius and Narses, Byzantine commanders

Late First Century 117 Late Fourth Century

476 535-567

Middle Ages
No coherent philosophy of war reign 582 602 Emperor Maurice - supposed author of the Strategikon, a comprehensive guide to military affairs. - represents contemporary (and successful) Byzantine military practice - said to have had actual influence on campaigns against the Arabs - anthropological analysis of the Empires enemies 800 Charlemagne crowned Emperor of Rome 890-912 reign Emperor Leo The Wise - supposed author of the Tacticon, the Byzantine military handbook - based on Emperor Maurices Strategikon and Onasanders treatise on generalship. Byzantine War is regarded as a tool of the emperor it lacks the humanitarianism of the Chinese thinkers Strategy 1096 1st Crusade 1291 Last Crusader Kingdom falls 1336-1453 Hundred Years War 1348 Battle of Crcy: 1st recorded use of gunpowder in battle 1400 Bonet, Honor - Monk and doctor The Tree of Battles - comprehensive view of what is and what is not permissible in a war - not military theory: a description of the rules of war and the art of chivalry On the origin of war: a discord or conflict that has arisen on account of certain things displeasing to human will, to the end that such conflict should be turned into agreement and reason. (van Creveld 62) If a baron is a vassal of two lords who are at war with each other, which should he help? (62) Pisan, Christine de (1364-1430) - The Art of Chivalry (1410) - French medieval writer 1453 Fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans 1492 Spanish Reconquista completed when Granada falls Columbus reaches Hispaniola 1494 Beginning of French-Spanish-Austrian struggle for Italy Vasco da Gama reaches India by sea

Early Modern
1469-1527 Machiavelli, Niccol - 1512: The Prince is a treatise on power (Erasmus Institutes Principis Christiani deals with morals) - The Art of War was famous but brought no real innovation. (1520-1521) - defended the use of commoners in a citizens militia (in the image of Republican Rome) 1st use of the Italian system of fortification Beginning of Dutch Revolt Ottoman navy broken at the battle of Lepanto Maurice of Nassau commands Dutch armies against Spain Spanish Armada defeated

1522 1566 1571 1584 1588

late 1500s

Lipsius, Justus - Flemish political thinker - the state is the only legitimate war-making organization - external war opposed to internal war - internal war downgraded to civil war, revolution, uprising 1618-1648 Thirty Years War 1625 Grotius The Law of War and Peace 16391643 Montecuccoli, Raimondo (1609-1680 ) - Italian nobleman who served the Habsburgs - Treatise on War (written 1639-1643, published 1680) - treated war as a continuation of state policy - war is made by states not peoples (Greece, Republican Rome) or rulers (China, Imperial Rome, Byzantium, Middle Ages, Renaissance) - Montecuccoli and his contemporaries did not distinguish between tactics (ordering of soldiers on the field) and strategy (long-term plans) - limited communications force commanders to keep their armies together - provisioning and supply take the form of plunder 1643 Spanish hegemony broken [Treaty of Westphalia?] 1648 Peace of Westphalia cements a structure of absolute states: the sovereign has absolute authority over his subjects. Agreements and battles take place between states. AGE OF TRINITARIAN WARFARE (van Creveld 79) government against government, regular army against regular army, with the people reduced to a passive role (van Creveld 76)

Enlightenment
Enlightenment War-Making War as a conceptual field - tactics, operational art and strategy treated as one - war is conducted against foreign states - the purpose of theory is to reduce warfare to a system of rules which would be grounded in experience and supported by reason. (van Creveld 78) Enlightenment Military Theory [to what extent does military theory follow the logic of other theorizing?] - systematizing is easier to do without having to consider the unpredictable actions of an enemy therefore: - theory tends to grow from the bottom up - discipline, marching, organization of ones own forces all precede broad tactics and global strategy - siege warfare is readily systematized (movement being eliminated) 1705-1706 Vauban, Sbastien le Prestre de (1633-1707) - French expert on fortification and siegecraft. - wrote The Attack and Defense of Places - effective siege artillery introduced and defense improved as a result - starting point for Enlightenment military thought in general (van Creveld 224) and its reduction of warfare to rules became a model for writing about warfare (79). - See Foucault on governmentality: Vauban had been an expert at reducing populations: he later decided that he should assist in increasing the population: he wrote a treatise on how to increase the population of France [what is this, if not grand strategy] [Remember Napoleons quip after receiving heavy casualties: one night in Paris will replace them all.] 1712 Battle of Poltava: Russia defeats Sweden and now becomes a great 1720s Foulard, Jean Charles (1669-1752 ) - A History of Polybios - French soldier and writer on military affairs. Defended phalanx in age of muskets. 1720s Puysegur, Franois de Chastenet

1732

- Louis XIVs quartermaster - wrote a tracked aimed at making field warfare as systematic as siege warfare - adapts Vaubans system to the field in The Art of War by Principles and Rules. -- commander must know how to create good formations and the rules governing their movement -- the principles of which are derived from geometry, which all officers must be familiar with (82) -- uses geometrical principles to find the best methods for marching, manoeuvering, building camps -- he stops his near-endless catalogue of rules at just the point where warfare is supposed to begin: when the two moving armies interact [The Enlightenment seems unable to cope with unpredictable interaction] [re: de Saxe that which is not-mechanical or not-geometric is categorized as sublime] Saxe, Maurice de (1696-1750) - French commander during the War of the Austrian Succession. - Mes Rveries: the epitome of 18th century warfare. - a response to Puysegur - laments the lack of any consideration of the sublime (non-mechanical) aspects of warfare in Puysegur - addresses 2 small armies, manoeuvering against each other, trying to capture a territory and fulfill their sovereigns wishes - The manoeuvring was seen as the essence of war; battle was to be engaged in only as a last resort, and then only when the prospects for victory appeared certain. (van Creveld 83) - de Saxe represents the actual practice of successful 18th century commanders - proposed a legion or integrated battalion that included a variety of arms, infantry and cavalry, headquarters, and support services - given this flexible, well supported force, there was no need to come up with a rigid plan before going into the field (which is what Puysegur proposed) - de Saxe called it a kind of universal seminary of soldiers where different nations are freely adopted and their natural prejudices effectually removed. (van Creveld 84)

1741-1763 : Campaigns

Frederick II of Prussia (1740-86 reign) - effective commander - described how arms could be combined - wrote a number of works General Principles (1746), Political Testament (1761), Military Testament (1768), Elements (1771), and a long poem entitled The Art of War. - King was to be sole commander of the forces - officers must be drawn only from the nobility - ruthless discipline for rank and file [They need to fear their officers more than the enemy] - disciplined army can move, shoot, and reload faster and more accurately than the enemy, and can recover from defeat (Frederick lost quite often) - good advice, but not philosophically interesting - Frederick (like most commanders) practiced a warfare of annihilation (Niederwerfung) or attrition (Ermattung) as the situation demanded. 1756-1763 Seven Years War: Britain conquers India and Canada - like W.W. I, it creates a paradigm for evaluating past successes and failures ? Why did the French, possessing geographic, economic, numerical advantage, lose so badly to Prussia? The State of Military Education - writers were frustrated that war, unlike other sciences, could not be reduced to a set of simple, universal rules - writers ignored politics and broader military context in order to simplify - the increase of published military theory indicated a respectability and practical usefulness for theory - staff colleges in Prussia and France represent the institutionalization of military leadership and created a body of experts interested in writing on and reading about tactics and eventually strategy 1772 Guibert, Jacques Antoine (1743-90) - linked warfare to politics: his ideal army required far-reaching political reforms

1776-1783

- General Essay on Tactics - Foresaw the forms of war employed in the Napoleonic Era 1) the entire nation had to wage war (French standing army was feeble) 2) general conscription was necessary if 1) was to be achieved 3) the huge armies resulting from 1) and 2) had to be provisioned without decimating the treasury; consequently, a system of logistics had to be developed 4) these huge armies should not move as a single block (as they had for centuries) they should move as independent divisions - the size and the patriotic fervor of the army would make it unbeatable [a nationalist impulse replacing love of sovereign?] - soldier scholar Maizeroy uses the term strategy to describe the overall conduct of military operations against the enemy (van Creveld 94) War of the American Revolution

Romantic Period
War of the First Coalition 1st instance of leve en masse Berenhorst, Georg Heinrich (1733-1814) - Reflections on the Art of War - emphasized moral factors against the Enlightenment view that war was rational, scientific activity - took apart the myth of Frederick as a great tactician -- he used complicated manoeuvres rarely/relied on discipline and willpower of his forces - It was the ever-variable, often unpredictable, state of mind of commanders and troops, and not simply calculations pertaining to time, distance and the angles between lines of operations, which governed victory and defeat to say nothing about the role played by that great incalculable, pure chance. (106) [who takes into account pure chance] Mapping Advances - from Rome up to Spanish travelling from Italy to Netherlands, commanders had little better than sketches to guide them - triangulation enabled accurate mapping of large countries France was the first - the first grand map of France was in the hands of the military and maps of other countries were soon underway - Strategy, then, was the art of conducting war not by means of coup doeil from behind a horses ears but in an office, on the surface of a map. (van Creveld 95) 1799 Buelow, Adam Heinrich von (1752-1807) FIRST ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH A THEORY OF STRATEGY - Spirit of the Modern System of War (1799) - utilized the newly-developed maps - Geometric approach to war: an army occupied space in a broad field, proceeded from this base, and was connected to its base by lines of operations, with supplies and ammunition going one way and wounded going the other. An army could advance in different lines with different strengths. - Buelows book consists of Euclidean proofs of the best way to conduct an attack (the width of the base should be proportional to the line of operations, two lines should converge on the target at right angles,) - Given these geometric laws, warfare could be reduced to a series of pre-determined moves and countermoves, and eventually people would realize the futility of the exercise and abstain from war. Tic-Tac-Toe becomes intolerably dull once you realize that intelligent players can always stalemate each other. [there is no consideration of the mathematics of probability] - 1st to describe strategy in terms of bases and lines of communication 1800 Battle of Marengo won through la manoeuvre sur les derrires (one part of the army holds its opponent down and the other, using the cover of a natural obstacle) attacks from behind 1792 1796-1799

1804 1805

1813 1815 1830 1832

Jomini, Antoine Henri (1779-1869) - French/Swiss soldier - A Treatise on Grand Operations of War (1804-1805) --strategy as a question of moving forces in two-dimensional space - tried to create a system for guiding manoeuvres even while acknowledging complicating factors such as terrain. - introduced Theatres of Operations (for a country engaging multiple enemies), Zones of Operations (space between armys base and its operations though which communication had to pass) - Provided a justification of la manoeuvre sur les derrires: -- Cutting off the lines of operations and defending ones own could mean victory: Failing to do so could result in disadvantage (the Austrians at Marengo, the Prussians at Jena in 1806) or outright defeat (Austrians at Ulm in 1805) - Provided a justification for operating on internal lines: -- An army with opponents on either side could strike a knock-out blow to one side and then turn and strike the other side before it had a chance to intervene (Israel in 1967). - Jominis rhetoric of geometry and the chessboard did not prevent him from addressing and shaping warfare as it was practiced at the time. - last of the rationalizing system-builders - very popular in the 19th century Battle of Leipzig Battle of Waterloo end of Napoleonic Wars Jominis The Art of War - takes into account the kind of political uses of war that were later described in von Clausewitz book. Clausewitz, Carl von (1780-1831) - Prussian general who combined Buelow and Jominis geometric thinking with Berenhorsts moral emphasis - He tried to understand the secrets of Revolutionary and Napoleonic warfare. Was it total national mobilization (Guibert) enabled by Revolution, or superior understanding of the principles of strategy and tactics? - made a Kantian-transcendental explanation of what war is: -- an act of elemental violence wherein all social limits are cast off -- force always invites retaliation by greater force -- as a result, wars have a tendency to escalate -- in summation: war is an unpredictable great passionate drama. - As such it was not primarily a question of acting according to this or that principle or rule; instead it represented the domain of danger, friction and uncertainty. Its successful conduct was above all a question of possessing the qualities needed in order to counter and master these inherent characteristics. (van Creveld 109) - War was a duel between two independent minds. (109) - Surprise and manoevring dont work at the strategic level/massive force does -- hit the capital, cripple the army, take the country -- away from a capital city and a base an army will at some point go on the defensive and the strengthened defenders will go on the attack -- the attacker must try to gain immediate victory - Political dimension of war: war was a continuation of policy by other means or, in van Crevelds terms, war has a grammar but its logic must be imposed from outside - later saw that total overthrow of the opponent was not the only aim in war - On War published posthumously - Chinese classics recommend minimum force/Clausewitz maximum force - [Romantic intellectual outlook more open to chance and uncertainty]

19th Century
From Classicism to Historicism - 17th and 18th century thinkers admired the Greek and Roman classics - late 18th century sees writers interested in universal principles not tied to venerated classical figures or ancient armies - Vico and Hegel suggest that the past is different from the present: you cannot look to the past for simple examples of how one must behave - specialized historical studies branch off from military history Evolution of Conflict - Mobilization was becoming total: Alexanders battle at Gaugamela involved 47k Greeks and 200k Persians. The Union mobilized 900k and the Confederates 600k during the Civil War. - Was wars no longer limited to tight formations manoeuvring in a restricted space 1854-1856 Crimean War - the most famous poem about this war describes a blunder 1859 Franco-Austrian War 1860s DuPicq, Ardant (1819-70) - Battle Studies - studied the behaviour of men in battle used survey [statistical techniques too?] - As an individual a French soldier was no match for a Mameluk. How was it that 100 Frenchmen could take on 500 Turks and win? - A new social force, known as cohesion, made its appearance (van Creveld 124): this was a product of training. - Roman legion allowed cohesion, but also allowed exhausted soldiers a chance to fall back and be replaced by fresh ones. - flexible tactics and open lines were recommended - skirmishers were to weaken the enemy from a distance (their actions had to be coordinated with smaller battalions) - rediscovered in the wake of French defeat in the Franco-Prussian war. 1861-1865 American Civil War - 1st massive use of railways, telegraph and breech-loaders - Commanders used disguise, skirmishing, surprise, unconventional formations 1866 Prusso-Austrian war witnesses the triumph of the General Staff 1871 Franco-Prussian war establishes German Hegemony to Europe Moltke, Helmut von (1800-91) - Chief of Prussian General Staff. - strategy is a system of expedients (an art of improvisation) - stressed communication and mobility: telegraphs, railways, and improvement of firepower - put into theory what the Americans had explored in practice - took into account the growth in armies since the advent of industrialization - planned for speedy mobilization of conscripted troops - following Jomini, von Moltke was prepared to have troops attack one branch of the enemy then be transported to another site of attack - gave directives that gave commanders flexibility: they were told what to do but not how to do it - war had to have the independent, active participation of all soldiers 1880 Mahan, Alfred (1840-1914) - American naval officer - The Influence of Seapower upon History: world-famous naval treatise - The command of the sea is presented as the route to national greatness. Engels, - Laid down the Marxist doctrine of war. Friedrich (1820- - Predicted an inter-empire conflict in the 20th century, ending the Belle poque impression that the 95 ) prosperous empires would never turn on each other.

1893

1898

Schlieffen, Alfred von (1833-1913) - Chief of German General Staff from 1893 to 1905 - developed a plan for overcoming France, one that depended on a strategy of outflanking movements - notable essays: The Warlord and War in the Modern Age - war consists of two armies manoeuvring in two-dimensional space with the aim of annihilating each other - it is not enough to win the battle, given that a defeated army could always regroup: the army had to be outflanked and its communications cut off. - Schlieffen plan conceived in 1893 Spanish-American War

20th Century
1904-1905 1911 Russo-Japanese War Corbett, Julian (1854-1922) - Principles of Naval Strategy, corrects Mahans Influence and emphasizes the political uses of sea power - presents a positivist understanding of theory it is a process by which we co-ordinate our ideas, define the meaning of the words we use, grasp the difference between essential and unessential factors, and fix and expose the fundamental data on which every one is agreed. In this way we prepare the apparatus of practical discussion ... Without such an apparatus no two men can even think on the same line; much less can they ever hope to detach the real point of difference that divides them and isolate it for quiet solution. (152) Italian-Turkish War sees the 1st military use of aircraft Overthrow of the Ching dynasty and the establishment of a republic 1st World War - The casualties motivated theorists to find some way to minimize casualties Invention of the tank Russian Revolution Ludendorff, Erich (1865-1937) - German chief of staff during the First World War - wrote and published The Nation at War (1936), which set forth a vision of future total war. Douhet, Giulio (1869-1930) - Fascist/Futurist Italian general and writer on air strategy - Futurist orientation: the form of any war ... depends upon the technical means of war available. (van Creveld 161) - The Command of the Air laid groundwork for aerial Blitzkrieg, and realized later in the 1991 Gulf War - Ignoring the massed troops on the ground, aircraft would attack capitals and industrial centres and debilitate the enemy and his war machine - Social engineering: the air troops were to be a professional elite Fuller, John Frederick (1878-1964) - Chief of staff to Royal Tank Corps in WWI - Lectures on Field Service Regulations III: the foundation of armoured warfare - 1920s/1930s Popularized idea that tanks were the wave of the future - followed Douhets vision of a new warrior class Lawrence, T.E. The Seven Pillars of Wisdom - Western view of guerrilla tactics practiced during the Arab revolt against the Ottomans. - The guerrilla should be a cloud of gas, inactive and invisible, hiding in remote places unreachable by cumbersome mass armies - Constantly snipe at his flanks, lines of communication, garrisons - Avoid creating vulnerable bases and exist on the countryside, theft from the enemy. - war is another form of military action

1912 1914-1918 1915 1917 1914-1919 1921

1922

1927

1929

1930s 1935 1936

late 1930s

1939-1945 1941 1941 1945 1949

Liddell Hart, Basil Henry (1895-1970) - British pundit - The Decisive Wars of History (later republished as Strategy) Liddell Hart was brought up on the notion that war was akin to sport and games. In his memoirs he relates, proudly, that he was rather good at football; not because his co-ordination and technique were in any way outstanding, but because he could engage in various combinations and foresee where the ball was likely to end up. (van Creveld 175) - The deadlock of W.W.I convinced Liddell Hart (and others) that tackling the enemy head on was a no-go. - weaken the enemy, disrupt his communications, confuse his commander - disperse your own forces so that enemy doesnt know your centre (the ruse of false airplanes before D-Day) UNCERTAINTY (think of the standard forms of game theory) every plan had to possess two branches, i.e. should be drawn up in such a way as to keep [the enemy] guessing concerning [your] true objectives. It should also be sufficiently flexible to enable that objective to be changed if, by some mishap, the first one turned out to be too strongly defended. (van Creveld 178) - he thought that bombing of cities, combined with tanks and poison gas, would bring wars to an end quickly - like Fuller and Douhet, Liddell Hart wanted small armies to fight quick, decisive battles Term grand strategy invented Germany builds armoured divisions Ludendorff publishes The Nation at War - L. had commanded the German war effort for 2 years - did not believe that the firepower of tanks or aircraft could bring a nation to its knees - followed 19th century militarists in seeking total war with general mobilization and mass armies - all forces of the nation had to be engaged in the struggle - civilians (ones own as well as those of ones enemy) would be involved - the paternalistic Imperial system had neglected the needs of the working classes they would get a new deal - total mobilization would require the end of democracy, and of free enterprise (unions and managers would not be permitted to let their conflicts endanger the state) - such a total mobilization would not be created quickly; therefore it had to be established before the next war and maintained permanently - nation and its life were the highest values All the theories of Clausewitz should be thrown overboard ... Both war and policy serve the existence of the nation. However, war is the highest expression of the peoples will to live. Therefore politics must be made subordinate to war. (van Creveld 185) Mao Tse-tungs writings on peoples war - Guerrilla was is primarily political - Guerrillas are dependent on the people for shelter and supply: they need the peoples support - This can be obtained by propaganda, provoking the enemy into attacking the people, or outright force. 1st Stage) Isolated hit-and-run attacks against enemy forces weaken, and demoralize 2nd Stage) Consolidate guerrilla power in a remote area intensify propaganda, harassment and sabotage. 3rd Stage) As the weakened enemy retreats, break into open warfare: too soon you will be defeated, wait too long and the people as well as the guerillas will become demoralized World War II German attack on the USSR initiates largest single military campaign ever known Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour Atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki USSR explodes nuclear device Chinese Revolution triumphs

The Cold War


- W.W. II introduced tactical innovations that have not changed, despite the proliferation of new weapons systems - Nuclear warfare introduced an entirely new problem for theoreticians of conflict. Few understood the significance of nuclear weapons. Initially they were treated as more destructive versions of the aerial weapons recommended by Douhet - Most theories of nuclear war were propounded by those outside of the military. - Post W.W. II has seen a number of wars acted out by non-state actors. These wars often saw powerful military machines humiliated by mobile guerillas. [The idea of a peoples war has not occurred to the Lipsius/Grotius/Post-Westphalia consensus that states were the only legitimate war-waging entities) 1950-1953 Korean War 1958 Soviet Union explodes largest nuclear device know to date 1960 First ICBM becomes operational, making defense against nuclear attack impossible The idea of MAD (mutually assured destruction) replaces the idea that one could win a nuclear war 1962 Sokolovsky, Vasily Danilovich (1897-1968) - Soviet Field Marshal in WWII - 1962 published the text of Soviet military doctrine - Earlier Soviet writers had followed Fuller in his celebration of the power of mechanization, to which they added the idea of the battle in depth that would take the war to the enemys communication and command centres, as well as a belief in the power of the masses. - Sokolovsky argued that any direct conflict between the superpowers would be total 1963-1975 Vietnam War shows the limits of US military power 1966 Schelling, Thomas (1918-) - American political scientist - wrote Arms and Influence (1966), important text of nuclear strategy 1967 China tests nuclear device 1971 Last Indo-Pakistani war 1972 SALT 1 signed 1973 Largest Arab-Israeli War 1982 Falklands War 1991 Gulf War Soviet Union disintegrates

Guerilla Warfare and Nuclear Warfare Challenge Clausewitzian Consensus


- Clausewitzian theory proved incapable of incorporating warfare by, or against, non-state actors (2120 Peoples War - the Communist-led guerrilla movements united war and politics - books on warfare have relegated it to a separate chapter - there are no powerful concentrations of troops and the process is dispersed in time Nuclear War - Clausewitz believe that one must prepare for rapid escalation of conflict - is this a useful guide to the conduct of nuclear-war? Contemporary Clausewitzian Theory - some have conjectured that the end of the Cold War will see the revival of Clausewitzian manoeuvre war - war will continue to be an instrument of policy between opposed states - some (particularly American) commentators have written that information warfare will offer a new dimension to conflict - technologically-mediated cyberwar will allow advanced warriors to obliterate their enemy from a distance Post-Clausewitzian Theory - nuclear proliferation has brought large-scale interstate warfare to an end - contemporary armies are huge dinosaurs, shrinking in size - war is not an instrument in the hands of policy policy goals are excuses for mans natural desire to fight (214) - Britain lost more people to the IRA than during Suez, Falklands, and Gulf War combined: war is not being marginalized to the backwards areas. - Breaking out now here, now there, limited in geographical scope but often extremely bloody, future war will be waged overwhelmingly by, and against, organizations that are not states. And since they do not own sovereign territory and consequently cannot be threatened with nuclear annihilation, they will be able to fight each other, and the state, to their hearts content. (217) - Few are attempting to do as Clausewitz or others have done: to present a comprehensive theory based on consideration of first principles and of the current situation. And yet, as the countless failures of the worlds state-owned, regular armed forces to put down guerrillas and insurgents show, such a theory is urgently needed. (217) Timeline and notes taken from: van Creveld, Martin. The Art of War: War and Military Thought. Cassell History of Warfare. General ed., John Keegan. London: Cassell, 2000.

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