Alfredo Velayo vs Shell Company

On September 8, 2011 100 Phil 168 Torts and Damages Obligations arising from human relations Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed P170k (abt. $79k) to Shell and CAL offered its C-54 plane as payment to Shell Company (the plane was in California) but Shell at that time declined as it thought CALI had sufficient money to pay its debt. In 1948 however, CALI was going bankrupt so it called upon an informal meeting of its creditors. In that meeting, the creditors agreed to appoint representatives to a working committee that would determine the order of preference as to how each creditor should be paid. They also agreed not to file suit against CALI but CALI did reserve that it will file insolvency proceedings should its assets be not enough to pay them up. Shell Company was represented by a certain Fitzgerald to the three man working committee. Later, the working committee convened to discuss how CALIs asset should be divided amongst the creditors but while such was pending, Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell USA advising the latter that Shell Philippines is assigning its credit to Shell USA in the amount of $79k, thereby effectively collecting almost all if not the entire indebtedness of CALI to Shell Philippines. Shell USA got wind of the fact that CALI has a C-54 plane is California and so Shell USA petitioned before a California court to have the plane be the subject of a writ of attachment which was granted. Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were unaware of the assignment of credit made by Shell Philippines to Shell USA and they went on to approve the sale of CALIs asset to the Philippine Airlines. In September 1948, the other creditors learned of the assignment made by Shell. This prompted these other creditors to file their own complaint of attachment against CALIs assets. CALI then filed for insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in the Philippines from being attached. Velayos appointment as CALIs assignee was approved in lieu of the insolvency proceeding. In order for him to recover the C-54 plane in California, it filed for a writ of injunction against Shell Philippines in order for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding with the attachment and in the alternative that judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for damages double the amount of the C-54 plane. The C-54 plane was not recovered. Shell Company argued it is not liable for damages because there is nothing in the law which prohibits a company from assigning its credit, it being a common practice. ISSUE: Whether or not Shell is liable for damages considering that it did not violate any law. HELD: Yes. The basis of such liability, in the absence of law, is Article 21 of the Civil Code which states: Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensated by damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability for damages arises from a willful or negligent act contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

Amonoy vs Spouses Gutierrez

On July 23, 2011

G.R. No. 140420 / February 15, 2001 Attorneys Fees The case had its roots in special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Julio Catolos, involving 6 parcels of land situated in Tanay, Rizal. Amonoy was the counsel therein for Francisca Catolos, Agnes Catolos, Asuncion Pasamba, and Alfonso Fornilda. On January 12, 1965, the project of partition submitted was approved and 2 of the said lots were adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba and Aldonso Fornilda. The attorneys fee charged by Amonoy was P27,600.00 and on January 20, 1965, Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Fornilda executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the said 2 lots in favor of Amonoy to secure the payment of his attorneys fees. But it was only August 6, 1969 after the taxes had been paid, the claims of settled and the property adjudicated, that the estate was declared closed and terminated. Asuncion and Alfonso died, among the heirs of the latter was his daughter, plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez. Thereafter, on Amonoys motion, the orders were issued for the demolition of structures in the said lots, including the house of Gutierrez spouses. A complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of their house was filed by respondents against petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in deciding that the petitioner was liable to respondents for damages. HELD: Clearly, the demolition of respondents house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. In insisting on his alleged right, he wantonly violated this courts order and wittingly caused the destruction of respondents house. In the ultimate analysis, petitioners liability is premised on the obligation to

repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of ones act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or punishable by law. The court ruled against Amonoy.

Puyat vs Zabarte
On July 23, 2011 G.R. No. 141536 / February 26, 2001 Forum Non Conveniens Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the August 31, 1999 decision of the CA which affirmed the RTC of Pasig City and which denied reconsideration. It appears that on January 24, 1994 Ron Zabarte commenced to enforce the money judgment rendered by the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Contra Costa. In his discussion, petitioner contends that the CA erred in ruling in this wise: A. That his answer failed to render genuine issue of fact regarding the following: 1. The jurisdiction of a foreign court over the subject matter, 2. The validity of the foreign judgment, 3. The judgments conformity to Philippine laws, public policy, canons of morality and norms of unjust enrichment, B. That the principle of forum non conveniens was inapplicable in this case. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA acted in a manner contrary to law when it affirmed the order of the trial court granting respondents motion for summary judgment rendering judgment against Puyat. HELD: Summary judgment in litigation is resorted to if there is no genuine issue as to the material fact, other than the amount of damages. If this verity is evident from the pleadings and the supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on file with the court, the moving party is entitled to such remedy as a matter of course. The grounds relied upon by petitioner are contradictory, on the one hand, he insists that the RTC take jurisdiction over the enforcement case in order to invalidate the foreign judgment, yet, he avers that the trial court should not exercise jurisdiction over the same case on the basis of forum non conveniens. Not only do these

defenses weaken each other but they bolster the finding of the lower courts that he was merely maneuvering to avoid or delay payment of his obligation. His petition is hereby denied.

Wassmer vs Velez
On July 23, 2011

12 scra 648 Breach of Promise to Marry Franciso Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left a note to her that they have to postpone their wedding because his mother opposed it. And on the next day he sent her the following telegram Nothing changed rest assured returning very soon apologize mama papa love Paking. Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again, sued by Beatrice for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. The record reveals that on August 23, 1954, plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-bes trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared, but two days before the wedding he never returned and was never heard from again. ISSUE: Whether or not in the case at bar, is a case of mere breach of promise to marry. HELD: Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid. The lower courts judgment is hereby affirmed.

Gashem Shookat Baksh vs Court of Appeals

On July 23, 2011

219 scra 115 Article 21 of the Civil Code This is an appeal by certiorari. On October 27, 1987, without the assistance of counsel, private respondent filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint for damages against petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that she is 20 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her country; other petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student, before August 20, 1987 the latter courted and proposed to marry her, she accepted his love on the condition that they get married; they therefore agreed to get married. The petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano apartments. She was a virgin at that time; after a week before the filing of complaint, petitioners attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of the complaint. Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and that the petitioner is already married to someone in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering petitioner to pay her damages. On the other hand, petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent and denied all allegations against him. After trial on the merits, the lower court ordered petitioner to pay the private respondent damages. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. HELD: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concepts of torts and quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines quasi-delicts thus: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that where a mans promise to marry in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to

accept him and obtain her consent to sexual act could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such breach of promise of marriage but because of the fraud and deceit behind it, and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.

Galang vs Court of Appeals

On July 23, 2011

Contract of Sale Encargado On July 16, 1976, Ramon Buenaventura on his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of Angeles, Corazon, Amparo, and Maria Luisa, all surnamed Buenaventura, sold to Guadalupe and Marcelino Galang 2 parcels of land situated in Tagaytay City. Marcelino and Guadalupe Galang, herein petitioners paid to the sellers the 1st 25% of the purchases price as stated in a deed. Therafter, they allegedly demanded from private respondents the removal of the encargado from the premises and the delivery of the owners duplicate certificate of the title. Private respondents failed to do so despite the willingness of petitioners to pay the 2nd 25% of the purchase price. Consequently, Marcelino and Guadalupe Galang filed on March 18, 1977 a complaint for specific performance with damages. ISSUE: Whether or not the encargado was a tenant. HELD: The Court discerns no reversible error in the finding and conclusion of the trial court that the unnamed encargado on the lands in question is actually a tenant or agricultural lessee. The bases of this ineluctable conclusion are not hard to so, as succinctly pointed out by the court a quo, the encargado is staying in his own existing house thereon, and subject agricultural land is planted with coffee and other plants not only by the encargado but also by his deceased parents. The court held that there is no bases for rescinding the contract because the removal of the encargado was not a precedent to the contract. Rather it was one alternative periods of payment of the 2nd installment given by the seller himself to the buyers. Secondly, even granting that it was indeed a legal status of the encargado, the lower court was rash in holding that the encargado was a tenant of the land in question. The petition is hereby granted and the decision of the CA is reversed and set aside. Petitioners are ordered to pay the full 75% balance.

Hermosisima vs Court of Appeals

On July 23, 2011 103 Phil 629 Breach of Promise to Marry An appeal by certiorari, on October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complainant, filed with the said CFI a complaint for the acknowledgment of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as a natural child of said petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise to marry. Petitioner admitted the paternity of the child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry complainant. Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917, since 1950, Soledad then a teacher and petitioner who was almost ten years younger than her used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he made no promise of marriage thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter where intimacy developed between her and petitioner, since one evening in 1953 when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board MV Escano to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was pregnant, whereupon he promised to marry her. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to marry. HELD: It appearing that because of the defendant-appellants seductive prowess, plaintiffappellee overwhelmed by her love for him yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control. In the present case, the court is unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten years younger but also because the CFI found that complainant surrendered herself to the petitioner because overwhelmed by her love for him she wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.

Custodio vs Court of Appeals

On July 23, 2011 G.R. No. 116100 / February 9, 1996 Actionable Wrong Perusing the record, the RTC of Pasig finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died during the pendency of this case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse (and children). The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos, Palingon, Tipas, Taguig, MM. Said properties may be described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to defendant herein. Taking P. Burgos as a point of reference, or the left side going to the plaintiffs property, the row of houses will be as follows: that of defendants Cristino and Brigido Custodio and that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos and then that of Ofelia Mabasa. There are two possible passageways. When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the premises and who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in February 1982, one of the said tenants vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the 1st passageway was making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence ws 1st constructed by defendant Santoses along their property which is along the 1st passageway. Defendant M. Santos testified that she constructed said fence because there was an incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle predated by a son of one of the tenants. She also mentioned some other inconveniences of having at the front of her house a pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows. Some of their footwear were even lost. Accordingly, the judgment given did not satisfy the plaintiff, herein private respondents went to the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of right of way to herein private respondents is proper. Whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. HELD: With respect to the 1st issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did not appeal from adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest. However, with respect to the second issue, the award of damages has no substantial legal basis. A reading of the decision of the CA will show that the award of damages was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway. However, the mere fact that plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach of wrong. In the case at bar,

although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right.

RCPI vs Court of Appeals

On July 23, 2011

143 scra 657 Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code Negligence Loreto Dionella alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to him by the operator RCPI not only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment and affected adversely his business as well because other people have come to know said defamatory words. Dionella filed for damages and was granted by the trial court and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals the liability of petitioner company employer predicated under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. RCPI now comes to the Supreme Court for review by certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the liability of RCPI is predicated under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. The cause of action of private respondent is based on Artciles 19 and 20 of the new Civil Code as well as respondents breach of contract thru negligence of its own employees.