Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Dissertation Title
Is the support of a national idea a necessary condition for a
sustainable liberal state?
Table of Contents
Introduction: The Uses and Abuses of Nationalism ..................................................................4
Introduction....................................................................................................................15
What do we mean by solidarity?....................................................................................17
State and Nation.............................................................................................................24
What is a state? ..............................................................................................................25
What is a Nation?...........................................................................................................26
The Five Unique Features of National Identity .............................................................29
(i)
Mutual Belief and Mythology: Nation as an Imagined Community ..........31
(ii)
Historical Continuity .....................................................................................37
(iii)
Political Activity ............................................................................................38
(iv)
Territorial Concerns: Nation as Home........................................................39
(v)
Cultural Similarities.......................................................................................44
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for a Nation.........................................................48
Conclusion .....................................................................................................................52
Chapter Two: Liberalism and Nationalism - Opposing Standpoints? ....................................53
Introduction....................................................................................................................53
The Liberal State............................................................................................................53
Four Main Areas of Contention .....................................................................................55
The First Problem: Political and Cultural Neutrality ....................................................56
The Second Problem: Autonomy and Choice................................................................62
The Third Problem: Rational Consent ...........................................................................64
The Fourth Problem: Republicanism.............................................................................65
Remaining Issues: what about social solidarity? ...........................................................67
(i)
Political Liberalism........................................................................................69
(ii)
The Common Way of Life .............................................................................74
(iii)
Civic Republicanism......................................................................................76
The Case for Liberal Nationalism: social solidarity ......................................................78
Conclusion .....................................................................................................................81
Chapter Three: The Ethics of Liberal Nationalism ...................................................................82
Introduction....................................................................................................................82
Ethical Universalism and Ethical Particularism ............................................................83
Voluntary Creation .........................................................................................................87
Useful Convention .........................................................................................................89
The particularist account of nationalism........................................................................94
Conclusion .....................................................................................................................98
Chapter Four: Nationalism and Multiculturalism ....................................................................100
Introduction..................................................................................................................100
Liberal States and Multiculturalism.............................................................................101
Cultural Dynamics .......................................................................................................104
Inclusive and Exclusive Membership ..........................................................................107
Michael Taylor, A857 TMA05, W0623315 Page 2 of 122
Scruton has argued that the view there is an unconditioned rational agent is psychologically, morally,
and metaphysically highly questionable (Scruton 1990: 272)
I will say more about both Andersons concept of imaginary communities and Hobsbawms term
invented traditions in Chapter Two.
Einstein put it, nationalism is the measles of the human race (Quoted by Miller, in his
Introduction to On Nationality. See Miller 1999, p. 5). Popper also said that Nationalism appeals to our
tribal instincts, to passion and to prejudice, and to our nostalgic desire to be relieved from the strain of
individual responsibility which it attempts to replace by a collective or group responsibility (quoted by
Tamir: 1993: 80). See also OLeary 1997, p. 192, for a further elaboration on dark gods.
of education that will prevent the virus from taking hold in the first
place (ibid, p.5). However both Gellner and Miller reject this account
out of hand.5 Miller argues that such accounts are both empirically
implausible and misrepresentative. It is empirically implausible
because there is nothing to suggest that nationalism is going away
(indeed as I have already stated the opposite appears to be the
case); and it is misrepresentative in that this view paints too passive a
picture of nationalism. In this essay I want to argue that nationalism is
not merely something that happens to us, it is also something we help
to re-create and sustain on a daily basis. As this is a crucial point, I
will return to this in more detail in the next chapter when I discuss the
definition of nations. I also want to reject here another implication of
this account, namely that nationalism is an inherently violent affliction.
History shows us that while nationalism has been the cause of
various conflicts and wars, the same can be said about any ideology
taken to extremes. As Scruton has argued, it is only ignorance that
could permit the belief that Soviet communism, founded on
universalist principles, has involved less crime, less suffering, less
While one could still argue that Nationalism is on the rise because it
is an inherently evil concept suited to evil times, I want to argue that
instead it is popular because it helps people to provide answers to
Michael Taylor, A857 TMA05, W0623315 Page 12 of 122
final chapter briefly discussing how this theory might help to meet the
challenge of modern, diverse societies. I will conclude that liberal
nationalism could provide the middle ground between the
requirement for solidarity and sharing on the one hand, and the need
to respect and support diversity on the other concepts which
otherwise might lead to conflicts of interest between the state and its
citizens. But in order to do any of this, we now need to define our
terms more precisely. I realise that so far I have used the words
solidarity, nation and state rather sloppily; it is now time to rectify
that mistake.
Some even argue that we can even experience solidarity on a global scale (see the REP entry for Richard
Rorty, Section 3). It also interesting to note that larger groupings still tend to employ metaphors that link
themselves with the strongest groupings people know, namely the family. Hence the common use of terms
such as brotherhood, sisterhood, fatherland and motherland, etc.
react if the latter were to heavily criticise the former? Such situations
become potentially more acute when people find themselves
members of two distinct cultures, the values of which may clash on
several important issues. However the point to be made here is that
being a member of a particular group does not typically exclude
someone from being a member of other groups at the same time.
Within the national context, this means that nationality will not
typically be the only source of a persons solidarity or identity
instead it will be merely part of a competing multiplicity of overlapping
and sometimes contradictory allegiances. I will return to this important
issue in more detail in the section on nationalism and
multiculturalism.
In philosophical terms, solidarity is usually described as a kind
of commitment in other words how the members of a particular
group are committed to each other. Commitments that imply
solidarity can usually be described in one of two ways. First there are
those commitments which demonstrate that members of a particular
group are concerned about the welfare and wellbeing of other
members. These concerns are, sometimes conceived in terms of the
recognition of special obligations between the members of a group,
Michael Taylor, A857 TMA05, W0623315 Page 19 of 122
Indeed the instrumental value of fraternity is underlined by none other than Rawls himself. For Rawls, his
difference principal, does seem to correspond to a natural meaning of fraternity: namely, to the idea of
not wanting to have greater advantages unless this is to the benefit of others who are less well off (Rawls
1999: 90), a practice of justice he sees as comparable to that normally observed in the family sphere.
However Rawls interpretation of fraternity remains problematic in that it is more political than social.
Indeed in his interpretation he leaves out precisely those aspects most of us would more commonly
associate with the concept of fraternity, namely sentiment and feeling, aspects which to Rawls are,
unrealistic to expect between members of the wider society (ibid, 90). This is perhaps because Rawls is
constantly on the look out for the rational justification, rather than the emotional.
government (in this sense the political) stands side by side with an
equally persuasive, and more actual, commitment to cultural
autonomy and national independence (meaning social).9 Just as
rationality is of intrinsic value to the liberal thesis because it helps
individuals to choose the best alternatives available to them, so too is
fraternity of intrinsic value to the individual, in that fraternity provides
belonging and the feeling that one is recognised by the larger
community as a fellow member, a concept without which rational
options would cease to have meaning. Together then, political and
social solidarity so described provide necessary and sufficient
conditions for what I want to call complete unity.
The distinction I have drawn here between social and political
solidarity will play a crucial role in the development of this argument.
However, before I go on to explore these links in more detail, it is
necessary to also provide working definitions of the terms state and
nation, without which it will be impossible to progress the argument
that liberal states should support and promote a national idea, one
which is not just politically expedient, but one which is also primarily
social.
10
The view that the state represented the institutionalisation of the peoples will formed the basis of the
French and American revolutions (see Tamir 1993: 60); while the term nation still refers to the federal
state in the USA today (ibid, p. 60)
What is a state?
The term state as I want to define it here refers to any political
organisation that can meet the following necessary and sufficient
conditions:11
(1)There is a population which reproduces itself and whose
members are socially related
(2)There is territory
(3)There is a single government, which: (a) is a distinct body
of rule, supported by a judicial, administrative and military
machine; (b) is the ultimate prescriber and enforcer of law
for all those within its jurisdiction; (c) claims exclusive
control of the use of force within the territory and has
preponderant control of its use; (d) claims authority for its
existence and actions and is generally accepted as
authoritative
(4)The state is legally and politically independent from other
states, and recognized by other states as an independent
11
The following criteria are taken directly from the definition supplied in the Routledge Encyclopaedia of
Philosophy (see Nicholson: 1998).
or sovereign state
Obviously there are arguments as to what extent a state must meet
each of these criteria in order to be classified as such. For example:
how many people must a state have to reach critical mass? And how
many other states must recognise a new state for it to satisfy the
recognition criteria? These are all valid questions, but for the
purposes of this investigation I want to concentrate on the
implications of the first and second conditions only. I want to see to
what extent (if at all) the concept of a nation might overlap with the
requirement that a state contains a population that is socially related
and which exists within a defined territory. However in order to do this
we first need to define what the term nation means.
What is a Nation?
In her book Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, Liah Greenfeld
researches the origins of the word nation and identifies nine stages in
its historical development as a term. Originally developed from the
Latin word natio meaning something is born, it was initially used to
refer to a group of foreigners. Subsequent use of the term in the
Michael Taylor, A857 TMA05, W0623315 Page 26 of 122
12
Indeed, the term is still used in this sense at Swedish universities today, where each major regional
district is represented by a nation, where students from the same geographic areas live and study together
in a communal dormitory.
13
The O.E.D. states that the term refers to a large number of people of mainly common descent, language,
history, etc, usually inhabiting a territory bounded by defined limits and forming a society under one
government.
14
15
For further reading in this area, see Miller 1999, Raz and Margalit 1990, Kymlicka 2004, and Tamir
1993.
(i)
Community
The first obvious point to be made about nations is that, due to their
size, members of these super-communities cannot possibly get to
know each other on a face to face or personal basis. This
differentiates them immediately from families and other small, tightly
knit communities. Nations are not like clans or tribes either, where
each member is indirectly linked to every other by ties of marriage
and descent (Miller 1999: 32). Nations are therefore neither families
nor clans so what is it exactly that differentiates nations from other
types of communities?
In an attempt to define a theory of nationality, Gellner argues
that nations must be willed by their members, and he identifies two
generic catalysts for group formation and maintenance: will,
voluntary adherence and identification, loyalty, solidarity, on the one
hand; and fear, coercion, compulsion, on the other (Gellner 1994:
53). In general, any group or community has a combination of these
factors in play at any given time in order to come into being and to
continue to exist. However, while these factors are necessary for any
nation to survive, they are not the exclusive property of propositions
Michael Taylor, A857 TMA05, W0623315 Page 31 of 122
about nations and apply equally well to other types of smaller subgroups and communities. Clearly, we will need some additional
criteria in order to differentiate a nation from a bridge club.
Miller picks up on a similar point but develops it in a different
way. For Miller, nations are instead held together by beliefs,
transmitted through cultural artefacts which are available to everyone
who belongs books, newspapers, media, pamphlets, and more
recently electronic media (Miller 1999:32). This is precisely what
Benedict Anderson had in mind when he argued that nations are
imagined political communities,
17
For a full clarification of what I mean by ritual in this instance, see the following section on Nation as
Home.
18 According
to McKee (who admittedly is writing about stories of the Hollywood variety), facts are
neutral. The weakest possible excuse to include anything in a story is [to say] it actually happened (Mckee
1999, p.25, my emphasis). Kenneth Burke once said too that, stories are equipment for living. Both
sentiments concur with the account of nation being argued for here.
are adept at stitching together the often unrelated events in our own
lives into life stories, and everything this entails: missing out those
facts we would rather forget and emphasising those of which we are
proud. It should therefore come as no surprise that we attempt to do
the same thing with the cultures which we inhabit.
Such an analysis is not without its problems. If nations are
nothing more than a random collection of facts, figures and people
woven into a largely mythical story, then why are they of value? It
would seem that if we wanted to achieve some kind of unity, then this
might be better served by some other, more rational means, such as
a civic forum. And if we do accept that nations at least serve a
function with regard to political unity, then surely the mythical,
imagined aspect of national identities means that at best such an
approach can only have instrumental value after all, how can such
an apparently random event such as being born in Britain have any
intrinsic value?
To counteract such arguments, Miller employs an analogy. At
first glance citizens of nations seem to be no different from the
occupants of a lifeboat both have been thrown together under
random circumstances. As Miller suggests
Michael Taylor, A857 TMA05, W0623315 Page 34 of 122
(ii)
Historical Continuity
19 As
a character in The Satanic Verses argues, the trouble with the British is that most of their history
happened overseas (quoted by Anshuman Mondal, see Replies to David Goodharts Essay in Prospect
magazine.
mock the ideals which formed our national character then they no
longer exist as a people but only as a crowd.20
(iii)
Political Activity
Quoted by Gordon Brown in his address to the British Council Annual Lecture.
values and replace them with Maoist ideology (ibid, 41). While no
national story can be perfectly true, there are variations in quality.
However a nation has come into being it needs to be
maintained by political and institutional processes, often by proxy. All
nations have an element therefore of political self-determination, in
that they have to reach joint decisions and abide by them. In this
sense, nations are far from passive communities. How far political
activity is taken however depends on how far those leading the
political process (and those who support them) are prepared to take
them, which may or may not result in the establishment of a state and
self-rule.
(iv)
21
Williams claimed that culture is the ordinary (quoted by Tamir see Tamir 1993, p. 85)
22
same is true, though in different ways, of the Jewish nation and its
relationship to Jerusalem, the Mormons to Temple Square, and the
Catholics relation to the Vatican.23
It would seem then that the concept of place, or home, should
play a qualifying role in the definition of a nation.
23 According
2006, p. 5.
to Scruton, the term nation came into common use through the Jewish bible. See Scruton
(v)
Cultural Similarities
Ernst Gellner makes the mistake of conflating ethnicity and nationality when he argues that, ethnic
boundaries should not cut across political [national] ones. (Quoted in Miller 1999: 21).
By way of a litte light relief, compare this to Frank Zappas suggested list of necessary and sufficient
conditions: you can't be a real country unless you have a beer and an airline. It helps if you have some
kind of a football team, or some nuclear weapons, but at the very least you need a beer.
Conclusion
I have argued for two types of solidarity social and political and
together these make for complete unity. I have also argued that social
solidarity on a national scale has instrumental value in that it helps to
sustain the liberal state. I have also argued that this kind of solidarity
has intrinsic value in that it helps to give people a sense of place and
belonging, much like that gained from being a member of a family or
a circle of friends. I have shown that national identities need not be
exclusive, and that they often compete with other forms of
membership. I have also tried to show what makes nations distinct
from other kinds of communities, from which I have subsequently
drawn up a list of necessary and sufficient conditions for identifying a
community as a nation. I have not as yet shown how our definition of
a nation might be further refined to make it compatible with liberalism,
or as yet defined what I mean by a liberal state. In the next chapter I
will begin to explore how we might go about this, and from there look
at the ethical implications for the liberal should they agree on
attempting to reconcile nationalism and liberalism.
opportunity for all. I do not wish to go into any more detail on these
points here for fear of prejudicing my argument for connecting liberal
values and nationalism in favour of one form of liberalism (e.g.
Rawlsian) over another; by leaving room for a certain amount of
ambiguity we can avoid this restriction.26 I now want to go on to
outline the major areas where the values of the liberal state might
clash with that of nationalism, and suggest how a liberal interpretation
of nationalism might provide solutions to these problems.
26
Having said this, my interpretation of the liberal state, by allowing for the provision of a welfare state
and the taxes this would entail, does in fact rule out any version of a nightwatchman or similar libertarian
state.
protecting individual rights and autonomy.27 This means that - far from
being neutral with respect to values liberals have in fact ring-fenced
certain values as inviolable and essential to the liberal outlook. Most
liberals however are willing to admit this. According to Rawls the core
values are ring-fenced because they are very great values indeed
and hence not easily overridden (Rawls 1989: 168). He goes on to
say that, these values govern the basic framework of social life, the
very groundwork of our existence28, and specify the fundamental
terms of political and social cooperation (ibid, p.168). However given
this twist meaning that we are now looking at a sliding scale of
values as opposed to two different types of values - the nationalist
could rightly accuse any liberal of making a distinction without a
difference when they attempt to differentiate between right and
good.29
At one end of the scale then (lets call it the thin end) we have
the small list of prioritised values essential to the liberal position,
while at the other end (the thick end) we have a much more
27 Although
see my later section on political liberalism as to why autonomy may or may not be one of
these values.
28
Rawls is quoting Mill here, see J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism (3rd ed., 1867), ch. 5, par. 25.
29
In a later work, Rawls also seems to acknowledge this point. In outlining a political conception of
justice, Rawls says that the difference between a political conception of justice and other moral
conceptions is a matter of scope (Rawls 1989: 165).
This interpretation of Walzers claims is made by Orlie in her review of Walzers book Thick and Thin:
Moral Argument at Home and Abroad. See Orlie, 1999, p. 140
31
Rawls argued that, somehow we must nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at
odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage (Rawls 1999:
118).
I will take it for granted here that atomization, and the inherent dangers it presents to social cohesion and
stability not to mention the sustainability of the liberal state itself - is no good thing.
Political Liberalism
Michael Taylor, A857 TMA05, W0623315 Page 69 of 122
33
autonomy: for many liberals, the right to step back and rationally
review the values of society and to potentially challenge them is of
vital importance; while for some communitarians, such a move can be
seen as potentially fatal to their entire enterprise.34 Thus, by reinventing liberalism in a way that significantly plays down the value
of autonomy, political liberalism claims to leave the door open for
dialogue with illiberal communities; whereas a more comprehensive
liberalism (because it values autonomy) may end up forcing certain
values on minority groups which they have no desire to adopt, a
position which could lead to charges of imperialism.
One advocate of political liberalism is none other than Rawls
himself. In his later writings, Rawls argued for a political conception
of justice, the aim of which was to specify the special domain of the
political in such a way that its main institutions can gain the support of
an overlapping consensus (Rawls 1989: 167). The overlapping
consensus turns out to be a very narrow set of what Rawls calls
purely political values; this domain affirms certain basic political and
civil rights and liberties, assigns them a certain priority, and so
34 A concrete
example of which can be found in America, where the Amish fought to be exempted from the
mandatory (liberal) education laws, because they believed that the liberal education system and its
emphasis on rational choice would undermine the successor generations beliefs in the Amish way of life
(see Kymlicka 2004, pp. 162-164).
35
The problems with this account are legion, but for the purposes
of this argument I will focus only on the following. 36 First, it explicitly
focuses only on the political aspect of solidarity, and says nothing
about the social aspect, which in the Rawlsian world becomes
privatised and outside of the states field of interest. I believe this is a
fatal flaw in the argument. Second, as an explanation of unity, it is
simply far too thin and extremely naive. As we have already pointed
out, shared political principles alone are not sufficient for
unity (Kymlicka 2002, p. 253). In other words, the fact that we are
occasionally take part in political debate is not enough to legitimise
state institutions. Finally, in its rush to find a common ground, it
abandons one of the fundamental building blocks of liberalism,
namely autonomy, and is thus in danger of throwing the baby out
with the bathwater. At first, this may seem like an odd position for a
liberal nationalist to adopt; surely autonomy works against the need
to protect the story and values which holds the national idea
together should not be tampered with? While this may well be the
case with some forms of nationalism, it is precisely not the case with
the liberal interpretation. According to Anshuman Mondal, we should
36
For a fuller account of the problems with political liberalism, see Kymlicka 2002, pp. 228-244.
not settle on a new story once and for all.37 Rather we should
recognise the value of keeping who we are open and negotiable.
This is a point I will raise again on the chapter on Multiculturalism and
Nationalism.
To conclude then, I want to argue that for unity to work, the
state must go beyond neutrality. Accounts of liberalism that rest on a
purely political definition of values and virtues address only the
political side of solidarity, and as such they fail to address the social
needs of communities.
(ii)
This and the following quote are taken from Mondals piece New national Myths (see Replies to David
Goodharts essay Too Diverse? 2004).
38
Kymlicka quotes Sandel and Taylor as two proponents of this type of approach (see Kymlicka pp.
257-261).
(iii)
Civic Republicanism
language within each state is one of the main goals of nationbuilding (Kymlicka 2002: 312). In other words, civic republicanism
answers the political side of the solidarity equation quite well, and as
such it is only to be welcomed by liberal nationalists. In turn liberal
nationalists can argue that they answer a different problem, namely
that of social solidarity, and so the two answers go hand in hand, as
both political solidarity and social solidarity are necessary conditions
for complete unity. This means that however much the civic
republicans would want it to be so their theory is simply not
sufficient on its own for unity. With respect to this investigation, what
is more interesting then is not to try and reject civic republicanism
(because we shouldnt), but rather to answer the arguments put
forward by its proponents as to why nationalism isnt part of the
equation. Much of this boils down to the fact that, by definition,
nationalism is not cosmopolitan in the same way citizenship theories
can be, which in turn comes down to a disagreement about ethical
justifications. This is something I will explore in the next chapter.
39
Conclusion
I have hopefully shown in this chapter that, just as it is possible to
have a liberal interpretation of a state, it is also possible to develop
and coherently defend a version of liberal nationalism. I have also
hopefully shown why the four main areas of possible conflict between
nationalism and liberalism neutrality, autonomy and choice, consent
and republicanism can in fact be reconciled with each other via
liberal nationalism. I have also attempted to demonstrate why
nationalism rather than some other approach holds the best way
forward to solving the puzzle of complete unity. I have not, as yet,
said anything about the ethical justifications of liberal nationalism.
This forms the subject of the next chapter, where I will argue that
liberal nationalism does a better job of explaining and justifying the
special attachments we often feel bound to as co-nationals of a state
something which a more universalist approach to ethics has
consistently failed to satisfactorily explain.
same point even more forcefully, any strong group identity derives
from, promotes, and rewards certain traits and habits that should be
called by their right name vices. 40 Clearly there is an ethical case
for nationalism to answer: why should we acknowledge special
obligations and duties at all?
In order to open the defence for special obligations to conationals, Miller makes a distinction between ethical universalism
and ethical particularism. The first argues that only general
responsibilities are really significant, meaning that our duties and
obligations should not be swayed by specific relationships - instead
they should adhere to a system of ethics rationally conceived. This is
what I would call the flat iron approach to ethics and it is the
traditional position of the liberal. The second argues that special
obligations do indeed matter, meaning that the social relationships
people find themselves in naturally and justifiably affects their
behaviour.
Taking ethical universalism first, MacIntyre argues that
whatever flavour of liberal moral philosophy we examine Kantian,
utilitarian or contractarian they all share five central positions:
40
Voluntary Creation
As a strategy for reconciling nationalism with the principles of
universalism, voluntary creation would seem to fall at the first hurdle.
Being a member of specific community brings with it specific
obligations. To account for these special obligations a universalist
could argue along the following lines: if the community is the result of
some kind of quasi-contract into which I and the other members have
voluntarily signed-up to and agreed in advance; and if the community
is grounded on universal ethics; then there is nothing wrong from the
universalist perspective if I subsequently observe special obligations
Michael Taylor, A857 TMA05, W0623315 Page 87 of 122
41
Useful Convention
The second alternative approach to reconciling universalism and
nationalism Miller calls the useful convention strategy. In his paper,
What Is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?, Goodin poses
the possibility that the special responsibilities required by nationalism
are of a universalist nature. Goodin argues that there are two types of
duties. The first are those general duties that we have towards other
people simply because they are people. The second type is what he
calls special duties, meaning those duties that - over and above our
general duties - we have toward particular individuals because they
stand in some special relation to us (Goodin 1988, 663). Among
those whom might qualify for this special treatment are, our families,
our friends, our pupils, our patients [and] our fellow countrymen (ibid,
663).42 In addition, Goodin takes special duties to ordinarily imply,
especially good treatment (ibid, 663). However Goodin seeks to
counter this general assumption by arguing that at least in some
cases our general duties to non-nationals are more compelling
morally than those of our special duties to co-nationals. The
42
It is important to note that Goodin makes no distinction in his paper between terms such as state and
nation, and citizenship and nationality. For the purposes of this argument, I will take the terms
compatriot and countrymen to mean co-national, in other words someone I might recognise as being
a member of the same national cultural community as myself.
43
The example is taken from William Godwin. See Goodin 1988, p. 665.
friends, co-workers and the like. The reason for this kind of partial
treatment has to do with, the need to centre ones self through
personal attachments to particular people and projects (ibid, 665).
However the crux of Goodins argument for downgrading special
duties to co-nationals stems from the fact that he does not see
attachments to co-nationals as being personal. In Goodins account,
attachments that generate partial treatment apply, most strongly to
more personal links, and only very weakly, if at all, to impersonal links
through shared race or nationality (ibid, 665, my italics). Two things
argue against this conclusion.
The first is that, as I have already stated, nationality can indeed
be bound up strongly with someones personal identity. People can
and often do attach significant, personal importance to the welfare
and wellbeing of co-nationals; in other words it is not a necessary
condition of a persons strong commitment to someone or something
else that the relationship should be intimate or at the level of face to
face contact. The second argument against a weak link between
special duties and co-nationals is that we often experience strong
emotions with regard to the behaviour and actions of our co-nationals
that are similar to those we experience with regard to families and
Michael Taylor, A857 TMA05, W0623315 Page 91 of 122
friends. Consider for example the case where we might feel shame
over the escapades of our co-nationals abroad (e.g. rioting football
fans), or, more positively, pride over their achievements within an
international arena (e.g. a sporting achievement). Both of these
emotions are ones we generally associate with more intimate
relationships, such as family and friends. Compare these emotions
with how we might look on the actions and behaviours of nonnationals: puzzlement, incredulity, surprise, sure, but not generally
pride or shame.44 This is surely because that at least to some
degree we are more emotionally tied to co-nationals than nonnationals. Once again this points towards their being a stronger rather
than a weaker commitment between co-nationals than Goodin is
prepared to admit. This is not to say that the welfare of co-nationals
should always override the welfare of non-nationals; such a position
is that of the hard-line nationalist rather than that of the liberal
nationalist. In the latter interpretation, claims by co-nationals compete
with other claims that often contradict or cut-across these, for the
simple reason that national solidarity is typically only one of many
solidarities in which an individual finds themselves entwined.
44
But there are further problems with Goodins account for the
nationalist. Consider the following example. The principle of efficiency
is all well and good where two nations lets call them nation A and
nation B are equally efficient in their assignment of special
responsibilities. It is more problematic however where we can
demonstrate that nation A is much more efficient than nation B in
assigning these special duties. In this latter case, on Goodins
account it would then make more sense to transfer nation Bs
responsibilities to nation A. Additionally, if we can show that nation B
is in greater need than nation A, then nation As primary
responsibilities lies with members of nation B, and not nation A. As
Goodin himself argues, in the present world system, it is often perhaps ordinarily - wrong to give priority to the claims of our
compatriots (1989, 686). Its not hard to see why these conclusions
might be antithetical to nationalism. For instance the liberal nationalist
may counter that the primary responsibility for nationals of nation B
lies not with nation A, but with the co-nationals of nation B. Only if the
co-nationals of nation B refuse, deny or renege on this responsibility
should responsibility then be transferred to nation A. In such a case,
As first reaction must be to try and persuade B to recognise their
Michael Taylor, A857 TMA05, W0623315 Page 93 of 122
accounts for the intuitive belief that we have special duties to those
we share our lives with. Third, as already discussed, communities
potentially solve the liberal social contract conundrum and thereby
allow members to agree on the principles of justice. Finally it is not
necessarily contradictory with the liberals desire for global justice in
fact liberal nationalism may help to further that cause. As I have
already discussed the point about social contract theory, I will not
elaborate further on this final point. I will however now go on to briefly
examine the three remaining points made by Tamir.
Taking the point about egoism first, in the liberal, quasicontractual view of the world - where communities could be seen as
nothing more than useful tools - it may well prove irrational in some
cases to help people if the same level of help is not already
guaranteed in return (e.g. through some form of insurance policy).
But communities as we actually experience them dont work like that.
Instead, what we find is more like what Miller terms loose reciprocity:
a person who acts to aid some other member of his group can be
sustained by the thought that in different circumstances he might
expect to be the beneficiary of the relationship (Miller 1999, 67). This
does not suggest that, such a person will act in order to receive
Michael Taylor, A857 TMA05, W0623315 Page 95 of 122
some future benefit [] the point is a weaker one: the act of making a
contribution is not a pure loss, from the point of view of the private
person making it, because he is helping to sustain a set of
relationships from which he stands to benefit to some degree (ibid,
67 my italics). I would argue that this second account is a more
realistic and accurate description of how people actually interact with
each other in communities.
Tamirs second point deals with special obligations. In Bleak
House, we are appalled by Mrs Jellbys inclination to care more for
the welfare of the inhabitants of Borrioboola-Gha than for the
wellbeing of her own children. 45 This is because there is something
deeply disturbing about someone who neglects their own children in
favour of someone elses. As Tamir agues, such examples are not
designed to suggest that we have no obligations to non-members in
need [] rather, they stress our intuitive belief that it is particularly
cruel to overlook the suffering and hardships of those we have a
particular reason to care about our fellow members (Tamir 1993:
99). The reason behind this lies in the pronoun my: they are my
family, my friends, my countrymen; only once the basic obligations to
45
See Chapter Four (entitled Telescopic Philanthropy) of Bleak House by Charles Dickens.
Conclusion
In this chapter I wanted to show how it might be possible to reconcile
nationalism and liberalism from an ethical perspective. Following
Miller, I began by making a distinction between ethical universalism
and ethical particularism. From here I went on to argue that attempts
to justify nationalism on universal grounds namely voluntary
creation and useful convention do not work. I then went on to look
at the particularist account of justifying nationality. I argued that not
only did this provide specific advantages to the nationalist, it is also
possible to justify ethical particularism in such a way that it is
compatible with liberal theory. Of course liberals may still suspect that
Michael Taylor, A857 TMA05, W0623315 Page 98 of 122
In Britain for example, Trevor Phillips (the current chair of the Commission for Racial Equality and the
successor of Bhikhu Parekh) has recently overturned thirty years of British multicultural policy and called
for the term to be scrapped. He goes on to argue that, the word is not useful, it means the wrong things. [It]
suggests separateness. What we should be talking about is how we reach an integrated society, one in which
people are equal under the law, where there are some common values (Baldwin 2004: 3). In a separate
article, Neil Ascherson claims that multiculturalism is not a permanent condition but rather it is a waystation to something else: hybridity - a new kind of urban society which is neither a bouquet of
contrasting cultures nor the adoption of the patterns of the old indigenous majority, but a fresh
synthesis (2004: 103).
these competing theories could be partially met. But first I will argue
that both radical multiculturalism and conservative nationalism rest
on the same false premise about the nature of communities and
groups - namely that they are immutable.
Cultural Dynamics
Conservative nationalists tend to see in the claims of minority groups
a threat to the established order of the national community, and as
such they are a subversive, destabilising force. Equally, radical
multiculturalists often treat the claims of minority groups as
unassailable; because the rights of the group are being suppressed
by the dominant culture, then the dominant culture must
accommodate the claims on the grounds of respecting diversity, even
if these claims occasionally run counter to liberal values. However
both of these approaches rest on false premises, namely that cultures
are unchanging entities cast in stone, and therefore immune to critical
assessment or re-evaluation. But this is to ignore the simple fact that
the nature of communities, large or small, is not static but dynamic.
Within the liberal context, claims for change should work both ways:
national identities should be willing (over time) to make concessions
Michael Taylor, A857 TMA05, W0623315 Page 104 of 122
47
48
principle that all cultures should be given equal respect? I will now go
on to briefly discuss these two issues.
Im thinking here of Norman Tebbits infamous cricket test approach to deciding nationality.
50
Miller makes the same point, but uses Wittgensteins analogy of the rope instead (see Miller 1999: 27).
51
52
It is interesting to note that some commentators still insist that the terms ethnicity and culture refer to
the same thing. Gilroy is wrong to assume that the debate on diversity started by Goodhart is hinged on
ethnicity (or more confrontationally, racism), and not culture. Lentin makes the same mistake when she
argues that, It is taken for granted that the concept of multiculturalism refers to the struggle of minority
ethnic groups for recognition of their cultural diversity in western societies (Lentin 2004). Gellner makes a
similar mistake (see Miller 1999: 21). But such a definition, because it blurs the distinction between
ethnicity and culture, misses the point. There is no reason to suppose that a culture should not by polyethnic, as indeed many are - such as in the case of most national cultures.
that helps to support the social cohesion liberal states are more often
than not lacking.
Conclusion
I began this chapter by exploring the policy of multiculturalism and
how this could conflict with liberal theory. I then went on to argue that
the policy of radical multiculturalism is incompatible with a sustainable
liberal state. Instead we should be looking to explore issues of
diversity within a common framework, and that common framework is
a national idea. Indeed, the final stop of radical multiculturalism may
be the state of affairs outlined by Ferdinand Mount. Quoting England
as an example, Mount argued that the country could become, one
giant cultural mall in which we would all wander, free to chose from a
variety of equally valuable lifestyles, to take back and exchange
purchases when not given satisfaction or simply to window shop. 53 I
concluded that the promotion of a common set of values is not
imperialistic or repressive with regard to minority groups; rather that
such a state of affairs helps to provide a stable building block for a
variety of competing comprehensive conceptions of the good, which
in turn yield a stable infrastructure within which cultural diversity can
flourish.
53
Quoted by Gordon Brown in his address at the British Council Annual Lecture (see Brown 2004).
Bibliography
Alibhai-Brown, Y. 2001. Who Do We Think We Are? Imagining the
New Britain, London: Penguin.
Anderson, B. 1991. Imagined Communities, London: Verso
Appiah, K. A. 2001. Equality of What?, The New York Review, 26
April, pp. 63-68.
Ascherson, N. 2004. Better off without them? Politics and ethnicity in
the twenty-first century, International Affairs, 80, 1, pp. 99-106.
------- 2004. From multiculturalism to where?, On openDemocracy:
free thinking for the world http://www.opendemocracy.net [accessed
1 Sep 2004]
Baer, J-M., Klamer, A., Throsby, D., Laly, I-P. 2004. Cultural
Diversity, Birthday Counterpoints, London: British Council
Baldwin, T. 2004. Britain must scrap multiculturalism, The Times, 3
April, pp.1-31.
Barrington, L. W. 1997. Nation and Nationalism: the Misuse of
Key Concepts in Political Science, PS: Political Science and Politics,
Vol. 30, No.4, pp. 712-716.
Barry, B. Theories of Group Rights, in Matravers and Pike 2003a,
pp.248-263.
Banting, K. and Kymlicka, W. 2004. Canada, not America, Prospect
Magazine, March, available on http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk
[accessed March 2004].
Birnbaum, P. and Strong, T. B. 1996. From Multiculturalism to
Nationalism, Political Theory, Vol. 24, No.1, pp. 33-45.
Blackburn, S. 1996. Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Michael Taylor, A857 TMA05, W0623315 Page 115 of 122
------- 1995. The Enigma of Nationalism, World Politics, Vol. 47, No.
3, pp. 418-440.
Taylor, C. 1985. Philosophy and the Human Sciences, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Waldron, J. 1998. Neutrality, Political. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved May 13,
2004, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/S041
Weinstock, D. M. 2002. Citizenship and Pluralism, in Simon, R. L.
2002, pp.239-270.
Young, I. M. 1989. Polity and Group Difference: a Critique of the
Ideal of Universal Citizenship, in Matravers and Pike 2003a, pp.
219-238.