Military

Strategy and Conflict between China and Vietnam during the Third Indochina War (1979): Battle for Asian Dominance
Aditi Garg GOVT-451: Conflict in Asia Professor Karber December 7, 2012

Introduction Throughout the Cold War era, the East Asian front was entangled in a hotbed of territorial confrontations amongst the grander ideological backdrop of two polarizing Superpowers. Unquestionably, the Sino-Vietnamese Border War of 1979 was fueled by underlying tensions caused by differing ideologies and ever-changing alliances. However, it can also be best understood as a limited conventional war of territorial dominance. In order to assess the military strategy of both nations, one must take into account both external influences as well as domestic lusts for Asian domination and increasing fears of territorial loss. While much has been written about the Third Indochina War, the conventional wisdom has been that, in reality, border and territorial differences were of little to no significance in explaining the outbreak of warfare or the intentions of either nation. In various instances, it has even been described as a wholly bogus border war where the entire land boundary had been demarcated and no territorial disputes were known to exist1. While external, ideological conflict and historical tensions certainly did contribute to both nations decision to go to war, it is clear from analysis of Chinese and Vietnamese objectives that territorial ambitions were at the heart of this conflict. Initially considered fraternal nations and brothers in growing socialist

beliefs, China and Vietnam generally shared common objectives, derived from their

1 Bruce Burton, Contending Explanations of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, International Journal,

Vol. 34, No. 4, China: Thirty Years On, (Autumn, 1979), 706.

 anti-imperialist struggles to socialist transformations in their societies.2 Their

collaboration during Vietnam's thirty-year struggle, first against French colonialism and later against the Americans, appeared to strengthen their common bond. However, when conflicting hegemonic interests overshadowed their common objectives, both nations twisted ideology to their advantage. The military conflict that ensued in the early months of 1979 can be viewed,

first and foremost, as a demonstration of China and Vietnams common desire to be the dominant player in Indochina at this moment in history. The brief border war, referred to today as the Third Indochina War, was a bloody episode that claimed tens of thousands of lives in the span of less than a month. As an example of classic limited war in aim and scope, time and space, and weapons usage levels, the direct conflict stemmed from an outburst of underlying tension over territorial ownership of Cambodia and growth of soviet-Vietnamese relationship in the wake of the Sino- soviet split. This paper will explore the multiple contributing factors, ranging from historical animosity to external influences of the Superpowers, to a more traditional analysis of territorial tensions. The outcome of the war and relative success of each nation will be assessed and analyzed in the context of disputed winners and losers. Finally, the significance of the Indochina War in the greater, modern framework of Asian power dynamics and current conflicts will be addressed. Historical Background

2 Stephen J. Hood, Dragons Entangled: Indochina and the China-Vietnam War, (New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc., 1992), 15.

 Over the last century, Vietnam and China have viewed each other in mixed

terms. For Vietnam, China was considered a helper and ally when the nation was fighting for independence from Western powers. Chinas interest in defending Vietnam, in turn, stemmed from its desire to establish a buffer against non-Asian nations.3 While the Sino-Vietnamese alliance at this time was generally advantageous for both nations, many Vietnamese nationalists considered China to be dangerously overinvolved in the direction and scope4 of Vietnams fight for independence against the West. For example, with regard to Chinese military intervention against French imperialists in Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh argued that it was better to sniff French dung for a while than to eat Chinese all our lives5. Thus, underlying the outward appearance of camaraderie lay a significant tension that would eventually manifest itself in the form of war. Additionally, each nations desire to be a dominant force in Indochina made

Hanoi and Beijing deeply suspicious of each others role in the affairs of other Indochinese states, specifically Cambodia. Historically, Vietnam had invaded Cambodia numerous times, and held on to land along the border that Cambodians considered properly theirs. Hanois continued aggression gave rise to the popularity of the Khmer Rouge, driving its leader Pol Pot to adopt an anti-Vietnamese sentiment and resulting pro-China allegiance. Accordingly, the Chinese appeased Pol Pot and the extremist Khmer Rouge, debatably out of their increasingly anti-Soviet
3 Edward C. O'Dowd, Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist War,
(London: Routledge, 2007), 26.
4
5

Hood, 156.

Nicholas Khoo, Collateral Damage: Sino-soviet Rivalry and the Termination of the Sino-Vietnamese

Alliance, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011)

sentiment and confirmed dislike for Vietnamese territorial expansion. Furthermore, as conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam wore on, China directly attempted to place blame for the border conflict in Hanois direction by commenting to the press about the Khmer Rouges efforts at self-defense in the midst of Vietnamese aggression. Territorial and border issues between the two nations is reached a peak in January 1974, when Chinese forces seized control of the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. The Vietnamese responded by taking possession of the Spratly Islands, whose ownership was also disputed, in April 1975. The two nations ongoing conflict over the ownership of the islands contributed to the mounting series of incidents along the joint land border. The two groups of islands possessed strategic importance for both countries in terms of trade routes and natural resources. Dominance over these islands would certainly contribute to each nations hegemonic ambitions in Southeast Asia. In so far as the strategic and economic

Figure 1: Map of the Paracel Islands in 1974 delineated as Vietnamese and Chinese Territory

 interests of China and Vietnam had collided over virtually the entire extent of the South China Sea, the battle for the groups of islands cannot have been entirely irrelevant to the outbreak of war between them6. In the midst of the Sino-Soviet split, increasingly friendly relations between Hanoi and Moscow created two major problems for the Chinese. Most notably, the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Vietnam in early November of 1978 raised anxieties in the region7. First, Hanois plans for the rapid reunification of Vietnam threatened Chinas dominance on its southern borders. Second, with the help of Soviet military aid, Vietnam was developing a position of influence in determining the political direction of other

Indochinese nations, giving Hanoi a much greater hold over power in the Southeast Asia region. The changing alliances between the USSR, Beijing, and Hanoi, along with the normalization of U.S.-China relations, certainly enhanced underlying tensions that existed between the two nations and brought a new level of ideological and strategic conflict to the East Asian front. Context Leading up to the outbreak of war, rising ethnic tensions inflamed the already complicated historical relationship between Vietnam and China. In early 1978, the region witnessed a mass exodus of Vietnamese people with Chinese origins from northern Vietnam trying to enter the Southern Chinese border. During

6 Burton, 708.

Hood, 50.

this time, over 160,000 people attempted to flee into China.8 The cause of this mass exodus was highly contested between both nations, with the Chinese alleging that the Vietnamese persecuted and expelled the overseas Chinese, and the Vietnamese charging the Chinese with spreading alarmist rumors that the Chinese community would become targets for the Vietnamese military amid tensions with Pol Pots regime. Relations suffered further when the Chinese announced they would end aid to Vietnam due to the thousands of Chinese refugees whom had been expelled from Hanoi. Beijing revealed that it was recalling all aid and technical personnel because of Vietnams apparent anti-Chinese activities and ostracism of Chinese residents9. The ethnic tension and dispute over the displaced Chinese population in Vietnam, as well as the official end to aid due to supposed Vietnamese aggression certainly fueled the fire that would soon break into war. The immediate act of aggression that essentially triggered the ongoing conflict between China and Vietnam occurred on Christmas Day of 1978, when Vietnam invaded Cambodia (Kampuchea). Despite the history of territorial conflict between the two nations, Vietnams intent was to stroke a quick and fatal blow10 to Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge leadership, taking control of the countrys government swiftly and significantly. The Vietnamese military declared the establishment of a new Peoples Republic of Kampuchea on January 7, 1979, essentially installing a puppet government. Hanoi ceased this opportunity to

8 Burton, 709. 9 Ibid, 710. 10 Zhang Xiaoming, Chinas 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment, The China Quarterly, vol. 184,

(2005), 853.

 establish its dominance in Indochina, but was increasingly deterred by unexpected Chinese support for Pol Pot and the counterattacks of the Khmer Rouge. Just as important in the build up towards the breakout of war was Chinas

obsessive concern with the tightening military and political alliance between Soviet global hegemonism and Vietnamese regional hegemonism11. Some authors argue that this preoccupation was probably the most important factor in determining the Chinese attack on Vietnam. Hanois capture of Kampuchea viewed in conjunction with the recent signing of the friendship treaty with the Soviets sent an unshakeable message that Vietnam was becoming an expansionist, militarist state becoming more aligned with the more dangerous Superpower12. The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and increasing alignment with the Soviets left the Chinese with a crisis of credibility, whereby failing to oppose Vietnamese aggression would be seen by the Soviet Union as an invitation to move aggressively into China13. The fear of fighting a two-front war, or becoming vulnerable to Soviet domination, was enough to invoke a military response from the Chinese in the form of limited war. Military Objectives The Chinese approached the ensuing military conflict with Vietnam as a

punitive action, with the general purpose being to sweep away the obstacle of Vietnamese aggression in Cambodia by military means.14 Deng and the PLA military

11 Ibid 711. 12 Xiaoming, 855. 13 Burton, 711.

14 Min Chen, The Strategic Triangle and Regional Conflicts: Lessons from the Indochina Wars. Boulder:

Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 2.

leaders employed a teach a lesson model of swift and sudden invasion, in order to inflict a humiliating local defeat and then stage a magnanimous unilateral withdrawal that was designed to underline the impotence of the victim nation15. The Chinese used this punitive model before in other scenarios, such as the Sino-Indian War and in Korea, and decided to replicate the same strategy against Vietnam. Kissinger explained the Chinese tradition of punitive warfare by noting how Chinese strategists were more likely to increase commitment to substitute courage and psychological pressure against the material advantage of the adversarythey believe in deterrence in the form of preemption16. Thus, much of the Chinese strategy involved disarming the enemys confidence and allowing China to reclaim a psychological upper hand. In justifying a Chinese invasion in Vietnam, Deng reiterated the leaderships

position that Vietnam had to be punished for its invasion in Kampuchea, pledging: To uphold the long-term prospects of international peace and stability . . . [the Chinese people] will firmly fulfill our internationalist duties, and will not hesitate to even bear the necessary sacrifices17. Dengs analysis of the Chinese strategic situation included a notification to the U.S. that China intended to go to war with Vietnam because it had concluded that Vietnam would not stop at the invasion of Cambodia. Deng warned against the growth of Hanois lust for an Indochinese

15 Henry Kissinger, Touching the Tigers Buttocks: The Third Vietnam War, On China, (New York:

Penguin Books, 2011), 14.

16
17 Ibid, 15.

Ibid, 14.

 Federation, an idea that Ho Chi Minh himself cherished18. According to Deng, the

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conquering of three states was only the first step, with Thailand as the next prospect to be included. From this vantage point, China had an obligation to act, and not await developments on Vietnams part, for once they had occurred, it would be too late. Furthermore, the Chinese clearly established that they did not truly want to

gain any Vietnamese territory, and that they would withdraw their forces unilaterally as soon as they had reached their objectives of definitely punishing Vietnam19. However, Deng was less than clear about explicitly stating what those objectives were or how they could be measured and achieved. For example, a punishment could range from wiping out a few significant divisions of Vietnamese forces and military bases, to occupying the borderland in its entirety20. It is clear from the lack of explicitly stated objectives on the part of Chinese leadership that they were unsure of the extent of their military capabilities, and were thus reluctant to make definitive statements which would mark their attack as a failure if they were not met. If Dengs objective was not to capture Vietnamese territory, then it was almost surely to preserve a strategic equilibrium of influence in Asia. Further, China undertook the campaign with the moral support, diplomatic backing, and intelligence cooperation of the United States, the same imperialist power that Beijing had helped eject from Indochina five years earlier21.

18 Ibid, 15. 19 M. Chen, 7. 20 Ibid, 8.

21

Kissinger, 16.

 The Vietnamese objectives for military action were directly influenced by

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Hanois decision to invade the Kampuchea region and overthrow the Pol Pot regime. Vietnams interest in Kampuchea stemmed from the belief that it was the key to maintaining a balance of power and sphere of influence in Indochina. Victory over Cambodia would maximize Vietnams independence from Western powers and from China, and would greatly increase Vietnams influence in the entire Southeast Asia region22. As Hood argues, the decision to conduct a preemptive offensive to deal with Pol Pot in Cambodia could be interpreted as a coup de main23 to secure a one- front operation. Likewise, from the Vietnamese perspective, Chinese antagonizing over the

apparent mistreatment of the Hoa24 in South Vietnam and the resulting recalling of all aid and assistance was actually done for the purpose of destabilization of Hanoi. Chinese full-fledged for the Pol Pot regime further encouraged Vietnamese fears of a two-front war situation whereby the Chinese would aim to keep Vietnam militarily preoccupied and boxed in with the help of its neighbors25. ODowd offers an explanation for how Vietnamese military objectives and ensuing invasion of Kampuchea can be interpreted as just war, as an effort to free the Cambodian peoples from one of the worst tyrannies in recent history26. However, in light of other scholarship and Ho Chi Minhs desire for an Indochina

22 Hood, 45. 23 Hood, 46. A Coup de main is defined as an offensive operation that capitalizes on surprise and

simultaneous execution of supporting operations to achieve success in one swift stroke. 24 The Hoa are the ethnic Chinese population in Vietnam. 25 O'Dowd, 45. 26 Ibid, 55.

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Federation, as well as the growing Soviet-Vietnamese alliance, it is more likely to be considered an aggressive, conventional offensive attack, despite any humanitarian consequences. In response to the initial Chinese invasion, Vietnam engaged in a War Against Chinese Expansionism, essentially outlining their main objective to be a hold a defensive front against unwarranted Chinese aggression. Course of War Initial Period: February 17-26, 1979 On February 17, 1979, China mounted a multipronged invasion of northern

Vietnam from southern Chinas Guangxi and Yunnan provinces. This was fifteen weeks after the signing of the Vietnamese Soviet Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship and just six weeks after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. The Chinese strategy was to engage in a peoples war, utilizing Maos strategy of the use of manpower over weaponry. The principle of peoples war, proposed by Mao and used throughout several Chinese conflicts including the civil war, implied that gains were not achieved by weaponry, but by overwhelming manpower27. The size of the Chinese force reflected the importance China attached to the operation. The official Chinese press accounts called the initial invasion the Self-Defensive Counterattack Against Vietnam or the Counterattack in Self-Defense on the Sino- Vietnamese Border. It represented the Chinese version of deterrence, an invasion advertised in advance to forestall the next Vietnamese move.

27 M. Chen, 5.

 Table 1: Relative Manpower at the Onset of War (February, 1979)28 Vietnamese Peoples Army (VPA) Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)

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Army 600,000 3.6 million

Navy 150,000 280,000-300,000

Air Force 300 400,000

In terms of manpower, the Vietnamese Peoples Army at the onset of war had

a significantly smaller force. When war broke out, there were only five regular divisions and four brigades surrounding the Hanoi area. However, there were initially six divisions along the border area where the entirety of the war was fought. In comparison the figures in Table 1 show that, prior to the war, the Chinese forces on the border area were quantitatively superior to their Vietnamese counterparts by 3 to 129. Manpower was upheld as the decisive factor for determining the capabilities of both forces. During the first offensive, the Chinese unleashed a blitzkrieg of 100,000 men, and launched powerful artillery shellings, followed by tank unites and waves of troops30. By February 20th, the Chinese had advanced ten miles from the border and into Vietnamese territory. At that point, the Chinese released reports that estimated that there were 10,000 Vietnamese killed and only 5,000 killed on the Chinese side. The Vietnamese gave different account, claiming that they caused heavy casualties to the PLA army. At this point, accounts of the fighting became contradictory, yet it

28 M. Chen, 10-11. 29 M. Chen, 14. 30 Ibid, 15.

 was clear that the sheer Chinese manpower was enough to deter a Vietnamese defense.
Figure 2: Map of Chinese Border Invasion31

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Surprisingly, the Soviet reaction to Chinas initial invasion of Vietnam was subdued. It was made clear during this initial period of war that the Soviet response would be primarily supportive in nature. Moscow continued to warn the Chinese against further advancement into Vietnam, but maintained that the Vietnamese people were capable of defending themselves. As a result, the actual fighting was totally left to the Vietnamese so not to bring Soviet troops into direct conflict with

31http://cdn.dipity.com/uploads/events/6c8e1912751546c9fe60ee0be82218c0_1M.png

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the Chinese32. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese border defense was amazingly strong. The Vietnamese Peoples Army employed various forms of creative warfare such as tunnel warfare, jungle warfare, surprise attacks, booby traps, and landmines, laser weapons, and bamboo stakes, which were successful at taming forceful acts of Chinese aggression33. Having captured several border cities just two weeks into the bloody war, it was clear that the Chinese would not advance into Hanoi, and that the Soviets would not intervene militarily in the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. Final Period: February 27-March 16, 1979 After announcing a limited scope of war and declaring an intention not to invade Hanoi, the Chinese forces focused on capturing more border cities in the final period of warfare. In addition to capturing and laying waste to the capitals of three Vietnamese border provinces, the PLA captured the hilltop city of Lang Song, and blew up the bridge south of the city. Immediately after the capture of Lang Song, the Chinese announced their complete withdrawal from Vietnam and claimed, We do not want a single inch of Vietnamese territory, but neither will we toleration incursions into Chinese territory34. Ironically, this occurred on the same day that Vietnam called for a nationwide general mobilization for war35. Chinas limited punitive strike lasted a total of twenty-nine days, including the withdrawal period from March 5-17th.

32 Harlan W. Jencks, China's "Punitive" War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment, Asian Survey, Vol.

19, No. 8, University of California Press (Aug., 1979), 805. 33 M. Chen, 15. 34 Hood, 78. 35 Ibid, 17.

 Assessment Table 2: Estimated War Losses: Manpower and Weaponry 36 Killed Wounded POWs Tanks, armored vehicles Heavy mortars/guns Missile stations

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Chinese 26,000 37,000 260 420 66 0

Vietnamese 30,000 32,000 1,638 185 200 6

One of the most interesting aspects of this brief but bloody military conflict

was the fact that both China and Vietnam claimed a victory over one another. Upon further analysis of the outcomes of the war, it is clear that neither country truly achieved all of its objectives in order to declare a decisive victory37. Both sides were willing to end hostilities and were relieved that the war was winding down. The price of war had been higher than expected for the Chinese, as the Vietnamese were able to muster more resistance than Beijing had originally expected. As far as China is concerned, it appears that one of the biggest weaknesses

was the backward weaponry and logistics of the PLA forces38. Many military scholars have noted that the PLAs command system, operational tactics, logistics, and, above all, weaponry were not in modern conditionsthey were behind the times39. Failing to modernize their army and weaponry in time cost the Chinese

36 M. Chen, 25. 37 King C. Chen, China's War with Vietnam, 1979Issues, Decisions, and Implication, (Stanford, Calif.:

Hoover Institution, Stanford University, California, 1987), 104. 38 M. Chen, 27. 39 Burton, 8.

 more casualties than expected, almost on par with Vietnamese ones as shown in

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Table 2. They also gravely underestimated Vietnamese forces and technology. Maos peoples war doctrine also proved to be an unsuccessful strategy in the face of the guerilla and modern warfare fought by the Vietnamese Army. The PLA failed to destroy some of Vietnams strongest divisions and did not achieve the objective of pacifying Vietnamese aggression in Kampuchea or forcing the withdrawal of their forces from the region. However, the Chinese did succeed in the punitive aspect of warfare by following through on a scorched earth policy, leaving extensive damage to the Vietnamese countryside, infrastructure, and economy. Accordingly, it is estimated that about eighty percent of the infrastructure in areas where the Chinese invaded was destroyed40, and cities were reduced to rubble and mass graves were everywhere41. For the Vietnamese, the limited assistance from the Soviet Union, and its lukewarm response to Chinese invasion, had a great impact on their capabilities and resources. The Soviets did end up sending a naval task force to the South China Sea, undertaking a limited arms airlift to Hanoi, and stepping up air patrols along the Sino-Soviet border. However, these actions were constrained by PLA blockades and were thus not decisive in assisting the VPA. Furthermore, the Vietnamese were able to claim a victory because China failed to take Hanoi, and barely penetrated the border before ultimately withdrawing all troops. Despite causing significant infrastructural damage, Hanoi was left intact. Most significantly, the Chinese did not

40 Burton, 718. 41 Nguyen Hung, The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict: Power Play among Communist Neighbors, Asian

Survey, Vol. 19, No. 11, University of California Press, (Nov., 1979), 1045.

 manage to force Vietnamese forces out of Kampuchea, and thus did not win the

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campaign, but rather withdrew. While some believed that a Chinese invasion would explode the myth of Vietnamese military power, the military performance proved astonishingly impressive, especially by border and militia units42. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese population suffered significant causalities and faced economic consequences of the PLAs scorched earth strategy. When assessing the Third Indochina War in the context of East Asian relations in the post -Cold War, the conventional assessment from historians is that the war was a costly Chinese failure43. In the end, China was not able to rescue the Khmer Rouge or force Hanoi to withdraw its troops from Cambodia for another decade. It is possible that Deng framed Chinese war objectives in much more limited terms and withdrew PLA forces promptly once he realized this the limits of Chinese capabilities. As a result of the failure on Chinas part to dissuade Vietnamese involvement, Vietnamese troops remained in Cambodia until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989. Kissingers assessment, essentially rooted in the U.S. perspective on the Sino- Vietnamese conflict, differed from other historians in that he believed that the Chinese campaign reflected a serious long-term strategic analysis44 of reversing an unacceptable momentum of Soviet strategy. It is undeniable that the Sino- Vietnamese conflict resulted in the closest collaboration between China and the

42 Harlan W. Jencks, China's "Punitive" War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment, Asian Survey, Vol.

19, No. 8, University of California Press (Aug., 1979), 814 43 Ibid, 816. 44 Kissinger, 17.

 United States for the period of the Cold War, and a period of normalization.

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Kissinger thus argues that, though providing breathing space for the remnants of the Khmer Rouge can hardly be counted as a moral victory, China achieved its larger geopolitical aims vis--vis the Soviet Union and Vietnam both of whose militaries were better trained and equipped than Chinas45. While his analysis aligns with Chinas ultimate success in establishing its dominance in Southeast Asia, it perhaps gives too much agency to Dengs military strategy towards Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Singapores Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew summed up the ultimate result of the war: The Western press wrote off the Chinese punitive action as a failure. I believe it changed the history of East Asia. Conclusion Despite the withdrawal of Chinese forces from Vietnam and the official end to the Third Indochina War in March 1979, border skirmishes between the two nations continued throughout the 1980s. Armed conflict only came to an official end in 1989 after the Vietnamese fully withdrew from Cambodia. The Vietnamese and Chinese finally signed a border pact in 1999, after years of negotiations46. Despite the official demarcation of the border being officially complete, control over the Paracel and Spratly islands remains a point of contention between the two nations. In light of the aforementioned analysis of the historical context and military objectives of both nations, it is clear that the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 was

45 Ibid, 18. 46 Xiaoming, 870.

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much more than an anachronism from a bygone era47. Chinas initial invasion and the military campaign that followed were responses to growing underlying tensions between two nations lusting for dominance over the Indochina region. The ideological aspects of the war, such as socialist camaraderie first between Vietnam and China, then Vietnam and the Soviet Union, proved not to be as important as imminent territorial threats of expansionism by both parties. Thus, it is clear that territory and boundaries were at the heart of this conflict, despite authors who suggest it should not be considered a border war. While the Sino-Vietnamese War can be analyzed as a baroque parody of a Cold War conflict,48 its significance is clearly relevant today as China and Vietnam continue to associate territorial control in the East Asia region with hegemonic power.

47 Hood, 95. 48 Anne Gilks. The Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 1970-1979. (Berkeley:

Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Center for Chinese Studies, 1992), 226.

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 The Third Indochina War: Conflict between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972-79, edited by Odd A. Westad, and Sophie Quinn-Judge, (New York: Routledge, 2006). Xiaoming, Zhang, Chinas 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment, The China Quarterly, vol. 184, (2005): pp. 851-874;

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