Unit of Employment Concepts for Major Combat Operations

Since 1999, the US military has undergone a sweeping evolution driven by operational experience and new capabilities. In the past, the conduct of operations was divided into loosely linked major land, sea, and air operations, often conducted with different objectives. Today, joint operations form an integrated joint fabric and increasingly, operations are integrated at the tactical level. The joint force commander employs air, sea, space, and special operations forces at the tactical, operational, and theater strategic levels. The complete integration of joint capabilities allows the joint force commander to adapt and tailor joint capabilities to the conditions and tasks extant in the theater and joint operational area (JOA). No single element is decisive; constantly changing combinations forge decisive campaigns. Employed as an integrated joint force, US forces deploy a range of capabilities unmatched by any potential opponent. Joint and multinational operations enable actions of other US Government agencies as part of the broader application of the instruments of national power. The operational environment requires Army forces that are much more responsive and tailorable to the needs of the combatant commanders. No single large formation is able to meet the requirements of full spectrum operations. To meet the needs of the RCC for land forces, the Army is constantly dismantling its current force divisions and task organizing them into independent task forces, something for which they werent designed. This is coupled with the need to employ land forces at the outset of the campaign, in completely complementary fashion with other joint capabilities, translated into the requirement for much more deployable Army forces. The nature of modern land operations has changed in terms of geography and time. In general, operations have become more distributed in space and more simultaneous in time. At tactical and operational levels, subordinate units operate in noncontiguous areas of operations and conduct nonlinear operations as a matter of routine. This contrasts sharply with the interlocked and hierarchical arrangement of land areas of operations prevalent in the past. This change is the result of smaller and more agile forces, quantum improvements in command and control, and continuing integration of joint capabilities at lower echelons. Army forces continue to increase their lethality, meaning that greater effects can be generated with much smaller forces. This continues the historical impetus of the last 100 years. However, the integration of advanced information technologies multiplies the effectiveness of the individual weapons systems by many times. The antithesis of this development is the increasing dependence on unconventional means by our enemies. They are simply unable to match the conventional military capabilities of the US, and the disparity is growing at an increasing rate. Thus, the frequency of facing large, conventional land forces diminishes even as the need for Army forces for full spectrum operations increases, when examined as a function of the total force engaged in campaigns. Note that while the frequency and perhaps likelihood of encountering powerful and competently commanded ground forces has diminished, it will not disappear. For many nations, the cost and infrastructure necessary to challenge the US at sea, in the air, or in space are far greater than that required to field land forces. When and if they challenge 1

US interests, their operational center of gravity will be land-based. Therefore, Army forces must be capable of defeating regional military powers with modernized and capable ground forces for the foreseeable future. All these factors presage the requirement for Army forces to execute offensive land operations early in the campaign, by introducing forces capable of maneuvering to operational depths in conjunction with other joint capabilities. This is the essence of operational maneuver from strategic distance. In order to be deployed and employed swiftly, these forces must be smaller than the two Army Corps that carried out Desert Storm (over 100,000 troops each), but with corps-like command and control to extend operations in sufficient depth and strength to dislocate and then defeat enemy forces. Such an operation was planned, but not executed in Operation Iraqi Freedom the attack of the TF IRON HORSE, built around the 4th Mechanized Division (including 33,000 troops) to attack along a line of operations from the Turkish border toward Baghdad.

Figure 1 TF IRON HORSE planned to attack from Turkey to Baghdad, a distance over 500 kilometers, using a mix of brigades and advanced command and control capabilities. TF IRON HORSE would have been controlled directly by 3rd Army as CJFLCC.

To meet joint requirements, the Army is reorganizing its operational forces as shown in Figure 2 to provide for a mix of land combat power that can be tailored for any combination of offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations as part of integrated joint operations.

Current
XXXX Army

Transformed

XXX CORPS

UEY UEX
Primary Warfighter JTF/JFLCC/ARFOR Capable* Army & Joint Support In AOR JTF/JFLCC Capable*

XX DIV

X BDE

BDE
Battles & Engagements

* With SJFHQ and Joint Manning Doc

Functional array, not pure hierarchy

Figure 2. The Army is in the process of a complete reorganization into a modular, brigade-based Army. Brigades will be the principal means of conducting battles and engagements. Two complementary higher echelons will replace the existing structure of divisions, corps, and army headquarters

Brigades Brigades will be the principal means of conducting engagements. The principal tactical unit of the modular Army will be the combined arms maneuver brigade combat team (BCT). Three standard brigade combat team designs make up the maneuver power of the modular Army Heavy Brigade Combat Teams, Infantry Brigade Combat Teams, and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. These maneuver brigade combat teams include organic battalion-sized maneuver, fires, reconnaissance, and logistics subunits. Beginning in 2014, the Army will modernize maneuver brigade combat teams with Future Combat Systems (FCS). FCS-equipped maneuver brigade combat teams will have greater lethality and be easier to deploy and sustain than anything in the current force. The organization of modular brigade combat teams will facilitate conversion to FCS.

X
Heavy Brigade

Brigade Combat Teams

BTB Brigade Troops RSTA

BSB

X
Stryker Brigade

HHC Brigade Staff RSTA

BSB

X
Infantry Brigade

BTB Brigade Troops RSTA

BSB

Figure 3. Three types of brigade combat teams form the maneuver striking power of the modular Army

A mix of other brigades supports the UEx and the brigade combat teams. These brigades include an aviation brigade, reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) brigade, a maneuver enhancement (ME) brigade, a fires brigade, and a sustainment brigade. These brigades will be organized as combined arms and single branch units intended to support the maneuver brigade combat team and carry out specific tasks in support of echelons above the brigade. Figure 4, below, shows the various supporting brigades

Modular Army Support Brigades

X
X

Aviation
Organic
I HHC II ASB II

MF

Fires
Organic Assigned
I
TAB
Rocket/Missile Rocket/Missile

Assigned
II U ASLT II GS CL IV
ATK
TBD

I
HHB

II
BSB

II
Cannon Cannon

IO

ATK

Maneuver Enhancement
Organic
I I II

Assigned
BSB MP

Attached or OPCON
EOD CA MAN

HHC

RSTA
Organic II
INTEL

Sustainment
Attached or OPCON II
BTB
SOF I UAV
Hunter

SUST

Organic
II
BTB

Assigned
II
SPT

Attached
X MED

R A

II

I HHC

I SPT MED FIN HR AMMO TRANS MAINT S&S

SPT LRSD 281100 HHC AUG 04 UE Update to CSA v 4.1

Figure 4. Modular supporting brigades extend the depth and duration of Army operations. RSTA stands for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition

Higher Echelons Between now and 2010, two higher headquarters will replace the existing structure of divisions, corps, and echelons above corps. These headquarters are currently designated UEx (primary warfighting), and UEy (theater operational land force and joint support). While the tendency is to think of these echelons as linear improvements to the division and corps, they are not. Both higher echelons will be complementary, modular entities designed to employ tailored forces within integrated joint campaigns. UEy The UEy will be the Army theater-level headquarters for each Regional Combatant Commander. The UEy consolidates most of the functions performed by corps and Army Service Component Command into a single operational echelon. It will be the primary vehicle for Army support to the entire region. It supports Army, Joint, and multinational forces deployed to a joint operational area. The UEy commander performs the functions and tasks of the Army service component commander (ASCC) when the UEy is under the COCOM (Combatant Command, Command Authority) of a Regional Combatant Commander. In major combat operations, where the regional combatant commander is the joint force commander, the UEy may become the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) and exercises operational control over tactical forces. When required for contingencies, the UEy provides a JTF-capable headquarters.

As the ASCC, the UEy is responsible for administrative control (ADCON) of all Army forces in the AOR. The ASCC also integrates Army forces into the execution of theater engagement plans, and provides Army support to joint forces, interagency elements, and multinational forces as directed by the regional combatant commander. This is shown in Figure 5:

UEy
TSC

ASCC
MI CA
Supporting Supporting Brigades Supporting Brigades Brigades

SIG CMD

ADCON and ASOS

UEy units provide tailored support to the JFC; provide ADCON and most Army support to other Services (ASOS)

JTF

OPCON UEx
JFLCC/ ARFOR J SOTF J FMCC JCMOTF JFACC JPOTF JLTF

AAMDC

Figure 5: The UEy exercises administrative control (ADCON) of Army forces and provides Army support to other services (ASOS) for other members of the joint talks force.

For major combat operations or theater war, the UEy may provide the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) and headquarters. At the same time, the UEy will continue to perform the ASCC functions. The illustration below shows a UEy as a JFLCC.

Major Combat Operations

UEY as JFLCC / ARFOR
RCC

JFLCC/ ARFOR

UEy

Special Operations

Maritime

Air

PSYOP

xxx

xx

UEx UEx
SUST

MN

Theater Sustainment Command

Theater Signal Command

Civil Affairs

Military Intelligence

MEF

Supporting Brigades

Support to Joint & Multinational forces

UExUEy_251200Aug04

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Figure 6. The UEy is designed to be the JFLCC for a major combat operation while continuing Army support within the theater

UEx The primary war fighting headquarters will be the UEx. The UEx combines the functions of todays division with the tactical responsibilities of the corps. The primary task of the UEx is to direct the operations of the subordinate brigades. The UEx is not a fixed formation. It is a completely modular command and control entity designed to exercise command and control over various brigades. The UEx will not have any organic forces beyond the elements that make up the headquarters. The UEx can be the JFLCC for smaller contingencies, or become the JTF headquarters for smaller contingencies, with appropriate joint augmentation. In major combat operations, UEx typically operates along a line of operations or in an area of operations to establish the military conditions required for the successful conclusion of the major land operation or joint campaign. The UEx controls up to six maneuver brigade combat teams in high and mid-intensity combat operations, but may control more maneuver brigade combat teams in protracted stability operations. The brigades may include any mix of heavy, infantry, Stryker, and eventually FCS-equipped brigade combat teams. The UEx has no fixed structure beyond the UEx headquarters, so not all types of brigades may be present in an operation. In some operations, the UEx may control more than one of a particular type of brigade. The UEx may also control functional groups, battalions, or even companies, but normally these will normally be task organized to one of the brigades. The important point is that the UEx is not a standard force, but it is tailored to the mission. Figure 7 illustrates two possible UEx organizations, but many more combinations are possible.

Each UEx is tailored for a specific operation; the composition of the UEx is completely variable

Example: Offensive Operations

X X X
Heavy

X
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition

X
SUST

Stryker Infantry

Fires

Aviation

Maneuver Enhancement

Sustainment

5 Brigade Combat Teams

5 Supporting Brigades

Example: Stability Operations

X X
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition

X X
Maneuver Enhancement

X
Aviation

X
SUST
Sustainment

Stryker

1 Brigade Combat Team

5 Supporting Brigades

Figure 7. UEx will be tailored according to operational requirements. Here, two UEx configurations are shown. This could be two different UEx in the same phase of an operation, or one UEx in different phases.

Intermediate Tactical Echelon If and when the campaign expands and entails the use of significant land forces in decisive offensive operations, the operation may require an intermediate land echelon between the UEx controlling brigade combat teams and the land component. This could be based on complexity, multinational requirements, the use of more than one UEx on a line of operations, or span of command. When required, one UEx may become an intermediate tactical headquarters under the JFLCC, with OPCON of two or more UEx or other large tactical formations. The UEy will tailor the intermediate UEx headquarters with the appropriate commander, staff, communications, and units to allow it to function as an intermediate headquarters over other UEx. The modularity of the UEx allows the Army to meet the needs of the JFC without excessive force structure for this requirement. Figure 8 depicts this possibility:

UEy as JFLCC; UEx as Intermediate Tactical Headquarters

xxx

RCC

UEy JFLCC

JSOTF

JFMCC JFACC

JFMCC

Theater Sust Command

Theater Signal Command

MI

CA

UEx
MEF

JFC assigns 3-star Host Nation Army commander to UEx from CONUS

xx

x x x

UEx

UEx

MN

Additional brigades controlled by intermediate UEx

Figure 8. The scale, complexity and span of command of major offensive operations may require an intermediate warfighting headquarters. When required, one UEx becomes the intermediate HQ.

Modular Army Forces Controlled by other Services The modularity designed into Army forces allows other service headquarters to receive and employ Army brigades directly, without an intervening Army headquarters. The figure below illustrates Army forces OPCON to a MEF for an offensive operation. The UEy, with its assigned commands, continues to exercise ADCON, for the maneuver enhancement brigade, while providing Army capabilities (for example NETOPS) in a supporting role to the MEF. This is only one example. Other examples may include the OPCON of a missile-heavy fires brigade to the JFACC, or a tailored sustainment brigade to the JSOTF.

UEy

XXX

MEF
Army support

OPCON ADCON X Army Maneuver Enhancement Brigade

ll

ll

ll

ll
P

ll

HHC

MP TEU BIDS

CA

EOD

SPT

Figure 9. The MEF controls a Maneuver Enhancement brigade tailored for support tot the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) ashore.

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