P 271758Z MAR 08 FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2077 C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 001136 SUBJECT: NEW CRIMINAL GROUPS AND

POLICE EFFORTS TO COMBAT THEM REF: A. BOGOTA 5882 B. 06 BOGOTA 8458 ------SUMMARY ------1. (C) The OAS Mission for Support of the Peace Process (MAPP/0AS) and local media highlight the growing threat to local governance posed by new narcotrafficking and extortion groups. The new criminal groups lack the popular and political acceptance that facilitated the expansion of United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) in some regions, but continue to corrupt local officials and perpetuate violence. Jailed former AUC leaders such as Macaco have largely lost control over their criminal bands, but demobilized paras who have returned to crime or who never demobilized--as well as new narcotraffickers--are filling the vacuum. The Colombian National Police (CNP) have made significant progress in combating the groups, but drug trafficking profits enable them to rapidly

regenerate.

End Summary.

----------------------------NEW GENESIS OR OLD PHENOMENON ----------------------------2. (C) MAPP/OAS analysts told us former AUC leaders are losing influence over their former bands, but said their places are being filled by former AUC members who have returned to crime or who never demobilized--as well as by new narcotraffickers. The groups focus on drug production and cultivation--as well as extortion-and lack the AUC's military capacity, command structure, and national scope. With some exceptions, the new groups do not use the AUC's counter-insurgency rhetoric, and do not enjoy the popular and political acceptance among some regional elites that facilitated the AUC's growth. Still, MAPP/OAS analysts cautioned that the new groups' emergence has been facilitated by local corruption within the police, military, and local government. In some area, senior officials turn a blind eye to narcotrafficking due to payoffs or threats. In a recent speech, OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza called the groups "delinquents." 3. (C) Semana magazine reporter Marta Ruiz agreed former AUC leaders no longer control their former criminal organizations; those that tried to retain command from prison, such as Carlos Mario Jimenez (Macaco), face criminal investigations and eventual extradition to the United States. Still, she warned that while the new groups do not control territory as did the AUC, they pose a significant threat to GOC efforts to establish security and

good governance in rural areas--especially in regions previously dominated by the AUC. Ruiz said new criminal leaders such as Daniel Rendon (Don Mario) and Daniel Barrera (Loco Barrera) control hundreds of gunmen, and cooperate with the FARC and ELN to protect and expand their narcotrafficking activities. The MAPP/OAS estimates the new criminal groups have between 3000-3500 members. ---------------AREAS OF CONCERN ---------------4. (C) The CNP estimates the new groups number approximately 2200 members--compared to approximately 30,000 in the former AUC--and are active in Uraba, Cesar, Narino, Meta, Vichada, Norte del Santander, southern Bolivar, and Cordoba. Major groups include the Colombian Antiterrorist Popular Revolutionary Army (ERPAC) in eastern Meta and Vichada (estimated 600 members reputedly led by non-demobilized AUC leaders), the Rastrojos (estimated 350 members), the New Generation Organization (ONG) in Narino (estimated 400 members), and the Aguilas Negras of Norte de Santander (a name used by many independent criminal groups across Colombia) Only the ONG and the Aguilas Negras del Santander maintain the former AUC's counterinsurgency line. The latter also maintains criminal networks that extend into Venezuela. The CNP said most criminal groups have fewer than 50 members; none have a national command structure. -------------MODUS OPERANDI --------------

5. (C) The CNP confirmed the new criminal groups largely operate in areas of high criminality, such as coca cultivation zones, key drug trafficking corridors, or regions with infrastructure (refineries, pipelines, ports) vulnerable to extortion. In areas with high unemployment, criminal groups find it easy to replace killed or captured gang members using narco profits. CNP analysts say the emergence of new groups correlates to high-crime indicators more than to the relative success or failure of local reinsertion programs. Data shows the percentage of demobilized paramilitaries involved in crime is around 15 percent. The CNP said they have not seen a concerted effort by the new groups to infiltrate political or military institutions. They stressed that unlike the AUC which generated popular support through provision of local services, maintained a centralized command structure, and penetrated state institutions, the new groups have few political pretensions. -------------------------POLICE EFFORTS AND RESULTS -------------------------6. (C) CNP Director Oscar Naranjo told us combating new criminal groups is the CNP's top priority. The rural police or Carabineros, who lead the GOC effort against the new groups with support from military and other law enforcement agencies, have set up 100 rural police stations in areas prone to drug trafficking. The stations have 3608 dedicated officers: 3480 carabineros in 29 mobile squadrons, 68 intelligence officers, and 60 judicial police. Regional security councils led

by governors coordinate interagency efforts to monitor, measure, and counter the emergence of new groups. 7. (C) The CNP reports that it captured or killed 2979 new criminal group members in 2007. Despite these successes, drug profits enabled the groups to rapidly regenerate. The CNP reported that some illegal groups had estimated turnover rates of up to 300 percent in 2007, but still remained active. GOC arrest and takedown figures show some success in targeting the new groups' leaders, with the CNP arresting at least eight individuals associated with gangs using the Aguilas Negras name including: Juan Hipolito Mejia Rodriguez (7.7 or Caucasia), Aguilas leader in Magdalena department; Jairo Alfonso Samper (Lucho), leader in La Guajira; John Freddy Beltran, leader in the border city of Cucuta; and Alcides de Jesus Durango (Rene), founder of an Aguilas group in Antioquia. In Narino, Marines captured Rastrojos leader Nolido Antonio Puente (Pedro), while the CNP arrested Cesar Augusto Solarte (el Paisa), ONG's head of finances and militia chief. BROWNFIELD (Edited and reading.) reformatted by Andres for ease of