Kosovo who does the ISG speak for?

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26 Jan 2012 | Kosovo Tags:Ahtisaari Plan Balkans EU EULEX Gallucci ICJ ICO Kosovo Mitrovica peacebuil ding Serbia Thaci With the ISG saying it plans to leave by the end of 2012, even whilst outstanding issues including the north remain, the UN must be prepared to play an essential buffering role between the two sides in the status dispute. By Gerard M. Gallucci The International Steering Group (ISG) met on January 24 in Vienna to consider its 2012 program for Kosovo. The forum issued a communique calling upon the government of Kosovo to continue to implement the Ahtisaari Plan, aiming to complete outstanding elements so that the period of supervised independence could terminate by the end of this year. The ISG reaffirmed its commitment to Kosovos territorial integrity within its existing borders. The ISG also called upon Serbia to abide by its international commitments and refrain from interfering in Kosovo, including by withdrawing its police, security, and other state presences, and supporting efforts by international actors and the institutions of Kosovo to promote the rule of law. The group also demanded that Belgrade ensure that its local elections are not extended into northern Kosovo. The ISG has, in effect, demanded that Serbia pull out from Kosovo and assist in bringing the north under the administration of Pristina. It called the continued presence of Serbian institutions there interference and not in line with Serbias international commitments. Who is the ISG speaking for here? The answer can only be that it speaks for itself, a self-chosen group of 25 countries brought together in another of those Bush-era coalitions of the willing to legitimate Pristinas unilateral declaration of independence. The ISG does not speak for the international community and certainly not for the United Nations or the Security Council. It speaks for those countries led by the Quint that saw fit in 2008 to step outside UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and to take on the political and financial costs of shepherding the new state through a shaky start-up. Politically, the ride has been rougher than expected, with recognitions even now from less than half of the UN membership and many internal problems remaining. So now, the Quint is in a hurry to cut the costs and

split. The ISG speaks very much for itself and certainly not for the people of Kosovo. The ISG really the US, Germany and Brussels are tired of Kosovo and impatient to leave. This is dangerous. Being in a hurry may lead the Quint to make mistakes. Right now, Washington, Berlin and Brussels appear to be looking to diplomatic pressure on Belgrade. If Serbias president, Boris Tadic, wants EU candidacy enough, hell accept surrender on the ISGs terms. Comments reportedly made by the EUs enlargement commissioner, Stefan Fle, make that clear. He emphasized that Serbias chances to receive candidacy next month hinge on accepting further concessions in the BelgradePristina dialogue and bringing down the barricades in the north. What happens if the diplomatic pressures fail to produce the desired effects? Its possible that recent British and French comments indicate a possible opening for a negotiated, compromise solution for the north. Is that opening real, however, or simply wheel-spinning till spring? The Self-Determination party is already adding to the pressure on the Kosovo administration to do something about the north by making it crack down against barricades in the south. It must be clear by now that there is no military solution to the north. Any determined use of force against the northern Kosovo Serbs by anyone will likely lead to violence and partition. Tadic cannot make this any less so. The ISG saying it plans to leave by the end of 2012, however, implies a threat to ensure the implementation by then of Kosovos rule of law. As noted previously, the end of supervised independence also raises another issue. If the ICO and EULEX leave or substantively end their missions while outstanding issues including the north remain, who assumes the essential buffering role between the two sides in the status dispute? This can only be the UN, which still has the peacekeeping responsibility under 1244. The UN should be developing plans now for a stepped up presence including police for the north. Without political agreement discounting a simple breakdown into renewed war it will still need to do what the Security Council sent it to Kosovo to do, keep the peace. Gerard M. Gallucci is a retired US diplomat and UN peacekeeper. He worked as part of US efforts to resolve the conflicts in Angola, South Africa and Sudan and as Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security Council. He served as UN Regional Representative in Mitrovica, Kosovo from July 2005 until October 2008 and as Chief of Staff for the UN mission in East Timor from November 2008 until June 2010. Gerard is also a member ofTransConflicts Advisory Board. To read TransConflicts recently-released policy paper, entitled The Ahtisaari Plan and North Kosovo, please click here. To read other articles by Gerard for TransConflict, please click here.

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