Trenholm 1

William of Orange and Why He Accepted the English Crown

David Trenholm
December 4th, 2006
HIST 2173 X1
Dr. Gerry Gerrits
 Trenholm 2

The eve of the seventeenth century saw a concerned England—an England ruled

by a Catholic and a Stuart, James II. James was a monarch who was distrusted by many

of his people due to his pro-Catholic beliefs, beliefs that had also caught the attention of

the Stadtholder of the United Netherlands, William III of Orange. Many protestant

Englishmen were concerned and outright enraged by James II’s generosity directed

towards the Catholics of the nation—whether it be the unilateral repealing of laws that

inhibited Catholics, or the appointment of Catholics to positions of power within the

government.1 James’ actions and the continual distrust of his nation’s politicians

eventually led to the revolution of 1688, coined often as the “Glorious” or “Bloodless”

Revolution, and even referred to as a “respectable” revolution by some.2 Whatever name

one uses is irrelevant, but the true wonder of the revolution of 1688 was that it was,

indeed, quite bloodless and non-violent—a stark contrast to England’s history of

“revolutions”. James II’s growing support of Catholics, however, was hardly the sole

reason that drove William III to invade England. With the growing resentment towards

James’ policies as voiced by parliament and indeed, the nation, William was beginning to

fear a rebellion, and perhaps an end to the Stuart dynasty and with it his claim to the

English throne. James II was aging, and had not produced an heir to the throne—Mary, a

staunch protestant, was next in line and the loyal wife of William. William knew that if he

wished to secure his future at the head of the English nation, he would have to act soon.

Growing concern of the French on the continent also compelled William to invade. Louis

XIV, a strong Catholic, was of great concern to William, especially with Charles II’s

recent dealing with the French nation still fresh in his mind. A victory in England, and

1
Maurice Ashley, The Glorious Revolution of 1688. (London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1966), 89.
2
Lucile Pinkham, William III and the Respectable Revolution. (United States: Archon Books, 1969), 239.
 Trenholm 3

control of the English throne, would secure a unified alliance against France, something

that meant a great deal to the Stadtholder.

Although quite Dutch, and indeed the face of the United Netherlands, William III

was also a Stuart, being a grandson of Charles I of England. His claim and connection to

the Stuarts of England, although remote, was still quite a certain fact. Being married to

Mary, the daughter of James II, made William third in line to the English throne. Mary

had promised William that he would “exercise actual executive power when she came to

the English throne.”3 Considering this, then, William III was indeed the prospective heir

to the throne, as James II was aging and without a son to be had. William had not been

largely concerned with his disinheritance for the longest time, though, and was content to

let James reign to his death. While James’ pro-Catholic policies did indeed give him

pause, it was not something he had intended to act on, as it did not affect his apparent and

expected ascension.4 It wasn’t until the spring of 1688 did William’s concerns peak, and

he felt compelled to act. King James II’s wife, Mary of Modena, was apparently pregnant,

and should the child be a son, Mary’s inheritance of the throne would be threatened.5

James II had taken the position that his heir, a son, would carry on his pro-Catholic

policies and Catholic regime, an unsettling notion. Further concerning the Stadtholder,

rumours were afoot that James’ heir was indeed illegitimate, “Rumours that the new heir

was actually suppositious (many said he had been smuggled into the birthing chamber in

a warming pan) crystallized the threats to William’s position.”6 It is no coincidence, then,

that the Glorious Revolution of 1688 was planned and launched not a year after the

announced pregnancy of James’ wife and the celebrated perpetuation of his pro-Catholic
3
Tony Claydon, William III: Profiles in Power. (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2002), 30
4
Claydon, 30.
5
Claydon, 31.
6
Claydon, 31.
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policies.7 William III, grossly concerned that his position as heir to the throne of England

had been greatly threatened, knew he had to act to secure both his right to the Crown, and

the longevity of the Stuart dynasty, which he believed was at risk of being lost, as more

talk surfaced of rebellion and the dethronement of James II as King of England.8 In part

to protect the interests of his wife Mary, and in doing so his own, William III had set off

at the head of a small army to England, after receiving the an invitation from Parliament

to dispose of James and his absolutist regime. 9 Although Parliament had not directly

offered William the throne, the Stadtholder had good cause to believe he would be

crowned King of England, which would secure the Stuart’s royal line, give him the ability

to deal with Catholicism in England, and the resources to address growing concern of

French imperialism on the continent.

Louis XIV of France was Catholic, and that was a problem for William, as James

II was Catholic, and had even been quoted saying that, “he could not but wish that all his

subjects were members of the Catholic Church.”10 With the previous alliance of Charles

II and Louis XIV, William was obviously concerned that a Catholic king might lead to a

return of friendly English-French relations. A Catholic English King, William envisioned,

would be bound to seek alliance with France, a strongly Catholic nation. William was

obviously concerned about a French-English alliance, an alliance that had nearly spelled

an end to the Dutch Republic in the third Anglo-Dutch war of 1672.11 Thus, the invasion

of England and the Glorious Revolution of 1688 also meant that the future of Catholicism

7
Claydon, 31.
8
Tony Claydon, William III: Profiles in Power. (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2002), 30.
9
Lois G. Schwoerer, “Propaganda in the Revolution of 1688-89. The American Historical Review 82, no. 4.
(1977): 853.
10
Lucile Pinkham, William III and the Respectable Revolution. (United States: Archon Books, 1969), 27.
11
Dr. Gerry Gerrits. “James II: 1685-1688, and the Glorious Revolution: 1688-1689.” HIST 2173 X1,
Acadia University, October 11th, 2006.
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in England was bleak. William III had intended to placate Parliament and secure a

protestant England by allowing and encouraging anti-Catholic legislature to be drafted.

Since before the invasion, however, William had been keeping up on Catholic

appointments and anti-Protestant movements in the form of reports from the Dutch

Ambassador of London, reports that such details as listed below,

A popish master was appointed to a school in Bath; the Protestant

President of Magdalan College was finally deposed; Father Petre became a
member of the Privy Council and was promised a cardinal’s hat; the Duke
of Berwick, James’s illegitimate Roman Catholic son, was appointed Lord
Lieutenant of Hampshire and became responsible for the defence of
Portsmouth; a Roman Catholic, Sir Roger Strickland, was to command the
Channel fleet.12

These appointments were in gross violation of the Test Acts, something that James had

disregarded; an act that many Englishmen viewed as absolutist.13 Mary and William were

not coy in response, and had distributed a letter voicing their displeasure with the help

from a friend, Caspar Fagel.14 The letter was distributed all over England and in Holland,

and it demanded that the Test Acts be retained, and that Roman Catholics were to be

“excluded from both Houses of Parliament and from public employment”.15 Believing

that if Roman Catholics were given political liberty, Mary and William had argued they

would be unrelenting with their pursuits of power and would press on “until they were

masters”.16 William, on becoming King of England, had accepted a “remodelling” of the

Stuart monarchy that had, among other things, instituted an outright ban against future

Catholic rulers17. This “remodelling” could prevent, in William’s mind, a return to

12
Maurice Ashley, The Glorious Revolution of 1688. (London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1966), 92
13
Gerrits, “James II: 1685-1688, and the Glorious Revolution: 1688-1689.”
14
Ashley, 93.
15
Ashley, 93.
16
Ashley, 84.
17
Tony Claydon, William III: Profiles in Power. (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2002), 34.
 Trenholm 6

friendly English-French relations, and indeed, would ensure that England’s loyalties were

Protestant, and more importantly, to William against France.

As always, William’s greatest concern lay with France, and whether or not

England would side with, or against the bold absolutist Louis XIV, the sun-king. His

Stuart inheritance and the staunching of Catholicism were indeed important to him, but

his primary concern was French imperialism, and the security of his United Provinces,

the Dutch Republic. William III was positive that his actions would prevent James from

joining in an alliance with Louis XIV18, an alliance possibly made in exchange for

pension money, as was the case with Charles II during the third Anglo-Dutch war, “…

James might alienate his subjects so far that he would have rely on pensions from Louis

to survive. This had happened to his brother, Charles II…”19 As previously stated, both

William III and the Dutch themselves feared what an English-French alliance would

mean for the Dutch Republic’s security, and remembered all too well what had happened

only a few short years ago. Simply put, the Dutch dreaded an English-French alliance and

the damage it could cause, “…the Dutch dreaded a strong alliance which could unite

English and French naval forces to cripple the commerce of the United Provinces by

blocking the exits to the Atlantic.”20 By invading England and achieving the crown,

William had hoped to compel England into a European coalition of sorts that was, “being

formed to stop the threat of French aggression.”21 This was William III’s chief concern,

and the main impetus behind his invasion and acceptance of the English crown: to stop

James from forming a military pact with France.22 This is evidenced by William’s conduct

18
Lucile Pinkham, William III and the Respectable Revolution. (United States: Archon Books, 1969), 75.
19
Claydon, 32.
20
Maurice Ashley, The Glorious Revolution of 1688. (London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1966), 86.
21
Maurice Ashley, The Glorious Revolution of 1688. (London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1966), 85.
22
Lucile Pinkham, William III and the Respectable Revolution. (United States: Archon Books, 1969), 94.
 Trenholm 7

with parliament after he had assumed his role as the English monarch, and his attitudes

towards the rest of Britain when compared to his continental concerns. In order to receive

the crown, William had to concede to many of Parliament’s demands, and indeed, was

forced to give them a considerable amount of freedom, “Certainly, parliament’s new role

meant that William would have to work closely with it to organise and finance the

struggle against Louis.”23 It was to William’s benefit that foreign affairs the army

remained in the relative control of the monarchy24. William knew that in order to secure

English resources for his campaign to stop the French threat, he had to appease and bow

to parliament’s will, lest they dispute his much-needed military control. It was a delicate

game, but William’s focus on the war meant that he would stop at nothing to secure

English assistance, “The history of the 1690s show that the king did have some aims in

Britain beside military finance, but it also demonstrates he would never pursue these if

they obstructed his continental strategy.”25 For example, William had initially made a bid

to retain some power of the crown, and in the early years of his reign had asserted he had

the political right to influence the composition of the legislature.26 It did not take long,

however, for the MPs to threaten to “cut royal revenue if the king did not retreat”, and

once such a threat was made, William took little time in surrendering his position on the

matter. This makes it quite clear the William’s primary concern was the assurance of

England’s loyalty against France. Although his interests in the Stuart dynasty and the

growing problem of Catholicism were indeed a factor, his decision to invade and accept

the parliamentary “Invitation” was largely made in order to prevent an English-French

alliance, and to thwart the growing problem of French imperialism.

23
Tony Claydon, William III: Profiles in Power. (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2002), 35.
24
Claydon, 35.
25
Claydon, 38.
26
Claydon, 38.
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Securing the English throne for himself was perhaps the great accomplishment of

William III’s political career—it was the culmination of careful planning, clever

propaganda and a delicate game of realpolitiks. William III knew that accepting the

historic parliamentary Invitation to dispose of James II would gain him a lot of ground

and power in Europe, power that he needed to combat the growing concern of French

imperialism. As he watched James II’s Catholic rule plummet into severe unpopularity

with a largely Protestant nation, William knew that his inheritance was at risk if he failed

to act—rebellion could cast the Stuart line out, and worse, might foster a Republic in

England. Invasion also meant a restoration of protestant values and the Test Acts, which

would secure the inhibition of Catholics in the nation, and subsequently prevent a

Catholic ruler from ever allying with France and endangering the national security of the

Dutch Republic again. William knew that accepting the crown could thwart another

English-French alliance, and would guarantee English fidelity for his European coalition

against France—his chief and primary concern. Remarkably the Glorious Revolution of

1688 was bloodless, as William’s force of arms (which he had justified in his

Declaration27) had not even engaged James’ army in any real combat. Even more

remarkable was the relative ease in which William had assumed control, a historic

success and the result of years of planning and networking between William and James’

opponents. History would remember him as King William of England, the Dutch Prince

of Orange that would save the English monarchy and English Protestantism from the

absolutist regime of James II.

27
Tony Claydon, “William III’s Declaration of Reasons and the Glorious Revolution The Historical
Journal 38, no. 1. (1996): 88.
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Bibliography

Ashley, Maurice, The Glorious Revolution of 1688. London: Hodder and Stoughton
Limited, 1966.

Claydon, Tony, William III: Profiles in Power. London: Pearson Education Limited, 2002

Claydon, Tony “William III’s Declaration of Reasons and the Glorious Revolution The
Historical Journal 38, no. 1. (1996): 87-108.

Gerrits, Dr. Gerry. “James II: 1685-1688, and the Glorious Revolution: 1688-1689.”
HIST 2173 X1, Acadia University, October 11th, 2006.

Pinkham, Lucile, William III and the Respectable Revolution. United States: Archon
Books, 1969.

Schwoerer, Lois G., “Propaganda in the Revolution of 1688-89. The American Historical
Review 82, no. 4. (1977): 843-874.