Red Book Second Edition January WINNING WAYS TO FIGHT TRAFFIC TICKETS ALL MATTERS OF VEHICLE CODE ARE

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS TRAFFIC TICKETS ARE VIOLATIONS OF CIVIL RIGHTS TRAFFIC TICKETS ARE VIOLATIONS OF BILL OF RIGHTS TRAFFIC TICKETS ARE FALSE ARREST TRAFFIC TICKETS ARE FALSE IMPRISONMENT TRAFFIC TICKETS ARE UNLAWFUL TAKING OF MONEY ARRESTS FOR D.U.I ARE ADMINISTRATIVE SCHEMES UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER BILL OF RIGHTS AND USC ARTICLE ONE, SECTION EIGHT - THREE, 14TH AMENDMENT, CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION ARTICLE ONE MAILING OF BENCH WARRANTS FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR ARE FRAUDULENT USE OF MAIL TO EXTORT MONEY TWENTY EIGHT CHAPTERS OF KNOWLEDGE AND HOW TO USE IT EIGHT YEARS OF COURT ROOM EXPERIENCE AND THE GROUNDS FOR A CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION WHEN APPLIED TO THE MOTORISTS, TRAVELERS AND DRIVERS ON THE PUBLIC'S COMMON HIGHWAYS

The Public Interest School of Law exists as one of the rights retained by the people under the Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution and recognized in the UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Resolution, United Nations General Assembly 217 A (III) OF 10/12/48 Article 13.1, Everyone has the right to freedom of movement.... INTERNATIONAL COVENANT OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS UNGA Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16/12/66, EIF 3/1/76 Article 13.4, No part of this article shall be construed so as to interfere with liberty of individuals or bodies to establish and direct education institutions. "A state legislature cannot deprive a person of the inherent constitutional rights to conduct a school and to teach for compensation any system of learning not inherently injurious, or harmful to the public health, welfare, or morals, and to do all things necessary or expedient for the explanation,

demonstration, or application of the principles and processes involvement" Colorado - Hurley vs People, 63 P2d 1227; 99 Colo 510 This School is not an instrument of the Corporate State of California; it is not established- as a public service agency; it is not a corporation created and approved by the Corporate State of California; it takes no benefit from the state and so no liability attaches to it for it has no legal obligations due the State thus the State may not impose liabilities upon the School. PREFACE The author became enmeshed with the Corporate State's Vehicle Code when he moved to California on November of 1954. From that date until 1984, he was as gullible and naive as are the majority of the now readers of this study and the research results published herein. He believed that dignity and honor was the foundation of this Country which set it aside as a special unique form of government, previously unknown in the annals of man's history; as a society functioning under a set of laws by which the People were the creators for the People, not for the People. Better that ten guilty men go free, unpunished, than that one innocent man be unjustly punished by a tyrannical government. That the power and might of the chosen government not be abused by amoral men, in stations of power, by the weight of the sword and thundering gunpowder but, that the government of the Nation/States be by Bills of Law, not amoral men serving their own selfish purposes and those of their ilk striving only for power. The author became involved in the abuse of Vehicle Code, a private business code, and of its misuse, misrepresentation and application to a class of individuals not encompassed by the intent of private statutes; it is used as a means of control of the individual, the unlawful taking of property, money, liberty and rights, privileges and immunities by regimentation. By false use of licensing laws/permits it has permeated and crumbled the very foundation of our rights by colorable law corporate statutes under color of robes / office / uniforms. Our right to be let alone, when we do no harm to our fellow man, has disappeared by deceitful imposition of contractual relationships with the Corporate State of California. By our ignorance of the nature of the statutes, unwillingness to challenge figures of authority, because we are "sheep-le" happily following the black sheep [think judicial robes, uniforms of a police

officer], believing all is well, after all, look about you and see your fellow happy sheep in the flock. All unaware that we are being led to fleecing pens, [tribunal courts] where in we are fleeced and never know that we have been fleeced, subjected to an unnatural fleecing by men functioning outside the scope of their duty as public officials. That the taking of our natural coat of protection, Our Laws, under guise of Corporate Administrative Law which excludes us from their juris-diction, and is not to be taken by onerous deceit, without our voluntary, knowing surrender of a right for a special privilege for which we have no need, will not enjoy, nor participate, nor any benefit gained in the future by our ignorant compliance. Others, as myself, who have raised their heads above the flock, to learn what is happening to the flock, have discovered themselves to be in the position of the turkey who does, so someone is going to take a shot at it because it disrupts the serenity of those who do not know they are going to be plucked. Fortunately, those who have learned of our status/power, have the large gonads, will take a stand to fight the deceitful application of compelled nexus. That knowledge is available; it enables that type of individual to use the knowledge herein to strike back, fight Corporate Administrative Agencies, Article I Tribunals, use Article III Courts for damages for deprival of immunity from Corporate Administrative Law which harms us. To the fighter goes the spoils. Wars are not by a single battle won, nor by a single defeat. Battles are learning experiences. Defeats are teaching experiences., Survive enough battles/defeats and you have gained the knowledge and experience of how a war is fought and won. It is the belief of this author that the courts, agencies people's prosecutors, review courts have directly and indirectly taught him a significant number of battle plans and tactics which he would otherwise never have become aware by research and study on his own solitary time in the law library. Understand the massed are never going to rally round your flag. The masses are followers. They do as they are told to do and believe what they are told to believe. Theirs is not to question why, theirs is but to comply, comply to the lie, suffer the knife plunged into their backs while being assured that all is right, and for the common goodwill, safety and security of the People, or is it the People? Read, read, read some more. Study and learn for yourself for whom the bell tolls. the bell tolls for the reader. It will be you for whom the bell dolefully tolls by your non-combativeness, or it can be a government which takes from you

all that was fought for by those slaughtered / maimed in their Rebel's War in the name of freedom and rights from tyranny. The Rodney King episode is a classic example of how the Vehicle Code is used by the police/peace officers of local municipalities, county municipalities, and the California Highway Patrol Traffic Officers, [CHiP traffic officers are not first peace/police officers but, traffic officers with alternative peace officer powers as employees of an administrative agency, within the Business, Transportation and Housing Agency] who by abuse of process and color of uniform deceitfully write civil notices naming individuals using the common highways, citing sections of Vehicle Code when the individual noticed is not within the jurisdiction of local municipalities police power [local police powers of counties and cities does not extend to enforcing state statutes] Department of Motor Vehicles itself has not police power as a Public Service Agency, which is composed of private individuals functioning as Corporate Agencies for the Corporate State, thus cannot delegate police power to arrest for civil actions, special in nature under code enforcement, which is maritime summary procedure, not criminal prosecution. RODNEY KING, now world known as a victim of aggravated assault and his near death; while traveling upon an inter-state federal highway, outside the jurisdiction of Department of California Highway Patrol, Department of Motor Vehicles, local police, may not be heard in County municipal courts under Vehicle Code. A CHiP Traffic Officer took off in pursuit of Mr. King because it was his belief that King was traveling at an unlawful rate of speed on a common highway but he as State Traffic Officer had no jurisdiction, nor the State by its Vehicle Code, nor the Department of Motor Vehicles hearing by magistrates in municipal tribunals for administrative agencies. MR. KING at some off-ramp exited the Inter-state and continued on the city streets. Because he refused to pull over and stop on the side of the street, the CHiP radioed that they were in hot pursuit of a speeding automobile. The Los Angeles Police Department responded to the message and joined the pursuit of Mr. King. At some location King was stopped. Assuming CHiPs had jurisdiction and were in legitimate "hot pursuit", Mr. King was theirs. But, the alleged unlawful speed was not committed within the geographical jurisdiction of the LAPD, they were intruders when they told the CHiPs they would take over and then brutalized him with clubs, kicks, tasers, to a critical need for hospital-ization, treatment

of broken bones, fractures and contusions. LAPD had no jurisdiction to arrest Mr. King under color of State Vehicle Code for State Department of Motor Vehicles. As an alleged speeding violation is not a arrestable offense, being an infraction of the Vehicle Code, not a substantive crime, and no penal code misdemeanor had been committed in the knowing presence of the LAPD, the LAPD was performing a false arrest and false imprisonment. Such an arrest without the force of law is an act of kidnapping (Pen C S207 (a) Every person who forcibly ..... arrests any person in this state, and carries the person into another country, state, or county, or into another part of the same county, is guilty of kidnapping.) The Department of Motor Vehicles and magistrates sitting to hear and set an adminis-trative record for possible review for DMV have blind eyes when they permit/condone abuse of process of administrative law procedure by state/local agencies. But, such is the method of procedure which unconstitutionally sweeps into a giant net all individuals merely because they are using a wheeled conveyance/automobile/truck upon the common highways/streets, not of a class supervised by the DMV, or subject to the jurisdiction of the Statutes 1959, Vehicle Code are falsely arrested, falsely imprisoned and fined and suffer fines and assessments where no state money of account exists. It is the author's opinion that the cop on the street in his black and white actually believes that he is functioning as a peace officer when he writes civil notices and that all individuals using streets and common highways are subject to his jurisdiction and Vehicle Code and Department of Motor Vehicles. As the "cop" is not educated to know the truth, he is being used by the DMV and the magistrates in municipal tribunals to violate the rights of the motorist using the common highways for personal or business use, who cannot be compelled to be licensed and pay "use taxes" when the conveyance is not dedicated to the use by the general public for its benefit. WITHOUT THE DUMB COP THE DMV WOULD BE LIMITED BY THE NATURE OF SPECIAL PROCEEDING REQUIREMENT UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE TRUTH WOULD BE KNOWN TO ALL MOTORISTS THAT THE COP IS NOT FUNCTION-ING AS A PEACE OFFICER BUT AN INFORMER FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES AS NO POLICE POWER CAN BE ATTACHED BY THE LEGISLATURE TO ANY RESOLUTION FOR ENACTMENT OF A PRIVATE STATUTE AS TO A CLASS OF PEOPLE. CALIFORNIA IS A REPUBLIC. THE FLAG OF CALIFORNIA BEARS ONLY THE WORDS "CALIFORNIA REPUBLIC ". THERE IS NO FLAG FOR THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA ONLY A CORPORATE SEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. [The Republic was created by the representatives of the People to do for the People that which they could not do themselves. Run the business of government; Article I Legislative Department "All legislative powers herein granted .... Sec 7 Mode of passing laws "Every bill .. before it becomes a law [No law shall be passed except by bill]. Article II Executive Department .... Executive power shall be vested in... Article III Judicial Department - The judicial power shall be vested... [When California applied for Statehood in 1850 it agreed that it would write a Constitution for California which would be in complete compliance with the National Constitution and would guarantee a Republic form of government for the people of California and that the National Constitution was the Supreme Law of the Land, that all laws enacted by the Legislature would be in accord with the National Constitution] STATE OF CALIFORNIA IS A BUSINESS CORPORATION [Because the National Constitution prohibits the Republic from engaging in private business with the People, and from passing any "Law impairing the Obligations of Contracts" see Article I S10, paragraph 1, U.S.C. an interesting paradox now exists in the relationship of the People of the Republic and the People of the State of California] OF: A term denoting that from which anything proceeds; indicating origin, source, descent, as "he is of a race of kings". The word has been held equivalent to at, or belonging to; Davis vs State 38 Ohio st 506; Associated with or connected with, usually in some casual relation, formal or final. Black's 4th p1232. A "State" as in State of California is a "corporate fiction" existing only in thought, created and sustained only and purely in the minds of men. A freewill body politic. [This is because the Constitution does not empower any state legislature to create "corporations by constitutional powers" but only by consent of parties incorporated] [All corporations function by an administrative procedure and are without police power when they perform as business agencies. Administrative agencies are so prolific and reach into so many aspects of the citizens lives that they are now considered to be the Fourth Branch of Government] [As agencies without the authority to exist, they are legal fictions, organizations used to do and perform functions/roles/purposes which a Republic Government cannot do under constitutional authority. Do engage in private business activities and thereby regulate business activities and regulate/control individuals by licensing law, enjoying the right to earn a livelihood, or deceive individuals to ask to be

incorporated/licensed/organized as part of a Corporate State because they believe they have a need for special privileges but, the constitutional right/privilege exists without the "make-believe" entity which has no constitutional power to grant a conditioned right/privilege when the right and privilege is recognized antecedent to the constitution. BOTTOM LINE QUESTION. When and how did the People in their sovereign capacity, in the Constitution [a contract with limitations clearly defined within the Articles and Bill of Rights] grant the power for the Republic Government to create Corporate Entity Federal Government and those Corporate State Entities which create other private corporations and grant members privileges not constitutional? [If the author is in some way mistaken in the above, absent the voluntariness of the individual, how can any individual be compelled to ask for "privileges" when he has the "right" under the Constitution?] MINI - BIO OF THE AUTHOR/PUBLISHER The author is a natural born rebel of the mature age of 70. His years of experience in society, in the job market, in marriages, etc. have given him an insight not available to the individual inexperienced, whose knowledge may be acquired by reading, etc., but until it has been experienced and emotionally impacted personally, it is merely book lore. His attitudes and beliefs were ingrained at birth by New England traditions and parentage and a school system far more demanding of the student, than today's system. More was expected of the individual scholastically, dress code of personal pride, image of self. We were conditioned by the need to perform to a standard which had to be attained by effort, taught that the mind must be probing, questioning, asking why. The author, Arthur Frank Sanford, is not a text book teacher. What he has learned from the text books have been taken into the courts and tribunals of this state since 1984, in the Superior Courts and Review Courts as well as numerous municipal courts/tribunals. Issues run the gamut from "traffic" Civil Notices in municipal tribunals sitting as magistrates for the Department of Motor Vehicles, to Superior Court actions for false arrest/imprisonment by defendants as Judges/magistrates, Deputy Sheriffs and the Sheriff and District Attorney of San Bernadino County and their spouses. Author currently has an action for false arrest/imprisonment naming

Ira Reiner, District Attorney of Los Angeles County and a Deputy District Attorney of that county as defendants remanded back to Federal District Court by the Federal District Court of Appeal for a cause of action showing by author. That was a case wherein I was alleged to be an evil person practicing barratry because I had filed 11 actions suing public officials for false arrest/ imprisonment and 3 of the suits named Mr. Reiner as defendant acting under color of law and misuse and malicious abuse of his office. Needlessly to say, it has been a long, tough experience trying to get an elected public officer to stand in a court under oath to account for his malicious prosecution of my right to "petition the Government for redress of grievances" when he is a defendant. Pro per and pro se litigants are led down a rocky road to deter them from reaching the goal at the end of the road. The victory is always sweeter when won the hard way. Trite but true, "when the going gets tough the tough get going." TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1 PEACE OFFICER DEFINED Chapter 2 PEACE OFFICER TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT UNCONSTITUTIONAL Chapter 3 LEGISLATIVE POWER LIMITATIONS Chapter 4 VEHICLE CODE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY PROMULGATED Chapter 5 JURISDICTION CHALLENGE TO COURT/TRIBUNAL MAGISTRATE Chapter 6 ASSEVERATION; AFFIDAVIT; DECLARATION Chapter 7 NOTICE TO APPEAR IS EXTRA-JUDICIAL CIVIL PROCEDURE Chapter 8 DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES PART OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY Chapter 9 COMMERCE IS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EARN A LIVELIHOOD Chapter 10 VEHICLE CODE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY AMBIGUOUS Chapter 11 DRIVER'S LICENSE UNNECESSARY Chapter 12 VEHICLE CODE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED IN PARTS

Chapter 13 VEHICLE CODE IS BILL OF ATTAINDER/BILL OF PAIN & PENALTIES Chapter 14 ADMINISTRATIVE ESTOPPEL PROCEDURE Chapter 15 DRIVING UNDER INFLUENCE; IMPLIED CONSENT BY DECEIT VOID Chapter 16 NO PROSECUTION LACHES APPLIES Chapter 17 INABILITY TO PAY FINE; STATE WITHOUT MONEY OF ACCOUNT Chapter 18 PROSECUTOR MUST IDENTIFY ACCUSED BY EYEBALL WITNESS Chapter 19 MOTION TO QUASH FOR WANT OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION Chapter 20 MUST DENY ACCUSATION BY OFFICER'S NOTICE TO APPEAR Chapter 21 HOW TO BAR COURT/TRAFFIC COMMISSIONER Chapter 22 CALIFORNIA ATTORNEYS ARE DE FACTO ATTORNEYS Chapter 23 BENCH WARRANTS BY MAIL ARE FRAUD/EXTORTION BY MAIL Chapter 24 NATURAL PERSON? SUBJECT? REPUBLIC? SOVEREIGN STATE? Chapter 25 BAIL FOR RELEASE ON TRAFFIC TICKETS ARE RANSOM Chapter 26 DMV ENFORCEMENT SCHEME IS ABUSE OF VEHICLE CODE PROCESS GROUND FOR US 42 S1983 CIVIL ACTION Chapter 27 LICENSE AND LICENSE FEES ARE BUSINESS TAXES

PEACE OFFICERS JURISDICTION DEFINED DOES NOT EXIST WITHIN VEHICLE CODE PEACE OFFICER. This term is variously defined by statute in the different states; but generally it includes sheriffs, and their deputies, constables, marshals, members of the police force of cities, and other officers whose duty is to enforce and preserve the public peace. Black's 4th p 1287 s830.2 Members of highway patrol

(a) Any member of the California Highway Patrol, provided that the primary duty of the peace officer shall be the enforcement of the provisions of the Vehicle Code or any other law relating to the use of vehicles upon the highways, so as that duty is set forth in the Vehicle Code. Penal Code. s830.3 Particular officers The following persons are peace officers whose authority extends to any place in the state for the purpose of performing their primary duty or when making an arrest pursuant to s836 of the Penal Code as to any public offense, with respect to which there is an immediate danger to person or property, or of the escape of the perpetrator of such offense, or pursuant to ss859.7, 859.8.....of Government Code s830.3 (d) Department of Motor Vehicles; employees. Employees of the DMV designated in s1655 of the Vehicle Code, provided primary duty of such peace officer shall be the enforcement of the law as that duty is set forth in s1655 of such code. s1655 VC Peace Officer Powers. (a) The director, a deputy director, the chief and assistant chief of the Division of Compliance of the Department and investigators of the department shall have the powers of peace officer for the purpose of enforcing provisions of law now or hereafter committed to the administration of the department. (b) Any person designated in subd. (a) may inspect any vehicle of a type required to be registered under this code, or any component part thereof, in any garage, repair shop, parking lot, used car lot.......... or any other establishment engaged in the business of selling, repairing ........ for the purpose of investigating the title and registration of the vehicles..... [So, it is obvious that the peace powers of the DMV is limited to non-criminal activities] POLICE OFFICER. One of the staff of men employed in cities and towns to enforce the municipal police, i.e., the laws and good order of he community. Otherwise called "police man" Black's p 1317

DEPARTMENT OF THE CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL Administration 2100. There is in the Business, Transportation and Housing Agency the Department of California Highway Patrol 2103. The department is the successor to and is vested with the duties, powers, purposes, responsibilities, and the jurisdiction of the former Division of Enforcement of the Department of Motor Vehicles, known as the California Highway Patrol. Article 3. Powers and Duties Law Enforcement s2400 VC. Commissioner shall administer [then follows all the various duties, none of which include private persons traveling, driving, transporting for self or other private parties] s2401.1 VC. The commissioner shall enforce all laws regulating the operation of vehicles and the use of the highways, [this section then proceeds to define the limitations of the commissioner] [The pertinent paragraph herein is " ... city police officers while engaged primarily in general law enforcement duties may incidentally enforce state and local traffic laws and ordinances on state freeways within incorporated areas of the state" [No mention is made that those powers extend to private persons who travel, drive or transport for personal reasons or for such person who transports for another private person] DEPARTMENT. Generally, a branch or division of governmental administration. Black's Revised 4th Ed p524 With reference to state or municipal administration, a "bureau" is merely a division of a department. supra 2256. State Traffic Officer of the California Highway Patrol. [So, a highway patrol officer is a "traffic officer" whose authority is the enforcement of traffic rules and regulations as delineated clearly in Vehicle Code, a private civil code (legislative private statute limited to "traffic" conducted by the use/operation/driving of commercial motor vehicles on the state highways. His peace officer power is limited to the enforcement of crime, does not reach private travelers and motorists]

TRAFFIC. Commerce, the subjects of transportation, on a route, as persons or goods; the passing to and fro of persons, animals, vehicles along a route of transportation, as along a street. Black's p 1667 The peace officer's power is limited to the enforcement of crime, to wit: s830.1 Sheriffs, police, marshals, constables, inspectors and investigators of district attorneys and designated department of justice personnel. [Such peace officers, supra, have no power to enforce Vehicle Code] s830.2 (a) Any member of the California Highway Patrol, provided that the primary duty of the peace officer shall be the enforcement of the provisions of the Vehicle Code or of any other law relating to the use or operation of vehicles upon the highways, as that duty is set forth in Vehicle Code. [Such members have no authority to enforce the vehicle code, as to persons who are not using or operating vehicles under the provisions of the Code as they are "motorists"] MOTORIST. A person who drives an automobile or travels by automobile; especially one who does so frequently but, not as an occupation. Webster's Dict, Unabridged 2nd Ed. OPERATOR. To "operate" any motor vehicle proscribes [forbids] illegal operation of "transportation business" rather than physical operation of the vehicle itself. Statute imposing penalty for operation of motor vehicle without first obtaining a license should be strictly construed "in favor" of one against whom imposition of a penalty is sought "Kramer vs Haley", 439 P2d 1968, 573, 574 USE. "Use means, among other things, "to carry out a purpose or action by means of" to "make instrumental to an end of purpose or process" and to "apply to an advantage" People vs Chambers (1972) Cal3d 666,672 [So, if an automobile or truck is not being used as a means of operating in the business of trafficking on state or city highways the user of that vehicle is not subject to the authority of Department of Motor Vehicles or any peace officer or "traffic officer" employee of the California Highway Patrol or municipality] [It is implied within civil Vehicle Code, a private business statute, by reading the context in its entirety that an individual not within the jurisdiction of Department of Motor Vehicles or a

Traffic Officer of the California Highway Patrol is "exempt" from arrests under the code, absent the public offense, by personal privilege under the constitution, National and State. [However, such a person if brought into a tribunal before a magistrate, that immunity must be asserted and claimed by a motion to quash, otherwise it is waived] In Ex Parte Emmett 7 P2d 1096, 120 CalApp 349 the court was ruling on immunity from arrest of public officials when engaged in their official capacity and members of the legislature while legislature was in session, such immunity was recognized a common law of England and is observed under the constitution of this country as to the rights, privileges of the Individual and by the civil codes of the state when an individual is not engaged in regulated business activity of particular code. WHEN POLICE OFFICERS ABUSE THEIR OFFICES, "ACTIONS FOR DAMAGES MAY OFFER ONLY REALISTIC AVENUE FOR VINDICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES" Harlow vs Fitzgerald (1982) 457 US at 814 [Police officers stopping a vehicle under guise of alleged Vehicle Code violations and color of uniform are acting outside the scope and duty as police officers and violate the Fourth Amendment restraints imposed on the States by the Fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution, to the harm of the people stopped] "The Fourth Amendment forbids stopping a vehicle even for the limited purpose of questioning its occupants unless the police officer has a founded suspicion of criminal conduct" United States vs Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F2d 1392 "Founded suspicion must exist at the time the officer initiates the stop" United States vs Thomas 863 F2d 622, 625 "In evaluating whether founded suspicion exists, the totality of the circumstances should be considered" United States vs Sokolow, 490 US 1, 8 United States vs Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F2d 1414 "founded suspicion exists when the officer is aware of specific articulable facts, that, together with rational inferences draws from them, reasonably warrant a suspicion that the person to be detained has committed or is about to commit a crime"

United States vs Cortez, 449 US 411, 416 United States vs Robert L., 874 F2d 701, 703 "The Unites States Supreme Court has defined and limited investigative detentions. Any restraint of a person for the purposes of checking identification and asking questions or detaining him or her briefly while obtaining is such a detention; it comports with the Fourth Amendment only when based on articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed a criminal offense. The mere presence with someone who has outstanding arrest warrant is not sufficient" United States vs Hensley, 469 US 221, 83 L Ed2d 604 "In a unanimous decision the United States Supreme Court held, "A demand for identification is an intrusion on the interests prohibited by the Fourth Amendment and requires a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts relating to the person or his or her conduct, in order to be lawful" (3) When police officers, with or without arresting an individual, detain the individual for the purpose of requiring him to identify himself, they perform a seizure of person subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. .......that the defendant's conviction requiring identification upon a lawful police stop was improper, the police officer's stopping the defendant's First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Unites States Constitution when the police officer has no reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was engaged or had been engaged in criminal conduct" Brown vs Texas (1979) 443 US 46; 61 L Ed2d 357 "A person driving an automobile cannot be stopped to see if he or she is licensed to drive unless there is reasonable suspicion the person he engaged in criminal conduct" Delaware vs Prouse (1979) 440 US 648, 59 L Ed2d 660 "The demand to produce a Driver's License to a police officer is permitted in California when the officer is enforcing provisions of Vehicle Code s12951 (b)" People vs Hinton-Walton, Cal Ct Appeal, 2nd Appellate Division Six, 1991 DJ DAR 1725 Possession of License s12951 (b) The driver of a motor vehicle shall present his license for examination upon demand of a peace officer enforcing the provisions of this code.

[Understand that the police officer is not acting within his scope and duty as a police officer, but as an officer acting as an informant for the Department of Motor Vehicles, a private Public Service Agency, itself without police power, thus the officer cannot act as police officer which only has jurisdiction over its licensees while they are engaged in some activity within the scope of the DMV's jurisdiction] "A law enforcement officer who observes a person engaged in any activity for which a license is required may demand to see the license certificate, with no other "probable cause" than the observation" People vs Nun (1968) 264 CalApp2d 919, 922 Kennett vs Municipal Court, 290 F. Supp 746, 747 [The "law enforcement officer" would be a "traffic officer" as clearly defined in Vehicle Code under California Highway Patrol Officer. This is patently clear from the limitation in DELAWARE (supra) that there must be a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by a police officer. So, if a "law enforcement officer/traffic officer" has no articulable facts that a person is engaged in any commercial business activity and the person is a licensee of the Department of Motor Vehicles at the time of the observation, it is outside his power as a "law enforcement officer/traffic officer"] Broussard, Justice, United States Supreme Court in ruling against roving stops cited Almeida-Sanchez vs Unites States (1973) 413 US 166, which stated: "Court rejects the argument that driving is a persuasively regulated activity subjecting motorists to roving stops. Court explains that a roving stop of a motorist was unreasonable, driver was not in the same position as the gun manufacturer or liquor distributor who had in effect consented to the inspection by entering a heavily regulated industry" Common highway. "A road to be used by the community at large for any purpose of transit or traffic" Ham. NP 239; Railway Co vs State, 23 Fla 546; 3 So 158, 11 Am St Rep 395 [Thus, the motorist using the "common highways" without the commission of a crime is not the subject of

investigation/supervision and arrest by "police officer/law enforcement officer/traffic officer] [So, on a traffic stop by a uniformed officer with a badge, gun, club, and mace, because you do not know in which capacity he is stopping you, civil vehicle code enacted as a statute, or peace officer with arrest power under Penal C s836 for enforcement of public offenses, misdemeanors & felonies, before you answer any questions or produce any licenses, registration certificate, you must ask him and get an answer; "is this a "civil arrest" or is this a "criminal arrest?" [If he states that he is arresting you as a police officer then Fourth Amendment procedure must be obeyed by him as he has taken an oath to uphold the Constitution. There and then inform him that he must read Miranda rights and if there are no witnesses that Miranda has been read there must be a subscription that they have been read and understood. The right to an attorney must be permitted before any further action by the peace officer] [If he informs you that he is arresting you pursuant to Vehicle Code, then inform him that you are not engaged in any licensed activity defined within the Vehicle Code and does he have any evidence that you are so engaged.] [If he writes a Civil extra-judicial notice to appear then under s40300 it constitutes a warrantless arrest] [As he was not acting in capacity of peace officer then he must be acting as a private citizen] [But, as a private citizen he is still restricted to citizen's arrest only where public offense was committed in his knowing presence] "Officer outside his jurisdiction believing probable cause for arrest existed, such circumstances was the same as that of private citizen arrest" People vs Monson (1972) 28 CalApp3d 935 People vs Martin (1964) 225 CalApp2d 91 People vs Alvarado (1962) 208 CalApp2d 629 cert denied 83 s. Ct 1891, 374 US 840, 10 L ed2d 1060 "Where peace officer acting as private citizen was authorized to arrest person who committed a public offense in his presence the seizure was legal" 37 CalApp3d 952 [Do not overlook 'committed public offense' and understand that

mala prohibitas are not public offenses. Under Vehicle Code, that person within jurisdiction of Department of Motor Vehicles has agreed, unknowingly, that certain violations of code would carry penal penalties. A citizen's arrest without the commission of a public offense is a false arrest unless citizen can justify the arrest] "Defendant makes a prima facie case of unlawful arrest when he establishes that arrest was made without a warrant, and burden rests on prosecution to show proper justification" People vs Holguin (1956) 302 P2d 635, 145 CalApp2d 520 PC s 837 Private persons; authority to arrest Arrests by private persons. A private person may arrest another: 1. For public offense committed or attempted in his presence. s841. Formalities in making arrest; exceptions The person making the arrest must inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him, of the cause of the arrest, and the authority to make it, except when the person making the arrest has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested is actually engaged in the commission or attempt to commit an offense, or the person to be arrested is pursued immediately after its commission or after an escape. The person making the arrest must, on request of the person he is arresting, inform the latter of the offense for which he is being arrested. [So, if the peace officer is outside his jurisdiction to arrest, functioning as a private person (citizen) and starts to write a Civil Notice ask him "Are you arresting me and if so for what public offense?" s847 Arrest by private person; duty to take prisoner before magistrate or deliver him to peace officer; liability for false arrest.

A private person who has arrested another for the commission of a public offense must, without unnecessary delay, take the person arrested before a magistrate, or deliver him to a peace officer. There shall be no civil liability on the part and no cause of action shall arise against peace officer, acting within the scope of his authority, for false arrest or false imprisonment arising out of any arrest when, (a) Such arrest was lawful or when such peace officer, at the time of such arrest had reasonable cause to believe such arrest was

lawful. [Right to use highways for private business, pleasure, transportation, family use, is outside police power as it is an interference with fundamental personal liberty] "Personal liberty is a fundamental interest second only to life itself, protectedunder both California and United States Constitutions" Re S (1977) 19 Cal3d 921, 141 Cal Rprt 1286 "The term 'liberty' as used in state and federal constitutions consist partially of the right to be free from arbitrary restraint; for example, the right of a citizen to drive on public street with freedom from police interference, unless he is engaged in suspicious conduct associated in some manner with criminality is a fundamental constitutional right" People vs Horton (1971) 14 CalApp3d 930, 92 Cal Rprt 666 [Thus, when a peace officer stops a motorist or Driver while wearing a peace officer's uniform and is acting under quasi-authority of vehicle code, it is his duty to inform that he is acting outside this role/scope/duty of peace officer. His failure to do so constitutes the impersonation of a peace officer and is a misdemeanor] [Author takes the position and argues that where the following section of Penal Code states "Any person", then, because the peace officer at the time of an unlawful stop, is acting outside his role of peace officer, at that time he is that "Any person other than an officer ..." and so because of his failure to inform, allows himself to be believed to be a 'peace officer' by intentional fraudulent misrepresentation] Penal s 538 e Impersonating an officer Any person, other than an officer... who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the authorized badge, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of an officer, ... of fraudulently person-ating an officer.... with the intent of fraudulently personating an officer... or of fraudulently inducing the belief that he is an officer.... is guilty of a misdemeanor... as would deceive an ordinary reasonable person into believing that it is authorized for use as an officer.... is guilty of a misdemeanor. Amended by Stats 1959 c 431 s 1 ADDENDUM "Thus, first issue to be determined by trial court was whether the police officer's initial stop was reasonable with in meaning of

Fourth Amendment, for if not, the Fourth violation might infect any purported consent..." US vs Mendenhall (1980) 446 US 544, 557, 64 Led2d 497 Wong Sun vs US (1963) 371 US 471, 487, 9 Led2d 442 LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CALIFORNIA REPUBLIC ARE LIMITED BY THE NATIONAL AND STATE'S CONSTITUTION [State governments like National government can claim only tree kinds of subjects (citizens) 1. Members or agents of their government 2. Violators of Law 3. Government creations; administrative agencies which are called Fourth Branch of government and are business corporations which of that which the Republic cannot, regulate individuals] [The part of which we only consider here is the legislature when it sits as an Article I s7 para.3 body. The concern here is the limited power of enacted 'resolutions', 'joint resolutions' and 'simple resolutions'] BILLS OF LAW have the Force of Law on all members of the general citizenry and cannot be created by 'resolutions, orders and Vote. [Note that all references herein as to authority are taken from the National Constitution as all powers of the States are limited as those of the National Government] "The power to make Resolutions. Article 1, s7 para 3 the Rules of Limitations prescribed in the case of a Bill" Resolution. Black's 3rd JOINT RESOLUTION. A resolution adopted by both houses of congress or a legislature. When such a resolution has been approved by the President (Governor) or passed with his approval, it has the effect of law. 6 Opinions Attorney General 680 [However, HD 95-259 defines "JOINT" ....... resolutions neither of which arise from any Constitutional- Authority brings up another form of legislation not authorized by the Constitution: the STATUTE] "Joint resolutions may originate either in the house of

Representatives or in the Senate - not, as may be supposed, jointly in both Houses. There is little practical difference between a Bill and a Joint resolution, [if not, why don't they call it a Bill?] and, although the latter are not as numerous as Bills, the two forms are often used indiscriminately. Statutes that have been initiated as Bills have later been amended by Joint Resolution, and vice versa [p7] [HD 95-259 concludes its definition with what appears to be an unconstitutional statement] "JOINT RESOLUTIONS become law in the same manner a Bills" [But it is not unconstitutional. Notice who wrote the sentence; Dr. Charles Zinn, author of the House Document 95-259 is a licensed agent of the House of Representatives. As a lawyer, he is a licensed also by the Supreme Court. As an agent of government, he is its subject, bound by its resolutions. For him, resolutions are Law. Remember, a bill is a petition given by a nobleman [government official] or his subject to the legislative body to be made into a law benefiting the petitioner without binding other nobleman. So, look to see if a statute accomplishes the same purpose] STATUTE: Black's 4th p 1581: An act of the legislature declaring, commanding, or prohibiting some thing; law enacted and established by the will of the legislative department of government; the written will of the legislature, solemnly expressed according to the forms necessary to constitute it the law of the state. Statutes are two in nature. PRIVATE STATUTE: A statute which operates only upon particular persons, and private concerns 1 Bl. Comm 86 An act which relates to certain individuals, or to particular classes of men. State vs Chambers, 93 NC 600 PUBLIC STATUTE: A statute enacting a universal rule which regards the whole community, as distinguished from one which concerns only particular individuals and effects only their private rights. Code Civil Proc, Calk s 1898 STATUTES " at large" Black's 5th: Open to discussion or controversy; not precluded. [So, "Statutes at Large" are in fact merely exercises of the legislature's will, the solemn declarations, commands and prohibitions of governmental subjects, all of them open to discussion and controversy. they are

merely "the law of the state" or law applicable to members of the state. (members are "One of the persons, constituting a partnership, association, corporation, guild, etc. In re Sixth Ward Building and Loan Ass. of Newark, 134 NJ Eq. 98, 34 A2d 292, 294; one of the persons cons-tituting a court, a legislative assembly, etc. In re Heafy, 247 AppDiv 277, 285 NYS 188, 193; Members of Congress (legislature) A member of the senate or house of representatives of the United States (state legislature) So, further limitations and restrictions of the state powers as to private individuals who have no nexus with the state as 'members', 'public officials', any branch of the Republic or any Administrative Agency do not come within the provisions of the 'private statutory law' Vehicle Code absent the knowing, free voluntary application for such privileges as the individual wishes to enjoy in lieu of rights under the Commerce Clause of the National Constitution as in the words of HD 95-259 "Statutes are not law but 'legal' evidence of the laws contained in them and will be accepted as proof of those laws in any court in the United States. Evidence is rebuttable. Proof is challengeable. And it is proved in the clear, unambiguous language of the Constitution. that statutes and resolutions are not Bills, they are not Laws of the United States (California Republic) [When the California Legislature enacted Vehicle Code and established Department of Motor Vehicles, a private department within Business, Transportation, and Housing Agency no police power could attached by California Plenary Power] "Legislature cannot delegate power to define crime or impose penalty to administrative- agency" Ex parte Cox 63 Cal 21; In re Mclain 190 Cal 376, 379 [Thus, violations of Vehicle Code are not substantive crimes under Penal Code subject at law to penalty of fines and assessments and incarceration/encagement] ADDENDUM 1 "The police power-the power to make laws secure the comfort, convenience, peace and health of the community- is an extensive one, and in its exercise a very wide discretion as to what is needful or proper for that purpose is necessarily committed to the legislative body in which the power to make such laws is vested (Ex parte Tuttle 91 Cal 589)" "But, it is not true that when this power is exerted for the purpose of regulating a business or occupation, which in itself is recognized as innocent and useful to the community, the legislature is the exclusive judge as to what is

reasonable and just restraint upon the constitutional right of the citizen to pursue such business or profession As the right of the citizen to engage in such a business or follow such a profession is protected by the constitution, it is always a judicial question whether any particular regulation of such right is valid exercise of legislative power (Tiedman's Limitation of Police Power secs 85, 195; State vs New Jersey, 47 NJL 286; Commonwealth vs Robertson 5 Cush 438; Austin vs Murray 16 Pick 121) This principle is stated very forcibly in the case of Mulger vs Kansas 123 US 661, in the following language: "The courts are not bound by mere forms, nor are they to be misled by mere pretenses. They are at liberty-indeed, are under solemn duty-to look at the substance of things when ever they enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its authority. If therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, public morals, or public safety, has no real or substantial relationship to those objects, or is palpable invasion of rights secured by fundamental rights secured by fundamental law, it is this duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the constitution" "And so also in the MATTER OF JACOBS 98 NY 108; 50 Am Rep 636, Earl, J., in delivering the opinion of the court in that case, said in relation to the power of the legislature to make police regulations: "The limit of the power cannot be accurately defined, and the courts have not been able or willing definitely to circumscribe it. But the power, however, broad and extensive, is not above the constitution. When it speaks its voice must be heeded. It furnishes the supreme law and the guide for the conduct of legislators, judges and private persons, and so far as it imposes restraints, the police power must be exercised in subordination thereto" And the necessary limitation upon the power of the legislature to interfere with the fundamental rights of the citizens in the enactment of police regulations, was recognized by this court in Ex parte Sing Lee 96 Cal 354, in which case we said that the personal liberty of the citizen and his rights of property cannot by invaded under the disguise of a police regulation. [Thus, all provisions in Chapter 2 Procedure on Arrests of California Vehicle Code are not lawful arrests by a peace officer in this scope and duty as a peace officer as no police power attaches to any vehicle code or any civil code enacted by a legislature of any state and must be challenged as such See Chapter 2

Remember, all alleged violations of any code are mala prohibita, not true crimes, mala in se] [Setting aside the settled question of police power, obviously no man/person is the subject of arrest either while engaged in business of trafficking on the public highway of which that man is a member of the general public in pursuit of happiness for himself and his family by using the right to earn a livelihood in some commercial activity thereon , absent the crime mala in se] STATUTES ARE NOT PRESUMED TO ALTER COMMON LAW AS IN STATUTES 1959, VEHICLE CODE, CHAPTER 3 "Statutes are not presumed to alter common law except to the extent they expressly so provide" In re: Elizalde, Citing Siminoff vs Goodman, infra "Civil code was not designed to embody the whole law of private and civil regulations, rights, and duties; it is incomplete and partial; except in those instances where the language clearly, unequivocally discloses the intent to depart from and later or abrogate the common law rule concerning the particulate subject matter, a section of code purporting to embody such doctrine or rule will be construed in light of common law decisions on the same subject: Siminoff vs Goodman, 18 CalApp 5, 11 [Vehicle Code of 1959 is unconstitutional as enacted resolution of the legislature of the State of California, thus void in toto. Vehicle Code cannot be applied to any private business traveler/ motorist or motorist or motorist acting privately for another on the 'common highways' or upon the chauffeur/operator of motor vehicles, commercial in nature, engaged in commercial trafficking as a livelihood] "If an act embraces two or more subjects, and two or more of the same expressed in the title, the whole act is void 'in toto'. Simms vs Sawyer, 101 SE 467 "But, if the title to the act actually indicates and the act itself actually embraces, two distinct objects, when the constitution says it shall embrace but one, the whole act must be treated as void, from the manifest impossibility in the court choosing between the two, and holding the act valid as to one and void as to the other" Judge James M. Cooley in "Constitutional Limitations" page 278 "Formerly, it was held to be discretionary in California but, court decisions were apparently so unsatisfactory to the people that the constitution were at once amended, so by its terms to make

the provision mandatory, since which time the California court have held the strict compliance with it is necessary to the validity of the act" Simms, supra California Constitution, Article 4 s24 Acts: Single subject, title; amendment Sec. 24; Every act shall embrace but one subject, which subject shall be expressed in its title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in its title such act shall be void only as to so much thereof shall not be expressed in its title. "The purpose of this section declaring that every act shall embrace but one subject, expressed in its title, was not to hamper legislation, but to prevent deception" People ex rel, Chapman vs Sacramento Drain Dict (1909) 155 Cal 373 "The object of this section that statute shall embrace but one subject expressed in its title are to prevent legislative abuse and passage of acts bearing deceitful and misleading titles to protect members of Legislature, as well as public, against fraud" People vs Superior Court In and For San Bernardino County (1937) 10 Cal2d 288 Statutes at Large, 1959, Chapter 3, page 1523 Approved by Governor, February 25, 1959 Filed with Secretary of State February 25, 1959 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS, An act to repeal and re-enact Vehicle Code of 1959 and to add Chapter 6.5 to Title 14, Part 4, Division 3 of Civil Code relating to vehicles. [Re-enactment 1959 has plurality of subjects and its real object is not expressed in its title, the regulation of motor vehicles used as commercial motor vehicles for hire to the public and thus violates the Constitution of California] [Must be condemned and fall for failing to comply with Constitution of California] "A statute or ordinance must be constitutional not only in its objectives but also in the means of administration and enforcement provided, which must conform to the limitations imposed by federal national, and state constitutions" Vissering vs Annuzio, 1 Illinois2d 108 Sec 1. The state of California is an inseparable part of the United States of America, and the United States Constitution is the

Supreme Law of the Land. 1 Am Jur2d s32 Classification The well settled rule that a state may classify persons and objects for purpose of legislation and pass laws applicable only to those persons or objects within a designated class, provided the classification is not arbitrary or capricious, but reasonable, has been applied to statutes creating administrative agencies. [Department of Motor Vehicles is a department within Business, Transportation and Housing Agency created by California Legislature to regulate those businesses which are licensees of the department and thus subjects pursuant to the Vehicle Code and subject to the rules and limitations of the code and subject to enforcement penalties while so engaged for mala prohibita violations but Statute as passed fails to comply with the one subject in its title] TO COURT/TRIBUNAL/ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY AND TO ANY PERSONS SITTING THEREIN, IF NO VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT WITH WARRANT OR ARREST IS PART OF THE RECORD, OR VERIFIED CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES OR INFORMATION OR COMPLAINT OTHER THAN CIVIL EXTRA JUDICIAL NOTICE TO APPEAR ADDRESSED TO A DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES LICENSEE DOES NOT EXIST COURT IS WITHOUT SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION [Jurisdiction of tribunals means no more than the power to hear the matter presented to the tribunal and to make a determination of the issues before it. It is the power lawfully conferred to deal with the subject matter brought before it and does not depend upon the existence of a good cause of action worthy of a judgment nor of the right of the parties to avail themselves of the jurisdiction of the particular court hearing] "Where a statute requires a court/tribunal to exercise its jurisdiction in a particular manner, or subject to certain limitations, and to follow certain procedure, any act beyond those limitations is in excess of its jurisdiction"

Los Angeles County vs Surety 208 Cal Rptr 194 [If only a Civil Extra judicial notice exists then a responsibility lies to challenge the court's lack of jurisdiction when the district attorney has not filed a verified complaint. A challenge must be made to the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction] "Once jurisdiction is challenged, the court cannot proceed when it clearly appears that the court lacks jurisdiction, the court has no authority to reach merits, but, rather, should dismiss the action" Melo vs Us 505 1026 "There is no discretion to ignore that lack of jurisdiction" Joyce vs US 474 F2d 215 "The burden shifts to the court to prove jurisdiction" Rosemond vs Lambert 469 F2d 416 "Court must prove on the record, all jurisdiction facts related to the jurisdiction asserted" Lantana vs Hopper 102 F2d 188 Chicago vs New York 37 F Supp 150 (This author has on two occasions appeared before a quasi-criminal arraignment court/tribunal and informed the magistrate that as no verified complaint had ever been served him; that he had checked with the Clerk of the Court before his special appearance and the file of the record of the case failed to show one had been filed with the clerk, he was present only to inform the court of the lack of process and thereby the court/tribunal's magistrate of his lack of jurisdiction. I then read the above case cites and stated that the forum should sua sponte dismiss, no prosecution] {The forum in both cases replied that the court did have jurisdiction acquired by the Notice to Appear and proceed to enter a plea of 'not guilty' and called the issuing officer to take the stand and testify] [Because this author takes the position that when a court proceeds forward without stating on the record the due process of law by which it has complete jurisdiction, he cannot assume the role of actor in the proceedings. He then turned his back to the bench, refused to cross-examine the witness. Refused to take the stand and testify or defend. When the bench/magistrate asked why I would not speak in my defense, my response was, "This matter is before a stranger to the bench, a stranger who has assumed the robe of office to which he has no right"] [Once a magistrate or any public official renders a judgment and sentence, the sentence being the

fine, that judgment and order that a fine be imposed on the defendant, it becomes appealable.] [Both cases were appealed on ground that the magistrate was without subject matter jurisdiction and because of that fact, magistrate had no personam by my mere appearance in the court room] [One case was reversed and dismissed; second case judgment was sustained by appellate court on the ground that a verified complaint pursuant to 40513 (a) had been filed. I did not ask for rehearing or appeal to the Court of Appeal as I had more important cases pending and the fine was only forty dollars] [This was before the days I knew about false arrest and false imprisonment by malicious abuse of process] ABSENT A COMPELLING STATE INTEREST AND WHERE PRIVATE PERSON DOES NOT FIT, COME WITHIN A STATUTORY CLASS, AND TAKES NO BENEFIT NOT OTHERWISE HIS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION THAT PERSON ENJOYS RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES FROM PROSECUTION BY THE PEOPLE IN THIS COURT AND SO THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE AND CANNOT HAVE JURISDICTION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER AND PERSONAM OF THIS PERSON USC 14th Amendment "Without reference in the history of the amendment, the circumstances under which and the special purpose for which it was adopted, it is manifest that it does not create any new or additional privileges or immunities. It operates on those already existing, and which may be conferred or recognized by the states the privileges and immunities meant and embraced by the same terms as elsewhere, and previously used in the Constitution" Sailer vs Leger 403 US 365, 29 L ed2d 534 [So, where the person is not engaged in some activity regulated and taxed under a particular private statute, as in case of Vehicle Code, and subject of the jurisdiction of Department of Motor Vehicles, any act while using a private automobile for personal business and pleasure or private contract between private individuals is not subject to the police power of the state. Absent the commission of a mala in se crime and absent the mala prohibita violation, while privately using any conveyance, any stop by a peace officer under color of statutory law, without the arrest warrant, demands the protection of the Bill of Rights privileges and immunities of the individual as imposed upon the states by the 14th amendment. "Rights, privileges and immunities not derived from the federal Constitution or secured thereby are left to exclusive protection of the states"

Paschal vs Perdue 320 F Supp 1274 [This is true because the rights, privileges and immunities are imposed by the 14th amendment as to citizens of a state while enjoying, partaking of long recognized common law right to the pursuit of happiness, enjoyment of liberty and the right to earn a livelihood without restraint] [The procedure now used by the arresting officer fail to articulate a reasonable belief of the commission of a crime, mala in se, and fail to articulate a reasonable belief that this individual was a party subject to the jurisdiction of the Department of Motor Vehicles and subject to penalties as a licensee thereto] [For the above reasons and grounds this court does not have jurisdiction as a court of general jurisdiction nor as a court set to hear and adjudicate by traffic referee or traffic commissioner as there is no overwhelming interest by the state absent the public good and welfare and the participation or involvement of state as to this cause] "Fact that conduct of business is subject to state regulation will not covert its private activity into a state action under this amendment, unless state has become entangled in activity" Melara vs Kennedy C.A. 1976, 541 F2d 802 "Factors to be considered in determining whether state is 'significantly' involved in statutorily authorized private conduct so that restrictions amendment apply are: source of authority for private action, whether regulation of private conduct by astute is so pervasive as to entangle state in the activity, whether state is joint participant in activity or mutual benefits are conferred between state and private actor; existence of contract which makes provision for the challenged activity and whether there has been delegation of what has traditionally been state function through enactment of stature" MELARA, supra [Obviously where that nexus is not established between the state and some private individual by THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, this court, in any capacity, cannot deny the individual- without the nexus rights, privileges and immunities as it is without jurisdiction when there is no compelling relationship by the state] "A universal principle as old as the law is that a proceedings of a court without jurisdiction are a nullity and its judgment therein without effect either on person or property" Norwood vs Kenfield 34 C 329; Ex parte Giambonini 117 C 573, 49 P 732

"Jurisdiction is fundamental and a judgment rendered by a court that does not have jurisdiction to hear is void ab initio" Re Application of Wyatt 114 CA 557; 300 P 132 Re Cavitt 47 CA2d 698, 118 P2d 846 "Thus, where a judicial tribunal has no jurisdiction of the subject matter on which it assumes to act, its proceedings are absolutely void in the fullest sense of the term: Hahn vs Kelley 34 C 391 Belcher vs Chambers 53 C 635; Thaxter vs Finn 178 C 270, 173 P 163 Taliaferro vs County etc 182 CA2d 587, 6 Cal Rptr 231 "In this connection, jurisdiction of the parties is as necessary as jurisdiction of the subject matter Before the rights of an individual can be bound by judicial determination, he must be brought within the jurisdiction of the court by actual or constructive notice of the proceedings against him" Brown vs Campbell 100 C 635, 35 P 433 First National etc vs Eastman 144 C 487, 77 P 1043 "Since jurisdiction is fundamental, and it is jurisdiction alone that gives a court power to hear, determine, and pronounce judgment on the issues before it, jurisdiction must be continuing in the court throughout the proceedings" Re Cavitt 47 Ca2d 698, 118 P2d 846 "When it appears that the court has no jurisdiction of a case, it has no power to proceed in any manner, but should dismiss the action" Smith vs Chin Chew 81 CA 704; 254 P 599 "A court will vacate or set aside a judgment void on its face, or one rendered without jurisdiction over the person or subject matter, on motion, and without affidavit of merits" California Casket vs McGinn 10 CA 5, 100 P 1079 "Since jurisdiction is fundamental to any valid judicial proceeding, the first question that must be determined by a trial court in any case is that of jurisdiction" Carrett 5 C 195; Clary vs Hoagland 6 C 685; Dillon vs Dillon 45 Ca 191, 187 P 27 [A reminder, all matters of vehicle code enforced by a Motor Vehicles agency/department are civil actions and the same rules apply as though criminal action] [If you intend to argue constitutional- questions, such as the vehicle code is in part,

unconstitutional and being unconstitutionally applied in the matter before it, read very closely the following] "If statute on which court's jurisdiction- depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute and appeal from the judgment compelling it to proceed" Mendoza vs Small Claims Court 49 C2d 668, 321 P2d 9 "A court has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction, for a basic issue in any case before a tribunal is its power to act, and a court must have the authority to decide that question in the first instance" Rescue Army vs Municipal Court of Los Angeles 28 C2d 460, 171 P2d 8; 331 US 549, 91 L ed 1666, 67 S Ct 1409 "The inquiry here is whether the case presented is of the nature of those wherein the particular tribunal is authorized to render a binding judgment or decree" Palermo etc vs Railroad Comm 173 C 380, 160 P 228 (determination of whether facts brought case within jurisdiction of the railroad commission) Scott vs Pacific etc 140 Ca2d 173, 249 P2d 1039 (determination of whether facts brought case within exclusive jurisdiction) [Reminder, a question which must be presented to the court for its ruling, so that the status in which it sits is established Question, "Is this court sitting judicially on a civil action, or it this court sitting judicially on a criminal action? If the answer is 'judicially', ask "Where is the process and service in my name? Does the court have the original filing in its records? This is a must; whether the court answers 'criminal' or 'civil' If it answers 'criminal' start screaming 'no fourth amendment rights read' as demanded under Cal Const Art I s13] "To ascertain in what court a right may be settled or a remedy enforced, it is necessary to consider the nature of the demand in question, together with the limits of jurisdiction of the several judicial tribunals, for which purpose the tribunals are charged with judicial knowledge as to the extent of their jurisdiction" Southern Pacific vs Superior Court etc 27 CA 240 150 P 397 James etc vs Superior Court etc 135 CA2d 352 Fitzpatrick vs Sonoma County 97 CA 588, 276 P 113

NATURE OF DEMAND "With respect to the nature of the demand in question, the test for determining jurisdiction is ordinarily the nature of the case as made by the complaint and the relief sought. In this connection the jurisdiction of the court usually depends on the sufficiency of the averments and not on their truth" Newlove vs Mercantile etc 156 C 657, 105 P 971 "Furthermore, in the determination of the subject matter jurisdiction, the courts are not bound by the labels put on the pleading, nor by the caption of the pleading or prayer, but by the substance" Benson vs Sales Corp 238 CA2d Supp 937, 48 CalRptr 123 [Never forget, the nature of a 'traffic ticket' is civil and all of the foregoing is applicable When a magistrate informs that the Notice to Appear is a complaint, then the complaint, standing alone, has only given the magistrate subject matter juris, and a summons standing alone without a complaint, cannot give the magistrate 'subject matter juris; not personam without the complaint] [The notice/summons fail to show substance Fail to show a controversy, judicable in nature, are nullities for purposes of due process] "As a general rule it has been stated that to invoke the jurisdiction of a court, an actual or judicable controversy must be presented to it. An action not founded upon an actual controversy between the parties to it and brought for the purpose of securing a determination of a point of law is collusive, and will not be entertained" First etc vs Eastman 144 C 487, 77 P 1043 ["actual controversy between parties" raises question of "real party in interest?" Can the district attorney of a County or city attorney appear for the People of the State when the issue is one of Vehicle Code mala prohibita, and the DMV is not a constitutional State Agency and the Real Party in Interest is the Department of Motor Vehicles, and no real controversy exists between the people and the man, in or out of the jurisdiction of the Department?] [In OK Corp vs Williams the review court said that if a government agency had standing and status to appear before administrative agency, which has original jurisdiction to hear on enforcement of its own rules and regulations, then that government agency must, first instance go to the administrative agency, not to the judiciary, otherwise, it denies the administrative agency its power to enforce its rules and regulations, to the harm of the

agency and the defendant] [Obviously, the controversy exists only between the administrative agency and its licensees and prosecuting attorneys for the people are limited to mala in se crimes] [for the people to be a Real Party in Interest, the people appearing as plaintiff and represented by a prosecuting attorney must have an interest because they have been harmed] "Plaintiff in a suit is not 'the real party in interest' unless he is a party who may be benefitted or injured by the judgment in the case" Jackson vs McGilbray 148 P 703, 705; 166 P 1077, 1078 "Real party is one having actual and substantial interest in the subject matter" Carey etc vs Sisco 64 SW 2d 430 Mosher vs Hines 154 P2d 372, 373 [So, if by some quirk of which the author is ignorant, the people's prosecuting attorney is actually appearing for the people, then, shouldn't he show the Department of Motor Vehicles as the Real Party in Interest?] [Author has stated within the RED BOOK that municipal courts sit as ministerial officer in the municipal court, as an 'arm' of the DMV, and thus is bound by the procedures demanded in vehicle code for purposes of hearing, etc] "Where the legislative scheme of delegation of power to an agency makes a court the 'arm' of the agency in recording its order and affording execution thereon, the agency and not the court retains jurisdiction to modify or stay the order, and to determine the sufficiency of the performance thereunder" Vickich vs Superior Court 105 CA 587, 288 P 127; Independent etc vs RR Comm 70 CA2d 816, 161 P2d 827 [Now , assuming you have appeared before the municipal court hearing for DMV and unhappy with the order, which has been sent to the DMV for its records, because you did not choose the alternative available infra, appeal would be a review by Court of Appeal, a long, long process. Best to go for a Writ/mandate/prohibition, which the author has found to be effective when the trial court has been challenged as to a want of jurisdiction] "Where remedies are available to a party in both the judicial and administrative forum, he may choose either" SP Co vs Spring etc 173 C291, 159 P 865

"Where administrative agency has exclusive jurisdiction, forfeiture of rights to relief before it cannot confer jurisdiction upon

another tribunal" Dominguez vs Pendola 46 CA 220 [See the form for transferring the matter to the agency from the municipal court a part of this RED BOOK] [It is the opinion of the author that when the court sits as an 'arm' of the DMV, and uses the sham tactics of a notice to appear constitutes a complaint, and uses the ploy of the quasi-criminal procedure, to put the fear of arrest into your mind and no warrant of arrest is issued then the procedure is summary. See Chapter 28 SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS ADDENDUM [The author of RED BOOK is constantly becoming aware of new issues and means of attacking the lack of juris of courts regardless of the manner in which they sit] [Now we come to the issue of venue of cops/sheriffs/prosecuting attorneys for the People, and the court, for there are many courts; Courts within counties, within provinces, within judicial districts, within municipal courts sit; appellate courts which sit only to review judgments and orders and law within districts of a County, and Supreme Court of the State of California, the only actual STATE COURT sitting for the STATE, not counties, districts, municipalities. This Court, in essence, sits to control the appellate courts within districts and trial courts within counties or municipalities.] [All prosecutions for mala prohibita are tried by a quasi-criminal procedure, although the court or prosecuting party will not use the prefix quasi, but criminal, in any nature, demand due process of law under Amendment Six. "All criminal prosecutions ... and the district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law...." [Veh Code is statutory law, as such, it has force of law upon licensees of DMV while engaged in inter-state commerce only within the state, on state highways. It's force of law does not extend into incorporated or unincorporated venues, as, towns/cities/counties. Local municipalities have their own business ordinances requiring a license, so, State Veh Code, cannot intrude into their geographical venue/jurisdiction. Any notice to appear issued within those entities juris/venue which cites sections of Veh Code is void/null. Thus, the individual employee of a particular entity in issuing a mala prohibita notice, must file it with the enforcement agency

within that municipal entity; the Sheriff of a County, with the County enforcement agency; the police officer of a particular town/city with the enforcement agency therein. [So, the only issue here is, what courts have venue to hear matters of mala prohibita vehicle code; does any local enforcement agency have venue to enforce Vehicle Code; if the enforcement agency is the California Department of Highway Patrol, where enforcement venue is restricted to state highways, can enforcement power lie to file a Veh Code Notice to appear in or go before a local district court, whose general juris is limited to mala in se and civil actions within that district? Can a district court, county or justice, whose juris is limited to the district within which it exists, entertain Veh C Notices which are limited to state property highways by the local constabulary or a sheriff of the county citing State Law?] [Legislative statutes are only as to the corporate state and have no force of law other than to a class of citizens engaged in commerce on state highways; so what court may sit as 'arm' of the DMV? Can any court sit as 'arm' of DMV?] [Can the DMV delegate its state power to a local entity for purpose of enforcing its rules and regulations?] [Can any district court of appeal, municipal court of a judicial district, or justice court of a district, have the original jurisdiction of a State Statute when the mala prohibita was committed within their judicial district?] [Is it not, in fact, error by local district prosecuting attorney's for the People to initiate any action within any court of this State, first instance, for the People, when the People of the State have no interest in administrative matters regardless of the nature of the penalties] READ AGAIN, OK Corp vs Williams [State Legislature may only enact statutes of the State, cannot enact statutes/ordinances for local entities, municipalities, districts, or unincorporated areas] [Legislature recognizes its limitations as to regulations of traffic within municipal communities and so permits them to adopt rules and regulations for local traffic control] Article 3 Local Regulation Vehicle Code Rules and Regulations; subject matter s21100 Local authorities may adopt rules and regulations by ordinance or resolution regarding the following matters:

(b) Licensing and regulating the operation of vehicles for hire and drivers of passenger vehicles for hire and drivers of passenger vehicles for hire (c)Regulating traffic by means of traffic officers Regulating of Highways; Vehicle Code s21101 Local authorities, for those highways under their juris, may adopt rules and regulations by ordinance or resolution on the following matters: [The subsections refer only to vehicular TRAFFIC] [So, if you are a man, not using a vehicle for hire or a driver not for hire, not a licensee of the local entity, how, in what manner, can the local entity have the juris to bring you under charges, in their local court citing the State of California Vehicle Code? Should it not, if it has juris of the man, take him before the local enforcement agency?] AFFIDAVIT BY AFFIRMATION OF ASSEVERATION AFFIDAVIT: A written or printed declaration or statement of facts, made voluntarily, and confirmed by oath or affirmation of party making it..... AFFIRMATION: In practice, a solemn and formal declaration or asseveration that an affidavit is true, that the witness will tell the truth, etc. this being substituted for an oath..... "A solemn religious asseveration in the nature of an oath" 1 Greenl. Ev. s371 Quakers, as a class, and other persons who have conscientious scruples against taking an oath, are allowed to make affirmation in any mode which they may declare to be binding upon their consciences, in confirmation of the truth of testimony which they are about to give. 1 Atk 21, 46; Cowp 340; 1 Leach CrCas 64; 1 Ry&M 77 ASSEVERATION: An affirmation, a positive assertion; a solemn declaration. This word is seldom, if ever, used for a declaration made under oath, but denotes a declaration accompanied with solemnity or an appeal to the conscience, whereas by an oath one appeals to God as a witness of the truth of what one says. Black's 4th page 152 [It is the author's opinion that Affidavits under Civil Code of Procedure s2003, affirmed under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, [corporate entity] and oath and must be sworn on testimony, are commercial law affidavits made

only by parties with a commercial nexus with the State of California. Cannot be mandated upon a person without that relationship, without any obligation or liability, when she/he is not a licensee, or is a licensee not enjoying any privilege at the time of a traffic stop. Nowhere in Vehicle Code is the word 'privilege' used or implied or defined as to its nature. It is the author's opinion that upon receipt of a Notice to Appear by some person using the common public highways of the state, immediately an Asseveration should be filed with the District Attorney of the County and with the Clerk of the Municipal Court]

YOUR NAME C/0 ADDRESS CITY, CALIFORNIA TUOLUMNE JUSTICE COURT, CENTRAL JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF TOULUMNE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA Plaintiff vs YOUR NAME (Defendant) Case No. AFFIDAVIT BY AFFIRMATION AND ASSEVERATION ................................................................. ............................................................. I, (defendant's name), the affirmation herein, does so state by this solemn and religious asseveration: 1. That I am competent to state as to the matters herein 2. That I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein 3. That all the facts of stated are true and correct and admissible as evidence in this matter. [Here state all the facts of the stop, as to date, time, police agency, officer's name and ID number. State as to whether you are a licensee, not a licensee; whether you were enjoying any privilege, special in nature and clearly defined, or implied that you are/were a person within the jurisdiction of the Department of Motor Vehicles and its Vehicle Code at the

time of the stop. State whether you were using a conveyance, automobile, truck, or whatever. Whether you were using it for personal benefit, pleasure, transportation, family use, business, or private business of any nature as to private business with any other private party, etc. State that, accordingly, you were not a person within the scope and duty of the named officer or a person within the jurisdiction of DMV; if applicable, that you were on a federal interstate common highway and outside the jurisdiction of any state municipal court where they could obtain subject matter jurisdiction for purposes of enforcement of Vehicle Code] I so solemnly assert/asseverate that the above is true and if called upon as a witness will tell the truth as to the above facts and confirm by truth the testimony which I may give. Your name Affirmant & Declarant ARTHUR FRANK SANFORD 5894 Villa Drive Rancho Cucamonga, Ca 714 980 8559 Plaintiff SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO ARTHUR FRANK SANFORD Plaintiff vs Defendant NO. AFFIDAVIT OF ARTHUR FRANK SANFORD IN SUPPORT OF [CCP s2003] State of California City of Rancho Cucamonga County of San Bernardino

ss.

Arthur Frank Sanford, on his oath deposes and says:

I, Arthur Frank Sanford, affirm under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that this affidavit is true and correct and if sworn, can competently so testify. Dated Arthur Frank Sanford Affiant Notarization is only necessary to make affidavits cognizable in foreign jurisdictions or venues. Since this affidavit is only meant to be cognizable in law, and not in commercial matters and not in a foreign jurisdiction, no seal of a notary public is needed at law. See Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth, page 1209 NOTICE TO APPEAR IS EXTRA-JUDICIAL CIVIL/ADMINISTRATIVE [A notice to appear is an extra-judicial civil notice for initiation of civil procedure. Before it may compel appearance it must issue by a court sitting with magistrate hearing for administrative agency and person named is within jurisdiction of the administrative agency] "Notice to appear is an invitation to appear in court. An accused may not wish to accept officer's invitation to appear in court" 8 Misc2d 140 "The issuance of a traffic ticket is not an arrest, rather it is a choice to appear in a given court on a given day, at which time a charge may be made" Jones vs State, 167 NYS2d 536 99 Ohio App 165 131 NE2d 682 [In California, any issue of a traffic ticket is considered to be an arrest] s40300 The provisions of this chapter shall govern all peace officers in making arrests for violations of this code without warrant for offenses committed in their presence, but any procedure prescribed herein, shall not otherwise be exclusive of any other method prescribed by law for the arrest and prosecution of a person for an arrest for an offense of like grade. [Remember, the offense committed in his presence must be while engaged in an activity regulated by the Department of Motor Vehicles.]

"Officer was not duly sworn at the time of issue of notice and notice was not verified, therefore, the notice is null and void, and has no legal binding in this court or in this cause" Federal, 34 US 969 Gleason, 32 Kansas 245 Balard, 43 Ohio 340 "Held, that a uniform traffic ticket is not sufficient information to be used as a pleading, and held that the absence of verified information was a jurisdictional defect which could not be waived by plea of guilty" 3 NY2d 148 "A notice is not ordinarily to be considered a process for all writs and process shall be under the seal of the court which they shall issue, shall be signed by the clerk thereof, and shall bear the teste of the judge or the Clerk" Chisholm vs Gilmer 299 US 99, 299 US 623 "As the notice does not allege or show any probable cause for an arrest and the fact that the petitioner was released on a promise to appear before a committing magistrate for an arraignment, that fact is circumstance, to be considered in determining whether in first instance there was a probable cause for the arrest" Monroe vs Pape, Illinois 1963, 221 F Supp 635 [Here the United States Supreme Court has agreed that a Notice to Appear is an arrest, and in nature is a false arrest as when doubt exists that there is a probable cause. So, a person signing that Notice, "Without admitting guilt..... " has 1. been released from physical custody arrest, Is in the 'constructive custody' of the magistrate sitting as administrative officer of the administrative agency (here Department of Motor Vehicles), 2. has not denied guilt of committing some cited section of Vehicle Code and so it is not a plea of not guilty and cannot be a plea of any nature and does not give subject matter jurisdiction to a court. Such a compelled extra-judicial plea cannot be made on an extra-judicial civil process Notice to Appear, nor to a court by such a Notice/traffic ticket, or to a 'magistrate' even when sitting in a 'quasi' [that which seems but is not in fact] criminal procedure. A plea cannot be accepted from party named on a Notice nor entered

by a 'magistrate' until a formal verified complaint is filed, pursuant to Pen C. s948 et seq, and authority to so do, and probable cause evidenced to some prosecuting officer, who files the verified complaint with a magistrate of the court and upon which a warrant may and must issue for the court to acquire complete jurisdiction. Traffic Offenses - Judge in Capacity of Magistrate Arresting officer must file a complaint under oath stating offense charged and copy of the Notice to Appear to the officer's law enforcement agency. VC sss40500-40505-40506. The failure to appear mandates regular verified complaint. Penal Code sss948, 963, 11.36 filed with court. MAGISTRATE. Person clothed with power as a public civil officer. State ex rel Miller vs McLeod, 194 So 628, 630 "The word 'magistrate' does not necessarily imply an officer exercising any judicial functions" Schultz vs Merchant's Inur Co. 57 Mo 336 "A public officer belonging to the civil organization of state, invested with powers and functions which may be either, judicial, legislative, or executive." Martin vs State 32 Ark 124 Ex parte Whitle 15 Nev 146 State vs Allen 83 Fla 655 [Remember, any officer of a court, regardless of how he sits in a hearing, has taken an oath of allegiance to uphold the Constitution of the United States and is bound by the limited authority granted to him by the people in its Bill of Rights to the government. The Fourteenth Amendment controls all administrative notice, hearing and adjudication proceedings where the party accused is a licensee and was engaged in the activities under the jurisdiction of the agency on the date of the accusation initiated by a Notice to Appear] "An action by the Department of Motor Vehicles, whether directly or through a court sitting administratively as the hearing officer, must be clearly defined in the statute before it has subject matter jurisdiction. Without such jurisdiction of the licensee, all acts of the agency, by its employees, agents, hearing officers, are null and void" Doolan vs Carr, 125 US 618 City vs Pearson, 181 Cal 640

"Agency, or party sitting for the agency, (which would be the magistrate of a municipal court) has no authority to enforce as to any LICENSEE unless he is acting for compensation. Such an act is highly penal in nature, and should not be construed to include anything which is not embraced within its terms. (Where) there is no charge within a complaint, no evidence to prove a charge if it were in a complaint, that the accused was employed for compensation to do the act complained of, or that the act constituted a part of a contract." Schomig vs Keiser, 189 Cal 596 "When acting to enforce a statute and its subsequent amendments to the present date, the judge of the municipal court is acting as an administrative officer and not in a judicial capacity; courts in administering or 'enforcing' statutes do not act judicially, but merely 'ministerially'" Thompson vs Smith, 154 SE 583

"A judge ceases to sit as a judicial officer because the governing principle of administrative law provides that courts are prohibited from substituting their evidence, testimony, record, arguments, and rationale for that of the agency. Additionally, courts are prohibited from substituting their judgments for that of the agency. Courts in administrative issues are prohibited from even listening to or hearing arguments, presentation or rationale." ASIS vs US, 568 F2d 284 "Ministerial officers are incompetent to receive grants of judicial power from the legislature. Their acts in attempting to exercise such powers are necessarily nullities" Burns vs Superior Court, SF, 140 Cal 1 [Thus, if you appear for arraignment on the date noticed on the traffic ticket, you must inform the magistrate that a municipal court cannot hear the matter on the Notice as there has been no determination and claim by the issuing officer, or the district attorney, that you are a person within the jurisdiction of the Department of Motor Vehicles.] [Author has exhaustively researched Motor Vehicle Statutes from 1905 to the present date of 1992 for the form of Notice to Appear. He has searched the Code of Civil Procedure, but nowhere can he find a NOTICE TO APPEAR. The root word of NOTICE is defined in Black's 4th page 1211 as follows:

NOTICE. Information; the result of observation, whether by senses or the mind; knowledge of the existence of a fact or state of affairs; the means of knowledge. In another sense, "notice" means information, an advise; written in more or less formal shape, intended to apprise a person of some proceeding in which his interests are involved, or informing him of some fact which it is his right to know, and the duty of the notifying party to communicate. [In all of the notices to appear seen by the author, all have been written and given to some motorist by a quasi-peace officer, all were extra-judicial and had no seal or teste of an officer of the court] [Author would suggest the following procedure when a person named on a Notice to Appear goes to the clerk of the court, and before appearing in the court room before the magistrate: Question: Is a notice to appear a penal code process? Question: Is a notice a civil procedure under Vehicle Code? Question: Will this matter be heard as a crime? Question: Will this matter be heard by a quasi-criminal procedure? Question: Is this matter a special civil procedure, and will it be heard by a magistrate or judicial officer? [If the clerk will not answer the questions, then ask for a continuance so that you will have time to hire an attorney.

When a trial date is set, never ask for a jury trial, even if you are entitled to same. Why? You may ask. Because juries rarely find a defendant 'not guilty', and will always be told the law as the judge determines it. The only questions you may want answered, are the law as it does or does not apply to you. When you appeal, you can only take forward for review the law of the case. So, you want to be found guilty on the law, not the facts. In this way, the magistrate cannot argue that he did not find you guilty, the jury did.] [Take note, listen carefully when they call your case. You will hear, The People of the State of California, Plaintiff. Understand that the People of the State of California are Government agents, and agencies of the Corporate State of California, are not the People who created California State, a republic.]

[Agents/employees/judicialofficers/magistrates/administrative judges, are the People of the State of California, a Corporate Entity] [District attorneys, police officers, cannot prosecute unless the People have been harmed. They can only defend or prosecute when the People of the Corporate State of California are named as defendants in civil suit, and the People of the Republic California cannot be sued without permission of the People, as they are the sovereign. [Prosecuting attorney for the People of the State of California, Plaintiff, cannot appear on a Notice to Appear when there has been no 'public wrong', as the violations of Vehicle Code are private statutory 'wrongs', and the People nor the people have an interest in private relationships to which neither is a party an no crime committed harming the people] WRONG: "A violation of the legal rights of another; an invasion of right to the damage of the parties who suffered it, especially a tort" State ex rel 134 SW2d 132, 133 "It usually signifies injury to person, property, or in a more extended sense, includes violation of contract." Daurizo vs Merchants 274 NYS 174 "The idea of RIGHTS naturally suggests the correlative one of WRONGS; for every right is capable of being violated. A right to live in personal security, a wrong on the part of him who commits personal violence; and the law is intended for the establishment and maintenance of RIGHTS, we find on closer examination, to be dealing both with rights and wrongs. It first fixes the character and definition of rights and then, with a view to their effectual security, proceeds to define wrongs, and to devise the means by which the latter shall be prevented or redressed. 1 Steph Comm 126 (Black's 4th page 1788)

[Notice to appear merely cites sections of Vehicle Code, does not either allege or charge a public wrong or a private wrong by the individual named on the caption] PRIVATE WRONG: "The violation of public or probate rights, when considered in reference to the injury sustained by the individual, and consequently as subjects for redress or compensation" Huntington vs Attrill 146 US 657; 36 Led 1123

State vs Magee 224 P 1028, 1031 ALR 142 PUBLIC WRONGS: "Violations of public rights and duties which affect the whole community considered as a community; crimes and misdemeanors" 3 Blackstones's Commentaries 2. 4 Bl Comm 1 Black's 4th p 1788 [Re-reading the above case law, can any reader find a ground for redress when a notice to appear is issued and not engaged in a regulated activity within the jurisdiction of the Department of Motor Vehicles or the commission of a substantive mala in se crime within Penal Code as a wrongful act?] WRONGFUL ACT: "Any act which in the ordinary course will infringe upon the rights of another to his damage, unless it is done in the equal or superior right " Victor vs Lewis, La App 157 So 293, 295 "No act is 'wrongful' unless the probability of injury to some determinate person or class of persons raises the duty as to those persons to refrain from such act" Harper vs Remington Arms 280 NYS 862 [A quasi-cop giving a civil extra-judicial notice to appear in a court before a magistrate and therein the person given the notice is harmed/injured when taken to a trial without subject matter jurisdiction by the magistrate and thereafter suffering a fine or jail time has certainly been the victim of a wrongful conduct wherein no duty attached to the person/individual affected] WRONGFUL CONDUCT: "Conduct which contravenes some duty which law attaches to relationship between parties affected" Duncan vs Lumbermen's Mutual 91 NH 349, 23 A2d 325, 326 [Certainly the law attaches a relation between the peace office and the private citizen wherein the duty to the private citizen who has not committed a mala in se crime or a mala prohibita violation peace officer has a duty not to arrest] [If the notice to appear was written by a CHiP on a federal Inter-state highway giving an appearance date before a county municipal court then it is without force for three reasons; 1. Department of Transportation has exclusive Federal Legislative jurisdiction of inter-state highways;

2. CHP has no jurisdiction other than on state highways; 3. Municipal courts have no subject matter jurisdiction where federal jurisdiction exists] s41401 VC. No person shall be prosecuted for a violation of any provision of this code if the violation was required by a law of the federal government, by any rule, regulation, directive or order of any agency of the federal government, the violation of which is subject to penalty under an act of Congress, or any valid order of military authority. [In this situation the particular officer, either traffic officer of peace officer is not only outside the scope and duty of his office, but is outside the area of his jurisdiction even if within the scope and duty of his office] [Here is a case where if the traffic officer is informed of s41401 and then writes a Notice to Appear where he cannot, even if the person given the ticket is trafficking, and an appearance is made to the magistrate of the court and he is told of the faulty nature of the notice, fails to refuse the matter as being without the court's jurisdiction and then accepts a plea of guilty or enters a plea and thereafter renders judgment and imposes a fine, he falls within the wrongful conduct making a ripe party for a civil tort act in an individual capacity, was not functioning within his official capacity as officer of the court] ADDENDUM [Author has searched Civil Code of Procedure and no where is the a 'notice to appear' as part of that procedure] [Further research on Chisholm produced this. The notice to appear is seemingly being used as a Notice of Motion as used in civil causes, but fails as a Motion in civil causes as it does not conform, with practice,.pleadings forms and modes of proceeding existing at this time in like causes in courts of record of State as it does not present issues and does not issue pursuant to verified complaint] [The magistrate informs that a mere notice to appear constitutes a complaint but 40513(a) clearly states that a notice may only be used as a complaint with permission of a person pleading guilty, any plea of not guilty demands the filing of a formal verified complaint by a prosecutor as the person issuing the notice is

merely a witness of the prosecutor and even the prosecutor must have a verified complaint provided him by the witness] [By a plea of not guilty by a person named on a notice, court does not obtain subject matter jurisdiction and no trial date may be set based on a plea of not guilty until a formal verified complaint is filed with the magistrate] [Any warrant issued because a person fails to appear for a trial, based only on notice and not guilty plea is an abuse of lawful process and firm ground for action of false arrest and false imprisonment as to all parties] [Never enter a plea absent the service of a verified complaint and summons/warrant. A service of complaint only does not give personam jurisdiction. Absent the warrant/summons no need lies to appear and no violation of a lawful court order exists. Any bench warrant for failure to appear is an absurdity and void without force of law. Ground for action] In the case of People vs Domagalski, 89 Daily Journal DAR 12878, court of appeal stated; "This opinion is not intended as an endorsement of the People's delay in filing the subject complaint with the court. We feel in most cases it would not place an undue burden on the prosecuting agencies to assure that complaints are prepared by the time defendants are scheduled to appear for arraignment. Failure to file the complaint in time for a noticed arraignment, or, in the alternative, to notice the court and defendant of the need for a continuance, undermines the integrity of judicial process" [This case cite is presented only so that when a magistrate states that the matter before him is a criminal procedure and not a civil and he is sitting as a judge the above ruling does bind him. But remember, supra, a complaint must be served with the summons/warrant.] [The Court of Appeal tells it as it is, one cannot enter a plea without being informed of the allegations/charges against the defendant and the showing of a prima facie and corpus delicti probable cause] [The trickery here is that if you stand before the bench and ask for a complaint and warrant and they hand it to you, you are in persona jurisdiction because there you are, in the flesh. In the

trap. If as in the case of Karen, a complaint is asked and the court says, "come back in two weeks and we will have on for you" What course of action will be taken by you?] [Do not go back until the complaint with warrant is served as the magistrate will argue that subject matter jurisdiction merely because a complaint has been filed with the court] "Court cannot engage in any action which deprives a party before it of his constitutional rights. It has long been recognized that it is a proper function of courts to act as check on improper use of both executive and legislative powers. Powell vs McCormack 395 US 486, which quoted Kilborn vs Thompson 103 US 168, to whit, "Especially is it competent and proper for this court to consider whether proceedings are in conformity with constitution and laws, because, living under a written constitution no branch or department of government is supreme; it is the province and duty of judicial and administrative departments in cases regularly brought before them, whether powers of any branch of government have been exercised in conformity to the constitution; if they have not, to treat their acts as null and void." Speaking by Mr. Justice Strong in ex parte Virginia, we said, "A state acts by its legislative, executive or its judicial authorities. It can act in no other way. The Constitutional provision, therefore, must mean that no agency of the State or offices or agents, by whom its powers are executed, shall deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Whoever, by virtue of public position under the State government deprives another of life, liberty or property without due process of laws, violates the constitutional inhibitions, as he acts in the name of and for the State, and is clothed with the State's authority his act is that of the State. This must be, or the constitutional prohibition has no meaning" "The only 'judicial' activity which can be instituted upon petition by government is 'enforcement' review, which is summary procedure with summary judgment, which is more in the nature of appeal by the government, for no new record can be made. No new evidence may be taken for the record can be made. The administrative record is the 'exclusive record for review'. No rationale may be supplied by agents of government or by the court itself hearing. Nor by

imaginative government counsel for the same is a devious device known as 'post hoc' rationalization which is prohibited as a matter of law. Judgment by the court cannot be substituted for that of the administrative agency" Abelliara vs District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal2d 280, 287-288; 109 P2d 942 [As court informs matter is criminal procedure, which would be judicial procedure, court would move precipitously to harm of individual if it does not dismiss for want of record for review] ADDENDUM [Notice to appear is statutory procedure and is without force of law when the man/person named on the caption of the notice is not within jurisdiction of the DMV unless he is engaged in some activity regulated by vehicle code and is a man/person subject to endorsement by DMV and further fails because it fails to plead the statute] "Pleading a statute is stating the facts which bring the case within it; and 'counting on it' in the strict language if pleading, is making express reference to it by apt terms to show the source of right relied upon" McCullough vs Clofax County 95 NW 31 "Every ingredient of which an offense is composed must be accurately and clearly alleged. It is an elementary principle of pleading that where the definition of an offense, whether it be at common law or statue, includes generic terms, it is not sufficient that the pleading shall charge the offense in same generic terms as in the definition; but it must state the species, it must descend to the particulars. The objective is, first, to furnish the accused with such description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense and avail himself of his conviction of acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; second, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. For the facts are to be stated, not conclusions of law alone. An offense is made of acts and intent; and these must be set forth with particularity of the time, place and circumstances" US vs Cook 17 Wallace 174 [Remember, although the above citation is addressing mala in se violations, the same standards of law demand the same in statutory

law, mala prohibita] "Offenses created by statute, as well as offenses at common law, must be accurately and clearly described, and, if the offense cannot be described without expanding the allegations beyond mere words of the statute, then it is clear that the allegations must be expanded to that extent, as it is universally true that no charge is sufficient which does not accurately and clearly allege all the ingredients of which the offense is composed, so as to bring the accused with in the true intent and meaning of the statute defining the offense. Every offense consists of certain acts done or committed under certain circumstances; and, in the charge of the offense, it is not sufficient to charge the accused generally with having committed the offense, but all circumstances constituting must be specially set forth" Arch Cr Pl 15th Ed 43 ADDENDUM [When ever a ticket/summons/notice to appear is issued by a quasi-peace officer and he checks only 'traffic' box on the caption of the ticket, etc., that is your evidence that the matter before the court will be 'civil in nature', thus must be administrative procedure] [When on the appearance on only a ticket etc., the court magistrate calls People of the State etc., Plaintiff, versus 'whomever' defendant, a question now arises; how do the People have an interest in the mala prohibita?] [If the People are represented by city/county attorney, as they speak only as a prosecutor acting on behalf of the Attorney General of the State, then the attorney general can only act to prosecute mala in se crimes, or in civil actions where the state has an interest and are classified as Real Party in Interest.

The real party in interest must be noticed in all actions when the state has an interest. So in all papers filed with the prosecuting attorney a copy must be filed with the attorney general, if the state has an interest, if there is no interest by the state, then local prosecuting attorney can not appear as plaintiff for the People, and the People must be excluded, be barred from the action, even assuming it was properly brought before the magistrate by following mandated procedure clearly outlined in the vehicle code]

So! let's read how the state acquires a Real Party in Interest in an action before a magistrate: "For the state to be 'interested' as a party, the state must have a direct and substantial interest of a monetary character" In re Kaindel 104 NE2d 619, 621 Keplinger vs Lord 192 NE 549, 550 "State is interested in a suit only when it has a direct and substantial interest in the outcome and not where only concern is to see that citizens are protected in their rights" People vs Mitchell 148 NE 242, 243 "Real party interest is one having actual and substantial interest in the subject matter of suit" Carey vs Sisco 64 SW2d 430 "Real party in interest is that party who would be benefitted or injured by judgment, or party entitled to avails of the suit, 'interest' meaning material interest, interest in issue, or to be effected, was distinguished from mere interest in question involved as against mere incidental interest" Weber vs City etc., 97 P2d 667, 669 [Now here is an interesting sample of real party not being an attorney speaking for the state. Remember the two parties in an action begun by Vehicle Code alleged mala prohibita is between the Department of Motor Vehicles and its licensees while they are engaged in some business activity which comes within the purview of the Vehicle Code] [In such a situation, then the prosecuting attorney becomes an intervenor] "Attorney has not interest in matter in litigation or success of either of parties or interest against as would entitle attorney to intervene in action or proceeding, and court acted beyond its jurisdiction in permitting attorney to intervene" Meadow vs Superior Court Los Angeles County (1963) 381 P2d 648, 59 Cal2d 610 [Read that again. An intervenor is a third party permitted in the action as he has some collateral, implicit, or ulterior right, adverse to that of either or both of the others or to defend a responsibility involved in the controversy. Black's fourth defines Intervenor p 956: An intervenor is a person who voluntarily

interposes in an action or other proceeding with leave of the court, citing MEADOW is grounds for dismissal of the action as magistrate acted in excess of its jurisdiction, to your harm] [As all prosecuting agencies function as arm of the Attorney General and he only has jurisdiction to act in the name of justice in a mala in se action or where the state has a direct involvement by some contractual nexus with some contractee performing a contract for the state, and the state has no relationship with the Department of Motor Vehicles, an independent corporation, private in nature, and the only party with the power to enforce vehicle code and its licensees the magistrate cannot, at law, permit a prosecuting attorney to intervene in the matter of a notice/summon/ticket, all traffic in nature. "The courts will determine who is the 'real party in interest' in an action, by reference, not merely to the name in which the action is brought, but as to facts as they appear on the record" Eastern etc. vs Grave's etc. 52 SE 837, 838 [So, intervenor without interest defined in supra cites must be barred from the case when you so inform the magistrate the nature of the facts of the case of record] [David Mayo of Oregon sent me some fascinating material which is apropos to the issue of a summons as notice is deemed by Oregon Courts under their vehicle code] [A notice is a civil extra-judicial notice, and so without force of competent court with subject matter jurisdiction and bears no seal of the court or is it subscribed by the magistrate or the clerk of the court] [A notice or summons issued without accompanying complaint is null and void as they fail to inform the recipient of the nature of the complaint upon which a man/person named on the mere notice/summons must defend.] [A notice/summons further is not binding on a recipient as there was no proper service by a person not a party to the notice/summons, as at best the cop will only appear as a witness for some prosecuting agency, is not a party] [Notice/summons further fails as quasi-officer cannot certify that a copy is a true and correct copy of the original as that may only

be done by a clerk of the court, who makes a true and correct certified copy from the records of the court] [As notice/summons is not a complaint verified by the quasi-officer, and is functioning as a private person at the time of the stop, matter being civil in nature, and pursued under administrative code regulatory/enforcement agency scheme, there is no delegated authority, by the enforcement agency, for the quasi-peace officer to act for or on behalf of the agency, as a complainant, an if there were, the complainant must file his complain/accusation, first instance with the enforcement agency] [The above challenge to the incompetency of the mere notice/summons, standing alone, should be part of the Motion to Quash for Improper Service and want of jurisdiction by the officer] Arthur Frank Sanford 5894 Villa Drive Rancho Cucamonga, CA Quasi-defendant MUNICIPAL COURT, WEST VALLEY DIVISION COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO People of the Republic of California v Arthur Frank Sanford, Quasi-defendant Sui Juris

NO. 55688 NOTICE OF MOTION MOTION TO DISMISS LACK OF PERSONAM JURISDICTION BY DISTRICT ATTORNEY OR MUNICIPAL COURT [United States Constitution Art. VI; 4TH, 5TH, 6TH Amends; Cal. Penal Code s16; Cal Penal Code s 19d; Vehicle Code of 1959] ................................................................. TO THE JUDGE OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:

Quasi-defendant, Arthur Frank Sanford, Sui Juris, will appear special at a law & motion hearing at above entitled court, located at 8303 Haven Avenue in Rancho Cucamonga, California, at 8:30 am, at which time he will motion the district attorney and the municipal court to dismiss the above cited case No. 55688 for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and personam of defendant. The motion to dismiss will be based upon the following; History of the Case, Legal Status of the Quasi-defendant, United States Constitution Article VI, United States Constitution Amendments 4, 5, and 6, Penal Code s 16, 19d; California Statute Vehicle Code of 1959 and the included Memorandum of Points and Authorities, made a part of this motion, within this motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction by the law and case citations of California Court of Appeals, State Supreme Courts of California and the several states of the Union within the United States of America and the United States Supreme Court.

Quasi-defendant asks the court to take judicial notice that a Notice to Appear issued in his name, and notices being civil process in nature, void on its face when is merely certified and further void on their face when they fail to identify/state the nature of the action as one of admiralty, Maritime, contract, fraud, negligence, tort or true criminal or quasi-criminal, as quasi-criminal is a procedure used only where criminal penalties attach to a licensed activity under statutes regulating businesses and professions which are private in nature. Without the face of the notice stating the nature of the case the person named on the notice has no way of knowing the jurisdiction nature of the man on the bench and the manner in which the person named has been brought into the jurisdiction of the court and if the plaintiff has the standing to petition the court and therefore the manner in which a person may prepare a defense or denial of the matter. Arthur Frank Sanford Quasi-defendant HISTORY OF THE CASE On June 22, 1989, quasi-defendant, Arthur Frank Sanfor, at the time not engaged in commercial traffic in the business of transportation of goods or people upon the highways and streets, a licensed privilege granted by the Department of Motor Vehicles to that class of persons who wish to hire their services and vehicles to the

public for gain profit and or compensation; While traveling as a motorist for personal business and transportation, south bound on Hermosa Avenue in the city of Rancho Cucamonga, California, was stopped at the corner of Lemon Avenue and Hermosa Avenue, by a deputy of the San Bernardino County Sheriff. Quasi-defendant asked the Deputy the probable cause for the stop at the time of his detainment. Deputy Sheriff (hereinafter named 'deputy') informed the quasi-defendant (hereinafter named 'accused') that the probable cause was that the accused had failed to stop at a STOP sign posted at the above described intersection. Accused, at that time, informed the deputy that he had made a stop and denied the accusation and that he was not engaged in the business of transportation and asked the deputy if he had any evidence that the accused was engaged in the business of transportation. Deputy did not respond to the questions of the accused. Accused then told the deputy to look at section 260(a) (b) of Vehicle code and section 10751 of the revenue & Taxation Code as they showed that the accused was not a person within the special class named as a class of persons regulated, supervised while engaged in business of transportation. Deputy responded that he did not know about the code sections and refused to read the sections as demanded by the accused.

Deputy then asked to see the registration certificate and the driver license and the evidence of proof of insurance of the accused. When the accused did not show proof of insurance to the deputy, deputy told accused that he must have insurance while 'driving' or 'operating' a motor vehicle. Accused denied the accusation that he was in violation of code as he was not 'driving' or 'operating' a motor vehicle. Deputy then issued a mere certified civil notice to appear captioned with name of accused, citing sections 22450 and 16028(a) of Vehicle Code without any charge or allegation that the accused was in violation of the code or naming the accused in the body of the notice. Accused then signed the notice "Without admitting guilt, I promise

to appear at the time and place below". Accused signed the notice protesting that his signature was obtained under threat of the taking into custody of his body if he would not sign, the signature of the accused was obtained by coercion and because the signature of the accused is a plea of 'not guilty' and the notice is a confession obtained under duress it is not admissible evidence in a prosecution of the accused at a lawful trial STATUS OF THE QUASI-DEFENDANT "The status of an individual, used as a legal term, means the legal position of the individual in or with regard to the rest of the community. L.R. 4 P.D. 11. The rights duties, capacities and incapacities which determine a person to a given class, constitutes his status; Campbell Autin 137........... The Action of Assumpsit must be reckoned a technical instrument, which gave no help to the forces which were making the transition from status to contact; 3 Hold. Hist. E.L. 349" Bouvier's Volume 3, page 3129 The accused has not sworn an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, as he is not a member of a military organization of the State or of the United States. He is not a member of a political organization which requires members to swear by oath to support the Constitution of the United States, nor is he an enfranchised voter. He is not a public or municipal employee, nor an employee of the federal government which requires all employees to swear by oath to support the United States Constitution. He is not an employee of a corporation contracted to do business with or for, any branch of government, be it military or civil, and he is not engaged in maritime or admiralty commerce. Nor does any evidence exist which show a 'joint adventure' or a 'limited partnership'. He is not a member of a judicial branch of the State of California, or of the United States. He is not an attorney at law, who is an officer of the judicial branch, required to take an oath to support the constitution of the United States. He is not an elected official of a local municipality, the State of

California, any of the several states of the Union or of the United States Federal government. He is not a member of a public Trust, whereby he must take an oath to support the United States Constitution. He is not an elected official of the legislature of the State of California, nor of a local Municipal Council or Board of Supervisors. See attached Declaration of Status filed with public official and agencies as exhibit "A" and Amended declaration of Status filed with public officials and agencies as exhibit "B" MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I CONSTITUTION WAS ENACTED WITH THE INTENT TO CREATE A GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE (sic) CONSTITUTIONS BY NATURE ARE CONTRACTS WHICH ARE VOLUNTARILY ENTERED BY THE INDIVIDUAL BY OATH AND SWEARING OF FEALTY IN RETURN FOR THE BENEFITS OF A GOVERNMENT. WITHOUT THE OATH BY THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THAT GOVERNMENT THEREUNDER CREATED IT IS NOT BINDING ON THE UNSWORN INDIVIDUAL. HE IS OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT FROM WHICH HE TAKES NO BENEFIT. THE QUASI-DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE IS SUCH A PERSON WITHOUT OATH TO THE CONSTITUTION. Chief Justice Story in the court decision in Martin vs Hunter's Leasee, Vol 1, Wheaton 304 (February 1816) speaking about the Constitution said, "The Constitution is a contract, a covenant. It is a Policy." Kent in his Commentaries, Edition I, Part I, Law of Nations, which is binding on the Constitution and thus superior to the Constitution says, "The most useful and practical part of the Law of Nations is no doubt instituted on Positive Law, founded on usage, consent, and agreement" God created Mankind. Mankind created constitutions. Constitutions create governments. Governments create Rules, Code, Regulations and Statutes (hereinafter called Enactments) for the execution of the business of the government. Most of which are applied by coercion, by deceit and fraud, to the harm of the subject of the government

in the guise of 'for the welfare of the people'. The presumption of government is that all people are the subjects of the government and that the government is the Sovereign of the people and all people are within the jurisdiction of government administrative agencies. But it was not the intent of the Colonists to create a SOVEREIGNTY, but by the very terms of the Constitution to bind and restrict all branches of the government and this is made abundantly clear in the Preamble to the Bill Of Rights December 15, 1791. "The conventions of a number of the States having at the time of their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added: And as extending the ground of public confidence in the government, will best insure the beneficent ends of its institution" It is presumptively clear that it was not the intent of the Colonists by their Constitutional Charter (a written grant of specific rights, a document setting forth the aims and principles of a united group) to create a SOVEREIGN government conferring juris on the people, in-toto, jurisdiction over the Colonists Themselves it is clear that a Sovereign government could create titles of nobility but the Constitutional Charter forbids it in: Article I., Section 9, Clause 8: "No title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States;......." and Article I., Section 10, Clause 1: "No state shall ......... grant any Title of Nobility" Thus, it is clear that there is no sovereignty over the individual by the United States or a State of the Union absent the showing of a jural or contractual relationship by a pledge of allegiance by oath or affirmation whereby the individual submits himself to the jurisdiction of the State or United States as a citizen of the State or of the United States. CITIZEN: Black's Law Dict. fifth Edition: Member of a jural society (state) who in associated relations submit themselves to rules of conduct..... In re McIntosh, DC Wash., 12 F Supp. 177 On who under the constitution and laws of the United States, or of a particular state, is a member of the political community, owing

allegiance............. Minor vs Happersett, 21 Wallace 162, 22 L Ed 627 Mere residency or inhabitation does not create a citizen or citizenship. Jeffcott vs Donovan, CCA Ariz., 135 F2d 213, 214 Mere birth within the United States, without subjection to the jurisdiction thereof, does not create a citizen or citizenship. [birth creates an American] Nyman vs Erickson, 100 Wash. 149; 170 P 546, 547 Thus, government and jural sovereignty if claimed by the State of California or this state court where this quasi-defendant repudiates it, is presumptive and fictitious and the State and this challenge for its lack of jurisdiction must be proved to exist.

Due process requires that the defendant have such contacts with the state as to make it reasonable, in the context with the state as to make it reasonable, in the context of the federal system of government, to require the defendant to defend against the particular action which is brought by the state, executive/administrative. Shaffer vs Heitner (1977), 97 S Ct, 53 L Ed2d 683, 697 The recognizable bases for jurisdiction in a case but absent in this case, when the matter before the court is civil in nature though proceedings are quasi-criminal: (4) Citizenship; (7) doing business in the state; (11) relationships to the state which make the exercise of judicial jurisdiction reasonable. Titus vs Superior Court (1972) 23 CalApp3d 792, 799 If the individual cannot be proved to be subject to the jurisdiction of any Constitution or other social or business contract by business license or compact, he also cannot be proved to be subject to the jurisdiction of any branch of government created thereunder. If it cannot be proved that the individual is directly subject to the jurisdiction of any state legislative enactment, it also cannot be proved that he is indirectly subject to such jurisdiction by way

of Legislative Enactments. In the absence of proof that the Individual is subject to the jurisdiction of any Constitution or other Social Contract or Compact, Jurisdiction over Him DOES NOT EXIST. The general requirement that "....burden is on defendant to show the non-existence of jurisdictional facts; Russell vs Butler, (Tex. Civ. App.) 47 SW 406; Glichrist vs Oil Land Co., 45 Am, Rep. 555, Bouvier's Vol 2, page 1763 is resolved by Article VI which clearly defines exactly who is subject to the jurisdiction of the Constitution, and exactly who shall be Contractually Bound by Oath or Affirmation to support which Constitution in consideration for offices of Public Trust and those benefits of Public Service and Public Employment. Article VI; "The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution;...." Thus, the intent of Article VI defines exactly to whom the Constitutional Jurisdiction applies; since the fact that the people, in toto, are not included by the requirements of Article VI, prima facie; See: INCLUSIO EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS; Black's Law Dict.; The inclusion of one is the exclusion of another. Thus, the fact that the people are excluded fro the demand. Thus, no presumption can be made, by the State or any branch of government, or their officials of the particular branch, that a particular person is subject to the jurisdiction of the Constitution without a showing of the oath/affirmation to the Constitution since all Constitutions are considered "in pari materia" (are to be constructed together) with all other Constitutions; all Constitutions are subject to the same provision of Article VI. Since no Constitution Charter operates on the people at large, in toto, by virtue of the fact that the people are excluded from the requirements of Article VI, et sqq., and when pursuing Common-Rights; occupations to earn a livelihood not unlawful; to travel for personal business and pleasure, the transportation of personal property, upon the highways of the state without the need for a license regulating his mode of travel, or the payment of

fees, taxes imposed on the Common-Right, he is not subject to Constitution created jurisdictions. II IF THE QUASI-DEFENDANT IS NOT SUBJECT TO ANY CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION, HE IS ALSO NOT SUBJECT TO ANY ENACTMENT MADE BY ANY CONSTITUTIONALLY CREATED LEGISLATURE STATUTE ENACTED AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED TO HIM; AND, IF THE QUASI-DEFENDANT IS NOT SUBJECT TO ANY CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION PRESUMED BY ANY CONSTITUTIONALLY CREATED BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT; AND, IF QUASI-DEFENDANT IS NOT SUBJECT TO ANY CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION, HE IS NOT SUBJECT TO ANY JURISDICTION PRESUMED BY ANY CONSTITUTIONALLY CREATED JUDICIARY BODY. In the complete absence of any lawful and verified oath or affirmation made by a Non participant Individual, in this case, the quasi-defendant, appearing sui juris, to support any Constitution; or in the complete absence of proving a Higher Title to that Non participant Individual, the quasi-defendant, In Personam jurisdiction does not exist; and in the complete absence of proving a lawful and voluntary contract evidenced by a certificate of license and the evidence that the quasi-defendant has enjoyed a benefit of a privilege granted by the license, the taking of gain, profit or compensation, and pledging himself and or his personal property rights to certain specified performance, subject matter does not exist; and, In the complete absence of any lawful and formal verified complaint issued timely and by due process of law against the Non participant, the quasi-defendant, wherein a real Injured Party claims a damage by harm, no criminal jurisdiction exists; thus, In the absence of proving the existence of either In Personam and/or Subject Matter Jurisdiction, governmental Jurisdiction over the Non participant, the quasi-defendant, does not exist. QUODERAT DEMONSTRANDUS

PAGE 100 III WHERE THE STATE DEEMS ITS PEOPLE TO HAVE BEEN HARMED BY THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME OR CRIMINAL PENALTIES APPLY TO VIOLATIONS OF

A LAWFUL, VALID, PRIVATE BUSINESS STATUTE, IN INSTANT CASE, VEHICLE CODE OF 1959, AND STATE HAS APPLIED THE STATUTE CONSTITUTIONALLY TO THE CLASS OF PERSONS NOTICED BY THE STATUTE, AND LEGISLATURE BY ITS CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY DEEMS VIOLATIONS OF THE STATUTE TO BE EITHER INFRACTIONS OR MISDEMEANORS, ATTORNEY GENERAL, AS VIOLATIONS OF STATE STATUTES ARE PROSECUTED BY HIS OFFICE, MUST BE PROSECUTED WITHIN THE RESTRAINTS OF THE UNTIED STATES CONSTITUTION AMENDMENTS FOURTH, FIFTH, AND SIXTH WHICH ARE IMPOSED ON THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNION CONSTITUTIONS PETITIONING FOR ADMISSION TO STATEHOOD. Where the police power of the state is used to enforce criminal activities or criminal penalties may be imposed on an accused as the particular administrative agency has no delegated police power, as is the case in the Department of Motor Vehicles an agency within the Business, Transportation and Housing Agency, Penal Code sets procedure; Penal Code s16; Kinds of Crimes; Crimes and public offenses include: 1. Felonies; 2. Misdemeanors; 3. Infractions. Penal Code s19d. Applicability of provisions of law relating to misdemeanors as applicable to infractions. Except as otherwise provided by law, all provisions of law relating to misdemeanors shall apply to infractions, including but not limited to powers of peace officers, jurisdiction of courts, periods for commencing action and for bringing a case to trial and burden of proof. In the case of People vs Gilberg, 21 NYS2d 920, 923, court said that a violation of vehicle code which provides that it be a traffic 'infraction' and not a 'misdemeanor', but cont.. PAGE 101

cont.... deemed it to be a misdemeanor for jurisdictional purposes. Arguendo, a deputy who has no evidence that a person traveling by motor vehicle is engaged in the business of transportation has no jurisdiction to accuse and arrest a person as he has no probable cause under the police power of a local municipality or the state to prosecute private travelers in the municipality or the state where his power does not extend into Administrative Law Agencies. Regulation power is limited to licensed or unlicensed persons engaged in the regulated activity. And the court in People vs Vermillion (1916) 30 Cal App 417, 418 said "that there is no offense of the statute when the statue specifies the receipt of or expectation of compensation is an element of the offense and that condition is not fulfilled." The court in the case of People vs Nunn (1968) 264 Cal App2d 919, 922, said "that when a law enforcement officer observes a person 'engaged'in any activity for which a license is required may demand to see the license certificate, with 'no probable cause.'" Arguendo, if the deputy had probable cause to accuse and arrest the accused then under 4th, 5th, and 6th amendments must procure a search warrant to find the evidence of the commission of a crime or the crime must have been committed in his presence when a public offense, which is not indictable but punishable summarily or by forfeiture of a penalty pursuant to Penal Code s836 (1) Whenever he has cont.... PAGE 102 cont....reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense in his presence. Thus, under Vehicle Code, when the accused was stopped and cited under VC s22450, failing to stop for STOP sign, deputy was in excess of his police authority when citing s16028 (a) of vehicle code, no proof of insurance, as that violation is not a misdemeanor under penal code nor failing to obey STOP sign. Upon such an arrest prosecuted by a quasi criminal procedure, accused cannot by compelled to be a witness against himself, nor to an arrest without issue of and service of a warrant of arrest, be deprived of his liberty, property or life, nor can he be questioned without being informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and under

Miranda he must first be informed of his right to an attorney at all stages of the proceedings unless he waives, in writing, those rights. USC Amendment VI ".......no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized." USC Amendment V "No person......... nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,......." USC Amendment VI "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused.........., be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;...." A notice to appear, tried as a crime, fails to charge or accuse and inform (the accused?) the nature and cause of any violation and the facts therein. The nature being the fact that the (accused?) was engaged in the regulated activity of 'business of transportation' and the violation cited was in the nature of harm to the people. V OFFICER AND DISTRICT ATTORNEY HAVE WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE OF OBSERVED PUBLIC OFFENSE COMMISSION, INTRUDED INTO, INVADED ACCUSED'S EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT Arguendo: People vs Vermillion, supra, page 13, para. 3; with no offense evidenced by deputy, deputy violated the constitutionally restrictive rights of the government to perform without probable cause of 'engaged in' and intruded into accused's expectation of privacy as a motorist. In State Supreme Court of California, in case of Ingersol vs Palmer, 87 Daily Journal DAR 8107, the court held that a 'motorist', pursuant to United States Supreme Court cases Colonnade, 307 US 72 and Biswell,406 US 311, have a considerable and legitimate expectation of privacy in their automobile, including an expectation of freedom of movement,citing (Deleware vs

Prouse (1079) 440 US 648, 662-663) VI STATUTES, COMMERCIAL VEHICLE CODE 1905, IS STATE BUSINESS STATURE LICENSING PERSON TO ENGAGE IN THE BUSINESS OF TRANSPORTATION. REGULATION IS LIMITED TO CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL. POLICE POWER IS DENIED LOCAL MUNICIPALITIES BY THE CODE. Vehicle Code is a state statute private business statue licensing commercial business of transportation. Only (cont...) PAGE 104 (cont...) California Highway Patrol may regulate by code and limits regulation power to traffic upon the highways of the state and state property under s34500 of vehicle code; The Department of California Highway Patrol shall regulate the safe operation of the following vehicles, subdivisions (a) thru (i) does not include passenger vehicles. Vehicle Code specifically forbids local municipalities under s21100 (b) Vehicle Code to regulate vehicles outside their licensing jurisdiction and limits them to only motor vehicles and passenger vehicles for hire for compensation and licensed by the municipality and driven or operated within their geographical jurisdiction. Article 3. Local Regulation s21100; Local municipalities may adopt rules and regulations by ordinance or resolution regarding the following matters, (b) Licensing and regulating the operation of vehicles for hire and drivers of passenger vehicles for hire. All other subdivisions of this section limit local municipalities to the regulation of 'traffic' on streets and roads within their jurisdiction. Black's Fifth defines 'traffic' as commerce; the subjects of transportation on a route, as persons or goods; the passing to and fro of person, animals, vehicles, or vessels, along a route of transportation, as along a street, canal, etc., traffic regulations as the prescribed rules of conduct to promote the orderly and safe flow of traffic. PAGE 105

No police power attaches to the regulation of traffic as Department of Motor Vehicles enforces code by civil actions. Thus, once the deputy had made a determination that the accused was not in the business of transportation and was not a business licensee of the municipality of which deputy was an employee, that accused was not driving, operating a vehicle for hire or compensation, that he had no jurisdiction of the accused and as his jurisdiction does not extend to the enforcement of state private business statute and that Vermillion supra, page 13, applied and the people had not been harmed by the accused, again, nor jurisdiction to write a citation under Vehicle Code. Assuming that a person was 'engaged', Vehicle Code provides for the imposing of fines, penalties and forfeitures for violations of vehicle code which may only be imposed on a lawful arrest and filing of formal complaint to give the trial court jurisdiction of subject matter and personam. Thus, prosecution must be pursued according to due process of law and such procedure must be inside the restrictions of the 4th, 5th, and 6th amendments of United States Constitution imposed upon the several states of the Union. All matters of Vehicle Code prosecutions are unconstitutionally applied by the statue itself to the deprival and harm of an accused. An 'accused' is brought into the court by a mere civil notice to appear and proceedings are by quasi-criminal action, but notice does not accuse or allege (cont...) PAGE 106 (cont...) or charge a violation naming accused in body of notice. The accused is compelled to enter a plea of 'not guilty' to an extra-judicial person under threat of false imprisonment if he will not identify himself and sign the notice. Thus, the signed notice is a coerced plea to an extra-judicial person. After the coerced plea of 'not guilty' under duress, prosecutor is required to file a formal verified complaint naming the accused, Thereafter proceeding shall be had according to administrative law.. As all proceeding are pursuant to Vehicle Code, the pertinent section is: s40513, subd. (a) "........New paragraph. If, however, defendant

.........pleads other than guilty or nolo contendre to the offense charged, a complaint shall be filed which shall conform to provisions of Chapter 2, section 948 of Title 5, Part 2 of the Penal Code and which shall be deemed an original complaint, and thereafter proceedings shall be according to law." According to statutory proceeding a verified complaint and warrant of arrest must first be served upon an accused to bring the accused into the subject matter and personam jurisdiction by the trial court. So saith the Constitution of the State and the United States. VII IF TRIAL COURT DETERMINES THAT IT WILL ABIDE BY 'BATTLE' THAT 'INFRACTIONS ARE NOT CRIMES/PUBLIC OFFENSES', AND THUS, PROSECUTOR AND THIS COURT NEED NOT ABIDE (cont..) PAGE 107 (cont) BY PENAL CODE EVEN THOUGH 'BATTLE' IS NOT APPOSITE PENAL CODE, AND ASSUMING IT IS ALLEGED AND EVIDENCED THAT DEFENDANT WAS 'ENGAGED' IN A COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY, BUSINESS OF TRANSPORTATION; THE MATTER LIES FIRST WITH DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES; NOT WITH PROSECUTOR OR THIS TRIAL COURT WHEN THERE IS NO SHOWING OF HARM TO THE PEOPLE ON ALL MATTERS OF ALLEGED VIOLATION OF VEHICLE CODE AND ENFORCEMENT OF THAT CODE'S RULES, REGULATIONS AND THE ACTIVITY, AGENCY IS PRIMARY JURISDICTION FOR ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES BY ITS QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS AND THUS PARTY OF FIRST INSTANCE. In People vs Battle, 50 Cal App3d, Supp 3; the court though did not prove anywhere within its interpretation but attempted to read the mind of the legislative body, held that 'infractions' were not crimes or public offenses and thus persons accused of infractions were not entitled to the restrictions and demand of the penal code placed upon a prosecutor for the people by the Constitution (s). Thus, with the appellate court ruling that 'infractions' are not crimes, then they must be civil in nature and thus do not come within the purview of the prosecutor and he cannot petition this court to hear when the agency itself has not heard and remedy carried to final appeal. Issue must be pursued administerially for a setting of the record to a final appeal by either party and only then my be moved to the judiciary.

VIII DEFENDANT HAS A BENEFICIAL INTEREST TO BE PROTECTED AND PRESERVED. PROSECUTOR FOR THE PEOPLE MUST INITIATE ACCUSATION WITH LICENSING AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, THE PARTY OF FIRST INSTANCE AS PRIMARY JURISDICTION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES MUST, CANNOT BE BY-PASSED WITHOUT VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION BY ALL PARTIES TO A SUMMARY PROCEDURE Prosecuting attorney cannot play 'house detective' for (cont...) PAGE 108 (cont) Department of Motor Vehicles. He may not act, function, directly or indirectly as enforcer for the Department of Motor Vehicles rules, regulations or of its licensees, or any person acting outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the agency which is limited to maritime summary procedure hearing under Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the State and admiralty/maritime jurisdiction of Federal District Courts, where the jurisdiction lies. Where a government agency or local municipality, (district attorney, added) believes that an individual is a person within the demands of a statute, of which it has authority to enforce, or standing to initiate an action, naming the individual, where the matter is administrative license, there must first be a demand for administrative enforcement. The government agency is required to first exhaust all administrative remedies before it may proceed on any civil action, as is the accused required. Where the people seek enforcement of administrative licensee, it must not skirt the administrative agency for enforcement by a 'mere hearing officer' without the 'administrative record for review', it must 'trigger' the administrative agency remedy, or it denies the agency its authority and power to enforce its own rules and regulations and its licensees, to the harm of and denial of administrative remedy to the accused. O K Corp. vs Williams, 461 F Supp 540 The respondent (court, added) who would be sitting as administrative hearing officer for a review of the 'exclusive

administrative record', must produce the administrative record, but has not, and so cannot ministerially sit or hear on non-existent record, thus no power to affect the individual's substantive rights (Nance vs Tavern 150 P2d 773) cannot regulate or take from (Terr vs Daniels 22 P 159) any individual where there is want of substantial nexus by license (Lehnhausen vs Auto Parts, 410 US 356; reh denied 411 US 910; Wisc vs Penny, 311 US 445) Only a substantive relationship means jurisdiction' Dee vs Seattle, 387 US 541; Camara vs San Francisco, 387 US 523 Agency (district attorney?/Department of Motor Vehicles?/ sheriff?/ trial court?; questions added) have no authority to enforce any licensee unless he is acting for compensation. Such an act is highly penal in its nature, and should not be construed to include anything which is not embraced within its terms. There is no charge in the complaint (notice to appear, added), no evidence to prove the charge even if in the complaint that accused was employed for compensation to do the acts complained of. Schmomig vs Keiser, 189 Cal 596 Practicing.......or engaging in a regulated activity without a license is an offense, if a statute so provides, unless the statue specifies the receipt or expectation of compensation as an element of the offense, in which case there is no offense if that condition is not fulfilled. People vs Vermillion (1916) Cal App 417, 418; Accused was not engaged in commercial activity of transportation for hire, for profit, gain or compensation, not is it alleged or charged by the 'officer' or the 'district attorney' or evidenced by any facts that 'accused' is of the class of persons required to register a private passenger vehicle and assume the attendant obligations and liabilities with the receipt in return of any wanted or accepted privileges and benefits. CONCLUSION: FOR EVERY ACT WITHOUT JURISDICTION IS AN ACT OF TORT With accused not a citizen, a Nonparticipant Individual and therefore not subject to jurisdiction of any legislature branch, executive branch, judicial branch of state government and not

having committed an observed crime/public offense (see Battle supra) and Sheriff and district attorney not having standing to petition the Department of Motor Vehicles and not having knocked on their door and accused thus denied his right to administrative remedy and the court having no administrative re- (cont..) PAGE 110 (cont..) cord to review, and prosecutor having failed to move the matter to Federal District Court by an admiralty action, court should sua sponde dismiss. Every act perpetrated by a Constitutionally created Branch of government while absent Jurisdiction; every such act being required to be made unlawfully under force of arms; and every such act having been made without probable cause; then, every such act is required to have been made as a Trespass, and/or other Tort upon a Nonparticipant Individual, and shall constitute a Case to be pursued against the Perpetrator in an action at-law for the recovery of Damages. Arthur Frank Sanford Quasi-defendant, Sui Juris PAGE 111 Arthur Frank Sanford 5894 Villa Drive Rancho Cucamonga, CA Quasi-defendant, Sui Juris MUNICIPAL COURT, WEST VALLEY DIVISION, COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA Plaintiff vs

ARTHUR FRANK SANFORD Defendant NO. 55688 NOTICE OF MOTIONS MOTION TO SUPPRESS NOTICE TO APPEAR. NOTICE TO DISMISS AS NOTICE APPEAR IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Cal Const. Art. 1, s13 CCP s2065 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT: This notice to suppress the notice to appear and notice to dismiss, is based upon the following memorandum of points and authorities showing that the notice to appear is an unconstitutional deprival of the defendant's right not to incriminate himself by compelled plea of 'not guilty' under threat of arrest and custody for the refusal not to sign a notice to appear. By signature, notice becomes self-incriminating statement and confession under duress of harm for failure to comply with the demanded signature. A plea of not guilty is an admission of the commission of a certain act, which may or may not be, a violation of a certain act, which may or may not be a violation by the defendant. Thus, defendant (cont...) PAGE 112 (cont..) has admitted the act but denies he is guilty of violating the law for some reason which will be disputed in court. A notice to appear must be verified and upon the written promise to

appear signed by person named upon the caption of the notice 'without admitting guilt I promise to appear' is the same as pleading 'not guilty', and upon the filing of the notice with the clerk of the court named upon the face of the notice, a verified complaint must be filed with the clerk of the court in order for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction and a warrant must be served upon the defendant named in the verified complaint before the court will have personam jurisdiction. Without the above due process of law, the notice to appear is not admissible as probative evidence of a violation of vehicle code and where notice merely cites a section and subdivision of the code without alleging or charging the commission of a violation and a showing of person on the caption of the notice as being engaged in and enjoying the privileges of the vehicle code, the business of transportation, it is invalid and void upon its face. Accordingly, this court must suppress the unverified notice to appear as it fails as evidence and dismiss the case incompetently before it. PAGE 113 Barnes vs Texas, 1956, 380 US 253 An allegation used in pleadings is a statement of what one can prove, a positive assertion of a fact. Merrill vs Pepperdine, 36 NE 921, 922 and mere allegations, usually denied, are not usually sufficient foundation for judicial or quasi-judicial determinations Schneider vs Rochester, 54 NE 721, 722 Allegations held not conclusions of law: It must be borne in mind that nowhere in the complaint (sic) is there any allegation specifically attributing any of the alleged (sic) wrongful acts to defendant. It would be unfair to the defendant to strike said defense. Defense was good and court properly refused to strike same. Van Schaick vs Cronin, 260 NYS 635

On the issue of compelled self-incrimination, defendant argues the following authority: California Constitution, Article 1, s13, clause 5 ****nor be compelled, in any criminal case to be a witness against himself**** State court, in interpreting this clause, may look to interpretation given in federal cases and in cases in sister states as an aid to understanding of this clause. People vs McCormick (1951) 102 CA2d Supp 954 This clause means no person shall be compelled to make any statement orally, or in writing, anywhere or at any time, which may be make or used against him in any criminal prosecution, then pending or which may thereafter be brought against him. McCormick, supra This clause relieves witness from giving any evidence which in a criminal prosecution against himself might tend to establish the offense with which he may be charged. Ex parte, Cohen (1895) 104 C 524 Thus, if district attorney elects to prosecute the defendant for a violation of vehicle code, defendant will not testify and the burden lies upon the district attorney to show due process of law pursuant to 40513(a) and to (cont...) PAGE 114 (cont..) produce evidence that defendant was engaged in and enjoying the benefits of the business of transportation, at the time of the stop by a traffic/peace officer. Any person, whether a party or stranger to the litigation, either in a civil action or criminal prosecution, may, if he sees fit, refuse to answer any questions, the answer to which, if true, will render him punishable for crime, or which, in any degree, may tend to establish a public offense with which he may be charged. Ex parte, Tahbel (1920) 46 CA 755 It the court magistrate makes a judicial ruling that Public

Offenses under Penal Code s16 include infractions, then when deputy stopped defendant and defendant was denied the right to refuse to answer any possibly self incriminating questions but did so under the threat of encagement, denied defendant protection of constitutional rights, immunities, and privileges, and statutory immunity then defendant was harmed. The words 'criminal case' as used in this section are broader than 'criminal prosecution' and, to bring a person within immunity of this clause, it is not necessary that his examination as witness be had in criminal prosecution against him, or that a criminal proceeding should have been commenced and be actually pending, but it its if there is a law creating the offense under which the witness may be prosecuted. Tahbel, supra There is no statutory law within Commercial Vehicle Code binding a private class of persons who outside the Code travels as a motorist for personal business of transportation using 'consumer goods' on the highways of the state, traffic officer and district attorney for the people and magistrate treat the notice to appear as though probative cause that (cont..) PAGE 115 (cont..) person named thereon is a person within the Code & proceed accordingly, thus party named was denied right of no self-incrimination and will not answer questions, where the/or answer, if true, would incriminate him and subject him to possible punishment and no police power existed under statue itself. Based upon the above authorities and arguments and objections, court must suppress the unlawfully obtained plea and confession, as a notice to appear when signed, is a confession obtained by threat, coercion and deceit, and not admissible in a court of law without the prosecution showing mens rea and willfulness and corpus delicti, as a confession, naked or otherwise, will not stand alone to evidence guilt of the confessor. The burden of proving all elements of the crime and the ultimate guilt of the defendant is, of course, on the prosecution. People vs Hudson (1934) 139 CA 543, 544

The significance of the corpus delicti concept lies in the rule that no part of it can be proved by the extra-judicial admissions or confession of the defendant. Unless the corpus delicti is established, such statements cannot be admitted in evidence. People vs Quarez (1925) 196 C 404, 409 People vs Parker (1954) 122 CA2d 867, 872 Trial judge instructed jury that 'in first instance' the corpus delicti for every criminal case must be proven by satisfactory evidence aside from any statement, confession, or admission of defendant People vs McMonigle (1947) 29 C2d 730, 738 Proper ruling is a dismissal of case for a lack or want of prosecution by due process of the law as district attorney has failed to comply with 40513 (a) and (cont..) PAGE 116 (cont..) officer, in some capacity unknown to the defendant, has not verified the Notice to Appear and neither officer or prosecutor has filed a verified complaint and failed to provide any evidence, or bill particulars that defendant is person specifically within the jurisdiction of the statute. It has been said that a prosecutor must give an accused, before trial, notice of particular acts or a bill of particulars. Commonwealth vs Chitty, 17 SCL (1 Bailey) 379; Commonwealth vs Davis, 28 Mass (11 Pick) 432 If this is not done court will not permit prosecution to proceed. Commonwealth rulings, ibid Arthur Frank Sanford defendant VOL 1 CHAPTER 8 - 1 PAGE 117

DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES IS LICENSING AGENCY FOR VEHICLE CODE, A CORPORATE PART OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA [Department of Motor Vehicles is a Business Entity of the State of California, a Corporate Entity and de facto government as to its licensees. Corporate Entities are imaginary creations, a state of mind, an artificial person created by the Legislature of the California Republic to do that which the Republic cannot do. That which the Republic cannot do is engage in private business which is outside the government business of a Republic. These are called Administrative Agencies and considered by many to be the Fourth Branch of Government and are business 'organizations', as such they function under UCC, (Uniform Commerce Code) and their rule book is the UCC] UCC s1-201 (28) "Organization includes a corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency....................." "Governments are corporations". Penhallow vs Doane, 3 Dallas 55; Clearfield Trust Co vs United States (1943) 318 US 363 "Governments descend to the level of a mere private citizen.......For purposes of suit, such corporations and individuals are regarded as an entity entirely separate from government" Bank of United States vs Planter's Bank 9 Wheaton (22 US) 904; 6 L Ed 24 [So, let us turn to Administrative Law, the book of rules (cont..) VOL 1 CHAPTER 8 - 2 PAGE 118 (cont.) to which all administrative agencies are bound by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution] Source: Public Administrative Law.

A. Administrative Government Establishment of Administrative Agencies Constitutional Provisions The California Constitution expressly creates only three administrative agencies; the Reapportionment Commission (see Cal Const Art IV s6) the Fish & Game Commission (Cal Const Art IV s20) and the Personal Board (Cal Const Art VII s2). By implication in various degrees the Constitution also creates, by recognizing them.............. WHAT ARE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES? An Administrative Agency is an individual or a group of individuals performing a governmental function. Departments, Divisions, Bureaus; There are between 50 to 60 departments in the state government, although only about 30 are denominated department...........All are categories of governmental functions. The functions denominated to departments usually are performed by directors, some of which are called commissioners. Public Administrative Law - I Licensing, page I - 6 (1) A licensing law describes a class of persons to whom it applies, by defining an activity in which those persons might engage. The law applies to all who engage in that activity. VOL 1 CHAPTER 8 - 3 PAGE 119 ENGAGE: To employ or involve one's self; It imports more than a single act or transaction or an occasional participation; 'Engage' means to take part in or be employed in......... while 'participation' means simply to take or have a part or share in..........Black's 4th p 622

(2) A licensing law also provides that anyone who engages in the subject activity without a license is guilty of an offense. If the prohibition were unqualified, the law would not be a license law; it would be an ordinary penal law. [So, now it can be understood that no person is required to have a license merely because he/she used the common highways and streets for personal/private use] [Penal law, of course, is a general law binding all persons within the geographical jurisdiction of the state in which they commit a criminal act; private law is that statutory law, private in nature, which is binding on a limited special class of persons clearly named and noticed and defined within the statute] Vehicle Code s1500 There is in the Business, Transportation, & Housing Agency the Department of Motor Vehicles. TRANSPORTATION is the removal of goods or persons from one place to another, by carrier. Black's 4th CARRIER is one undertaking to transport persons or property, or one employed in or engaged in the business of carrying goods for other for hire. Black's 4th TRAFFIC is Commerce; trade; sale or exchange of merchan- (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 8 - 4 PAGE 121 (cont..) dize, bills, money and the like. The passing of goods or commodities from one person to another for an equivalent in goods or money. Black's 4th BUSINESS: The term 'business has no definite or legal meaning. The term in vehicle code would be restricted to a business affected with public interest, devoted to public use. "Business wherein person engaged expressly or impliedly hold himself out to engage in business of supplying his product or service to public as a class or limited portion of the public"

Masgai vs Public Service Comm Penn, 136 P2d 426, 434 [So, if you are not engaged in any of the above or employed in any of the above, and a Notice to Appear/traffic ticket does not allege/charge that you are or were at the time of the issue of the Notice so engaged/employed, why are you being asked to appear in a 'traffic court' before a magistrate for the Department of Motor Vehicles? Why are you asked to show evidence of a Driver's License or registration number and license tax paid by a 'tab' on the license plate?] [Obviously, the Department of Motor Vehicles which has the authority to enforce the Vehicle Code, which are the rules and regulations required to be obeyed by licensees of the DMV, while engaged/employed in some business or transportation activity but, no jurisdiction over persons not engaged/employed within those activities] "It is basic in our law that an administrative agency may act only within the area of 'jurisdiction' marked out (cont..) VOL 1 CHAPTER 8 - 5 PAGE 121 (cont..) for it by law. If an individual does not come within the coverage of the particular agency's enabling legislation, the agency is without power to take any action which affects him" Endicott vs Perkins 317 US 501 (1943) Administrative Powers "Administrative powers partake of all three traditional governmental powers: legislative, executive, and judicial. In every case, administrative powers are delegated instead of residual, which is the principal basis for distinguishing administrative powers from the powers of the Legislature, the courts and the executive officer of the state government. Hence, the rule that an administrative agency 'must act within the powers conferred upon it by law and may not validly act in excess of such powers"

Fertig vs State Personnel Brd (1969) 71 Cal2d 104 "While an agency may establish an operational policy, it may not adhere to that policy when to do so would deny a person statutory or constitutional rights" Bank of Italy vs Johnson (1926) 200 Cal 1, 15 "A government agency wants jurisdiction to 'directly' affect a person or any subject matter related to his person and may not haul any natural person into administrative forum without his voluntary assent by subscription to a particular 'regulatory scheme' " (Wickard vs Filburn) and it is impossible to prove jurisdiction exists absent a substantial nexus with the state, such as voluntary sub- (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 8 - 6 PAGE 122 (cont) scription, contract, license. All jurisdictional facts supporting the claim that the supposed jurisdiction exists must appear on the record of the court" (Pipe Line Vs Marathon, 102 S Ct 2585; quoting Cromwell vs Benson 285 US 22) [If you are a licensee and traffic tickets were issued at a time when enjoying the privilege of the license and now the tribunal is informing you that it is going to limit the use of the benefit, or suspend/condition the use of the privilege, or revoke, then because a constitutional issue is raised by that threat, or because any of the above were committed, then a notice must issue for a hearing and hearing held before the license effected] [A licensee cannot first rush to the judicial branch of government (remember you were not before a judicial officer when you appeared in the municipal court even though you may have been informed that the matter was a criminal proceeding)] Government Code s11503 A hearing to determine whether a right, authority, license or privilege should be revoked, suspended, limited, or conditioned, shall be initiated by filing an accusation. The accusation shall be a written statement of charges which shall set forth in ordinary and concise language the acts or omissions which the respondent

(that is the accused) is charged, to the end that the respondent will be able to prepare his defense. It shall specify the statutes and rules which the respondent is alleged to have violated, but shall not consist merely of charges phrased in language of the statutes and rules. The (cont..) VOL 1 CHAPTER 8 - 7 PAGE 123 (cont) accusation shall be verified unless by a public officer acting in his official capacity or by an employee of the agency before which the proceeding is to be held. The verification may be on information and belief. [So, when a magistrate informs that he is affecting the use of a license he is acting outside the scope of magistrate and denies due process of and equal protection of the law under the 14th Amendment. If he commands that the license be immediately surrendered to the court and informs that you may not use/drive any passenger/truck/conveyance vehicle then he has taken form you: (1) right to an administrative hearing by the agency, (2) taken from you a vested right, (3) a fundamental right, without due process of the statutory law or judicial trial pursuant to a true, substantive commission of a crime, mala in se] "Administrative remedies must be exhausted before resort may be had to the courts: Arguello vs Cross 88 F Supp 107; 83 CalApp2d 759; 66 CalApp2d 870 "Judicial determination even of constitutional issues ordinarily must await the exhaustion of prescribed administrative remedies: 399 US 954; 339 US 932 [On a challenge of an adverse ruling by the agency or the failure of the agency to hear, the time is ripe/appropriate to go either state court or federal court on a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief] VOL 1 CHAPTER 8 - 8 PAGE 124 [A determination is necessary for a judgment as to whether the right to travel is a vested right granted only by license or

whether the right to earn a livelihood by engaging in some private business traditionally practiced and recognized in common law and the use of the common highway is not used for the conduct of that private business but merely as a means of traveling from point to point but because the common highway is used demands a license to do so] [The chief concern of administrative law, as of all other branches of civil law, is the protection of civil rights and its subject matter is therefore the nature and the mode of the exercise of its administrative power and the system of relief against administrative action] "That the rules of judicial review are a part of administrative law is confirmed by the statement that it is 'a simple but fundamental rule of administrative law' that a reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency" Securities vs Chenery 332 US 194, rhring denied 332 US 783 "Lawyer's administrative law, roughly speaking, embraces the law which is pertinent to the bearing of administration upon private persons and property" Fuches, 47 Yale L J 540 "and indicates to the individual the remedies for the (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 8 - 9 PAGE 125 (cont) violation of his rights" 25 Yale L J 658 [The major elements in the judicial role in relation to administrative law are, within the constitutional and statutory limitations of judicial power, to maintain the Constitution by seeing that the powers are not unlawfully vested in administrative agencies, and to maintain the constitutional, statutory, and the common law rights of persons by seeing that powers lawfully vested in administrative agencies are lawfully exercised, without

undue extension by the administrative agency of its own power, or invasion of the powers of the judiciary] I Am Jur2d s26: Statutes and Ordinances, in general: "A statute or ordinance must be constitutional not only in its objectives but also in the means of administration and the enforcement provided, which must conform to the limitations imposed by the federal, national, and state constitutions" Vessering vs Annunzio 1 Illinois 2d 108 s27 Who may question constitutionality. "The elementary doctrine that the constitutionality of a legislative act is open to attack only by a person whose rights are affected thereby, applies to statutes relating to administrative agencies, the validity of which may not be called into question in the absence of a showing of substantial harm, actual or impending (declaratory judgment, supra) (cont..) VOL 1 CHAPTER 8 - 10 PAGE 126 (cont) to a legally protected interest, and directly resulting from enforcement of the statute" Board of Trade vs Olsen 262 US 1; 29 ALR2d 1051 "Thus, where a statute applies to different classes of persons a contestant may raise questions only to the matters proper to his own class" Garden Courts vs Hartnett 65 A2d 231 [An administrative agency is a .......(see supra page 1) and thus may sue and may be sued as individual(s) and any claim when sued as defendant(s) immunity cannot be sought as they are not part of executive branch of government who have absolute or qualified

immunity as the executive branch 'conducts public business', where as, as administrative individuals they conduct an administrative enforcement scheme which regulates only private licensees. Private licensees and the administrative agency are not part of or engaged in any 'public business' thus, agency individuals cannot be and are not protected by immunity as are general executive officials] "The Supreme Court has made clear that absolute immunity depends upon the particular function performed by an official" Butz vs Economou 438 US at 508 (1977) "The question is not one of status, but of the 'nature of the responsibilities of the individual official' " Cleavinger vs Saxner 474 US 193, 201 (1958) "The prime categories of executive officials that are entitled to absolute immunity are those whose functions parallel the functions of judges and prosecutors" VOL 1 CHAPTER 8 - 11 PAGE 127 Butz 438 US at 511-15 and see Schlegel vs Bebout 841 F2d 937, 942 (9th cir. 1988) [Administrative agency powers are not executive and their agency powers to enforce are 'quasi-judicial'; 'that which seems to be but which is not'] [So, the bottom line is, whether you are a licensee or not a licensee of the agency, if you are not a private contract carrier, or common carrier, or if you are a private contract carrier, or common carrier, if at the time of the unlawful stop by a peace officer, you were not so engaged, you do not come within the administrative jurisdiction. Any action by the agency by a magistrate sitting for it is a violation of common law rights protection as even an agency with exclusive jurisdiction has its limits within the statute conferring the power. Under those circumstances the injured party may proceed directly to the judiciary for a court determination without exhausting administrative remedy as it does not exist without the agency

jurisdiction] See, Tunstall vs Brotherhood 323 US 210, 89LEd 187; Steele vs Lousville & NR Co 323 US 192, 89 Led 173 ADDENDUM 1 Am Jur2d ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

The chief concern of administrative law, as of all other branches of civil law, is the protection of private rights, and its subject matter is therefore the nature and the mode of exercise of administrative power and the system of relief against administrative action. VOL 1 CHAPTER 8 - 12 PAGE 128 Lawyer's administrative law, roughly speaking, embraces the law which is pertinent to the bearing of administration upon private persons and property. (Fuchs 47 Yale LJ 540) as that part of the law which fixes the organization and determines the competence of the authorities which execute the law, and indicates to the individual the remedies for violation of his rights. (Fuchs Yale LJ 658) "Any issue properly presented to the Department of Motor Vehicles for a determination and submitted for a final decision, (a) must be heard and decided on the administrative record (b) thereafter cannot be heard in any court upon a petition of government agency" California vs Sims 32 CalApp3d 468 (1981) "Agency of government must scrupulously observe its rules, regulations, or procedures which it has established. When it fails to do so, its actions cannot stand and courts will strike it down. This Doctrine was announced in US ex rel Accardi vs Shaugnessy 347 US 260, 98 Lwd 681 (1954). The failure of the agency to follow established procedures was held

a violation of due process. Accardi Doctrine has been utilized by courts of appeal US ex rel Brooks vs Clifford 409 F2d 700, 706" ADDENDUM [An alleged defendant cannot enter a plea on a mere Notice to Appear, nor may court when no written waiver shows on the record. Beyond the fact of law that notice give no (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 8 - 13 PAGE 129 (cont) trial court jurisdiction lies the fact that any matter of mala prohibita vehicle code is a civil action administratively conducted pursuant to vehicle code procedures which are bound by the law of the constitutions State and Federal] "Although private, personal, civil statutes, are, in instant case, occupational statutes, where particular statute permits a penalty of incarceration, when brought before a competent court, persecution may be by penal action but it is not necessarily criminal prosecution as statute is civil." US vs Oregon etc 180 F2d 483 "The fact that the statute provides that the penalty shall be recovered by civil action has been regarded as conclusive of the nature of the action" Us vs Southern etc, DC Cal 162 F 412, aff'd 171 F 360 "The fact that the proceeding is brought in the name of the People will not alone prevent it from being regarded as civil in nature (Peo vs Briggs 20 NE 820; 114 NY 56) nor is the fact that the proceeding may be commenced by a warrant for the arrest of defendant in itself sufficient to change the character of the proceeding from civil to criminal (Alton vs Kirsch 68 Ill 261; 25 CJ p1182 n 60) " 3RD ADDENDUM BUSINESS TRANSPORTATION & HOUSING AGENCY s13975 Existence of agency; departments

The Business & Transportation Agency in state government is hereby renamed the Business & Transportation & Housing Agency. The agency consists of.....Department of Cali- (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 8 - 14 PAGE 130(cont) -fornia Highway Patrol (and all the while you believed that it was a police agency)....Department of Motor Vehicles s13976 Secretary The agency is under the supervision of an executive officer known as the Secretary of the Business & Transportation and Housing Agency s13978 The secretary has the power of general supervision over and is directly responsible to the Governor for the operations of each department, office, and unit within the agency. The secretary may issue such orders as the secretary deems appropriate to exercise of any power or jurisdiction, or to assume or discharge any responsibility, or to carry out or effect any of the purposes by law in any department in the agency. [Now, reading this section, the author is beginning to believe that, the party of first instance, as to violations of the personal/private interests of individuals being prosecuted by Department of California Highway Patrol and Department of Motor Vehicles is, in actuality, the Secretary of the Business and Transportation Agency. That is where, to quote Harry Truman, "the buck stops here"] s13978.4 Exercise of authority of governor; representation of governor (whoops, maybe the buck is the governor, or a combination of the Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles and the Department of the California Highway Patrol and the Secretary and the Governor) The Secretary of the Business and Transportation and (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 8 - 15 PAGE 131

(cont) Housing Agency shall exercise the authority vested in the Governor in respect to the functions of each department, office, or other unit within the agency, including the adjudication of conflicts between or among the departments, offices, or other units; and shall represent the Governor in coordinating the activities of each such department etc., with those of other agencies, federal, state or local (note the use of lower cases in state, which identifies it as the Corporate state, not the State of California, Republic) s13982 Delegated powers Whenever a power is granted to the secretary, the power may be exercised by such officer or employee within the Agency as designated in writing by the secretary. [Can the author interpret, the above, as meaning that perhaps someone should demand a certified copy of the delegation of authority, in wiring, of the Highway Patrol Commissioner and Director of Department of Motor Vehicles? The only way it can be known is by the asking for that information] PAGE 132 CITIZEN'S LAW REVIEW Publisher - Public Interest Law School Vol 1 Issue 5 - 1992 In law, one must always inform opposing party/person/man that what he is about to do or has done will harm you, and thus given the opportunity to do that which is right and lawful. If after being warned, that party/person/man fails to protect you from his harmful act, grounds for lawful suit at law, which could be a civil rights deprival (42 USC 1983) or action naming him/her as private individual. Either action would be based on his or her acting outside the scope and duty of office. Vehicle Code Article 2 Release Upon Promise to Appear Notice to Appear s40500 (d) para 3 "If , after an arrested person has signed and received a copy of a notice to appear, the arresting officer or other officer of the

issuing agency, determines that, in the intrest of justice, the citation of notice should be dismissed, the arresting agency may recommend, in writing, to the magistrate or judge that the case be dismissed. The recommendation shall cite the reasons for the recommendation and be filed with the court." "If the magistrate or judge makes a finding that there are grounds for the dismissal, the finding shall be entered on the record and the infraction or misdemeanor dismissed." If the arresting officer or other officer issuing agency, and here my guess could be that it was an employee of the Department of Motor Vehicles, immediately after issue of "notice/citation", obtain full name and address of the issuing agency individual, notice him/them that, in the interest of justice', the notice/citation be dismissed as pursuant to s40500 (d). Let's define two words used within the section: Black's 4th defines 'citation, as a, "writ issued out of a court of competent jurisdiction, commanding a person therein named to appear on a day named, or show cause why he should not." So, obviously the notice to appear is not a lawful court citation and so your show of cause why you should not would be the want of competent jurisdiction; now, let's look at the Notice 'To' Appear among the many definitions of 'To' in Webster's are "when". So, obviously the Notice given by the arresting officer is not a lawful order of a court, but an invitation as to 'when' you should appear, by the date on the notice, which is an exta-judicial civil notice, without force of law by a competent court. So, because you were not, at the time of a 'stop', a man within the jurisdiction of a competent court, and no mala in se crime had/was committed, the argument becomes "how did the peace officer have the power of arrest, without a warrant, when you were not 'using' the common public highway for a purpose for which you would be compensated?" A man using the highway for personal travel, business, pleasure assumes civil liability to some fellow citizen when he fails to use reasonable care and concern for others using the highways and thereby harms some other person or person's property. Peace officer, absent the mala in se crime had no police power to arrest and absent the mala prohibita violation when you were not using the highway for profit, no police power exists under Vehicle Code enforced under administrative law, and, so, the only other

'issuing agency' must be the DMV, as employees of that agency have the power to command you to appear when they (cont) PAGE 133 (cont) file an 'accusation and set a hearing date and you are a man/person within their jurisdiction and they have delegated some municipal court magistrate to hear or a justice of a Justice Court. Remember, an arrest without a warrant, lays the burden on the arresting man/person to prove the probable cause for the arrest; remember, an arrest pursuant to vehicle code is a civil arrest, but no police power attaches to vehicle code; the power for civil arrest lies within a court sitting civilly only for a contempt of court when a lawful order of the court is disobeyed.. Without the issue of a 'citation' by a competent court and without a contempt of lawful order, and without the probable cause any arrest is a violation/deprival of your Bill of Rights, constitutes a false arrest and false imprisonment and the subject of a 1983 action or habeas corpus. So, in writing, ask the arresting officer that he request the court to dismiss in the interest of justice on the grounds supra. VOL 1 CHAPTER 9 - 1 PAGE 134 THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN COMMERCE CANNOT BE REGULATED BY LICENSING LAW AS TO THE INDIVIDUAL EARNING A LIVELIHOOD [Administrative Agencies are considered to be the Fourth Branch of Government. They were created by the Republic of California to do that which the Republic cannot do. There is no constitutional authority for the Republic to stop commerce by the individual by licensing laws, demand for registration of business equipment for purposes of taxation. The legislature of the Republic created the Corporate State of California at the request of certain special classes of the people who petitioned; We, the People, our elected public officials, to do for them what the constitution would not permit directly, create individuals as artificial persons by licensing law which give limited liability to that class who in turn submit to codification

of commerce and taxes which otherwise could not be imposed on the individual not licensed. This was accomplished by creating private agencies manned by individuals, not officials of the Republic, known as Administrative Agencies who, though without police power to enforce their regulations as they are civil organizations, would have to power to enforce its regulations on its licensees under Administrative Law procedures when the licensee voluntarily submits to special civil proceedings by summary process. By this process, carried out by deceit, misdirection, misrepresentation and coercion by threat of arrest, a contin(cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 9 - 2 PAGE 135 (cont)-uing process has evolved whereby the private individual using the common public highways for personal business in pursuit of earning a livelihood and the right to contract in commerce between private parties, they have been conditioned to believe the to engage in commerce is a 'privilege' for which they must apply and by which they can be taxed by license fees, registration fees, and 'use' tax on private property not dedicated to the benefit of the public] "The Constitution found it (commerce) and existing right" said Chief Justice Marshall in 1824 (Gibbons vs Ogden 9 Wheaton 1, 211) "and gave to Congress the power to regulate it" The citizen's rights in commerce do not come from the Constitution (nor from the state). They existed before the Constitution was written, and as Chief Justice Marshall pointed out, the Constitution recognizes that fact. If the right of man to trade is above the Constitution, and the Constitution empowers the Congress (a legislative body) only to 'regulate commerce', by no line of sound reasoning can the conclusion be reached that Congress can 'stop' commerce. Citation from; LOSING LIBERTY JUDICIALLY Prohibitory & Kindred Laws Examined by Thomas James Norton of Chicago Bar 1928

STOP: Webster's New World Dictionary Second College Edition; [Stop carries such a multitude of meanings depending upon the context in which it is used that we must turn to its SYNONYM 'discontinue', is apt as used in Gibbons vs Ogden; discontinue suggests the suspension of some action that is a (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 9 - 3 PAGE 136 (cont) habitual practice, an 'occupation'. An occupation is a vocation. VOCATION: One's regular calling or business; the activity on which one spends major portion of his time and out of which he makes his living. Black's 4th p 1745 [If the legislature has no power to delegate police power to an administrative agency to 'stop' the right of the private individual to engage in or be employed in commercial activities, then the Department of Motor Vehicles and the magistrates sitting for the Department have, under color of Statutory law, have by deceit and coercion, deliberate misdirection, misrepresentation of the statutory law caused the individual to believe that the individual's 'right' is a 'privilege' granted by a license to engage in commerce. The Department of Motor Vehicles to which it leads the individual to believe he must be licensed, pay fees, taxes, include automotive related services and products; i.e. automobile car dealers, truck dealer, automobile paint shops, repair shops, et al. and person who drive/chauffeur automobiles, trucks, taxi, et al. All of which are commonly practiced traditional common law means of earning a livelihood recognized by the Constitution] "A statute or ordinance must be constitutional not only in its objectives but also in the means of administration and enforcement provided, which must conform to the limitations imposed by federal, national, and state's constitutions" Vissering vs Annunzio, Illinois 2d 108 [It is not a 'privilege' to earn one's livelihood and (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 9 - 4

PAGE 137 (cont) seek happiness in commerce, it is a God Given absolute 'right' which cannot be taken from the People by the People, for the People have retained that 'right' under the Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution and absent the crime no legislation can stop it] Ninth Amendment, United States Constitution: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to any or disparage retained by the People" [The Constitution gives the power to lay and collect taxes by duties, impost, and excises, which are collected by the sale of tax stamps on some products such as tobacco and alcoholic beverages] Article I, sec 8, para 1 [The Constitution grants the power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, with the Indian Tribes] Article I, sec 8, para 3 [But no where in the Constitution is there a grant of police power by the Federal Government to itself or to the several States to stop, prohibit or condition the right to commerce by licensing absent the criminal act or where there is no public safety endangerment] "If a state statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to these objects or is a palpable invasion of the rights secure by fundamental (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 9 - 5 PAGE 138 (cont) law, it is the duty of the court to so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution" Hennington vs Georgia, 1896, 41 L Ed 166 "The power of the legislative branch of government to regulate commerce is the power to enact all appropriate legislation for its

protection or advancement; to adopt measures to promote its growth and insure its safety; to foster, protect, control, and restrain. (Virginia Rwy vs System, 84 F2d 641, 650) It is also the power to prescribe prohibitory regulations. US vs Darby, 312 US 100, 165" [The power to regulate commerce does not extend to the power of licensing the individual and thereby taking a 'right' and changing it to a 'privilege'] "To carry on interstate commerce is not a franchise or a privilege granted by the state; it is a right which every citizen of the United States is entitled to exercise under the Constitution and laws of the United States; and the accession (acquisition) of mere corporate facilities, as a matter of convenience in carrying on their business, cannot have the effect of depriving them of the right,........." Crutches vs Kentucky, 1891, 141 US 57, 35 L Ed 640 [So, the power to regulate commerce does not reach to the individual by a need for license/permit/franchise as a license only grants the privilege of doing some act not permitted] "Licenses are for the conduct of a business, profession, occupation, the exercise of such when they are a privilege. Licensing is in the nature of a special privilege entitling (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 9 - 6 PAGE 139 (cont) licensee to do something he would not be entitled to do without the license" San Francisco vs Liverpool 74 Cal 113 "The object of a license is to confer a right which does not exist without it" Inter-City vs Harrison 157 SE 673, 676 "A license is merely permission to do that unlawful under common law, or is made so by some ordinance or statute, including the one authorizing or requiring the license" 22 Federal 701, 703 (D Oregon 1885) "A right which is free and open to all is not the subject of a license"

Chicago vs Collins 51 NE 907; or a tax. Freeburg vs Dawson 274 F 240 "License tax is not a charge for enjoyment of privilege bestowed by state. It is an unconstitutional attempt to regulate a privilege which exists apart from the state authority, when it is guaranteed the people by the constitution" Supra, COLLINS "The use of common highways for travel and transportation is not a mere privilege but a fundamental right: Escovedo vs California, 35 Cal2d 870 "We hold that the enforcement of the act against the defendant, would deprive him of his rights under the Federal Constitution" Pacific Tel vs Kuykendall 265 US 196 "The procuring of licenses may not be required as a (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 9 - 7 PAGE 140 (cont) means of prohibiting any vocation that is not injurious to the public morals, offensive to the senses, or dangerous to the public health and safety; nor may such conditions be annexed to their issuance that would tend to such prohibition" Whitwell, in re 98 Cal 73; Sonora vs Curtin 137 Cal 583 [If one has the 'right' to transport his own goods, property, guests then probably a few million people in business for themselves and using a truck in their personal business are registering and licensing and paying taxes where no legal statutory need exists to do so] [Even if they are delivering merchandise which they have sold to a customer, so long as they do not charge for delivering the merchandise, even though the customer has paid for the merchandise, signed for it, until such time as the customer takes actual possession of the merchandise, the seller of the merchandise is still the legal owner. Thus, absent the delivery charge, the seller is transporting his own property and does not come within the commercial vehicle code]

[There are many people who own their trucks/rigs who then contract with some company to haul for them. This obviously places them into the position of performing for compensation by another party, and thus, subject to the supervision and regulations of the Commercial Vehicle Code and the payment of license fees, road taxes and 'use' tax as they do not own the cargo hauled, they are not transporting private property] VOL 1 CHAPTER 9 - 8 PAGE 141 [Now, if that individual owning the truck/rig were to go forth and buy for himself some goods, property, merchandise, etc., and thereby set himself as a 'middle man' between the original producer and some buyer, then he is hauling his own property. Understood?] [Examples; buy ice cream from a creamery, sell it to the consumer; buy a farmer's crop, sell it to a wholesaler; buy bread from a bakery, sell to stores or door to door to the consumer directly; thus, you are not a 'carrier' either public, private or common] "So long as one uses his property for private purposes and does not devote it to public use, the public has no interest in it and no voice in its control" Associate Pipe vs Rail Road Comm, 176 Cal 518 "Regulations, fees, taxes.......may not be applied to natural person using common highways as it is in derogation of common right of public to use highways as an avenue upon which vehicles for transportation of good, passengers, freight and traffic of all kinds may be freely moved, having due regard for rights of others, which this, or other provisions of statute, should be fairly, liberally construed to promote the effect the evident purpose for which it was intended, care should be exercised not to unduly extend its effect" Young vs Madison County 115 NW 23 "The constitution declares to be a public utility or service which is subject to the control by the state, all (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 9 - 9

PAGE 142 (cont) private persons that own, operate, control, or manage a line or system for the transportation of people or property; the legislature has defined such terms as 'common carrier', 'highway common carrier' and 'public utility' but, the constitutional and statutory definitions are construed as applying only to enterprises in which property, in fact, is devoted to public use, They must not be given the effect of an attempt to impress with a public use, property not so devoted" Allen vs Railroad Comm of California, 179 Cal 68; Cert denied 249 US 601 "The state and its municipalities are prohibited from violating substantive rights (Owen vs City 445 US 622 (1980) among which are the right to travel free of license, fee, tax, within or interstate (Crandell vs Nevada 73 US 35) and it cannot by any power do that which is expressly prohibited by any other power, that is, taxation, eminent domain,licensing, as a matter of law (US & Utah vs Daniels 22 P 159) nor may it do indirectly, that which is prohibited to it directly (Fairbanks vs US, 181 US 294,300)" "Where a private occupational statute exists, as here, of which the intent is regulation of private commercial occupations, the particular agency enforcing that private statute, shall not apply it by trickery and deceit, and threat and misrepresentation, to persons who are not noticed by the statute as persons regulated and taxed, nor should it permit any party to do so, in violation of a persons right to stay out of a compelled contract, when he (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 9 - 10 PAGE 143 (cont) is not a person subject to the statute, unless clearly with in its words" state vs Eberhard 179 P 853; 246 P2d 1011 VC s362. A 'house car' is a motor vehicle originally designed, or permanently altered, and equipped for human habitation, or to which a camper has been permanently attached. VC s260 (b)............and house cars are not commercial vehicles............ [Does anyone reading this have a house car as defined above? Have

you register and paid license fee and taxes on it?] ADDENDUM 13 cal Jur 3d Commerce Power "To regulate commerce is to prescribe the conditions which it shall be conducted, to determine how far it shall be free and untrammeled, how it shall be burdened by duties and imposts, and how far it shall be prohibited" Zee Toys vs County of Los Angeles (1978) 85 CalApp3d 763 Aff'd 449 US 1119, 69 L ed2d 106, 101 S Ct 933 "The term 'commerce' as used in United States Constitution.....may include any business activity carried on for purpose of procuring subsistence or profit into which enter elements of bargain, sale, barter, exchange or traffic" State vs Tagmi (1925) 195 Cal 522, 234 P 102 [None of the underscored offered to the general public for profit, earning a livelihood, unfettered by Constitution] PAGE 144 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT HISTORY OF THE CASE On June 22, 1989, defendant while traveling as a motorist upon the streets and highways of the state in his private passenger vehicle, which had not been hired by any person by which defendant anticipated compensation; defendant was stopped by a deputy of the San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department, and deputy without probable cause asked to see defendant's certificate of registration and chauffeur's license (referred in vehicle code as a driver's license). Defendant informed the deputy that he was not engaged in the business of transportation, a business privilege license for the occupation of transportation offered to the public. Contrary to the intent of Vehicle Code 1959, deputy then issued a

notice to appear citing section 16028 (a) VC and said act was under color of statutory law which did not apply to the defendant and under color of authority of county government entity, sheriff's department, for purposes of an inquiry or demand of the defendant. I DEPUTY OF THE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT WAS LEADING THE DEFENDANT TO BELIEVE THE HE HAD THE AUTHORITY TO REMAND THE DEFENDANT TO APPEAR BEFORE A MUNICIPAL COURT FOR AN INQUIRY BY THE COURT AND FURTHER IN ERROR AS HE FAILED TO FILE A VERIFIED COMPLAINT WITH THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO, ALL TO THE HARM OF THE DEFENDANT AND DEPRIVAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW PAGE 145 Penal C. s146 b: Every person who, with intent to lead another to believe that a request or demand for information is being made by the state, a county, or city, or other governmental entity, when such is not the case, sends to such other person a written or printed form or other communication which reasonably appears to be such a request or demand by such governmental entity, is guilty of a misdemeanor. A notice to appear, issued under color of law by the Sheriff is such a demand. It misleads the civilly cited person to believe that he must appear before a court with jurisdiction for an arraignment and testify and give information or enter a plea under criminal prosecution. "Preliminary proceedings (notice to appear) do not invoke jurisdiction of an inferior court" Wells vs Justice Court, 5 Cal Rptr 204 "Preliminary proceedings are only intended as a basis for the issue of warrant" 71 CA 709 Notice, if used as a complaint under criminal procedure, must be filed with prosecuting attorney, not with court clerk to have legal effect. As a complaint it must be supported by such evidence as

shows an offense has been committed and tenders it certain or probable that it was committed by the person named or described in the complaint" Commonwealth vs Pick, 11 Pick 436 Because a police officer has no prosecutorial powers, a notice confers no jurisdiction to a trial court. "Accused was neither arrested, charged, or otherwise (cont) PAGE 146 (cont) subjected to a formal restraint by the issue of the notice to appear" Overby vs Municipal Court, 1981, 121 CA3d 377, 378 ARG., if court rules that a certified notice is a proper complaint, it errs; Notice to appear fails as complaint because officer was not duly sworn at time of issue of certified notice and not verified by proper prosecuting attorney. Therefore, the complaint is null and void, has not legal binding in this court or in this case. Federal, 34 US 969 [From the form of the notice (ticket) it is clear that it is not intended to fulfill the function of an information . It is certainly not an 'allegation made to a magistrate' that a person has been guilty of some designated crime, rather it is a notice to appear in a given court, at which time he will be charged with a specific violation. A uniform traffic ticket is not a sufficient information to be used as a pleading and held that absence of verified information was a jurisdictional defect which was not waived even by a guilty plea] People vs Scott, 3 NY2d 148 [A notice to appear, is used to compel an attendance to court by threat of encagement if cited person will not sign notice "Without admitting guilt, I promise to appear". However, pursuant to s40513(a) VC," a verified complaint (cont) PAGE 147

(cont) must be filed with the court clerk by the district attorney of the county. A plea cannot be entered without the : FILING OF COMPLAINT (a) Whenever a written notice to appear has been prepared, delivered, and filed with the court,.......... copy of the notice when filed with a magistrate, in lieu of a verified complaint, shall constitute a complaint to which defendant may plead guilty or nolo contendre. If, however, the defendant .........pleads other than guilty or nolo contendre to the offense charged, a complaint shall be filed which will conform with the provisions of Chapter 2, section 948 of Title 5 Part 2 of the penal code (s1427), and which shall be deemed an original complaint and thereafter proceedings shall be had according to law, except that a defendant may, by an agreement in writing, subscribed by him and filed with the court, waive the filing of a verified complaint and elect that the prosecution may proceed upon a written notice to appear." II A NOTICE TO APPEAR SIGNED UNDER DURESS AND COERCION BY THREAT OF ENCAGEMENT IS COMPELLED SELF INCRIMINATION. AS THE SIGNING OF THE NOTICE IS A COMPELLED PLEADING OF 'GUILTY' AND MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS ROUTINELY ADMIT THEY ACCEPT THE SIGNED NOTICE AS 'PROBATIVE EVIDENCE' OF A VIOLATION OF VEHICLE CODE EVEN THOUGH THE NOTICE IS NOT VERIFIED AND DOES NOT, ON ITS FACE, ALLEGE OR CHARGE A VIOLATION OF CODE WHEN IT MERELY CITES A SECTION OR SUBSECTION OF THE CODE. DEFENDANT SIGNED THE NOTICE UNDER THREAT OF INCARCERATION. THUS, IT IS A COMPELLED SELF INCRIMINATION BY ONE WHO HAS THEREBY MADE A STATEMENT IN WRITING AND IT WILL BE USED IN A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OR CIVIL ACTION WHICH MAY BE BROUGHT AGAINST HIM If this court rules that mere citations constitute and have affect of allegations or charge of crime and are complaints, then this court rules in error. (1) A complaint is in essence an affidavit setting forth the grounds for the arrest. It must contain sworn information establishing probable cause, whether in its main body or as a separate document attached as an exhibit. In re Walters, 1975, 15 Cal3d 738, 748

Magistrate cannot accept mere conclusions in the complaint. VOL 1 CHAPTER 9 - 11 PAGE 148 "To engage in commerce is a right. By the taking of a license one does not then act on behalf of the State. In reality, on continues to act for ones self and exercise the commerce right. Thus, if the Amendment against self incrimination are retained as acting in personal, rather than as agent representative of the State. One does not lose, as does the agent representative entity, the personal privilege against self incrimination" California vs Byers 402 US 424, 430-431, 29 Led2d 9 PAGE 149 Arthur Frank Sanford C/O 5894 Villa Drive Rancho Cucamonga, Cal. Holder of Movable Chattel Identified as AFS 2421 To: Secretary of the State of California 1230 "J" Street Sacramento, Cal Treasurer of the State of California 9800 South Sepulveda Blvd Los Angeles, Cal Director of the California Department of Motor Vehicles; an Agency within the Business, Transportation and Housing Agency of the State of California 2451 First Street Sacramento, Cal Notice of Withdrawal of Commercial Property from That Status to Personal Movable Chattel; To All Concerned Parties;

A Chevrolet Monza, known as an automobile, and with identification number of AFS 2421, with such assigned identification number located on left front passenger door beneath lock mechanism and top left side of instrument pane and on the top left side of engine bulkhead has been appraised as having a value of $200.00 (1)Commercial Vehicle 260 (a) A 'commercial vehicle' is a vehicle of a type required to be registered under this code used or maintained for the transportation of persons for hire, compensation, or profit or designed, used, or maintained primarily for transportation of property. (b) Passenger vehicles which are not used for the transportation of persons for hire, compensation, or profit and housecars are not commercial vehicles. (2)Revenue & Taxation Code. s10751. A license fee is hereby imposed for the privilege of operating upon the public highways in this state any vehicle of a type which is subject to registration under the Vehicle Code. Be informed by this declaration, duly verified, that this automobile is now personal, movable chattel, and not subject to duties, impost fees, license fees, taxes, and is not driven or operated as a commercial vehicle, nor is it registered as such with the Department of Motor Vehicles. This also constitutes my demand that the Department of (cont) PAGE 150 (cont) Motor Vehicles be officially informed, in writing, by the State Treasurer and Secretary of State, each respectively, of the State of California, of the now declared status of this vehicle known as an automobile, identified as AFS 2421 is movable personal chattel. VERIFICATION State of California, county of San Bernardino. I, the undersigned, declare/certify, that I am the holder of a

chattel on personal movable property known as an automobile/passenger vehicle, with an assessed value of $200.00, identified as AFS 2421. I have read the Notice of Withdrawal of Commercial Property From That Status to Personal Movable Chattel. It is true to my own knowledge, except as to matters which are therein stated on my personal information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true. I declare and certify, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that it is true and correct. December 4, 1989 Arthur Frank Sanford Declarant/Chattel Holder VOL 1 CHAPTER 10 - 1 PAGE 151 CALIFORNIA MOTOR VEHICLE LEGISLATION AS AMENDED 1961 TO THE DATE OF 1991 IS VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS [Because of the manner in which it is written, a person with competent skill and knowledge finds an uncertainty of meaning of expressions used in the code which possess a doubleness of meaning; is patently ambiguous] LATENT: "that is latent where the language employed is clear and intelligible and suggests but a single meaning, but some extrinsic fact or extraneous evidence creates a necessity for interpretation or a choice among two or more possible meanings,........"Black's 4th p 105 [Because of its ambiguity, police officers and prosecutors for the People and magistrates of municipal tribunal sitting as hearing officers in a ministerial capacity, permit it to be applied to all persons who travel on the common highways for personal and private business, by automobile and or trucks, motor homes, whereby, are misled, allowed to believe, that the vehicle code is enforceable against them by the Department of Motor Vehicles. The use of a mere administrative civil notice to appear, and extra-judicial instrument, is permissively used to bring any and all such persons

into a tribunal as though the Statute, Vehicle Code, operated as a law of general nature and uniform in operation, when in fact it is private law which does not operate generally. Vehicle code operates as general law only to the whole class of persons embraced in a class found as licensees while engaged in some activity regulated by Vehicle Code.] VOL 1 CHAPTER 10 - 2 PAGE 152 "The phrase 'general law' does not necessarily mean a law which operates upon all persons and things, since the word 'general' comes from 'genus', and relates to a whole 'genus', or kind, or, in other words, to a whole class or order, hence a law which effects a class of persons, or things less than all, may be a general law." Brooks vs Hyde (1869) Cal 366 [The ambiguity of Vehicle Code fails to provide a reasonable degree of certainty as to the class of persons, by misdirection, doubleness of meaning, to clearly, implicitly, define the class, and thereby misleads the traveler on the common highways to believe that they are of the general class regulated by Vehicle Code] "No one may be required at peril of life, liberty, or property to speculate as to the meaning of statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids........'a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of the law" Lanzetta vs New Jersey, 306 US 451, 453, 83 L ed 888; Connally vs General Construction 269 US 385, 391; 70 L Ed 322 "Such also is the law of the State of California" People vs McCaughan, 49 Cal2d 409, 414 [The uncertainty of the legislative intent of Vehicle (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 10 - 3 PAGE 153 (cont) Code 1959, and its repealed and re-enactments as of 1991,

is prominent on the face of the statute by its use of certain words and proper nouns which fail to be clearly definitive and mislead the person of common intelligence to believe that the code is binding on all who travel and use an automobile or truck for personal business and private business, pleasure, family usage] "The required meaning, certainty and lack of ambiguity, may appear on the face of the questioned statute or from any demonstrably established technical or common law meaning of the language in question" McCaughan, supra; Lorenson vs Sup Ct 35 Cal2d 49, 60 [This is not evidenced in vehicle code as certain nouns are played with by 'anglosizing' or using certain descriptive words without defining same in Division 1. WORDS AND PHRASES DEFINED p 5 of Vehicle Code] "Varied phraseology in statute should not lead to subtle distinctions in meaning when essential purposes is the same and grammar should yield to legal, administrative intent" People vs Nowacki 40 NYS2d 131 [Ambiguity and doubleness of meaning lies within Vehicle Code in the use of 'Driver' when formerly 'chauffeur' was used and driver did not exist in the code] Driver,. VC s305 A 'driver' is a person who drives or is in physical control of a vehicle. VC. s310 then misleads by its ambiguity, uncertainty, (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 10 - 4 PAGE 154 (cont) and doubleness of meaning for a person of reasonable intelligence having read s305, when reading s310 then believes that as a person driving a vehicle is that person required to possess a Driver's License. VC s310 DRIVER'S LICENSE

"Driver's License is a valid license to drive the type of motor vehicle.......for which a person is licensed under this code......." [Vagueness reigns and a reasonably intelligent person because he believes, or has been told to believe, that the Vehicle Code is a 'general law' applicable to any person using an automobile or truck when she/he reads VC 12500(a), is further led to believe that she/he is that NO PERSON within that section of the code] UNLAWFUL TO DRIVE UNLESS LICENSED VC s12500(a)" NO PERSON shall drive a motor vehicle upon a highway, unless the person then holds a driver's license issued under this code. (b) NO PERSON shall drive a motor vehicle............ (c) NO PERSON shall drive a motor vehicle." Two tests which have been applied in determining vagueness are found in: Winters vs New York, 333 US 507, 524-525: "(1) the 'men of common intelligence test; (A) A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 1 - 5 PAGE 155 (cont) must guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." (2) The 'subject matter of the legislation' test: "Indefiniteness is not a quantitative concept.....It is itself an indefinite concept.....That which may appear to be too vague and even meaningless as to one subject matter may be definite as another subject matter of legislation permits; if the legislative power to deal with the subject is not to be altogether denied" DRIVER. Black's 4th p 585

"One employed in 'conducting' or 'operating' a motor vehicle....'conduct' v. to manage; direct; lead; have direction; carry on; regulate; 'do business'. Black's 4th p 367 [Prior to re-enactment of Vehicle Code 1961, there was no usage of the word 'driver', only 'chauffeur'] VC s250. "Chauffeur is a person who is employed by another for the principal purpose of driving a motor vehicle on the highways and receives compensation therefor." Statute 1961, Chap 1615, p 3452, July 12, 1961 effective September 15, 1961, amended subds (a) (b) (c) s12500 to read Driver's License required and deleted subd (d) which read: "It is a misdemeanor for any person to drive a motor vehicle upon a highway as a 'chauffeur' unless he then holds a chauffeur's license duly issued under this code....." [The legislative intent of this code was not changed by substituting descriptive title from 'chauffeur' to 'driver' (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 10 - 6 PAGE 156 (cont) as the role remained the same, employment, compensation. Only that person being compensated is code required] [On the issue of type of vehicle required to be registered a doubleness exists between VC s260 (a) (b) (c), and VC s4000 (a), and Uniform Commercial Code which is the common law of the land as to commercial activities] [Vehicle code fails to inform by its vagueness, uncertainty, indefiniteness, and doubleness, that the only intent of Vehicle Code is to regulate the activity of commerce on the intra-state common highways of the state and by deceit, by failure to inform, where the need lies to inform, it allows the individual private driver/operator of private automobiles and trucks and motor homes that she/he is a person required to register said vehicles. A person of common intelligence upon the reading of NO PERSON, is led to believe that he must register and license and pay tax upon a non-commercially used private vehicle and thereby tricked into asking for any privileges which attach to that registration which are of no benefit to the private user of private vehicles]

REGISTRATION REQUIRED VC 4000(a) "NO PERSON shall drive, move, or leave standing upon a highway, or in an off-street public parking facility, any motor vehicle,......., unless it is registered and the appropriate fees have been paid under this code....." [However, no person is required to register any vehicle or consumer goods when she/he derives no benefit thereby] REGISTRATION: "Registrant is one who register anything (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 10 - 7 PAGE 157 (cont) for the purpose of securing rights or privileges granted by law on the condition of the registration." Black's 4th p 1449 "Registration catalogues all persons with respect to an activity, or all things that fall within a certain classification" Galvan vs Sup Ct 70 Cal2d 851 [A conflict lies within Vehicle Code between VC s260 and VC s4000(a) (1) and Uniform Commercial Code s9-109, and a traffic officer or peace officer acting outside his scope and duty of peace officer must first make a determination as to whether a stopped vehicle is of the type required to be registered and use tax is currently required and paid before acting to the harm of the individual not required] See, VC s4000(a) (1) supra page 6 COMMERCIAL VEHICLE 260(a) "A 'commercial vehicle' is a vehicle of a type required to be registered under this code used or maintained for this transportation of persons for hire, compensation, or profit or designed, used, or maintained primarily for the transportation of property. (b) Passenger vehicles which are not used for the transportation of persons for hire, compensation, or profit and house cars are not commercial vehicles.

(c) Any van pool vehicle is not a commercial vehicle." [First showing of conflict in the law and how it is improperly applied as a 'general law' to a class not within the class of the 'general law' Statute Vehicle Code] VOL 1 CHAPTER 10 - 8 PAGE 158 [Uniform Commercial Code makes a clear determination of the type of property which must be registered and taxed and the type of property which cannot be required to be registered and taxed by the defining of the property in question as either a 'business equipment vehicle' or 'consumer goods'. Vehicle Code being a commercial code is bound by the Uniform Commercial Code] "A state agency cannot require registration and payment of 'business use tax' on 'consumer goods'. Automobile purchased for personal and family use was 'consumer goods' " In re Rave 7 USS Rep Serv 258 (DC Conn Ref 1969) Bank of Boston vs Jones 4 UCC Rep Serv 1021, 236 A2d 484 "Automobile owned by a person not in business is 'consumer goods'. Use of the vehicle by its owner of purposes of traveling to and from his employment is a personal, as opposed to business use, as that term is used in Ucc s9-109. 1,. 14, the vehicle will be classified as 'consumer goods' rather than equipment. The phraseology of s109.(2), defining equipment as goods used or bought for use primarily in business seems to contemplate a distinction between collateral automobile 'in business'and the mere use of the collateral automobile for some commercial, economic, or income producing purpose by one not engaged 'in business' " In re Barnes 11 UCC Rep Serv 679 (Me Ref 1972) [Thus, under UCC s9-109. 14, a vehicle not used for commercial activities is 'consumer goods', and though a sales (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 10 - 9 PAGE 159

(cont) tax may be charged and collected at the time of its sale, it is not a type of vehicle required to be registered and 'use tax' paid of which the tab is the evidence of receipt of the tax] [Remembering that statute Vehicle Code remains the same in intent, even though repealed and re-enacted, the code has always specifically exempted and operator, functioning in a private relationship, from the need to register vehicles of any type or to pay a 'use tax' since the original Motor Vehicle Act of 1904] "Use tax does not fall upon owner because he is owner, regardless of the use or disposition he may make of the property, but is imposed on certain privileges of ownership. The use tax frames an excise tax upon the privilege of using the property within the state in a certain manner, and is a tax upon the enjoyment of that which is purchased" West's Ann Rev 8 Tax Code ss6203, 6204 Union Oil Co of California vs State Bd of Equalization, 386 P2d 496, 60 Cal2d 441, appeal dismissed, 84 S Ct 1629, 377 US 404, 12 L Ed2d 495 PRIVILEGES. "A particular and peculiar benefit or advantage enjoyed by a person, or class, beyond the common advantages of other citizens. A right, power, franchise, or immunity held by a person or class, against or beyond the course of law" Colonial Motor Coach vs City of Oswego 215 NYS 159, 163; Bank of Commerce vs Senter 260 SW 144, 147 VOL 1 CHAPTER 10 - 10 PAGE 160 [OPERATOR used within Vehicle Code is not defined in Division 1, WORDS AND PHRASES DEFINED, p 5 and Black's 4th does not define the noun 'operator' but, a clear definition of 'operator' os found in case law and statutory vehicle codes antecedent to 1991] "To operate any motor vehicle proscribes illegal operation of 'transportation business' rather than physical operation of the vehicle itself. Statute imposing a penalty for operation of motor

vehicle as carrier without first obtaining a license should be strictly construed 'in favor' of one against whom imposition of penalty is sought." Kramer vs Haley 439 P2d, 1968, 573, 574 Thus; VC s10: Continuation of Existing law 2. The provisions of this code, insofar as they are substantially the same as existing provisions relating to the same subject matter, shall be construed as restatements and, continuations thereof and not as new enactments. Statutes, 1923, page 706 (1) The obvious and only purpose of the act of the legislature imposing a fee for the transportation of persons or property for hire and compensation upon the public streets, roads, highways, in the state by motor vehicles was to provide a revenue and that such revenue was to be obtained by the imposition of a license or privilege tax on the business of operating a motor vehicle for hire. (2)The Act of 1923, a Revenue Measure: the act of the (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 10 - 11 PAGE 161 (cont) legislature, page 706, is not a police measure in any sense, it provides for a license tax for revenue purposes only. (4) Operators Transporting Own Property: The fact that those who operate motor vehicles for the transportation of person and property for hire enjoy a different or more extensive use of the public highways for the transportation of their own than those who use said public highways for the transportation of their won property constitutes a natural distinction and full justification for the classification of the latter operators among those exempted from the license tax provided by the act. [So, obviously. of an individual uses his automobile or truck for transportation of family or his property, he cannot be brought into that special class of persons for not having registered and licensed and paid a use tax, by any traffic officer/peace officer

of the state or local governmental corporate municipality, no police power attaches to the statute and so none can be delegated to another governmental agency, either state, county, city police agency] Statutes, 1937, Vehicle Code, Chapter 27 (a) The term 'operator' shall include all persons engaging in the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation by or upon motor vehicles upon any highway in this State, either directly or indirectly, but shall not mean or include the following: (1) Any person transporting his own property in his vehicle. VOL 1 CHAPTER 10 - 12 PAGE 162 Statutes, 1941, s9701, page 592 Every operator of a motor vehicle within the State who transports or desire to transport for compensation or hire persons or property upon any highway within this State, shall apply to the board for a license to operate motor vehicles for the transportation of persons or property for hire/compensation. OPERATOR under this statute does not include s 9603(a); any person transporting his own property in a motor vehicle owned and operated by him unless he makes a specific charge for the transportation. [Read KRAMER, supra, page 10] "The elementary doctrine that the constitutionality of a legislative act is open to attack only by persons whose rights are affected thereby, applies to statute relating to administrative agencies, the validity of which may not be called into question in the absence of a showing of substantial harm, actual or impending, to a legally protected interest directly resulting from the enforcement of the statute" Board of Trade vs Olson, 262 US 1; 29 ALR2d 1051 "Where a statute applies to different classes of persons, a contestant may raise questions only as to matters proper to his class"

Garden Courts vs Harnett, 65 A2d 231 [If a traffic officer/peace officer writes a Civil extra-judicial Notice to Appear, administrative action in nature, and you are not of the class clearly defined in the statute, (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 10 - 13 PAGE 163 (cont) and he does not clearly state that you are a person within the special class named in the statute, or he is a CHiP acting on Inter state highway, or hi is a peace officer for a local corporate municipality without police power to act for a state statute, a ripe cause of action lies for malicious issuance of process, abuse of process and false arrest and false imprisonment will prevail for a plaintiff] "Taxing and licensing statutes are not enacted as 'positive law' which consists of those statutes enacted by legislative bodies in pursuance to authority or mandate granted in United States or California constitutions. Such tax and licensing statutes are private, equity, maritime law contracts, which are entered voluntarily by private persons with the private corporate state" Escovedo vs State of California, 35 Cal2d 870 VOL 1 CHAPTER 11 - 1 PAGE 164 THE TRUE NATURE OF LICENSES, MALEFACTIONS OR BENEFACTIONS? [At common law the private individual has the right and the Constitutions protect it, to travel for personal business, personal pleasure, personal transportation, family business, upon the public highways inter-state, afoot, on horseback, by driving a team of horses, by driving a wheeled vehicle, a motor propelled conveyance, or whatever is the current mode of the day which suits the individual's purpose or choice. While doing such the individual cannot be taxed/licensed/regulated without his voluntary assent] [That right exists and cannot be denied or excised by a legislative act which is in nature a fiat when the public has no interest, or no interest by a governmental administrative agency, exists by some relationship between the individual and the Corporate State of

California by and through the administrative agency functioning for the Corporate State] [To use a motor propelled automobile/truck for private purposes cannot be declared a privilege of those who would exercise the right when the individual does not knowingly, voluntarily, ask that the right be converted to a privilege because of some benefits which will accrue by the granting of the public license] [Licenses are contracts. Are of two types, private, and public. Private contracts are between two or more private individuals wherein the parties to the contract obtain mutual benefits/privileges and mutual power to enforce the contract when there is a failure to perform the contract] VOL 1 CHAPTER 11- 2 PAGE 165 [Public contracts/licenses permit an individual, who by becoming an artificial person by the license with the particular agency for the Corporate State, may practice or perform or engage in some profession or business which would otherwise be unlawful, or licenses may be used to regulate a common law right] "The courts cannot be unaware that the licensing power, resting on the proposition that all activities of a certain kind in a certain endeavor are enjoined until authorized, necessarily places upon the individual the burden of affirmatively proving that he proposes to do should be permitted. In a sense, therefore, licensing by its very nature is repugnant to the philosophy behind the principle that the individual is innocent until the State proves him guilty" 37 Georgia Law Journal 73, 74 (1948) [Here the intent is to show how, to considerable extent, the misapplication of the true character of a license by the Department of Motor Vehicles under it Vehicle Code, by deceit and misdirection and misinformation and the failure to inform as to the true intent of private statutory code, has led the individual motorist to believe he must have the licensed relationship with the Corporate State] [By the individual ceding the right for a privilege, that individual forfeits/loses the constitutional protection of the

Fourteenth Amendment which imposes limitations upon the State by the Federal Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments of the National Constitution of (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 11 - 3 PAGE 166 (cont) the United States of America, which protect the individual from the aberrations of a 'public license' by the taking of the license and using it] "The object of a license is to confer a right which does not exist" 127 Indiana 109; 26 NE 560, 561 (1891); 194 So 569 (1940) " A license is merely a permission to do what is unlawful under common law, or is made so by some statute or ordinance, including the one authorizing or requiring the license" 22 Fed 701, 703 (1885) [Reminder, the common law right to travel cannot be impeded nor the individual's right to engage in commercial trafficking upon the public's common highways by legislation] [The earliest expression of the concept of mobility as being a legally protected right has always been protected by and consistently by the United States Supreme Court] [Denial of mobility because one has to have a Driver's License or fails to pay a tax for the privilege is at issue] Justice Washington in Corfield vs Coryll 4 Wash CC 380, Federal Case No 3230, (1823) enumerated the privileges and immunities of Citizens of the states (US Const Art IV, s2) as including 'the right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or reside in any other state.' Article IV s2

The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 11 - 4 PAGE 167 (cont) Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States. In Crandall vs Nevada 73 US (6 Wallace) 35 (1886) it struck down the statute (requiring the payment of taxes when traveling into or out of the state of Nevada by travelers) on the ground that the statute violated the Constitution of the United States as the state action violated a personal privilege impliedly granted by the Constitution. [In that ruling the court did not cite Art IV s2, but it is noteworthy that the decision was handed down before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, yet without the Fourteenth Amendment the state action was forbidden from its restriction of freedom/mobility/locomotion to move from one place to another] [Remember, the individual has been led to believe that there is no right to mobility by the use of an automobile or truck unless one has a Driver's License] "The right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which a citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment" Kent vs Dulles 357 US 116 (1958); Reaffirmed in Zemel vs Rusk 33 US 1 "Where activities or enjoyment, natural and often necessary to the well being of an American citizen, such as travel, are involved, we will construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them.....to repeat, we deal here with a constitutional right of the citizen" Edwards vs California 314 160 (1941) VOL 1 CHAPTER 11 - 5 PAGE 168

[The enactment by the legislature of its Statute 1959 Vehicle Code whereby a person who travels in commerce for purposes of trafficking and using the public highways must be licenses is faulty as it assumes the right to engage in commerce by the individual as a means of earning a livelihood may be regulated and taxed as a privilege] [As the individual cannot be required to have a license to earn a livelihood which is a traditional common law right, it cannot require the private individual not using the highways for the earning of a livelihood to be licensed and taxed for enjoying the right by naming it a 'privilege'.] [Obviously, this is a misapplication of the concept of licensing where it is used to regulate the individual's common law right. There is no grant of a 'privilege/benefaction'of any kind in a public license. The Department of Motor Vehicles by its abuse of the statute by causing the individual to believe a Driver's License is a privilege and the only means by which the individual may use the common public highways and so the general public in its ignorance of the statutory law and its privileged right believes that they must apply for and have a 'public license' while enjoying its privileged right] [The individual must be made aware of the principles of the 'public license/malefactions' are not the principles of a 'private license/benefaction'] "A private license is technically an authority given to do some act, or series of acts, on the land of another with (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 11 - 6 PAGE 169 (cont) out the passing of any estate in the land. Licenses amount to nothing more than an excuse for the act. which would otherwise be a trespass" Cook vs Stearn 11 Mass 533, 537 (1814) [If a private license is between private persons then a public license is one granted by some division/agency/department of the Corporate State to an individual thus, converting that individual to a license/contractual relationship with the Corporate State, a business entity]

[A question arises in the mind of the author as to just how, under the National Constitution, was it possible for the National Government to create a Corporate Entity known as the Federal Government. My conjecture is that the Congress without constitutional authority simply created such a Corporation. So, such a Corporation is a de facto corporation and it in turn creates de facto corporations which do business for the Federal Corporate Government. Black's 4th states that de facto is an office, position, or "status existing under a mere claim or color of right" Here is an interesting definition of De Facto Government which if the above is true then the Federal Government and the State of California are De Facto Governments and exist because no one challenges their colorable authority. "One that maintains itself by a display of force against the will of the rightful legal government and is successful, at least temporarily, in overturning the institutions of the rightful legal government by setting up its own in lieu thereof"] VOL 1 CHAPTER 11 - 7 PAGE 170 [If the above interpretation, by the author is true, then the Department of Motor Vehicles is a de facto department within the de facto Business, Transportation & Housing Agency created by the De Facto State of California] [The claim of the Department of Motor Vehicles that a motorist must be licensed is not the granting of a privilege as the motorist and individual engaged in earning a livelihood already has the privileged right to use the common public highways without the need for a license. Thus, it is actually a restraint upon activities recognized as privileged right] "A license law assumes an illegality of an action, and denounces and penalizes those who pursue it without protecting themselves from prosecution by the procuring of the unneeded license" 37 Georgia Law Journal 73, 74 [The conflict here lies in 'form' as against 'substance' as in form, a license is a permission of action that would otherwise be unlawful; in substance, a license is a limitation of an action which would otherwise be lawful. So, the purpose of any license, private or public is to grant a 'gift'. The gift restricts the

activity of those without the license] [So, the true purpose, when private, is to control and regulate the manner in which the otherwise unlawful act is conducted, thus controlling the interest of the private person. In the case of the public license controlling the public's interest & right (If there is a public interest) VOL 1 CHAPTER 11 - 8 PAGE 170 [So, the statute and its code administered by the Department of Motor Vehicles, by the Driver's License is licensing a 'right' and naming it a 'privilege', but not as a 'privilege' under the Constitution's rights/privileges/immunities] [Thus, does the Department of Motor Vehicles by deceit and failure to inform where the need exists to inform as to the true nature of the Vehicle Code, seemingly take a right and convert it, in the mind of the individual motorist, to a privilege] "A license when granting a privilege, may not, as the terms to its possession, impose conditions which require the abandonment of constitutional rights" 271 US 583, 589 (1924) 257 US 529, 532 (1922) "The acceptance of a license, in what ever form, will not impose upon the licensee an obligation to respect or to comply with any provisions of the statute or with the regulations prescribed that are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States" 180 US 452 (1901); 333 US 426; 606 Cal (1936); 56 P2d 602 Collier & Wallis [Question. Analogous. If a robber steals part of your money and leaves the rest, have you been given a 'gift'?] [Recap, Activities when licensed but, which are rights by common law or natural law, are intended to restrict the liberty (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 11 - 9

PAGE 172 (cont) of enjoying those rights/liberties in the name of revenue and control of the individual as to his/her whereabouts by the record keeping in todays computer age] "The 'liberty' guaranteed by the constitution must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiar and known to the framers of the constitution. this liberty denotes the 'right' of the individual to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to locomote, and generally enjoy those rights long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men" Meyer vs Nebraska 262 US 390, 399 US vs Wong Kim Ark 169 US 649, 654 "No thing is gained in the argument by calling it 'police power' Henderson vs City of New York 92 US 259, 271 (1875) Nebbie vs New York 291 US 501 (1934) [Repeat, the licensing of motorist/individuals engaged in private business using the common highways dedicated to the use of the general public is a method of restricting activities long recognized by the colonies before the formation of the states and subsequently recognized by the newly created states by their elected We, the People when they wrote the Constitution 'for' the United States, a Republic. A Republic recognized in the Constitution 'of' the United States and the People therein] [The de facto corporate created license method by the (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 11 - 10 PAGE 173 (cont) legislature sitting assembled for the Corporate State of California by the creation of the Department of Motor Vehicles found within the Business, Transportation and Housing Agency is a strict method of controlling and taxing in that it substitutes administrative agency supervision, which is continuous by a case by case method of control under quasi criminal prosecution. But, when control is by licensing and administrative enforcement such enforcement is not tried in criminal courts at law but, is by summary procedure which is maritime/admiralty courts sitting for

the Department of Motor Vehicles as it is pursued under a civil code which is private and by-passes the usual criminal procedure and uses civil, non-judicial Notices to Appear under color of criminal prosecution] "If a license is a true privilege, so long as the legislation making the privilege available to the public generally or to 'certain class of persons', the individual could have the right to receive and the right to enjoy the use of the license in conformity with the requirements of the legislation and under the constitutional protection against unjustifiable administrative action, in the case of any other of his constitutional rights" Tutan vs US 270 US 568, 578 (1927) [Bottom line. Whether general public or certain class of persons, any action under Vehicle Code, whether licensee or non-licensee, if not engaged in licensed activity, is an 'unjustifiable administrative action'] VOL 1 CHAPTER 11 - 11 PAGE 174 ADDENDUM NATURE OF STATUTE, VEHICLE CODE [An individual not engaged in trafficking is not a class of persons within Vehicle Code; an individual licensed but not engaged in trafficking is not a person within the Vehicle Code, subject to its enforcement scheme] [Thus, where there is no public statute which regulates individuals, licensed or unlicensed, they do not come within jurisdiction of Department of Motor Vehicles as their jurisdiction is only to private privilege statute] 58 Cal Jur2d Statutes s8 The Code of Civil Procedure provides that all statutes are public or private and defines private statute as one that concerns only designated individuals and affects only their private rights. All other statutes, including those creating or affecting corporations, are public statutes (CCP s1898) A valid private act is as conclusive within its particular scope as is a public statute (Peo

ex rel McLane vs Bond 10 Cal 563) and the courts are as much bound to observe the one as the other (Peo vs Oakland 118 Cal 234) A general or public act affects the whole community, whereas a private act affects only particular persons or private concerns (Ex parte Burke 59 Cal 6) a selected class or particular object (Earle vs Bd Ed 55 Cal 489; Smith vs McDermott 93 Cal 421) The constitutional declaration vesting legislative (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 11 - 12 PAGE 175 (cont) power in legislature by Constitution Art IV s1, is not considered a grant of power, rather it is a restriction thereby rendering the legislature competent to exercise all powers not forbidden by state or federal constitutions (Peo vs Coleman 4 Cal 46; Peo vs McCreery 34 Cal 432) The legislature may command or merely permit a thing to be done (Peo vs ex rel Blanding vs Burr 13 Cal 343; Peo vs Lynch 51 Cal 15) but it may not violate Constitutional prohibits or guarantees (Lockard vs Los Angeles 33 Cal2d 553; Cert den 337 US 939) OR AUTHORIZE OTHERS TO DO SO. "When private individuals or groups are endowed by state with power or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the state and subject to its constitutional limitations" San Francisco vs Johnson 3 Cal3d 937; cert denied 401 US 1012 [Recall, governmental agency of California which is a Department with the Business, Transportation & Housing Agency is composed of private individuals and Vehicle Code is a private statute, so where do you fit in the scheme?] VOL 1 CHAPTER 11 - 13 PAGE 176 VEHICLE CODE SINCE 1905 IS A BUSINESS STATUTE [All occupations, trades, professions, businesses, and private property dedicated to the benefit of the public, when without the

traditional recognized common law right to pursue as a livelihood are subject to the police power of the State] Munn vs Illinois, 94 US 113 (1876) FACTS: Several grain warehousemen in Chicago were sued by the state of Illinois for failing to comply with the state law establishing maximum rates for the storage of grain. The warehousemen claimed that this law was repugnant to the part of the 14th amendment which ordains that no state shall deprive 'any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws'. ISSUE: Can a state constitutionally regulate the use, or even the fee for the use, of private property in that state? DECISION: Yes. REASONS: Waite, C.j. Two hundred years before this case, Lord Chief Justice Hale stated in his treatise, De Protibus Maris, 1 Harg. L. Tr., 78, that when private property is affected with a public interest it ceases to be purely private. Property becomes clothed with a public interest when used in a way to make it of public consequence and affect the community at large. When one devotes his property to such a use, he must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good. Of course, he may withdraw the use, but so long as he maintains it, he must submit to public control for the public good. The vast storage of grain falls into this category. If the proprietor of a hackney can be licensed and controlled, so can warehousemen. "We know that this is a power which may be abused; but that is no argument against its existence. For protection against abuses by Legislatures, the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts......" [The use of the word 'Vehicle' in the statute 'Vehicle Code' is intentional deceit intended to mislead the traveling public, deceptive advertising notice to the public, causing them to believe that it is a statute binding on them as (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 11 - 13A PAGE 177 (cont) vehicle users. In actuality the Vehicle Code is to regulate and enforce the safe operation of commercial motor vehicles operating for hire to the public, for profit, for gain, for

compensation, to the general public on an indifferent basis, transporting goods, property, and regulating drivers, chauffeurs of passenger vehicles uses to transport people, for hire, for profit, for gain, for compensation, on an indifferent basis] [Thus, Vehicle Code 'not' being general law, a law which affects the community at large, and does not omit any subject and operates equally upon all of a group, is a private business statute which embraces a class of subjects well defined within the context of the statute. Thus, it does not embrace the general public privately traveling upon the highways of the State by force of statutory law, does not have the force of law upon the general public] [Vehicle Code is mere private business civil statute enacted for regulating special class of persons in the business of operating as common/public carriers for hire to the general public on an indifferent basis for hire, for profit, gain and compensation] Beginning with the Motor Vehicle Act of 1905, and continuing to the present time, that intent has remained constant, up to and including the re-enactment of the code in 1959. Statutes at Large, 1959, Chapter 3, page 1523; Approved by Governor, February 25, 1959' filed with Secretary of State, February 25, 1959; THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS: An act to repeal and re-enact the Vehicle Code...........(cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 11 - 14 PAGE 178 (cont) 1. This act shall be known as the Vehicle Code. 2. The provisions of this code, insofar as they are substantially the same as existing provisions relating to the same subject matter, shall be construed as restatements and continuations thereof and not new enactments. [To repeal (to rescind, abrogate, recall, annul, reverse) a statute or law, and then to re-enact that law or statute with amendments or new definitions or add to the law or statute, with continued obeyance of the provisions of constitutionally protected common law

rights, does not change the intent of the statute. If it was the intent of the body of the legislature to write new statute, it would not have re-enacted existing statute, it would have enacted new written statute with new intent therein] [Does a part time driver chauffeur need a license?] At the time of the re-enactment of Vehicle Code of 1959, s250 defined 'chauffeur' as; "Chauffeur is a person who is employed by another for the principle purpose of driving a motor vehicle on the highways and receives compensation therefor" [At the time of the enactment of Motor Vehicle Act of 1905, it was the clear intent to regulate those persons who drove for compensation and so those persons who wished to chauffeur for compensation had to apply for and be granted and issued a 'license' in order to earn a livelihood on the highways of the state as chauffeurs] When VC s250 was repealed, 1961, amended, Chapter 1615, page 3452, July 12, 1961, filed July 13, 1961, it simply substituted 'driver' for 'chauffeur' VOL 1 CHAPTER 11 - 15 PAGE 179 [That new section, 350 VC, did not alter/change the intent of Vehicle Code, driver and chauffeur simply became synonymous, the private traveler driving a passenger vehicle had not been converted by the amendment to chauffeur, but remained a private traveler still without the need to possess a license, either as chauffeur or driver] [It was a deliberate act to obfuscate by semantics and thereby cause traveling persons driving their passenger vehicles for private business and pleasure and transportation to believe that he is required to have a driver's license, that the mere act of driving for personal travel, business, was a privilege, although the common law right remained unaffected by the trickery and deceit] CALIFORNIA STATUTES AT LARGE 1905 Motor Vehicle Act, Chapter 612 1913 Motor Vehicle Act, Chapter 326

1915 Vehicle Act, Chapter 188 1923 California Vehicle Act, Chapter 266 1935 Vehicle Code, Chapter 27 1959 Vehicle Code, Chapter 3 The state legislature, either by itself or by delegation of its power to municipal corporations, or other subdivisions or agencies, in its discretion, may impose a license, privilege, occupation, sales, use, or other excise tax on any or all lawful occupations, trades, professions, businesses, callings, or subjects, except where constitutional provisions, federal and state, considered generally, limit the power to exact a license or to impose a tax, except in so far as its power in this respect is limited by constitution or statute. State vs Kievman, 165, A 601; Shreveport vs Stringfellow, 68 So 951 When a statute law, regulation is adopted affecting the public highway, the question to be resolved is whether the regulation is reasonable exercise of state's power to regulate highways, or whether it is an attempt on the part of the state to abridge fundamental constitutional (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 11 - 15 PAGE 179 (cont) rights in the guise of highway regulation. 62 Cal App 3d 566 [The right to private travel for pleasure, business or transportation upon the highways does not come within the 'commerce clause' of state or federal constitutions where by it can be subject to license, fee, tax] Agency has no authority to enforce any licensee unless he is acting for compensation, such an act is highly penal in its nature, and should not be construed to include anything which is not embraced within its terms. There is no charge in the complaint, no evidence to prove the charge if it were in the complaint that accused was employed for compensation... Schomig vs Keiser, 189 CAL 596

It is basic in our law that an administrative agency may only act within the area of 'jurisdiction' marked out for it by law. If an individual does not come within the coverage of the particular agency's power to take any action which affects him. Endicott vs Perkins, 317 US 501 (1943) Engaging in a regulated activity, without license is an offense, if the statute so provides, unless the statute specifies the receipt or expectation of compensation as an element of the offense, in which case there is no offense if that condition is not fulfilled People vs Vermillion (1916) 30 Cal App 417, 418 Where a private statute exists (Vehicle Code of 1959) of which the intent is regulation of commercial common carriers, the particular agency enforcing that private statute, shall not apply it by trickery and deceit, to persons who are not noticed by the statute as persons regulated and taxed, not should it permit any party to do so in violation of a persons right to stay out of compelled license/contract, when he is not a person subject to the statute, unless clearly within its words. State vs Eberhart, 179 P 853; 246 P2d 1011 Where a statute is enacted for the benefit of one class of persons it is not for courts to say that it was also meant to embrace and protect other and additional persons and situations; that statute which defines separate classes on whom special benefits are conferred, the pro- (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 11 - 17 PAGE 181 (cont) -visions relating to a single class should be regarded as applying to that class alone, unless the language clearly show intent to have larger or more general application; that statute which imposes obligation in derogation of the common law, and effects substantial rights must be strictly construed and cannot be extended by implication to include persons who do not come within the terms. Kurtz vs Capital, 61 A2d 4l70

Even if defendant was a licensee, a 'licensing agency' has no authority to proceed against a licensee, not any party sitting 'ministerially' for the agency, for acts done outside the activity in which he is licensed. King vs Bd Med Exam, 65 CA2d 644 An action by agency, whether directly or through a court sitting administerially as hearing officer, must be clearly defined in the statute before it has subject matter jurisdiction, without such jurisdiction of the licensee, all acts of the agency, by its employees, agents, hearing officers, are null and void. Doolan vs Carr, 125 US 618; City vs Pearson, 181 Cal 640 Statutes may not be given a meaning which would be restrictive of personal liberty unless the language thereof is clear and explicit and permits no other reasonable interpretation. In interpreting a statute which is ambiguous, and is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations, must adopt that construction which is favorable to the individual and tends to least interfere with or to circumscribe or delimit personal liberty. State vs Mitchell, 7 SE2d 567 Defendant bases a defense on the fact that statute is being unconstitutionally applied to him as an individual not required to be a licensee of the agency under the statute. San Mateo County vs Palomar Holdings, 1962, 208 CA2d 194 No Statutory duty lies to apply for, or to possess a driver's license for personal travel and transportation as defendant is not within the class of persons for whose benefit or protection the statute was enacted. Routh vs Quinn, 20 Cal2d 488 DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES HAS NO DISCRETION TO PRESUME TO ALTER COMMON LAW AND APPLY COMMERCE VEHICLE CODE OUTSIDE ITS MANDATED STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO MERE PRIVATE TRAVELERS WHEN INFORMED BY PRIVATE TRAVELER VOL 1 CHAPTER 11 - 18

PAGE 182 Where fundamental vested rights are involved, courts have the duty to scrutinize the issue before them under independent judgment test, rather than mere substantial evidence, or rationale basis test, as a matter of law. Bixby vs Pierno, 4 C3d 130 Statutes are not presumed to alter common law except to the extent that they expressly so provide. "The civil code was not designed to embody the whole law of private and civil relations, rights, and duties; it is incomplete and partial; and except in those instances where its language is clearly and unequivocally discloses an intention to depart from, alter, or abrogate the common law rule concerning a particular subject matter, a section of the code purporting to embody such doctrine or rule will be construed in the light of common law decisions on the same subject" (Estate of Elizalde, 182 Cal 427, 433) The rule is stated as follows in 45 California Juris-prudence 2d, s116, page 625: "Statutes must be given a reasonable and common sense construction in accordance with the apparent purpose and intention of the law makers - one that is practical policy rather than to mischief or absurdity" The court should consider the consequences that might flow from a particular interpretation (Estate of Ryan, 21 Cal 2d 498) and where the language is susceptible of two different constructions general phrasing must yield to an intent which is apparent from the act itself. (Pritchard vs Sully Miller, 178 CA2d 246, 256; Farnworth vs Nevada Cal., 188 CA2d 382, 387; Blumenthal vs Larson, 79 CA 726) Superior Court as intermediate appellate court is bound by the law, both statutory and case, and as it existed at the time of the decision, further modifications, if any, are required to come from the legislature or re-interpretations by highest appellate courts. Gustin vs Williams, (1967) 255 CA2d Supp 929 VOL 1 CHAPTER 11 - 19 PAGE 183 FOR ANY GOVERNMENT AGENCY TO STEAL AWAY COMMON LAW RIGHT OF

LIBERTY, RIGHT TO TRAVEL FREE OF REGULATION, TAX AND FEE, WHICH IS PROTECTED BY ORGANIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL TREATY, AND TREATIES ARE SUPERIOR TO ALL LEGISLATIVE STATE ACTS; PRIVATE PROPERTY BY LICENSING AND FEE AND TAX, IS THE UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY AS IT TAKES AWAY TITLES OF ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP. WHEN IT IS DONE BY INDUCING THE INDIVIDUAL TO CONTRACT BY MISINFORMATION, THREAT, EITHER DIRECT OR IMPLIED, BY THE FAILURE TO INFORM WHERE THE NEED TO INFORM EXISTS, IT IS A CRIMINAL TRESPASS OF COMMON LAW RIGHTS OF FREEDOM AND A TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY WITHOUT COMPENSATION FROM THE INDIVIDUAL AND A GROUND FOR AN ACTION AT LAW WILL LIE. "Persons lawfully within the United States are entitled to use the public highways and have the right to free passage thereon" (85 CA2d 497) Constitutional Law, 11 Am Jur s329 "Personal liberty largely consists of the right of locomotion, to go where and when one pleases, only so far restrained as the rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens" (Williams vs Fears, 179 US 270; Pinkerton vs Verberg, 78 Mich. 573) "The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horse drawn carriage, wagon, automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but common right which he has under the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Under this constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at this inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner neither interfering with nor disturbing another's rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct" (Thompson vs Smith, 155 Va 367) NATURE OF LICENSES AS MALEFACTIONS The primary intention of licensing, a right and then naming it a 'privilege', really, is not prohibition, but regulation of the 'right'. This regulation of the 'right' is made effective by a form, general denial of the 'right' and renaming it a 'privilege', which is then made available to the individual by an administrative act of approval, a license/permit/consent. Thus, does a 'right'

become a 'privilege', but calling something a gift/privilege cannot make it one. When a robber takes part of a man's money (right to property), but leaves the rest, the victim certainly does not feel that he has been given anything. VOL 1 CHAPTER 11 - 20 PAGE 184 A license which regulates an activity, which are rights by common law or 'natural law' are intended to restrict the liberty and enjoyment of private property in the name of revenue and regulation. Thus, it is very clear that the requirement of a license is not intended as a 'privilege' , but as a common restraint upon activities authorized by the common law for the intent of a license in to pursue that regulated activity which otherwise is unlawful to the individual without the license. Here lies a conflict. The license is the permission to perform an illegal activity, in for, but in substance the license is a limitation of a action/activity which otherwise is lawful. So, the purpose of the 'gift of privilege' is to restrict the rightful activity of the licensee and to prohibit the lawful activities, of those without the 'gift', activities already existing at common law. "A license is in the nature of special privilege entitling licensee to do something he would not be entitled to do without the license" (San Francisco vs Liverpool, 74 Cal 113) "Power of the legislature to impose taxes upon occupations and privileges in unlimited, save restrictions found in organic law, (People vs Coleman, 4 Cal 46; People vs McGreery 34 Cal 342) or such as are inherent in nature of subject itself" "License fee imposed as revenue measure cannot be justified under police power" (San Francisco vs Boss, 83 CA2d 445) "The individual has no liability to the State where there is no possession of state license/contract nexus, or where possession of same is by necessity. The necessity being to protect life, liberty and property from an

unlawful taking. The necessity annuls the liability" (Burrows vs Sup Ct, 13 Cal3d, 238 (1974) Where the benefits of the license are unwanted, and the wanting of the benefits is an important one, since, if a benefit is forced upon a person who objects, the benefit then becomes a gift and no reciprocating obligation arises. Even (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 11 - 21 PAGE 185 (cont) if a benefit is experienced by the default of the Grantee, the State, to take back the benefit when the licensee has objected and protested. This Benefit Experienced Doctrine applies to both tangible and intangible benefits. This issue of 'benefits not wanted' is analogize in the amendment to the U.S. Postal Statutes regarding the mailing of unwanted merchandise, Title 39 s3009(a) THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL IN THE MODE OF THE DAY, BE IT MOTOR VEHICLE, WAGON, CARRIAGE BY HORSE, IS INVIOLATE AND PROTECTED BEYOND COMMON LAW, ANTECEDENTLY, AND CONSTITUTIONALLY, AND BY INTERNATIONAL TREATY The United States State Department has defined the right to travel as being among the multiple entente meanings of Human Rights in those treaties. "Treaties have the effect of overruling state and Federal laws. This is not generally well known" (Chief Justice Warren Burger, US Supreme Court, Quoted by New York Times Magazine, September 22, 1985) "The United States has always been dedicated to the faithful observance of its treaty obligations. Many of the treaties to which the United States is a party contain stipulations so drafted that they create private rights, duties, privileges, or immunities without the need of implementing legislation. Such treaties by virtue of the constitution, are more than international obligations of the U.S., they become part of our domestic law upon being made. Citing Haver vs Yaker, 9 Wall 32, 35, (1869) ".......in this country, a treaty is domestic law upon being made, something more than a contract, for the federal constitution declares it to

be the law of the land. It is consequently to be regarded in the courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision, ruled so in marshall, C.J. in Foster vs Neilson, 2 Pet 253, 314 (1829) "A treaty then is a law of the land as an act of Congress is, whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined" (Head Money Cases, 112 US 580, 598, 599, (1884) VOL 1 CHAPTER 11 - 22 PAGE 186 "If the treaty contains stipulations which are self executing, that is, require no legislative act to make them operative, to that extent they have the force and effect of legislative enactment" (Whitney vs Robertson, 124 US 190, 194, (1888) Justice Cardoza drew the distinction as follows: "A treaty has a twofold aspect. In its primary operation it is a compact between independent states. In its secondary operation, it is a source of private rights for individuals within the states" (Techt vs Hughes, 229NY 222, 242 (1920) ADDENDUM [Licenses issued by administrative agency, Department of Motor Vehicles, are only for 'privileges' and do not grant that right or any right which otherwise is not yours, to use the common public highways for personal travel] "The privilege of using the streets and highways by the operation thereon of motor vehicles for hire, can by acquired only by permission of license from the state or its political subdivisions" Blashfield Cyc of Automobile Law & Practice Ed s331 "City having right to regulate use of its streets by motor vehicles for hire may issue licenses; license being permission" Ex parte Schutte 42 SW2d 252

"A license confers upon licensee neither contractual nor vested rights" (Rosenblatt vs California etc. 69 CalApp2d 69) Nor does it create a property right" (Zugravu vs O'Brien 196 NE 664) [The vested right already exists under common law; the right of property exists under common law] VOL 1 CHAPTER 11 - 23 PAGE 187 LICENSE IS BUSINESS CONTRACT WITH A PRIVATE AGENCY CREATED BY THE STATE, BUT IS NOT THE STATE EVEN THOUGH THE STATE AS AN INTEREST It has been held that license involves a 'contract obligation' to pay a specific compensation for a privilege. State vs Chicago & North West RR, 108 NW 594 Chauffeur/driver license is a unilateral contract. After offer was accepted by a performance of the act, there was an obligation outstanding on person only, the person performing the act as unilateral contract is by a promise for an act, or by an act for a promise. DMV offers the privilege in return for a sum of money. But until you accept the privilege by the act of performing the privilege, no obligation is outstanding, thus, the license is void and no rights, or civil liabilities arise under a void contract. To phrase it another way: When you have taken no bite from the proffered apple 'privilege', have not enjoyed the sweetness of the fruit, no obligation or duty exists with the proffering agency, the Department of Motor Vehicles enforcing the Vehicle Code. Effect of License: Its acceptance does not impose any obligation on the licensee to exercise the privilege or to engage in the business covered by the license. State vs Chicago etc., 108 NW 594 VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 1 PAGE 188 LEGISLATURE HAS NO POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION BY WHICH IT MAY

GRANT POLICE POWER TO AN AGENCY WHICH IS NOT ESTABLISHED TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC PEACE, GOOD ORDER, OR THE HEALTH, MORALS AND SECURITY OF THE PEOPLE. IF THE PARTICULAR AGENCY IS CREATED BY THE CORPORATE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AS A CORPORATE AGENT TO DO THAT WHICH THE REPUBLIC STATE CANNOT DO WHICH IS TO GRANT LICENSES TO REGULATE PERSONS ENGAGED IN BUSINESS ACTIVITY; NO POLICE POWER ATTACHES TO CIVIL STATUTES/CODES "It is true that the legislation which secure to all protection in their rights, and the equal use and enjoyment of their property, embraces an almost infinite variety of subjects. Whatever affects the peace, good order, morals and health of the community comes within its scope; and everyone must use and enjoy his property to the restrictions which legislation imposes. What is termed the 'police power' of the state, which from the language often used respecting it, one would suppose to be an undefined and irresponsible element in government, can only interfere with the conduct of individuals in their intercourse with each other, and in the use of their property, only so far as may be required to secure these objects." Munn vs Illinois 94 US 145, 24 LEd 77; Slaughterhouse Cases 16 Wallace 62, 21 LEd 394; Stone vs Miss. 101 US 818, 25 L Ed 1079 "An authority conferred by the American constitutional system upon the individual states, through which they are enabled to establish a special department of police; adopt (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 2 PAGE 189 (cont) such regulations as tend to prevent to commission of fraud, violence, or other offenses against the state; aid in the arrest of criminals; and secure generally the comfort, health and prosperity of the state, by preserving the public order, preventing a conflict of rights in the common intercourse of citizens, and insuring to each an uninterrupted enjoyment of all the privileges conferred upon him by the laws of his county" Lalo, Pol. Encyclopedia s.v. Black's Law p 1317 [No police power constitutionally attaches to the Department of Motor Vehicles by Statute, 1959, Vehicle Code either as party to

Department or not a party to the Department when they are enjoying peaceful intercourse in their common law right/privilege to participate in commercial traffic or as individuals enjoying the use of the common highways for personal/private business, pleasure, transportation of private property without hire on those common highways] "Regulations, fees and taxes may not be applied to the natural person using the common highways as it is in derogation of common right of the public to use highways as an avenue upon which vehicles for transportation of goods, passengers, freight, and traffic of all kinds may be freely moved, having due regard for rights of others, while this, or other provisions of statute, should be fairly, liberally construed to promote and effect the evident purpose for which it was intended, care should be exercised not to unduly extend its effect" VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 3 PAGE 190 Young vs Madison County 115 NW 23 "Highways are constructed and maintained for the benefit of members of the public, who have the inalienable right to use them in a reasonable manner without obstruction and under the doctrine of 'over broadness', no statute may be drawn in such a way as to inhibit the exercise of the individuals freedoms affirmatively protected by the constitution. When a law of regulation is adopted effecting the public highway, the question to be resolved is whether the regulation is a reasonable exercise of state's power to regulate highways, or whether it is an attempt on the part of the state in guise of highway regulation, to abridge constitutional rights" (Findley vs Justice Court 62 CalApp3d 566) "While the use of the highways for 'travel and transportation' is not a mere privilege, but a fundamental right, such use is subject to reasonable regulations for public good and any appropriate means adopted by the state to insure competence and care on the part of licensees to protect others using highways is consonant with due process" Escobedo vs State of California, 35 Cal2d 870; Escobedo vs Dept of

Motor Vehicles, 222 P2d 1 [Nowhere in case law does it evidence that police power to arrest as the accepted procedure for regulation of users of the common public highways. The only power to regulate highways is obtained by the power to regulate commerce, which is not the regulation of persons engaged in commerce/traffic] "Held,.......merely driving an automobile on the public (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 4 PAGE 191 (cont) roads is not a threat to the public safety or health, and constitutes no hazard to the public, and a driver owes nothing more than 'due care' to the public; and that the driver owes no other duty to the state, he and his automobile have equal rights to and on the roadway as horses, wagons, carriages, etc..This same right is still the substantive rule, in that speeding, running stop signs, driving without a license, plates or registration are not in se 'threats to the public safety', and thus, are not arrestable offenses." "While it is true that officer could not arrest the accused for vehicle code infractions." Farley vs California, 20 CalApp3d 1032; 261 CalApp2d 461 VEHICLE CODE UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN PARTS An act to repeal and re-enact the Vehicle Code. (Chapter 3, Statutes of 1959, as amended to the close of the Regular Session of the Legislature in 1989) CONSTITUTIONALITY Division 1, s10 5. If any portion of this code is held unconstitutional, such decisions shall not affect the validity of any other portion of this code. [The Vehicle Code of 1959, and its amendments as of 1991, is in parts unconstitutional and should be challenged when those parts are applied and thereby, the person named in a Civil Extra-judicial Notice to Appear, has been deprived by those unconstitutional parts when she/he is not a person of (cont)

VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 5 PAGE 192 (cont) the class named/defined in the code, but merely because she/he uses a present day mode of transportation as a means of personal travel, private business or operating same and is immune from prosecution under the code] "Due process provisions are commonly relied upon in attack of defense. However, principle that due process requirements of United States Constitution are violated by licensing legislation only where legislation interferes, or destroys a personal property right" Payne vs Kansas 248 US 112; 240 US 342; 177 US 183 "While the use of highways for travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a fundamental right" Escobedo vs State of California, 35 Cal2d 566 PART 1 THAT PART OF VEHICLE CODE WHICH PERMITS THE ARREST OF A PERSON PURSUANT TO VEHICLE CODE BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE CIVIL NOTICE TO APPEAR, WHICH IS EXTRA-JUDICIAL, UNVERIFIED, AND FAILS TO SHOW A MALA PROHIBITA VIOLATION OR MALA PER SE VIOLATION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT PERMITS ADMINISTRATIVE ARREST FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS WHICH ARE NOT ARRESTABLE OFFENSES UNDER POLICE REGULATIONS, STATE LAW. POLICE REGULATIONS; The laws of a state, or ordinances of a municipality, which have for their objective the preservation and protection of public peace and good order, and of health, morals, and security of the people. Sonora vs Curtin 137 Cal 583 VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 6 PAGE 193 [No constitutional police power exists for a peace officer to arrest an individual for a cited section deemed an 'infraction' as defined in Vehicle Code. Infractions of civil codes are not 'public offenses'.

As civil offenses must be pursued as civil administrative actions when a person is a licensee of the agency and so engaged at the time of stop. Civil Administrative actions are summary procedure, which are maritime in nature as to licensees. Vehicle Code is not a 'general law' as to all persons, but only 'general law' with force of law as to a class of persons named and noticed within the Vehicle Code] [Infractions not being 'crimes' or 'public offenses' arrests citing sections of Vehicle Code in a Notice to Appear, commonly referred to as a 'traffic ticket', are not subject for police or civil arrest, thus, section 40306VC, is a false arrest and constitutes false imprisonment] s40306.(a) Whenever a person is arrested for a misdemeanor or an 'infraction', and is taken before a magistrate, the arresting officer shall file with the magistrate a complaint stating the offense with which the person is charged. " 'Arrest' occurred when police officer waved motorist to a halt, and restricted his liberty of movement pursuant to traffic violation" US vs Washington, DC 1965, 249 F Supp 40; affirmed 401 F2d 914, 130 US App DC 374 "A city police officer under pretended color of official right was an abuse of authority invested in them as peace (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 7 PAGE 194 (cont) officers and relegated them to category of trespassers, so as to be liable for false imprisonment" Ware vs Dunn (1947) 80 CalApp2d 936 "As a notice to appear does not allege or show any probable cause for an arrest, and the fact that petitioner was released on a promise to appear before a committing magistrate for an arraignment, that fact is circumstance to be considered in determining in first instance there was probable cause for an arrest" Monroe vs Pape, DC Ill. 1963, 221 F supp 635

[Here are the grounds for a civil suit for damages for tort of malicious abuse of process, notice to appear, for false arrest and false imprisonment] PART 2 THAT PART OF VEHICLE CODE WHICH PERMITS ARRESTS FOR MISDEMEANORS AS THOUGH CRIMINAL (MALA IN SE) ACTS, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THEY ARE NOT CRIMES UNDER PENAL CODE, BUT CIVIL ADMINISTRATIVE WRONGS (MALA PROHIBITA) [Although all matters of Administrative Code Law are, in fact, special statutory proceedings, civil in nature, they are tried by quasi-criminal procedure as though, in fact, are mala in se criminal violations of Vehicle Code rather than, in fact, mala prohibita offenses of Vehicle Code] MALA IN SE: Wrongs in themselves; acts morally wrong; offenses against conscience. (Crimes under penal code) MALA PROHIBITA: Prohibited wrongs or offenses; acts which are made OFFENSES by positive laws and PROHIBITED as such. VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 8 PAGE 195 Black's 4th p 1108 POSITIVE LAW: Law actually and specifically enacted or adopted by proper authority for the government of an organized 'jural society'. Black's 4th p 1324 JURAL SOCIETY: The term 'jural society' is used as the synonym of 'state' or organized political community. Black's 4th p 989 note 4 [Positive laws are those laws which are judicial in nature, general law as to all the people of a state, whereas administrative law is to a special class of people and general law only to that special class created by the legislature and given created rights by a license which imposes duties, rules, of conduct when natural rights are abandoned for special privileges not available to the general population] "Where criminal proceedings are used as ruse or pretext, or in bad

faith for the bare purpose of, getting some person into the jurisdiction in order to serve him with civil process, the process will be set aside on the ground that there has been such an abuse of process as precludes jurisdiction in personam, and the facts may justify a recovery of damages for abuse of power" 1 American Juris 2d s14 [Vehicle Code misdemeanors are civil misdemeanors and thus, not arrestable offenses as mala in se, and are tried by special statutory proceeding as a traffic offense] "A 'traffic offense' is not a 'criminal' case within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment" VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 9 PAGE 196 Lea vs MacDuff 126 NYS2d 646; People vs Bliss 278 NYS2d 732 "Violations of Vehicle Code are civil, including Driving Under the Influence" Hawaii vs Brown 651 P2d 488 "In People vs Olds 140 CalApp2d 156, reviewing court held that under Gross vs Superior Court 42 Cal2d 816, 820, when a matter is civil code, which are special proceedings with possible collateral criminal action, but it cannot be pursued where there is no criminal act as then the defendant is not fined for the commission of a criminal act, but because it was determined he had violated some civil code" [To make a determination, if the cited section in the notice to appear is a mala in se (penal code crime) or mala prohibita (private code violation) go to the Penal Code. If the cited section is on in Health & Safety Code or Vehicle Code, or Welfare & Institutions Code, etc. is a mala prohibita violation, and you must be a licensed person enjoying the benefits of the private code at the time of the issue of the notice to be within the jurisdiction of the particular code and its enforcing agency] PRIVATE STATUTE, (code): A statute which operates only upon

particular persons, and private concerns. I Blackstone's Commentaries 86 An act which relates to certain individuals or to a particular class of men. State vs Chambers 93 NC 600 VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 10 PAGE 197 PART 3 BENCH WARRANTS FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR ON MERE UNVERIFIED NOTICE TO APPEAR ISSUED WHEN NO VERIFIED COMPLAINT HAS BEEN FILED BY SOME PARTY OR AGENCY WITH THE MAGISTRATE OF MUNICIPAL TRIBUNAL SITTING FOR HEARING FOR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY TO SET AN ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD ARE NULL AND VOID WITHOUT FORCE OF STATUTORY LAW [A bench warrant for arrest for a failure to appear on a Notice to Appear constitutes a false arrest by the magistrate issuing the bench warrant when the matter allegedly before the tribunal is civil special statutory procedure. Is error as it assumes person named on the notice is a licensee and was engaged in the activity regulated and enforced by the Department of Motor Vehicles.] [Bench Warrants are not Arrest Warrants. A bench warrant can only issue on civil proceedings for contempt of a lawful court order pursuant to a judgment] [Bench Warrants are administrative as in case of Vehicle Code when they do not issue pursuant to s40513(a), "a complaint shall be filed which shall conform to the provisions of Chapter 2 (commencing with section 948) of Title 5, Part 2 of the Penal Code,....." Which are the demanded provisions for issuing a criminal warrant of arrest] The other side of the 'coin' as to nature of warrants of arrest where administrative is clearly explained in Abel vs US 362 at 246: "The administrative warrant of arrest which has long been (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 11 PAGE 198

(cont) used by INS and other agencies. It is not the ordinary judicial warrant; yet, even so, there is some check in the requirement that, before the administrative warrant is signed, the signing official must be shown a prima facie case, and even if we must, under Wong Wing, concede that administrative arrest authority may be conferred where necessary to give effect to substantive powers possessed by an agency, that is true only where substantive powers are powers over the person (Aiuppa vs US 338 US F2d 146) only substantial relationship means jurisdiction (See vs Seattle 387 US 541, Camara vs San Francisco 387 US 523) Otherwise administrative arrest authority might be permitted so widely that it could subvert the practical effectiveness of the Fourth (Aiuppa)" "To the administrative arrest power may thus be added an administrative bail power, remembering first, power over the person. The vital safeguard of independent judicial determination is lacking. The same agency which is given arrest power, also determines whether there is probable cause to support a given arrest, whether the person detained should be conditionally released on bail. To all this should be added the fact that it is the same agency that makes the charge which leads to the arrest, prosecutes the charge and then determines in an administrative proceeding whether the charge is justified. It is comparable to a case in which the prosecuting attorney or their law enforcement subordinates make a final determination as to whether persons accused on something shall remain in jail awaiting a (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 12 PAGE 199 (cont) decision as to the truthfulness of the accusation against them. (342 US 554, per Black's) [Civil Notices issue on cited section of Vehicle Code which only by proper procedure and evidence become administrative 'traffic offenses'] "Traffic Offenses - Judge in Capacity of Magistrate. Arresting officer must file a complaint under oath stating the offense charged and copy of the Notice to Appear to the officer's law enforcement agency, VC sss405000, 40504, 40506. The failure to appear mandates regular verified complaint. (Pen C. ss 948, 963)"

[When the above proper procedure is not followed and no probable cause shown by mandated regular verified complaint no bench warrant can lawfully issue] "In United States vs Evans 574 F2d 352 (1978) it held: If after the service of an appearance ticket and filing of a complaint for the offense designated therein, the defendant does not appear in the designated local criminal court at the time the appearance ticket is returnable, the court may issue a warrant based upon the complaint filed." [A bench warrant cannot issue without the filing of a verified complaint showing the probable cause for the arrest as the magistrate is without subject matter jurisdiction] [A notice to appear, standing alone with mere citations from Vehicle Code, without accompanying complaint, cannot be accepted by the magistrate as presumptive evidence of facts evidencing probable cause as it is without facts]

VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 3 PAGE 200 PRESUMPTIVE EVIDENCE: Note (2) Evidence which must be received and treated as true and sufficient until rebutted by other testimony. Note (3) Presumptive evidence is synonymous with prima facie evidence. Black's 4th p 1350 PRIMA FACIE: At first sight; on the first appearance; on the face of it; so far as can be judged from the first disclosure; presumably; a fact presumed to be true unless disproved by some evidence to the contrary. Black's 4th p 1353 PART 4 THAT PART OF VEHICLE CODE WHICH PERMITS A DEFENDANT TO WAIVE THE NEED FOR THE FILING OF A VERIFIED COMPLAINT THEREBY GIVING THE MAGISTRATE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION IS CONTRARY TO STATUTORY MANDATE AND DENIED A DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS OF STATUTORY PROCEDURE The pertinent part of 40513(a) VC is: ....except that a defendant may, by an agreement in writing, subscribed by him and filed with

the court, 'waive the filing of a verified complaint and elect that the prosecution may proceed upon the written complaint'. [A magistrate of a court without subject matter first obtained by a filing, has no jurisdiction to take any steps in a case brought before him or make a ruling or listen to any motions by any party to the case] [One may as well state that a magistrate has the power to (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 14 PAGE 201 (cont) assume subject matter jurisdiction, step into the halls of the court house or upon the streets and by mere robe of office bring any person into his jurisdiction without the need to conform to the mandated procedure of Vehicle Code] "Where no formal complaint filed, no subject matter jurisdiction. Court must be relieved of the burden of being compelled to participate in illegal conduct. It is morally incongruous for the state to flout the constitutional rights and at the same time demand that its citizens obey the law. If government becomes law breaker, its actions breeds contempt for the law. Such conduct by its lawless venture lends aid to lawless venture." Cahan, 44 Cal2d at pg 445 [Where the district attorney appears for the People of the State as plaintiff, his duty to conform is mandated] "The requirement that a prosecution be based upon a sworn statement, made by a district attorney, is an essential guarantee to a defendant of a fundamental right, namely, that he not be punished for a violation without a formal and sufficient accusation, and this right may not be waived even by a plea of guilty" Albrecht vs US 273 US 1, 8; Weeks vs US 216 F 292 "Subject matter jurisdiction may not, however, be conferred by consent, vaiver, or estoppel" Summers vs Sup Ct 53 Cal2d 295 "A court cannot obtain judicial subject matter jurisdiction (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 15 PAGE 202

(cont) by consent" Bonds vs Hickman 29 Cal 460; Norwood vs Kenfield, 34 Cal 329; Elliot vs Sup Ct 168 Cal 727; Schlyn vs Schlyn 43 Cal2d 361 "Jurisdiction of subject matter cannot be conferred" Van Horn vs Justice Ct Cal2d 235; Samsell vs Sup Ct Cal2d 763 "Jurisdiction of subject matter over which a court has otherwise no subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred, by consent, stipulation" Kurtz vs Culer 178 Cal 178 ".....or agreement" Johnson vs Malloy 74 Cal 430 "...or silence" Tennessen vs Prudential 8 CalApp2d 160; James vs Sup Ct 135 CalApp2d 352 "....or appearance" Samsell, supra, Robinson vs Sup Ct 35 CalApp2d 379 ".....or waiver" Schlyn, supra; Keithly vs Civil Service 11 CalApp3d 443 "Where there was a want of jurisdiction of the subject matter, the purported judgment or order of the respondent court was void for all purposes" Fletcher vs Sup Ct 79 CalApp 468 PART 5 UNLAWFUL, INDISCRIMINATE USE AND ABUSE OF VEHICLE CODE AS TO LICENSEES OF DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, AND (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 16 PAGE 203 (cont) NON-LICENSEES OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY AGENTS AND EMPLOYEES AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND PEACE OFFICERS AND COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS, WHO UNDER COLOR AND GUISE OF VEHICLE CODE AND OFFICE AND SCOPE OF DUTY, TREAT CITATIONS IN NOTICES TO APPEAR AS CRIMES AND THEREBY VIOLATE RIGHTS OF

PRIVACY [The user of the common public highways has an interest which must be protected, his privacy. When the privacy is not a concern to the public with right to know, the user of the common public highways, absent the commission of a crime, his right to privacy is guaranteed as a constitutional privilege, and so deemed by the United States Supreme Court by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments] [The right of the individual to engage in lawful activity of business of transportation, trafficking on the highways by the use of motor propelled conveyances is absolute, and the individual so engaged cannot be compelled to sacrifice his freedom, liberty and privacy while so engaged under color and guise of Vehicle Code; when his property and time and facilities are not dedicated to the public's benefit, nor the individual so engaged to earn a livelihood for himself and his family, nor the individual who uses a motor driven conveyance for family use, transportation of private property, personal business or private business for another individual] [When an individual acts on his behalf, without any legal or lawful responsibility to the people of the state or any of its corporate agencies, then the privacy zone is trespassed (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 17 PAGE 204 (cont) and thereby violated when he is stopped by any person acting for the Department of Motor Vehicles and is asked any questions, personal in nature, as the right to expectation of privacy as to himself or his activity are fundamental and not to be violated when there is no nexus contractually, legal, lawfully with Corporate State of California or specifically with the Department of Motor Vehicles] TRAVELER: To go from one place to another at a distance; to journey; spoken of voluntary change of place. TRAVELER: One who passes from place to place, whether for pleasure, instruction, business, or health. Black's 4th p 1671 "Right to travel is a basic right repeatedly recognized and guaranteed by constitution"

Town of Pompey vs Parker, 1976, 385 NYS2d 959 "Deceit and fraud is used to bring a traveler who travels by the mode of the day, a passenger vehicle, to unknowingly volunteer for an occupational license whereby he is led to believe that he must be licensed, and thereby infringes and takes from the him right to privacy as a traveler. When the traveler has no relationship to the public health, safety, and welfare, and the license offering no benefit or protection to the traveler, is an unconstitutional application of a constitutional statute, and infringes upon the privacy of the individual by the demand of certain facts and information as a condition of the license. Thereby infringes upon the fundamental liberty of privacy and the right to be let alone (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 18 PAGE 205 (cont) as guaranteed by the 9th Amendment of the Constitution." State vs Albertson, 1970, 470 P2d 300 "......when there is no showing of subordinating state interests" Dawson vs Hillsborough County, DC Fla, 1971, 322 F Supp 286 [Equally, the individually licensed to engage in, enjoy trafficking on the common highways by any mode of transportation but, at the time of a 'traffic stop' is using a motor vehicle but not using such at time trafficking, is not within the jurisdiction of Department of Motor Vehicles, and thus, has not lost his zone of privacy] [Nor is any traveler, business engaged or private, a subject of scrutiny by municipal police officers, as he is not the subject of investigation/scrutiny when he has not committed a public offense/crime by the eyeball witnessing of the police officer in his scope of duty] "The right to privacy, to be let alone, (9th Amend) may only be justified by the state's taking, when a compelling state interest in regulation of the subject is within the state's constitutional power to regulate can justify the limiting of freedoms, liberty, and privacy" US vs Lee, Pa, 1982, 455 US 252, 71 Led2d 127 [To stop any traveler upon the public highways is an unwarranted

invasion of the individual's privacy when there is no probable cause for belief of a public offense, and inflicts unwarranted publicity, of a negative nature, when done in view of all persons witnessing. It is always the (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 19 PAGE 206 (cont) belief of the public that when an individual is being held by a uniformed figure of authority, the person so held has committed some wrong. Thus, by the intrusion of a figure of authority, valid or invalid, into the privacy of the individual by the asking of questions, outside the right of the police officer to know the answers, inflicts public shame and embarrassment upon the individual who has done no wrong] "The right to privacy is the right to be let alone, to be free from unwarranted publicity" Holloman vs Life Insur. 192 Supreme Ct 454 [Any act, by any person, which denies the individual's right to withhold private information or his property from scrutiny without voluntary, willing, consent, is an infringement and taking of one's privacy, to his harm] "And the right to withhold himself and his property from public scrutiny, if he so chooses, and it exists so far as its assertion is consistent with the law, or public policy, and in a proper case equity will interfere, if there is no remedy at law, to prevent the threatened injury by invasion or infringement upon his right from motives of gain or malice" Federal Trade Comm vs American Tobacco, 264 US 298 MALICE: The intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse, with an intent to inflict injury or under circumstances that the law will imply an evil intent. A conscious violation of the law (or the prompting of the mind to commit it) which operates to the prejudice of another person. (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 20 PAGE 207 (cont) In the law of malicious prosecution, it means that the prosecution was instituted primarily because of a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice.

Black's 4th p 1109 [In US vs CHADWICK, 1977, 97 S. Ct 2476, 53 LEd2d 538, the Supreme Court in a 7 to 2 decision, said to be the most important case since 'Chimel vs Cal (1969) 395 US 752' since it expands the right to protection of the individual's privacy to that right where personal property is involved, where previously/traditionally it had been limited to the home] [CHADWICK extends the right of movable personal property to the protection of the Fourth Amendment. The case was based upon reasonable expectation of privacy by a person manifested by an act to exclude the invasion of privacy even if the authorities obtain exclusive control over it. In that case it was luggage obtained by probable cause, where if there is no emergency or exigent circumstances to justify invasion without warrant, a warrant is required to invade personal movable property] [The court in CHADWICK emphasized that their decision in no way changed the different rule that applies to motor vehicles. 'A historical governmental treatment of motor vehicles, which permits them to be licensed as commercial motor vehicles in common carriage, and as such subject to impound'] [Take careful notice of the limitation implicit therein. They are talking about commercial motor vehicles which have (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 21 PAGE 208 (cont) been dedicated to the public's use] "So long as one uses his property for private purposes and does not devote it to the public's use, public has no interest in it and no voice in its control" Associated Pipe vs R.R. Comm 176 Cal 518 [So, the motorist with his private undedicated automobile obviously, does not neatly fit in CHADWICK included vehicles used for 'common carriage', further that any motor propelled vehicle is 'movable personal property', and not being 'equipment' under Uniform Commercial Code s1-109. 1, 109.14 but is 'consumer goods' it comes within CHADWICK's 'luggage'. Additionally, in Ingersoll vs Palmer, the California State Supreme Court, Broussard, J. in his dissenting opinion cited the United States Supreme Court case,

(Delaware vs Prouse (1979) 440 US 648, 662-663) which ruled that " 'motorists' have a considerable and legitimate expectation of privacy in their automobiles, including expectation of freedom of movement"] [Author would argue that a person traveling in his 'consumer goods' with doors locked and windows closed, and which is not heavily, persuasively regulated dedicated motor vehicle, certainly comes within the restrictions imposed on government police power by the Fourth Amendment] "It seems rather elementary to us that a locked door is a very strong manifestation of a person's expectation of privacy, and thus, protected by the Fourth Amendment" People vs Trull (1978) 380 NE2d 1169 [Driving for pleasure, private business, or personal transportation (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 22 PAGE 209 (cont) obviously does not deprive a 'motorist' of the Fourth Amendment protection from invasions/ intrusions, unless 'palpable, reasonable articulable probable cause exists] "As to general public, his expectation of privacy was unqualified" State vs Johnson (1981) 301 NW2d 625, 628 "Court rejects the argument that driving is a persuasively regulated activity subjecting motorists to roving stops. Court explained that roving stops of a motorist was unreasonable, the driver was not in the same position as the gun manufacturer or liquor distributor who had, in effect, consented to the inspection by entering a heavily regulated industry" Almieda-Sanchez vs US (1973) 413 US 266 [So, the expectation of privacy is not qualified merely because the motorist uses the common public highways and he is a member of the public, but only when licensed and obtains a benefit by catering to the general public] "Because a person travels by motor vehicle, vehicle does not become a viable touchstone which determines that the scope of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment is reduced or eliminated, such

determination would be conclusory." Standing and Expectation of Privacy 31 University of Florida Law Review "The individual's right to privacy may be raised on the specific provisions of constitution protected personal privacy, from other forms of governmental invasion, so that the individual is able to raise the shield of the constitution (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 23 PAGE 210 (cont) against the practice, and if a zone of privacy can be grounded on neutral principles rooted in constitutional protection of Amendments of the United States First, Third, Fifth, Ninth." US vs Choate 576 F2d 165; cert denied 439 US 953, and California State Constitution Article 1, s1 "The vision of the Fourth Amendment that emerges from this re-interpretation is that any effort by a government agency to obtain information falls within the ban of fourth if it intrudes upon citizen's security." Katz vs US (1967) 389 US 351 [The involuntary disclosure of personal information, induced by deceit of color of statute, color of uniform, at time of quasi-police stop by the demand for identification when no nexus exists with a particular administrative agency (department of motor vehicles), the deceit and coercion being that failure to produce identification of oneself, registration of a vehicle, or evidence of license fee paid, is an unlawful intrusion/invasion/deprival of privacy by some person who, under color of Vehicle Code, when there is no actual knowledge that the individual stopped is a person within the jurisdiction of the Department of Motor Vehicles as licensee who, at the time of the traffic stop, is using/enjoying the privilege and its benefits] "When disclosure of personal information, which is potentially harmful, violates the right secured by the constitution, and the constitution secures the right of privacy because that (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 24 PAGE 211 (cont) privacy right is 'indispensable' to some other

constitutional right, and thus critical questions are whether, and how, involuntary information affected exercise of right independently secured by the constitution. The constitution protects individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matter, which right is well characterized as the 'right of selective disclosure' " Crain vs Krehbiel 443 F Supp 202 [Obviously, any information extracted from you which would lead to prosecution and fines, assessments, or incarceration, can not be compelled by the intrusion of privacy] [If the person stopping is legitimately able to act for the Department of Motor Vehicles as an employee or agent, and by his own determination able to articulate that you are a person within the jurisdiction of the agency, i.e., (a chauffeur catering to the general public in some capacity, and have collected a sum of monies or anticipate collecting a sum of monies in some activity regulated by the Department of Motor Vehicles) then you are ripe for the plucking] [When you are a person traveling as a private affair and the purpose of the traveling is without business privileges from an agency of the corporate state, then the state nor the general public of the state, has any interest in that private affair for it neither gains a benefit due it, nor does it lose a benefit due it] "A right of action for invasion of one's privacy is recognized in California" VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 25 PAGE 212 Coverstone vs Davies 38 Cal2d 315; cert denied Mock vs Davies 344 US 840 [Intrusion into a plaintiff's private affairs are tortable cause of action. Private affairs are those acts which are not clothed with public interest, which affects the plaintiff but have no effect upon the public, and no duty is owed the general public or to any division of the state] Four torts are encompassed with the 'law of privacy'. (1) Intrusion upon plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs;

(2)Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) Publicity which places plaintiff in a false light in the public's eyes; (4) Appropriation for defendant's advantage, of likeness or name. Lugosi vs Universal Studios 25 Cal3d 813 "The state cannot enter the realm of the private life of the individual anymore than it can enter the realm of private family life" Moore vs City of East Cleveland 431 US 494 (1977) [So, seriously consider a civil suit when stopped, and as a result of that stop you are deprived of the right to privacy as is the common mala in se criminal] VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 26 PAGE 213 PART 6 THAT PART OF VEHICLE CODE WHICH PERMITS PEACE OFFICERS TO ARREST FOR MALA PROHIBITA MISDEMEANORS, AND TRIED AS THOUGH MALA EN SE MISDEMEANORS BY QUASI-CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WITHOUT TRUE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS [Where the matter is a quasi-criminal procedure for mala prohibita misdemeanor under Vehicle Code, then because a six month jail incarceration may ensue, it is a deprival of due process of the law. When true criminal procedure is absent from the prosecution by law enforcement agency, and when arresting officer fails to file with Notice to Appear, a verified complaint with the law enforcement agency] "TRAFFIC OFFENSES - JUDGE IN CAPACITY OF MAGISTRATE. Arresting officer must file a complaint under oath stating the offense charged, and copy of the Notice to Appear to the officer's law enforcement agency, sss 40500, 40504, 40506. The failure to appear mandates regular complaint filed (Pen C. ss 948, 963) with court." [It is the belief of the author that the law enforcement agency must be the Department of Motor Vehicles, as Notices to Appear are only authorized within Vehicle Code, and original jurisdiction lies only with that agency] [This author then started his research with VC s40500, and followed

its references and continuing sections, and made the discovery that a Notice to Appear included violations of ordinances of city and county traffic violations. So, somewhere along the line in the chain of command and delegation (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 27 PAGE 214 (cont) of authority, the county municipal courts have been delegated the authority to hear county and city traffic ordinances when they are violated within those jurisdictions, and were licensees engaged in trafficking at the time of arrest] NOTICE TO APPEAR 40500 (a) "Whenever a person is arrested for any violation of this code not declared to be a felony, or for a violation of an ordinance of a city or county relating to traffic offenses..........the offense charged......." [I have never seen a Notice which charged an offense, which of course, is why the need for a complaint] (d) ".....the officer shall deliver the remaining original and all copies of the Notice to Appear as provided" s40506 [which merely states that the officer shall file a copy of the Notice to Appear with a magistrate or judge, and with the commissioner, chief of police, sheriff or other superior officer to the arresting officer] [So, here we go again. Author maintains the need to file a copy with the commissioner, the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles, the agency enforcing its own statutory law. The other parties must be noticed by a copy of the Notice to Appear, as they can be called as witnesses. Give this thought some serious consideration. After arraignment, subpoena the Commissioner and whomever is the superior officer of the arresting officer as a witness for the defense] [Now comes the interesting sections of Penal Code cited under failure to appear which are mandated] VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 28 PAGE 215

Pen C s948 is forms; rules for determination of sufficiency of pleadings, and in cases of inferior courts it refers to s740 PC s740. Offenses Triable in Inferior courts; Prosecution by Written complaint. Except as otherwise provided by law, all public offenses triable in the inferior courts must be prosecuted by written complaint under oath subscribed by complainant. Pen C. s963 Pleading private statutes or ordinances; judicial notice. In pleading a private statute, or ordinance of a county or a municipal corporation, or a right derived there from, it is sufficient to refer to the statute or ordinance by the title and the day of passage, and the court must take judicial notice thereof, in the same manner that it takes judicial notice of matters listed in section 452 of Evidence Code. PRIVATE STATUTE: A statute which operates only upon particular persons and private concerns. 1 Blackstone's Commentaries 86 An act which relates to certain individuals or to a particular class of men. State vs Chambers 93 NC 600 "Where a private occupational statute (vehicle code) as here, of which the intent is a regulation of private commercial occupations, the particular agency enforcing that private statute, shall not apply it by trickery and deceit, or threat and misrepresentation, to persons who are not noticed by the (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 29 PAGE 216 (cont) statute as persons regulated and taxed. Nor should it permit any party to so do, in violation of a persons right to stay out of a compelled contract, when he is not a person subject to a statute, unless clearly within its words" State vs Eberhard 179 P 853; 246 P2d 1011 [This is the demanded procedure for issue of a 'failure to appear bench warrant' if person is clearly within its words]

"Before a man can be punished, his case must be plainly and unmistakenly within the statute, and if there is any doubt whether the statute embraces it, that doubt is to be resolved in favor of the accused" US vs Lacher 134 US 624 Evid C. s452 JUDICIAL NOTICE MAY BE TAKEN OF THE FOLLOWING MATTERS TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY ARE NOT EMBRACED WITHIN s451 (a) The decisional, constitutional, and statutory law of any state of the United States, and the resolutions and private acts........of the legislature of this state. s453. COMPULSORY JUDICIAL NOTICE UPON REQUEST The trial court shall take judicial notice of any matter specified in s452, if a party requests it and: (a) Gives each adverse party sufficient notice of the request through the pleadings, or otherwise, to enable such adverse party to prepare to meet the request, and: (b) Furnished the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter. VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 30 PAGE 217 [The bottom line question is: Is this a mala prohibita or is it a mala en se violation?] [This author believes and contends that any action, which is initiated by a Notice to Appear pursuant to Vehicle Code, cannot be converted to a public offense status. That is why cops, district attorneys and prosecutors, never, when a party has been issued a civil, extra-judicial notice, file a verified complaint charging a public offense based only on the notice itself, and why arresting quasi-cops never verify a Notice to Appear as required under s40513 (b), which only then permits the magistrate to issue a bench warrant for failure to appear when the notice is checked as a 'traffic ticket'.] [If the matter was a true penal code misdemeanor, mala en se, and the issue is 'no Driver's License', and you are to be prosecuted for not having a Driver's License, here is the due process procedure which the magistrate & prosecutor must do when the procedure is 'quasi-criminal' in nature]

[Understand that because cops/prosecutors/magistrates would have you believe that 'driving is a privilege', they are not actually saying the mere driving (verb) is the privilege. The privilege is to do some act which would otherwise be unlawful, i.e., selling alcoholic beverages, or driving for compensation or anticipated compensation] "Criminal prosecution and conviction for violation of a law requiring a license, or imposing an occupation or private tax, will lie where (Commonwealth vs Leswing 5 A2d 809), and only where (City of Pittsburgh vs Kane 14 A2d 887), and the (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 31 PAGE 218 (cont) accused's conduct comes within the condemnation of the statute sought to be enforced. The question of what court has jurisdiction of such prosecution is determined by the statute" City of St. Louis vs Bouckaert 185 SW2d 886 [If a Vehicle Code misdemeanor were a true misdemeanor, then the demand for a verified complaint is clearly mandated in s40513(a)] "A complaint must be sufficiently definitive and specific, to give fair notice to the accused of the nature of the case he is to meet, and furnish the court and jury with sufficient basis for an appropriate judgment" US vs Independent Meat 32 F Supp 317 "The necessity and sufficiency of allegations are determined in accordance with general principles. Where facts are material elements of the offense, .........., and where the license is required for doing certain acts only under certain conditions, a complaint for doing such acts without required license should clearly set out the existence of such conditions in order to bring the offense within the statute" State vs Insley 20 A 1031 "Before a man can be punished, his case must be plainly & unmistakenly within the statute, and if there is any doubt whether the statute embraces it, that doubt is to be resolved in favor of the accused" US Lacher 134 US 624 "Where the complaint is for pursuing or engaging in an occupation

or profession requiring a license, it must be (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 32 PAGE 219 (cont) alleged that the accused did pursue or engage in such occupation, and that the accused did pursue or engage in without the required license" People vs Wacks 137 NYS 652 Calif - People vs Jarvis 27 P2d 77, 135 CalApp 288 "The fact that the occupation or business is carried on for compensation or profit, must be alleged where the fact is essential element of the offense" Cousins vs Commonwealth 19 Gratt 807 37 Cal Juris p 268, note 20 "The essential elements of the offense must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt" Fuller vs City 152 So 66 "The burden is on the prosecution, in the first instance, to prove all the material elements of the offense charged; when the prima facie case has been established, the burden devolves on accused of adducing evidence as to the matters of defense, such as, he was exempt from the requirement" Ex parte Buczkowski D.C. Cal 30 F2d 416 affirmed CCA 32 F2d 891 PART 7 NOTICE TO APPEAR IS USED AS A PLEADING WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF EITHER PENAL CODE OR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE [That part of the Notice to Appear, which is an administrative civil procedure, non-judicial in nature, cannot be used as a pleading] "Held, that a uniform traffic ticket is not sufficient (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 33 PAGE 220 (cont) information to be used as a pleading, and held that the absence of verified information was a jurisdictional defect which could not be waived by a plea of guilty"

3 NY2d 148 "As a notice does not allege or show any probable cause for an arrest, and the fact that petitioner was released on a promise to appear before a committing magistrate for an arraignment, that fact is circumstance, to be considered in determining whether in first instance there was probable cause for the arrest" Monroe vs Pape D.C. Illinois 1963, 221 F Supp 635 [Notice requires the individual to sign a promise to appear with an admission of guilt a part thereof] "Without admitting guilt, I promise to appear........" [That is a plea, and in the opinion of the author, that is a plea of guilty as it does not state 'not guilty', but the fact is that it is a plea] [That is an unconstitutional demand for a plea made to an individual who, at the time, is not a sworn officer of a court with subject matter/personam jurisdiction to accept a plea] "Officer was not duly sworn at the time of issue of the notice, and notice was not verified, therefore the notice is null and void, and has no legal binding in this court or in this case" Federal 34 US 969 Gleason 32 Kansas 245 Balard 43 Ohio 340 VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 34 PAGE 221 [A plea cannot be accepted until a formal, verified complaint has been filed by a law enforcement agency with the magistrate of the court, showing probable cause, and the asking of a warrant of arrest] "TRAFFIC OFFENSES - JUDGE IN CAPACITY OF MAGISTRATE Arresting officer must file a complaint under oath stating offense charged, and a copy of the Notice to Appear, to the officer's law enforcement agency. VC sss40500, 40504, 40506, Pen C sss948, 963, 11.36, filed with the court." [If the complaint is filed under Vehicle Code, the matter is before a magistrate]

"The word 'magistrate', does not necessarily imply an officer exercising any judicial functions" Schultz vs Merchant's Insur Co 57 Mo 336 [If the complaint is filed under Penal Code, the matter is a true criminal complaint demanding all the protection to the accused by the court at-law under 4th, 5th, and 6th Amendments of the Bill of Rights] [So, if or when you appear in a municipal court on a Notice to Appear (traffic ticket), then you must ask the man on the bench whether the arrest was a civil arrest pursuant to Vehicle Code, or if it was a criminal arrest pursuant to the Penal Code. You can then understand the nature of the action against you, and ask for the mandated complaint so you can understand the nature of the charge, as you cannot enter a plea without understanding the charge filed with the court] VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 35 PAGE 222 PART 8 "WITHOUT ADMITTING GUILT, ......." HAS THE SAME EFFECT AS A PLEA OF GUILTY, AS THERE IS AN AWARENESS OF GUILT, THOUGH NOT ADMITTED. ONLY A PLEA OF 'NOT GUILTY' DENIES GUILT "A plea of guilty, in so far as regards proceeding on complaint, and is a confession for purposes of criminal prosecution" US vs Hartwell 3 Clifford 221 [So, if the magistrate informs you that a Notice to Appear is the same as a complaint, or is a complaint, and the proceedings before the court are criminal or quasi-criminal, then inform the magistrate that the confession of guilt is being withdrawn] [When a plea of guilt is obtained under duress and coercion, if the notice will not be signed, then it is invalid. A confession must be voluntary and knowingly made, and must show corpus delicti, prima facie and mens rea evidence before it may be introduced into the record of the case by a court at a pre-trial hearing, or at the trial] [Where a confession is obtained under duress, by coercion or threat, and fear of loss of liberty, that confession is not an admissible confession of guilt. Standing alone, without a

determination that it was in fact voluntary, is a 'naked' confession] "A confession is naked when it is unsupported by any evidence of a crime by the confessor, and was induced from the confessor by the threat of official prosecution, and (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 36 PAGE 223 (cont) thus, is not voluntary" Cannon vs US 19 F2d 823 State vs Dolan 90 A 1034, 1035 "No confession induced by threat of official prosecution is voluntary, and as such, is not admissible on a question of guilt even though statements contained in the confession may be independently established as true" Rogers vs City of Richmond 357 US 200 "A confession is a fact to be proved by evidence, rather than evidence to prove a fact" State vs Castelli 101 A 476 MANDATORY APPEARANCE s40302 VC. Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of this code, not declared to be a felony, the arrested person shall be taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate within the county in which the offense charged is alleged to have been committed, and who has jurisdiction of the offense and is nearest or most accessible with reference to the place where the arrest is made in any of the following case; (b) When the person arrested refuses to give his written promise to appear in court. [Subd. (b) constitutes the threat and coercion used to compel the confession and shows the act of signing the confession was not voluntary] [Additionally, the confession should not be admissible evidence as it was made to an individual who was not a sworn (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 37 PAGE 224

(cont) officer of the court before which you must appear. The court magistrate must suppress the unknowing, involuntary confession of guilt on the notice, and suppress the notice itself, as standing alone it is without probative proof or evidence of the commission of an arrestable offense by the signatory] PROBATIVE: In the law of evidence. Having the effect of proof; tending to prove, or actually proving. Testimony carrying quality of proof and having fitness to induce conviction of truth, consisting of fact and reason co-operating as co-ordinate factors. Black's p 1367 [Thus, where a magistrate admits a Notice to Appear as a confession without voluntary giving of evidence, and no proof of corpus delicti, prima facie and mens rea, and where the magistrate has informed the defendant that the matter before the bench is criminal or quasi-criminal prosecution, then there must be a showing reading of Miranda vs Arizona rights 1966, 384 US 436, 444 rule] [Remember, vehicle code considers stops as arrests. The issuing of the notice constitutes 'constructive custody' had by the court when a promise was made to appear] [Repeat. If you ask the magistrate what is the nature of your appearance and the procedure before him, he will inform you that is criminal or quasi-criminal, thus due process criminal prosecution must be observed from the moment of the original stop and arrest, which was custodial, because you were denied the right to continue to enjoy your liberty to leave] VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 38 PAGE 225 MIRANDA RULE Prior to any custodial interrogation; that is questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way, the person must be warned: (1) The he has a right to remain silent; (2) That any statement he does make which may be used as evidence against him; (3) That if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Unless, and until these warning or a waiver of these rights are

demonstrated at the trial, no evidence obtained in the interrogation may be used against the accused. Miranda vs Arizona 384 US 436, 444, 478, 479; 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612; 16 L ed2d 294 [So, at the time of the stop, and you have asked the cop (quasi-cop) if he is arresting pursuant to Vehicle Code or Penal Code, whichever he informs you, demand that your Miranda rights be read to you] [Repeat. It is the author's opinion that an arrest is an arrest under either code, and demand that he not only read the Miranda rights, but that you be given a copy with his signature that he did read you your rights, COPS LIE!] [Repeat. On the issue of notices to appear being extra-judicial confessions] VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 39 PAGE 226 "But, even if we assume against the prisoner that, besides his own extra-judicial confessions, there was evidence given at the trial tending to prove the corpus delicti, the instructions asked would not, for that reason, be less pertinent, nor would it be of less importance that the jury should be instructed that his guilt could not be established alone by his extra-judicial statements or confessions" People vs Thrail 50 Cal 414 (1875) "The rule is clearly established in this state that the extra-judicial statements, or admissions of the commission of a crime charged him, are insufficient to establish the existence of any substantive or essential element of a crime charged against the defendant....The Corpus Delicti consists of the elements of the crime" People vs Quarez (1925) 196 Cal 404, 408-409 People vs Simonsen 107 Cal 346 People vs Vertees 169 Cal 404 [Here is corpus delicti explained] "The rule of proof of corpus delicti requires that the elements of the crime must be established before admissions or confessions of

a defendant may be admitted in evidence. The required evidence is: (1) the injury, loss, or harm, and (2) that the criminal agency was the cause. The preliminary proof need not be beyond reasonable doubt, but only a slight or prima facie showing is necessary" People vs Wong (1973) 35 CalApp3d 812, 839 [So. Cause the magistrate to make a clear, unmistakable (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 12 - 40 PAGE 227 (cont) claim that the proceedings are not civil, but most assuredly criminal in nature, on the record of the case filed with the Court Clerk] [Addendum. When you sign the notice, cross out "Without admitting guilt" and print, "NOT GUILTY", and on your appearance at arraignment, be sure to ask the court room clerk or the bailiff for a copy of "ADVISEMENT OF RIGHTS AND CERTAIN COURT PROCEDURES, but preferably a copy of LEGAL RIGHTS. Sign it 'no waiver of rights', and when you stand before the bench inform the magistrate that you need to have your legal rights read to you on the record, so that you will be certain that you understand them, and also a copy of the verified complaint be given you, and that the magistrate read the charges (not mere cites from Vehicle Code in the Notice to Appear) as you do not understand them] s40300 VC Application of Chapter Article 1 Arrests The provisions of this chapter shall govern all peace officers in making arrests for violations of this code, without a warrant, for offenses committed in their presence, but the procedure prescribed herein, shall not otherwise be exclusive to any other method prescribed by law for the arrest, and prosecution of a person for an offense of like grade. [Here is the knowledge that a mala prohibita violation must be processed the same as a mal in se violation from the words of the code itself] PAGE 228 CITIZEN'S LAW REVIEW Publisher Public Interest School of Law VOL 1 ISSUE 6 - 1992

HAVE YOU BEEN CHARGED WITH DRIVING WITHOUT A LICENSE? The following is what is known as a 'so what' defense; yes, I was driving without a chauffeur/driver license, 'so what!', no law exists which can command me to have a license while using the common highways for personal travel, pleasure, transportation or business, or while engaged in a legitimate business for profit . In the RED BOOK, the string of argument is that where a man is not engaged in a business activity for compensation, there is no need for a chauffeur/driver license by an individual. That police power exists to license an activity only when the activity is unlawful under common law, i.e.., selling alcoholic beverages. Thus, author alleges that so long as the right to engage in a business, which is a commercial activity, exists, then when engaged in a lawful business/occupation, then the man has the right to engage in commerce, that commerce itself can be regulated, but the individual so engaged cannot be regulated or controlled by a license, which may only be required for acts which are for the benefit of general public by the dedication of one's property to the benefit of the general public. Without the dedication, then one is only pursuing a livelihood by performing a service in commerce, as the means by which one's property remains private, thereby no obligation to the general public, but only to the individual member of the general public, one is serving, thus, any obligation thereby is only the subject of civil litigation between private litigants. Remembering that the legislature has no police power, and private statutory enactments are without police power as they are private, in nature, such as Vehicle Code, and your pursuit of a legitimate pursuit; let's turn to the law and be educated as to your right to use the public highways, and your private automobile for legitimate compensation by servicing another individual. "The right of a citizen to engage in a business that is innocent and useful is constitutionally protected (Whitwell, In re 98 C 73, 32 P 870), and neither the legislature (Whitwell & Laurel Hill etc. vs San Francisco 152 C 464, 93 P 70 affd 216 US 358, 54 Led 515, 30 S Ct; Foley In re 172 C 744, 158 P 1034; Mares, In re 75 CA2d 798, 171 P2d 762), nor the governing body of a city or county (McCoy In re 98 CA 116, 101 P 419) may, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private

business, or impose unusual or unnecessary restriction of lawful occupations. The procuring of licenses may not be required, as means of prohibiting any avocation that is not injurious to the public morals, offensive to the senses, or dangerous to the public health and safety; nor may conditions by annexed to their issuance that would tend to such a prohibition (Whitwell In re supra; Sonara vs Crutin 137 C 583, 70 P 674) "The right to prohibit the sale or traffic in intoxicating liquor, is entirely separate and distinct from the power to regulate and impose a license tax, thereon, for revenue purposes, and an ordinance which in terms proceeds under the latter power, but in effect amounts to an exercise of the former, cannot stand" Merced County vs Fleming 111 C 46, 43 P 392 Thus, where there is no power to regulate the individual man in the pursuit of happiness, and a legitimate livelihood, then the (cont) PAGE 229 (cont) use of the license fee to obtain revenue, cannot stand where it can only exist under the power to regulate. "The principle limitation on the exercise of power to license is that a legitimate business may not be subjected to oppressive, or unjust discriminatory burdens (Guerrero In re 69 C 88, 10 P 261; Pacific etc. vs Conrad 168 C 91, 141 P 916) Indeed, a state cannot exclude a person from any occupation in a manner, or for reasons, that contravene the due process or equal protection clauses of Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Endler vs Schutzbank 68 C2d 162, 65 CalTptr 297, 436 P2d 297) Let's exhaust WHITWELL, which is so pertinent to the issue of no licensing of the individual, when the respondent in that case argued that licensing is a legitimate police regulation: Quoting the court in WHITWELL: "The police power-the power to make laws to secure the comfort, convenience, peace & health of the community-is an extensive one, & in its exercise a very wide discretion as to what is needful, or proper for that purpose, is necessarily committed to the legislative body in which the power to make such laws is vested (Ex parte Tuttle 91 Cal 589) But, it is not true that when this power is exerted for the purpose of regulating a business or occupation, which in itself is recognized

as innocent and useful to the community, the legislature is the exclusive judge as to what is a reasonable and just restraint upon a constitutional right of the citizen to pursue such business or profession. As the right of the citizen to engage in such business or follow such a profession is protected by the constitution, it is always a judicial question whether any particular regulation of such right is a valid exercise of the legislative power (Tiedeman's Limitation of Police Power ss 85, 194 State vs Jersey City 47 NJL 286; Commonwealth vs Robertson 5 Cush 438; Austin vs Murray 16 Piek 121) This principle is stated very forcibly in the case of (Mugler vs Kansas 123 US 661), in the following language;" "The courts are not bound by mere forms, nor are they to be misled by mere pretenses. They are at liberty, indeed are under solemn duty, to look at the substance of things whenever they enter upon the inquiry, of whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its authority. If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety (here think vehicle code, inserted by author), has no real or substantive relation to these objects, or is palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the constitution" And so, in the (Matter of Jacobs 98 NY 108; 50 Am Rep 636, Earl J.) in delivering the opinion of the court in that case, said in relation to the power of the legislature to make police regulations: "The limit of the power cannot be accurately defined, and the courts have not been able, or willing definitely to circumscribe it. But, the power, however, broad and extensive is not above the constitution. When it speaks its voice must be heeded. It furnishes the supreme law and guide for the conduct of legislators, judges and private persons, and so far as it imposes restraints, the police power must be exercised in subordination thereto." And this necessary limitation upon the power of the legislature to interfere with the fundamental rights of the citizens in the enactment of police regulations was recognized by this (cont) PAGE 230 (cont) court in (Ex parte Sing Lee 96 Cal 354), in which case, we said that the personal liberty of the citizen and his rights of property cannot be invaded under guise of police regulation

Unquote. "So long as one uses his property for private purposes and does not devote it to public use, the public has no interest in it and no voice it its control." (Assoc. Pipe vs Rail Road Comm 176 Cal 518) "The Constitution found it (commerce) an existing right, and (Gibbons vs Ogden 9 Wheaton 1, 211) it gave to Congress the power to regulate it" The citizen's rights in commerce do not come from the Constitution. They existed before the Constitution was written, and as Chief Justice Marshall pointed out, the Constitution recognizes that fact. If the right of man to trade is above the Constitution, and the Constitution empowers Congress only to regulate commerce, by no sound reasoning can the conclusion be reached that Congress can stop commerce. Mugler vs Kansas supra: "It does not follow that every statute, enacted ostensibly for the promotion of these ends, is to be accepted as a legitimate exertion of the police powers of the State. There are, of necessity, limits beyond which legislation cannot rightfully go. While every possible presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of the Statute, the courts must obey the Constitution, rather than the law making department of government and must, upon their own responsibility, determine whether, in any particular case, these limits have been passed." So, although Congress and the Legislatures of the States may regulate commerce, that regulation cannot demand franchises, licensing, permits required of the Man, so engaged, as rights cannot be licensed where a right exists, other than by the voluntary act by the Man. REGULATE: The power of Congress to regulate commerce is the power to enact all appropriate legislation for its protection or advancement; to adopt measures to promote its growth, and insure its safety; to foster, protect, control and restrain. (Virginia etc. vs System etc. 84 F2d 641, 650) Thus, State and Congress may regulate the commercial activity of the trafficker, manufacturer, dedicated property, i.e. seat belts, safety features in a manufacturer's products; regulate the food processor, drug manufacturer, etc., for the safety of the

public, or those who have an effect on the morals of the public, but that is done by licensing/franchising/incorporation, but not the individual functioning as a private man/individual to serve another man/individual while so doing to earn a livelihood, which does not endanger the public etc. VOL 1 CHAPTER 13 - 1 PAGE 231 PENALTY FOR VIOLATIONS OF VEHICLE CODE, AS ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE, ARE INFLICTED WITHOUT CONVICTION IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. AS VEHICLE CODE INFLICTS A MILDER DEGREE OF PUNISHMENT THAN THAT OF DEATH IT IS CALLED A "BILL OF PAINS & PENALTIES" BILL OF ATTAINDER. Black's 4th p 162 "Bills of attainder" as they are technically called, are such special acts of the legislature as inflicts capital punishment upon persons supposed guilty of high offenses, such as treason and felony, without any conviction in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. If an act inflicts a milder degree of punishment than death, it is called a 'bill of pains and penalties', but both are included in the prohibition in the federal constitution" Losier vs Sherman, 157 Kansas 153, 138 P2d 272, 273; State vs Graves, 352 Mo 1102, 183 SW2d 46, 54 Black's 4th. In the United States, the doctrine of attainder is now scarcely known, although during and shortly after the Revolution, acts of attainder were passed by several of the states. The passage of such bills is expressly forbidden by the constitution. Attainder differs from conviction, in that it is 'after' judgment, whereas conviction is upon verdict of guilty, but 'before' judgment pronounced.....The consequences of attainder are forfeiture of property. FORFEITURE: "To incur a penalty; to become liable to the payment of a sum of money, as the consequence of a certain (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 13 - 2 PAGE 232 (cont) act" Sands vs Holbert 93 W Va 574, 117 SW 896, 899; Ford vs Ellison 287 Mo 683, 230 SW 637, 640

"Something to which the right is lost, by the commission of a crime or fault, or the losing of something by way of penalty" Ridgeway vs City of Akron, Ohio App 42 NE2d 724, 726 Note. 8. The incurring a liability to pay a definite sum of money as the consequence of violating the provisions of some statute......... Note. 9. A ...... of sum of money forfeited. Something imposed as a punishment for an offense......... FINE: Criminal Law, A pecuniary punishment imposed by law by a tribunal upon a person convicted of misdemeanor. Black's 4th p 759 [That part of the California Commercial Vehicle Code, which grants the power to the Department of Motor Vehicles, to define certain violations of the code as misdemeanors, and to impose penal penalties by a non-judicial civil special proceedings is unconstitutional, and cannot be enforced under the Constitution of the United States or California Constitution] Constitution of the United States Article 1, s9, cl 3: No bill of attainer shall be passed. California Constitution Article s16 No bill of attainer,........shall ever be passed. VOL 1 CHAPTER 13 - 3 PAGE 233 Note. 31 Definition "A 'bill of attainer' is a legislative act inflicting punishment without judicial trial" Dept of Social Welfare of State vs Gardiner (1949) 210 P2d 855, 94 CalApp2d 431 "This clause and principle of separation of powers are intended only as protection for individual persons, and private groups, those who are peculiarly vulnerable to non-judicial determinations of guilt." State vs Katzenback, SC 1966, 66 S Ct 803; 383 US 301 [Department of Motor Vehicles has no judicial powers delegated to it by Statute, 1959, Vehicle Code. It may not impose fines or

incarcerate individuals within its jurisdiction, but persons, class of persons, are subject of non-judicial determinations of guilt, by a magistrate of a municipal tribunal sitting as an 'arm' for enforcement of Vehicle Code, which are by summary procedure and summary judgment] "Bill of attainer clause not only was intended as one implementation of general principle of fractionized power, but also reflected framer's belief that the legislative branch is not well suited, as politically independent judges and juries, to task of ruling upon blameworthiness of, and levying appropriate punishment upon, specific persons" US vs Brown, Cal, 1965, 85 S Ct 1707, 14 L Ed2d 484 [Legislature has permitted the Department of Motor Vehicles to delegate, to magistrates of corporate municipal tribunals (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 13 - 4 PAGE 234 (cont) (courts), the authority to sit as administrative hearing officials for it, and by summary procedures initiated by civil non-judicial notices to appear, make a summary judgment, and to impose fines and assessments and impose county jail sentences. Summary procedures are non-judicial, in nature, and operate without the usual protection guaranteed under the 4th & 5th Amendments of Federal Constitution and are heard by a quasi-criminal procedure] [Procedure in summary proceedings is governed by the provisions of the statute. The proceedings are not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted. But, such a procedure by a party pursuing that remedy, must bring his case strictly within the requirements of the statute] [In summary proceedings, although defendant must be notified or summoned to appear, the process or notice need not satisfy the requirement of formal summonses, and so it has been stated that a summary proceeding ordinarily implies one begun without summons or supena] "A 'summary proceeding' is not an action, though analogous to its purpose and scope, it is special proceeding. Properly speaking, therefore, there can be no judgment in summary proceedings, though the final order entered is frequently referred to as a judgment, and is in effect a judgment"

Seymour vs Hughs, 105 NYS 249, 250 [Thus, summary procedure is not judicial trial, and any judgment, in effect, is not a judicial judgment, and any (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 13 - 5 PAGE 235 (cont) penal penalty is punishment by pain & penalties] "Legislatures may act to curb behavior which they regard as harmful to public welfare, whether such is found to be engaged in by many persons or by one, and so long as the incidence of legislation is such that persons who engaged in regulated conduct, by they many or few, can escape regulation merely by altering the course of present activities, there may be no complaint of attainer" Communist Party vs Control Brd, 367 US 1, rehearing denied 368 US 871 "Principle on which this clause is based, the notion that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties, is fundamental to our concept of constitutional liberty, and, as such, that right is protected against judicial action by due process clause of Amend. 5" US vs Brown, Ca Geo 1977, 555 F2d 407, rehearing denied 599 F2d 29, Cert denied 98 S Ct 1440, 435 US 904 [In California, all individuals are told by peace officers, and magistrates of municipal tribunals, that it is a privilege to use the common highways of the state for personal business, pleasure, transportation of private goods, or family benefit, merely because they use a motor drawn vehicle as mode of conveyance without the registration of that conveyance, and a license fee/tax paid, and the granting of a Driver's License by the Department of Motor Vehicles] [Thus, fair warning is denied the individual that, in fact, (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 13 - 6 PAGE 236 (cont) only the individual engaged in commercial enterprise/activity/business, dedicated and conducted for the benefit of the public, is within the jurisdiction of the Department

of Motor Vehicles and under supervision of the Vehicle Code] [In California, the individual cannot escape, by altering his course of conduct to avoid the prosecution under Vehicle Code by Department of Motor Vehicles, as even when he uses the common highways for personal travel, business, transportation and business between private parties, and are parties outside the jurisdiction of statute and its code and administrative agency, he/they are prosecuted by summary procedure and summary judgment but, by deceit, misrepresentation, fraud are told that all violations under Vehicle Code are Criminal actions, and alleged violators appear before a magistrate by a Case Number entitled People of the State of California vs John/Jane Doe. Thus, grounds lie for an action for malicious abuse of process by an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder (bill of pains & penalties), as individuals are being prosecuted seeking criminal penalties by non-judicial actions without the protection of the 5th Amendment, which limits the way in which a person may be prosecuted] [Thus, the legislature has created a form of statute, which speaking on its own behalf and acts on behalf of the legislature, as judicial function or more simply expressed, trial by the legislature] "Legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply......in such a way as to inflict punishment without judicial (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 13 - 7 PAGE 237 (cont) trial, are 'bills of attainder' (bill of pains & penalties)" US vs Lovett 328 US 303, 90 L Ed 1252 VOL 1 CHAPTER 14 - 1 PAGE 238 ALTHOUGH ALL MATTERS OF VEHICLES CODE WHEREIN A VIOLATION IS ALLEGED ARE NOT MALA IN SE, BUT IN FACT MALA PROHIBITA MUNICIPAL COURT MAGISTRATES STATE THAT THE BEFORE THEM IS A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION, MALA IN SE. [Thus, the court would have the defendant believe that he is in a judicial court at law, not true]

2 Am Jur2d s779. Administrative jurisdiction as excluding judicial jurisdiction. Unless there is a clear indication of a contrary legislative intent, (17) if the legislature provides a remedy before an administrative agency which meets the demand of due process of the law (18), and does not invade the constitutional jurisdiction of a court, a court may be deemed to have no jurisdiction in the premises. Administrative agencies and their departments have been held to have exclusive original jurisdiction of particular matter, which precludes an original action in court in regard to such matters, (20) particularly where the statute provides for 'final and conclusive' action by the administrative agency. (1) This principle is not limited to remedies in relation to rights created by the statutes empowering the administrative agencies, but applies as well, to 'common law rights' protection or endorsement, of which, is confided to the administrative tribunals. (2) (17) Union P R Co vs Price 360 US 601, 3 L ed2d 1460 Holding that action at law was precluded by prior choice of administrative remedy. (18) Sunshine Coal Co vs Adkins 319 US 381, 84 Led 1263 VOL 1 CHAPTER 14 - 2 PAGE 239 Where Congress has created a special administrative procedure for the determination of the status of persons or companies under a regulatory act, and has prescribed a procedure which meets all requirements of due process, that remedy is exclusive. [Remember, any act of Congress as to constitutional rights to due process of law, administrative or at law, is binding on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, so don't let the magistrate bluff you that this is an exclusive state issue] (20) Pennsylvania R. Co vs Day 360 US 543, 3 L ed2d 1422 Retirement of an employee did not effect the board's exclusive jurisdiction to interpret a labor agreement. [Hypothetical. A person/individual was a licensee, but after the notice to appear that individual surrendered the privileges of the license, but the magistrate is going to permit prosecution on the ground that the violation was committed before the surrender of the license. That individual is still entitled to a final determination and remedy by an administrative hearing by Department of Motor

Vehicles] (1) First Moon vs White Tail 270 US 243, 70 Led 565 (2) Erie R Co vs Stewart Furnace Co 17 Ohio App 335 Common law recognizes a right.......... [Magistrate cannot engage in any action before it which would deprive the individual of administrative remedy which recognizes common law rights as must the magistrate sitting for the agency and as the magistrate must when he falsely states the proceedings are mala in se, criminal action] VOL 1 CHAPTER 14 - 3 PAGE 240 "A court cannot engage in any action which deprives a party before it his constitutional rights. It has long been recognized that it is a proper function of courts to act as check on improper use of both executive and legislative powers" Powell vs McCormick 395 US 486 In Powell, the Court quoted Kilborn vs Thompson 103 US 168 as its authority: "Especially is it competent and proper for this court to consider whether proceedings are in conformity with the constitution and laws (statutory enactments are law as to the class identified in the statute, but only as to that class) because, living under a written constitution no branch or department of government (Department of Motor Vehicles) is supreme; it is the province and duty of judiciary in cases regularly brought before them, whether powers of any branch of government have been exercised in conformity to the constitution; if they have not, to treat their acts as null and void" [Regularly brought before them means, at law of due process that the court has proper/competent subject matter jurisdiction and personam] [So, use the estoppel power available to you, remembering first, that the matter must have been properly and competently brought into the jurisdiction of the court,and that a notice to appear does not, but if the magistrate asserts, and I would demand that he do it in writing, under (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 14 - 4

PAGE 241 (cont) oath, that the magistrate has jurisdiction by a mere civil extra-judicial notice, then ask for a continuance. With the continuance, you will have time to file Form 372, and there after if the magistrate refuses to dismiss, the Form 373 for a writ of prohibition with the Superior Court of the County] [Although the author has done his best to educate the reader on how to proceed, necessarily he can do no more than put you on the proper road and direct you to the local law library for details as to your personal case] ADDENDUM "When that statute, as in Vehicle Code, grants quasi- judicial powers to the agency, and that power is used to act and its acts are particular and immediate, a person enjoying the licensed privileges granted by the agency, also assumes obligations and liabilities of the privilege, and where a person whose rights or property may be affected by an action of the agency enforcing Vehicle Code, that person is entitled to notice and hearing of accusation and notice to defend" Calif' Fascination vs Hoover 246 P2d 656 Andrews vs State Brd 267 P2d 352 PAGE 242 ARTHUR FRANK SANFORD 5984 Villa Drive Rancho Cucamonga, CA Demandant DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES 2451 First Street Sacramento, CA ATTENTION: A.A. Pierce, Director ARTHUR FRANK SANFORD, DEMAND FOR 'FORMAL' Demandant, ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING Notice to Appear No. TO ESTABLISH RECORD FOR Agency:

REVIEW; ADJUDICATION AND Officer: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Area: ON ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD

Held, that the constitutionality of an agency's procedure may be challenged in a judicial reviewing court, without first challenging in the agency, and without first exhausting administrative remedies on the questions (Mathews vs Eldridge, 424 US 319 (1976), However, demandant believes that, because it is a sharp departure from previous law, and in certain respects, contrary to the clear words before it, that he will exhaust administrative remedies, as the historical holdings are clearly cut as to demanded procedure. Administrative exhaustion is demanded where constitutional challenge is to the statute as applied by the agency. (Matters vs City, 219 NW2d 718) Where the challenge is to the statute as administered, the exhaustion requirement does serve a useful purpose. The courts should not rule that a statute is unconstitutionally administered when the available avenues of administration have not been explored (Metcalf vs Swank, 444 F2d 1353, 1357 (7th Cir 1971), vacated on other grounds, 406 US 1114 (1972) When determination of the constitutional issue depends (cont) PAGE 243 (cont) on factual determinations, they should be made first by the administrative officials who are especially equipped to inquire, in the first instance, into the facts. (Roadway Express vs Kingsley, 179 A2d 729, 732) HISTORY OF CASE DEMANDS ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING An immediate hearing is vital on this matter as the demandant has become an aggrieved person suffering legal wrongs, no administrative hearing record of facts of the matter for review, or issues for review are extant; demandant has not been heard and

exhausted, people have not exhausted, and yet the people are proceeding without 'exclusive record of hearing' asking vehicle code enforcement where the demandant is not a common carrier, without allegation or presentation of facts that he was engaged in common carriage at the time of the 'traffic stop'. Before a matter may be reviewed, a record of the hearing and the ruling must be established on the record of the administrative agency, for review by the agency is nothing more than an appellate procedure for a final determination by the agency. Procedure to be followed is outlined within Government Code, Title 2, Div. 3, Chapter 5, Administrative Adjudication Gov C. 11500 11528 Upon final appeal by the agency the matter may be moved for a review by judicial court. The basic principle is that review is limited to the agency record (US vs Bianco, 373 US 709, 715) "The review shall be confined to the record" More recent cases applying the principle are (Interior vs Rogers, 522 P2d 164 (1974); Lellis vs Archie, 516 P2d 469, 471 (1973); Helland vs Civil Service, 519 P2d 258, 260 (1974) (cont) PAGE 244 (cont) defendant, in error, demand for a hearing. Guy Gardner Defendant, in error. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES In Austin vs Department of Motor Vehicles, Court of Appeal, Case No 037357, Superior Court No 309327, Court of Appeal, first Appellate District, Division Two held "(a) request for Formal Hearing operates to stay proceedings" "A court cannot engage in any action which deprives a party before it of his constitutional rights. It has long been recognized that it is a proper function of courts to act to check on improper use of both executive and legislative powers" Powell vs McCormack 395 US 486 citing Kilborn vs Thompson 103 US 168 to whit; "Especially is it competent and proper for this court to consider whether proceedings are in conformity with constitution and laws,

because, living under a written constitution, no branch or department of government is supreme; it is the province and duty of judicial and administrative departments, in cases regularly brought before them, whether powers of any branch of government have been exercised in conformity to the constitution; if they have not, to treat their acts as null and void" PAGE 245 Evidence may not be received by the reviewing court, even if it was wrongfully excluded by the agency, or is newly discovered evidence. If the court feels that such evidence should be heard, it should remand the case for it to be received before the agency. Not only is review restricted to the administrative record, it is also limited to the issues raised before the agency. Both orderly procedure and good administration require that objections to agency proceedings be made while the agency has the opportunity for correction (US vs Tucker, 344 US 33, 37). Any issue not raised at the administrative level may not be considered on review. A reviewing court usurps the agency's function when it sets aside the administrative determination upon a ground not theretofore presented, and deprives the agency of an opportunity to consider the matter, make its ruling, and state the reasons for its action (Unemployment vs Aragon, 329 US 143, 155 (1946) The Supreme Court has been strict in applying this principle, since it has felt that it is as essential to the effective operation of the administrative agency process as it is to that of the trial courts. Freedom to save issues until review would be as destructive of agency autonomy, as freedom to withhold evidence at the administrative level, and then to introduce it in a judicial proceeding (373 US 717) An administrative agency is a creature of statute (Soriano vs US, 494 F2d 681, 683, (9th Circuit 1974) As a corporation is to its charter, the administrative is to its enabling legislation. This means that the basic doctrine of administrative law, as of corporate law, is the doctrine of ultra vires. The jurisdiction principle is the root principle of administrative power. The statute is the source of agency authority as well as its limits. If an agency act is within the statutory limits (vires), it is valid.

If it is outside them (ultra vires), it is invalid. No statute is needed to establish this; it is inherent in the constitutional positions of agencies and courts (Stark vs Wickard, 420 F2d 592) Thus, when court sits as 'administrative agency (cont) PAGE 246 (cont) hearing officer' for administrative regulations enforcement purposes, it wields the power of the agency vires. However, when a court sits for a particular agency, ultra vires, an agency without jurisdiction subject matter or person, it is bare of power, a sham court which proceeds at its own peril. DEMAND FOR ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING An immediate hearing is vital on this matter as the demandant has become an aggrieved person, suffering legal wrongs and deprivation of the protection of his constitutional rights, and any administrative rights he may have when he is not within their jurisdiction. No administrative hearing of the case noticed on this demand has been held, or is part of the administrative record for an administrative review or issue of mandamus. Defendant has not been heard and his remedies exhausted, and people have not filed an accusation with the agency, and thus obviously, their intent is to by-pass the agency, to the detriment and harm of the demandant, and to the denigration of the agency, and its primary jurisdiction. A government agency wants jurisdiction to directly affect a person or any subject matter related to his person (Wilson vs US; US vs Texas; Murdock vs Pa.), and may not haul any natural person into any administrative forum without his voluntary assent, (voluntary being fully knowing, intentional), subscription to a particular 'regulatory scheme' (Wickard vs Filburn, USSC, 1942), it is impossible to prove jurisdiction exists absent a substantial nexus with the state, such as voluntary subscription to license. All jurisdictional facts supporting the claim that the supposed jurisdiction exists must appear on the record of the court (Pipe Line vs Marathon 102 S Ct 2858; quoting Crowell vs Benson, 285 US 22) Therefore, this demand that the 'dept' notice a (cont)

PAGE 247 (cont) hearing for the demandant within thirty days of the mailing of this demand. BY A FAILURE TO HEAR MATTER WILL BE COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED If agency fails to respond, and thus, stand silent on the demand for a hearing, and to provide remedy to the demandant, Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel will prevail. The failure of the agency to grant hearing, bars civil liability or criminal prosecution for actus reas later under the Collateral Estoppel Doctrine, as Administrative Law demands, are the administrative equivalent of judicial Declaratory judgment, and all Natural Law requirements and indicia that apply to Judicial Declaratory Judgments also apply to Administrative Judgments. Babcock vs Babcock, 63 CA2d 94; Maxwell vs Maxwell, 66 CA2d 549 That failure to hear, estopps a magistrate from presiding over criminal charges pursuant to statutory penalties, where issues were offered to be settled, and should have been settled, in the lesser executive administrative forum offering remedy. This doctrine is found as a consistent pattern of rulings throughout the United States Supreme Court rulings. Submitted, Arthur Frank Sanford Demandant PAGE 248 Instructions: The following Memorandum of Points and Authorities are not to be mailed with the Demand. It will be used at the time of the hearing. Everything else goes with the demand. Be certain that you Demand is accompanied with a Declaration of Mailing, and when you Demand is filed with whomever, a copy of the mailing of service is included. PAGE 249 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

A COURT CAN ONLY BE DELEGATED TO SIT AND HEAR THE RECORD FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES WHERE THE 'DEPT' ITSELF HAS JURISDICTION OF SUBJECT MATTER/PERSONAM "An administrative agency it a creature of statute (Soriano vs US, 494 F2d 681, 683 (9th Cir 1974) As a corporation is to its charter, administrative agency is to its enabling legislation. This means that the basic doctrine of administrative law, as of corporate law, is the doctrine of ultra vires. The jurisdiction principle of administrative power. The statute is the source of agency authority, as well as its limits. If an agency is within the statutory limits (vires), it in valid. If it is outside them (ultra vires), it is invalid. No statute is needed to establish this; it is inherent in the constitutional positions of agencies and courts (Stark vs Wickard, 420 F2d 592) Where a person is not, at the time, a licensee for the particular agency, his license having expired, and he not having asked for its renewal, neither the agency nor any other officials, has jurisdiction of said person to consider or to make any order One ground as to the jurisdiction, was that accused was not a licensee, and it is not claimed that he was. His license had expired and he had not asked its renewal. (O'Neil vs Dept Prof and Vocations, 7 CA2d 398; Eiseman vs Daugherty, 6 CA 783) There was no allegation that demandant was licensed under any act (in fact it was stated that he did not have a license). The license was not offered in evidence. But assuming the accusation was sufficient, evidence failed to prove demandant came within its limitations. (King vs Bd Med Exam, 65 CA2d 644) Assuming demandant was a licensee, (dept) has no authority to....enforce any licensee unless he is acting for compensation. Such an act is highly penal in its nature, and should not be construed to include anything which is not embraced within its terms. There is no charge in the (notice to appear) complaint, no evidence to prove the charge, if it were in the complaint, that accused was employed for compensation. (Schomig vs Keiser, 189 Cal 596) Incompetent action by the agency (Department of Motor Vehicles), whether directly or through a court sitting administerial as hearing officer, must be clearly defined in the statute before it has subject matter jurisdiction, without such

jurisdiction of licensee, all acts of the agency, by its employees, agents, hearing officers, are null and void. (City vs Pearson, 181 Cal 640) PAGE 250 It is basic in our law that an administrative agency may act only within the area of 'jurisdiction' marked out for it by law. If an individual does not come within the coverage of the particular agency's enabling legislation, the agency is without power to take any action which effects him (Endicott vs Perkins, 317 US 501 (1943) A government agency wants jurisdiction to 'directly' affect a person or any subject matter relAted to his person, and may not haul any natural person into any administrative forum without his voluntary assent by subscription to a particular 'regulatory scheme' (Wickard vs Filburn), and it is impossible to prove jurisdiction exists absent a substantial nexus with the state, such as voluntary subscription, license/contract. All jurisdictional facts supporting the claim that the supposed jurisdiction exists must appear on the record of the court. (Pipe Line vs Marathon, 102 S Ct 2858; quoting Crowell vs Benson, 285 US 22) It is an accepted rule, not only of state Courts, but, of federal courts as well, when a judge is enforcing administrative law, they are described as 'mere extensions of the administrative agency for superior reviewing purposes' for an agency, and so act at their own risk and peril. (30 Cal 596; 167 Cal 762) Supra: City vs Pearson, where an employee or agency moves without jurisdiction, cause of action, deprival of due process of law, deprival of constitutional rights, lie. PAGE 251 HISTORY OF THE CASE An immediate hearing is vital on this matter as the demandant has become an aggrieved person, suffering legal wrongs and deprivation of the protection of constitutional rights. No administrative hearing record of the facts of the matter for review, or issues for review are extant. Demandant has not been heard/exhausted, people have not exhausted remedy, and yet the people have proceeded without 'exclusive record for reviewing procedure' before a court

sitting where the agency was without jurisdiction of the subject matter/persona. Agency did not, and could not, accordingly delegate authority of the particular court to sit with jurisdiction, as the demandant is not a licensee of the DMV, nor engaged in the activity regulated by 'Dept', that of common carrier. Where a party (demandant) is without a license, the evidence of a contract, all acts to prosecute for an alleged violation/breach/misdemeanor of the contract are null and void, unless party was engaged in regulated activity of common carrier. On March 12, 1985, demandant was given a notice to appear M 084259, quoting certain sections of Vehicle Code, by an informer, one T. Koblick, to wit; 23152a and 125900a VC. On April 09, 1985, appeared special to inform hearing officer of his want of proof of jurisdiction of the subject matter, and the person of the accused. Hearing officer entered plea, although without proving his jurisdiction of the accused, of not guilty. On May 24, 1985, accused was placed to trial by jury (cont) PAGE 252 (cont) wanted proof of jurisdiction of the subject or accused. On May 28, 1985, accused was found guilty of 12500a and 23152a VC. A copy of the docket of the unlawful case is attached hereto. On October 17, 1985, accused filed a notice of appeal, erroneously, with the Superior Court of California, Appellate Department as he had not exhausted his remedy with the Department of Motor Vehicles, and now is attempting to rectify that error, and, by this demand asks the 'dept' to grant this hearing to set and administrative record for review in the judicial courts. DEMAND FOR HEARING

Therefore, this demand that the 'dept' notice a hearing on this matter within sixty days (VC s16075 (b) ) If hearing is denied, matter at issue will be estopped for any further action by the Department of Motor

Vehicles. CONCLUSION AND DEMAND This hearing, for administrative findings, must state reasons, basis, authority, rationale, for its decisions and orders and acts. (In re Sturm 11 Ca3d 258) in the form of a written statement, which sets forth findings that bridge the analytic gap between raw and evidence, and the decision or order, (Topanga Assoc vs Los Angeles, 11 Ca3d 506) in order to assure administrative decision making is careful, reasoned and equitable. (Farfield vs Ct, 14 C3d 768) That the statement cannot merely relate statutory language, but must be related to and based on, the record of the facts before the agency (Topanga cited in Sierra Club vs hayward, 28 c3d 840, 860) Arthur Frank Sanford Demandant PAGE 253 ARTHUR FRANK SANFORD 5894 Villa Drive Rancho Cucamonga, CA Defendant, in error, Sui Juris MUNICIPAL COURT, WEST VALLEY DIVISION COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, NOTICE OF MOTION; MOTION TO DISMISS; Plaintiffs, in error MATTER BARRED BY COLLATERALL vs ESTOPPEL; COURT IS WITHOUT ARTHUR FRANK SANFORD HEAR; NO. 556888

JURISDICTION TO

Defendant, in error MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND Sui Juris AUTHORITIES ................................................................. ................................................................. TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE NAMED COURT: Arthur Frank Sanford, will appear special at the above named court, located at, 8303 Haven Avenue, in Rancho Cucamonga, California, at AM, 1989, at which time he will demand that the court dismiss the matter before it, as the district attorney and this court, are without jurisdiction to proceed as the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel bars any action on the case. On July 22, 1989, defendant filed with the Department of Motor Vehicles a DEMAND FOR FORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING TO ESTABLISH A RECORD AND FOR ADJUDICATION AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT See Exhibit "105" attached herein PAGE 254 Agency as of this date has not responded within the thirty days notice given by defendant in error. Time has run out for a hearing and so the failure to respond is an 'exoneration', and matter is now estopped. Neither district attorney, nor this court, can proceed civilly, in equity, or criminally. Arthur Frank Sanford Defendant, in error, Sui Juris MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION BY AGENCY'S FAILURE TO GRANT HEARING ON DEMAND, ALL ACTION ON MATTER IS COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM PROSECUTION BY THE PEOPLE When agency stands silent by failure to respond or to grant a hearing, Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel forbids district attorney/city attorney/county counsel/attorney general, from filing

complaint with a court sitting to hear a civil action or court sitting judicially for any criminal action. The failure of the agency to grant a hearing bars civil liability, or criminal prosecution for actus reas later under the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel, as Administrative Law demands for hearing are the administrative equivalent of judicial Declaratory Judgment, and all Natural Law requirements and indicia that apply to Judicial Declaratory Judgment also apply to Administrative Judgments. (cont) PAGE 255 (cont) Babcock vs Babcock, 63 CA2d 94; Maxwell vs Maxwell, 66 CA2d 549 Where an administrative agency has quasi-judicial power to hear and rule to a final determination on matters within its jurisdiction, and does so, then; "The conclusiveness of judgment in a prior action, where subsequent action is upon different cause of action, is barred by doctrine of collateral estoppel" Babcock vs Babcock, supra Where an administrative agency has no jurisdiction of matter or issue outside its delegated authority, it stands silent on the demand for hearing, or refuses to grant one because of that want of jurisdiction, the matter is barred by Collateral Estoppel Doctrine from a subsequent action on the same matter or issue. A recent case, Gonzalez vs Municipal Ct, 87 Daily Journal D A R, 8930, the Court of Appeal, and here defendant takes the position that a 'no grant of hearing for want of jurisdiction is the same as an exoneration', the court cited Peo vs Sims, 32 CA13d 468 (1982), which ruled that Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel bars a criminal prosecution by administrative hearing by the agency; and in the case before it, 'Gonzalez', held that 'Sims' decision compelled ruling collateral estoppel barred district attorney action. " In this case we address a facet of the collateral (cont) PAGE 256 (cont) estoppel effect of administrative proceedings in subsequent criminal prosecutions. The issue before us is whether a ruling in

a driver's favor, in administrative proceeding of the Department of Motor Vehicles, should be accorded collateral estoppel in subsequent criminal prosecution .............We conclude under controlling authority, People vs Sims (1982) 32 Cal3d 248, The answer is yes" "Held, administrative orders or determination are unassailable, except for fraud, mistake, or lack or failure of jurisdiction" US - Consolidated vs Siggans 99 F. Supp. 151 "........and they precluded subsequent inquiry by the court into questions which have been decided" US - Hecox vs Pullman Co., DCf Wash., 85 F. Supp. 740 In the case of Vary vs Department of Motor Vehicles, Superior Court No. N31940, Court of Appeals, 4th App District, Division One, cited in 88 Daily Journal, DAR 7519, the appellate court cited Rohrabaser vs Lederer (1986) 179 CA3d 290, 297, which said: "A judgment in a previous action, between the same parties or those privity with them, operates in a later action as conclusive adjudication as to the issues actually, and necessarily decided in a first action" "In order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the issue in the second action must be identical to the issue adjudicated in the first action" (cont) PAGE 257 (cont) In re Marriage of Modnick (1983) 33 Cal3d 879, 904 Defendant has exhausted administrative action and remedy, which may have been available to him, and so if district attorney wishes, he may take the Department of Motor Vehicles to an appellate court for a review of the record set by the Department of Motor Vehicles. If the court denies this motion for dismissal, and permits the district attorney without jurisdiction, to prosecute defendant, court will place the defendant into a position of 'double jeopardy' in permitting district attorney to petition the court for a trial on the same issue adjudicated by the agency with primary jurisdiction. California Constitution, Article 1, s13 Double Jeopardy: No person shall be twice put into jeopardy for the same offense.

Caveat: The district attorney has failed to pursue the issue with the party, with the primary jurisdiction, so is attempting to usurp the power of the agency, which is a NO NO! "Where a government agency, or local municipality believes that an individual is a person within the demands of a statute, of which it has authority to enforce, or standing to initiate an action naming the individual, there must be a demand for administrative enforcement. The government agency is required (cont) PAGE 258 (cont) to first exhaust all administrative remedies before it may proceed on any civil action (remember that matters of violation of vehicle code are civil with criminal penalties attaching, by a quasi-criminal procedure, added by exonerated movant), as is the accused required. Where the people seek enforcement of administrative licensee, it must not skirt the administrative agency for enforcement by a 'mere hearing officer', without the 'administrative agency record for a review', it must trigger the administrative agency remedy, or it denies the agency its authority and power to enforce its own rules and regulations, and its licensees, to the harm and denial of administrative remedy to the accused" (OK Corp. vs Williams, 461 F. Supp 540) In Austin vs Dept Motor Vehicles, the Court of Appeal held that, "(A) requested Formal Hearing operates to suspend and stay proceedings" Cal Court of Appeals, First Appellate District, Div Two Arthur Frank Sandord, Movant, Defendant PAGE 259 GUY GARDNER 320 South Citrus Street West Covina, CA Defendant, in error RIO HONDO MUNICIPAL COURT

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, STATE OF CALIFORNIA PEOPLE OF THE STATE NO. OF CALIFORNIA, NOTICE OF SPECIAL APPEARANCE TO INFORM Plaintiffs, in error COURT OF DEMAND FOR FORMAL HEARING SERVED vs DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND COURT GUY GARDNER Defendant, in error MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.

TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE REFERRED COURT; Guy Gardner, will appear special at the above court located at 11234 E. Valley Blvd in El Mone, California before a magistrate of the court on June 00, 0000, at 8:30 AM, in Div . At the time and place defendant, in error, will inform the court that a Demand for an Administrative Hearing was filed with the Clerk of the Court on (date) and served by mail on (date) to the Department of Motor Vehicles with 60 day notice. Accordingly, a stay of proceedings must be entered by this court until the Department of Motor Vehicles responds to (cont) PAGE 260 (cont) defendant, in error, demand for a hearing. Guy Gardner Defendant, in error.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES In Austin vs DMV, court of Appeal, Case No 037357, Superior Court No. 309327, Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two held "(A) request for Formal Hearing operates to stay proceedings" "A court cannot engage in any action which deprives a party before it of his constitutional rights. It has long been recognized that it is a proper function of courts to act to check on improper use of both executive and legislative powers" Powell vs McCormack 395 US 486 citing Kilborn vs Thompson 103 US 168 to whit; "Especially is it competent and proper for this court to consider whether proceedings are in conformity with constitution and laws, because, living under a written constitution no branch or department of government is supreme; it is the province and duty of judicial and administrative departments in cases regularly brought before them, whether powers of any branch of government have been exercised in conformity to the constitution; if they have not, to treat their acts as null and void" PAGE 261 22 CJS, Criminal Law s371, page 941 It has been stated broadly that, in view of the greater likelihood of the disregard of the rights of accused in summary trials in inferior courts, such courts should exercise greater degree of care in guarding such rights. Ex parte Williams, 183 Cal 11 and in general, a summary conviction cannot be sustained if there has been a denial of substantial rights of the accused. Williams supra De facto, an officer, position, or status, existing under claim or color of right Black's Law Dict. Fourth Edition A court cannot engage in any action which deprives a party before it of his constitutional rights. It has long been recognized that it is a proper function of courts to act as check on improper use of both executive and legislative powers. Powell vs McCormack, 395 US 486, which quoted Kilborn vs Thompson, 103 US 168, to whit;

Especially is it competent and proper for this court to consider whether proceedings are in conformity with constitution and laws, because, living under a written constitution no branch or department of government is supreme; it is the province and duty of judicial/administrative departments in cases regularly brought before them, whether powers of any branch of government have been exercised in conformity to the constitution; if they have not, to treat their acts as null and void. Guy Gardner Defendant & Movent PAGE 262 Arthur Frank Sanford 5894 Villa Drive Rancho Cucamonga, CA Defendant MUNICIPAL COURT, WEST VALLEY DIVISION, SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY People of the State of No. 55688 California, NOTICE OF MOTION; MOTION FOR Plaintiffs, CONTINUANCE; NOTICE TO DEFEND vs FILED WITH DEPARTMENT OF Arthur Frank Sanford MOTOR VEHICLES; DEMAND FOR FORMAL Defendant HEARING, DMV. POINTS & AUTHORITIES TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: Defendant, Arthur Frank Sanford, will appear for Law and Motion Hearing at the above name court on (date) at (time), at which time he will motion the court for a continuance as he has filed with the Department of Motor Vehicles a Notice of Defense and Demand for Formal Administrative Hearing and Declaratory judgment based upon the Notice of Defense. See attached Seze Exhibit 105 and

Exhibit 108 attached herein. Grounds for the granting of Motion for Continuance are clear and stated within Notice of Defense, Demand for Formal Administrative Hearing, and Department of Motor Vehicles is agency with primary jurisdiction and the first instance on all matters of vehicle code. PAGE 263 District Attorney, County of San Bernardino, California has failed to properly initiate an accusation with the DMV, the enforcement agency for Vehicle Code 1959. Defendant in order to protect his right to hearing and the remedy available to him by administrative agency by a setting of the administrative record for review, has initiated such an action himself, thus, this court sitting must continue the matter until all remedy has been exhausted at the administrative level. Arthur Frank Sanford Defendant PAGE 264 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OPENING STATEMENT Movant contends that this court is without jurisdiction, as jurisdiction is defined as follows: To have power and authority to hear and determine issues of fact and law by having jurisdiction over the supposed subject matter as a cause of action. To make a record of evidence found, findings of fact and conclusion of the law. To make orders, decrees, judgments with supporting rationale. Where a person challenges the agency/court's jurisdiction by a special appearance, the court/agency, it cannot proceed [Melo vs US, 505 F2d 1026; Joyce vs US, 474 F2d 215] the burden of proof shifts to the government forum [Rosemont vs Lambert, 469 F2d 416] forum must produce on the record of the court/agency all jurisdiction facts related to the assertion [Lantana vs Hopper, 102 F2d 118; NY vs US, 337 F Supp 150]

Movant challenges the forum's assumed jurisdiction to hear and rule on this matter presumptuously as court is not, though it is deceptively presenting itself as a judicial court my a quasi-criminal procedure, moving forward to deny movant his right to administrative remedy by the DMV. This forum/court is not a United State Article III judicial court. Only after the agency (DMV) has set the record, may this forum, a legislative court, sitting 'as mere extension of the agency' for 'superior reviewing purposes' [FRC vs Gen Elec., 281 US 464; Keller vs Pot. Ed., 216 US 428] Only the particular agency with primary jurisdiction, DMV, may make a record and decision on the applicable law, and the facts of the accusation after investigating of the accusation. That record, of the agency, (cont) PAGE 265 (cont) then becomes final and review may then be had if needed. Accordingly, this legislative court/forum, at this time, is without jurisdiction to hear a quasi-accusation naming the movant, no administrative record for review exists, and no substantive criminal charge is evidenced for court to sit judicially, or any allegation sustained with facts that the movant was engaged in and enjoying the benefits of the activity of the business of transportation, regulated and enforced by the Department of Motor Vehicles, primary jurisdiction. Once the party of first instance, Department of Motor Vehicles, hears by an application of movant, and upon investigation and hearing, makes a decision on the statutory law and the facts of the accusation naming the movant, it may then turn to this legislative court, and this court may on reviewing and determining/finding rationale basis and substantial evidence, determine if the agency showed facts whereby statute applied to movant, at the time of the 'police stop', and that the movant was within the subject matter jurisdiction of the agency. So, first instance, the agency must have had an accusation filed with it, by its own initiative, some government agency with standing, or a private party. After an investigation showing cause, hold a hearing where accused notifies intent to defend, and by its quasi-judicial authority adjudicate the matter.

Where the agency granted and issued a certificate of license, (cont) Page 266 (cont) the agency may condition the terms of the privilege, suspend the privilege, or revoke the privilege, upon a finding of violation of vehicle code regulation(s). These events are not a part of this quasi-defendant/movant's matter, do not show on any record, and the challenge for want of jurisdiction takes from this forum any power to directly affect the quasi-defendant. No court of any description, can substitute its general jurisdiction once the victim has demanded a 'Formal' quasi-judicial hearing of the agency. The prosecuting district attorney is not entitled to a 'trial' of the matter by a mere notice to appear, without first having accused the victim with the agency, and the agency having ruled on an accusation. (see, Cal. vs Sims, 32 CA3d 468 (1982) Any 'trial' (sic) to discover facts and determine the law is mandated only to the agency by the legislative enactment California Statutes 1959, Chapter 3, Vehicle Code. This forum/court, as a matter of law, lacks jurisdiction to hear/find/determine as a party of first interest/instance, and thereby take from the Department of Motor Vehicles its power to enforce its own rules and regulations and the statute, without a single exception. For those reasons and the law contained within this motion, the court/forum must continue this matter and remand it to the agency, as movant has filed a 'Formal Demand' and 'Notice to Defend' with the Department of Motor Vehicles. Arthur Frank Sanford Page 267 HISTORY OF FACTS OF THE MATTER On June 22, 1989, a Notice to Appear was written by San Bernardino Deputy Sheriff John Tomasse, No. 556888, citing VC 16028(a), in the

name of the defendant. At the time of the quasi-police stop, defendant was not engaged in the activity regulated by the Department of Motor Vehicles, business of transportation. Accordingly, defendant has moved this matter to the Department of Motor Vehicles for remedy, which only the department may provide by a hearing of defense. In Austin vs Department of Motor Vehicles the Court of Appeal; held that, "(A) requested Formal Hearing operates to suspend stay of proceedings" Austin vs DMV, No a037357 Superior Court No. 309327; Cal Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two In Gonzalez vs Mun. Court, the Court of Appeal held, "......that when defendant takes a position that a 'no grant of hearing for want of jurisdiction it is the same as exoneration', and the court cited People vs Sims 32 Cal 3d 468 which held, 'when a defendant has been exonerated' in hearing by agency that the case before it 'Gonzalez' Sims applied, collateral estoppel bars further district attorney action is barred" 87 Daily Journal, DAR 8930 Thus, this court must continue this matter until DMV investigates the matter, hears and makes a determination to enforce or not to enforce for a want of jurisdiction of the defendant. Arthur Frank Sanford Defendant/Movant PAGE 269 Department Motor Vehicles 2451 First Avenue Sacramento, CA Attention A.A. Pierce, Director Department of Motor Vehicles 16499 Merrill Avenue Fontana, CA Attention Mr. Stark, Manager Universal Life Church Arthur Frank Sanford, Minister 5894 Villa Drive

Rancho Cucamonga, CA Petitioner, Demandant SUBJECT: DEMAND FOR ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING FOR WAIVER FROM REGISTRATION AND LICENSING OF MOTOR VEHICLE WHERE NO NEED EXISTS PURSUANT TO SECTION 260(a) (b) V.C. BY PETITIONER, AND RULING ON NO NEED FOR DRIVER'S LICENSE WHEN NOT ENGAGED IN ACTIVITY ENFORCED BY THIS DEPARTMENT Agency should be challenged at its level as that question is waived unless brought before the agency because the failure to raise the constitutional issue at the administrative level constitutes a waiver of the right to bring later in any forum. Reinel vs house, 259 Cal App2d 511; Quality vs Court, 73 Cal App3d 860, 862; Mestinak vs Atwater, 79 Cal App3d 593; Griswold vs School District 63 Cal App3d 1034 Petitioner seeks ruling from the Department of Motor Vehicles by the issuance of a variance/waiver, by the DMV, showing that the petitioner is not a person of the class named within Vehicle Code 1959 required to register and license, and pay fees and taxes on his private passenger vehicle, not for hire, and has a 'personal stake in the outcome' as the ruling will sharpen the resolution of the constitutional question. Baker vs Carr, 369 US 186, 204; see also NAACP vs City of Richmond, 743 F2d 1346, 1350; petitioner/demandant has suffered actual harm and will continue, and continue to be threatened with future harm by the putative illegal conduct of the DMV, and local municipality police agencies and a ruling will most likely redress, by a favorable decision, present and future harm to the petitioner. Valley Forge vs Americans United, 454 US 464, 472 Petitioner does not function within the activity regulated and enforced by the DMV. Petitioner does not enjoy any of the privileges or benefits, which are granted by the 'dept', and merely uses his automobile (cont) PAGE 270 (cont) for personal private travel and transportation. Petitioner has registered and licensed a private automobile, a Chevrolet Camaro, yr 1984, 1G1AP87H8EL128690, license # 1KBU654, and has so done under protest evidenced by this petition. No statutory duty lies to apply for or to possess a driver

license, or to register a private passenger vehicle used for personal travel and transportation, when person is not within the class of persons for whose benefit or protection the statute was enacted Roth vs Quinn, 20 Cal2d 488 So long as one used his property for private purposes and does not devote it to public use, the public has no voice in its control Assoc Pipe vs R.R. Comm., 176 Cal 518 Petitioner is concerned that he will be harmed unlawfully, if he travels upon the public's highways of the state, without the 'unlawful compelled licensing' of his private automobile, or without a written waiver issued by the agency in his possession while traveling for personal pleasure and business. The individual has no liability, to the state, where there is no possession of valid state license nexus, or where possession of the same is by necessity. The necessity being to protect life, liberty, and property, and property rights from unlawful taking. The necessity annuls the liability. A statute which imposes a contractual obligation, relationship in derogation of the common law, and affects substantial rights, must be construed strictly, and cannot be extended by implication to include persons who do not come within its terms. Kurtz vs Capital, 67 A2d 470 In Wall vs King, 206 F2d 878 the courts said: It might have seemed that the state could not have deprived the plaintiff of any constitutional right, since it has been adjudicated by the highest court of the state that the action was not authorized by state law. Nowhere within the context or intent of Vehicle Code 1959, is it evidenced that vehicle code is a'positive', 'public', general law applying to all travelers, who as motorists, locomote upon the highways of the state. The United States Supreme Court in Grosjean vs American Press, 1936, 297 US 233, 234, said: In fact it is under the enlarged connotation of the word 'liberty'.........due process of the 14th amendment as a limitation upon the states. (2) Therefore, it is unimportant whether for one purpose or another, a license to operate motor vehicles may properly be described as a mere personal privilege, rather than a property right. We have no doubt that the freedom to make use of one's own property, here a motor vehicle, as

a means of getting about from place to place, (cont) PAGE 271 (cont) whether in pursuit of business or pleasure, is a liberty, which under the 14th amendment, cannot be denied or curtailed by state without due process of law. JUDICIABLE ISSUE LIES WITHIN THE AGENCY Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution, including agency's own regulations. Wotton vs Bush, (1953) 41 Cal2d 460-467 United States Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit held; in Darring vs Kincheloe, 86 Daily Journal DAR 651; A threatened injury may be justiciable, see 'Valley Forge 454 US at 472', and a plaintiff is not required to undergo prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief, where he has alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct that is arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder 'Doe vs Bolton 410 US 37, 42. Petitioner believes that uncertainty and peril will be constantly a threat to his personal life, liberty, and property, privacy, and immunity from prosecution, while he is merely traveling as a motorist for personal locomotion. Police officers of a multitude of police agencies of the state and local municipalities, and agents, employees and officers of the DMV, have orally and in writing informed the petitioner that his vehicle is of a type required to be registered and licensed, fees and taxes paid by the petitioner, even though it is not for hire as commercial vehicle in business of transportation, that he will be prosecuted which, is contrary to vehicle code. s260 VC (a) A "commercial vehicle" is a vehicle of a type required to be registered under this code, used or maintained for the transportation of persons for hire, compensation, or profit or designed, used, or maintained primarily for the transportation of

property. (b) Passenger vehicles which are not used for the transportation of persons for hire, compensation, or profit, and house cars are not commercial vehicles. He has been told that if he travels upon the highways of the state, with said vehicle unregistered and unlicensed, he will be cited by some police officer and thereby subject to fines, penalties and assessments, and/or his vehicle will be impounded, even though at the time of the stop he was not engaged in the activity regulated and enforced by the DMV, which is an agency within the Business, Transportation and Housing Agency, the business of transportation. PAGE 272 Petitioner states that he is not a person of the class named within the words and intent of the Vehicle Code 1959. That he does not use the highways for profit, gain, or compensation. That he, therefore, does not come within the force of the private business, occupational statute, Vehicle code of 1959. Petitioner must show that he has applied for a ruling on a waiver granted by the DMV, that will protect him from prosecution for merely driving for purposes of private travel and private business. Petitioner demands a response and hearing or granting of the waiver, for if he fails to ask it of the agency, he will be precluded from asserting, as an 'affirmative defense', that the Vehicle Code is being unconstitutionally applied to his vehicle and petitioner, by agents, hearing officers, and police agents which are clearly excluded, pursuant to s21100(b), of jurisdiction to enforce state statutes, and severely restricted to business licensees of the particular municipality of which they are employees. (b) Licensing and regulating the operation of vehicles for hire and drivers of passenger vehicles for hire. Petitioner must demand an administrative hearing to show that he has not voluntarily applied for a license by registration, which is now evidenced by this written protest. He asks for a ruling, on the record, even though DMV cannot grant one as petitioner is not a person within the subject matter jurisdiction of the agency, but must do so as, if he does not, he

will not be able to present as affirmative defense, a setting of the record of his status being that of one outside the business of transportation, and to protect his common law constitutional rights and privileges and immunity from unlawful prosecution under color of Vehicle Code. If petitioner fails to petition for an administrative hearing, he will be denied access to the judicial courts. Petitioner demands a formal hearing be granted by the DMV within 30 days of receipt of this demand(VC s16075 (b) for hearing. No agency can refuse a prior hearing when affecting fundamental rights, on the issue of the statute as 'applied', for such an application is a form of 'rule making', and agency have the duty and power to adopt, rescind, or modify its rules to meet the requirements of the law and other exigencies. Reimel vs House, 259 Cal App2d 511, 515 If dept fails to respond and grant the hearing, any judicial court hearing will deem that the agency wants jurisdiction of the subject matter, and of the personam of petitioner, and thereafter, no court may acquire jurisdiction for purposes of 'administrative regulatory enforcement scheme' when the administrative agency itself has no jurisdiction (cont) PAGE 273 (cont), and the people have no interest and have suffered no harm, where there is no government interest. On the issue of a Driver's License, petitioner will argue that he does not use an automobile or truck as a Driver, and thus, has no need for a Driver's License when he receives no compensation, and will not receive any compensation for so doing. That indeed, he uses an automobile/truck only for private business and pleasure, and transportation and as a mode of travel/conveyance, and so does not come within the jurisdiction of this Department. "Practicing a profession, or otherwise engaging in a regulated activity, without a license, is an offense if a statute so provides, whether or not the offender received or expected compensation, unless the statute specifies the receipt or

expectation of compensation as an element of the offense, in which case there is no offense, if that condition is not fulfilled" People vs Vermillion (1916) 30 CalApp 417, 418 "No statutory duty lies to apply for, or to possess a Driver's License, or to register a private passenger automobile used for personal travel and transportation, as defendant is not within the class of persons for whose benefit or protection the statute was enacted" Routh vs Quinn 20 Cal2d 488 "In Matter of Charles Stork; Classification of Drivers of Motor Vehicles; Not unconstitutional in that it requires chauffeurs or drivers of motor vehicles for hire, to pay an annual license tax, but exempts all other operators of such vehicles from such tax and regulation" 167 Cal 295 (1914) CONCLUSION "It is basic in our law, that an administrative agency (department therein) may only act within the area of 'jurisdiction' marked out for it within the law. If an individual does not come within the coverage of the particular agency's enabling legislation, the agency is without power to take any action which effects him" Endicott vs Perkins 317 US 501 (1943) Arthur Frank Sanford Petitioner, Demandant PAGE 274 defendant, in error, Sui Juris MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION BY AGENCY'S FAILURE TO GRANT HEARING ON DEMAND, ALL ACTION ON MATTER IS COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM PROSECUTION BY THE PEOPLE When agency stands silent by failure to respond or to grant a hearing, Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel forbids district attorney/city attorney/county counsel/attorney general from filing a complaint with a court, sitting to hear a civil action, or court sitting judicially for any criminal action. The failure of the agency to grant a hearing bars civil liability or criminal prosecution for actus reas later under the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel as Administrative Law demands for hearing are the administrative equivalent of judicial Declaratory Judgment, and

all Natural law requirements and indicia that apply to Judicial Declaratory Judgment also apply to Administrative Judgments" Babcock vs Babcock, 63 CA2d 94; Maxwell vs Maxwell, 66 CA2d 549 PAGE 275 Where an administrative agency has quasi-judicial power to hear and rule to a final determination on matters within its jurisdiction and does so, then: "The conclusiveness of judgment is a prior action where subsequent action is upon different cause of action is barred by doctrine of collateral estoppel" Babcock vs Babcock, supra Where an administrative agency has no jurisdiction of matter or issue outside its delegated authority, it stands silent on the demand for hearing, or refuses to grant one because of that want of jurisdiction, the matter is barred by Collateral Estoppel Doctrine from a subsequent action on the same matter or issue. A recent case, Gonzalez vs Municipal Ct, 87 Daily Journal DAR, 8930, the Court of Appeal, and here defendant takes the position that a 'no grant of hearing for want of jurisdiction is the same as an exoneration', the court cited Peo vs Sims, 32 Cal3d 468 (1982), which had ruled that Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel bars a criminal prosecution by District Attorney when defendant has been 'exonerated' by administrative hearing by the agency; and in the case before it, 'Gonzalez', held that 'Sims' applied also in 'Gonzalez', ruling that 'Sims' decision compelled ruling collateral estoppel barred district attorney action. "In this case we address a facet of the collateral (cont) PAGE 276 (cont) estoppel effect of administrative proceedings in subsequent criminal prosecutions. The issue before us is whether a ruling in a driver's favor, in administrative proceeding of the DMV, should be accorded collateral estoppel in subsequent criminal prosecution........We conclude under controlling authority, People vs Sims (1982) 32 Cal3d 248, The answer is yes" "Held, administrative orders or determinations are unassailable

except for fraud, mistake, or lack or failure of jurisdiction" US - consolidated vs Siggans 99 F Supp. 151 ".......and they precluded subsequent inquiry by the court into questions which have been decided" US - Hecox vs Pullman Co., DC Wash., 85 F Supp. 740 In the case of Vary vs DMV, Superior Court No. N31940, Court of Appeals, 4th App District, Division One, cited in 88 Daily Journal, DAR 7519, the appellate court cited Rohrabaser vs Lederer (1986) 179 CA3d 290, 297, which said: "A judgment in a previous action between the same parties, or those privity with them, operates in a later action as conclusive adjudication as to the issues actually and necessarily decided in a first action." "In order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, this issue in the second action must be identical to the issue adjudicated in the first action" PAGE 277 Inn re Marriage of Modnick (1983) 33 Cal3d 879, 904: Defendant has exhausted administrative action and remedy which may have been available to him, and so if district attorney wishes, he may take the DMV to an appellate court for a review of the record set by the DMV. If the court denies this motion for dismissal and permits the district attorney, without jurisdiction, to prosecute defendant, court will place the defendant into a position of 'double jeopardy' in permitting district attorney to petition the court for a trial on the same issue adjudicated by the agency with primary jurisdiction. California Constitution, Article 1, s13. Double Jeopardy: No person shall be twice put into jeopardy for the same offense. Caveat: The district attorney has failed to pursue the issue with the party with the primary jurisdiction, so is attempting to usurp the power of the agency, which is a NO NO!! "Where a government agency, or local municipality believes that an individual is a person within the demands of a statute, of which it has authority to enforce, or standing to initiate an action naming the individual, there must be a demand for administrative enforcement. The government agency is required

(cont) PAGE 278 (cont) to first exhaust all administrative remedies before it may proceed on any civil action (remember that matter of violation of vehicle code are civil with criminal penalties attaching, by a quasi-criminal procedure, added by exonerated movant), as is the accused required. Where the people seek enforcement of administrative licensee, it must not skirt the administrative agency for enforcement by a 'mere hearing officer' without the 'administrative agency record for a review', it must trigger the administrative agency remedy, or it denies the agency its authority and power to enforce its own rules and regulations and its licensees, to the harm and denial of administrative remedy to the accused." OK Corp vs Williams, 461 F. Supp 540 In Austin vs DMV, the Court of Appeal held that, "(A) requested Formal Hearing operates to suspend and stay proceedings" Cal. Court of Appeals, First Appellate District, Div Two Arthur Frank Sanford, Movant, Defendant

VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 1 PAGE 285 D.U.I., IMPLIED CONSENT UNDER s23152 IS VOID WITHOUT WRITTEN VOLUNTARY CONSENT ON THE RECORD [There can be no implied consent under VC s23157(a), effective Jan. 1, 1992, without the knowledgeable, consent voluntarily given in written waiver] [Consent implies knowledge by written or oral word or by conduct therefrom; if informed, silence and inaction are circumstances showing consent & acceptance; the act of consent implies, at least, the power of preventing, and thereby, implies not only that person acceded to the consent, but authorized the act] "Consent means 'voluntary' yielding of will and cannot be the subject of compulsion" Shehany vs Lowry 152 SE 114 "Consent and implied consent, as recognized by law, cannot be the subject of compulsion, each must be in agreement to that, which but

for the consent, could not exist, and which the party consenting has a right to forbid" State ex re United Rys Co of St. Louis vs Public Service Comm. of Mo. 192 SW 958, 961 "The theory of law to acts done and licenses/contracts made by parties affecting their rights and interests is that in all such cases there must be free and full 'consent' in order to bind the parties, and mind weighing, as in a balance of the good and the evil on each side" Lervick vs White Top Cabs La App 10 So2d 67, 73 VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 2 PAGE 286 "Legal 'consent', which will be held sufficient in a prosecution, assumes a capacity in the person consenting to understand, and appreciate the nature of the act committed, the probable or natural consequences which may attend it" People vs Perry 146 P2d 44, 45 26 CalApp 143 [For one to have volunteered, by implied or silent consent, one must have been informed, made known of the fact of the consent under s23157, informed that a choice was his to be made, without coercion] [A voluntary act is done by design and intention, for some purpose, cannot be accidentally] "Voluntary means intentionally and without coercion" Young vs Young 84 P2d 916, 917 "Voluntary is freely and intelligently" Kovach vs US C.A. Ohio 53 F2d 639 "Construction of word 'voluntarily' is implying knowledge instead of in its ordinary sense of 'willingly' or 'without compulsion', should be given when necessary to give effect to statute" Sweeny vs Sweeny 118 A. 882 "Voluntary presupposes choice, one makes no choice when one does not know he has a choice" Jenkins vs Kaplan 148 A2d 33, 36 [At no time, in any manner, does the DMV inform an applicant, orally or in writing, or present a lawfully required form of

waiver, that he/she is (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 3 PAGE 287 (cont) waiving the Bill of Rights under the Constitution imposed on Department by the Fifth Amendment. Therefore, there was/is no voluntary, knowing waiver of rights under s23157(a). Silence is not acceptable argument when one has not been informed. When Department is silent there is no opportunity to question or challenge. This is why the section 23157 is known as implied consent] The standard for voluntary waiver of rights has been clearly addressed by the Supreme Court in at least the following cases: Brady vs US 397 US 742 at 748 (1970) Emspak vs US 349 US 190 at 197-198 (1955) Ohio Bel Tel Co vs Public Utilities Comm 301 US 292 at 307 (1937) Fuentes vs Shevin 407 US 67 at 95 (1972) [If implied rights/waiver is asserted by prosecutor or DMV by an application for a Driver License by defendant, but no facts are introduced in evidence of knowing waiver of rights by applicant, then such an application is void on its face, and without force of law as to applicant when a signed waiver is not/cannot be produced, which would show that defendant voluntarily abandoned his constitutional rights, privileges and Immunities] "Coerced waiver of rights under Fifth Amendment is invalid" Davis vs State, Fla. App 1970, 233 So2d 6 41 [It is obvious as to why the Department does not inform (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 4 PAGE 288 (cont) of the right to waive. Such a policy must be by malicious intent, as it contravenes the obligation of the Department to inform where a need lies to inform. By the avoidance of the obligation, the individual is harmed by the failure of the Department to inform] "Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or Legislation which would abrogate them" Miranda vs Arizona 348 US 491

[As all prosecutions for DUI are tried by quasi-criminal procedure, then the Bill of Rights must be obeyed, unless of course, you have waived them and thereby submitted to self incrimination.] "The privilege against self-incrimination, guaranteed by this clause (fifth amend), may be waived either specifically, by word of mouth or in writing, or some act amounting to waiver, in latter event, act alleged to constitute waiver must be carefully appraised and any doubt must be appraised as against the waiver" US vs Steffen, D.C. Cal, 1951, 103 F Supp 415 [Fraud enters the sordid action by the Department for it takes from you certain rights, privileges and immunities under the statute itself, by acts of Active misrepresentation; Conscious concealment of material fact or defect; Non-disclosure where there is a duty to speak] [Fraud is the intentional deception to cause a person to give up property or some legal right, and when fraud (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 5 PAGE 289 (cont) exists, a tort exists, and civil suit lies for damage] [Fraud is the taking of monies (license fees/taxes) under false pretenses and conduct perpetrated to induce another into harmful contract] 1. ACTIVE MIS-REPRESENTATION is used in reference to unconscious or honest mistaking of material facts, and it has the same legal effect as fraud in giving the injured party the right to plea at law to avoid/ void/cancel/annul the license. Where there has been fraud or mis-representation the credulity of the injured, damaged party is no defense. "One who has perpetrated a fraud will not be permitted to say that the injured party ought not to have believed or trusted him" Wilcox vs American T & T Co 176 NY 115 2. CONSCIOUS CONCEALMENT OF A MATERIAL FACT OR DEFECT. To warrant the rescission/revoke/cancel a license/contract or other obligation, it must be further shown that the false representations complained of were the inducement, that is, that they created such an impression in the mind of the party complaining, as to overcome

any indecision on his part, and led or influenced him into giving his consent. Conclusive test of mis-representation being the inducement to the license is the fact, if it be so, that the party would have refused his consent if the truth were to be known. [There is certainly provable evidence of mis-representation, of conscious concealment of a material fact/defect, when applying for a Driver's License] VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 6 PAGE 291 [Go to the Department with a friend, as a witness, who thereafter, will make an affidavit/declaration/asseveration as to the facts stated by some employee of the Department when you asked about the conditions of the Driver's License] 3. NON-DISCLOSURE WHERE THERE IS A DUTY TO SPEAK as to fraud, may not be merely consisting of an express mis-representation of fact, but also in concealment or non-disclosure of a material fact when there is a duty to speak. An intention is as much a fact as the existence of non-existence of anything. "The state of a man's mind, is as much a fact as the state of his indigestion" Edington vs Fiszmaurice 29 English Law Reports 459, 483 (1885) [Any act other than lawful persuasion is coercion] "Lawful persuasion, is that which is not directed to the accomplishment of an illegal or unlawful purpose, but appeals to the judgment, reason, leaving the mind free to act of its own volition. Where there is no such freedom of action, more than mere persuasion has been exercised, it amounts to duress, intimation and coercion" 108 SE 226; 151 GA 776 V.C. s23157, AND ITS SUBSECTIONS, IS TOTALLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY VIOLATIVE OF FOURTH, FIFTH, AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION'S BILL OF RIGHTS, AND EMPLOYEES SUBTERFUGE TO GAIN IMPLIED CONSENT FROM APPLICANT FOR DRIVER'S LICENSE VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 7 PAGE 291

"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or Legislation which would abrogate them" Miranda vs Arizona 348 US 491 [Understand that though all matters of enforcement of Vehicle Code are civil in nature, and are mala prohibita violations but, as such misdemeanor violations, incarceration in the local poky can be and are imposed upon the state and its administrative agencies, to obey them and thus the quasi-criminal procedure is used] "Actions taken under the implied consent law are civil in nature" State vs Severino 56 Haw 378, 537 P2d 1187 (1975) "Officer arresting one for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and who has advised driver of his constitutional rights according to Miranda, and later advises him of requirements and sanctions of implied consent law, is required to further inform driver that those constitutional rights do not apply to his decision whether or not to take a chemical test required by implied-consent statute, only if driver's responses to query, whether he wishes to take a breathe-lyzer or blood test, indicates confusion on the part of driver, and his refusal to take it is based on assertion of constitutional rights" [Now, understand, that the driver above is assumed to be a Driver possessed of a Driver's License, and engaged in the (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 8 PAGE 292 (cont) activity regulating licensees while engaged. It does not refer to 'statute' which is civil code, private in nature, only to a class of persons identified therein] [Remember, peace/police officers have no authority to arrest individuals for violations of Vehicle Code as police officers, and any arrest under color of police power is a civil/citizen's arrest and civil tort suit will lie] [Now we come to the magic phrase, 'lawful arrest', and 'licensee', and an individual without the license, and not engaged in regulated activity is a 'motorist', 'traveler', and not subject to liability under the Vehicle Code]

MOTORIST: A person who drives an automobile or travels by automobile; especially one who does so frequently, but not as an occupation. Blacks's 2nd "Unless a person is 'lawfully arrested' for violation of substantial offense of driving under the influence of alcohol, he or she is not subject to license suspension or revocation under implied consent and license revocation statutes" Mercer vs Dept of Motor Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal3d 783; 809 P2d 404; 280 Cal Rptr 745 [Recap 'lawful arrest', remembering a peace officer may only make a lawful arrest, without an arrest warrant, for public offenses/misdemeanors eye balled & felonies] s836. PC Peace officers.....grounds for arrest w/o warrant . A peace officer may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant, or may pursuant to the authority granted him by the provisions of section 830 without a warrant, arrest a person; (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 9 PAGE 293 (cont) 1. Whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense in his presence, 2. When a person has committed a felony, although not in his presence [Now, before we cover s830 PC, understand that a peace officer that gave you a 'traffic ticket'/notice to appear, was an employee of a municipality police agency of a city or county. Such a peace officer is limited to enforcement of state penal code and ordinances of the city/county which employs him] [His authority does not extend/reach to Vehicle Code for DMV] [When Chapter 4.5 Peace Officers is read, it refers to s830.3] s830.3 Particular officers: The following persons are peace officers whose authority extends to 'any place in the state' for purpose of performing their primary duty, or when making an arrest pursuant to s836 of penal code as to any public offense (mala en se), with respect to which there is immediate danger to person or property, or of the escape of the perpetrator of such offense. [Subsection (d) s830 is the only one of interest to the individual given a 'traffic ticket/notice to appear] s830 (d) DMV, designated in Section 1665 of the Vehicle Code,

provided that the primary duty of any such peace officer shall be enforcement (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 10 PAGE 294 (cont) of the law as that duty is set forth in section 1655 [So, now is the picture becoming clearer? All peace officers have limitations as to their scope and duty. Peace officers cannot, when they are not functioning within/for enforcement of substantive crimes make civil/citizen's arrests under guise/color of office/law enforce Vehicle Code for the DMV civil citizen's arrests] [Administrative agencies, and their departments, have no police power to enforce Vehicle Code as the legislature can not attach police power to civil administrative statutes, which are class business statutes] LISTEN UP! 1655 (a) The director, a deputy director, the chief and assistant chief of the Division of Compliance of the department, and investigators of the department, shall have powers of peace officers for the purpose of enforcing those provisions of law, now or hereafter, committed to the administration of the department or, enforcing law, or enforcing law on the premises occupied by the department. (b) Any person in (a) may inspect any vehicle of a type required to be registered under this code.........., for the purpose of investigating the title and registration of the vehicle,........ [Reading and re-reading the above, and much more material, two opinions surface; employee of department has no police power to go forth on the common highways of the state (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 11 PAGE 295 (cont) arrest any person/individual who is not engaged in some one of the activities regulated and enforced by the department; a peace officer of a municipal corporation has no authority, as defined above, to enforce Vehicle Code for the department] [Now, we come to the issue challenged of Implied Consent for Chemical Testing, as iterated in s23157 et seq., and assuming a licensee who did waive constitutional rights; author cannot find any statement that a licensee, or any individual, can

be 'lawfully arrested' pursuant to 23152, is of the opinion it is because all violations of Vehicle Code are administrative civil actions, to which no power of arrest attaches] VC s23152 (a) Any person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his blood, breath or urine, for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, and to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or urine for the purpose of determining the drug content of his or her blood, IF LAWFULLY ARRESTED for any offense allegedly committed in violation of s23152 or 23153. The testing shall be incidental to a lawful arrest..... [Question. How can the test be 'incidental' when it may be the only evidence that the person was under the influence?] [The chemical testing of the blood for drugs/alcohol, can in no way be constitutionally incidental, as it is the evidence to be used in a quasi-criminal prosecution before a jury, with you, the accused and charged, and thus, would (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 12 PAGE 296 (cont) deny the right of no self-incrimination when no search warrant is issued and served] [21357 then rambles on about 'lawful arrest' under subd. (2) (A), B, C, (3), (4), (5) (b) (c) (d), but lawful arrest is not clarified/made clear/defined] [Lawful arrest is with all due process of law, statutory and constitutional. Brought into custody, charge made and filed, by proper prosecutor for the people, before a magistrate, with the issue of and execution of warrant of arrest and Miranda rights read and signed] [As 23152, 21353 are civil, but tried under quasi-criminal process, we must turn to case law and the Bill of Rights, as criminal prosecution rights apply, and even consent to the tests cannot be constitutionally given] "No consent can be given which will deprive the consenter of any inalienable rights" A & E Encyc, Desty Criminal Law s33 "Privilege against self incrimination, guaranteed by this clause (Fifth), may be waived either specifically, by word of mouth or in writing, or some act amounting to waiver; latter event act alleged to constitute a waiver must be carefully appraised and any doubt

must be appraised against waiver" US vs Steffen, DC, Cal, 1951, 103 F Supp 414 Fourth Amendment ".....right of the people to be secure in their persons, against unreasonable searches...shall not be violated, and (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 13 PAGE 297 (cont) no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath and Affirmation........" Illegal Seizure Davis vs Miss 394 US 721 1. Illegally seized evidence is inadmissable at criminal trial, however relevant, and trustworthy the seized evidence may be as item of proof; 2. Search and Seizure: For purposes of Fourth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment is meant to prevent whole sale intrusions upon personal security of citizenry, whether intrusions are termed arrests or investigatory detention; 3. Detention for sole purpose of obtaining evidence, are subject to constraints of Fourth Amendment, Search and seizure section 25, necessity of arrest warrant on detention to obtain evidence. 4. General requirements are that authorization of a judicial officer be obtained in advance of detention, would seem not to admit of any exception in context of detention for the purpose of obtaining evidence" "The taking of blood sample constitutes a search and seizure within the meaning of this amendment (fourth)" State vs Acquin, conn, 1979, 416 A2d 1209 "Intrusions involving examinations of person not outside the protection of the Fourth Amendment even if they involve no probing into the body or beneath the body surface" McClain vs State of Indiana, 1980, 410 NE2d 1297 "Strictures of this Fourth Amendment against unreasonable (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 14 PAGE 298

(cont) search and seizure apply to searches embodying penetration of body, including drawing of blood" State vs Howard, 1975, 225 NW2d 391 "Search unlawful when made is not legalized by after acquired knowledge of officer" Raniele vs US 34 F2d 877 "Seizure on mere suspicion not justified by confirmation of suspicion" Gorske vs US 1 f2d 620 "This Fourth Amendment prohibits compelled intrusions into body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content, if intrusions are not justified in circumstances or made in improper manner. Withdrawal of blood to determine alcohol content, in connection with arrest for driving while under influence, constitutes 'search' of person and depends antecedently upon 'seizure' of person within Fourth Amendment" Schmerber vs State of California, Cal, 1966, 86 S Ct 1826; 384 US 757; 16 L Ed2d 908 "Because blood samples and breath test for alcohol are not testimonial evidence, they come under the protection of the Fourth Amendment" Commonwealth vs Reynolds, 1979, 389 A2d 1113 "Stipulation in criminal prosecution, that the result of the blood test could be admitted into evidence without identification, and without objection, as to the identification and chain of custody of samples, did not fore lose objection to admission of test results on the ground sample was (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 15 PAGE 299 (cont) obtained by impermissible search" State vs Gordon, 1976, 549 P2d 886 s23157 (5) ........the person is told that his or her failure to submit to, or the noncompliance of, the test or tests will result in the suspension or revocation of his or her privilege to operate a motor vehicle....... [Once again, the person is being asked, under threat, to give possible evidence against himself, when no consent has been knowingly, intelligently given at time of application for a Driver's License, waiving constitutional rights and privileges and

immunity protection, both statutorily and constitutionally, as to license engaged] "There can be no sanctions or penalty imposed upon one because of his exercise of a constitutional right/rights" Sherer vs Cullen 481 F2d 946 (1973) s23157 (4) The officer shall also advise the person that he/she does not have the right to have an attorney present before stating whether he/she will submit to the test or tests, before deciding which test or tests to take, or during the administration of the test or tests, the refusal may be used against him/her in a court of law. "A defendant is entitled to counsel at time of arrest" Cole vs Holliday, Iowa, 1969, 171 NW2d 603 Sixth Amendment, USC ".......and to have assistance of Counsel for his Defense"

VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 16 PAGE 300 "The right to counsel attaches whenever accused is substantially deprived of his freedom" McConnell vs US, C.A., Alabama, 1967, 375 F2d 905 "When accusatory process was existent, accused, though not then charged, had right to counsel" Thompson vs Cox, CA, N.M., 1965, 352 F2d 488 "Any defendant who has been taken into custody as prime suspect, is entitled to attorney to represent him at all crucial and critical stages of proceedings against him" Sanders vs State of So Carolina, DC, 1969, 296 F Supp 563 "Critical stage of proceedings is point where rights of defendant must be preserved or irretrievably lost" US ex rel Lamborn vs Rundle, DC, Penn, 1966, 251 F Supp 760 State vs Williams, 1967, 235 A2d 684 "Accused is denied assistance of counsel, in violation of Sixth Amendment, when he is in custody, has requested and been denied

opportunity to consult lawyer, and has not been effectively warned of his absolute right under Fifth Amendment to remain silent" Calloway vs Wainwright, CA, Fla, 1969, 409 F2d 59 [It is constitutionally impossible to deprive an accused of Constitutional rights, privileges and immunities absent the showing of clear, knowing, informed, intelligent, signed consent of waiver of said rights, and therein, showing the consequences, by a full explanation of the consequences, in writing at the time of the application for a Driver's License] [DMV clearly fails to provide (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 17 PAGE 301 (cont) any information of a forgoing/abandonment of said rights to an applicant, as no information is provided the applicant on his/her application form for a Driver's License. None is part of the Driver's Hand Book, nor is it a part of the written examination. The clerk who handles the paper work does not make an oral statement, as to the fact, that the applicant is consenting to waiver of constitutional rights] [There are people who will argue that it is the responsibility of the applicant to know the statutory law but, courts have ruled that no man can be an expert in the law, and so must be informed of the law, and its effect on him] In Gould vs Gould 245 US 151 at 153 (1917), the Supreme Court held; "a person has no obligation, unless the obligation was very clearly stated in the statute" PERFECT OBLIGATION: A perfect obligation is one recognized and sanctioned by positive law; one of which the fulfillment can be enforced by the aid of law. Black's 4th p 1225 IMPERFECT OBLIGATION: But, if the duty created by the obligation operates only on moral sense,without being enforced by any positive law,......., it creates no right of action, nor has it any legal operation. Black's 4th p 1225 [Nowhere in Statute, 1959, Vehicle Code, which is not positive law, can one be obligated to abandon constitutional rights in return for quasi-privileges, granted under color of law, which it asserts under color of law] "All legislation is prima facie territorial"

American Banana vs US Fruit 213 US 347 at 356-357 (1909) VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 18 PAGE 302 "Legislation is presumptively territorial, and confined to limits over which the law has jurisdiction" NY Central RR vs Chisholm 268 US 29 at 31032 (1925) [It is not disputed by the author that the legislature can pass statutory law pertaining to the operation of commercial activities, which effect public interest. Such a public interest business can be regulated for the good and protection of the public. The Legislature may establish conditions of doing such business and it may be licensed] [However, when the person is not engaged in a licensed regulated public business, he has not consented to the application of the regulation of himself] Almeida-Sanchez vs US 413 US 266 stated, "Businessmen engaged in regulated enterprises accept the burdens, as well as the benefits of their trade, whereas the petitioner here was not engaged in any regulated industry or licensed business. The businessmen in a regulated industry, in effect, consents to the restrictions placed on him. The court quickly pointed out that in the Sanchez case, he was not in a regulated enterprise nor licensed, which would automatically waive his constitutional rights" "The rule is 'there are certain, relatively unique circumstances', which consent to regulatory restrictions are presumptively concurrent with participation in regulated enterprises" US vs Biswell 406 US 311 Colonade Catering vs US 397 US 72 PAGE 303 BEING RESEARCHED BEFORE INSERTING VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 19 PAGE 304 [If none of the above circumstances exist then (if Sanchez had been licensed or in regulated business, the stop and search would have been legal, but since he was not so regulated, the stop and search was unconstitutional)] [Here the author will re-iterate the nature of police power of the state and its limitations] [The state's police power exists when the purpose is criminal

enforcement; to keep the state from public offenses, felony, affront, falling within the purview of common law crimes and nuisances. The Constitution provides positive defenses to the individual against the state's unlawful invasion of rights, privileges and immunities.] [There is no state police power where the action is in the form of civil actions for torts as municipalities of the state, and the state itself are barred from exercising 'governmental functions' in the nature of 'public duties' or 'public benefits', which have, as their object, the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of its political division, as tort actions are between private parties] [The police power does not exist by the state and its municipalities, where there is statutory jurisdiction by an administrative agency or department within the agency, as administrative enforcement schemes are civil in nature and enforced by special proceedings] [We now come to the matter of 'sobriety check points', and their common usage by peace officers and police agencies (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 20 PAGE 305 (cont) under color of law and color of uniform] [Author argues that sobriety check points are farces, as there is no law within the Penal Code prohibiting the use of an automobile, by a motorist, while under the influence of alcohol/drugs. Thus, no police power exists for the stopping of motorists at any time or place. That there is no law permitting the stop of any person/individual to check as to their sobriety. Thus, the changing of the phrase from 'drunk check points' to 'sobriety check points' to skirt the issue of unconstitutionality of police power stops] [Has anyone ever seen a sign, among the multitude of billboards, police cars, bus stops, etc, that read "It is against the law to drink and drive?"] [How can there be 'police power' to establish a sobriety check point to stop any vehicle and check the motorist for sobriety, when to be sober is not some penal code violation? And to ask the driver/motorist if he has had a drink is asking the individual to incriminate himself. If he answers 'yes', he will be ordered to submit to a series of field sobriety tests, further incriminating

himself; all without the first determination that the individual is a person within the jurisdiction of DMV Vehicle Code at the time of the stop, or there is evidence that the individual has signed a waiver of constitutional rights] "Lawful arrest - In order for an arrest to be proper, offense must have been committed in arresting officer's presence" (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 21 PAGE 306 (cont) Spurlock vs DMV 1 CalApp3d 821 [Under s23157(a), one must be lawfully arrested before sobriety/drunk tests may be performed, and then only with the permission of the individual or the obtaining of a warrant] [The mere observation of blood shot eyes, odor of alcohol on the breath, etc., is not admissible proof of drunkenness, and incapacity to perform safely, thus, the need for hard core scientific evidence of 'influence' as without the evidence it is 'hearsay'] California Supreme Court Ingersoll, et al Petitioners vs Palmer, Respondent 87 Daily Journal DAR 8107; 241 CalRptr 42 PREFACE: [Author must explain why Ingersoll case should not have been heard. Why? Because the petitioner had neither status nor standing to petition the Court] STANDING TO SUE: Doctrine that in an action in federal constitutional court by citizen against a government officer complaining of alleged unlawful conduct, there is no judiciable controversy unless citizen shows that such conduct invades, or will invade, a private substantive legally protected interest of plaintiff citizen. Black's 4th p 1577 STATUS: Standing, state or condition. The rights, duties, capacities, which determine a person to a given class. A legal personal relationship, not temporary in its nature nor terminable at the mere will of the parties, with which third persons and the state are concerned. Black's 4th p 1580 VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 22

PAGE 307 [Petitioners were California tax payers who sought to prohibit the use of sobriety check points. As tax payers, not as motorists/drivers, the use of sobriety check points would not invade an interest, did not allege status, which would be business licensees engaged in business regulated by DMV, and its Vehicle Code, nor do they show a status which subjects them to CHP authority under VC s2400, powers and duties. Nor did they argue that there is no crime (mala in se) prohibiting motorists from drinking intoxicating beverages, and driving (verb) their private automobile/truck, thus, no standing that they could/would be harmed by the use of 'sobriety check points', by police/peace officers whose power does not/cannot invade rights of private citizens absent a crime (mal in se)] In its opinion, Court said, "However, the sobriety check point here was operated, not for the primary purpose of discovering or preserving evidence of crime or arresting law breakers, but primarily for the 'regulatory' purpose of keeping intoxicated drivers (were they using verb or noun?) off the highways to the end of enhancing public safety" [Remember, enhancing public safety is a function of the police power only when an actual commission of a substantive crime under Penal Code has been committed and someone has been injured, which does not include violations of Vehicle Code mala prohibita. Obviously, the state has not been a victim of a mala prohibita violation without a mala in se a part of the prohibita] VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 23 PAGE 308 [Next, petitioners argue that sobriety check points are violative of constitutional rights, for it avoids reasonable suspicion of commission of crime and due process, therein demanded, before a peace/police officer may so act. Court then argues that role is a 'regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose'. This is intentional deception, as no such system/method/scheme constitutionally exists for DUI under Vehicle Code] [Author has included the Dissenting Opinion by Broussard, Justice and Concurring Mosk and Panelli, Justices. Author includes it in its entirety as part of this treatise. It cuts neatly and cleanly through the garbage of the grounds, presented by the majority, for affirming the denial of the writ of mandate by the Court of Appeal]

[Author includes the Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joins, dissenting in Michigan Department State Police et al Petitioners vs Rick Sitz, et al to the "Sobriety Check Points Don't Violate Substantial Fourth Amendment Rights" by the Supreme Court of the United States] "Each of the respondents (Sitz et al) is a licensed driver in the State of Michigan......who regularly travels throughout the State in his automobile" "Respondents argue that there must be a showing of some special governmental need, 'beyond the normal need' for criminal law enforcement, before a balancing analysis is appropriate, and that petitioners have demonstrated no such special need " (Sitz) VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 24 PAGE 309 [It appears to the author that the 'necessary balancing analysis' is, and respondents failed to show it, that though they are licensees of the State of Michigan who travel throughout the State, at the time of the stop, they were not engaged in some vehicle code activity which is enforceable by State Police of Michigan, and that the seizure by the State Police, absent the mala in se, the seizure did not advance the public interest as neither the state nor the people were victims by mala in se by respondents] [Let me once more go into the issue of what constitutes a lawful arrest as Vehicle Code s23157 is explicit that in proceedings on 'influence' arrests, the person must be 'lawfully arrested', and a lawful arrest is clearly defined within Penal Code] "Petitioners concede, correctly in our view, that a 4th Amendment 'seizure' occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a check point" (Michigan vs Sitz) [Assuming officer is acting within the scope and duty as a police officer/peace officer, then a seizure is an arrest without a warrant, and must await the filing of an accusation under oath for issue of arrest warrant before arrestee may be questioned, or can be required to submit to any 'tests' which would be evidence admissible in a trial as to guilt] PC s849 Arrest without warrant, duty to take prisoner before a magistrate and file complaint;......... (a) When an arrest is made, without a warrant, by a peace officer

or private person, the person arrested, if not otherwise (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 25 PAGE 310 (cont) released, shall, without unnecessary delay, be taken before.........magistrate.........and a complaint stating the charge against the arrested person shall be laid before such magistrate. [Remember, until a verified complaint is filed with a magistrate and a warrant issued for 'probable cause showing' there is no jurisdiction of the subject matter or personam. Any questioning or testing without permission, in writing, by seized person is a violation/deprival of Bill of Rights] PC 849.5 Arrest without filing of accusatory pleading, record, arrest deemed detention In any case in which a person is arrested and released, and no accusatory pleading is filed charging him with an offense, any record of arrest of the person shall include a record of release. Thereafter, the arrest shall not be deemed arrest, but a detention only. [This procedure mandated under VC s40513(a), and until comported/complied with under PC s948 et seq (rules of pleading) then a civil, extra-judicial notice to appear does not constitute a charge under s952] s952 Statement of Offense In charging an offense, each count shall contain, and shall be sufficient if it contains in substance, a statement that the accused has committed some public offense therein specified. Such statement may be made in ordinary and concise language without technical averments, or any allegations of matter not essential to be proved. It may be in the words of (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 26 PAGE 311 (cont) the enactment describing the offense, or declaring the matter to be a public offense, or in any words sufficient to give the accused notice of the offense of which he is accused. [Read a notice to appear carefully. Does any of it on its face conform to s952? If not, then it is null and void, without force of law, either criminally or civilly]

[If none of the above is obeyed, and a person/individual is taken/appears for an arraignment or trial, then that person has been falsely arrested and falsely imprisoned, and grounds for civil suit will lie] Section 4 of Stats 1975, C. 1117, s1 provides; "It is the intent of the Legislature that nothing in this act shall effect the civil remedy of any person for false arrest or imprisonment" [If any trial to prosecute is based upon 'implied consent', under s23157 for chemical tests, then two steps are required by the person to be prosecuted; a demand that a true, certified copy of the written waiver, made voluntarily and knowledgeably, be produced at the trial; or the person to be prosecuted, under that section, introduce at the trial the evidence that he has attempted to have the DMV allow the accused to inspect its public records and refused, or no finding of a waiver, or under Information Practices Act of 1977, the Office of Information Practices has refused to assist in identifying records, or no record identified as a waiver found] [Partial sections of these processes are part of this (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 27 PAGE 312 (cont) material for your guidance, and to assist as to the general procedure for further research for evidence of records] [Also included, are the forms for transfer of action to a court having jurisdiction, where the court does not have jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction, appears on the petition or complaint (courts always argue a notice is a complaint)] [If a prior judgment of conviction was without the due process of law defined supra, then proceedings should be initiated under s41403, Defenses Div 17 Chapter 5] [This section is not only for DUI convictions. It applies to convictions down graded from DUI] Prior Conviction: Constitutional Validity 41403(a) In any proceedings to have a judgment of conviction of a violation of Section 14610 (Driving when Privileges Suspended or Revoked; Reckless Driving. This is common in dropping of the DUI) 14601.2 (Driving When Privilege Suspended or Revoked for Driving Under the Influence, With Excessive Blood Alcohol, or When Addicted) 23152 (Alcohol or Drug: Driver) 23153 (Alcohol or Drug Causing Injury;

Driver) 23103 (Reckless Driving) as specified in 23103.5 (Guilty Plea to a Lesser Charge) which was entered in a separate proceeding' declared invalid on constitutional grounds, the defendant shall state in writing and with specificity, wherein, the defendant was deprived of the defendant's constitutional rights, which statement shall be filed with the clerk of the court, and a copy served on the court (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 28 PAGE 313 (cont) that rendered that judgment, and on the prosecuting attorney in the present proceedings at least five court days prior to the hearing thereon. (b) Except as provided in subd. (c), the court shall, prior to the trial of any pending criminal action against the defendant, wherein, the separate conviction is charged as such, hold a hearing, outside of the presence of the jury, in order to determine the constitutional validity of the charged separate conviction issue. At the hearing the procedure, the burden of proof, and the burden of producing evidence shall be as follows: (1) The burden of proof remains with the prosecution throughout, and is that of a reasonable doubt. (2) The prosecution shall initially have the burden of producing evidence of the separate conviction sufficient to justify a finding that the defendant has suffered that separate conviction. (3) After the production of evidence required by paragraph (2), the defendant has the burden of producing evidence that the defendant's constitutional rights were infringed in the separate proceeding at issue. If the separate conviction sought to be invalidated is upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the defendant shall provide the court with the evidence of the prior plea, including the court docket, written waiver of constitutional rights executed by the defendant, and the transcripts of the relevant court proceedings at the time of the entry of the defendant's plea. VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 29 PAGE 314 These records shall be provided to the defendant without cost to him/her, when the defendant is represented by the public defender or counsel appointed pursuant to section 987.2 of Penal Code.

(4) If the defendant bears this burden successfully, the prosecution shall have the right to produce evidence in rebuttal. (5) The court shall make a finding on the basis of the evidence, thus produced, and shall strike from the accusatory pleading any separate conviction found to be unconstitutionally invalid. (c) If the defendant fails to comply with the notice requirement of Subd. (a), or fails to produce the evidence required by paragraph (3) of Subd. (b), the court shall hear the motion at the time of sentencing in lieu of continuing the trial, unless good cause is shown for failure to provide notice pursuant to subs (3), or produce the evidence required paragraph (3) of subd (b), in which case the court will grant a continuance of the trial for a reasonable period. The procedure, burden of proof, and burden of producing evidence as provided in subd. (b), shall apply regardless of when the motion is heard. [Author has sat in too many courts as a spectator, where a jury was hearing a charge (sic) of DUI, and no complaint was part of the record, and the defendant did not have the required copy of the complaint, or any evidence that a warrant of arrest had issued in the defendant's name] VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 30 PAGE 315 [So, if on a prior conviction no complaint/warrant is part of the record, including a signed waiver of legal rights was placed on the record, and waiver evidenced, regardless of any evidence otherwise produced at the trial, the court and the prosecutor were without subject matter/personam jurisdiction, and defendant was deprived of due process of the law demanded in all prosecutions, mala in se and mala prohibita, and in civil actions] [If it is a first time trial DUI, or any charge (sic) under Vehicle Code by a civil extra-judicial notice, you must challenge the prosecutor, and the court, for their want of subject matter/personam jurisdiction, and never abandon the challenge until the court proves its jurisdiction] [Interesting question. If the party/court moving against you has no jurisdiction, can they dismiss when no action has been initiated at law?] [Where the action is civil in nature, though tried by a

quasi-criminal procedure, and the Plaintiff are the People of Corporate State of California, and the People of the State have not been harmed mala in se, and cannot be harmed mala prohibita, because they are without standing in private statutes administered by agencies composed of private individuals (see Administrative Law, supra), where is the standing for the People to appear Plaintiff when they are a political corporation?] PEOPLE: A state. A nation in its collective and 'political' capacity. VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 31 PAGE 316 POLITICAL: Pertaining or relating to the policy or the administration of government, state or nation. Pertaining to, or incidental to, the exercise of the functions vested in those charged with the conduct of government; relating to affairs of state; as political theories. State ex rel Maley vs Civic Action Committee 28 N23d 467, 470 POLITICAL CORPORATION: A public or municipal corporation; one created for political purposes, and having for its object the administration of governmental powers of a subordinate or local nature. Curry vs District Tp 17 NW 191 [So, the People cannot assume a standing outside the political arena, and come into a civil action when they have not been harmed mala in se] "As generally used in constitutional law, the entire body of those citizens of a state or nation who are invested with political power for political purposes" Boyd vs Nebraska 12 S. Ct. 375, 143 US 135, 36 Led 103 "The word 'people' may have various significations according to the connection in which it is used. When we speak of the rights of the people, or of the government of the people by law, or of the people as a non-political aggregate, we mean all the inhabitants of the state or nation........, But when reference is made to the people as the repository of sovereignty, as the source of government power, or to popular government, we are in fact, speaking of that selected (cont)

VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 32 PAGE 317 (cont), and limited class of citizens to whom the constitution accords the right of participation in the office of government" Black's Constitutional Law Ed p 30 [So, unless the individual has committed a mala in se crime against the people, the People have not been harmed, as the matter is or is not between an administrative agency department (DMV), and not some political corporation, wherein, some public official employed by that corporation appears as defendant] [I learned about this when I tried to sue a magistrate and County Counsel for the Municipal County of San Bernardino appeared as attorney of record for the employee] [Governmental powers are, of course, limited to mala in se prosecutions, or if the governmental corporation is sued as defendant, or corporation sues in an ex contractu action some contractee who has failed to perform the contract] [Give this serious consideration as an affirmative defense, if named as defendant by district attorney on a mere civil, extra-judicial notice to appear, whether a person within the jurisdiction of the Department or not a person within the jurisdiction of the Department] ADDENDUM "Mobile home is 'consumer goods' within the meaning of and as defined in 9-109 (1)" In re Pelletier 5 USS Rep Srv 327 (DC, Me) ref (1968) Maine UCC 9-109(1) In re Fourgere 5 UCC 410 (1968) VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 33 PAGE 318 In re Ten Brock 4 UCC Rep Serv 712 (WD Mich 1966) [Author did some research on Uniform Commercial Code under which DMV must comply as to procedure license/contract relationships] Implied Consent is Unconscionable License/Contract "Unconscionability is generally recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on part of one of parties within contract terms

which are unreasonably favorable to other party, i.e., unconscionability has both procedural and substantive element. The procedural element focuses on oppression and surprise, oppression dealing with absence of bargaining power, and surprise encompasses the extent to which supposedly agreed on terms are hidden in a printed form typically drafted by party with superior bargaining position" A& M Co vs FMC Corp 34 UCC Rep Serv 1129 ADDENDUM VITAL! [If a person has been properly charged, and the court has jurisdiction, and someone brings forth the issue of a possible plea bargain, by a plea of guilty to a lower charge, don't] [The usual lower plea is reckless driving, which has the same serious effect as a conviction for DUI, as to insurance, possible conditioning of privilege of driving, etc.] [So, anyone offers you a deal, say no, demand that they take the matter to trial, they won't] VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 34 PAGE 319 Penal Code s1192.7 Plea bargaining, limitation (a) Plea bargaining in any case in which the indictment or information charges any serious felony, or any offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, narcotics, or other intoxicating substance, or any combination thereof, is prohibited, unless there is insufficient evidence to prove the people's case, or testimony of a material witness cannot be obtained, or a reduction or dismissal would not result in a substantial change in sentence. (b) As used in this section, 'plea bargaining' means any bargaining, negotiation, or discussion between a criminal defendant, or his/her counsel, and a prosecuting attorney or judge, whereby, the defendant agrees to plead guilty or nolo contendere, in exchange for any promises, commitments, concessions, assurances, or consideration, by the prosecuting attorney or judge, relating to any charge against the defendant or to the sentencing of the defendant. [There is the ball. Are you going to carry it?]

PSS Fourth Amendment applies on stops for DUI "As...suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the commission of offenses against the law (VC is statutory law) are of this quasi-criminal nature, we think that they are within the reason of criminal proceedings for all purposes of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution" Plymouth Sedan vs Pennsylvania 380 US 693, 85 S. Ct. 1246 14 Led2d 170 (1965) quoting Boud vs US 116 616, 634, 6 S. Ct. 524, 534, 29 Led 746 (1886) VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 35 PAGE 320 [For individuals stopped and arrested pursuant to a 'sobriety checkpoint', keep in mind that peace officers/Highway Patrol in California, do no conduct such stops as peace officers, but as 'traffic officers' under color of peace officers, and thereby, deprive the stopee of Bill of Rights, and become ripe for a 42 USC s1983 civil rights action as individuals using a 'state action' to deprive the individual of rights, which cannot be taken away under color of law. All of the above is strong medicine to cure an abuse, and misuse of a 'regulatory scheme', outside the juris of any peace officer or magistrate/justice of a justice court if you were not engaged in any activity regulated by Vehicle Code] [Ingersoll vs Palmer 43 Cal3d 1321, 743 P2d 1299 (Oct 1987) was the first challenge taken to a state supreme court, and is worthy of comment by the author. Note must be taken that the petitioner was not a party with an interest, or the standing to petition the state supreme court. Petitioner was a California taxpayer. Certainly any actions/procedures by CHP in conducting 'sobriety checkpoints' was of no concern to a taxpayer, because he possibly would be stopped at a 'checkpoint' as a taxpayer. As a taxpayer he did not come within the scope and duties of a traffic officer] [The author has included a few pertinent pages from INGERSOLL, and it should be considered the Bible which shall be quoted/cited by any and all individuals who are arrested by a peace officer for a DUI and prosecuted thereafter] VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 36 PAGE 321 [It is the opinion of the author. that INGERSOLL was docketed for hearing only because there was enormous pressure to hear and rule on the case, because the CHP was chomping at the bit to renew the

use of 'sobriety checkpoints', as misleading deceit by CHP, because there was so much antagonism to the original 'drunk driver checkpoints'] [Nowhere, in Penal Code, can be found any section stating that it was/is a mala in se/misdemeanor to drive while drunk, or any degree of blood alcohol content. Think about it. If to drive/use an automobile while sober, is not a crime of any nature, how/or why could anyone of such persons be lawfully stopped, and checked to see if they are sober? So such a stop, would in itself, be an abuse of process, and the individuals rights to travel with constitutional expectation of privacy, unless a crime has been committed] [If the individual reads/researches penal code, he will discover that all references are under Vehicle Code, not penal code, thus, obviously, are administrative in nature] [Author has included, in the RED BOOK, the dissenting opinion of Brousard in INGERSOLL. For any reader who is or has been charged and found guilty of a DUI, if you cannot find INGERSOLL locally, the author has put together the complete INGERSOLL & Michigan Department of State Police et al vs Rich Sitz et al, 170 Mich App 433, 429 NW2d 180 & Michigan State Police et al vs Rich Sitz Supreme Court of United States No 88 - 1897 Cited in 90 Daily Journal 6696 (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 15 - 37 PAGE 322 (cont) US vs Harvey 701 F2d 800 (1983) [This package is available for 50 FRN's cash or postal money order blank, only, and should be the foundation of any timely appeal or habeas corpus if you are in state custody, actual or constructive, where probation is granted before the imposition of the sentence or a 42 USC s1983 civil action] "Evidence developed from a blood sample, which was seized without consent, without a warrant, and without prior formal arrest, or at least substantially contemporaneous arrest, was inadmissable in prosecution of defendant....since valid formal arrest, or a contemporaneous arrest, is generally required prior to the taking of the blood sample" US vs Harvey 701 F2d 800 (1983)

ARTHUR FRANK SANFORD c/o 5894 Villa Drive Rancho Cucamonga, Cal Applicant, Sui Juris MUNICIPAL COURT, WEST VALLEY DIVISION COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO (center these two lines) PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NO. SH 556888 CALIFORNIA, APPLICATION FOR Plaintiff in error LAW AND MOTION vs HEARING ARTHUR FRANK SANFORD [CRC, Rules 301, 303 (a) (1), 307 Applicant 309] Date March 1, 1991 time 8:30 am Dept ................................................................. ................................................................. TO THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: ARTHUR FRANK SANFORD, Sui Juris, by this notice will appear March 1, 1991, at 8:30 am, before the presiding judge of above court, where he will appear for Law and Motion hearing, pursuant to California Rules of Court; CRC Rule 301: Applicability The rules in this division apply to proceedings in civil law

and motions in superior, municipal, and justice courts............................ CRC Rul 303: (a) "Law and Motion" includes any proceedings: (1) On application before trial for an order,.............. CRC, Rule 307: Assignment of Matters Except as provided by rule 375, the presiding judge (cont) PAGE 367 (cont) or a judge designated by the presiding judge shall hear the proceedings in law and motion. CRC Rule 309: Notice of Determination of Submitted Matters When the court rules on a demurrer or motion or makes an order or renders a judgment in a matter it has taken under submission, the clerk shall forthwith notify the parties of the ruling, order or judgment. The notification, which shall 'specifically identify' the 'matter' ruled upon, may be given by mailing a copy of the ruling, order or judgment, CONCLUSION This court of general jurisdiction, sits ministerially on all matters of Vehicle Code when the applicant is a licensee of the DMV, the enforcement agency for Vehicle Code, if the applicant is a man/person within the jurisdiction of that department. This appearance, by the applicant, is special in nature, and made only for the purpose of challenging the general jurisdiction of this court, and specifically the subject matter jurisdiction and personam jurisdiction as absent and incompetent when no verified complaint has been filed by the district attorney, and no issue of a warrant of arrest by the court on a probable cause showing mala in se. Further, on grounds that if this matter is, in nature a vehicle code violation, a mala prohibita violation, the prosecuting attorney has no authority under Vehicle Code to appear and plead before this court as the people are without standing under the Vehicle Code to by-pass the administrative procedure, first instance, as original jurisdiction (cont) PAGE 367

(cont) lies with that department, and is exclusive as to that department. This court sitting on a law & motion hearing is asked to take judicial notice of the Notice of Demand that the District Attorney Make the Extra-judicial Civil Notice to Appear More Definite & Certain, and the Denial of Any Accusatory Complaint & Recant of an Involuntary Coerced Confession on (date if issue of Notice to Appear), which are made a part of this Law & Motion Hearing, and attached hereto, as to which court must take judicial notice pursuant to Evid C s310 Questions of Law & s550 Party Who Has Burden of Producing Evidence (b), The burden of producing evidence as to a particular fact is initially on the party with the burden of proof as to that fact (district attorney), and s350 Only Relevant Evidence Admissible, "evidence must correspond with the substance of the material allegations, and be relevant to the questions in dispute", and s451, Matter Which Must be Judicially Noticed (a), "the decisional constitutional & public statutory law of this state & of the United States and the California Constitution", and s452 Matters Which May be Judicially Noticed (a), "The Decisional, Constitutional, & Statutory Law of any State of the United States, and the Resolutions and Private Acts of the Congress of the United States, and of the Legislature of this State" This notice of judicial notice is, in nature, compulsory under s453, Compulsory Judicial Notice upon Request. PAGE 369 This applicant must not be defined an opportunity to present information to court s455 (a), "If the trial court has been requested to take, or has taken, or proposes to take judicial notice of such matter, the court shall afford each party reasonable opportunity, before the jury is instructed, or before the case is submitted for decision by the court. Applicant must be noticed if the court denies the request to take judicial notice s456, "If the trial court denies a request to take judicial notice of any matter, the court 'shall', at the earliest practicable time so advise the parties, and indicate for the record that it has denied the request" Petitioner believes the court should, sua sponde, dismiss the above captioned case, in the interest of justice, and/or order

district attorney to transfer to the DMV for Formal Hearing and Declaratory Judgment. Arthur Frank Sanford Applicant PAGE 370 ARTHUR FRANK SANFORD 5894 Villa Drive Rancho Cucamonga, CA Movant MUNICIPAL COURT, WEST VALLEY DIVISION COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO (center on page) PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF Case Number CALIFORNIA NOTICE OF DEMAND DEMAND THAT DISTRICT Plaintiff, in error, ATTORNEY MAKE THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CIVIL NOTICE TO vs APPEAR MORE DEFINITE AND CERTAIN AND DEMAND THAT A ARTHUR FRANK SANFORD VERIFIED COMPLAINT FILED WITH OFFICER'S NOTICE TO Defendant, in error, APPEAR WITH DISTRICT ATTORNEY MAY BE MADE MORE DEFINITE AND CERTAIN AND THAT THIS COURT IS WITHOUT THE JURISDICTION WITHOUT THE

FILING OF ABOVE COMPLAINT NOTICE THAT THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER DOES NOT EXIST WITHOUT AN EXTRA-JUDICIAL CIVIL NOTICE TO APPEAR AND VERIFIED COMPLAINT FILED WITH HIM BY THE ARRESTING OFFICER AND COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION WITHOUT A VERIFIED COMPLAINT FILED WITH A MAGISTRATE OF THIS COURT WITH PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ISSUE OF ARREST WARRANT BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE In re: San Bernardino county Sheriff's Extra-Judicial Civil Notice to Appear citing VC s4000 (a) Vehicle Code mandates the filing of a verified complaint, and issue of a warrant of arrest be filed with this court, and served on defendant, Arthur Frank Sanford, or court is without subject matter and personam jurisdiction. Without the filing of said papers, making the notice definite, and certain both this court, and defendant, in error, lack information upon which (cont) PAGE 371 (cont) this matter can properly proceed forward for adjudication according to due process of the law. This notice of demand is based on the following case law, which is stare decisis binding on this court. DEMANDS TO MAKE THIS NOTICE MORE DEFINITE, AND CERTAIN ARE SPECIAL APPEARANCES AND SHALL NOT BE CONSTRUED AS GENERAL APPEARANCES BY THE QUASI-DEFENDANT Defendant is at a loss for sufficient information from plaintiff's notice upon which to base a defense, and properly makes this motion before the court for a more definite and certain statement, and raises objections to the notice on points of law (Kauffroath vs Wilbure 185 P2d 522) A motion to make a notice more definite and certain is 'not a pleading', and does not constitute a 'general appearance'; the object of this motion to require the pleading to be made more definite and certain, is to enable the movant to demur or answer, or reply more intelligently, and the respondent does not waive his right to notice the court, and the district attorney of their 'want' of jurisdiction by moving to make notice more definite and certain, when the nature of the charge or defense is uncertain

(Lawrence vs Lawrence 62 SE 8; Smith vs Smith 50 SC 54; 27 SE 545; 31 SE 660) NOTICES TO APPEAR ARE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CIVIL NOTICES AS THEY DO NOT BEAR THE SEAL OR SIGNATURE OF ISSUING COURT, AND CANNOT BE CONSTRUED AS GENERAL APPEARANCES BY THE QUASI-DEFENDANT A motion to make a notice more definite and certain is not a 'general appearance' under civil practice, provided motion shall be by service of the Motion to Make the Notice More Definite and Certain and Raising Objection on Points of Law, as motions to correct or reform a pleading are not regarded as constituting a 'general appearance' (199 NYS 519, 520; 172 NYS 273) ALL NOTICES TO APPEAR ARE SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS, CIVIL IN NATURE, ALTHOUGH ADMINISTERED BY A QUASI-CRIMINAL PROCEDURE The fact that the proceedings is brought in the name of the people, or of the state, will not prevent it from being regarded as civil in nature (People vs Briggs 20 NE 820; 114 NY 56), nor is the fact that the proceeding may be commenced by warrant of arrest of the respondent, itself (cont) PAGE 372 (cont) sufficient to change the character of the proceeding from civil to criminal (Alton vs Kirsh 68 Ill 261; 25 CJ p 1183 note 60) EXTRA-JUDICIAL CIVIL NOTICES TO APPEAR, AND VERIFIED COMPLAINTS MUST CLEARLY ESTABLISH THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF AN ACTION In US vs Cook, 17 Wallace 174, the court said that, "every ingredient of which an offense is composed must be accurately and clearly alleged. It is an elementary principle of pleading that where the definition of an offense, whether it be at common law or statute, includes generic terms, it is not sufficient that the pleading shall charge the offense in the same generic terms as in the definition; but it must state the species, it must descend to the particulars" 1 Arch Cr Pr and Pl 291. "The objective is, first, to furnish the accused with such description of the charge against him, as will enable him to make his defense, and avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; second, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.

For this, facts are to be stated, not conclusions of law alone. An offense is made of acts and intent; and these must be set forth with particularity of time, place and circumstances" MATTERS OF ENFORCEMENT OF VEHICLE CODE ARE, IN NATURE, MALA PROHIBITA, AND NOT MALA IN SE VIOLATIONS "Offenses created by statute, as well as offenses at common law, must be accurately and clearly described, and, if the offense cannot be described without expanding the allegations beyond mere words of the statute, then it is clear that the allegations must be expanded to that extent, as it is universally true that no charge is sufficient, which does not accurately and clearly allege all the ingredients of which the offense is composed, so as to bring the accused within the true intent and meaning of the statute defining the offense. Every offense consists of certain acts done or omitted under certain circumstances; and, in the charge for the offense, it is not sufficient to charge the accused generally with having committed the offense, but all the circumstances constituting must be specifically set forth" Arch. Cr. Pl. 15th Ed 43 EXTRA-JUDICIAL CIVIL NOTICE TO APPEAR ISSUED TO DEFENDANT, IN ERROR, DOES NOT SHOW A DETERMINATION BY ISSUING OFFICER THAT DEFENDANT, IN ERROR, WAS A PERSON/MAN ENGAGED IN ANY ACTIVITY WHICH IS REGULATED AND ENFORCED AS TO THE DEFENDANT (cont) PAGE 373 (cont) WITHIN JURISDICTION OF DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES Practicing a profession, or otherwise engaging in a regulated activity, without a license is an offense, if the statute so provides, whether or not the offender received or expected compensation, unless the statute specifies the receipt or expectation of compensation as an element of the offense, in which case there is no offense if that condition is not fulfilled. People vs Vermillion (1916) 30 Cal App 416, 417 NOTICE OF POINTS OF LAW AND PROCEDURE AND FACTS OF THE MATTER WHICH NEED TO BE MADE MORE DEFINITE AND CERTAIN AS TO THE QUASI-DEFENDANT Extra-judicial civil notice to appear issued by the arresting quasi-peace officer, and upon which district attorney alleges he appears for the people is vague and meritless.

Thus, a need exists, is the notice to appear standing alone without a mandated verified complaint filed by the district attorney with the magistrate, sufficient at law to give this court subject matter jurisdiction? Notice upon which District Attorney is proceeding is unclear, vague and indefinite on points of statutory law, and fails to follow due process of administrative law. Notice fails as complaint as; 1. Cites the vehicle code, but fails to establish the status of the movant as a person within the statute.. 2. Notice does not allege breaches of the vehicle code by the movant, merely cites sections of code. 3. Notice does not allege fact(s) as to movant. 4. Notice fails to evidence that quasi-defendant movant has any binding duty to Vehicle Code 5. Notice fails to evidence that movant named on the caption of the notice is of the class regulated by VC. 6. Notice fails to name the movant within any body of the notice as a person in violation of the code. (cont) PAGE 374 7. Notice fails to evidence corpus delicti 8. Notice fails to show prima facie case. 9. Notice fails to evidence intent to violate code 10. Notice fails to give district attorney, or the court personam jurisdiction, when the matter is civil administrative law, and not a mala in se violation. 11. Notice failed to inform movant that the nature of the notice was a matter of 'ministerial action', in an administrative action to be heard by a 'ministerial official'. Accordingly, movant motions that District Attorney make the notice more certain and definite as a pleading, and on points of statute with force of law on the movant, and show his standing and status to appear, and show the statutory law which permits him to appear on a mere vague notice, which as a matter of administrative law must proceed first instance with the exclusive jurisdiction agency DMV, if movant is within its class, so that movant may, as must the people, move, first instance, to the administrative hearing agency, if the agency has jurisdiction as to the movant.

Arthur Frank Sanford Movant MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES This motion is made so that District Attorney, having had a copy of the Notice to Appear, filed with him but no verified complaint having been filed with the hearing court, and no warrant of arrest having been issued, and district (cont) PAGE 375 (cont) attorney not having moved, first instance, to any agency with jurisdiction to hear, that he do so, or if he 'standing' that he file a competent complaint, clear and concise and definite, as movant is unable to understand, and thus, present a defense, how the existing extra-judicial civil notice to appear, standing alone, may be accepted by the court as a ground for jurisdiction before a 'ministerial officer' NOTICE TO APPEAR, STATUTORY, IS WITHOUT FORCE OF LAW, WHEN THE PERSON NAMED ON THE CAPTION OF THE NOTICE IS NOT WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, AND FAILS TO PLEAD THE STATUTE "Pleading a statute is stating the facts which bring the case within it; and 'counting on it', in the strict language of pleading, is making express reference to it by apt terms to show the source of right relied upon" McCullough vs Colfax County, 95 NW 31 "Where a person is not at the time of a licensee, neither the agency, nor any official, has any jurisdiction of said person..........." O'Neil vs Dept Prof & Vocations, 7 CA2d 398; Eiseman vs Daugherty, 6 Cal 783 "It is impossible to prove jurisdiction exists absent a substantial nexus with the State, such as voluntary subscription to license. All jurisdictional facts supporting claim that supposed jurisdiction exists must appear on the record of the court" Pipe Line vs Marathon, 102 S Ct 2858 quoting Crowell vs Benson, 285 US 22 "Only substantial relationship means jurisdiction" See vs Seattle, 387 US 541; Camara vs San Francisco, California, 387 US

523 PARTICULAR AGENCY WITH LICENSING POWER HAVE SUBJECT MATTER AND PERSONAM JURISDICTION ONLY OF THEIR VALID LICENSEES "Where a person is not, at the time, a licensee, neither the agency, nor any official, has any jurisdiction of said person to consider or to make any order. One ground as to the want of jurisdiction was, accused, was not a licensee, (cont) PAGE 376 (cont) and it was not claimed that he was" O'Neil vs Dept Prof. & Vocations, 7 CA2d 398; Eisman vs Daugherty, 6 CA 783 "The accusation does not allege that appellant was licensed under any act, the license was not offered in evidence.......evidence was that he did not come within its limitations" King vs Bd Med Exam, 65 CA2d 644 PARTICULAR AGENCY WITH LICENSING POWER TO ENFORCE ITS REGULATIONS ONLY HAVE JURISDICTION TO REGULATE THEIR VALIDLY LICENSED LICENSEES, WHEN AT THE TIME OF THE 'STOP' LICENSEE WAS DRIVING, OPERATING FOR COMPENSATION OTHERWISE 'STOP' WAS ILLEGAL "Agency has not authority to revoke or enforce any licensee, unless he is acting for compensation. Such an act is highly penal in its nature, and should not be construed to include anything which is not embraced within its terms. There is no charge within the complaint, no evidence to prove the charge if it were in the complaint, that accused was employed for compensation........" Schomig vs Keiser, 189 Cal 596 "Practicing a profession, or otherwise engaging in a regulated activity, without a license, if statute so provides, whether or not offender received or expected compensation, unless the statute specifies the receipt or expectation of compensation as an element of the offense, in which case there is no offense if that condition is not fulfilled." People vs Vermillion (1916) 30 CalApp 416, 417 MERE APPLICATION FOR AND POSSESSION OF LICENSE FROM PARTICULAR LICENSING AGENCY IS NOT 'IP SO FACTO' BINDING VALID CONTRACT, LICENSE, AND NEXUS WITH THE STATE BY ITS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY The effect of a contract and a license is the evidence of the

contract, because licenses are unilateral, one has voluntarily assigned power of attorney to the licensing agency. But power of attorney and voluntary contract, with the license being the evidence of the contract, can be terminated when the party has not been enriched, enjoyed benefits, and considerations from the contract. "License is a 'unilateral contract', in which a promise is given in exchange for an act of forbearance" Black's law Dict 4th Ed "Unilateral is an expression of absence of mutuality. Unilateral contracts are void where no mutuality of obligation exists, and only one party is bound" Hirsch vs Paragould, 127 SW 623 "Unilateral contracts are merely promises to do something in the future, provided the promisee performs some specified act, no enforceable obligation will be imposed upon the promisor unless the specified act is performed, but if performed, contract matures and the original promise is capable of enforcement" "The requirement of experiencing benefit is important in American Jurisprudence, as it is immoral and unethical to hold a person to a contract who takes no enrichment from it" WHERE A PARTICULAR AGENCY IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION OF PERSON NAMED ON CAPTION OF NOTICE, NO PERSON (S) MAY GAIN JURISDICTION OF A PERSON OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION OF PARTICULAR AGENCY "Incompetent action by the agency, whether directly or through a court sitting administerial as hearing officer, must be clearly defined in the statute before it has subject matter jurisdiction, without such jurisdiction of the licensee, all acts of the agency, by it employees, agents, and hearing officers, are null and void" Doolan vs Carr, 125 US 518; City vs Pearson, 181 Cal 640 "It is basic in our law that an administrative agency may only act within the area of its jurisdiction marked out for it by law" Endicott vs Perkins, 317 US 501 "Substance and form rule applies to government agency as well as to its victims" Falbro vs Cir, 315 F2d 784 ALL MATTERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROCEEDINGS LIE OUTSIDE JUDICIAL

JURISDICTION, ARE MERELY QUASI-JUDICIAL, ARE IN FACT MINISTERIAL IN NATURE Thus, where the court sits as 'ministerial officer' for the DMV, and the matter has not been, in fact, brought before it by true criminal due process of PAGE 378 (cont) law, mala in se violations, the court is sitting in capacity of 'ministerial officer', who is bound by the procedures under Administrative Law. Such an 'official' is without discretionary power, and so is bound by the administrative rules, and should transfer the matter for a true administrative hearing before the DMV. "Ministerial duty is one, regarding which, no thing is left to discretion - a simple and definite duty, imposed by law, and arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist" Mott vs Hull 152 P 92 "It arises when an individual has such legal interest in its performance, that neglect of performance becomes a wrong to such individual" Morton vs Comptroller etc 4 SC 473 "Ministerial officer is one whose duties are purely ministerial, as distinguished from executive, legislative or judicial functions requiring obedience to the mandates of superior authority, and not involving exercise of judgment or discretion, is ministerial officer" Kinney vs Bell 127 F 1002; State vs Loechner 91 NW 874 CONCLUSION By the above points and authorities, it is an obvious conclusion that neither the district attorney, nor this court to hear for the DMV, has not, nor cannot, have jurisdiction of the person of the movant. Accordingly, the DMV delegated court should sua sponde, dismiss this matter, in the interest of justice or in alternative, if movant was, in fact, a practicing licensee at the time of the 'traffic stop' order the district attorney to move to the DMV for their determination

PAGE 379 Should this court refuse to obey its mandated ministerial duty, and dismiss for want of proof of jurisdiction, movant notices this court that the movant has been denied the protection of the law of this State's Constitution, and of the Constitution of the United States and ground for a civil action in the district courts of the United States. A motion to this court-for dismissal of proceedings within exclusive jurisdiction of administrative agency is made a part of this Demand to Make the Notice more Definite and Certain. If this court does not sua sponde dismiss, or order the transfer, then the movant will file a Petition for Writ of Prohibition to prevent this court from assuming or acting in excess of its general jurisdiction, which is solely vested in the DMV, which is within the Business, Transportation & Housing Agency. Arthur Frank Sanford Movant UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES, A MAGISTRATE SHOULD ESTOP PLAINTIFF FOR THE PEOPLE FOR GUILT OF LACHES [A quasi-defendant who has an opportunity to plead an estoppel, on which his cause or defense depends, must do so] "A failure to do some act which should be done or to claim or enforce a right at a proper time" Hutchinson vs Kenny 27 F2d 254, 256 "Neglect to do some act which one should do, or to seek to enforce a right at a proper time" Jett vs Jett 171 Ky 548 "To create 'estoppel by laches', party sought to be estopped must, with knowledge of transaction, have done something to mislead other party to his prejudice" Wisdom vs Sims 144 SW 232, 235, 236 [Plaintiff and issuing officer, at all times have misled quasi-defendant to believe that they have jurisdiction of him, yet have failed to timely file a demanded verified complaint pursuant to 41513 (a) VC, Pen C s9948 et seq]

[The guilt of laches, by the prosecutor, is evidenced by the failure of the docket/record of the case to show a filing of an accusation by a verified complaint, and issue of summons/warrant naming quasi-defendant] "Laches, is neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, under circumstances permitting diligence to do what could or should have been done. The omission to do what the law requires to protect one's rights under (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 16 - 2 PAGE 383 (cont) circumstances misleading or prejudicial to adverse party" School District #14 vs School District #1, 254 NW 174 [As Vehicle Code violations are mala prohibita, and are special proceeding in civil process, laches are relevant to the estopping of plaintiff to proceed when no verified complaint is timely filed. Action is estopped] "To establish the defense of laches, a party must show (1) there was an inexcusable delay in the assertion of a known right and, (2) the party asserting laches has been prejudiced" Trustee Alaska Laborers vs Ferrel 812 F2d 512, 518 PREJUDICIAL ERROR: Error substantially affecting legal rights and obligations. Black's 4th p 1343 [When there has been no filing of, and service of a verified complaint, and its order to appear upon quasi- defendant, he will be prejudiced to his harm if the magistrate permits, and knowingly supports the cause of prosecution by the plaintiff absent due process of the statutory law] "When the principles of natural justice require disclosure, they raise the duty and bind the conscience. In such cases 'equity' will impose an estoppel to the extent necessary to protect the innocent party" Altman vs McCollum 107 CalApp 2d Supp 847 EQUITY: In its broadest and most general signification, this term denotes the spirit and the habit of fairness, justness, and right dealing which would regulate the intercourse of men with men, - the

rule of doing to all others as (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 16 - 3 PAGE 384 (cont) we desire them to do to us; as it is expressed by Justinian, "to live honestly, to harm nobody, to render to every man his due" It is therefore the synonym of natural right or justice. [Question of violations mala prohibita, are civil causes under Civil Vehicle Code, are not brought into a court at-law or common law jurisdiction. The rights of a class of person named within the statute, or a person not named within the statute, as in instant case, even though certain violations may permit penal penalties and are quasi-criminal procedure, they remain civil codes. Thus, there is the expectation of equity jurisdiction principles] EQUITY JURISDICTION: In its ordinary acceptation, as distinguished on the one side from the general power to decide matters at all, and on the other from jurisdiction 'at-law' or 'common law', is the power to hear certain kinds and classes of civil causes according to the principles of the method and procedure adopted by the court of chancery, which decisions may involve either the determination of the equitable rights and interest of the parties to be maintained, or the violation of which furnishes the cause of action, must be equitable rather than legal. Black's 4th 1038 LEGAL: Conforming to the law. Black's 4th p 1038 LAW: That which must be obeyed and followed by citizens, subject to sanctions or legal consequences,is a law. VOL 1 CHAPTER 16 - 4 PAGE 385 [So, the bottom line here is, Statutes which are private in nature, and only apply to a defined/named certain class of persons/individuals, while engaged in some activity for which they have applied for a voluntary license, if they are to be prosecuted under quasi-criminal procedure, must be proceeded by the filing of a verified complaint, etc., and when it is not done, then the guilt of laches estops any proceeding against an individual/person by the People at the time of an appearance before a magistrate sitting under administrative law]

[Statutes have force of law only upon those enjoying the benefits of the statute] ADDENDUM ESTOPPEL: Conduct intended to deceive or of such nature that reasonably prudent person would have been deceived. Cellized Fl vs Glen Falls 156 A 845, 846 [It should be obvious that it was the intent of the quasi-peace officer intended to deceive, that by someone putting into the court docket a Notice to Appear, captioned People of the State of California, Plaintiff, and informing on a request as to the true nature of a Notice, and are informed that it constitutes a complaint suitable to give the magistrate jurisdiction, and that the People are deceiving by implication that the State has been harmed. Neither state has been harmed because of an 'interest' had by the state on a mala prohibita citation, nor have the people been harmed, absent a substantive crime, mala in se, by some claim that all individuals (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 16 - 5 PAGE 386 (cont) are of the class compelled to comply with Vehicle Code, and within the jurisdiction of the DMV.] [The cop, the district attorney, and the magistrate proceeding on mere notice to appear are designedly inducing a penalty under fraud as to an individual not within the strictures of Vehicle Code/juris of DMV] [An action for estoppel arises when the plaintiff (s) by omission to speak, to state the true nature of the matter before the magistrate, constitutes actual or constructive fraud to the harm of some individual] [Estoppel, in its broadest sense, is a penalty paid by someone perpetrating the wrong by known fraud, or by an affirmative act which, even though without fraudulent intent, may result in legal fraud on another] [So, person perpetrating the fraud loses if he argues he did not know his act was fraudulent] [At all times during course of this matter, plaintiff, the PEOPLE, and the court sitting administerial, have misled the quasi-defendant by stating or acting as though they do have jurisdiction complete, and yet, the

record shows that they have not filed any competent process, naming this quasi-defendant; and service of a complaint, and warrant and this forum/tribunal has failed to demand that the PEOPLE bring the matter competently before this court. Their failure to timely act constitutes estoppel by laches] VOL 1 CHAPTER 17 - 1 PAGE 387 THIS CHAPTER DEALS WITH THE FACT THAT ALTHOUGH MALA PROHIBITA VIOLATIONS ARE CIVIL CODE VIOLATIONS, ARE IN FACT HEARD BY SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS IN CIVIL CODE, THE ALLEGED VIOLATOR IS INFORMED THAT THEY ARE TRIED AS CRIMINAL ACTIONS, AS THOUGH MALA IN SE. [The man on the bench, a magistrate when hearing vehicle code issues, presents himself to the person with the notice to appear as a judge, a judicial officer. Doesn't the nameplate on his bench read 'JUDGE'?] [So, lets take advantage of the deception perpetrated by the court. It is now known to the reader of this book that all matter of Notices to Appear are, in fact, quasi-criminal proceedings, (that which seems to be, but which is not) so let's set the record for that time when the magistrate answers your question at an appearance for arraignment] [Question: Your Honor, I have a need to know if this notice to appear is a complaint, and will be heard and prosecuted by a criminal proceeding so that I can understand if I should hire a lawyer before I enter a plea on the Notice to Appear] [What the author wants you to do is 'set up' the man on the bench, and the court, to have him inform you that it is a criminal action and yes, he is a Judge] [Now, when you have been through the 'money collection mill', a la cafeteria style; enter here, pay the cashier and get out of here, you are holding up the line, (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 17 - 2 PAGE 388 (cont) which the court calls a 'trial', and the man says "I find you guilty and the fine is $XXXXX." "Can you pay the fine now or do you need time to pay? The magic words are "Can you pay"]

[Now, having read this book, and being a natural born rebel who resents being lied to, and certain persons under color of law reaching into you money pocket upsets you, you answer "NO! I cannot pay the fine" "I am filing a Motion with the County Clerk for a hearing on why I cannot pay the fine"] [Write and let the author know how you made out. The author used this tactic and was successful, and several people that he has counseled have been successful. The result was that the man on the bench suspended the fine. So, if you are staring at a large, large fine, hundreds of dollars, it is certainly worth a try. And you still have the option of an appeal on the grounds of no jurisdiction.] ADDENDUM [Remember, the state court is informing that Federal Reserve Notes of Obligation are money for purposes of paying a fine and its assessment, and is a dollar but it is not a dollar, nor does it represent a note entitling the holder to exchange it for a dollar] [Now, set him up again. Ask him if a Federal Reserve Note is a dollar or dollars as the case may be] "The Constitution was 'designed to provide the same currency, having a uniform value in all the States'. It was for that reason that the power to regulate the value of (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 17 - 3 PAGE 389 (cont) money was conferred upon the Federal Government, while the same power, as well as the power to 'emit bills of credit', was withdrawn from the States. The States cannot declare what shall be money, or regulate its value. Whatever power there is over the currency is vested in the Congress" Norman vs B&O etc., 294 US 240, 303 79 L ed 885, 900, 55 S Ct 407, 414 BILL OF CREDIT. In the constitutional law. A bill or promissory note issued by the government of a state or nation, upon its faith and credit, designed to circulate in the community as money, and redeemable at a future day Hale vs Huston 44 Ala 138, 4 Am Rep 124

[Now, read how Federal Reserve Notes of Debt can be made legal tender by Congress, and the use of FRN's legal tender for parties with a relationship with the Federal Government; i.e., fed govern employee, recipient of federal largesse, elected federal office holders, or those who choose to use FRS's either knowingly or unknowingly. Those persons can be required to use FRN's who have a nexus/benefit from the Federal Government, but the state and individuals cannot be compelled to use FRN's] Congress provided in 31 USCA s463 in part, that; "Every provision contained in, or made with, respect to any obligation which purports to give the obligee a right to require 'payment' in gold or a particular kind of coin or currency, or in an amount in money of the 'United States' measured thereby, is declared to be against public policy; and no (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 17 - 4 PAGE 390 (cont) such provision shall be contained in or made with respect to any obligation hereinafter incurred. Every obligation heretofore, or hereinafter incurred, whether or not any such provision is contained therein, or made with respect hereto, shall be discharged upon payment, dollar for dollar, in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal tender for public and private debts" [Note that it states 'discharge', and the statement of private as against public debt. The federal debt of Congress may be required for payment in discharge of its debt; the payment in discharge for private debt cannot be compelled between private parties or the States] "The courts have consistently held that the Constitution leaves the power to declare what shall be legal tender for payment of all debts to congress. The mere utilization of a standard of legal tender prescribed by Congress is not a state action as prohibited by US Const Art 1 s10, but rather an effectuation of validly exercised constitutional power of Congress under US Const Art 1 s 8" Chermack vs Bjornson 223 NW2d 659 [United States by Congress sitting in Washington DC can do so, but the States are forbidden, and cannot demand/require FRN's in payment of debts/fines/assessments to merely discharge those

obligations] VOL 1 CHAPTER 17 - 5 PAGE 391 [Additional grounds are, if you can show by an affidavit financial statement, that to pay the fine would impose a hardship on a man's family and his creditors] "One who is convicted of a crime and fined, is not to be imprisoned in satisfaction of the fine, or in lieu thereof, if he is unable to pay the fine" State ex rel Pederson vs Blessinger (1972) 56 Wisc 286 PAGE 392 ARTHUR FRANK SANFORD c/o 5894 Villa Drive Rancho Cucamonga, CA 714-980-8559 Movant MUNICIPAL COURT, WEST VALLEY DIVISION COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO (center these) PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NO. 556888 CALIFORNIA, NOTICE OF MOTION. MOTION THAT MOVANT Plaintiffs, In Error DOES NOT HAVE THE ABILITY TO PAY ANY FINE vs MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ARTHUR FRANK SANFORD, IN SUPPORT OF MOTION Movant & Defendant In Error .................................................................

TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT: Movant, Arthur Frank Sanford, will appear special at the above named court, located at ......................... on...........................at.........................., at which time he will notice the magistrate of the court of its want of subject matter jurisdiction when on a judgment of guilty on (date), the magistrate imposed a fine and assessment in the amount of $205.00. This motion is based on the fact that the defendant, in error, is bankrupt, and without the ability to 'pay'the fine and assessment sentence, imposed on the above date by this court. Movant has no lawful money of the state by which he (cont) PAGE 393 (cont) could 'pay' the sentence. Movant cannot be deemed a contempter because he cannot 'pay' at-law, the sentence imposed by this court. Arthur Frank Sanford Movant MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOVANT'S INABILITY TO PAY THE SENTENCE

I IF THE MATTER BEFORE THE COURT ON THE ABOVE DATE WAS A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION, AND TRIAL WITH THE JUDGE OF THIS COURT CONDUCTING THE TRIAL THEN THIS MOVANT AND DEFENDANT HAS IMMUNITY FROM THE SENTENCE IMPOSED ON THE DATE ABOVE BY THIS JUDGE. A JUDGE CANNOT ACT WITH JUDICIAL POWER IF HIS COMPENSATION IS DIMINISHED; THE PAYING OF STATE OR FEDERAL INCOME TAXES Any judge over whom the Internal Revenue Department has power by way of income tax is incapable of receiving or exercising any 'judicial' power as it is in violation of Article III of the United States Constitution with limits on the judicial powers where judge's compensation shall not be diminished by Congress. US vs Woodley, 774 F2d 1175, (Dist Ct., Hawaii) Citing: Evans vs Gore, 253 US 245;

O'Donahue vs US, 289 US 516 USC Article III, Section 1: The Judges, both of supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

II NO STATE SHALL ......................; MAKE ANYTHING BUT GOLD AND SILVER COIN A TENDER IN PAYMENT OF DEBTS United States of America Constitution, Article I, Sec 10 Article I Sec 10 is binding on California (cont) PAGE 394 (cont) thus, prohibits this court from accepting Federal Reserve Notes where there is no federal nexus by a state court. This state court, as all agencies/branches of the State government, California Republic, is bound by Art 1, sec 10. As the State Legislature has not declared gold and silver coin issued by California is the legal tender in payment of debt (s) movant has no ability to pay the fine (debt) and assessment (tax) ordered on (date).

III STATE LEGISLATURE HAS NEVER DECLARED THE MONEY OF ACCOUNT OF CALIFORNIA FOR 'INLAND', 'INTRA-STATE' PURPOSES, USE OF FEDERAL RESERVE NOTES MAY NOT BE USED BY THE MOVANT OR THIS COURT OR ANY OFFICER OF THIS COURT FOR THE PAYMENT OF DEBT WITHIN CALIFORNIA. COURTS HAVE NO JURISDICTION WITHOUT MONEY OF ACCOUNT. State never having declared what shall be legal tender for the business of the state, 'inland, intra-state', it cannot use federal notes of obligation as the Constitution denies that right to the several states of the Union. "Absent a legal tender, no damages, fines, bails, penalties, license fees, awards, can be extracted as only legal tender can be compelled to use" UCC Wash., RCW 62A 3-107

"It being impossible to obtain the remedy sought, the state and their agencies/municipalities being impotent to enforce their judgments/decrees, and thus, should not even exercise their otherwise 'general' jurisdictions" Louisiana vs NAL, 106 La 621 "Mere equity is impotent to correct the defect" McGraw vs Gortner, 96 Md 489 "A law which restricts their power to render and enforce a judgment is, therefore, a limitation upon the exercise of their jurisdiction; and a law which destroys or impairs the effect which their judgments, without such law would have, is equally so" Fordyce vs Beecher, 2 Tex. Civ. Ap. 29, 31 PAGE 395 "Unable to 'comply" 31 ALR 649 "to comply is impossible, made so by the failure of the state in its constitutional duty, US Const 1: 10: 1, the remedy resting in the hands of the state" Rio Grande vs Darke, 167 P 241 The individual cannot be compelled to use federal money (Vick vs Howard, 136 SE 101; 116 SE 465) nor federal negotiable instruments, federal Reserve Notes (Swanson vs Fuline, 248 F Supp 364) the federal reserve being 1238 at 1241) which is engaged in commercial activity governed by law of merchants (UCC 72A-1-103) "Governments lose their immunity and descend to level of private corporations when involved in commercial activity enforcing negotiable instruments, as in fines, penalties, assessments, bails, taxes, the remedy lies in the hands of the state and its municipalities seeking remedy" Rio Grande vs Darke, 167 P 241 "The principles of estoppel apply against the state as well as individuals" Cal vs Sims, 32 C3d 468 IV MOVANT STATES THAT HIS INABILITY TO COMPLY WITH ANY JUDGMENT AND ORDER TO PAY A FINE AND ASSESSMENT IS A DEFENSE TO A CHARGE OF CONTEMPT, EITHER DIRECT OR INDIRECT, BY THIS COURT, WHEN MOVANT IS WITHOUT THE ABILITY TO PAY A FINE AND ASSESSMENT

Fines, penalties and assessments on judgments are debts & taxes. The issue raised by the movant is that this court recognizes and honor the constitutional immunity of the movant from an order of contempt, when he cannot pay, at law, a fine and assessment ordered by this court, that under that doctrine of immunity this court cannot imprison him because California has no 'money of account', gold or silver coin. This court must take Judicial Notice of the following: (cont) PAGE 396 California Government Code s6850: "The money of account of this State is the DOLLAR, and all proceedings in courts shall be kept and had in conformity with this section" In tandem with above: Title 31 US Code s371 "The money of account of the United States shall be expressed in dollars or units, dimes or tenths, cents or hundredth part of a dollar; and all proceedings in the courts shall be kept and had in conformity to this regulation" A judicial determination is absolutely necessary to movant's ability to pay at law, as opposed to discharge in equity, any fine, penalty or assessment of this court. Court is further demanded to take judicial notice that the Coinage Act of 1792 which declared gold and silver coin to be the money of account of the several states and the United States has never been amended, rescinded nor abrogated and so is binding on this state and this court. Movant calls to the court to take Judicial Notice and rule on the notice by citing the authority for its ruling as to Federal Reserve Notes being notes of obligation and not redeemable in lawful coin, money of account, how he can obtain any lawful coin (dollar) based on the following: Title 31 USC 408 prohibits the redemption of any currency into gold and Title 31 USC s405(a)-3 prohibits the redemption of any United States currency dollar for dollar into (cont)

PAGE 397 (cont) gold and silver. so the law itself prohibits movant from using any money of account. As checks are not money in themselves but merely simple order forms instructing the bank to move transaction balances, which are MONEY, but banks do not have cash/money of account which may be transferred. For a check to be negotiable instrument it must contain an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain in money and be payable on demand or at a definite time (UCC 3-103 (b) (c). Thus, neither the bank nor the movant is able to comply with the law of money and cannot be held as a contemner. 31 ALR 649, supplementing 21 ALR 1256: "The rule laid down in the earlier annotation on this question, that the part, to render obedience to an order or decree of court, is a good defense to a charge of contempt for the disobedience of the order or decree, is supported also, by the following decisions" California; Ex parte Overend (1898) 122 Cal 201; Bakeman vs Sup Ct (1918) 37 CalApp 785; Myers vs Sup Ct (1920) 46 CalApp 206; Ex parte Von Gerzabeck (1923) 219 Pac 479 "In Meyers vs Sup Ct, supra, it was held that the court had no power to punish one in contempt for failure to comply with a judgment for payment of money, since it was evidenced that it was physically impossible for him to comply (cont) PAGE 398 (cont) with the court's order. The court statutory provisions in that state that, when contempt consists in the omission to perform an act 'which is yet in the power of the person to perform' he may be imprisoned until he shall have performed it, and that the disobedience of any lawful judgment, order, or process of the court constitutes contempt, and said that under the provisions of the statute it must appear from the warrant of commitment (1) that the thing ordered to be done is within the power of the person so ordered to perform, and (2) that such person, although he has it within his power to do so, has disobeyed the court's lawful order. An order adjudging one guilty of contempt for failure to perform an act directed by the court to be performed is void, as a

basis for the imposition of imprisonment, unless it appear therefrom that it is within the power of such person to perform the act" Baker vs Sup Ct, supra Although the following cases cited pertain to an order to pay alimony, the principles of the law and procedure and constitutional immunities apply to any threat of warrant for contempt charge by this court. In Newsome vs Newsome (1923) 117 SE 90, that State Supreme Court held, "that the trial court had erroneously adjudged the husband to be in contempt for failure to comply with an order to pay alimony, where his sworn answer, which was undenied, and the uncontroverted evidence introduced by him showed his inability to comply (cont) PAGE 399 (cont) with the order. That inability on the part of the husband which is not due to his own fault, to conform, or perform with the judgment, constitutes a complete defense to a charge of contempt, it is the rule laid down, also, in Armijo vs Armijo (1923) 217 Pac 623 "Requiring a convicted indigent defendant upon being sentenced or otherwise ordered to pay a fine and penalty assessment to serve them out in jail at a specified rate per day because he is unable to pay the constitutes an invidious discrimination on basis of wealth in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment" In re Antazo, 1979, 3 Cal3d 100

V MOVANT STATES THAT HE HAS ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN LAWFUL MONEY OF CALIFORNIA, GOLD AND SILVER COIN. HAS BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL AND THUS CANNOT AND DOES NOT HAVE MEANS TO COMPLY WITH THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT AND ORDER THAT MOVANT PAY A FINE AND ASSESSMENT As California has not complied with Article 1 s10 of the United States Constitution that "No State shall..... make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts" which is binding on the several States and thereby on this court, a department of California under its constitution which

conducts business of the court. "Acts of Congress making notes of the United States a legal tender do not apply to involuntary contributions in the nature of taxes, fines, assessments, debts exacted under State Laws" Hagar vs Land Reclamation 111 US 701 PAGE 400 And, as lawful money is not available to the movant from any government association, corporation, functioning as banks, which are prohibited from putting into circulation any Thing but gold and silver Coin if a State Bank or if a National Bank and United States Notes and Federal Reserve Notes of Obligation of the Congress of the United States are not exchangeable for gold or silver Coin. California Constitution Article 12, s5 Issuing Money No corporation, association, or individual shall issue or put into circulation, as money, anything but lawful money of the United States. Corporations or associations may be formed for such purposes (to act as though banks) under general laws,......... "..........to prohibit any person, association, or corporation from 'exercising the privilege of banking or creating paper to circulate money' referred merely to the issuance of bank bills or paper to circulate as money" Bank of Martinez vs Hemme etc (1895) 105 Cal 376 As the state cannot issue bills of debt or paper to circulate as money neither can any private corporation, association or individual issue or use Anything but gold and silver coin. Movant, now a debtor to California by a judgment and order of this court, is without the ability to pay his debt to this court. PAGE 401 Movant only has access to and must use Federal Reserve Notes, which are merely debt instruments, evidence of debts of the Congress, has not been able to redeem such notes issued by the Federal Reserve Bank and as the United States Treasury was abolished in 1921 by the Act of 1920, 66th Congress Session II Ch 214 amending Section 3595 this movant cannot turn to the newly created Department of Treasury, a private corporation dealing only in commercial paper which is not redeemable for lawful money minted coin of gold and silver.

REDEEMABLE: "Subject to an obligation of redemption; embodying, or conditioned upon, a promise or obligation of redemption; controvertible to coin, as, a redeemable currency" US vs North Carolina 136 US 211, 34 L ed 336 Based on the above authority/case law, movant attempted to redeem Federal Reserve Notes at the Los Angeles Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank. He was informed that no 'authorized' federal reserve notes have been issued for more than 20 years, and that the bank could not redeem notes for gold or silver Coin as the bank did not have gold or silver Coin. CONCLUSION: As federal reserve notes are not legal tender for the 'payment' of fines, which are debts, or assessments, which are taxes, (see HAGAR supra p 8) and California cannot obligate the movant to use notes of obligation (debt due) (cont) PAGE 402 (cont) involuntarily (see HAGAR) the movant is without the/has no ability to 'pay' the judgment as Federal Reserve Notes are not 'dollars' as 'dollars' are coined 'dollars' of the United States. (see Bank of New York vs Bd of Supervisors etc 74 US 60 (1869); Bronson vs Rodes 7 Wall 229 (1886) Foot Note: Municipal Court Judge Larry Moritz, City of Spearville, Kansas reads person before him their 'money rights' for the payment of fines and assessments imposed by him on his judgments. "Its the guarantee that they are exempt from having to pay the sum is they choose to object to the form of money in which the sum is demanded. If Congress wont keep its part of the Constitutional bargain, and coin money of gold and silver like Art 1 s8 cl 5 commands, there is no way my court can require anyone to pay fines. It is clear by Art 1 s10 of the United States Constitution and by Title 31 s371 of United States Code that this court can only make gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts. However, this court will accept other forms of money such as Federal Reserve Notes or personal check if voluntarily tendered. But I sure cant make anybody pay in paper" Arthur Frank Sanford Movant

Page 403 This letter from : Pete Wilson UNITED STATES SENATE Washington, DC 20510 July 3, 1984

Committees: Armed Services, Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry; Special Committee on Aging Mr. Arthur Frank Sanford 3157 Camino Avenue Hacienda Heights, CA 91745 Dear Mr. Sanford: Thank you for contacting me regarding the relationship of the Federal Constitution to the California State Constitution. In regard to your question about the legal tender laws, Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution of the United States is binding in the state of California. Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution prohibits any state from making anything other than gold or silver coin legal tender for the payment of debts. While this provision of the Constitution prohibits any state from making anything other than gold, silver, or silver coin a legal tender in payment of debts, the Supreme Court in 1884 interpreted this clause to apply only to the states and not the federal government. That ruling is still in effect. Since Article I, Section 8, Clause 5 of the Constitution grants to the federal government the exclusive power to coin money and regulate its value, and since the federal government is not limited in what it may designate as legal tender, it is constitutional for Congress to declare as it has, that Federal Reserve Notes, the chief form of currency in circulation today, are legal tender for all debts. Your concern expressed in your letter may stem from a belief that only gold and silver coin or currency backed by gold and silver can be legal tender. I want you to know that historically this has not been the view held by either Congress or the Courts. Again, thank you for writing. I appreciate your interest and

expression of concern. Sincerely, Pete Wilson PAGE 404 SAME LETTER FROM SENATOR WILSON DATED APRIL 27, 1984 VOL 1 CHAPTER 18 - 1 PAGE 405 ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE MUST CONFORM WITH FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS AS ALL MATTERS OF VEHICLE CODE VIOLATIONS EVEN THOUGH ONLY MALA PROHIBITA ARE TRIED AS QUASI-CRIMINAL MALA IN SE VIOLATIONS AND SO MUST COMPLY WITH PENAL CODE [Vehicle Code consider violations of the code to be arrestable offenses by a peace officer, even when merely infractions] s40300 VC. The provisions of this chapter shall govern all peace officers in making arrests for violations of this code without a warrant for offenses committed in their presence, but the procedure prescribed herein 'shall not otherwise be exclusive of any other method prescribed by law for the arrest and prosecution of a person for an offense of like grade'. s40306 VC. (a) Whenever a person is arrested for a misdemeanor or an infraction and is taken before a magistrate, the arresting officer shall file with the magistrate a complaint stating the offense with which the person is charged. [Now it can be understood why the peace officer (sic) rather than having to file first a complaint and then taking the arrested to the magistrate will Release Upon Promise to Appear under s40500 (a) to whit; Whenever a person is arrested for any violation of this code not declared to be a felony, or for any violation of an ordinance of a city or county relating to traffic offenses (remember traffic offenses can only be committed by a person (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 18 - 2 PAGE 406

(cont) while engaged in trafficking) and he is not immediately taken before a magistrate, as provided in this chapter, (40306) the arresting officer shall prepare in triplicate a written notice to appear in court or before a person authorized to receive a deposit of bail, (that is the clerk before whom you appear who will then set an arraignment) containing the name and address of the person, the license number of his vehicle if any, the name and address, when available, of the registered owner or lessee of the vehicle, the offense charged and the time and place when and where he shall appear. [Now, when the person appears at the time and place indicated on the notice, a complaint will not have been filed with the magistrate or with the law enforcement officer by the arresting officer; which the author believes would be the district attorney for the county or a city attorney where there is one] [This oversight (sic) is overlooked by the court although it is demanded by the code itself] Traffic Offenses - Judge in Capacity of Magistrate Arresting officer 'must' file a complaint under oath stating the offense charged and a copy of the notice to appear to the officer's law enforcement agency. VC sss40500, 40505, 40506. The failure to appear mandates a regular verified complaint, Penal C. sss 948, 963, 11.36 filed with the court. [If a complaint under oath stating offense charged, (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 18 - 3 PAGE 407 (cont) must be filed with a copy of the notice to appear then obviously the notice, standing alone as an extra-judicial form, unverified, does not fulfill the need for a complaint] [Upon an appearance of the arrested person there will not have been a complaint, pursuant to vehicle code procedure filed by any officer of the court, i.e., district attorney filing with the court or magistrate of the court] [So, now we must look to the Penal Code beginning with s948 et seq] s949 Penal Code. First pleading on the part of the people in all inferior courts is the 'complaint', except as otherwise provided by law.

[Except as otherwise provided by law is an indictment, information, accusation] COMPLAINT: In criminal law. A charge, preferred before a magistrate having jurisdiction, that a person named has committed a specified offense, with an offer to prove the fact to the end that a prosecution may be instituted. It is a technical term, descriptive of proceedings. Hobbs vs Hill 32 NE 862 [Now, understanding that no court has subject matter jurisdiction without the filing of a complaint, under oath, naming an accused, with the court, and copy of the notice. If a complaint has not been served with a warrant of arrest and subsequently filed with the clerk of the court and made part of the record of the courts files, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction and so cannot have personam (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 18 - 4 PAGE 408 (cont) of the person] [Now, even though the court on a notice to appear will accept a plea of guilty/nolo contendere without jurisdiction by the filing of a verified complaint by a prosecutor, it then puts the cart before the horse and says we will accept the mere civil extra-judicial notice to appear as though a complaint to which a plea of guilty or nolo contendere may be entered s40513 (a) VC] [However, if the person making the appearance decides he does not want to permit the notice to be used as though a complaint and enters a plea of not guilty, to the court still without complete jurisdiction, the court suddenly puts the horse before the cart, and decides it must await the filing of a verified complaint before it can permit the prosecutor to take you to an arraignment/trial] [Even a plea of guilty to a court without jurisdiction does not give a court jurisdiction] [The court must have jurisdiction, without the jurisdiction it cannot issue any lawful order, such as appear for a trial, issue a bench warrant if you do not appear, etc] s978.5 (a) PC. A bench warrant of arrest may be issued whenever the defendant fails to appear in court as required by law. (Read first the jurisdiction command) [There are two types of custody. Actual physical custody in the

cell and constructive custody. Neither custody exists by the mere issue of a notice, a complaint must be filed and a warrant issue for true custody of the defendant] VOL 1 CHAPTER 18 - 5 PAGE 409 s978 PC. If in custody, to be brought before the court. When his personal appearance is necessary, if he is in custody, the Court may direct and the officer in whose custody he is in must bring him before it to be arraigned. [Understand, that the author considers law to be a chess game. There are rules of procedure which must be obeyed by the players. Before each player may make a move, it must be his turn (jurisdiction) and his play/move must be according to the rules of the game, and must be made at a certain time and completed within a time frame limit. So, when one of the players does not have jurisdiction he cannot play, make moves/make points and the alleged player/opponent cannot be penalized by the player who does not play by the rules] [Rule One. The player making the aggressive move must have jurisdiction] [So, the arresting officer must produce the body for the arraignment. But, before he can do that he must have true custody of the body because he filed a verified complaint and a warrant of arrest, both served upon the body] [Recall, at the time of the stop and civil arrest the quasi-cop asked you to identify yourself, and you did even though the Supreme Court says that is a no no, you cannot be compelled to do so unless trafficking] [So, on your appearance at the arraignment court, you can not be required/compelled to ID yourself.. The arresting cop should be present, see you in the courtroom and identify you to the court. If he cannot, the court must await the (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 18 - 6 PAGE 410 (cont) producing of your body before it may proceed with an arraignment, assuming jurisdiction of the body and subject matter] [If you watch television court trials, always the witness, (in this

case the arresting officer)is asked to ID the defendant. So, when you are in the arraignment court and clerk or magistrate calls your name, do not respond, await the identification of your person by the arresting officer who is the only witness for the prosecutor, who has never seen you. At arraignments on vehicle code civil notices to appear, he will not be present. 4th amend, "not shall be compelled to be a witness against himself" Accuser to ID the accused, "without due process of law" Criminal process] [If the accuser does not identify you to the court, be mute, as one judge told an accused, "If you had kept your mouth shut, you wouldn't be in this mess"] [Now, no one having knowingly produced the body of the accused, leave/exit the courtroom. Again, assuming jurisdiction by the prosecutor and thereby the court magistrate, they cannot prosecute an unknown accused defendant] [When you decide you have the balls to do the above, take a friend with you to the court. Then have him execute a declaration or affidavit that he bears witness that he and you were present on the date noticed on the Notice to Appear in the court named on the notice and the exact time there, that you were not identified as the accused and the exact time you departed/exited the courtroom together] VOL 1 CHAPTER 18 - 7 PAGE 411 [Thereafter, if the court issues a warrant for failure to appear, proof exists by the affidavit that you were present at the time requested by the notice and that no accuser identified you as the accused and it is not required that the accused identify himself at law] [Appear on the bench warrant, demand the void warrant be withdrawn on the grounds that you were timely present and the matter should be sua sponde dismissed for lack of prosecution by the accusers by their failure to produce the body and their failure to file a verified complaint. It is not the responsibility of the accused to demand that a complaint be filed not to ID himself]

[The author used these tactics on a personal case and made three appearances on bench warrants, each time the bench warrant was withdrawn and a new appearance time set by the court. Each time the author failed to appear and did appear on the subsequent bench warrant and each time argued that the court was without jurisdiction and the arresting officer did not appear to ID me as the accused] [This must be done by filing a notice with the court that you will be appearing on a specific date at which time you will demand the withdrawal of the void bench warrant and the grounds, by points and authorities for the withdrawal] [In that case the court finally dismissed 'in the interest of justice'] TRY IT, YOU'LL LIKE IT. VOL 1 CHAPTER 19 - 1 PAGE 412 AN OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION MAY BE A MOTION TO QUASH AND IS A SPECIAL APPEARANCE WHICH DOES NOT GIVE MAGISTRATE SUBJECT MATTER OR PERSONAM JURISDICTION [This is done on the premise that as magistrates assert that Civil Notices to Appear constitute lawful need to appear and that if the individual named on the Notice does not appear a Bench Warrant for Failure to Appear will be issued by the Magistrate] [Author claims that if the above is true, and because all matters of State Statute Vehicle Code is civil in nature, see Hawaii vs Brown etc, it may reasonably be assumed that intent of Notice is that of Summons as the officer will be filing the Notice (summons?) and a complaint with his law enforcement agency asking the issue of an arrest warrant] SUMMONS: To notify the defendant that an action has been instituted against him, and that he is required to answer to it at a time and place named. Black's 4th p 1604 [Of course above assumes that a complaint will be filed with a copy of the Notice to Appear and a warrant of arrest issued on showing probable cause but, there being no service of a complaint and its warrant prior to your appearance before the court for a quasi-criminal arraignment appearance then such an appearance should be made to challenge for want of competent jurisdiction by the special appearance by a Motion to Quash and Dismiss for want of

prosecution] "Where proceedings are irregular, 'void', or 'defective', the courts will quash them both civil and criminal cases. (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 19 - 2 PAGE 413 An indictment/complaint/accusation which is so defective that no judgment can be given on it, or where there is no jurisdiction of the offense, 'will be quashed'. The remedy is applicable only to irregular, defective, or improper proceedings" Crawford vs Stewart 38 Penn (2 Wright) 34, 36 [If no complaint with warrant has been served before the date of appearance on the notice/summons and you do not want to face the issue that a Warrant for Failure to Appear may be issued by a magistrate, even though the magistrate is without juris to so do, then any appearance should be special, and ideally with a Law & Motion Request part of the Motion to Quash] [If a bench warrant has been issued and you have been informed by mail or service of the warrant, then on your appearance to withdraw the void warrant this Quash should accompany the motion to withdraw at a Law & Motion hearing] Motion to Quash is Civil Code of Procedure s418.10, OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION or to Stay or Dismiss Action (a) Defendant (most likely a quasi-defendant in all cases of vehicle code) on or before the last day of his time to plead (think alleged arraignment date appearance on the notice or summons) or within such further time as the court may for good cause allow (here we are discussing, quasi-defendant has appeared and asks for continuance) may serve and file a notice of motion either or both: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of (cont) VOL 1 CHAPTER 19 - 3 PAGE 414 (cont) jurisdiction of the court over him (no arrest warrant issued)] [Until juris of the man/person is clearly settled by the challenge that the cop on the beat did not have juris, that the prosecuting attorney did not have juris because no verified

complaint had been filed with him by the dumb cop, and had not filed a complaint with the magistrate, not the magistrate who will preside at a quasi-judicial/quasi-criminal proceeding, the prosecuting attorney had no juris to appear at a quasi arraignment, and with none of the above the man sitting on the bench had neither subject matter nor personam juris] [So, the challenge is not, first instance, to the court's want of juris but, to the cop's want of juris and the prosecuting attorney's want of juris. Once they prove their juris only then does the court have subject matter and personam juris] [Immediately after receiving a copy of the notice/summons file a Demand for Formal Administrative Hearing & Declaratory Judgment (See document 119A and 109, chap 14) Giving the department 15 days to reply. Then you may argue that no one had juris because of the 'exoneration' by the agency's failure to grant the hearing and because prosecuting attorney failed to move, first, with the department, thus depriving it of its party, first instance, on matters which are regulated and enforced by administrative agency] VOL 1 CHAPTER 19 - 4 PAGE 415 [Incorporate your Motion to Quash as part of the Application for Law & Motion Hearing in the Caption} Application for law & Motion Hearing Notice of Motion to Quash Summons and/or Dismiss Action See Form in Chapt 15, Application etc THIS COMBINATION IS PROBABLY THE CLOSEST PROCEDURE TO BE A SILVER BULLET [Having gone to the Prosecuting Attorney to file and serve a copy of the Motions, rule of thumb is, he will not accept service, if you ask him if he is the prosecuting party] [The primary argument to be presented to the Hearing Officer, is, no one has proceeded according to law and you are unable to find the proper prosecuting plaintiff and obviously it is not the quasi-cop as he is merely a witness for whomever is going to properly and timely prosecute by due process of the law and its procedure under that timely appropriate law. Being unable to

determine or find a prosecuting plaintiff, the court should, sua sponde, vacate the matter in its entirety for want of prosecution or some prosecutor, unknown, has established proven juris] PAGE 416 THRU 428 BEING RESEARCHED WILL INSERT AT A LATER TIME PAGE 429 ARTHUR FRANK SANFORD c/o 5894 Villa Drive Rancho Cucamonga, CA Demandant, Sui Juri MUNICIPAL COURT, WEST VALLEY DIVISION, COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO (center these) PEOPLE OF THE STATE NO. 556888 OF CALIFORNIA, NOTICE OF DEMAND TO WITHDRAW Plaintiffs, in error, UNLAWFUL WARRANT ISSUED 2/8/91 vs DEMAND TO EXONERATE BAIL TAKEN 3/2/90 ARTHUR FRANK SANFORD POINTS AND AUTHORITIES Demandant, Sui Juris IN SUPPORT OF DEMAND ................................................................. ........................................................ TO THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:

Demandant will appear special on (date) at which time he will demand the court to withdraw an unlawful bench warrant issued on 2/8/91, and further that the court exonerate bail taken on 3/2/91 in the amount of $207.50. This demand is based upon the grounds that the court is toothless as demandant was deprived of due process of law, both statutory and constitutional. HISTORY OF THE CASE (center this) On June 22, 1989, demandant was stopped by John Tomassi, who wrote and gave to the demandant a civil notice to appear, a citation under the Vehicle Code. PAGE 430 Section 16028 (a) was cited within the notice. At that time demandant signed a statement "Without admitting guilt, I promise to appear". On October 26, 1989, demandant appeared for a hearing before the above entitled court which was sitting and hearing a special procedure under a civil code. On that date a plea of 'not guilty' was entered into the record of the case by the hearing officer, he must then await the filing of a verified complaint, pursuant to s40513 (a) VC before it could obtain judicial subject matter jurisdiction for a quasi-criminal procedure. As the people have not filed a verified complaint with this court, at this time the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to issue bench warrants. Sufficient grounds exist for this court to withdraw the invalid bench warrant and exonerate the bail on a bench warrant issued December 5, 1989. Extra-judicial notice to appear was not verified, the court's record of the case show a plea of 'not guilty', at this time, demandant requests that a verified complaint be filed and that complaint and arrest warrant are served upon the demandant, only then can this matter be moved forward to trial. Arthur Frank Sanford Demandant

PAGE 431 1. Matter was collaterally estopped when Department of Motor Vehicles 'exonerated' demandant pursuant to a Demand for Formal Administrative Hearing and Declaratory Judgment filed with that agency forum. 2. Since the date of exoneration district attorney has not filed a criminal complaint with this court. This matter if pursued is special procedure and civil in nature as the matter is civil statute. 3. The plea of 'not guilty' entered by this court on October 26, 1989, was by this court without jurisdiction as no formal complaint had been filed with the court or with the demandant. 4. Court could not enter that plea when court failed to read demandant his legal rights and grant a continuance when demandant was without counsel. 5. As of the date of demandant receiving a notice of issue of invalid bench warrant, demandant has not been served a copy of a formal complaint or a notice from any prosecutor asking for a continuance for time to file a formal complaint, so court issued an invalid warrant. 6. This inferior court is functioning without jurisdiction and must await action by district attorney to prosecute before it may hear the matter. Submitted; Arthur Frank Sanford Demandant, Sui Juris