Chronology of Events at Mission Coordinator Position

My name is Colin Scoggins, I specialize in airspace and procedures, and military

operations. My intent was to check with TMU to make sure that fighters were requested
for AAL11 a Hijacked aircraft. Once at TMU the call to NEADS for Fighter escort had
just been made. I volunteered to help and man the mission coordinator (MC) position.
Below is a recollection of some of the telephone calls, and communications that occurred
in the TMU unit. Unfortunately, most of these calls were made on the DSN telephone at
the MC position. This is an unrecorded line at Boston Center, but is recorded at NEADS.
Without a recording I am unable to provide a timeline, I did my best to keep things in
order. I actually came in late that morning, at about 8:25 AM. As I entered the doorway
someone advised me that a Hijacking was going on, an AAL11.)

I wasn't in a rush because when Hijacks do occur sometimes to many people try to get
involved but instead they just get in the way. I went to the credit union first. I then
thought I should probably go to the TMU unit to make sure the fighters got off because of
the Hijack. I commented to the Credit Union employee, that I needed to go to the TMU
unit to make sure that the fighters got off, just in case they needed to take action against
the hijack. Commenting that if it really came to it and if they had to stop the highjack
from hitting a building or something, there wasn't much they could do.

Entered TMU Unit to verify that NEADS was called to scramble fighters.

Joe Cooper was talking to NEADS requesting fighter escort asking them when they were
going to get off.

Conversed with Dan Bueno the STMC to verify that NEADS had been called. He
advised they had, and briefed me on the Hijack. (There was a delay here because Bueno
called the 102nd first and asked them to scramble, they advised they needed a scramble
order over the scramble circuit.) (Bueno had also advised me that the Hijack seemed to be
more real, that there may have possibly been a Mid-eastern or Arabic voice heard on the
hijack.) (He also advised me that they had turned off the transponders to prevent the
Hijack code from appearing.) (This was not someone pissed off or mentally deranged,
you could tell that our awareness was higher than normal.)

Contacted NEADS to see if they could identify AAL11 primary target only, attempting to
get an altitude from their radar. (Height finding equipment) NEADS unable to identify
target.

Called NEADs several times to identify target, 50 South of ALB, then 30 North of JFK,
16 N of JFK, and again when we lost radar 8 NE of JFK.

Conversed with Dan Bueno on AAL11 target, target seemed to be slowing down entering
ZNY's airspace, possibly descending. (400 + knots to 320 knots)
 Contacted NEADS requesting them to identify AAL11 primary target, to receive an
altitude read out from their radar system. NEADS unable to identify target. Advised
NEADS that they should consider launching fighters from ACY, that Otis ANGB might
not be able to catch up to the AAL11.

Primary Radar target lost, conversed with Dan Bueno about radar coverage, aircraft
possibly descended below our coverage.

Conversed with Dan Bueno about whether the fighters had scrambled or not, Dan advised
that Cape Sector had issued the clearance but didn't believe they were off yet.

Call from HUNTRESS (Same as NEADS), Sgt. Powell advising us about the fighters
from Otis ANGB. Advising ZBW that the fighters should be airborne. Advised
HUNTRESS that radar was lost.

Began numerous discussions with a female Major at NEADS believe to be Major

Deskins on DSIs] | We needed to identify radar target, gave last known
positions 8 NM northeast of JFK, also gave L/L of last known position.

TMU Unit notified of an ELT and an aircraft had hit the WTC.

Discussions in TMU on what aircraft hit the WTC. I believe a call was made to AAL
operations to confirm. It was apparent it was AAL11.

Open TELCON at TMU desk discussion about a UAL 175 Hijack or NORDO.

Bo Dean had entered TMU area. I requested Bo Dean to call UAL operations to find out
the status. I don't believe UAL new the status. ASD indicated that UAL175 was over
NJ. /

Terry Biggio, the OMIC, issued a ground stop.

Catted NEADS on DSN] [requested to speak with Bill Ayers ADLO. Received
several different numbers to use.

OMIC advises that there may be more aircraft involved.

Bob Jones had entered the TMU Unit and advised Biggio that the tapes indicated and
clearly stated that they an Arabic voice was heard and stated that they " we have planes,
we have more planes", he states again "we are returning to the airport everyone stay
calm, we are returning to the airport calm down and no one will be injured."

(I heard this tape several days later, it is very chilling to hear based on the knowledge of
the entire ordeal.) (My good friend Pete Zyleski was the radar controller working
AAL11.)

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

I believe I called NEADS and asked them if they knew of information on UAL 175 or if
they were tracking UAL 175.

The fighters had got off from FMH, but by the time they broke ground the WTC had
already been hit. (I did not hear this directly but was repeated to me that when they got
off on initial contact with the center they were advised they were too late. They were
cleared into W-105 to delay until they received other orders.) (We did not know that
UAL 175 had been hijacked yet. On several calls to New York Center we were advised
that they were working a hijack, and we assumed it was AAL11 not UAL175.)

AF personnel advise that a 2nd aircraft had impacted the WTC. They have CNN on a TV
at their position.

Open TELCON rumor that AAL11 may not have impacted the WTC, that it might have
been another aircraft, AAL11 may be en route Washington DC.

Call NEADS gave last known position again of where AAL11 was and that the aircraft
may still be in the air.

Called FACSFAC VACAPES (Giantkiller) and requested their help in identifying target
of AAL11, gave last known position.

Open TELCON advises that an aircraft may be headed towards the White House, a large
VFR aircraft.

Called NEADS to advise of the target flying towards the White House. I was not sure at
the time whether NEADs was on this open TELCON. NEADS didn't seem to be aware
of this, or at least the person I was speaking with.

Open TELCON reports aircraft turned 6 NM southwest of the White House.

Open TELCON reports two minutes later that the pentagon was struck by an aircraft.

(My ex-wife's sister works at the pentagon, I was worried but I didn't have time to call
my ex-wife to find out her status until the next day.)

Open TELCON reports that a DAL1889 is NORDO in ZOB airspace. ASD indicates
aircraft is near Cleveland.

Call NEADS to advise of DAL 1889, possible Hijack.

NEADS calls back and advises that fighters from Selfridge, and Toledo have been
launched. To intercept DAL1889.

TMU conversation, either Dan Bueno or Terry Biggio advises that no aircraft can enter
ZBW airspace. All aircraft must divert or return to destination.
I called Moncton Centre to advise them we were shutting the door, no aircraft could enter
ZBW Airspace.

Open TELCON, or NEADS reports of an unidentified aircraft approaching ACK,

requests ZBW if any knowledge on this aircraft.

Call Giantkiller about aircraft south of ACK.

Open TELOCN, or PVD approach reports of a large white aircraft heading towards MVY
at 1700 feet MSL. Aircraft approaching from the west.

We get a call on the TELCON about an Iberian airliner being hijacked off the coast of
Spain, further research indicates no such flight exists.

We get a call on I believe a COA56 possible Hijack from overseas, turns out to be
negative, the aircraft returned for maintenance problems.

Open TELCON another aircraft Hijack/Crash possibly at Camp David (actually UAL93
in Southwest PA).

Call NEADS advise of both unknowns.

Call Giantkiller about slow moving aircraft approaching MVY.

The first aircraft is determined that it is a Coast Guard aircraft returning to FMH.

Ginatkiller calls and advises that a fleet of ships or en route towards the northeast, and
mentions an AEGIS Cruiser is on the way.

All aircraft are requested to land.

Someone advises us that MVY tower is going to evacuate due to the unknown aircraft.

Call NEADS to find out status on DAL1889. They advise that the aircraft has begun
descent but is heading north away from Cleveland. Advise NEADS of target west of
MVY.

TMU conversation we have been advised that DAL1889 is not a Hijack and is in contact
of Cleveland ATCT out of 12,000 feet MSL.

OMIC Action being taken to evacuate ZBW due to a possible airborne threat.

At the same time a tractor-trailer is parked directly outside the FAA Center on Rte 3,
State police called to get the truck away from the center.
ATC ZERO declared by ZBW OMIC.

There was some arguing on who was going to stay, and where to evacuate, supposedly a
bomb scare was called into the childcare center, our evacuation point. Controllers were
advised to either go to 11 Murphy Drive or the Holiday Inn.

Ed De Lacy ordered Pete Pasquale to leave, at this time we honestly felt that we were
targeted and an impact was imminent. I was ordered by Ed De Lacy to leave the
building.

Called Moncton Centre High Level Supervisor and advised that we were going ATC
ZERO and evacuating the building.

Called NEADS Battlestaff advise that Boston Center has declared ATC ZERO and that
we are evacuating the building due to a possible airborne threat. (This was the first time it
really hit me, I believe my voice crackled a little bit on the last call that I made.) (I hate
that I did because I believe under the greatest duress is when our professionalism should
be maintained the most.)

Advised Terry Biggio, and Ed DeLacey that I had notified Moncton Centre and NEADS
of ATC ZERO and then I left the building.

Upon leaving the building I saw Nashua SWAT Team in the parking lot with automatic
weapons, the FBI running with the audiotapes with Bob Jones by their side. Not a vision
we are used to around the center.

When I left it just so happens that my fiancee works next door at Unifirst. I couldn't
leave with out at least advising her what was going on and telling her boss so he could
decide what his company should do. When I went in I told her GM that we were targeted
and that an unidentified target was en route to the center confirmed by the Region in
Burlington, MA. He evacuated his building.

It turns out that the target they were concerned with was the Coast Guard target 120 miles
away off the coast of Nantucket. We had already identified it. Though we had thought
that we had evacuated the building 3 or 4 FSDPS personnel were left in the basement of
the building, there is no paging system in their office.

We reentered the building some 30 minutes later, to a desolate Air Traffic Control
Center. That's when you realized that nothing would ever be the same. We learned later
that day that Doug McKay a controller in Area E had his wife on board AAL11. Doug
has never returned to work, not even to visit.
ZBW ARTCC 148 PERSONNEL STATEMENT
1 FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
BOSTON ARTCC

This statement concerns the accident/incident involving /\ \ L JL-_ at

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by'the FAA at the Boston ARTCC, Nashua, NH.

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(sectWand position) (time) (time)

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I certify, to tne best of my knowledge and recollection, the above statement is correct. C

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ZBW Form 7210-45 (Revised 8/98) Page 1

 PERSONNEL STATEMENT
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
BOSTON ARTCC

Text of statement continuation:

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9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

ZBW Form 7210-45 (Revised 8/98) Page 2