Table of Contents

Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Western IR and its Discontents ....................................................................................................................................... 1 Non-Western Approaches ............................................................................................................................................... 2 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................................................... 3 Bibliography .................................................................................................................................................................... 4

Introduction
Despite the plurality of approaches in International Relations (IR), the vast majority of its theories stem from Western scholars. This raises the question about the ability of such a Western-centric lens to speak to the lived experiences and distinctive meanings of the developing world. Are the enlightenment notions of rationality, individuality, and freedom as universal and rigid as Western-IR assumes them to be? Or is it the case that these concepts are anthropogenic created and given meaning by human individuals and societies and thus likely to be shaped by the histories of the communities in which these notions are held? If the latter is the case, it would imply that the current dominance of Western-IR should be reined in, given a narrower domain of applicability: one specific to those states which hold common understandings of sociopolitical concepts. This essay will briefly look at some of the ways in which Western-IR has failed to adequately universalise some of its key ideas. These include theoretical components such as rationality and sovereignty, and also extend to higher order epistemological and ontological confines as well. Thus, both the content of particular concepts and the existence (social or material) and ways of knowing the concepts can be challenged. The final portion of this essay will thus look at the ways in which a non-Western approach to IR could differ from the current stock, and propose the impact this could have on both the discipline and the practical interactions between states and statespeople.

Western IR and its Discontents

There are two primary reasons why the development of non-Western IR theory should be a matter of some importance. First, the rise of the states in the developing world, such as China, India, Brazil, and a host of countries across Africa, has meant that the actions and intentions of such states have grown in relevance to the international order. Whereas during the Cold War Western interest in the third world extended only as far as their use in proxy skirmishes with the Communist threat1, the current influence of the formerly global periphery is such that their actions have significant reverberations for the international political economy. Second, and relatedly, the growing presence of these developing states on the world stage means that IR scholars have a broader range of data points for their empirical work. Yet, as Neumann (1998) and Bilgin (2008) note, much of the conceptual content of Western-IR fails to refer adequately to the corresponding ideas and meanings held in the developing world. This disconnect can be seen to stem from both the differing ontological substance and epistemological assumptions made by Western-IR. In terms of the former, the notion of the state in Western-IR draws heavily from the Westphalian advent in 17th century Europe. In contrast, African states, for example, are predominantly the result of the scramble

Not an entirely one-sided relationship either, as elites in developing countries undoubtedly milked the bi-polar dynamics of the Soviet-US regime.

for Africa, where political borders were drawn by colonial powers and thus represent their constituent nations, cultures, norms, and meanings in only a loose, superficial manner2. This ontological misapplication creates further problems for notions of sovereignty and the way in which this has developed incongruently across developed and developing countries. Contrary to Western-intuitions about state sovereignty, in reality developing states have historically taken ideas about non-intervention far more seriously than their Western counterparts (Neumann, 1998:7). Western-IR also fails epistemologically, first in its almost dogmatic and rhetorical adherence to the Enlightenments vision of the autonomous, unencumbered individual. This atomic view of persons is at odds with developing nations understanding of human interrelation and interdependence within a society. The African concept of Ubuntu demonstrates just this dichotomy between the Enlightenment vision of Gesellschaft that is held by Western-IR theories and the developing states community oriented Gemeinschaft. As Desmond Tutu (1999) put it, You cant be human all by yourself. Further, abstraction to the homo economicus model of human rationality often assumed in Western-IR faces a disconnect not only from the way in which it may be understood by citizens in developing countries, but also from the data coming out of the blossoming branches of neurobiology and evolutionary psychology. Rather than the utility maximiser posited by neoliberal economics, the affects that determine human behaviour are instead likely to be disjoined from the epiphenomenal, ex post facto justifications that are often given as reasons for action (Haidt, 2001; Libet, 1999). What would the introduction of cognitive determinism3 do to Western-IR?

Non-Western Approaches
The above section sketched just a few of the ways in which the particular history of the West has seeped into International Relations. This shouldnt, of course, mean that Western-IR theories can be dismissed as broken or as having no value for the developing world. Instead, these shortcomings allow the singling out of the theoretical aspects of the current body that would have to be worked on in order to improve the explanatory power and accuracy of the discipline in general. A non-Western theory of IR would, I propose, differ from the current models in several ways. First, there would be a shift away from universality to a more contextual approach. While in practice many of the current stock of IR theories do utilise a historical base, the rhetorical stance is one that advocates the held assumptions as universal, or, last least, as constituent of humans across the world. Thus, this shift may take place primarily in the language of IR, which would adapt to the specific historicity of the peoples involved.

Eritrean and South Sudanese independence, as well as the efforts by the East African Community (EAC) are one area in which the problem of African irredentism has begun to impact on notions of state relations, in Africa at least.
3

We could, of course, go even further than just social epistemology. What implications would material determinism have for IR theories, Western or not? If the Heisenbergs (there is one in cognitive psychology as well) and their uncertainty principles are the only glue holding together the freedom assumed by Western-IR theory, then the next few years might bring about a bit of a Copernican revolution in International Relations as a whole.

Second, a more communitarian approach to understanding the ideas and meanings in a given society would be beneficial, in that it could shed light on the values and incentives that drive the various actors to, in fact, act. With better information about the desires held by developing countries citizens, better theory can be constructed. The third, and linked to the first two, would be to change the way in which human nature is understood. Rather than as a rational cost-benefit analyst, a biopolitical approach to human nature (as in Fukuyama (1998)) would improve both the factual content of IR and the pragmatic results which can be gained. This alternative perspective would not only benefit non-Western theories but could also help bridge the epistemological failings in the currently dominant Westerncentric approaches. As Sheeler (2013) notes:
America has always been a nation with severe Daddy Issues, [which] practically deifies our Founding Fathers and their belief in a rational system of government, based on the consent of the governed. But what sort of content can any of these words possibly have if we are not actually capable of making rational choices; of using reason to evaluate alternatives to determine a course of action?

Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to look at if, why, and how a non-Western theory of International Relations may differ from the Western dominated discipline that currently exists. To this end, it looked at some of the key concepts and assumptions which are used in IR, in order to test their universal applicability. Ideas about the state and sovereignty were touched on, implying that the Westphalian origins of Western countries are a far cry from the way in which much of the developing world has experienced statehood. Thus, any theory which holds too rigidly to this conception of the state would likely face some problems when attempting to apply it to the developing world. Additionally, the way in which domestic factors impact on the international system would be changed drastically (particularly for realists, I imagine) when the community themed approach that is often more prevalent in developing countries is adopted. This de-emphasis of the individual could also be applied to understandings of human nature, which, in contrast to the Kantian idea of personhood, may turn out to be no more than a biological sock puppet, made to dance to a symphony of environmental and social affects. In conclusion it seems fair to suggest that an approach to IR that disestablished itself from the canon of current literature would indeed be both plausible and different.

Bibliography
Bilgin, P. 2008. Thinking past Western IR. Third World Quarterly, 29(1): 5-23. Fukuyama, F. 1998. Women and the Evolution of World Politics. Foreign Affairs, 77(5): 24-40. Haidt, J. 2001. The Emotional Dog and its Irrational Tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgement. Psychological Review, 108():814-834. Harris, S. 2010. The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values. New York: Free Press. Libet, B. 1999. Do We Have Free Will? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6(8): 47-57. Sheeler, J. 2013. Lose Your Illusion. [Online]. Available: http://thoughtcatalog.com/2013/lose-your-illusion/ [6 May, 2013]. Tutu, D. 1999. No Future Without Forgiveness. New York: Random House. Neumann, S. 1998. International Relations Theory and the Third World. London: Macmillan.