Wolff Song Cog Psych 2003

Cognitive Psychology
Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332 www.elsevier.com/locate/cogpsych
Models of causation and the semantics of causal verbsq

Phillip Wol a,* and Grace Songb
a
Department of Psychology, University of Memphis, 202 Psychology Building, Memphis, TN 38152, USA b Department of English, University of Memphis, 125 Patterson Hall, Memphis, TN 38152, USA Accepted 15 January 2003
Abstract This research examines the relationship between the concept of CAUSE as it is characterized in psychological models of causation and the meaning of causal verbs, such as the verb cause itself. According to focal set models of causation (Cheng, 1997; Cheng & Novick, 1991, 1992), the concept of CAUSE should be more similar to the concepts of ENABLE and PREVENT than either is to each other. According to a model based on Talmys (1988) theory of force dynamics, the force dynamic model, the concepts of CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT should be roughly equally similar to one another. The relationship between these predictions and the meaning of causal verbs was examined by having participants sort causal verbs and rate them with respect to the dimensions specied by the two models. The results from ve experiments indicated that the force dynamic model provides a better account of the meaning of causal verbs than do focal set models of causation. Implications for causal inference and induction are discussed. 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
Keywords: Causation; Causal models; Lexical semantics; Verbs
This work was supported in part by a grant from The University of Memphis Faculty Research Grant Fund. This support does not necessarily imply endorsement by the University of research conclusions. We give special thanks to Bianca Klettke and Tanya Vassilieva for their help in the research and analyses. We also want to thank Adele Goldberg, Doug Medin and an anonymous reviewer for their very insightful comments and suggestions. * Corresponding author. Fax: 1-901-678-2579. E-mail address: pwol@memphis.edu (P. Wol). 0010-0285/$ - see front matter 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/S0010-0285(03)00036-7
P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332
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1. Introduction The aim of this paper is to examine laypersons concepts of causation through an analysis of the meaning of causal verbs. The vast majority of studies in cognitive psychology have examined how people interpret covariational information in order to induce probabilistic causal relations. Relatively little work (e.g., Ahn, Kalish, Medin, & Gelman, 1995; Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001) has examined how people dene causation and related concepts such as prevention and enabling. In particular, we do not know the degree to which models of causal judgment accord with laypersons concepts of causation as reected by their understanding of the meaning of causal statements in ordinary language. Despite this lack of knowledge, researchers in psychology, linguistics and philosophy have often made what we will refer to as the equivalency assumption, namely, that the concept of CAUSE as it is reected in tasks of causal reasoning is the same concept as that encoded in causal language. This assumption is reected in many experiments of causal reasoning in which the dependent measures are based on evaluations of claims containing the verb cause, e.g., Does water cause plants to grow? (e.g., Ahn, Kim, Lassaline, & Dennis, 2000; Anderson & Sheu, 1995; Cheng & Novick, 1991; Johnson, Ogawa, Delforge, & Early, 1989; Lien & Cheng, 2000; Mandel & Lehman, 1996, 1998; McGill, 1989; McGill & Klein, 1993; Schlottmann & Anderson, 1993; Schlottmann & Shanks, 1992; Shanks, 1989; Shanks, Pearson, & Dickinson, 1989; Spellman, 1997; Vinokur & Ajzen, 1982; Wells, Taylor, & Turtle, 1987; White, 1995, 2000). In linguistic theorizing, the equivalency assumption is reected in the treatment of CAUSE as a conceptual primitive in the meaning of a large number of causal verbs, prepositions and conjunctions (e.g., Carter, 1976; Croft, 1990, 1991; Dowty, 1979; Jackendo, 1983, 1990; Lagerwerf, 1998; Levin & Rappaport Hovav, 1996; McCawley, 1968; Parsons, 1984; Pinker, 1989; Pustejovsky, 1991, 1995; Sanders & Spooren, 2001; Shibatani, 1976; Wierzbicka, 1975). Philosophers have also made this assumption. As stated by the philospher Mackie (1974), Of course, we may, or rather must, accept the use of causal language as a rough guide to what we are to take as causal relationships. . . (p. 1). The equivalency assumption makes a great deal of sense. Indeed, if the assumption were not true, it would imply the existence of linguistic expressions without any corresponding conceptual function and important causal constructs that could not be readily described. Moreover, if the assumption were not true, it would imply the need for a massive re-examination of the conclusions drawn from experiments using linguistic dependent measures to investigate causal decision-making. Without such a re-analysis, it would be impossible to say, for example, whether departures from normative models of causality were due to computational errors in information processing (e.g., weighting and combination of covariational data), as has often been assumed, or due to biases introduced by the semantics of the language. While the equivalency assumption makes sense and simplies our experimental analyses, it also raises several implications concerning the generalizability of these models. Most notably, if the equivalency assumption is true, then models of causal judgment should accord with lay understanding of the meaning of causal claims.
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As noted by Ahn and Kalish (2000), models of causal judgment specify at least implicit denitions of the concept of CAUSE. Given the equivalency assumption, these implicit denitions should be consistent with the concept of CAUSE as it is encoded in causal claims. Moreover, the equivalency assumption implies that we should be able to compare the denitions of causation that are implicit in models of causal judgment with the explicit denitions of causation given in models of causal meaning. A second major aim of this paper is to perform such a comparison. Models of causal judgment and causal meaning have evolved to the point where comparisons of this kind can be made. In particular, recent models of causal judgment and meaning specify not only the criteria for inducing causal relations in general, but also criteria for distinguishing particular subcategories of causal relations, for example, causing, enabling and preventing. Henceforth, we will use CAUSE to refer to a particular subtype of causal relation, distinct from ENABLE and PREVENT. It is interesting to note that these subcategories of causal relations at least appear to mirror three related but distinct sets of verbs: CAUSE-type (e.g., cause, force, and make), ENABLE-type (e.g., enable, allow, and help), and PREVENT-type verbs (e.g., prevent, block, and keep). If there is a tight relationship between our conceptual and linguistic systems, as many have assumed, then models of causal judgment and meaning that distinguish dierent kinds of causal relations should do so in much the same way that people do when they use these verbs. There should be consistency, for example, in how these models dene the concepts CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT and in how people use the verbs cause, enable, and prevent in causal claims. We examine this possibility through an investigation of models of causal judgment based on the concept of focal sets and a recent model of causal meaning based on work in force dynamics. 1.1. Focal set models of causation Focal set models of causation (Cheng, 1997, 2000; Cheng & Novick, 1991, 1992; Cheng, Park, Yarlas, & Holyoak, 1996; Cheng & Holyoak, 1995; Novick & Cheng, in press) represent perhaps the most prominent approach within an entire class of models of causal judgment known as regularity theories. Regularity theories range from associative learning models (originally developed in animal learning research) to more social psychology-based models such as Kelleys causal attribution model (e.g., Cheng, 1997; Kelley, 1973; Shanks, Lopez, Darby, & Dickinson, 1996; Wasserman, Kao, Van Hamme, Katagiri, & Young, 1996).1 The basic idea behind
1 Associative accounts of causal judgment, a species of regularity theory that is most often based on the Rescorla and Wagner (1972) model, have represented a prominent alternative to focal set models of causation (e.g., Baker, Murphy, & Vall ee-Tourangeau, 1996; Lober & Shanks, 2000; Shanks et al., 1996; Wasserman, Eleks, Chatloch, & Baker, 1993). In associative accounts, causal concepts are represented in terms of a value on a single output that can be characterized as a positive, a negative or zero dierence. As a consequence, these accounts cannot distinguish more than two causal concepts from the absence of any causal relation at all. In particular, while these accounts suggest representations for the concepts of CAUSE and PREVENT, they are fundamentally unable to represent any other type of causal concept (Cheng, 1997; Cheng & Holyoak, 1995; Cheng et al., 1996). Thus, this approach to causation is quite limited in terms of its potential relevance to language.
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most regularity theories is that causal relations are inferred from the constant conjunction or covariation of a candidate cause and an eect. Covariation can be assessed by subtracting the probability of an eect, e, in the presence of a candidate cause, c, from the probability of the eect in the absence of the candidate cause, :c, or, in other words, by using the DP statistic in which DP P ejcP ej : c. A generative or facilitative cause is inferred if the probability of the eect is noticeably greater in the presence of a possible cause than in its absence, i.e., when P ejc > P ej : c. For example, the probability of cancer in the presence of smoking is greater than the probability of cancer in the absence of smoking, which leads us to infer that smoking causes cancer. A inhibitory or preventive cause is inferred if the eect occurs noticeably more often in the absence of the causal factor than in its presence, i.e., when P ejc < P ej : c. For example, the probability of re is less in the presence of rain than in the absence of rain. Thus, even the most basic kind of regularity theory provides an implicit account of the concepts CAUSE and PREVENT. The rst focal set model, the probabilistic contrast model, was proposed by Cheng and Novick (1991, 1992). Previous covariation-based models of causation in the psychological and philosophical literatures assumed that the assessment of covariation between a candidate cause and an eect was computed over all instances of the cause and the eect. In contrast, Cheng and Novick (1991, 1992) proposed that such assessments were usually based on only a subset of the universal set of events, namely a contextually constrained set of events referred to as a focal set. Equipped with the concept of a focal set, Cheng and Novick (1991) proposed how covariation-based models of causation could distinguish not only the concepts of CAUSE and PREVENT, but also these two concepts from the concept of ENABLE. For example, lightning is more readily construed as causing forest res than enabling them. Conversely, oxygen is more easily construed as enabling a forest re than causing it. As many have noted, the dierence between lightning and oxygen cannot be made in terms of necessity or suciency (Cheng & Novick, 1991, 1992; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001; Hart & Honor e, 1985; Mill, 1872/1973; Turnbull & Slugoski, 1988; Wol, Song, & Driscoll, 2002), even if causal factors are viewed in terms of Mackies (1965) INUS condition: lightning and oxygen are both I nsucient but N ecessary parts of a complex set of factors that together are U nnecessary but S ucient for starting a forest re. To distinguish CAUSE from ENABLE, Cheng and Novick (1991, 1992) invoke the notion of constancy of the causal factor. Specically, they propose that enabling is perceived for candidate causal factors that are constantly present in a reasoners current focal set of events (making P ej i undened), but covary positively in another focal set. Thus, a candidate factor such as oxygen can be viewed as an enabler of forest res since, in a reasoners current focal set of events, oxygen is constantly present when res do and do not occur. However, in another focal set, such as situations involving oxygen-free chambers in chemistry labs, the presence of oxygen does covary with the occurrence of a re. Since oxygen may covary with res in this, but not in the reasoners current focal set of events, oxygen may
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be seen as enabling rather than causing res.2 In eect, then, the concepts of CAUSE and ENABLE are distinguished in terms of the nature of covariation in dierent focal sets. One limitation of the probabilistic contrast model is that it doesnt specify what kinds of focal sets are likely to be most informative for inducing a causal relation. Another limitation of the model is that it cannot specify when a zero constrast (i.e., DP % 0) should be interpreted as implying the absence of causation or prevention or when a zero contrast is not interpretable (e.g., the causal eectiveness of a drug when the control group contains no instances of a disease). These limitations, among others, led Cheng (1997, 2000) to develop a new focal set model of causal judgment that species when covariation reveals causation. She proposes that peoples causal judgments are based on their estimates of a causal factors power to produce an eect. Causal power is viewed as a theoretical entity that cannot be directly observed, but can be estimated from observable events. Specically, generative causal power, pcause , can be estimated from the normalization of DP by 1 P ej i, specically, pcause DP =1 P ej i while preventive causal power, pprevent , is normalized by P ej i, specically pprevent DP =P ej i. Cheng (1997, 2000) shows that the equations associated with generative and preventative causal power apply only when all alternative causes of the eect vary independently of the candidate cause. Thus, the power PC theory can motivate why people prefer to draw causal inferences from focal sets in which alternative causes are not confounded with the candidate cause of interest. Further, the power PC theory can also explain why zero contrasts (i.e., DP % 0) are sometimes interpreted as non-causal but at other times are uninterpretable. When both DP % 0 and pcause % 0, a zero contrast will be interpreted as non-causal. However, when DP % 0 and pcause is undened, as occurs when P ej i 1 due to division by 0, the zero contrast is uninterpretable, as occurs when the eect is always present even in the absence of the cause. One key dierence between the models is that the probabilistic contrast model has only one output, DP , while the power PC model has two outputs, DP and pcause or pprevent . The additional output in the power PC model allows it to indicate when covariational information, as supplied by DP , can be used to infer causation. Nevertheless, the power PC model remains a focal set theory of causation. As specied in Cheng (1977; see also Cheng et al., 1996), the model species the kinds of focal sets that are likely to be most informative for inducing causal relations. Moreover, the power PC model adopts the very same approach to distinguishing causal relations from enabling relations through comparison of multiple focal sets. Indeed, Cheng
2 The denition of enabling conditions provided in Cheng and Novick (1991, 1992) is rened in Cheng (1993, 1997) and Cheng et al. (1996) to include the further constraint that in a focal set in which a candidate enabling condition is absent, the causer (or preventer) no longer covaries with the eect (e.g., matches do not covary with re when oxygen, the enabling condition, is absent). This additional constraint allows the probabilistic contrast model, as well as the other focal set models, to distinguish enabling conditions from alternative causes (or preventers). Importantly, however, the eect of this constraint on the relationship between CAUSE and ENABLE is no dierent than the eect of this constraint on the relationship between ENABLE and PREVENT. For ease of discussion, nothing more about this constraint will be mentioned since its inclusion would have no impact on the similarity predictions to be made for this class of models.
P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332 Table 1 Focal set models representations of CAUSE, PREVENT, and ENABLE Occurrence of the eect CAUSE PREVENT ENABLE Y N Y Constancy of factor in the focal set N N Y
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Note. Y, Yes; N, No.
(1997; see also Cheng et al., 1996) lists the ability to distinguish causal relations from enabling relations as one of the power PC theorys many strengths. Recently, Cheng and Novick (in press) have extended the power PC model to handle conjunctive causal relations, that is, those involving two candidate causes and an eect. As with the power PC model, the conjunctive power PC theory species the conditions under which covariations imply causation, in this case, however, conjunctive causation. As with the probabilistic contrast and the power PC theories, the conjunctive power PC assumes the use of focal sets. Importantly, the conjunctive power PC model does not oers an alternative account of the distinction between causes and enabling conditions, and nothing introduced in the new model prevents it from using the same account of enabling conditions as that developed and adopted by the previous focal set models. In sum, focal set models of causation imply that causal concepts and meanings associated with causal claims can be characterized by values on two dimensions: the occurrence of the eect and the constancy of candidate causal factor in a reasoners current focal set.3 The values on these two dimensions have consequences for the degree of similarity between each pair of concepts. As indicated in Table 1, the concepts of CAUSE and ENABLE share one property in common: both apply to situations in which the eect occurs. The concepts of CAUSE and PREVENT share one property in common: both apply to situations in which the causal factors covary within the reasoners initial focal set of events. Finally, the concepts of PREVENT and ENABLE have no properties in common. As a consequence, PREVENT and ENABLE are predicted to be less similar to each other than either is to CAUSE. Indeed, in descriptions of how focal set models are able to account for enabling conditions, the main issue has been one of trying to distinguish CAUSE from ENABLE,
In discussing enabling conditions, Cheng and Novick (1991, 1992, Cheng, 1993, 1997) have always used examples in which the enabling condition covaries positively with the eect (e.g., oxygen as an enabling condition for re). However, according to their denitions of enabling conditions, positive covariation is not strictly required. Rather, to be an enabling condition merely requires that the causal factor covary with the eect in at least one focal set. This denition leaves open the possibility that an enabling condition might covary negatively with the eect. While we nd this possibility counterintuitive, if enabling conditions could covary either positively or negatively with the eect, focal set models would predict that the concepts of CAUSE and PREVENT should be more similar to each than either is to the concept of ENABLE, since neither CAUSE and PREVENT require information from more than one focal set. As we will see, the results from Experiments 15 provide no support for this alternative interpretation of the concept of ENABLE.
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Fig. 1. Co-occurrence/similarity matrix predicted by focal set models in terms of number of shared properties (left-hand side) and multidimensional scaling solution derived from the matrix (right-hand side).
not ENABLE from PREVENT (e.g., Cheng, 1996, 1997; Cheng & Novick, 1991, 1992; Cheng et al., 1996). The predicted similarities between the dierent kinds of concepts can be organized into a similarity matrix, as shown on the left-hand side of Fig. 1. This matrix, in turn, can be submitted to a multidimensional scaling (MDS) program. Such a program computes coordinates in space such that the distances between any pair of points ts as closely as possible to the measured or theoretically derived dierences between a corresponding set of entities (Shepard, 1974, 1980). When the matrix in Fig. 1 is, in fact, submitted to a MDS program, 100% of the variance is captured by a solution in which the three concepts are arranged along a line, as shown on the right-hand side of Fig. 1.4 The resulting spatial conguration in Fig. 1 nicely captures the main prediction of focal set models by showing the concepts of PREVENT and ENABLE further apart from each other than either is to the concept of CAUSE. Note that while dierent weightings of the two dimensions could change the relative distances between the three concepts, the relative distance between PREVENT and ENABLE would always be the greatest. So, for example, if occurrence of the eect was weighted more strongly than constancy, the distance between CAUSE and ENABLE would decrease relative to the distance between CAUSE and PREVENT. Nevertheless, the concepts of PREVENT and ENABLE would still be more distant from each other than either would be to CAUSE. 1.2. The force dynamic model of causation The predictions of focal set models can be contrasted with a new model of causation derived from work in force dynamics. The force dynamic model represents our version of a proposal originally made by Talmy (1985, 1988) and elaborated on by several researchers, most notably Jackendo (1990; Kemmer & Verhagen, 1994; Pinker, 1989; Robertson & Glenberg, 1998; Siskind, 2000; Verhagen & Kem4 In this case, a 1-dimensional (non-metric) MDS solution can be found for these concepts even though they are based on two dimensions because the dimensions are correlated with each other.
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mer, 1997; Verhagen, 2002; Wol, in press; Wol et al., 2002; Wol & Zettergren, 2002). From a force dynamic perspective, the concept of CAUSE is one member of a family of concepts that includes the concepts of ENABLE and PREVENT, among others. Each of these concepts represents an interaction between an aector and a patient5 that can be captured in terms of various patterns of tendency, relative strength, rest, and motion of the two participants (Talmy, 1988). Typically, an aector is separate from the patient (usually external) and impinges upon the patient. In our adaptation of Talmys theory, the various CAUSE-related concepts are specied according to whether one entity (the patient) changes or remains the same with respect to a particular location or state as a consequence of the forces associated with it and another entity that impinges on it (the aector). By force, we mean directed quantities (e.g., physical forces, desires, historical pressures, etc.) that can combine to produce an overall push or pull upon the patient. One way in which our account diers from Talmys (1988) is that we base our representations upon only three main semantic dimensions while Talmys is based on four or more dimensions. In addition, in Talmys (1988) account, underlying all more complex force-dynamic patterns is the steady-state opposition of two forces. . . (p. 53). Thus, in Talmys theory the vast majority of force dynamic interactions are said to involve opposition. However, in our account, we follow Jackendos (1990) observation that many such complex interactions appear to involve concordance rather than opposition between the aector and the patient. Our account diers from Jackendos (1990) in that we stipulate a dimension for the patients tendency (like Talmy (1988)) while he includes a dimension that captures the deniteness of the result (e.g., preventing will not lead to a result while hindering may or may not lead to a result). Specically, in our model we hold that causal relations are distinguished from each other in terms of three main dimensions: (1) the tendency of the patient for a result, (2) the presence of opposition between the aector and patient, and (3) the occurrence of a result. The notion of a result is dened as a particular endstate that a patient might enter into if a change in the patient occurs. The notion of a tendency is dened as the patients propensity for a particular direction due to properties or actions that are internal to the patient, including its ability to change itself and/or resist change. These three binary dimensions allow for eight possible congurations of values. In the discussion that follows, we will focus on those congurations that are directly relevant to the comparison between the two models (see Table 2). A fuller account of the force dynamic model is provided in Appendix A. Consider, for example, an example of causation as described in sentence (1a). In this sentence, the tendency of the patient (the craft) is not for the result (heeling). But because the tendency is opposed by the aector (the blast), the result of heeling occurs. (1) a. The blast caused the boat to heel. b. Vitamin B enables the body to digest food. c. The rain prevented the tar from bonding.
5 We use the more familiar terms aector and patient instead of antagonist and agonist as originally used in Talmy (1988).
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Table 2 The force dynamic models representations of prototypical CAUSE, PREVENT, ENABLE, and DESPITE Tendency of patient for the result CAUSE PREVENT ENABLE Note. Y, Yes; N, No. N Y Y Opposition between aector and patient Y Y N Occurrence of a result Y N Y
In enabling situations, as in (1b), the tendency of the patient (the body) is for the result (to digest food). This tendency is not opposed by the aector (vitamin B). Rather, vitamin B assists in the realization of the tendency, leading to the occurrence of a result. In situations involving preventing, as in (1c), the tendency of the patient (the tar) is towards the occurrence of the result (bonding), but this tendency is opposed and blocked by the aector (the rain) and, as a consequence, the result does not occur. As indicated in Table 2, the force dynamic model predicts that each concept shares one feature in common with each other concept: ENABLE and PREVENT both involve patients with a tendency for the result; CAUSE and PREVENT both involve opposition; and CAUSE and ENABLE both lead to results. Provided the dimensions are equally weighted, the model implies, then, that the three concepts should be equally similar in meaning. Therefore, if we were to plot these concepts in a similarity space in terms of the verbs that encode them, they should be spaced equally distant from one another. The left-hand side of Fig. 2 illustrates the predicted similarities between the concepts in a similarity matrix. The right-hand side shows the resulting MDS solution. If the three dimensions are not weighted evenly, the triangle formed by the three concepts shown in Fig. 2 will not be equilateral. For example, people might weigh the occurrence of the result more heavily than the patients tendency for the result
Fig. 2. Co-occurrence/similarity matrix predicted by the force dynamic model in terms of number of shared properties (left-hand side) and multidimensional scaling solution derived from the matrix (righthand side).
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or the opposition between the aector and patient. If so, the distance between CAUSE and ENABLE will be smaller relative to the distances between CAUSE and PREVENT and ENABLE and PREVENT. While we do not assume that the three dimensions are necessarily weighted the same, we do assume that any dierences between the various weightings are not extreme. For example, if one of the dimensions were weighted at or near zero, the resulting semantics would eectively be based on only two dimensions rather than three. Importantly, however, provided none of the dimensions are weighted at or near zero, the resulting solution MDS solution will necessarily require more than one dimension. As noted earlier, focal set models predict that the similarity between ENABLE and PREVENT should be less than the similarity between both CAUSE and ENABLE and CAUSE and PREVENT. If we were to nd that the similarity between ENABLE and PREVENT was the same as that between the other two pairs of concepts, this pattern would count as evidence for the force dynamic model and against focal set models of causation. 1.3. The linguistic expression of causation Do the models of causation described above capture the underlying meanings of our linguistic expressions of causation? If so, then such models could serve not only as models of CAUSE-related concepts, but also implicitly as models of causal meaning. There are a number of linguistic structures that can be used to express causation in English and other languages, including causal conjunctions (e.g., because), prepositions (because of, thanks to), and lexical causatives, i.e., verbs that encode both the notions of CAUSE and RESULT, as in Peter broke the stick (i.e., caused the stick to break). Yet another means of expressing causal interactions is the use of periphrastic causative verbs (also called analytic, auxiliary or overt causatives). These verbs, e.g., cause, make, force, or get, include the notion of CAUSE, ENABLE, or PREVENT without specifying a particular result (Ammon, 1980; Baron, 1972; Comrie, 1985; Fodor, 1970; Levin & Rappaport Hovav, 1994; Pinker, 1989; Shibatani, 1976). They are of special interest to us because they are frequently used in psychological experiments to test models of causation. They are also of interest because many of them appear to directly encode the various causal concepts that are described in the causal models above. For example, in addition to the verbs cause, make, and force, which appear to encode CAUSE, the periphrastic causative category also includes verbs that appear to encode the concepts of ENABLE (e.g., enable, let, allow) and PREVENT (e.g., prevent, block, and restrain). It is for these reasons, then, that in comparing the ability of the two models of causation to capture the semantics of causal expressions, we focused on this small but well-known class of verbs. Periphrastic causative verbs are dened by both syntactic and semantic criteria (Shibatani, 1976). Syntactically, periphrastic causative verbs can be used as the matrix verb of a sentence containing an embedded clause (Baron, 1972; Cole, 1983; Kozinsky & Polinsky, 1993; Radford, 1988; Wol & Gentner, 1996; but see Kemmer & Verhagen, 1994). Semantically, periphrastic causative verbs encode the notion of
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cause, broadly construed, (e.g., caused in 2a) while the verb in the embedded clause encodes a particular result (e.g., heel in 2a). (2) a. The blast caused the boat to heel. b. The rain prevented the tar from bonding. Periphrastic causative verbs entail or strongly imply the occurrence of a result, or, in the case of PREVENT-type verbs, the non-occurrence of a change of state or location that would have occurred without intervention (e.g., 2b). We can say that a verb implies a result if negating its implied endstate leads to a contradiction.6 (3) a. ?The blast caused the boat to heel, but the boat didnt heel. b. ?The rain prevented the tar from bonding, but the tar bonded. c. Mary begged Bob to marry her, but he didnt marry her. While negating the endstate in (3a) and (3b) does indeed lead to a contradiction, negating the endstate in (3c) does not. Thus, the verbs cause and prevent qualify as periphrastic causative verbs, but beg does not: although it can take a clausal complement, it does not necessarily imply the occurrence of a result. Early work on periphrastic causatives assumed that the class of periphrastic causative verbs was limited to a small set of verbs (Ammon, 1980; Baron, 1972, 1977; Shibatani, 1976), the most common being cause, make, get, have, and let. However, later work suggested that the class was much larger, including such members as allow, convince, force, permit, persuade, etc. (Goldberg, 1995; Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976; Pinker, 1989; Talmy, 1988). To accurately determine the relationship between models of causation and the semantics of periphrastic causative verbs, we needed as complete a list of these verbs as possible. To construct such a list, we conducted extensive corpus searches of the Penn TreeBank versions of the Brown corpus and the 1989 Wall Street Journal. Using the semantic and syntactic criteria mentioned above, our search turned up 49 periphrastic causative verbs, 23 of which can be used to describe interactions involving either sentient or non-sentient patients (see 4a) while the remaining are restricted to situations involving sentient patients only (see 4b). (4) a. allow, block, cause, enable, force, get, help, hinder, hold, impede, keep, leave, let, make, permit, prevent, protect, restrain, save, set, start, stimulate, and stop b. aid, bar, bribe, compel, constrain, convince, deter, discourage, dissuade, drive, have, hamper, impel, incite, induce, inuence, inspire, lead, move, persuade, prompt, push, restrict, rouse, send, and spur Our corpus analyses yielded all the periphrastic causative verbs that have been mentioned in the literature, as well as roughly 38 new verbs. The size and representativeness of the corpora provide some assurance that our list is relatively complete. A fuller description of this corpus search is provided in Wol et al. (2002).
6 Although ENABLE-type verbs such as let have traditionally been classied as periphrastic causative verbs, the entailment criterion doesnt strictly hold in their case, especially with sentient patients (cf. Mary let Bob to leave, but he didnt leave, which is acceptable, and Mary let the water seep into the oor, but the water didnt seep into the oor, which is a contradiction). It might be, for these verbs, that the occurrence of a result is a strong implicature rather than an entailment. Essentially the same observation is made by Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird (2001).
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1.4. Testing the models With a relatively complete set of periphrastic causative verbs in hand, we are in a position to examine how well focal set and force dynamic models of causation capture the meaning of the verb cause and related verbs. Both types of models imply that there should be at least three major subcategories of periphrastic causative verbs: one each associated with the concepts of CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT. Thus, the nding that the periphrastic causatives do fall into these particular subcategories would count as evidence for both types of models. The question then turns to how these subcategories are related to each other as a whole. According to focal set models, the subcategory of ENABLE verbs should be less similar to PREVENT verbs than ENABLE verbs are to CAUSE verbs or CAUSE verbs are to PREVENT verbs. As depicted in Fig. 1, this pattern of relationships can be captured by a conguration of verb types that reside at dierent points along a single dimension. Hence, focal set models predict that it should be possible to capture the inter-item similarities between the dierent verbs within a single dimension. In contrast, according to the force dynamic model, the CAUSE, PREVENT, and ENABLE subcategories of verbs should be roughly equally similar (or dissimilar) to one another. As shown in Fig. 2, the pattern of relationships predicted by the force dynamic model requires a 2-dimensional MDS solution. To test these two sets of predictions, we needed to rst obtain a measure of the semantic similarity between each pair of periphrastic causative verbs. Such a measure can be obtained by having participants sort periphrastic causative verbs into groups according to their meanings and then counting the number of times each pair of verbs is placed in the same group (see Malt, Sloman, Gennari, Shi, & Wang, 1999; Miller, 1969; Rosenberg & Kim, 1975). Verbs with similar meanings will tend to be grouped together while those with dissimilar meanings will not. Combining these co-occurrences over participants, we can then construct a similarity matrix, which in turn can be analyzed using multidimensional scaling. We can then observe whether the clusters are distributed as predicted by focal set models or the force dynamic model. This general strategy was used in the next four experiments to test the two classes of models.
2. Experiment 1: Semantic organization of periphrastic causative verbs In Experiment 1, we performed an initial examination of the semantic organization of the periphrastic causative verbs. As discussed earlier, both focal set models and the force dynamic model assume three types of periphrastic causative verbs. Where the models dier is in the pattern of similarity relationships among the verb types. One prediction of the focal set models is that it should be possible to capture the pattern of similarities among CAUSE-, PREVENT-, and ENABLE-type verbs within a single dimension. In addition, focal set models predict that PREVENTand ENABLE-type verbs are less similar to each other than either is to CAUSE-type verbs. In contrast, the force dynamic model predicts, at the very minimum, that the
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pattern of similarity relationships among CAUSE-, PREVENT-, and ENABLE-type verbs requires two dimensions. In addition, it predicts that the three kinds of periphrastic causative verbs should be roughly equally similar to each other. Because we were interested in those components of meaning that were most essential to periphrastic causative verbs, we limited our analyses to those verbs that can be used to describe physical interactions, i.e., those that can be used with non-sentient patients (see (3a)). As argued by Talmy (1976, 1988), events involving physical causation are in several ways simpler than those involving psychological interactions. Moreover, it has been suggested that people might use their knowledge of physical causation as a basis for thinking about psychological causation (Jackendo, 1983; Talmy, 1988). To measure the inter-item similarities between each pair of verbs, participants sorted periphrastic causative verbs into groups according to their meaning. Each verb was printed on an index card along with two example sentences. To maintain the focus on physical causation, all the example sentences included patients that were non-sentient and, in most cases, tangible. 2.1. Method 2.1.1. Participants The participants were 26 University of Memphis undergraduates who participated for course credit. 2.1.2. Materials Each of the 23 verbs in (3a) was printed at the top of a 4 in. 6 in. index card. Below each verb were printed two sentences that illustrated periphrastic causative uses of that verb. The example sentences were selected, without modication, from The British National Corpus (BNC) and to a lesser extent, from the Linguistic Data Consortiums Tipster Corpus and the Oxford English Dictionary II. The example sentences were chosen on the basis of their conciseness, their concreteness and their uniqueness with respect to the other example sentences. Moreover, all of the sentences contained patients that were non-sentient and, in most cases, tangible (e.g., crystals, cork, trains, oors, and fabric). The sentences are listed in the rst table in Appendix B. 2.1.3. Procedure The experiment had two phases. In the rst phase, participants wrote denitions of the verbs printed at the top of each card, on the basis of the two example sentences. The purpose of this task was to encourage participants to think relatively deeply about the meanings of the verbs. In the second phase, participants were asked to sort the verb cards into as many or as few groups as they felt appropriate. They were told that the members of each group should have essentially the same meaning. All of the participants saw all of the verbs. The order of the cards was randomized dierently for each participant. Using co-occurrences as an indicator of similarity, participants sorting results were combined and, in turn, submitted to the multidimen-
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Fig. 3. Multidimensional scaling solution of participants sorting responses of periphrastic causative verbs in Experiment 1 with associated 95% condence ellipses.
sional scaling program implemented in SYSTAT version 9 with Youngs S-STRESS scaling method. 2.2. Results and discussion The resulting MDS solutions depicted in Fig. 3 show a pattern of clustering as predicted by the force dynamic model.7 As predicted by the force dynamic model, participants sorts were well t by a 2-dimensional MDS solution. This was indicated, in part, by a very low stress value,8 .08, associated with a 2-dimensional solution, as well as by a high proportion of variance accounted for, R2 :97. Further support for a 2-dimensional solution over, for example, either a 1- or 3-dimension solution, was indicated by the scree test (see Steyvers, 2002). According to this test, the dimensionality of a MDS solution is determined by examining the stress values for solutions of several dimensionalities (e.g., 1-, 2-, 3-, and 4-dimension) and observing where, after a certain number of dimensions, the reduction of stress levels o. The stress for 1-, 2-, 3-, and 4- dimensions was .20, .08, .06, and .04, respectively. As these stress values indicate, there was a dramatic decrease in stress between 1
7 In Figs. 36, the units of distance specied along the x- and y-axes were determined internally by SYSTAT version 9s Youngs S-STRESS multidimensional scaling method. Thus, distances within this space are only meaningful relative to the other distances within the same space since their absolute magnitudes were assigned arbitrarily. 8 Stress is a measure of the deviation between the distances between items in a particular MDS solution and the distances between items as they were determined empirically or theoretically.
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and 2 dimensions, but afterwards very little reduction in stress, indicating that the data was t best by a 2-dimensional solution. As predicted by both the focal set and force dynamic models, participants sorted the verbs into three main groups: CAUSE-type verbs (cause, force, get, make, set, start, and stimulate), PREVENT-type verbs (block, hinder, hold, impede, keep, prevent, protect, restrain, save, and stop), and ENABLE-type verbs (allow, enable, help, leave, let, and permit). The surrounding 95% condence ellipses in Fig. 3 imply that the clusters dier from each other reliably. Given the relative completeness of our list of periphrastic causatives, the results from the MDS solution suggest that there are only three major subcategories of periphrastic causative verbs in the English language. Moreover, the three major subcategories map onto the three basic kinds of causal concepts postulated by both focal set and the force dynamic models. At issue now is the nature of the relationship among the clusters. According to focal set models, the three clusters should be arranged in a line with the concept of CAUSE in the middle (see Fig. 1). According to the force dynamic model, the clusters should be arranged roughly equally distant from one another. As shown in Fig. 3, the results mirror those predicted by the force dynamic model, not the focal set models. The observations were conrmed statistically by comparing the t between the two models and the observed data. To make this comparison, we rst maximized the t between the predicted and the observed data using the canonical rotations algorithm in Systat version 9.0. Canonical rotations is a general translation procedure that performs rotations, reections and uniform dilation transformations in order to minimize the dierence between two sets of coordinates. By using this procedure, we could eliminate dierences between the MDS solutions associated with the models and the observed data that were merely due to idiosyncratic factors associated with the overall positioning and sizing of the congurations within each of the MDS spaces. In our case, the MDS solution generated from the observed data (see Fig. 3) was rotated, reected and dilated as necessary to minimize the dierence between it and the MDS solutions predicted by focal set models (see Fig. 1) and the force dynamic model (see Fig. 2). We then calculated the Euclidean distance between each verbs location in the tted MDS space (based on the observed data) and its location in the MDS space associated with each of the types of models. As expected, the distances between the observed and force dynamic model MDS solutions (M :259, SD :159) were smaller than that between the observed and the focal set model MDS solutions (M :547, SD :237), t22 6:15, p < :001, indicating that the observed data was better predicted by the force dynamic than by focal set models. The results so far support the force dynamic model. However, one potential concern that could be raised relates to the kinds of example sentences used on the cards. The sentences included both generic (general or type-level) causal claims (e.g., Snowmelt causes rivers to ood) and non-generic, specic (singular or token-level) causal claims (e.g., Snowmelt caused the Colorado River to ood). In the literature discussing focal set models, the example sentences have typically been generic, that is, they have
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been about what is generally true across many events (Enc , 1991; Hitchcock, 1995). Since focal set models concern regularities across sets of events, it follows that generic sentences might provide the best evidence for this kind of model. Therefore, in order to provide the most favorable conditions for nding a pattern of results consistent with focal set models, we ran the experiment again, this time separating generic from specic sentences. If focal set models describe the meaning of periphrastic causative verbs for generic statements and not necessarily specic statements, the similarity predictions for focal set models should be more strongly reected by generic statements than by specic statements. However, if the semantics of CAUSE-related verbs are explained by the force dynamic model, there is no a priori reason why the pattern of similarity relationships should dier from those obtained in Experiment 1, that is, there should be no qualitative dierence in the pattern of results associated with generic vs. specic statements.
3. Experiment 2: Generic versus specic statements of causation In this experiment we examine whether the pattern of similarity relationships between CAUSE-, PREVENT-, and ENABLE-type verbs might depend on the use of either generic or specic causal claims. The verbs used were the same as those in Experiment 1. However, to compare between generic and specic statements, two new sets of example sentences were culled from the British National Corpus. One set exemplied each of the 23 verbs in generic statements while the other set exemplied each of these verbs in specic statements. The procedures were the same as in Experiment 1 except that participants sorted either generic sentences only or specic sentences only. If focal set models explain the generic meaning of the verb cause and related verbs, the pattern of similarity relationships among the three types of verbs should be better represented by generic statements than by specic statements. On the other hand, the force dynamic model predicts that there should be no eect of generic versus specic statements and that the results should be qualitatively the same as those found in Experiment 1. 3.1. Method 3.1.1. Participants The participants were 42 University of Memphis undergraduates who participated for course credit. 3.1.2. Materials Two sets of index cards were prepared. In both sets, the 23 verbs in (3a) were printed at the top of 400 600 index cards, and below them were printed two example sentences illustrating their use. In one set of cards, all of the example sentences were generic statements while in the other set, all of the example sentences were specic statements. The example sentences were taken, without modication,
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from the British National Corpus, and to a lesser extent, the Linguistic Data Consortiums Tipster Corpus and the Oxford English Dictionary II. The sentences were chosen on the basis of their conciseness, concreteness and uniqueness with respect to the other example sentences. In all cases, the sentences included nonsentient patients. The generic statement sentences are listed in the second table in Appendix B, while the specic statements sentences are listed in the third table in Appendix B. 3.1.3. Procedure The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. Participants were given a set of cards that were randomized dierently for each participant. Using these cards, participants wrote denitions of the verbs based on the two example sentences. Participants then sorted the verbs into groups on the basis of their semantic similarity. A multidimensional scaling analysis of the data was performed using Youngs SSTRESS scaling method. 3.1.4. Design A between-participant design was used with half of the participants sorting generic sentences and the remaining participants sorting specic sentences. Participants were randomly assigned to the generic and specic groups. 3.2. Results and discussion As shown in the right and left panels of Fig. 4, the resulting MDS solutions based on generic and specic example sentences provide further support for the force dynamic model. For both generic and specic sentences, participants sorts were well t by a 2-dimensional MDS solution. In the case of generic sentences, the stress values
Fig. 4. Multidimensional scaling solution of participants sorting responses of periphrastic causative verbs exemplied with generic statements (left-hand side) and specic statements (right-hand side) in Experiment 2.
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for 1-, 2-, 3-, and 4- dimensions were, .19, .09, .06, and .05, respectively. Thus, as in Experiment 1, there was a dramatic decrease in stress between 1 and 2 dimensions, but relatively little reduction in stress afterwards. This pattern, along with a very high proportion of variance accounted for, R2 :97, suggests that the results associated with generic sentences are best captured within a 2-dimensional solution, rather than either a 1- or 3-dimensional solution. With specic sentences, the stress values for 1-, 2-, 3-, and 4- dimensions were, .12, .08, .06, and .04, respectively. While not as dramatic as with the generic sentences, the pattern of stress values, along with a very high proportion of variance accounted for, R2 :97, is consistent with a 2-dimensional solution for specic statements as well. The relative modest shift from 1 to 2 dimensions in the case of specic statements most likely reects the relative closeness between CAUSE- and ENABLE-type verbs in the case of specic sentences (see below). In the case of both generics and specics, participants sorted the verbs into three main groups, CAUSE, PREVENT, and ENABLE-type verbs, just as in Experiment 1. As shown in Fig. 4, the relationships between the verb clusters matches the relationships predicted by the force dynamic model and not the focal set models. This support for the force dynamic model over focal set models held even for generic statements (in fact, especially for generic statements), that is, for the kinds of statements that we expected focal set models would be most apt since they concern probabilistic relationships. As in Experiment 1, we used canonical rotations to t the observed MDS solutions to the models as closely as possible. Then, we tested whether the models diered in their ability to predict the observed locations in the tted MDS space. As expected, the dierence between observed and predicted locations was smaller for the force dynamic model (M :219, SD :146) than for the focal set models (M :583, SD :227) for generic causal claims, t22 7:72, p < :001. The dierence was also smaller for the force dynamic model (M :356, SD :195) than for focal set models (M :567, SD :311) for specic causal claims, t22 5:64, p < :001. Hence, the force dynamic model provided a signicantly better t of the data than did the focal set models for both generic and specic statements. While the results based on generic and specic sentences support the force dynamic model, the results from the two kinds of sentences did dier in certain ways. Most notably, the clusters based on generic sentences are more equally distant from one another than those based on the specic sentences. As Fig. 4 shows, the CAUSE and ENABLE clusters based on the specic sentences are closer than those based on the generic sentences. Indeed, the t between the force dynamic model (which, assuming equal weightings, predicts equal distance between the clusters) and the observed MDS solutions was better for the generics than for the specics, t22 3:73, p < :01. We suspect this dierence may be due to a decrease in similarity between the verbs that imply the occurrence of a result (CAUSE- and ENABLE-type) as opposed to those that imply the non-occurrence of a result (PREVENT-type). With specics, the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a result is certain while with generics it is probabilistic. This means that the occurrence of a result is likely to weigh more heavily
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in sorting specic statements than in sorting generic statements, making CAUSEand ENABLE-type verbs more dissimilar from PREVENT-type verbs for specic statements than for generic statements. This decrease in similarity would lead to a relative increase in similarity between the CAUSE- and ENABLE-type verbs when all the clusters are t into the same MDS space. In sum, the nature of the dierence between the generic and specic causal claims is one that can be accounted for within the framework of the force dynamic model. The dierence found between generic and specic sentences also indicates that people considered the example sentences in deciding how to group the verbs. Had they simply ignored the sentences, the observed dierence would not have obtained. It appears, then, that the results tapped the meanings of periphrastic causatives verbs as they are used in the context of natural language. However, it must be acknowledged that periphrastic causative expressions involve more than the use of periphrastic causative verbs. In fact, sentences containing CAUSE- and ENABLE-type verbs almost always include the innitive form of a verb in the embedded clause, which is indicated by to (see 5a and 5b) while sentences containing PREVENT-type verbs always include the preposition from and a gerund (see 5c). (5) a. The roofs weight caused the oor to buckle. b. Diesel traction enabled the train to traverse the boiler shop road. c. A rim prevents food from sliding over the edge. The overt grammatical signals associated with CAUSE- and ENABLE-type verbs on the one hand and PREVENT-type verbs on the other raise the possibility that participants may have sorted the verbs according to such features of the surface structure rather than meaning alone. One way to address this concern is to examine the meanings of these verbs when they are used in single-clause sentences. Several of the verbs examined in Experiments 1 and 2 can appear with a nominal direct object rather than a clausal complement, as in (6). (6) a. Smoking causes cancer. b. Ascorbic acid in the juice prevents discoloration. When these verbs appear with only noun phrases as direct objects, the grammatical signals associated with the CAUSE- and ENABLE-type verbs in two-clause sentences are no longer present in the surface structure. We can be condent, then, that if the pattern of results from Experiments 1 and 2 are replicated in an experiment using single-clause sentences, the results obtained in those experiments were probably not due to surface features of the sentences but rather due to the meanings of the verbs. However, one tradeo to using single-clause sentences is that the number of verbs that can be examined is sharply reduced. Many of the verbs listed in (3) do not appear in single-clause sentences with causative meanings. For example, the verb get when used in a single-clause sentence, Barry got the tickets, indicates a change in possession, not that something or somebody was caused to do something, as in Jill got Barry to buy the tickets. Similar changes to non-causative meanings occur with the verbs hold, keep, leave, make, protect, save and set. The verb let, on the other hand, cannot be used in a single-clause sentence at all, apparently because it requires a clausal complement.
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4. Experiment 3: The meaning of causative verbs in single-clause sentences In Experiment 3 we examined whether the sorting behavior observed in Experiments 1 and 2 would replicate with the use of single-clause example sentences, in which the dierence between CAUSE-, PREVENT-, and ENABLE-type verbs is not overtly indicated in the surface structure of the sentence. The verbs were 14 of the 23 verbs used in Experiments 1 and 2. The most common reason why many of the original verbs were not used was because they no longer had a causative meaning when used in a single clause sentence. The procedures were the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. Participants were asked to sort cards containing a verb and two example sentences into groups according to their similarity in meaning. We predicted that even without overt indicators of the verbs class membership in the surface structure, the MDS solution would show the verbs in three main clusters, roughly equidistant from one another, as predicted by the force dynamic model. Such a result would support the assumption that the results obtained in Experiments 1 and 2 actually reected the underlying semantics of the periphrastic causative verbs. 4.1. Method 4.1.1. Participants The participants were 26 University of Memphis undergraduates who participated for course credit. 4.1.2. Materials The verbs were a 14 of the 23 verbs used in Experiments 1 and 2, specically, the verbs allow, block, cause, enable, force, help, hinder, impede, permit, prevent, restrain, start, stimulate, and stop. Each verb was printed at the top of a 4 in. 6 in. index card and below it were printed two example sentences illustrating its use. The example sentences were selected, without modication, from the BNC on the basis of their conciseness, concreteness and uniqueness with respect to the other example sentences. The example sentences used are listed in the fourth table in Appendix B. Unlike in Experiments 1 and 2, the sentences were not restricted to non-sentient patients. In most cases, the patients were not even explicitly mentioned. All of the sentences contained direct objects that referred to either an action or a condition. 4.1.3. Procedure The procedure was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. Each participant was given a randomized set of cards. Using these cards, participants rst wrote denitions of the verbs based on the two example sentences. Then, participants sorted the verbs into groups on the basis of their semantic similarity. A multidimensional scaling analysis of the data was performed using Youngs S-STRESS scaling method.
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4.2. Results and discussion As shown in Fig. 5, the resulting MDS solution provides further support for the force dynamic model. Participants sorts were well t by a 2-dimensional MDS solution. The stress values for 1-, 2-, 3-, and 4- dimensions were, .18, .05, .03, and .02, respectively. Thus, as in Experiments 1 and 2, there was a dramatic decrease in stress between 1 and 2 dimensions, but relatively little reduction in stress afterwards. This pattern, along with a very high proportion of variance accounted for, R2 :99, suggest that the results associated with single-clause sentences are better captured in a 2dimensional solution than either a 1- or 3-dimensional solution, just as predicted by the force dynamic model. As in Experiments 1 and 2, participants sorted the verbs into CAUSE-, PREVENT, and ENABLE-clusters of verbs. Importantly, the location of the groups within the MDS space is that predicted by the force dynamic model and not focal set models. The results suggest that the pattern of clustering found in Experiments 1 and 2 and the present experiment was likely due to the meaning of the periphrastic causative verbs and not due to the presence of associated grammatical indicators in the surface structure of the example sentences. These observations were conrmed statistically by using canonical rotations to rst t the observed MDS solution to the locations predicted by the force dynamic and focal set models. As expected, the dierence between observed and predicted locations was smaller for the force dynamic model (M :257, SD :168) than for the focal set models (M :597, SD :248), t22 3:79, p < :01. This signicant dierence indicates that the force dynamic model provided a better match to the data than did the focal set models.
Fig. 5. Multidimensional scaling solution of participants sorting responses of causative verbs in singleclause sentences.
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Table 3 Distances between the centers of the CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT clusters in Experiments 14 Exp. 1 CAUSEENABLE CAUSEPREVENT ENABLEPREVENT 1.26 1.78 1.9 Exp. 2: Generic 1.3 1.86 1.83 Exp. 2: Specic 1.01 2.01 1.64 Exp. 3 1.43 1.79 1.83 Exp. 4 1.21 1.78 1.87 Average distances 1.24 1.84 1.81
In sum, the results from Experiments 13 support the force dynamic model, but not the focal set models. This has been indicated not only by the relationship between the three main clusters of verbs, but also by the stress values that indicate the need for a 2-dimensional solution rather than a 1-dimensional solution, as well as by the high proportions of variance accounted for. It is interesting to note that, while the three main clusters of verbs in Experiments 13 have been roughly equidistant from each other, it appears that there was, in fact, a consistent asymmetry in the distances between the three clusters. The asymmetry is revealed by the values in Table 3,9 which shows the average distances between the positions of each of the clusters in Experiments 13, as well as in Experiment 4, to be described below. As shown in Table 3, the distances between the CAUSE and ENABLE clusters were consistently smaller than the distances between the CAUSE and PREVENT clusters and the PREVENT and ENABLE clusters. These results indicate that people viewed CAUSE and ENABLE as more closely related than the other possible pairings. This intuition is apparent in much of the scholarly work on causation, where discussion of the concept of ENABLE has focused almost exclusively on how this concept might be distinguished from the concept of CAUSE (for reviews, see Cheng & Novick, 1991; Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001). There has been little, if any, discussion contrasting ENABLE and PREVENT. If the concepts of CAUSE and ENABLE are viewed as slightly more similar to each other than either is to the concept of PREVENT, it follows that CAUSE and ENABLE verbs should be slightly more confusable than CAUSE and PREVENT or ENABLE and PREVENT verbs. As a consequence, we would expect that the verbs encoding CAUSE and ENABLE might be slightly less concentrated than the verbs encoding the concept of PREVENT. This prediction is supported by the MDS solutions in Experiments 13 (see Figs. 35). We suspect that this dierence in distances is due to the peoples weighing the occurrence of a result more heavily than the tendency of the patient for the result or the opposition between the aector and patient. In other words, people may treat occurrence of a result as more important than either tendency or opposition. As discussed in Experiment 2, greater weighting of the result (relative to the other dimensions) was the likely reason why the CAUSE and ENABLE clusters were more closely related in the MDS solutions based on sorts using specic (token-level) sentences than on sorts
The distances reported in Table 3 are based on the same units of measure as specied by the x and y-axes in Figs. 35. In turn, these units were determined internally by SYSTAT version 9s Youngs S-STRESS multidimensional scaling method.
9
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using generic (type-level) sentences: with specic sentences, occurrence or non-occurrence of the result is absolutely certain, while with generic sentences, it is only probabilistic, thus making commonalities along this dimension less certain. What the values in Table 3 indicate is that the apparent greater weighting of the results dimension occurred across all of the experiments, and especially in Experiment 2, where the sentences used were specic descriptions of causation. Importantly, this assumption of unequal weighting does not lend support to the focal set models. Strictly speaking, an unweighted version of the focal set account, like an unweighted version of the force dynamic model, predicts that the distance between CAUSE and ENABLE should be the same as the distance between CAUSE and PREVENT. Recall that focal set models predict that the concepts of ENABLE and PREVENT will reside on opposite sides of the CAUSE concept in an MDS solution. Thus, to account for the observed asymmetry, focal set models would need to assume unequal weighting as well, specically, that the occurrence of the eect is weighed more heavily than constancy. Importantly, even if this dimension were weighted more heavily, focal set models would still predict that the distance between PREVENT and ENABLE would necessarily be greater than the distance between CAUSE and PREVENT. But as shown in Table 3, the results from Experiments 13 provide no support for such a dierence. Moreover, while an asymmetry in distances does appear to exist, the relative magnitude of this asymmetry is not extreme: the three clusters can still be characterized as roughly equidistant, implying yet further evidence against focal set models. While the results have so far been fully consistent with the force dynamic model, they are also consistent with an alternative explanation. According to the force dynamic model, the three clusters are roughly equidistant from each other because the verbs in each cluster share one key component of meaning with the verbs in the remaining two clusters. Thus, the assumption is that people analyzed the concepts of CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT into their component meanings. Another, less interesting, possibility is that the three clusters were roughly equidistant because the sorting tasks used in Experiments 13 were insensitive to the internal structure of the concepts being sorted. Specically, participants could have sorted the verbs according to whether they encoded the concepts of CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT without having to consider any underlying components of meaning. Such a sorting strategy would have given rise to an MDS solution in which there were three roughly equidistant clusters of verbs, not because of equal similarity, but rather because the verbs in each cluster were perceived as completely unrelated. It would be as if participants had been asked to sort sh, owers, and fence posts. There are at least two reasons why we think that this alternative possibility is unlikely. First, as discussed above, the three clusters were not, in fact, perfectly equidistant: CAUSE and ENABLE verbs were viewed as closer to each other in meaning than PREVENT and CAUSE or PREVENT and ENABLE verbs. If the concepts had been treated as unanalyzed primitives, this relatively modest but consistent asymmetry would not have been reected in peoples sortings. Rather, the greater weighting of the results dimension suggests that people did sort the verbs according to their component meanings. Second, if participants did not perform a relatively
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ne-grained analysis of the verbs, there is no clear explanation for why they chose to organize their sorts around just these three concepts of CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT in the rst place. It is not as if a three-cluster solution was a foregone conclusion. An alternative analysis of these verbs oered by Jackendo (1990) suggests that there should have been four clusters: strong causation (e.g., cause, make), weak causation (e.g., enable, allow), strong prevention (e.g., block, prevent) and weak prevention (e.g., impede, hinder). Other linguistic analyses suggest still other possibilities (e.g., Pinker, 1989; Talmy, 1988; Verhagen & Kemmer, 1997). Thus, pretheoretically, other possible patterns could have been found. Without decomposition, there are no dimensions along which all of the verbs in the group can be evaluated, hence no dimensions along which the group as a whole might be partitioned. Moreover, without decomposition into the components hypothesized by the force dynamic model, the resulting groups surrounding these, and only these, three concepts are not easily explained. Nevertheless, while we think it is unlikely that people simply sorted the verbs around the unanalyzed conceptual primitives, the possibility cannot fully dismissed. Fortunately, however, there are ways in which the potential problem can be addressed, namely by having people make the kinds of similarity distinctions that they might not otherwise make if left to their own devices. One way participants could be encouraged to think about the concepts at a ner level of analysis would be to have them explicitly evaluate the degree to which two concepts were similar to a third concept. For example, people could be instructed to decide whether a particular ENABLE or PREVENT verb was more similar to a particular CAUSE verb. To do this, participants would be encouraged to analyze ENABLE and PREVENT verbs as more than simply a non-CAUSE verb. Rather, they might be prompted to analyze three concepts into their component parts. This logic was used in the design of the next experiment. Participants were given a triad task in which they were asked to select which one of two verbs was most similar to a standard. Of special interest was how people would respond in the case of P-CE triads, that is, triads in which the standard is a PREVENT verb (e.g., impede), one of the alternatives is a CAUSE verb (e.g., force), and the remaining alternative is an ENABLE verb (e.g., allow). According to focal set models, PREVENT and CAUSE verbs should be more similar to each other than PREVENT and ENABLE verbs; hence, people should choose the PREVENT option. In contrast, according to the force dynamic model, PREVENT and ENABLE verbs each share one feature in common with CAUSE verbs; hence, people should be as likely to choose the PREVENT verb as the ENABLE verb. For the remaining triads, the two types of models make the same predictions. In particular, given the asymmetry described above, i.e., that participants judged CAUSE and ENABLE verbs to be more similar to each other than to PREVENT verbs, we expected that on C-EP trials, people would tend to choose the ENABLE verb and on E-CP trials, people would tend to choose the CAUSE verb. For triads in which one of the alternatives is of the same category as the standard (i.e., C-CE, CCP, P-PC, P-PE, E-EC, and E-EP), both models predict that people will strongly tend to choose the alternative that is in the same category. Finally, for triads in
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which the two alternatives were of the same category (i.e., C-CC, C-EE, C-PP, E-CC, E-EE, E-PP, P-CC, P-EE, and P-PP), no predictions were made since neither model addresses within-category distinctions.
5. Experiment 4: The meaning of periphrastic causative verbs using a triad task In Experiment 4, participants were given triads of periphrastic causative verbs and asked to select which one out of two verbs was most similar to a standard. Because the number of triads associated with a particular set of verbs increases dramatically as the number of verbs increases, the number of verbs used was limited to only 12 of the 14 verbs used in Experiment 3. The two verbs dropped from this experiment (restrain and stop) were both PREVENT verbs so that the total number of verbs in each category would be the same. As in previous experiments, the verbs were presented along with two example sentences taken from naturally occurring text. The example sentences used were the generic sentences used in Experiment 2. We used these sentences instead of those used in Experiment 3 because the sentences in Experiment 2 were more uniform than those used in Experiment 3 in terms of the kinds of situations they referred to, namely situations involving physical causation. The total number of sets of three verbs, order irrelevant, that can be formed from 12 verbs is 440. Because each verb in a set can serve as the standard, the total number of triads of verbs that could be formed is 1320. Because no one participant could make this many decisions within a reasonable amount of time and with care, the total number of possible triads was divided into 66 mutually exclusive sets of 20 triads. We kept the number of triads rated by participants low so that participants could devote a signicant amount of time to each and every decision. Because participants judged all possible triads that could be formed from 12 verbs, it was not only possible to examine choices on particular kinds of triads, but also possible to form a matrix of similarity ratings for each pair of verbs. Thus, the triad ratings could be used to yield a similarity matrix that could be analyzed with multidimensional scaling analysis, which could then be compared to the results from Experiments 13. 5.1. Method 5.1.1. Participants The participants were 66 University of Memphis undergraduates who participated for course credit. 5.1.2. Materials The verbs were 12 of the 14 verbs used in Experiment 3, specically, the CAUSE verbs cause, force, start and stimulate, ENABLE verbs allow, enable, help and permit, and PREVENT verbs block, hinder, impede, and prevent. Each verb was presented along with two example sentences, specically, the generic sentences from Experiment 2 (see the second table in Appendix B).
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5.1.3. Procedure The experiment was run via computer. The experiment began with instructions to the participant. Participants were told that they would see three verbs and associated sentences arranged in a triangular formation. One of the verbs, along with two example sentences, would be located at the top of the screen and two verbs, along with two sets of examples sentences, would be at the bottom of the screen. Participants were told that their task was to say which of the two verbs at the bottom of the screen was most similar to the verb at the top. Participants were then given an example triad in which the standard was the verb jump and the two choices were the verbs hop and break. Participants were told that many people would say that the verb hop was more similar to the verb jump than break was to jump. Participants were told to indicate their choice by pressing the LEFT or RIGHT arrow key depending on whether their choice was found on the left or right side of the screen. Finally, participants were told that they should read the example sentences carefully so that they would know which particular sense of the verbs they should consider when making their similarity judgments. Each participant made similarity judgments on 20 triads of verbs. Each set of 20 triads was one of 66 sets based on the random selection of triads, without replacement, from a total of 1320 triads. Each of the 1320 triads was viewed once by a single participant. Across the 1320 triads, each verb was paired with each other verb 20 times in the context of each of the remaining verbs. For example, the pair cause and prevent appeared with each of the ten remaining verbs twice: in half of the triads, cause was the standard and prevent was the alternative and in the rest, the reverse was true. It was possible, then, to calculate inter-item similarities between every possible pair of verbs by counting the pairs that were composed of the standard and the alternative that people selected as being more similar to the standard. On the basis of these derived similarity ratings, it was possible to form a similarity matrix that could be analyzed in terms of multidimensional scaling, as was done in Experiments 13. 5.2. Results and discussion The results provided converging evidence in support of the force dynamic model and further evidence against focal set models. The frequencies and percentages for each verb-type chosen for the each type of triad are shown in Table 4.10 The probabilities reported in Table 4 indicate the likelihood that the outcome was the result of random responding assuming a binomial distribution. The three triads at the top of Table 4 (C-EP, E-CP, and P-CE) were the ones in which verbs from all three categories were compared. In all triads, unless otherwise noted, the likelihood of outcome was less than one in one million, assuming a binomial distribution. Given that people appeared to weigh the occurrence of the result/ eect more heavily than the other semantic dimensions, we predicted that, in the
10 Note, the probabilities for the triads E-EP, P-CP, and P-EP reported in Table 4 are conservative estimates since exact values were too small to be calculated.
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Table 4 Frequencies and percentages for CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT alternatives for dierent standards along with probability of chance responding, pchance :5, assuming a binomial distribution115 Triad Standard Alternatives Frequency Percentage (%) 73 27 75 25 52 48 74 26 79 21 29 71 91 9 11 89 11 89 N Probability of outcome if responding were random p < :0000002 p < :00000007 p > :98 p < :000002 p < :000000004 p < :00003 p < :000000001 p < :000000001 p < :000000001
C-EP E-CP P-CE C-CE C-CP E-CE E-EP P-CP P-EP
CAUSE ENABLE PREVENT CAUSE CAUSE ENABLE ENABLE PREVENT PREVENT
ENABLE PREVENT CAUSE PREVENT CAUSE ENABLE CAUSE ENABLE CAUSE PREVENT CAUSE ENABLE ENABLE PREVENT CAUSE PREVENT ENABLE PREVENT
93 35 96 32 67 61 71 25 76 20 28 68 87 9 11 85 11 85
128 128 128 96 96 96 96 96 96
C-EP triads, people would tend to chose ENABLE over PREVENT verbs, as indeed they did. We also predicted that, in the E-CP triads, participants would tend to choose CAUSE over PREVENT verbs, which was also conrmed. As discussed above, the fact that CAUSE and ENABLE verbs are treated as more similar to each other than the other possible pairs of concepts doesnt count as evidence against either type of model since both types can only explain this asymmetry by assuming an unequal weighting of the underlying dimensions. Of special interest, then, was how people would respond in the case of the P-CE triads. Contrary to the predictions of the focal set models, there was no evidence that people viewed PREVENT verbs as more similar to CAUSE verbs than to ENABLE verbs. Instead, with a PREVENT verb as a standard, people chose CAUSE and ENABLE verbs equally (Binomial, p > :98). The fact that there was no dierence between the CAUSE and ENABLE options in this type of triad cannot be attributed to participants inability to distinguish between the two categories. In triads in which one of the alternatives was the same category as the standard, people were quite capable of selecting the verb from the same category: in the C-CE triads (Binomial, p < 2 in 1 million) and in E-CE triads (Binomial, p < 3 in 100,000). It is interesting to note that, according to the focal set models, people should have been slightly less consistent in matching PREVENT verbs in P-CP triads than in P-EP triads since PREVENT and CAUSE verbs are hypothesized to be more similar, and thus more confusable, than PREVENT and ENABLE verbs. The frequencies and associated percentages shown in Table 4 provide no support for such a prediction.
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Fig. 6. Multidimensional scaling solution of participants sorting responses of periphrastic causative verbs based on similarity judgments from a triad task.
Rather, participants matched PREVENT verbs just as readily in P-EP triads as they did in P-CP triads, as predicted by the force dynamic model (see Table 4). Other results were as expected: people were quite able to match CAUSE verbs in C-CP triads, and ENABLE verbs in E-EP triads. Based on data from all possible triads that could be formed from the 12 verbs, we were able to calculate a similarity rating for all 66 possible pairings of verbs, arrange these pairs into a similarity matrix, and then analyze the ratings in terms of multidimensional scaling. As shown in Fig. 6, the resulting MDS solution provides further support for the force dynamic model and evidence against focal set models. Participants sorts were well t by a 2-dimensional MDS solution. The stress values for 1-, 2-, 3-, and 4- dimensions were, .20, .08, .06, and .03, respectively. Thus, as in Experiments 13, there was a dramatic decrease in stress between 1 and 2 dimensions, but relatively little reduction in stress afterwards. This pattern, along with a very high proportion of variance accounted for, R2 :97, suggest that the results of the triad task are better captured in a 2-dimensional solution than either a 1- or 3-dimensional solution, just as predicted by the force dynamic model. As shown in Fig. 6, participants similarity judgments were implicitly organized around the concepts of CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT.11 Moreover, the implicit
11
The only verb that was not associated with one of the verb clusters was the verb stimulate, which was located somewhere in the middle of the CAUSE and ENABLE verb clusters. We have no clear explanation for this exception other than the fact that the verb stimulate may be slightly more neutral with respect the tendency of the patient than the other verbs in the CAUSE and ENABLE verb clusters. In addition, because we used fewer verbs in this experiment, the more idiosyncratic aspects of meaning in any particular verb may have played a more prominent role in the way the verbs were compared and, eventually, organized.
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organization of these three concepts with respect to each other was as predicted by the force dynamic model: roughly equidistant. Indeed, as in Experiments 13, the dierence between the observed and predicted locations of these concepts, after canonical rotations, was smaller in the case of the force dynamic model (M :302, SD :252) than in the case of focal set models (M :627, SD :161), t11 3:93, p < :01. As discussed above, in Experiments 13, it is possible that peoples sorts could have been based on unanalyzed notions of CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT. In the current experiment, participants were asked to make similarity judgments in which they had to compare and contrast three verbs encoding three dierent concepts (i.e., in the C-EP, E-CP, and P-CE triads). To evaluate these kinds of triads, people could not simply rely on unanalyzed concepts. Rather, it was necessary to compare the ways in which the concepts of CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT were similar and dierent: that is, it was necessary to decompose these concepts into their underlying components of meaning. It is reassuring, then, that when participants made these kinds of similarity judgmentspresumably on the basis of some sort of decompositionthe implicit structure of their judgments, as revealed by multidimensional scaling, mirrored that found in Experiments 13, in which people were asked to simply sort the verbs. The results from the current experiment suggests that participants in Experiment 1-3 did decompose the concepts and that simple sorting procedures can be used to examine the internal structure of verbs. In sum, the results from Experiments 14 support the force dynamic model, but not the focal set models. However, up to this point, the evidence supporting the force dynamic model has only been structural in nature: that is, the pattern of results has been consistent with a semantic system in which there are three dimensions with a particular correlational structure. What the results have not addressed is the hypothesized semantic content of these dimensions, that is, the particular criteria specied by the models. In order to investigate the semantic components associated with our causal concepts, we could ask participants to evaluate some of the sentences used in the previous experiments with respect to the dimensions specied by the two models. According to the force dynamic model, sentences containing ENABLE and PREVENT verbs should be evaluated as implying a patient tendency for the result more often than sentences containing CAUSE verbs; sentences containing CAUSE and PREVENT verbs should be evaluated as implying aector-patient opposition more often than sentences containing ENABLE verbs; and sentences containing CAUSE and ENABLE verbs should be evaluated as implying the occurrence of a result more often than sentences containing PREVENT verbs. According to focal set models, sentences containing CAUSE and ENABLE verbs should be evaluated as implying positive covariation more often than sentences containing PREVENT-type verbs; and sentences containing ENABLE-type verbs should be evaluated as implying aector constancy more often than sentences containing CAUSE and PREVENT verbs. These predictions were tested in the next experiment.
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6. Experiment 5: Rating sentences with respect to the dimensions postulated by the two models In this experiment, participants evaluated the generic sentences used in Experiment 2 with respect to the semantic dimensions specied by the two models. Six dierent evaluations were performed by six separate groups of participants. Three of the evaluations focused on the three dimensions specied by the force dynamic model, specically, the patients tendency for the result, the presence of opposition between the aector and patient, and the occurrence of a result. The remaining three evaluations focused on the dimensions specied by focal set models. One evaluation was used to examine the presence of positive covariation between the aector and the result and two evaluations were conducted to examine the constancy of the aector. The dimensions were evaluated by asking participants whether a particular value on each of the dimensions held for each of the sentences. We used two dierent questions to examine the constancy of the aector because each type of question had limitations. In one type of question we asked participants whether the aector was always present when the result occurred, e.g., Yes or No: When a match lights a candle, is oxygen always present? The word always seemed consistent with that idea that enabling conditions are causal factors that are constantly present in the current focal set. However, it is also the case that the word always could invoke the universal set of events rather than the subset of events currently available in the focal set. Moreover, the word always could be interpreted as a necessary condition. Since we know that truly necessary conditions are rare, the question might not elicit the relevant set of events necessary to determine constancy. Given these concerns, we asked an another group of participants to evaluate whether the aector was usually present when the result occurred, e.g., Yes or No: When a match lights a candle, is oxygen usually present? We believed the word usually would be more likely to invoke participants current focal sets and not imply that the aector was a necessary condition. However, the word usually is consistent with the possible occurrence of the eect in the absence of the cause, P ej : c, in contrast with the way in which enabling conditions are dened in focal set models (e.g., Cheng, 1997; Cheng & Novick, 1991). Because there were potential advantages and disadvantages to both questions, we decided to use both. 6.1. Method 6.1.1. Participants The participants were 96 University of Memphis undergraduates. 6.1.2. Materials We used the same 46 generic sentences used in Experiment 2 (see the second table in Appendix B) to construct six sets of yes-no questions. Three sets of
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questions focused on the dimensions specied by the force dynamic model and three sets focused on the dimensions specied by focal set models. The rst set of questions concerned whether the patient had a natural tendency to carry out or bring about the stated result. For each of the 48 sentences, we asked whether the patient had a natural tendency to undergo the result on its own, e.g., Yes or No: Does the skin have a natural tendency to retain body heat on its own? The second set of questions concerned the presence of opposition between the aector and patient. We asked, for each of the 48 sentences, whether the aector opposed the natural tendency of the patient, e.g., Yes or No: Does thermal underwear oppose the natural tendency of the skin? The third set of questions concerned the occurrence of a result. These questions asked whether the result occurred under the conditions specied by the sentence, e.g., Yes or No: When thermal underwear enables the skin to retain body heat, does the skin retain body heat? The fourth set of questions concerned whether the result covaried positively with the aector. These questions asked, for each sentence, whether the likelihood of the result in the presence of the aector was greater than the likelihood of the result in the absence of the aector, e.g., Yes or No: Is it more likely that the skin will retain body heat when thermal underwear is present than when it is absent? The fth and sixth sets of questions focused on the constancy of the aector. In one set of these sets we asked whether the aector was always present when the result occurred, e.g., Yes or No: When the skin retains body heat, is thermal underwear always present? In the remaining set of questions we asked whether the aector was usually present when the result occurred, e.g., Yes or No: When the skin retains body heat, is thermal underwear usually present? In all cases, the questions were worded as closely as possible to the way they were worded in the example sentences. In addition, the wording within each set of questions was kept as consistent as possible. 6.1.3. Procedure Participants were run on windows-based computers in sound-attenuating carrels. Participants were told that they would see a series of sentences and a yes-no question for each sentence. Sentences appeared near the top of the screen (e.g., The ideal thermal underwear enables the skin to retain body heat). Two lines below each sentence was the phrase According to the sentence above. . . One line below this phrase was a yes-no question beginning with the phrase Yes or No (e.g., Yes or No: Does the ideal thermal underwear enable the skin to retain body heat?). Two lines below each question was the phrase Yes or No. The cursor was initially positioned underneath the word or. Participants chose Yes or No by pressing either the LEFT or RIGHT arrow key, respectively. When participants pressed the arrow keys, the cursor moved in the corresponding direction and either the word Yes or No became highlighted. Participants could freely switch between the Yes and No options. To record an answer and proceed to the next question, participants were instructed to press the ENTER key. For each of the six sets of questions described above, there were sixteen participants. In other words, each participant responded to one type of question for each of 48 sentences.
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6.1.4. Design A single factor, one-way repeated measures design was used with participants receiving all levels of the verb-type (CAUSE, PREVENT, and ENABLE). Order of presentation was randomized separately for each participant. 6.2. Results and discussion Participants responses provided further support for the force dynamic model and only limited support for focal set models. As predicted by the force dynamic model, participants rated sentences containing PREVENT and ENABLE verbs as higher in patient tendency than sentences containing CAUSE verbs (see top left panel of Fig. 7). Also as predicted by the force dynamic model, participants rated sentences containing CAUSE and PREVENT verbs as higher in aector-patient opposition than sentences containing ENABLE verbs (see top right panel of Fig. 7). Finally, as predicted by the force dynamic model, participants rated sentences containing CAUSE and ENABLE verbs as higher in the occurrence of the result than sentences containing PREVENT verbs (see bottom panel of Fig. 7). According to focal set models, sentences containing CAUSE and ENABLE verbs should be evaluated as implying positive covariation more often than sentences
Fig. 7. Mean proportion of yes responses to questions concerning dimensions specied by the force dynamic model, specically, the tendency of the patient for the result (top left panel), aector-patient opposition (top right panel) and the occurrence of a result (bottom panel) for CAUSE-, PREVENT-, and ENABLE-type verbs with error bars indicating standard errors of the mean.
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containing PREVENT verbs. This prediction was conrmed, as shown in the left panel of Fig. 8. Importantly, though, this pattern of results is highly similar to that associated with the result dimension of the force dynamic model, so this result is not so surprising. The other prediction of focal set models is that sentences containing ENABLE verbs should be evaluated as implying the constant presence of the aector more often than sentences containing CAUSE or PREVENT verbs. As shown in Fig. 8, this prediction was not supported either when participants were asked whether the aector was always present (right panel) or usually present (bottom panel). The results associated with the force dynamic model were supported by oneway repeated-measures ANOVAs that indicated overall eects of verb type across both participants (p) and items (i) for patient tendency, Fp 2; 30 108:47, p < :001, Fi 2; 43 37:53, p < :001, aector-patient opposition, Fp 2; 30 33:95, p < :001, Fi 2; 43 7:35, p < :01, and occurrence of a result, Fp 2; 30 103:35, p < :001, Fi 2; 43 128:75, p < :001. Planned comparisons of participants patient tendency evaluations conrmed that the proportion of yes responses for CAUSE sentences (M :17, SD :125) was lower than for PREVENT sentences (M :76, SD :123), tp 15 12:13, p < :001, ti 32 9:50, p < :001, and ENABLE sentences (M :50, SD :110), tp 15 8:07,
Fig. 8. Mean proportion of yes responses to questions concerning dimensions specied by focal set models, specically, whether the result covaried positively with presence of the aector (left panel) and the constancy of the aector (right panel) for CAUSE-, PREVENT-, and ENABLE-type verbs with error bars indicating standard errors of the mean.
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p < :001, ti 24 4:42, p < :001. Planned comparisons of participants aector-patient opposition evaluations indicated that the proportion of yes responses for ENABLE sentences (M :45, SD :096) was lower than for CAUSE sentences (M :69, SD :127), tp 15 5:62, p < :001, ti 24 2:30, p < :05, and PREVENT sentences (M :77, SD :130), tp 15 7:26, p < :001, ti 30 4:07, p < :001. Finally, planned comparisons of participants occurrence of result evaluations conrmed that the proportion of yes responses for PREVENT sentences (M :12, SD :144) was lower than for CAUSE sentences (M :77, SD :134), tp 15 12:71, p < :001, ti 32 13:14, p < :05, and ENABLE sentences (M :77, SD :181), tp 15 10:67, p < :001, ti 30 18:03, p < :001. One-way repeated-measures ANOVAS indicated overall eects for the two dimensions associated with focal set models. Specically, these analyses indicated effects of verb type for the presence of positive covariation, Fp 2; 30 79:50, p < :001, Fi 2; 43 47:91, p < :001, and patient constancy for questions using the word always across participants, Fp 2; 30 6:13, p < :01, but not across items, Fi 2; 43 1:67, p :20. For questions using the word usually, there were no signicant overall eects across either participants, Fp 2; 30 1:72, p :198, or items, Fi 2; 43 :584, p :562. Planned comparisons of participants positive covariation evaluations indicated that the proportion of yes responses for PREVENT sentences (M :18, SD :157) was lower than for CAUSE sentences (M :77, SD :142), tp 15 9:60, p < :001, ti 32 11:79, p < :05, and ENABLE sentences (M :70, SD :118), tp 15 10:44, p < :001, ti 30 7:14, p < :001. Planned comparisons of participants constancy evaluations using the word always indicated that the proportion of yes responses for ENABLE sentences (M :47, SD :215) was not higher than for CAUSE, tp 15 1:92, ns, ti 24 1:15, ns, and PREVENT sentences, tp 15 1:35, ns, ti 30 :612, ns. Similarly, participants constancy evaluations using the word usually indicated that the proportion of yes responses for ENABLE sentences (M :59, SD :169) was not higher than for CAUSE (M :67, SD :200), tp 15 1:53, ns, ti 24 :849, ns, and PREVENT sentences (M :59, SD :180), tp 15 :003, ns, ti 30 :001, ns, It is interesting to note that while participants evaluated PREVENT and ENABLE sentences as implying patient tendency more often than CAUSE sentences, they also evaluated PREVENT sentences as implying patient tendency more often than ENABLE sentences, tp 15 9:22, p < :001, ti 30 3:35, p < :01. On the one hand, this dierence between PREVENT and ENABLE sentences could be due to idiosyncratic dierences between the two sets of sentences that were evaluated. However, we suspect that the dierence may reect an important property of the ENABLE verbs. As noted earlier, our ENABLE sentences were based on the verbs allow, enable, help, leave, let, and permit. According to the force dynamic model, these verbs encode interactions in which the aector and the patient do not oppose one another, and we consider the absence of opposition to be part of the core meaning of these verbs. However, we assume that dierences between the verbs in a category are based on elaborations of their core meaning. One such elaboration is that some of these verbs seem to imply a pre-existing impediment that opposes the tendency of the patient prior to the aectors impingement. This pre-existing opposition may explain, then,
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why people tended to rate the ENABLE sentences as somewhat lower in patient tendency for the result than PREVENT sentences. For example, consider the sentences in (7). (7) a. Jerry helped Bob nish his homework. b. Jerry enabled Bob to nish his homework. The sentences above both imply that Bob was at least trying to nish his homework on his own. Importantly, though, (7a) does not exclude the possibility that Bob could have nished his work without Jerrys help. However, for the other ENABLE verbs, the role played by the aector is necessary for the result to occur. That is, statements using the verbs allow, enable, let, leave, and permit strongly imply that the result could not have occurred without the aectors intervention. For instance, in (7b), it is implied that Bob was facing some kind of diculty, and he needed Jerrys intervention to complete his homework. Importantly, this additional component of meaningthe existence of a pre-existing impediment (if only the inability to do it himeself) would not be part of the core meaning of the ENABLE verbs because it involves a distinction that only seems relevant within the category of ENABLE verbs but not for distinguishing ENABLE from the other two categories of causal verbs.
7. General discussion The results of the experiments described in this paper all provide support for the force dynamic model. In Experiment 1, participants sorted causal verbs, presented in the context of naturally occurring sentences, into the three major categories predicted by the model. These categories, when submitted to an MDS program, formed three roughly equidistant clusters, reecting the fact that each of the three causal categories shares one feature with each other category. In the Experiment 2, sorting patterns of generic and specic statements of causation were examined to see whether generic sentences might provide more support for focal set models. They did not: MDS analyses of participants sorts of both types of statements resulted in roughly three equidistant groups. Experiment 3 showed that the causative meanings of these verbs remained the same in their transitive uses, suggesting that it was the meaning associated with the verbs and not with any surface syntactic features that guided participants sorts in the rst two experiments. In Experiment 4, a triad task was used to encourage a ner-grained analysis of the verbs; the pattern of results remained the same. Finally, in Experiment 5, participants evaluated statements with respect to the components of meaning proposed by both the force dynamic model and focal set models. Participants responses provided support for the dimensions proposed by the force dynamic model but not focal set models. One aspect of the experiments that makes the results particularly strong is that they are based on 120 dierent causal claims taken from naturally occurring text. In most studies, causal scenarios are constructed by the researcher and their number is far fewer. The breadth and number of scenarios examined in our studies provides some assurance of the generality of the results.
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As discussed in the introduction, there are multiple reasons for believing that the causal concepts used in causal reasoning should be the same as those underlying causal expressions. One implication of this assumption is that models of causation focusing on psychological issues should be compatible with how the causal concepts are reected in word meanings. However, turning this reasoning around, another implication of the assumption is that models of causation focusing on word meaning e.g., the force dynamic modelshould be compatible with causal concepts as they are reected in tasks of non-linguistic causal reasoning. In the current context, we might ask, is the force dynamic model consistent with the causal concepts that emerge from the processes of causal selection, inference or induction? We believe it is. However, the force dynamic model does not provide nearly as detailed an account of these phenomena as the focal set models have been able to do. At this stage, the force dynamic model is primarily a theory of causal meaning. However, we believe that it suggests several novel ways in which certain psychological phenomena might be explained and places where the insights of various models might be brought together, as we discuss below. 7.1. The problem of causal selection According to Hume (1739/1978), causes are sucient conditions for their eects. Mill (1872/1973), however, recognized a problem in this assertion, specically, that it is rare, if ever, that a particular consequent necessarily follows from a single antecedent. For example, while it might be said that a wave caused the boat to capsize, a wave is not a necessary condition for capsizing. Rather, a particular consequent follows from the sum of several antecedents. For example, a capsizing might follow from the occurrence of a wave in conjunction with the boats weight and orientation with respect to the wave. This intuition is captured in Mackies (1965) theory of INUS conditions. As noted above, a particular factor is an INUS condition for some eect if it is an insucient but necessary part of a set of factors that are unnecessary but sucient for the eect. Thinking of antecedents in terms of a collection of factors allows us to capture at least part of the intuition that causes necessitate the occurrence of their eects (Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001; Harr e & Madden, 1975; Kant, 1781/1934). The cost, however, is the problem of causal selection. While it is true that a particular consequent follows from a collection of conditions, when talking about a particular consequent, we typically designate only one of these conditions as the cause. In the example above, we may designate the wave as the cause of the capsizing, rather than the boats weight or orientation. Factors such as the boats weight and orientation are characterized as mere conditions or enabling conditions (hereafter, enabling conditions). As discussed earlier, the criteria for distinguishing causes from mere or enabling conditions have been dicult to specify (Cheng & Novick, 1991; Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001; Hesslow, 1988). The distinction between causes and enabling conditions has bedeviled not only necessary-and-sucient and probabilistic approaches, but also counterfactual approaches to causation (Hart & Honor e, 1985; Lombard, 1990). According to a counterfactual analysis of causation, an event c is a cause of an event e if and only if it is
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the case that if c had not occurred, e would not have occurred (see also Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Lewis, 1973; Mackie, 1974; Mandel & Lehman, 1996; Spellman & Mandel, 1999; Wells & Gavanski, 1989). For example, according to a counterfactual approach to causation, it is possible to say a wave caused the boat to capsize because if the wave had not occurred, the capsizing would not have occurred. One of the classic problems for a counterfactual analysis of causation (in addition to the problems of transitivity and overdetermination) is that the counterfactual criterion is too inclusive. For example, it predicts birth causes death, given the truthfulness of the counterfactual if birth did not occur, death would not occur and that My pouring the coee caused him to drink it, given the truthfulness of the counterfactual If I had not poured the coee, he would not have drunk it. Frequently, a counterfactual approach conates enabling conditions with causes. For example, it predicts, orientation causes capsizing given the acceptability of the statement if the boats orientation had been dierent, the boat would not have capsized. But as we noted earlier, orientation is best thought of as an enabling condition for capsizing. Indeed, as reviewed in Spellman and Mandel (1999), when people are asked to think counterfactually about how a bad result to a story might have been undone, the part of the story they change is not always the part considered by another group of participants to be the cause (Mandel & Lehman, 1996). Rather, the parts that people often change are best classied as enabling conditions. Lombard (1990) suggests that the counterfactual analysis of causation might be saved if enabling conditions were ltered out from consideration prior to application of the counterfactual test. However, given such a lter, its not clear what work would be left for a counterfactual test to perform: the lter itself would constitute a theory of causation. Several general hypotheses have been proposed for distinguishing a cause from an enabling condition. One approach explains the distinction in terms of normality: a cause is a causal factor that is unusual, abnormal, or unlikely, while an enabling condition is a causal factor that is regarded as a condition that is normal to the background context (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Hart & Honor e, 1985; Hilton & Slugoski, 1986; Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Mackie, 1974; Turnbull & Slugoski, 1988). As noted by Cheng and Novick (1991), one problem for the normality criterion is that it argues against the existence of prevalent causes. While pedantic, we can nevertheless say, Gravity causes things to fall, even though gravity is a normal condition. A second approach to distinguishing causes from enabling conditions is in terms of the conversational principle of being informative (e.g., Hilton, 1990; Mill, 1872/ 1973; Turnbull & Slugoski, 1988). According to this approach, an enabling condition is a causal factor that is already known to an inquirer (e.g., a trains movement prior to a train crash) while a cause is a causal factor that is not already known to an inquirer (e.g., a bent rail). One problem with the informativity criterion is that it predicts that the more we learn more about a causal factor, the less causal it should become. However, as shown in Cheng and Novick (1991), while informativity plays a role in what people are likely to tell a na ve inquirer, it doesnt appear to aect judgments of causality (see also Hart & Honor e (1985)). For example, increased knowledge about global warming doesnt reduce the strength of the statement Global warming is causing the icecaps to meltif anything, it strengthens it.
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Another approach to distinguishing causes from enabling conditions is oered by Cheng and Novick (1991, 1992). As discussed in the introduction of this paper, on their account, an enabling condition is a causal factor that is constantly present in one focal set of events, but covaries positively with the eect in another focal set. A problem with this account is that, like the normality criterion, it argues against the existence of certain kinds of prevalent causes. Gravity, for example, can be viewed as a cause even though it is likely to be constantly present in at least one of the reasoners focal set of events. The acceptability of many kinds of prevalent causes indicates that the constancy criterion is not sucient. Studies reported in White (2000) and Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird (2001) do not uphold the constancy criterion. In both sets of studies, people identied non-constant causal factors as enabling conditions. The results reported in this paper also indicate that people do not dierentiate ENABLE claims from either CAUSE or PREVENT claims on the basis of constancy (Experiment 4). Given the success of the force dynamic model in predicting the meaning of ENABLE-type verbs, we might ask whether the model suggests a viable account of what it means to be an enabling condition. We think it does. In most discussions, the dierence between causers and enabling conditions has been explained in terms of various characteristics of the aector (e.g., whether it is constant, normal, or known to the inquirer) with respect to the same eect. In the force dynamic model, the patient plays as large a role as the aector in distinguishing causers and enablers. Consider a scenario in which a train crashes because of a bent rail, as discussed in Hart and Honor e (1985). Hart and Honor e suggest that most people would identify the bent rail as the cause of the crash and the trains weight and movement as enabling conditions. According to the force dynamic model, the bent rail causes the train to crash by virtue of the fact that it opposes and successfully overcomes the trains tendency to move in a straight line on the rails (and not crash). What makes the trains weight and movement enabling conditions is that they enable the cause to produce its eect. Thus, what is enabled is not the train, but rather the bent rail to cause the crash. If the train had no weight, it wouldnt rest upon the tracks, and if it didnt rest upon the tracks, a bent rail could not cause the crash. Similarly, if the train were not moving, the bent rail could not oppose the trains tendency. As argued by Lombard (1990), whereas the cause is conceptualized in terms of what it does to the patient, an enabling condition is conceptualized in terms of its relationship to the cause, not the patient (see also White, 2000). 7.2. The model theory and causal inference Yet another account of the dierence between causes and enabling conditions has recently been proposed by Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird (2001). The authors posit six dierent kinds of causal relations: A causes B, A prevents B, A allows B, and A allows not-B, and two stronger relations of causation and prevention.12 The mean-
12 Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird prefer to use the verb allow instead of the verb enable because they suggest that the verb allow is more neutral with respect to intentionality than is the verb enable.
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Table 5 Possible and impossible co-occurrences associated with the concepts CAUSE, ALLOW, and PREVENT A CAUSE PREVENT ALLOW Y N Y B :A Possible co-occurrences B A :B Y Y N N Y Y :A Y Y Y :B
Note. Y=Possible; N=Not possible.
ings of the six causal relations are dierentiated from each other in terms of the set of possible co-occurrences each causal relation is compatible with. The set of possible co-occurrences associated with the causal relations CAUSE, PREVENT, and ALLOW are summarized in Table 5. Their account can be more fully illustrated with the sentences in (8). (8) a. Melinda caused Stan to leave. b. Melinda allowed Stan to leave. One of the ways in which ALLOW and CAUSE statements dier is that ALLOW statements (e.g., 8b) are compatible with situations in which A occurs but B does not, while such co-occurrences are not compatible with CAUSE statements (8a). For example, there should be no contradiction in saying Melinda allowed Stan to leave, but he didnt leave, but it should be contradictory to say Melinda caused Stan to leave, but he didnt leave. Another way in which ALLOW and CAUSE statements dier is that CAUSE statements, but not ALLOW statements, are compatible with situations in A does not occur but B does. For example, there should be no contradiction in saying Melinda did not cause Stan to leave, but he left, but it should be contradictory (or at least highly odd) to say Melinda did not allow13 Stan to leave, but he left. Interestingly, in Goldvarg and Johnson-Lairds theory, the concepts of CAUSE, PREVENT, and ALLOW are dened such that they are equally similar to one another: they each share two kinds of co-occurrences. Hence, their model, like the force dynamic model, predicts that when verbs encoding the concepts of CAUSE, PREVENT, and ALLOW are sorted and submitted to an MDS program, they should form three equidistant clusters, a prediction that was supported in Experiments 14 of this paper. Another interesting property of their theory is that it highlights how the dierent causal relations give rise to dierent patterns of inference. For example, it proposes that A : B is compatible with ALLOW claims but not CAUSE claims (see Table 5). Therefore, when told that A has occurred, people should be more condent that B will occur if the relation between A and B is one of CAUSE rather than ALLOW. This prediction was supported in Experiment 3 of Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird (2001).
13
Here, the permission sense of allow is not intended.
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Importantly, the same inference can be derived from the force dynamic model. According to the force dynamic model, in CAUSE interactions, the aector is capable of bringing about the result despite the patients opposition. In contrast, in ENABLE interactions in which the aector and the patient act in concordance (no opposition), we may not know their relative contributions. Thus, while the aector alone may be able to bring about the result regardless of what the patient does, it is also possible that the result might not occur without the patients help. In eect, then, the force dynamic model can motivate why the eect is more likely in the presence of A in a CAUSE interaction than in an ALLOW/ENABLE interaction. Similar arguments from the force dynamic model can be made for the other sets of possible co-occurrences specied in Goldvarg and Johnson-Lairds (2001) theory. 7.3. Causal induction One of the model theorys strengths is that it suggests how dierent kinds of causal relations might be induced from co-occurrence information. For example, the model theory predicts that a CAUSE relation, as opposed to an ENABLE relation, will tend to be inferred from the co-occurrences of A and B in the absence of cases of A : B (see White, 2000). In addition, the model theory predicts that an ENABLE relation, as opposed to a CAUSE relation, will tend to be inferred from co-occurrences of A and B in the absence of cases of :A and B. However, the model theory does not handle causal induction from a single observation as well. According to Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird (2001), causal relations are intrinsically modal, that is [t]hey are not merely about what occurred but also about what might have occurred (p. 576). As a consequence, their model predicts that it should never be possible to induce a causal relation from a single observation without knowledge of the possible sequences of states that are consistent with that observation. In eect, Goldvarg and Johnson-Lairds (2001) model requires multiple observations for the induction of a causal relation. These observations can be based on sequences that are actually observed along with sequences that are envisioned via hypothetical or counterfactual reasoning. The problem with this approach is that sequences generated from hypothetical or counterfactual reasoning can provide no more knowledge about the causal relation than what is already known. To hypothetically generate possible sequences of states that accord with the kind of causal relation observed in a particular co-occurrence requires that one already knows the kind of causal relation demonstrated by the observed co-occurrence. But if this is already known, generating hypothetical possibilities serves no point. The launch event provides one well-known example of how people can induce causal relations from a single observation (Michotte, 1946/1963; Leslie, 1984; Cohen & Oakes, 1993; Schlottmann & Anderson, 1993; Schlottman, 2000; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000; Scholl & Nakayama, 2002). In these kinds of events, an object hits another object and sends it into motion. Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird (2001) dismiss these events as potential counterexamples to their theory. They argue that in many of these experiments the objects (and hence the causal relations) werent real.
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Peoples causal attributions were in fact mistaken, just as might be expected on the basis of a single observation. However, the issue is not whether participants in these experiments were correct in their causal attributions, but rather that they made such attributions at all. Michotte (1946/1963) reports that people sometimes needed to see the launch event several times before they perceived a causal relation. Importantly, however, the replications involved the same sequence of events (A B), which is compatible with both a CAUSE and an ALLOW relation. In other words, participants were willing to make specic causal attributions in the absence of sequences that, according to the model theory, are required to uniquely identify CAUSE and ALLOW relations, i.e., :A B and A : B, respectively. In contrast to the model theory, the force dynamic model denes causal relations in terms of distinctions that can be induced from the occurrence of a single event. According to the force dynamic model, what leads people to perceive Michotte events as causal is their perception of the patients tendency to not move, an aector that opposes the patients tendency and the occurrence of a result. The ability of the force dynamic model to explain how dierent kinds of causal relations can be inferred from a single instance was demonstrated in a set of experiments reported in Wol and Zettergren (2002). In these experiments, participants viewed realistic 3D-animations of an inatable boat whose movements through a pool of water were aected by a bank of fans. The strength of the fans (the aector) and the tendency of the boat (the patient) were represented by force vectors. The boats movements were completely determined by the force vectors entered into a physics simulator. Participants linguistic descriptions of the animations closely paralleled those predicted by a computational version of the force dynamic model called the vector model. Participants chose CAUSE descriptions when the boats tendency (produced by an outboard motor) was opposed and overcome by the bank of fans that pushed the boat to a goal. Participants chose ENABLE descriptions when the boats tendency was in the direction of the goal and the fans were concordant with this tendency. Participants chose PREVENT descriptions when the boats tendency was in the direction of the goal but the fans forced it away. The animations diered from each other only in the direction and magnitude of force vectors entered into the physics simulator, and these dierences alone were sucient to produce dramatic changes in how the scenes were described. While the force dynamic model and model theory sometimes make the same predictions regarding the meaning of CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT, there are situations in which their predictions dier. The model theory, at its core, denes causal concepts in terms of necessity and suciency. According to Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird (2001) the claim A caused B is false if A can occur without the occurrence of B, that is, the claim is false if A is not a sucient condition for the occurrence of B. The claim A allowed B is false if B can occur without A, that is the claim is false if A is not a necessary condition for the occurrence of B. Goldvarg and Johnson-Lairds claims are supported, in part, by recent research by Mandel and Lehman (1998), who founded that people tended to dene causation (and prevention) more in terms of tests of suciency than tests of necessity. However, the predictions of the model theory coincide with those of the force dynamic model only
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for the simplest kinds of force dynamic interactions: namely, those in which the forces associated with the aector and the patient are either diametrically opposed or fully concordant. As shown in Wol and Zettergren (2002), the force dynamic model can be extended to force interactions in which the forces involved do not meet head on or are oriented in the same direction. For example, imagine a ship that was heading in a certain direction but moved slightly o-course because of tides and ended up hitting a buoy. If the boat had not been moving under its own power, the tide would not have pushed the ship directly into the buoy: hence, the tide was not a sucient condition for the ships hitting the buoy. In addition, in the absence of the tide, the boat would not have hit the buoy: thus, the tide was necessary condition for the hitting of the buoy. Since the tide is a necessary but not sucient condition for the result, Goldvarg and Johnson-Lairds model theory predicts that people should prefer to describe the tide as enabling or allowing the ship to hit the buoy rather than causing it to hit the buoy. However, using an analogous scenario, Wol and Zettergren (2002) found that people preferred exactly the opposite. This is as predicted by the force dynamic model since the ship did not have a tendency for the buoy, but the tide opposed it and the result of hitting the buoy occurred, thus making it a CAUSE conguration. Theories of causation based on necessity and suciency have not fared well in the philosophical literature (see Introduction of Sosa & Tooley, 1993). The problem of overdetermination demonstrates how causes need not be necessary conditions. To use an example from Sosa and Tooley (1993), if two bullets pierce a mans heart simultaneously, neither is necessary for death, yet intuition says both would count as causes. The problem of epiphenomena illustrates how causes need not be sucient conditions. Suppose (to adapt an example from Lewis (1973)), that as an axe falls, its shadow moves as well, and a log splits in two. Indeed, as the log splits, the shadow of the axe moves, implying that the shadow is a sucient condition for the splitting of the log, yet few would say the shadow caused the log to split. Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird take the novel step of using necessity and suciency to distinguish the concepts of CAUSE and ENABLE, but the old problems associated with accounts based on necessity and suciency still remain. 7.4. Mechanistic accounts of causation The force dynamic model shares several assumptions with an account of causality known as the mechanism view (Ahn & Bailenson, 1996; Ahn & Kalish, 2000; Ahn et al., 1995; Bullock, Gelman, & Baillargeon, 1982; Shultz, 1982). According to the mechanism view, causal relations necessarily involve chains of connected parts (i.e., mechanisms) through which energy can be transferred from the aector to the patient to produce an eect in the patient. People need not have detailed knowledge of how a particular causal mechanism operates to make a causal claim. Rather, they must only believe that a causal mechanism is possible (Ahn & Kalish, 2000). Indeed, people commonly make causal assertions even when they have little understanding of the underlying causal mechanism, e.g., Benzene causes cancer (see Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001).
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The force dynamic model also implies that people believe that causal relations must involve a mechanism: we cannot have a conguration of forces unless there is impingement, either direct or indirect. The force dynamic model, in fact, motivates why people have the intuition that causal relations involve mechanisms in a way most covariational accounts, for example, do not. Nevertheless, we dont see mechanism as constituting the core meaning of a causal statement. We assume that force dynamic relationships can be separated from the underlying way in which impingement occurs, i.e., the mechanism. The force dynamics of a situation are given by the tendency of the patient, whether the aector opposes that tendency, and whether a result occurs. These aspects of a situation can be represented without knowledge of the precise mechanism by which the aector, for example, opposes the patient. Thus, according to the force dynamic model, the core meaning of a causal statement captures the arrangement of forces that result from the interaction of an aector and a patient. Further, these arrangements allow us to distinguish dierent types of causal relations in a way that a mechanism alone cannot.
8. Conclusions The results from ve experiments indicated that the force dynamic model provides a better account of the meaning of causal claims than do focal set models. However, we do not interpret these results as implying that covariational information is unimportant to the way in which people think about causal relations. As discussed above, on our theory, every kind of causal interaction involves some kind of impingement, either direct or indirect. Without impingement, there can be no interaction of forces, physical, psychological or social. Impingement relations are sometimes signaled by the physical contact of two entities, which is why spatial-temporal contiguity is a particularly important cue for causality (Bullock et al., 1982; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Lesser, 1977; Shultz, 1982; Spelke, Phillips, & Woodward, 1995; Woodward, Phillips, & Spelke, 1993). Often, however, impingement relations cannot be seen, or the chain of impingement relations is so long that it cannot be fully followed. For these cases in particular, people may rely on other methods for determining impingement relations, including statistical information. The probabilistic contrast model and the power PC model (Cheng, 1997), in particular, specify how such statistical information may be used for inferring the presence of an impingement relationship. In eect, they establish whether the necessary conditions for a causal relation are present. They also extend our ability to detect causality in relationships where the impingement is not directly observable, e.g., the relationship between benzene and cancer. Nevertheless, while statistical information plays a crucial role in our understanding of causal relations, there is more to causality than impingement. This work has examined our understanding of causation as it is expressed in ordinary language. What this analysis has shown is that those meanings are represented in terms of a combinatorial system in which there are three underlying dimensions that specify
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the ways in which two forces can interact. We conclude by raising the possibility that a similar mental calculus might apply in the representation of relational concepts in general.
Appendix A A.1. Denition of terms in the force dynamic model

The force dynamic model concerns the ways in which two actors, an aector and a patient, interact with respect to a particular change of state or location. An aector is dened as an entity separate from the patient (and usually external to the patient) that impinges upon the patient. A patient is dened as an entity that undergoes a transition as a consequences of the forces associated with the aector and the patient. By forces, we mean directed quantities (e.g., physical forces, desires, historical pressures, etc.) that can combine to produce an overall push or pull upon the patient. The force dynamic model distinguishes several kinds of CAUSE-related concepts on the basis of (1) the tendency of the patient for the result, (2) the presence of opposition between the aector and patient, and (3) the occurrence of a result. The notion of a tendency is dened as the patients propensity for a particular result due to factors that are internal to the patient itself. The notion of a result is dened as a particular endstate that a patient might enter into if a change in the patient occurs. The rst and third of these dimensions closely resemble two of Talmys (1988) four main dimensions that characterize force dynamic relations. However, according to Talmy (1988), virtually all force dynamic interactions involve opposition. In contrast, Jackendo (1990) notes that opposition is not present in a sizable number of such interactions, and that rather the aector and patient can act in concordance with each other. He further proposes that the presence or absence of opposition can be treated as a basic parameter in distinguishing types of causal situations. We adopt this proposal as the second dimension of our force dynamic model.
A.2. The meaning of CAUSE, ENABLE, PREVENT, FAIL TO CAUSE, and FAIL TO PREVENT
These three binary parameters allow for eight possible patterns of values. Five of these patterns represent the concepts of CAUSE, ENABLE, PREVENT, FAIL TO CAUSE, and FAIL TO PREVENT, as shown in the table in Appendix A.
The force dynamic models representations of CAUSE, PREVENT, ENABLE, FAIL TO CAUSE, and FAIL TO PREVENT Patients tendency for the result CAUSE ENABLE PREVENT FAIL TO CAUSE FAIL TO PREVENT N Y Y N Y Opposition between aector and patient Y N Y Y Y Occurrence of result Y Y N N Y Example sentence
Kramer caused Jerry to leave the room. Bill enabled Jill to catch the bus. Fred prevented the door from opening. The hurricanes winds failed to cause the house to fall down. The bodyguards failed to prevent the press from reaching the senator.
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As implied by the example sentence in the table in Appendix A, in a CAUSE situation, the patient does not have a tendency for the result, but the result occurs because of something the aector does. In an ENABLE situation, the tendency of the patient is for the result, this tendency is not opposed by an aector (and may be facilitated by the aector), and the result occurs. In situations instantiating PREVENT, the tendency of the patient is for a result, but this tendency is opposed by more powerful aector, and as a consequence, the result does not occur. In FAIL TO CAUSE situations, the patient does not have a tendency for a result and the aector opposes this tendency, just as in CAUSE situation, but the aector fails to bring about a particular result. Finally in FAIL TO PREVENT situations, the patient has a tendency for a result; the aector opposes this tendency but is unable to block the tendency of the patient from being realized. The concepts of FAIL TO CAUSE and FAIL TO PREVENT, while expressed here with phrases, can be expressed in dierent ways. For example, the concept of FAIL TO CAUSE appears to be encoded in such verbs as resist, withstand, and survive (e.g., The house withstood the hurricanes winds). The concept of FAIL TO PREVENT can also be expressed in other ways, including verbs such as overcome, surmount and prevail, and prepositions such as despite, in spite of, and in the face of (e.g., Despite the bodyguards, the press reached the senator). It is interesting to note that for the verbs encoding the concepts of FAIL TO CAUSE and FAIL TO PREVENT, the patient is the grammatical subject of the sentence rather than direct object, in contrast with verbs encoding the concepts of CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT. The force dynamic model suggests why this dierence in syntactic behavior might arise by highlighting the importance of the relative strength of the aector and the patient. Specically, in the case of FAIL TO CAUSE and FAIL TO PREVENT interactions, the magnitude of the force associated with the patient is necessarily greater than that associated with the aector, while in the cases of CAUSE and PREVENT this dierence in strength is reversed, and in the case of ENABLE, it is unspecied. Thus, there appears to be a constraint on the syntactic-semantic interface regarding the relative strength of the participant and the grammatical role in which it can occur. This apparent constraint might explain why there appear to be no verbs encoding the concepts of FAIL TO CAUSE and FAIL TO PREVENT in which the aector of the situation is expressed in the subject position of the sentence.
A.3. Congurations that do not lexicalize

The patterns of parameters in the table in Appendix A make up ve of the eight possible combinations that can be created from the three binary parameters. Two of the remaining congurations (NNY and YNN) are not included in this table because they imply impossible situations, or at least situations that cannot be realized without the overwhelming inuence of a third participant. For example, the NNY conguration represents a situation in which the patient does not have a tendency for the result and is not opposed by the aector; nevertheless, the result occurs. Such a conguration could be realized only if there were a third entitybesides the aector and patientthat impinged upon the patient to lead to the result. Under such conditions, however, it is likely that people would view this third entity, rather than original aector, as the actual aector of the result. The same reasoning can be applied to the conguration, YNN. In the case of the last remaining conguration NNN, while semantically possible, it is also pragmatically vacuous. That is, it describes a situation in which the tendencies of the patient and aector are not for the goal state, and the goal state is not reached. Hence, the reason why this conguration might not lexicalize is because it violates the maxim of informativity. Another possibility is that in NNN congurations, the goal is reconstrued such that the patient and aector are viewed as actually moving toward it rather than away (see Wol & Zettergren (2002; in progress)). In sum, the force dynamic model species not only what kinds of causal categories are possible in language, but also which categories are impossible or highly unlikely. Of the eight possible combinations that can be formed from three binary variables, ve map onto basic categories of causation that are readily described in language in terms of single verbs. The absence of linguistic expressions for the remaining three categories is due to the fact that two of the remaining congurations specify impossible situations (assuming there are no other entities besides the aector and the patient inuencing the
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patient) and the remaining congurations maps onto a situation in which essentially nothing happens, hence making it relatively uninformative. While the force dynamic model is able to dene various categories of causation, several issues remain unresolved.
A.4. Future directions

Steady state versus onset causation. There are several important distinctions that are not currently captured by the force dynamic model as discussed above. One such distinction is that between steady-state and onset causation. As discussed in Talmy (1988), in the case of onset causation, there is a clear transition or change in state or location, as exemplied in (9). (9) a. The ball caused the vase to break. b. The torpedo caused the boat to sink. c. Cold air causes water to freeze. In contrast, in steady-state causation, there is an interaction of forces without an explicit change in state, as exemplied in (10). (10) a. Gravity causes the earth to orbit the sun. b. Buoyancy causes boats to oat. c. His mustache caused him to look older. The force dynamic model, as formulated above, is equipped to capture instances of onset causation but not steady-state causation. One way the distinction might be handled would be to calculate a result dimension by summing the forces acting on a patient and evaluate its relationship with respect to a goal location. This possibility is articulated more fully in Wol and Zettergren (2002). Prototypical versus nonprototypical expressions of causal concepts. A second distinction that the force dynamic model will ultimately need to explain is the one between prototypical and nonprototypical uses of the concepts CAUSE, ENABLE, PREVENT, FAIL TO CAUSE, and FAIL TO PREVENT. The semantics associated with the prototypical expression of these concepts is expressed in the table in Appendix A. However, while we may often associate the concept of CAUSE with the occurrence of a result in a patient and the concept of PREVENT with the nonoccurrence of a result in a patient, the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a result is actually not denitional for either of these concepts. The concept of CAUSE, for example, is not restricted to events in which a patient undergoes a change. We can also talk about causing things not to change, as in Fred caused the door to stay closed, which, in fact, describes the same situation as in Fred prevented the door from opening. Similarly, we can talk about preventing the nonoccurrence of a result, as in Kramer prevented Jerry from staying in the room, which, in fact, describes the same situation as Kramer caused Jerry to leave. Interestingly, while the verb cause can be used to describe situations in which the occurrence of the result either does or does not occur, it often seems more naturalmore prototypicalto describe situations in which a result occurs with cause (see 11a) than with prevent (see 11b). (11) a. High winds caused the trees to fall. b. High winds prevented the trees from remaining standing. Similarly, in situations in which the result does not occur, it is less linguistically marked more prototypicalto describe it with a verb like prevent (see 12a) than with a verb like cause (see 12b). (12) a. The boulder prevented the cars from passing. b. The boulder caused the cars to remain stationary. While these biases are clearly present, there is nothing in the current formulation of the force dynamic model that predicts how these biases might come about. They may reect a more general pragmatic bias to describe eventualities in dynamic rather than static terms. It might also be possible to capture the difference between prototypical and non-prototypical causal expressions by thinking about results, along with patients and aectors, as entities in space. From this perspective, the expression of causal concepts might be related to the perceptual distinction between gure and ground. Initial work exploring this possibility is discussed in Wol and Zettergren (2002).
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Appendix B
Sentences used in Experiment 1 Allow Block The slow cooling allowed the metal crystals to grow. You should keep compost moist but allow the surface to dry out between waterings. Water Conversion Corp., which runs Saudi Arabia s municipal desalination plants, says the two Jubail plants are each protected by long, yard-thick booms, which block the oil from entering the intake valves. In another experiment, the researchers succeeded in blocking the antibodies from sticking to the tube, strong evidence that the antibodies were a specic response to silicone. Damp conditions will cause the cork to deteriorate and encourage bugs. The blast caused the craft to heel violently, ripping away Henckes purchase on the torpedo rack and lifting him bodily before throwing him across the oily oor. Diesel traction then took over briey to enable the train to traverse the boiler shop road and Bridgnorth Head Shunt using two separate shunters. The heat released in this process generates a pressure that enables the sun to resist the attraction of its own gravity, which is trying to make it smaller. The weight of the roof pushed the pillars down and the resulting pressure also forced the oor to buckle and move upwards. Dieting without exercise also forces the body to manage on less oxygen, and it reduces its oxygen intake even further when it has to take energy, not from food, but from the body itself. He did not know how he had got the door to this place to open. My oil paintings often involve a lot of ne lines and small details, but when using ne brushes I nd it very dicult to get the oil paint to ow from the brush very smoothly. The coating helps the fabric to keep some strength as the glass softens and melts. The weight of the conditioner pulls the curls down and as it dries it also helps the curls to separate. Like the sugar tonics, the glycerophosphates have no long-term benecial eects on health, and indeed perhaps hinder the body from restoring its own ecient breakdown of glucose to release energy. Whale external ears are reduced to small slits, but this does not hinder them from perceiving a wide range of sounds, many of which are not audible to humans. Once the soldiers from the barracks had to hold the ship from blowing away while Fogg revved the engine and got the tail up. Many shirt manufacturers leave the wings too short and cut the collars too low and without a loop at the back to hold the tie from rising to the top (or, poor sod, over the top) of the collar. The eucalyptus consumes more water than almost any other tree and impedes other plants from growing nearby. The scientists said abnormally high levels of the hormone appear to impede cells lining the blood vessels from expelling sodium. I put the basket on the counter and held onto it to keep it from banging into the shopping of the woman in front. Only one good thing to come out of such coldit kept the bugs from biting. The landowner was letting the buildings return to dust, but no doubt he would be grateful to have them re-stored at no cost to himself. I let the ticket fall to the ground. I like to shear half my plants at a time, leaving one half of them to blossom while the second half is getting started on its new round of blooming. Boil for 10 min and then leave the pan to cool. Two fuel injectors blew which made the engine crackle very loudly.
Cause
Enable
Force
Get
Help
Hinder
Hold
Impede
Keep
Let
Leave
Make
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Appendix B (continued)
The wind made the window shudder as she picked up the receiver and whispered a brief almost wordless prayer. The presence of this second pair of cords is thought to be the secret behind the extraordinary purring mechanism that permits the cat to produce the soft, rumbling sound for minutes and even hours on end, without any eort and without opening the mouth. The sediment at the bottom of the sea permits nuclear waste to leak out at the rate of 1 m per 10,000 years not 10 years as appeared in last weeks article . The tiled roofs had overhangs to prevent the walls from getting wet during the rains, and were supported on columns of red bricks. Butter up: if you add a teaspoon of oil to butter when frying it will prevent the butter from burning. Keep it loose, you are not planting yet; the purpose is simply to hold the bushes steady, to protect the roots from drying out and keep them in an environment that will encourage them to begin making new growth. Put straw mats under strawberry plants to protect fruit from rotting. We admired the clever valve system, and the chordae tendineae which restrain each valve from opening too far: a tough little parachute harness preventing over-deployment of the canopy. Experts blamed a fault in the design of the mechanism meant to restrain the cable car from swinging. A Kentucky man whose yacht was reported to have been rammed by gunboats was quoted as saying the Nicaraguan coast guard saved his craft from sinking in a storm. If so, it may save the planet from overheating. The new quake, generated by the Calaveras Fault, set the ground quivering at 8:26 a.m., with an epicenter seven miles east of Morgan Hill and a Richter scale reading up to 4.0. Hotel executives stood aside as customers lined up by the hundreds at check-in counters and set slot machines whirring. He said it also gives a view back in time and the galaxy as seen now is only few billion years after the Big Bang, the massive explosion that is thought to have started the universe expanding outward. In reed pipes, the incoming air causes the curved end of a reed to beat against a metal trough, which starts the surrounding air vibrating. The rst approach is to stimulate the bowels to become more active through diet. Theres no way that shaving can stimulate the hair roots to work harder. Similarly, the gravity of the sun keeps the planets in orbit around it and stops the earth from shooting o into the darkness of interstellar space. Attached to the webbing on the shoulder harness, the chest strap stops shoulder straps from sliding sideways and so keeps the sack much more comfortably in position.
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Sentences used in Experiment 2 (generics only) Allow You should keep compost moist but allow the surface to dry out between waterings. Intermittent braking is often more eective because it allows the wheel to re-grip between skids. The sheath blocks heat from going through and, at the same time, removes it along the plane of each platelet. Hes already lost the sight of his left eye because cocaine starved the retina of blood, and hes damn lucky not to be totally blind, or even dead, because the next time it could constrict the arteries of his heart or block the blood from reaching his brain. Damp conditions will cause the cork to deteriorate and encourage bugs. Sunlight causes these gases to break down, which releases the chlorine.
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Enable The ideal thermal underwear enables the skin to retain body heat, but lets perspiration out so you feel comfortable. The vitamin B complex enables the body to make full use of the food consumed. Dieting without exercise also forces the body to manage on less oxygen, and it reduces its oxygen intake even further when it has to take energy, not from food, but from the body itself. This increase in greenhouse gases is expected to eventually force global temperatures to rise by 25 C, although the full amount of warming will be delayed for a few decades because of oceanic thermal inertia. Similarly, the motorist who discovers that he should pull out the choke button a particular amount so as to get the car to start on a cold morning is also an empiricist. It makes a beautiful 6 ft (T.8m) shrub, but it does need dry sunny weather to get the blooms to open. The coating helps the fabric to keep some strength as the glass softens and melts. The weight of the conditioner pulls the curls down and as it dries it also helps the curls to separate. Like the sugar tonics, the glycerophosphates have no long-term benecial eects on health, and indeed perhaps hinder the body from restoring its own ecient breakdown of glucose to release energy. The eect of this pinching is to hinder the branches from growing too thick. The third part of the lock is the tumbler, which is a catch or click holding the bolt from being withdrawn. Many shirt manufacturers leave the wings too short and cut the collars too low and without a loop at the back to hold the tie from rising to the top (or, poor sod, over the top) of the collar. The eucalyptus consumes more water than almost any other tree and impedes other plants from growing nearby. The scientists said abnormally high levels of the hormone appear to impede cells lining the blood vessels from expelling sodium. This in turn removes heat from the blood owing beneath the nasal membranes, and this pool of relatively cool blood helps keep the brain from overheating. Once dug and left to dry, potatoes can be sorted and stored in teachests, thick paper sacks or shallow boxes covered with sacking to keep the light from turning them green. The eye is basically the same shape as ours, but there is no lens and the pupil is just a hole that lets the seawater into the hollow interior of the eye. In very high winds it is usually better to deliberately let the glider swing into wind so that it comes to a stop facing directly into wind. It then seals each cell with daubs of more mud and leaves the ospring to hatch in elds of plenty. The rst cleaning happens right out there in the orchard, because many of the harvesters have fans that blow sticks and other debris away while leaving the nuts to fall into their trailer. He said: Ive always been a worrier, and apparently its stress that makes the lining of the stomach and bowel come away. Some toxins have been identied, and one makes the blood vessels more leaky, which might account for the production of urticaria. The presence of this second pair of cords is thought to be the secret behind the extraordinary purring mechanism that permits the cat to produce the soft, rumbling sound for minutes and even hours on end, without any eort and without opening the mouth. The sediment at the bottom of the sea permits nuclear waste to leak out at the rate of 1 m per 10,000 years not 10 years as appeared in last weeks article.
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Prevent Protect As water contains oxygen, it does not in fact prevent the paint from drying anyway! Similarly, a plate with a slight rim prevents food from sliding over the edge too easily. Protect your hair from changing color or drying out in the sun by using a hair sunscreen with conditioners. This groove in the needle both guides the thread and, provided it is not too thick, protects it from touching the fabric. We admired the clever valve system, and the chordae tendineae which restrain each valve from opening too far: a tough little parachute harness preventing over-deployment of the canopy. Experts blamed a fault in the design of the mechanism meant to restrain the cable car from swinging. Wall-mount your phone to save it from being kicked or left o the hook. If so, it may save the planet from overheating. That sets the little boats rocking like crazy, like theres a sudden storm or summat. [something] Hotel executives stood aside as customers lined up by the hundreds at check-in counters and set slot machines whirring. Spring weather, characterized by cold nights and warm days, starts the sap running in maple trees. In reed pipes, the incoming air causes the curved end of a reed to beat against a metal trough, which starts the surrounding air vibrating. The rst approach is to stimulate the bowels to become more active through diet. Theres no way that shaving can stimulate the hair roots to work harder. Similarly, the gravity of the sun keeps the planets in orbit around it and stops the earth from shooting o into the darkness of interstellar space. Attached to the webbing on the shoulder harness, the chest strap stops shoulder straps from sliding sideways and so keeps the sack much more comfortably in position.
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Sentences used in Experiment 2 (specic sentences only) Allow Block The slow cooling allowed the metal crystals to grow. He allowed his papers to drop on to the cabin oor, and his eyes lit up with interest. In another experiment, the researchers succeeded in blocking the antibodies from sticking to the tube, strong evidence that the antibodies were a specic response to silicone. The Miserable Summer of 88 and its triple whammy of heat, haze and humidity began with a late spring high pressure system over the Great Plains that blocked the jet stream from delivering cooler, cleaner air from Canada and hobbled the production of thunderstorms. The blast caused the craft to heel violently, ripping away Henckes purchase on the torpedo rack and lifting him bodily before throwing him across the oily oor. Pete recalls 1983, when a huge quantity of snowmelt caused the Colorado to ood, almost breaking through Glen Canyon Dam, and making Crystal virtually unrunnable. Diesel traction then took over briey to enable the train to traverse the boiler shop road and Bridgnorth Head Shunt using two separate shunters. But soon after his arrival, the spring thaw enabled hydro-electric stations to start generating, and bread supplies returned to normal levels of insuciency. The weight of the roof pushed the pillars down and the resulting pressure also forced the oor to buckle and move upwards. Seeing a sheet had been stued round the edges of it he suspected something suspicious was going on inside and forced the door to open. He did not know how he had got the door to this place to open.
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Ever since you went away we have been unable to get the re to burn; even if we borrowed a light from the neighbors it went out as soon as we brought it in. Gently he helped the loose piece to fall clear. Today they were busy removing the bandage body stocking that had been used to help the wing to heal. Police alleged a crowd hindered them from chasing the killers. None of these things hindered the General from sending his brother to discover the pass. Once the soldiers from the barracks had to hold the ship from blowing away while Fogg revved the engine and got the tail up. A wooden pin stuck anciently on sides of the bed-stead to hold the cloths from slipping on either side. I think I actually impeded him from going up (because) I was all over his back. Large shoots impeded the fruit from its due maturity. The van jerked forward but he managed to keep the engine from stalling and within seconds they had turned into a sharp bend and the grotesque crater was no longer visible in the rear view mirror. I put the basket on the counter and held onto it to keep it from banging into the shopping of the woman in front. He pulled the car over to the curb and let the engine idle while he turned to face her. I let the ticket fall to the ground. In this case, the crew ejected and left the plane to y on its own. It numbed the mind of one woman so much recently that she left her baby to suocate inside her car while hoping to hit the jackpot, a bucketful of balls, which can be exchanged for jars of coee or pairs of tights. Two fuel injectors blew which made the engine crackle very loudly. The wind made the window shudder as she picked up the receiver and whispered a brief almost wordless prayer. He permitted the machine to lose speed until it had become what is known as stalled, that momentary pause before the machine turns over on its side or nose and falls. The door that Fenella had indicated was the one with ill-tting seams that permitted the red glow to seep through. Ocials believe one explanation may be the heavy overnight rain in the area prevented the tar from bonding. Cylindrical pierced metal candle shades which, placed in a shallow dish of water, steadied the ame and prevented the candle from setting light to what it was standing on. The stringy bark roof of the salt-shed protected the troughs from rotting. They protected the uncultivated ground from being indiscriminately turfed. Yugoslav army and Bosnian ocials barely restrained him on Saturday from detonating the explosives and ooding populated lowlands in Serbia. Reaching Horse Prairie on 12th August, the chiefs could no longer restrain the warriors from killing ve settlers in raids for fresh horses. They arrived within minutes to save the building from being burnt down. A Kentucky man whose yacht was reported to have been rammed by gunboats was quoted as saying the Nicaraguan coast guard saved his craft from sinking in a storm. The new quake, generated by the Calaveras Fault, set the ground quivering at 8:26 a.m., with an epicenter seven miles east of Morgan Hill and a Richter scale reading up to 4.0. The photo opportunity set lights ashing and cameras whirring. He said it also gives a view back in time and the galaxy as seen now is only few billion years after the Big Bang, the massive explosion that is thought to have started the universe expanding outward. Dropping it over the side started the timing mechanism running.
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Stimulate The passing air currents had the opposite eect on the hairs, stimulating the insect to y faster. Amino acid residue stimulated the CAT activity to the same extent as the wild type clone. She stuck a piece of adhesive tape round it to stop the needle from coming out and hung the bottle on to a hook just over the dog. He fell silent, staring broodingly at the picture, and Kathleen closed her eyes to stop the tears from overowing.
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Sentences used in Experiment 3: transitive uses Allow The jacket allows plenty of all round movement and the hem will not ride up once the drawcord is tightened. I see this restaurant allows smoking. Other drugs block the reuptake of acetylcholine from a synapse and at the junction between neurons and muscles. Not only does alcohol displace essential nutrients from the diet, but it blocks their absorption by the body. The condition (hemianopia) usually causes problems with visual tracking as in scanning along a line or print. There was also more than a little evidence that other peoples cigarette smoke causes glue ear in children. The dolphin suit enables a more complex response to dolphin body language, as mutual mimicry and playfulness are primary means of dolphin communication. It is a ne-boned animal, with small hoofs on slender but strong legs, and the very wide pelvis enables a easy calving, even to large continental bulls such as the Charolais. Schomberg dismissed Williams plan, to force the river crossing, as too dangerous but the normally cautious king overruled him. France, however, realized that her good relations with Egypt would suer and her inuence in the Levant diminish if she participated in an international move to force Mehemet Alis withdrawal from Syria. Some coaches believe that stretching before exercise reduces the chances of injury and helps athletic performance. Changing the diet usually helps the constipation, especially if bre is added. At the same time, the oxygen decit hinders the assimilation of nutrients from the food we eat. Using articial light to break up a long night into two short ones promotes the owering of long-day plants and hinders the owering of short-day ones. The brous tissues round the infected area impedes access of antituberculous substances. Damage to these cells reduces electrical pacemaker activity and impedes its propagation. Coiling the wire into a loop permits directional ow of the magnetic ux through the loop. A central shaft connected to a moveable shelf allows canvases across a wide size range to be mounted and also permits variations in the height at which the canvas is carried. Vitamin B12 helps to produce red blood cells which carry oxygen, and therefore prevents anemia and tiredness. We now know that the ascorbic acid in the juice prevents discoloration. You can also buy special seat belts for dogs, to restrain their movements within a car. By contrast, there were clear advantages if people were motivated by their own self-interest to restrain greenhouse emissions. Because it is the mating act in cats that induces ovulation, it is possible in this way to start the female cats ovulation as if she is carrying male sperm. He wasnt badly hurt but people have since told me that shock sometimes starts the onset of diabetes.
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Stimulate Selective weed killers contain plant hormones that stimulate abnormal (and fatal) growth in certain types of plants. Lavender, in particular, has the remarkable ability to stimulate the regeneration of skin cells wonderful in the healing of burns, scar-tissue, wounds, ulcers and so forth. When the maltster is satised that germination has unlocked the rich natural sugars in the barley, the grains are taken to a kiln room where heat stops germination. If you are bleeding badly then try to stop the ow of blood by pressing on the wound with a large pad of cotton wool, or some clean material.
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Further reading
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Cognitive Psychology

Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332 www.elsevier.com/locate/cogpsych

Models of causation and the semantics of causal verbsq

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

Note. Y, Yes; N, No.

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

C-EP E-CP P-CE C-CE C-CP E-CE E-EP P-CP P-EP

CAUSE ENABLE PREVENT CAUSE CAUSE ENABLE ENABLE PREVENT PREVENT

128 128 128 96 96 96 96 96 96

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

Note. Y=Possible; N=Not possible.

Here, the permission sense of allow is not intended.

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

Appendix A A.1. Denition of terms in the force dynamic model

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

A.3. Congurations that do not lexicalize

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

A.4. Future directions

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332

P. Wol, G. Song / Cognitive Psychology 47 (2003) 276332