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Cavalry in Late Roman Warfare
Hugh Elton
Ancient History and Classics Department, Trent University
This article attempts to use a problem in tactical history
to pose questions about late Roman warfare. The tactical
problem is how cavalry came into contact with enemy,
i.e. the charge. Although this article focuses on cavalry in
the Late Roman East, much of it should have greater
applicability.
Before 1976, most discussions of ancient battles by
modern writers were simple narratives, based on the
perspective of the general. Then in 1976, John Keegan's
Face of Battle was published. This has been very
influential; indeed, it often seems to be the only book on
non-ancient military history read by ancient historians.
The predominant method of discussing battle then
switched to the experience of battle, how it felt to be a
soldier. Perhaps the best exponent of this has been
Hanson, whose The Western Way of War is concerned
with hoplite warfare in Classical Greece.
1
This focussed
on assembling anecdotes from many different
engagements to tell a story, hoping in this way to fill the
gaps in our evidence. Keegan, however, did not attempt
to characterise particular eras of warfare, but only to
capture the experience of three specif'ic days in 1415,
1815, and 1916. This is very different from the approach
of ancient historians creating a 'typical' battle.
In recent years, a large amount of work has been done on
the Roman battle, though little of this has concentrated on
the late Roman period. Two approaches can be
distinguished. One is the 'experience' approach,
concentrating on what it felt like to be in battle, e.g.
Mattbevvs, Lee, Lendon, and Lenski.
2
The other is the
'mechanics' approach, e.g. Zhmodikov, Sabin. and
McGeer.
3
And some works are able to combine the two,
e.g. Goldsworthy and Daly.
4
Tl1ere have also been a
number of books on various aspects of ancient cavalry; in
particular, advances have been made in our understanding
of Roman horses and saddles.
5
Many of these approaches, however, by focussing on
generalities, minimise the differences bet\veen various
military actions. To some extent. generalising is
necessary, allowing complex situations to be simply
understood. But this complexity is also \vhat made late
Roman \Varfare different from vvarfare elsewhere in time
or space. There were three major theatres of operations in
the late Roman East the mountains and valleys of
1
Hanson 1989: Hanson 1994.
2 1v!atthcws 1989: 279-303; Lee 1996: Lcndon 2005: Lcnski. this
volume.
3 Zhmodikov 2000: 67-78: Sabin 2000: McGccr !995.
4
Goldsworthy 1996: Daly 2002.
" Dixon - Southcm !992;
Murray 1991
1990: Connolly 1987 Van Dric!-
Anatolia, tbe plains and river valleys of Mesopota
and the deserts (of various sorts) of South Syria
Arabia. The Romans fought tbe Sassanid in 1
areas at one time or another, though most of the efforts
against the Persians took place in Mesopotamia. But they
also faced Lazi, Albani, and Huns in the north and Arabs
and Saracens in the south. Mauricius' Strategikon made
clear the difference between fighting Sassanids \vho
would engage in hand to hand combat, and fighting
Turks, Huns, or A vars \;vho preferred to keep at a
distance. In both cases, the Romans \Vere advised to
defeat the enemy hand-to-hand, but for different reasons.
The Sassanids generated an arrow storm before contact,
and it was important to minimise the time of exposure lo
this, whereas the Turks, etc. preferred to wear the enemy
dmvn gradually and thus avoiding contact was playing
into their hands.
6
This complexity suggests that a single
view of Late Roman battle can only be a high-level
perception.
The cavalry charge is often seen as the definitive moment
in combat for horsemen and as such, provides a good \vay
to examine the problems in describing ancient battle.
First, literary examples 11-om the sixtl1 century are
discussed. These are compared to a more theoretical
example, from the late sixth century, from Mauricius'
Strateg,ikon. Lastly. this can be compared to an early
modern manual from the American Civil War. Fev,r
Roman historians provide significant details about
cavalry combat in the sixth century, while earlier
Ammianus Marcellinus, for example. says nothing about
the mechanics of combat in the east. Theophylaci might
be considered typical, \vhen he described an action at the
river Nymphius m 582: 'the Persians made a
counterattack when they saw that the Roman cavalry was
exhausted by the exertion of the chase'
7
Or Procopius
377
about Satala in 530:
Thereupon Florentius. a Thracian. commanding a
regiment of cavalry, rushing (opflllCJcxc;) into the ene
centre and seizing the [Persian] general's standard, fr
it to the ground.
This suggests that contemporaries we:e unable to g
clear description of how cavalry fought. It is also ob
that cavalry did not gallop directly into the oppo<:
Occasionally. however, we do have more detail as
Procopius also described at Satala 'both sides
making advances upon their opponents and re
auicklv for thev were all cavalry.'';
' ,/ ,/
6 \o1auricius. Suaregikon l 1 preface.
Thcophyiact !.9.1 1.
' Procooius. Wars l.i 5.! 5 (loeb translation cf. l .!3 .25-21\
THE LATE ROMAN ARMY IN THE EAST
A similar vagueness about combat is found in theoretical
literature, like Mauricius' Strategikon. Mauricius
recommended that cavalry regiments form up for battle
between 8-l 0 deep at a maximum and S men deep at a
minimum. This he contrasts with the standard practice of
his day, of all units deploying 10 deep at all times.
9
Mauricius also recommended two lines of cavalry units,
though it is clear from his arguments that other generals
recommended only one row of units.
10
Mauricius' vision
of deployment is very clear, but becomes less clear when
he describes the approach to the enemy. No distinction is
made according to the type of enemy, i.e. both cavalry
and infantry are to be approached in an identical fashion.
The first description of the attack is in section 3.4,
concerned with deploying the regiment for battle.
experience in North America and an observer in the
Crimea.
13
Cooke distinguishes between three modes, in
line, column and 'as foragers'. The charge as foragers is
recommended for use against artillery or for pursuit. For
charging in line, Cooke recommends that the unit walk
for 20 paces, then trot for 60 paces, gallop for 80 paces,
and then 'charge'. Like Mauricius, Cooke says nothing
about the moment of contact with the enemy, but is
greatly concerned with order, prefacing the section on
charges with a stern admonition: 'as soon as any
confusion is observed, it is necessary to halt and
recommence the movement'. He also does not distinguish
between charging against cavalry and infantry. Other
nineteenth century material also emphasizes control, even'
in the face of heavy artillery fire, as during the Charge of
the Light Brigade in the Crimean War.
14
When, within three or four bowshots of the enemy line,
the decision is made to close up by the flanks and by the
rear, depending on the circumstances, the command is
'Close Ranks'. They then gradually close up while
continuing the advance. The archers open fire, and the
whole line together in close order begins the charge [Gk.

11
The next section (3.5) is concerned with drilling the
regiment.
At the command 'Close ranks', the soldiers close up hom
the rear for the charge. With the troops marching in close
formation, particularly after they have closed in tightly
hom the flank, the archers open fire and the command is
given: 'Charge' [Percute=strike ]. The dekarchs and
pentarchs then lean forward, cover their heads and part of
their horses' necks with their shields, hold their lances up
high as their shoulders in the manner of the fair-haired
races, and protected by their shields they ride on in good
order, not too fast but at a trot, to avoid having the
impetus of their cbarge [Gk. T1l rf]c; A.acriac; lit:
the sharpness of their riding] break up their ranks before
coming to blows with the enemy, which is a real risk. All
the archers to the rear should open fire.
12
Mauricius then moves on to pursuit formations, avoiding
the issue of what actually happened when the two battle
lines meet each other. .He appears more concerned with
control than with speed. The same emphasis is given in
the following section, on pursuits. The only idea of what
happened after contact is provided by 3 .I 2 suggesting
that if the Romans were repulsed, they should retire, then
wheel and re-engage. This matches exactly Procopius'
description of the battle of Sa tala.
Mauricius' instructions for a cavalry charge can usefully
be compared with the 1862 Cavaby Tactics written by
Philip Cooke, a US cavalry officer with combat
"Mauricius, Strategikon fl.6.
10
l'v!auricius, Strategikon If.l3.
11
Mauricius, Strategikon ffl.4 (translations from Dennis, G.T.,
lvfaurice 's Srrategikon (Philadelphia 1984).
'' Mauricius. Srrategikon HI.5.
378
\Ve can now make some comments on the whole process
of the attack. The primary consideration in all types of
evidence is that of the importance of order. The skills
required to achieve this could only be acquired through
training and practice as a unit. The acceleration to contact
occurs when the archers have begun shooting. Bowshot is
generally reckoned to be about 300 m, so the two lines
would be close together. To cover 300 m at a trot (c. 16
kph = 4.5 m/sec) would take approximately 66 seconds.
If the enemy were also cavalry units approaching at the
same speed, the time to contact would probably be c. 33
seconds. Reaching a full gallop can also be seen as
Lmlikely, as there would not be enough time for the
formation to reach this speed. As the two sides closed,
archers would begin to shoot. At this range, however,
archers were not shooting at individual targets, but
simply volleying in the general direction of the enemy.
Sighting would also be difficult as the archers were rarely
in the front ranks of regiments. For aimed shot at
individuals, effective range was less than 100 m.Js In any
case, the archers would have had little time to shoot, and
rate of shot was probably privileged over accuracy. In all
these cases, the precise accuracy of times and distances is
less important than the fact that distances and times in
combat were short.
Describing the moment of contact was as difficult for
contemporaries as it is for us, even though Ammianus,
Procopius, and Mauricius had all had extensive combat
experience. The moment of contact itself is not discussed,
suggesting genuine uncertainty as to what happened.
Moreover, the lack of details in the sources makes this a
highly theoretical exercise. It can be divided into several
possibilities (though the fact that ancient sources do not
distinguish between targets may suggest an over
schematization on our part). When cavalry charged heavy
infantry, they were hoping that the infantry broke and ran.
If the infantry held firm, then the cavalry would have had
two choices. They could come to a halt and start trying to
13
Cooke 1862.
14
e.g. Brighton 2004.
i) McLeod 1965.
break into the format
combat. Or they co
missiles, fire these at
their formation. If t
dispersed infantry,
Against cavalry, the
met, a swirling, diso
rarely provide detai
53 I, the Roman
after giving up, the
determined to break
always retired agai
similar to events a
demonstrates cavalr
accounts of cavalry i
this did happen at r
outside Phasis in 556
Each of these battles,
unique. All of this sh
should not be trying
but rather to develo
of battle and the fac
needs to be connect
of Late Roman cava
we are trying to writ
combined with other
quality, or less often
Procopius' descripti
Book 1 of the War
modern writers who
effective force until
units were armed wi
century evidence sho
and that not every trc
was not describing a
ancient writers were
V egeti us in the late
out that Roman ca
contact with Goths,
On cavalry there
branch of the mi
principles, types
not think there is
since the present
Such comments are
the superlatives lav
especially the Sar
makes positive com
barbarian cavalry in
the emperor's horse
the Huns and Alans
!
6
Procopius, Wars I.l8.
Stylitc, Chronicle 277-278.
17
Procopius, Wars !.1.12-l
IR Vcgetius, de re militari r
merica and an observer in the
uishes between three modes, in
agers'. The charge as foragers is
ainst artillery or for pursuit. For
recommends that the unit walk
or 60 paces, gallop for 80 paces,
Mauricius, Cooke says nothing
contact with the enemy, but is
order, prefacing the section on
admonition: 'as soon as any
it is necessary to halt and
ent'. He also does not distinguish
1st cavalry and infantry. Other
ial also emphasizes control, even
Iery fire, as during the Charge of
rimean War.
14
comments on the whole process
:lry consideration in all types of
importance of order. The ski lis
could only be acquired through
unit. The acceleration to contact
ave begun shooting. Bmvshot is
about 300 m, so the two lines
To cover 300 m at a trot (c. 16
take approximately 66 seconds.
avalry units approaching at the
:ontact \Vmdd probably be c. 33
ll gallop can also be seen as
not be enough time tor the
peed. As the two sides closed,
shoot. At this range, hmvever,
ing at individual targets, but
;eneral direction of the enemy.
fTicult as the archers were rarely
egiments. For aimed shot at
I"
__ e was less than I 00 m. ) In any
ave had little time to shoot, and
privileged over accuracy. In all
curacy of times and distances is
act that distances and times in
)f contact was as difficult for
)r us, even though Ammianus.
had all had extensive combat
f contact itself is not discussed,
rtainty as to \Vhat happened.
1ils in the sources makes this a
. H can be divided into several
act that ancient sources do not
gets may suggest an over
). When cavalry charged heavy
that the infantry broke and ran.
en the cavalry would have had
me to a halt and start trying to
break into the formation with their spears in hand to hand
combat. Or they could veer off and, if equipped with
missiles, fire these at the infantry in the hope of breaking
their formation. If the infantry broke, or if they were
dispersed infantry, then the cavalry rode them dm-vn.
Against cavalry, the results were different. As both sides
met, a swirling, disorganised melee began. We can only
rarely provide detailed descriptions. At Callinicum in
531, the Roman infantry formed ajoulkon. 'Many a time
after giving up, the Persians would advance against them
detennined to break up and destroy their line, but they
always retired again from the assault unsuccessful',
similar to events at the Hippis in 549. Satala well
demonstrates cavalry combat, but we bave no detailed
accounts of cavalry in battle breaking up infantry, though
this did happen at Tell-Beshmai in 502 (at night) and
outside Phasis in 556.
16
Each of these battles, Callinicum, Hippis, and Sa tala, was
unique. All of this should be combined to suggest that we
should not be trying to create a model of a typical battle,
but rather to develop an understanding of the mechanics
of battle and the factors which affected combat. It also
needs to be connected to an understanding of the nature
of Late Roman cavalry forces and of the type of history
we are trying to wTite. How can these tactical thoughts be
combined with other areas, e.g. subjective comments on
quality, or less often described logistical material?
Procopius' description of mounted archers at the start of
Book 1 of the 11/ars has had a great impact on many
modern writers wbo rarely see Late Roman cavalry as an
effective force until the sixth century. Although many
units were armed with both bows and lances, other sixth
century evidence shows that this was not always the case
and that not every trooper \:vas able to shoot.
17
Procopius
was not describing any technological changes, and other
ancient writers were less vvorried about Roman cavalry.
Vegetius in the late fourth or mid-fifth century pointed
out that Roman cavalry had improved as a result of
contact \vith Goths, Alans and 1-luns. He also noted that
On cavalry there are many precepts. but since this
branch of the military has progressed in its training
principles, types of armour, and breed of horses, I do
not think there is anything to be gained from books,
since the present state of know ledge is sufficient.
18
Such comments are hard to interpret. Tbe same is true of
the superlatives lavished on many of their enemies,
especially the Sarmatians, and 11uns. Thus Vegetius
makes positive comments about the horsemanship of
barbarian cavalry in the fourth century where he praises
the emperor's horsemanship by stating that 'the nation of
the Huns and Alans would like to imitate if it could.' and
1" Procopius. Wars !.18.47; Vlll.8.3l-32: Rance 2004: Joshua the
Srylitc, Chronicle 277-278: Agathias 111.26.8
17 Procopius. Wars 1.1.12-15; iv1auricius, StratC'gikon !!.8.
18 Vcgctius. de re miiitari !.20. 11!.26.
HUGH ELTON: CAV/\LRY !N LATE ROMAN WARF
Aurelius Victor described the Alamanni as 'a people'
fight wonderfully on horseback'.
19
These superlat
depend on literary accounts which are par1icul
concerned with individual abilities in riding or vvea
handling, like Procopius' description of the Goth Tot 1
cavalry dance before the battle of Busta Gallorw
These skills, however, have little to do witl1 the abilii
deliver a cavalry charge.
Armies, however, function very difterently
individuals, as well as differing between themselves. The
Roman Empire had a highly developed infrastructure,
which included an eiJective system of providing horses
and training troops. Most mounts were supplied by the
state, either by purchase or from imperial horse farms.:
1
The process was administered by the tribunus (later comes)
.Ytabuli, a post first attested in the mid-fourth century. l-Ie
supervised a number of stratores who could reject horses
they were offered if tbey did not meet fixed ;tandards.
12
DiHiculty in obtaining sufficient horses easily is suggested
by two other sources of remounts. Direct levies of horses
could occur, \vhile if a cavalry veteran's son enlisted with
one horse, he could join a cavalry unit directly (and with
two horses was given the rank of circitor).
23
Once
acquired, horses were managed. If a horse went lame or
fell ill, there was a Roman concept of veterinary
medicine.
24
Soldiers received a ration allowance (annona),
and cavalrymen also received a fodder allowance (capitus)
for their horses. The allowance was nominal. Practical
estimates of how much food a horse needed vary, but 2.2
kg of grain and 6.8 kg of forage, as well as 36 litrcs of
water per mount seem typical, albeit low. These were
minimal estimates. though probably rarely exceeded on

Once recruits were equipped, mounted, 8nd

organised they participated in an extensive system of
exercises, ranging from individual weapon drills up to full-
scale army manoeuvres. This would give the Rormm army
expertise in many of the problems faced in battle, including
practice in operating as a formation.
26
This expertise
systematically retained as many men served long
periods, e.g. Valerius luventinus who served in a regiment
of Dalmatae for 20 years in the late third century or Fl.
Marcus. \Vho served in the vexil!urio Fesioneso for 23
years the fourth century. Long periods car:not l:c
documented later because of a change m eprgrapl11C:
habits.2"
7
379
A separate infrastructure existed for campaigning. \
horse losses could be enormous, if rarely mentione
contemporaries. It has been estimated for Napolc
1'' Vcgctius, de re mi/iwri 111.26; ;\urclius \'ictc.>r, Df:' Cot'wnl;
;\mmianus Ivlarccllinus XXXI.2.6. 20: /\gathl;l\ \'.19.12.
20 Procopius, iVorsV!ll.3l.l7-20 .
21 Elwn !996 116: cf. for the early Empire. Da\iC'> 1969.
' 2 strotor rejecting horses, ;'\mmianus Marccl!inus XX!X.3 5:.
CTVI.31.l (365!373)
:' CT\'11.22.2 (326).
:' 'vlczzabottJ 2000: Doycn-Higuct 19S4.
:'Haldan 1999: 287.
Rance 2000.
:- !LS 2792, 2783
THE LATE ROMAN ARMY fN THE EAST
campaigns that he lost at least three horses for every
human casualty and in the 1812 campaign lost at least
130,000 horses.
28
If a horse fell out of service, there was a
remount system which meant that many soldiers had a
spare horse available and Belisarius is praised by
Procopius for his rapid replacement of horses lost in
battle
29
A full system of campaign supply existed, which
included large supply dumps, like the huge haystack
recorded at Batnae in 363. These allowed the army to
remain concentrated at all times. Forage and water were
the major problems, since they could not be carried in
required quantities.
30
Replacement of consumable items
was also necessary for prolonged campaigning, especially
arrows, and javelins. Although individuals carried only
30-40 arrows each, these numbers rapidly mounted up. A
proposed requisition for an expedition in 911 included
800,000 arrows and I 0,000 javelins for an army of about
34,000 men.
31
Far less can be said about these processes among Rome's
enemies. These need to be divided into two groups, the
state of the Sassanid Persians and the less developed
powers like the Huns or Turks. Although the Persians
only had a large standing army t!om the sixth century, they
had a permanent administration that was able to organise
logistics. This is shown in particular by their ability to
manage long sieges but also an ability to improvise. In 586,
Roman strategy in Mesopotamia before the battle of
Solachon revolved around denying the Persians access to
water; the Persians in response organised a camel train
carrying water. On other occasions, things could go wrong,
as at the siege of Archaeopolis in Lazica, where 20,000
horses were lost on account of a shortage of fodder.
32
The
existence of military manuals also suggests some concept
of training, as does the existence of named regiments.
33
The Persians could thus Lmdertake long sieges, and could
charge home against Roman infantry (even if not always
with success).
But other powers had less structure, and this in turn limited
their abilities. Thus, even amongst the Huns, veterinary
science and horse care were probably less developed.
Vegetius' Mulomedicina suggests that Hun horses were
not stabled in winter, but pastured. This supposedly bred
hardiness, but would probably also contribute to
underfeeding and small-sized horses. To some extent, this
could be counteracted by having spare horses (as
Ammianus describes for the Sarmatians), though these
were probably concentrated among the rich.
34
With little
concept of organisation (except as suggested by the
ZR Elting 1989:317, 3!9.
29
1999: 142-3: Procopius, Wars VII.1.8; Mauricius, Stra1egikon
V.2.
30
Arnrnianus Marcell in us XXIII.2. 7.
31
Mauricius, Straregikon I.2, XILB.5; Haldon 2000; De Caer. 657.!0-
!5.
32
recent overview, Grcatrex 1998: 52-59; Theophylact, ll.l.S-6, 2.4;
Procopius, Wars VlfLl4.44; Scbeos 113-114; Joshua the Stylitc,
Chronicle 295.
33
Inostranccv I 926; Hamblin 1986: 99-106.

Ammi<tnus i'v!arcellinus XVU.l2.3.

380
Strategikon), by political units, there was probably no
training. We should thus expect these armies to be more
adept at skinnishing than at pitched battles, and we should
not expect to find many accounts of them people being
able to make effective charges. The large numbers of
horses required (because they tired easily) would also have
had an etiect on operations. The Strategikon thus
comments in the case of the Scythians, Tmks, etc., 'they
are hurt by a shortage of fodder which can result
hom the huge number of horses they bring with them'.
Consequently, they avoided fortified camps and instead
moved in small scattered groups, concentrating only for
battle.
35
Nor should we expect to find Saracens or Huns
carrying out sieges or long campaigns, since these would
require extensive logistical preparation. In 626 the A var
Chagan claimed, very plausibly, that he abandoned the
siege Constantinople after about 5 weeks for logistical
reasons.-'
6
Thus, the differing infrastructures available to
protagonists in the Late Roman East did atiect the sorts
of battles that were fought. This is true, even if the source
material available is rarely sufficiently detailed to
understand events at a tactical level, or to provide a
detailed knowledge of a campaign's logistics.
37
Detailed
examination of weaponry does not do this, though it
attracted much attention from both ancient and modern
vvriters.
36
Reconstructing any battle, ancient or modern, is a
difficult process for many reasons. Success in war is
achieved by imposing one's will on the enemy. This can
be achieved in many ways, including but not limited to
battle. Although battle was an attractive subject for
authors wntmg within the canons of classical
historiography, it does not follow that this typified late
antique warfare. On the contrary, the extant manuals
focus on avoiding pitched battle wherever possible, in
part because battle was unpredictable. Thus the focus on
battle by both ancient and modem authors is misleading.
But if we follow the manuals in our interpretation, we
will look at factors which maximised the strengths of the
empire, i.e. logistics, planning, and discipline, and thus
stress structural and thus Roman supremacy. Such an
interpretation cannot explain how the Persian army was
able to sack Antioch in 260 and 540, or besiege
Constantinople in 626. Understanding Hun or Avar
success is even harder in this world. Neither approach can
stand alone. Nor is the use of theory to reconstruct
tactical necessities sufficient. In other words, a far more
complex approach to understanding ancient war is
necessary. If we write only about the face of battle, we
miss the face of war.
35
Mauricius, Srrategikon XI.2.
36
Chronicon Paschale p.725.
37
cf. Trombley 2003.
3
s Elton 1996: I 07; Lendon 2005: 263; for one example of the
'hardware' approach, see Mielczarek 1993 or any of the literature cited
there.
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the Scythians, Turks, etc., 'they
fodder Wooxfjc;] which can result
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fter about 5 weeks for logistical
infrastructures available to
Roman East did affect the sorts
t. This is true, even if the source
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37
Detailed
y does not do this, though it
from both ancient and modern
tle, ancient or modern, is a
ny reasons. Success in -vvar is
e's will on the enemy. This can
ys, including but not limited to
v.ras an attractive subject for
1 the canons of classical
ot follow that this typified late
contTary, the extant manuals
d battle wherever possible, in
npredictable. Thus the focus on
modern authors is misleading.
nuals in our interpretation, we
maximised the strengths of the
1ning, and discipline, and thus
Roman supremacy. Such an
ain hovv the Persian army was
n 260 and 540, or besiege
Understanding Hun or Avar
1is world. Neither approach can
use of theory to reconstruct
nt. In other Yvords, a more
nderstanding ancient war is
ly about the face of battle, we
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