Royal Institute of Philosophy

Clearness and Distinctness in Descartes Author(s): Alan Gewirth Source: Philosophy, Vol. 18, No. 69 (Apr., 1943), pp. 17-36 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3748353 . Accessed: 21/03/2013 02:55
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CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS IN DESCARTES

ALAN GEWIRTH

rulethat"whatever I. Descartes's is clearly and distinctly general is true" has traditionally been criticized on two closely perceived relatedgrounds. As Leibniz,forexample, and disputsit, clearness are ofno value as criteria of truth tinctness unlesswe have criteria of clearnessand distinctness; but Descartesgives none. And conthe standards of judgment whichthe rulein factevokes sequently, are purely and psychological. Theremusthencebe set up subjective and logical "marks" by means of whichit can infallibly analytic, be recognized without arbitrariness whether anyideasorpropositions are or are notclearand distinct.2 In a general had been laid before Descartes sense,thesecriticisms In the FifthObjections Gassendiwrites:"Whyare thereso himself. thathe amongmen? Each one thinks manyand so variedopinions and he And the which defends. perceives clearly distinctly opinion I lest you say that manyare eitherbeingpartisanor pretending, wantyou to noticethatthereare thosewhoevenfacedeathforthe sake of the opinions whichtheyhold,even though theysee others the of it for sake the facing oppositeopinions." Hence, Gassendi main shouldhave been to "propound concern Descartes's concludes, a method whichshoulddirect us and teachus when weare deceived and whennot deceivedin thinking that we clearlyand distinctly In thefaceofthisobjection, Descartes'sreply something."3 perceive ofmenwhofacedeathon behalf oftheir is significant. The instance provedthat they clearlyand distinctly perceivethat whichthey And as forwhatyou thenadd, that the conaffirm. pertinaciously cernmustbe notso muchwiththetruth oftheruleas witha method or not we are deceivedwhenwe thinkthat we to discern whether I do not denythis; but I contend that something, clearlyperceive
I This is the third in a series of articles on some basic problems in the two were "Experience and the Non-Mathephilosophyof Descartes. The first matical in the CartesianMethod," Journalof theHistoryof Ideas, II, 2 (April I941), p. 183 ff.,and "The Cartesian Circle," The PhilosophicalReview,1., 4

opinions, he writes,"proves nothing . . . because it can never be

cf. C. S. Peirce, texts therecited. For a more recentversionof this criticism, 3 Vae Obj., VII, 278-9. Cf. ibid., 318. Referencesare to the volume and page of (Euvres de Descartes,ed. Adam-Tannery. B I7
Collected Papers, 5. 39I.

(July I94I), p. 368 ff. 2 Cf. L. Couturat, La Logique de Leibniz (Paris, 1901), pp. I96, 202-3, with

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PHILOSOPHY set forth thisverything has beenaccurately by meinitsplace,where I discarded all prejudices, all theprincipal and thenenumerated first thosewhichwereclearfrom the obscure or ideas and distinguished confused.'" Descartesis here referring, of course,to the procedure followed But beforeexamining the relevant in the first threeMeditations. to it shouldbe notedwhat he considers detailsof that procedure, ofthe "proof"ofclearness and distinctness be thegeneral character to Gassendi. Whereas Leibnizdemands suchas he mentioned thatthe and lacking in "eventheleast criterion be "palpable,""mechanical," that"thereis no needforprolixdiscussions and declares difficulty," our Descartes statesalready in theDiscourse concerning prejudices,"2 in notingwell what are the things that "thereis some difficulty and tells Gassendithat "I do not whichwe conceivedistinctly,"3 so littleconcerned withthe uprooting believethat those who are of prejudices that theycomplainthat I have not spokenof them and in fewwords,' willreadily themethod perceive 'simply whereby we can distinguish thatwhichis reallyperceived that clearlyfrom is onlythought to be clearly The setting which forth of perceived."4 ofclearness and distinctness, criteria then,willforDescartesneceshis basic comments discipline. Among sarilyinvolvea psychological formal method of demonstraconcerning logicand the "synthetic" werethat the tion,both of whichhe opposedto his own method, former the mindto "go on a holidayfrom the evidentand permits of the inference attentiveconsideration and the latter itself,"5 "wrestsassent from the reader,no matter how unwilling and pertinacioushe may be."6 Both of these methods,in their formal thusrealizeLeibniz'sideal,but only,Descartesholds,at character, the expenseof losingall heuristic value. His own method, on the other is not to the dedicated formal of interrelations hand, exhibiting but to research intosubject-matters ideas and propositions thetruth to themind, so thatthenecessity which is notyetknown concerning formal whichit achievescannotbe a merely one but mustderive itself from the impactof the subject-matter upon the mind.Hence, even whenthe resultsof the methodare set downin writing, but 1 Vae Resp., VII, 361-2. (Italics here and in all otherquotations are mine.)

An anonymous exponent of Gassendi took up the debate at this point, a methodfordistinguishing the really "denying" that Descartes had set forth from the apparentlyclear and distinct(X*** toDescartes, JulyI64I; III, 402). convinced of the clearhowever,his examples of men firmly Unfortunately, of their perceptions,and nevertheless in contradiction ness and distinctness so that Descartes to one another,were all taken fromtheologicalcontroversy, was able to say in rebuttal merelythat "reply to them would be very easy the lightof faithfrom the naturallight,and sets the forone who distinguishes former beforethe latter" (to X***, Aug. I64I; III, 426). 2 Couturat,op. cit., 3 Disc. IV, VI, 33. p. Ioo, nn. 2 and 3; p. 203, n. 2.

I8

4 Vae Resp., VII, 379.

5 Reg. X, X, 405-6.

6 IIae Resp., VII, 156.

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CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS IN DESCARTES the same procedures as were followed in the original exhibiting the method "has it investigation, nothing whereby may impel an inattentive or unwilling readerto believe:foriftheleastbit ofwhat it propounds be not attendedto, the necessity of its conclusions is not apparent."'When this consideration is put within the frameworkof a theory ofrepresentative whereonlyideas can perception, be directly the the reason forthe psychological mind, perceived by orientation ofDescartes'smethod becomesevident. Yet if Descartes'scriteria of clearnessand distinctness will not be logicalin the formal, "mechanical" sense demanded by Leibniz, neither willtheybe so radically as to be divorced from psychological all logicalconsiderations. At least thereis a difference, Descartes between theevidentness ofclearand distinct and insists, perception the"precipitation," and "persuasion" ofminds which "pertinacity," cannotprovewhattheyassert, orwhoseassertions to varyaccording whim.'And the accomplishment of the difference comes arbitrary a certainprudenceacquired by habituation:"only the through between thatwhich is clearly and disprudent correctly distinguish and that for seems which or so";3 perceived, tinctly only appears "there are few who are accustomedto clear and distinctperis accentuatedfromthe side of the ceptions."4This difference for if Descartes insistsupon the ease and itself; subject-matter of the deduction he also infallibility prescribed by his method,5 warnsthat the deduction must first be "preparedfor" and "disso that covered,"and the orderof the deduction"excogitated,"6 the clearnessand distinctness exhibited the have will process by had to meet the tests presented these by preliminary operationis in hand. uponthespecific problem of these 2. But let us now examinethe basis and development the Cartesianorder fromthe simple to considerations, following The direct thecomplex. is for objectofthemind'sact ofperception have a double status: Descartesalways an idea.7 Ideas, however, "formal on the one hand,theyare themselves essences," existents, on theother modesofthought; hand,theyare significances, "objecotherthan themselves.8 In of things tive essences,"representative
Cf. Disc. II, VI, I8. IIIae, IIae Resp., VII, 146, I92. Reg. II, X, 363. To Regius, 24 May, I640; III, 65. To X***, Aug. I641; III, 430-I. Princ. I, 50, 68.
X 2

IIae

Resp., VII, I55-6.

mente percipitur."IIIae Resp., VII, I8I. 8 Med. III, VII, 40 ff. Cf. ibid., 37: "Quaedam ex his (cogitationibus) tanquam rerumimaginessunt, quibus solis proprieconvenitideae nomen."

3 VIIae Resp., VII, 461-2. Notae in Prog., VIII (2), 352. 4 Ibid., 5 I. 5 Reg. II, III, IV, XII, X, 365, 369, 372, 429. 6 Reg. IV, XII, XIV, X, 372, 428, 439-40, 451. 7 ". . . ostendo me nomen ideae sumere pro omni eo quod immediate a

I9

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PHILOSOPHY oftruth, orderthatideas be susceptible theymustbe viewednot in in the thefirst but secondway,or "formally."I way,or "materially," The total cognitivesituationfor Descartes thus containsthree factors: act, idea (thedirect perceived), objector content perceptive and thingpurportedly represented by the idea. From this characit is at once apparent that the clearness and distinctness terization, of"correspondence" consist in therelation ofan idea cannotdirectly For since"we can or "conformity" between the idea and the thing. theideas which thanthrough ofthings have no knowledge otherwise it follows that if clearnessand distinctness we conceiveof them,"2 in some directrelation betweenthe idea were qualitiesconsisting the and the thingit purports to represent, the mind,not knowing the never know it had attained without could whether idea, thing to these qualities,so that the first preceptof Descartes'smethod, as true what is and could accept clearly distinctly perceived, only lead only to obscurity and indecision. Clearnessand distinctness, cannotin their essential be thesameas truth; it remains nature then, that theyare qualitiesinternal to ideas and perceptive acts. ofideasplaysan important Andyetthesignificatory character part in theirbeingclear and distinct.It is precisely from the relation between thesetwoaspectsof ideas,theinternal and therepresentathat been foundin the which have difficulties tive, traditionally the natureof thosediffiDescartes'sdoctrine arise. To understand of Descartes'sgeneraldescription culties,we must firstconsider clearnessand distinctness:
A clear perceptionI call that which is presentand open to the attending mind; just as we say that those thingsare clearly seen by us which, being and openly. But presentto the regardingeye, move it sufficiently strongly is distinct whichis not onlyclear but is so preciseand separated that perception from otherthanwhatis clear.3 all othersthatit plainlycontainsin itself nothing

It will be notedthat the wordwhichDescarteshereuses is "perrather ception,"not "idea." But thathe meansby it the perceived thanthe perceiver, the objectrather thanthe act, is apparent from the analogywhichhe drawswithsight:"perception" is giventhe samerelative statusas "things seenby us." Since,however, idea and act are the indicated for either correlative, requirements perceptive willto a certain extent to the other as well. belong In orderto be clear,then,an idea mustbe (i) "present"to the mind,(2) "open" to the mind,and (3) the mindin turnmustbe of Descartes'sdoc"attending"to the idea. Some of the problems trineare alreadyapparentin this formulation. It might seem that the first and thirdrequirements are reallythe same, that an idea cannotbe "present"to the mindat all unlessthe mindis "attendin us of whichwe are not ing" to it, for"therecan be no thought
IVae Resp.,VII
232. 2

To Gibieuf, iQ Jan. 1642; III, 476.

3 Princ. I,

45.

20

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CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS IN DESCARTES at thatsame moment conscious at whichit is in us."I Moreover, it held be that there cannot be even an idea unless these two might are fulfilled, sincean idea is "all thatwhichis immerequirements the In theserespects, mind." diatelyperceived by might difficulty be foundwithDescartes'sanalogyof vision.For an object can be locally "present" to the eye withoutthe eye's "regarding"the the objectsof visioncan presumably exist even object; moreover, whiletheyare notbeingseen; but an idea is constituted bothas to its very existenceby the mind's act of perception, and as to its or representative characterby preciselythat about significance The case is the same withDescartes's whichthe mindis thinking. that the idea be "open" to the mind.The anaotherrequirement, logousphraseon the side of visionis that things"move the eye to which stronglyand openly." The "sufficiency" sufficiently is the abilityof the mindto Descartesis herereferring obviously the object whichis seen. But here again, does not the recognize mindrecognize that,and all that, anyidea,sincean idea is precisely themindis at anymoment At least,suchwould ofwhich thinking? likethese:"I call generally, ofdefinitions seemto be thetenor by the is in ourmindwhenwe conceive a thing, name'idea,' all thatwhich mannerwe conceiveit";2 and "by the name 'idea' I in whatever of any thought, that form the immediate understand through perI conscious of which am that same of In the thought."3 ception of an Nouveaux Essais, Leibnizprotests againstjust thisdefinition "Is it not true that the idea is idea when,to Philalethes' question, he has Theophilus "I the object of thought?" reply, grantit, prointernal videdyou add thatit is an immediate object,and thatthis of the nature or an is idea If the qualitiesofthings. expression object it would arise cease with or the actual the were form ofthought, thoughts it can be anterior to it; butsinceit is their or which correspond object, tothethoughts."4 posterior to say that ideas, at least Now forDescartesit is also correct the essencesof things. thosewhichare clearand distinct, represent in theinterpretation thedifference ofthisstatement But apartfrom dissimilarities from to fundamental Leibniz,the metaphysical owing itselfcannotbe used by Descartesin a methodological statement context;i.e. he cannotconsultthe essencesof thingsin orderto themselves ofan idea,becausethings cannotbe theclearness specify after the of It is nature clearness and disonly perceived. directly and theveracity ofGoddemonstrated, has beendetermined, tinctness ideas are true. thatDescartesis able to assertthatclearand distinct of the ofideas in theinitial status And thisdifference interpretation ofourgeneral the lines a solution also prevents along problem given
3 IIae

I IVae Resp., VII, 246. Resp., Def. II, VII, I60.

To Mersenne, July I64I; Nouv. Ess., II, i, I.

III, 392-3. 21

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PHILOSOPHY have by Leibniz. The problemto whichthe above considerations failto be clear how can any idea whatsoever pointedis, of course, in any way and distinct, i.e. how can clearnessand distinctness forideas when,on Descartes's a normative constitute requirement For if formulation, everyidea seems ipsofactoclear and distinct? what has been said about ideas makes all ideas clear,thenit also sincethe mindperceives makesthemdistinct, onlythatwhichit is "other"thanthat. In the laterdisand nothing in factperceiving, of cussionof the same problem by Locke and Leibniz,'the solution of ideas to theirnames,was based upon the relation the former, of the idea to the amendedby the latterto restupon the relation an is not clear it to idea if it does not thing purports represent: of But in its the Cartesian context recognition object. permit whereby in any case can be perceived ideas,thissolution things onlythrough at least without serious cannotbe accepted, qualification. whichwe have been canvassingarise out of 3. The difficulties the need to findin Descartes'sdoctrine distinctions, analogousto Locke's betweenidea and name, and Leibniz's betweenidea and can be thing,whichwill explain how clearnessand distinctness in a methodonormative qualitiesand yetcapable ofascertainment the sphereof ideas and perceptive within acts. The logicalcontext, distinctions are forthcoming whenit is seen thatthe idea Cartesian act are less simple thanourabove interpretations and theperceptive have indicated.Let us examinesome instanceswhereDescartes fortheconsiderations and confused; on which calls ideas obscure he bases this characterization shouldhelp to revealthe natureof the as well.Senseperceptions are thebest-known class qualities opposite of Descartes'sobscureand confused ideas. Yet thisis not the only whichhe applies to them. They are called clear characterization in two different and distinct contexts:(I) "whentheyare viewed sensations or and (2) when they are used as as thoughts,"2 only to the mind what is or harmful to thecomposite "signifying helpful of whichit is a part."3They are called obscureand confused, howas viewed the essence of when material ever, representing things outsidethe mind.4 From this example we may inferthat the clearnessand disofan idea are neither or obscurity and confusion, intrinsic tinctness, in terms ofa simplerelation to theidea norexplicable between idea the for same and perceptive ideas of sensation be both clear act; may It seemshardly distinct and confused. and obscure, possibleto say
Human Understanding, II, xxix, 5-6. Nouv. Ess., ad loc. I Essay concerning cf. Krit. d. r. V., Paralog.,B 414-I5 For Kant's echo of the same difficulty, Anm. X Princ. I, 68. Cf. Med. III, VII, 35. Reg. XII, X, 423. 3 Med. VI, VII, 83. 4 Princ. I, 66-70. Med. VI, VII, 83. 22

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CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS IN DESCARTES are in no waythe thattheideas involved in thesedifferent instances the common name at least Descartes to them all of same; applies "sense perceptions." There must,then,be some additionalfactor whosecombination withthe twoalreadyindicated givesto theidea or perceptive act one or another This third of thesequalifications. factoris revealed in Descartes's significant expressionthat the the situation in which sensations are "viewedas" (spectantur For ut). there enter clearnessand distinctness involves not merelythe of a directly but also some content, passiveapprehension perceived each of with to that In the threeincontent. interpretation regard stances thesame ofideas ofsensation, givenabove oftheperception case the ideas (e.g. content was directly but in the first perceived; in the colours)were"viewed" or interpreted simplyas sensations, and in secondcase as havingsome biologically function, symbolic the thirdas being "similar"or cognitively adequate to external ofdirect material It wouldhenceseemthatit is in therelation things. and interpretive contents or perceptions and disthatthe clearness orobscurity and confusion, ofan idea are to be found. tinctness, The same conclusion from consideration of otherideas emerges whichdo not involvethe sharp distinction betweenessentialand non-essential foundin Descartes'saccountof sense representation ideas Thus the of the modes thought and extension, perception. Descartes "can be clearly and distinctly ifthey understood be writes, viewed notas substances, or things from other but things, separated hand,we wereto onlyas modesofthings.. . . But if,on theother consider themwithout the substances in whichtheyare, by that view fact we would them as and so we would very subsisting things, the of a mode of ideas and a substance."' Here again the confuse samecontent is directly and it from ofthat is the relation perceived, contentto the way in whichit is "viewed" or interpreted that and distinctness, clearness or confusion, result. Descartes'sdoctrine of greater than admits,however, generality is envisaged in thesetwo examples.For in each of theseexamples, the directcontent(sense qualities,or "the modes thoughtand is held constant, whilethe interpretive content varies. extension") But Descartesalso discusses clearness and distinctness in situations where the direct contentvaries while the interpretive content remains fixed. For example,not everyidea whichis interpreted to be representative of God is clear and distinct. The idea will have thesequalitiesonlyif"we do notput anything fictitious intoit,but note those things alone which are really contained in it, and whichwe evidently perceiveto pertainto the natureof the most perfectbeing."2 Among these "real" attributesDescartes lists sourceof all goodness and truth, "eternal,omniscient, omnipotent, I Princ. I, 64. 2 Ibid., 54.
23

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PHILOSOPHY all thosethings and in sum havingin himself of all things, creator or is infinite, which some in whichwe can clearlynote perfection the idolaters' the other On terminated hand, by no imperfection."' content "idea of God," whichin its direct includes, representatively and such attributesas vindictiveness togetherwith perfection, and confused.2 is obscure corporeality, of We can now see the sense in whichDescartes's description characis a normative in thePrinciples clearand distinct perception For in to any idea whatsoever. and not one belonging terization, is "which content is some there situation present everyperceptual or "vindictive mind"(e.g. sensequalities, and opento theattending and an not be "need this content but integral being") corporeal is what of i.e. the directlyperceived thing,"3 perception complete or less, thanwhatthe mindinterprets (or wishesto may be other, or itself to be "matter," "God"). Thus (e.g. perceiving interpret)4 to be is in content Descartes's thedirect statement, which, required whatcontent is not to the mind" and any attending open "present but thiscondition), fulfills situation soever(sinceeveryperceptual and complete"in relathatcontent whichshall be "integral rather content ofit. Whentheinterpretive tionto themind'sinterpretation is taken as basic, then,an idea is clear if its directcontent(e.g. includes if the directcontent interpretation ("God"), and distinct is content direct whenthe otherthan this.And similarly, nothing if its an idea is clear taken as the pointof reference, interpretive content(e.g. "havingbiological utility")includesall that whichis if the includedin its directcontent(sense qualities),and distinct 5 In mostgeneralterms, else. includesnothing then, interpretation of an idea may be said to consistin and distinctness the clearness contents. and interpretive ofits direct the "equality"6
3 Princ. I, 34. Thus Descartes writesthat "the ideas which I have of heat and cold are so little clear and distinctthat I cannot learn fromthemwhethercold is only a privationof heat, or heat a privationof cold, or each is a real quality, or neither" (Med. III, VII, 44). It is hence in relation to such contemplated of their direct content, in which one wishes to "learn from interpretation that these ideas are lacking them" the nature of the qualities they represent, of themin On the otherhand, an interpretation in clearnessand distinctness. termsof biological utilityfindsthe same ideas, i.e. the same directcontents, clear and distinct. 5 From this it can readilybe seen that when the directcontentis the basis of evaluation (as in Descartes's example of the clear but confusedperception of pain in Princ. I, 46), ideas are usually clear, but their distinctnessmay contentis made come into question; on the otherhand, when the interpretive the basis, ideas may oftenbe lacking in clearness,but if they are clear, they 6 Cf. Reg. XIV, X, 439-40. will usually be distinctas well.
2 4

"incorporeal," "good") includes all that which is included in the

I Princ. I, 22. Ilae, IVae Resp., VII, I38-9, 233-4.

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CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS IN DESCARTES thana narrowly a logicalrather Thisequality is, ofcourse, quantiof science, wherethe concern is with In the context tativerelation. thetwocontents theconnection between must ofthings, theessences for an idea to be clear,then, The minimum be necessary. requirement content be takenas basic,the otherincludewhat is thatwhichever nature" (ratio of its in the Repliesis called tne "formal formalis)' is called the the in and what Principles object's "leading object, its nature and essence."2Thus the which constitutes property, of the between square thebase and thesquareofthe other equality "is not clearlyunderstood unlessin a right two sides of a triangle is to be which of the idea i.e. ;3 interpreted representative triangle" tosucha proportion, is notclearunlesswhatis essential thatequality be includedin the idea's direct in a righttriangle, its inherence foran idea to be the minimum content.Similarly, requirement to the of its object essence is that nothing distinct contradictory a distinct in it; it is in thissensethatDescartesdefines be included than is other what Thus clear." idea as one which"contains nothing if be understood the "cannot a right triangle distinctly proportion of equalitybetweenthe squares of its sides and of its base be ofthatproportion, an essential forthenthecontradictory denied,"4 the in idea ofthetriangle. would be contained ofthetriangle, property be conceived "an atomcan never sincethevery distinctly, Similarly, of the wordimpliescontradiction, viz. to be body and signification a truepartofmatter, thedeterminate to be indivisible" ;5and "as for includedin the quantityof space whichit occupiesis necessarily whichone can have ofit" ;6 i.e. iftheidea in which distinct thought to represent a part of matter is interpreted is to a directcontent that directcontentmust representatively be clear and distinct, of a determinate of space. includethe occupancy quantity been confusing idea withjudgment? 4. But has notourdiscussion oftheabove formulation It is perhapsa signofthecorrectness that this same objectionwas made to Descarteshimself Arnauld.7 by thatneither ideas norperceptive Descartesinsists For although acts, incur he holds that is a there but only judgments, error,8 may as real what is not in ideas, whentheyrepresent "materialfalsity acts "view as," so real."9 It will be noted that just as perceptive is interpretive as": in each case the orientation ideas "represent Now if ideas be in simple apprehension. ratherthan consisting
1 lae, IIae, IIIae, Vae Resp., VII, II3, 147, I75, 368. 2 Princ. I, 53. 3 IVae Resp., VII, 225. 4 Ibid. 5 To Mersenne, 30 Sept. I640; III, 191. Cf. IIae Resp., VII, 152. Conversa7 IVae Obj., VII, 206.

tion,V, I60.

6 Ibid., loc. cit.

8 Med. III, IV, VII, 37, 56-8.

9 Ibid., III, VII, 43.

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PHILOSOPHY from viewed thestandpoint ofwhatthey"really" normatively, solely to speak of ideas not "representing" it is nonsense their represent, objects "as" thoseobjectsare. Thus Descartestells Gassendithat "the idea represents the essence of the thing,and if something from be added to or subtracted becomesthe idea of it, it forthwith And from the same a different Arnauld thing."I precisely standpoint to Descartes: "that of call idea which cold, materially objects you to yourmind?A privation? Then it is a false,whatdoes it exhibit Then it is not trueidea. A positive the idea of Descold."2 being? stresses thattheissueinvolves notmerely a normative cartes'sreply ofdirect ofideas,but a mixture content withinterpretaconception whether whatit exhibits tion: "I cannotdecide to me is something outside positive mysense,ornot."3 does not, of course,make the idea or perSuch interpretation act involvesan act of will in judgmental;forjudgment ceptive to perception. addition no Hence,any objectof the understanding, howcomplex, is an idea so longas thereenters matter no volitional is notofitself or inference it may, act. Now a proposition volitional; it indeedmust, be an objectofperception and in thiscontext in the same sense as the simplest idea. For if it is simplyby the act of that the judgment comesintobeing, willingan idea or perception have previously been a proposition mustnot theidea or perception If the idea werelogically or groupofpropositions? equivalent only to a term,the additionthereto of the act of will could in no way or deniesis nota term resultin a judgment. Whatone affirms but a been simply a perceptual which,having previously proposition ofa significant is transformed intoa judgment content, interpretation act of or the affirmation volitional denial. by is not a judgment That the interpretive is, indeed, perception in one of his Descartes letters:4 men indicated "What explicitly by whentheyjudgethatspace,which is nothing, theycall empty, they it as a positive nonetheless understand Thus,too,whenthey thing. themto themselves thinkthat accidentsare real,theyrepresent as do not them to be To substances." substances, although judge they as" is hencedifferent from as" orto "understand judging; "represent suchan interpretive results from and theidea which takes operation ofa proposition or inference.5 thelogicalform
I For a statement of indifference as to whetherideas are expressed as cf. to Mersenne,July 1641; III, 395: "Car, qu'elles termsor as propositions, ce n'est pas cela par des noms ou par des propositions, (les idees) s'expriment a l'espritou i l'imagination;les unes etles autres qui faitqu'elles appartiennent de ces deuxmanieres. . . ."In anotherletterto Mersenne se peuvent s'exprimer III, 417), Descartes writes: "Je n'entendspas bien la question (22 July I64I; 26
I Vae Resp., VII, 37I. 3 IVae Resp., VII, 234.
2 IVae Obj., VII, 207. 4 To X***, Aug. I64I;

judge frequentlydisagrees with what they understand. . . . Thus,

III, 430.

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CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS IN DESCARTES ofDescartes'smethod The non-formal orientation bearsout these For eventhe"simplenatures"are described considerations. as "proand of course which is the act of intuition, positions,"' elementary stated to as is have its now now object perception, propositions, the and their natures now consequences connections, simple necessary or seriesofpropositions. Both the simplenatures and the act ofinto judgments, tuition are by Descartesopposedprimarily in virtue ofthevolitional ofthelatter, character which in "formal" result may in But sinceideas maybe propositions, is no absurdity there falsity. them false. calling "materially" of 5. Once an idea has what we have seen to be the minimum it can becomeclearerif,whileit is still clearness and distinctness, ofthesameobject,itsdirect to be representative content interpreted attributes the comesto include additional connected with necessarily more we in content. "The attributes apprehend the interpretive or substance, the moreclearly do we knowit."' And by same thing the same token,the idea will becomemoredistinct, forthe richer from its content, the moreis it distinguished whatis otherthanit: "A conceptis not made moredistinct by the factthatwe comprethe factthatthosethings which in but hendfewer things it, onlyby in it from all do we others."3 we comprehend distinguish accurately in addition in degreerevealsanother This variation distinction, to give to that betweendirectand interpretive contents, required a normative basis. This otherdistinction clearness and distinctness of an idea. We have contents is betweenthe explicitand implicit and is "integral a clear and distinct seen that although perception can becomemoreclear,i.e. even more complete,"it nevertheless "complete."The limitof such increaseis an "adequate" idea, in all the properties "containedabsolutely whichare representatively known."4 whichare in the thing OnlyGod can have suchadequate ofit,although it mayhave thehumanmindis incapable knowledge; a and hencea Thus man have knowledge. complete may "complete" this idea is by no means idea of God although clear and distinct just as "we do not doubtthat perfection, adequateto God's infinite whenhe has theidea ofa wholetriangle, in geometry one unlearned three it to be a figure understands lines, although by comprehended be known about thattriangle, can by geometers manyotherthings For a direct he is ignorant."5 and be notedin theidea ofit,ofwhich
par un simpleterme;car les que vous me faites,savoir si nos id&ess'expriment paroles 6tant de l'inventiondes hommes,on peut toujours se servird'une ou de plusieurs,pour expliquerune m6mechose ...."
Reg. V, VI, XI, XII, X, 379, 383, 409, 410, 428. Princ. I, II. Cf. Med. II, VII, 33. 4 IVae Resp., VII, 220. Cf. IIae Resp., VII, I40, 152.
'

3 Ibid., 63.

5 Vae Resp., VII, 368.

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PHILOSOPHY not to "containabsolutely all the properties whichare in content known"is possibleonlybecause of the logicalorientation the thing ofcourse, an idea refers ofDescartes'sviewofideas. Metaphysically, to a which the can never itself mind thing perceive directly; beyond Descartesis not relybut in denying adequacyto humancognition or evenprimarily, he is ingexclusively, uponthisbasic fact;rather, to in a what be ascertained ideas Now for can themselves. referring an idea is and exhaustively position, precisely strictly psychological ofwhich themindis at anytimeaware,so that(putting thatcontent in termsof ideas and of adequate knowledge Descartes'sdefinition to of a which is notawareof everyperception acts) speak perceptive an in is a contradiction in ForDescartes, contained idea terms. thing is possible betweenthose ideas on the otherhand, a distinction i.e. arbitrarily which are "fictitious," compoundedby the mind and thosewhichthe mindmerely discovers without itself, adding idea not to their"objectivereality."It stillremains truethatevery in that but consists onlydependsupon the mindforits existence, aware. But once thus verycontentof whichthe mindis directly an idea of the latter as a directobject of perception, constituted an independent sort is, with regardto its furthersignificance, itself a of of within containing logicalentity system implications, natures their which deduction and relations, may gradually simple to reveal,and whichindeedit is the task of scienceprogressively of the discover. Thus, to take again Descartes'sfavourite example idea ofa triangle,
when I imagine a triangle,although perhaps such a figure exists nowherein the world outside my thought,and never has existed, yet it has forthwith a determinatenature, or essence, or form,immutableand eternal, which has not been made up (efficta) by me, and does not depend upon my mind; as is can be demonstrated ofthistriangle, shownby the factthat variousproperties viz. that its three angles are equal to two rightangles, that its greatestside I now clearly is subtendedby the greatestangle,and the like,whichwilly-nilly whenI imagined perceive,even ifI have in no way thoughtofthempreviously so that theyhave not been made up by me.i a triangle,

the properties revealedby such deductive deHence, even though have not been the these mind, previously suspectedby velopment do notbasically"augment"theidea, but merely "render operations and explicit, becauseall theseproperties it moredistinct musthave in thatidea which was had at first."2 been contained to note,however, It is important thatthisvariation in thedegree is possibleonly because an idea for of clearnessand distinctness as well as a directcontent. Descartesinvolvesan interpretive The remains fixedand unchanged "idea" which the process throughout
2

I Med. V, VII, 64. Cf. Reg. XII, X, 422. Conversation, V, I5I-2. Vae Resp., VII, 37I. Cf. ibid., 368.

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CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS IN DESCARTES in whichproperties unknown are discovered in "it" is previously not merely the initialdirectcontent, since this undergoes obvious the interpretive content increase;it is rather which, equatedat the outsetwiththe direct is found to be necessarily connected content, withthe "new" properties, sincetheseare foundto be necessarily withtheinitial direct so thatthemindinterprets connected content, of the same object. each succeeding to be representative property It can readily be seen how thisinterpretive is theinitial perception basis of Descartes's doctrineof substance and methodological essence. theclearness and distinctness 6. Thusfarwe have beendiscussing ofideas simply in terms ofthecharacteristics theideas themwhich selves mustpossess. But we mustnow turnto consider just how ofideas are to be ascertained, thesecharacteristics i.e. whatis that thatwhich "method"ofwhich Descartesspoketo Gassendi, whereby from thatwhichis can be distinguished is reallyclear and distinct this to be so. In termsof the preceding discussion, only thought has a For the one has on Descartes hand, question specialurgency. the ideas of them; on can be knownonlythrough said that things or the idea of corthe otherhand, in callingsense perceptions, are when viewed as repreobscure and confused they poreality, of material and God, he the essence things, senting, respectively, seemsto have assumedthatthemindhas someindependent insight, intothe"real" essence torepresent ideaspurporting them, apartfrom ofideas ofthings. ofhowtheclearness and distinctness The question ofhow thesameas thequestion is thusbasically areto be ascertained context of and ideas the mind, withinthe methodological perof objects,whichit ceptiveacts, can ascertainthat its definitions of the clearnessand distinctness as a basis forevaluating employs are real and not the equatingof directand interpretive contents, it mustbe emphasized, or arbitrary. This problem, nominal merely is different fromthe ultimatemetaphysical questionof whether enters clearand distinct ideas are true.The divineguarantee onlyto at by methodoto the decisions alreadyarrived give finalsanction logicalmeans. in theRulesand in thesecondpartofthe Thesemeansaresetforth ofhis"method," thatin telling It willbe recalled Gassendi Discourse. Descartes emphasizedfirstthe removalof "prejudices."Now a made priorto clearand distinct is a judgment perception prejudice and whichis judged.zDoes thismean that clearness of the content to attaintheseveryqualities?The mustbe employed distinctness
I Cf. IIae Resp., Def. II, VII, i6I, and especially IVae Resp., VII, 222, to be the where Descartes shows that substance is that which is interpreted 2 Cf. Princ. I, 47. subject of directlyperceivedideas.

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PHILOSOPHY
act and answeris givenby the distinction betweenthe perceptive theidea or content For it is possible thatdirect and interperceived. whilethe full contents be "equal" or necessarily connected, pretive ofthegrounds forthisbe lacking. Thiswouldbe thecase perception ifthe idea werenot "open" to the mind,i.e. ifits elements and the relations to between themwerenot revealedto the extentrequired or to permit the deduction connection. In of,thisnecessary justify, this perceptual, as againstthe preceding logical,sense, an idea is obscureand confused between not because of an actual inequality its directand interpretive but "onlybecausethereis concontents, tainedin it something whichis unknown."'Indeed,it is from this latterobscurity that ideas become and confusion i.e. contradictory, in thelogicalsense.2 confused To makean idea "open" to themind, to render known its elements connecand to see how the necessary tion of its directand interpretive fromthem,is contents follows thusthepurpose ofDescartes's basicmethodological precept whereby "we reduce involved and obscure stepby stepto simpler propositions ofthe simplest ones ofall."3 ones," untilwe cometo an "intuition The ultimate of are called elements ideas conceptual by Descartes of on the side material such "simplenatures."Theyinclude, things, "extension,""motion,"and on the side of conceptsas "figure," mentalphenomena, "volition." "doubt," "ignorance," "cognition," Unlikecomposite from ideas, in whichit is possibleto discriminate one anothernot only directand interpretive but also contents, variousparts of the directcontent,the necessityof whose connection withone another in the idea is not self-evident, the simple natures cannotbe misinterpreted, to discriminate for it is impossible in them a directand an interpretive content.To thinkof these and hence clearly; simplesat all is to thinkof themcompletely, theirvery simplicity forthe mind to makes it difficult similarly, confusethemwith,i.e. interpret "other" than themas, anything so that theyare perceived as Since all well.4 themselves, distinctly ideas involve to these it follows that attain a composite simples, clear and distinctperception of any composite idea requiresthe of the idea to these self-evident reduction elements and then the of the in are in a which combined perception preciseway they to nexus form the idea in necessary originally question.
I

3 Reg. V, X, 379. The de omnibusdubitandum of the First Meditationis just such a systematicreductionof ideas received"fromthe senses or through the senses," to the thoughtswhichare theirelements. makes on this doctrineof the simple or primitive"notions" (Princ. I, 47 if., and to Elizabeth,21 May I643; III, 663), since they involve essentiallythe same principle as the discussionof the Regulae,althoughin a broader context, are here passed over.
4 Reg. XII,

Ilae

Resp., VII, I47.

2 Ibid., I52.

X, 4I8-420,

422.

The further refinements which Descartes

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CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS IN DESCARTES does not,of course,resultin an "adequate" idea. This reduction theidea mustin its direct conto be clearand distinct, For in order nature" of the which it is the "formal tent represent object only not the or but "matter" itselfas object interpreted representing, be infinite, forexample,mustnot itself the idea of infinity, just as be that the need not reduction the idea of obscurity obscure--so of implications in whichan idea is will attainnot the total system are "sufficient"z to establish(or which but thoseelements involved, oftheidea's direct and interpretive connection thenecessary refute) or proportions" in whichthe proThe various"relations contents. involvedwill hence have been so "reduced" positionwas initially will contents that the equalitybetweenits directand interpretive itselfbe "clearly seen."3 The reductionattains this perceptual because it enables the mind,within the clearnessand distinctness ofideas and perceptive context acts,to "distinguish methodological essenceof a thing, to the trueand immutable that whichpertains a fiction of the to it only through fromthat whichis attributed 4 understanding." The contents of a fictitious idea, such as that of a wingedhorse in a square,can be clearlyand distinctly or of a triangle inscribed one another, i.e. even if one part be from conceived in separation can still be fullyconceived each the of denied other, explicitly whichit presents the significance in any way contradicting without ofa trueand immutable to themind.An idea willbe representative of its contentsis necessary, not nature,then,if the connection a sundered of "real" be cannot that so contingent, by way they ofthe one without one can think distinction: payingany "although to the other,one cannot,however, attention denyit of that other true ofboth."5"Those ideas whichdo not contain whenone thinks ones fictitious and immutable natures,but only compounded by not can be dividedby thatsame understanding the understanding, so that but by a clearand distinct operation, only by abstraction, cannotthusdividehave undoubtedly theunderstanding thosewhich not been compounded If, then,the mindfindsthat it by itself."6 and stillbe trueto cannotdenythe parts of ideas of one another to it, suchideas are each partdirectly which the meaning presented natures of are essential which of objects independent representative contents ofthese themindfortheir beingwhattheyare. The direct to represent ofdifference," ofthis"method ideasare seen,as a result oftheobjectswhich or at leastpartoftheessence, theessence, they
Cf. IIae, IVae Resp., VII, I40, 152, 221. 4 Iae Resp., VII, 3 Reg. XIV, X, 440. s To Gibieuf, I9 Jan. I642; III, 474. Cf. VIae Resp. VII, 443. 6 lae Resp., VII, I17.
2

I Iae, IIae, Resp., VII, II3, I47-8.

II6.

3I

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PHILOSOPHY are interpreted as representing, so that the directand interpretive contents are equal to one another. It willhave been noted,however, thatthe criterion of "immutability"statedin thesecondquotation givenabove was theinability of ideas to be divided"by a clear and distinct which operation," Descartes as meaning what goeson to specify "rightly understanding I say." Here again,as previously in thediscussion ofthediscarding of "prejudices,"the logicalsense of clearnessand distinctness, as of ideas,is statedto be ascertained characteristics and by clearness distinctness as characteristics of the perceptive act which, resulting fromthe reductiveprocess,findsnecessityof connection within the ideas. An excellent of this is the famous example process operationupon thewax in theSecondMeditation. It is required to ascertain theessential A direct natureofmatter. content whichis interto be of matter is in the chosen, preted representative consisting various sensequalities thewax initially which Then these presented. are of see a series reductions to whether qualities put through they and theinterpretive content "so dependuponone another, thatone can in no way be changedwhilethe otherremainsunchanged."' It is foundthat the sense qualitiesare changed, the wax although still "remainsthe same." Hence, those qualities are essentially "other"than the wax, and the interpretive of themas perception the essence of the wax was not This distinct. representing "identity" of the wax throughout the changing of the directcontent, whichis can be understood greatly emphasized by Descartes,2 onlythrough the interpretive of ideas. It is because the aspect of his doctrine is held constantthat the reductive interpretive perception process can be viewed,in the methodological as goingfrom accicontext, dentalto essentialattributes of the sameobject,and not from one set of ideas to anotherset whollyunrelated thereto. The process the directcontent consists, then,in gradually divesting interpreted as representing a certainobject of the "formsexternal"to that object,i.e. of thosequalitieswithwhosedenial the objectcan still be conceived, so that thereis no necessary connection betweenthe object and those qualities.The end of the processcomes when a directcontentis attainedwhichsurviveseveryreductive device, so long as the object can be conceived,and without remaining whichthe objectcan no longer be conceived. This directcontent is hencenecessarily connected withthe interpretive content whereby the mind thinksof the object in question,and constitutes the
"Remanet adhuc eadem cera ? Remanerefatendum est; nemonegat,nemo aliter putat. Quid erat igiturin ea quod distinctecomprehendebatur? Certe nihil eorum quae sensibus attingebam; nam. . mutata jam sunt: remanet cera." Med. II, VII, 30. Cf. Princ. II, 4.
2
I

Reg. XII,

X, 429.

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CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS IN DESCARTES essentialdefinition of that object. And only in virtueof such a reductive is act clear (as attaining process the resultant perceptive theessenceoftheobject,in thatthedirect content is actually which of the essence of the which it is representative object interpreted as representing has been made "presentand open to the attending "otherthan" whatis mind") and distinct (as excluding everything The thus wax is ascertained to consist ofextenessential). essentially sion and mobility, not of any peculiarcolours, and sounds, tastes; ofthe reductive the sense hence,at theconclusion process whereby Descarteswritesthat the perception of the qualitiesare removed, wax "can be eitherimperfect and confused, as it was before, or clearand distinct, as it nowis, in so faras I attendless or moreto thethings ofwhich it consists."I The physicalmanipulation whichthe procedure of the wax involvesis themostgraphic but nottheonlyform which thereductive and distinctness clearness operation leadingto thisperceptual may of the process, Descartespointsout,consists take. The culmination in an "inspection ofthemindalone."The sameoperation in principle occurswheninfinite is found to be to essential God: ultiperfection which it is the the mind finds in the mately impossibility conceiving latter withoutthe former that methodologically shows the idea of a "trueand equatingthemto be a real definition, representative immutable These essentialdefinitions nature."2 consist,of course, not in genusand differentia but in variouscombinations of simple 3 Once attained, can then be to the natures. used test clearness they
Med. II, VII. Med. V, VII, 67, 11. 21-4. It is because Descartes holds that he has shown in this way that the idea of God as an infinitely perfectbeing representsa true or real essence,and is not merelya nominaldefinition, that he maintains that his ontological argument,unlike that of St. Anselm as reported by Thomas Aquinas, is neitherverbal nor fallacious. Cf.Iae Resp., VII, II5-I9. 3 Definitions as viewed in the Aristotelian tradiby genus and differentia, kinds of things,so that to defineany tion, presuppose essentiallydifferent given species requiresshowing the genus to which the species belongs, and then the formwhichdifferentiates it fromotherspecies of the genus and constitutesit what it is. Such definitions are hence basically additive: the differentia adds a characteristic which is essentiallyother than that of any other species. The Cartesiandefinition by simplenatures,on the otherhand, adds no "new" characteristic, but consists in a different or "mixture" arrangement of the same basic elementspossessed by all otherthings; such definitions are hence "mechanistic" (cf. the example of a righttriangleto exhibit what is meant by "species," Princ. I, 59). The only point at which the Aristotelian differentia would enter into the Cartesian scheme is in the initial separation of the "material" from the "intellectual"natures.There is, however, a certain of a analogy betweenthe two methods; just as forAristotleif the definition the species in question species states the genus alone it has not differentiated fromother species, i.e. the definition is not "distinct," but if it states the C
To Mersenne, I5 June I64I; III, 383.

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PHILOSOPHY to be repreare interpreted and distinctness ofall other ideas which "idea of the objectsdefined. sentative It is thusthat the idolaters' and of God," wherethe directcontentincludes"vindictiveness" is for shown to be both these confused; qualities "corporeality," the former becauseit is a tendency implyimperfection, away from the latterbecausewhatever and hencetowardnon-being, goodness, not to be is corporeal is divisible, and "it is a greater perfection dividedthan to be divided,"so that "if you mean (by 'God') only what is mostperfect in the natureof body,thisis not God."I The is of the and consistsin "comparison" procedure now deductive, essential definition withotherideas,through as manyintermediate It is in thissensethatDescartesmentioned stepsas are necessary.2 to Gassendi,as the secondpart of his method of ascertaining what is reallyperceived and distinctly, afterthe removalof preclearly all the that he "enumerated judices by the processof reduction, ideas and distinguished thosewhich those wereclearfrom principal whichwereobscureor confused"; i.e. he set forth whichideas conthereal definitions stituted of God,the mind, material objects,and whichnot,so thatdeductive then ascertain what could comparison further ideas interpreted oftheseobjectswouldbe as representative clearand distinct. The discovery of what ideas represent the essencesof things is It to ideas and internal acts. thuseffected perceptive by operations is precisely because ideas are viewedby Descartesas beingreprethat ofthings which are notthemselves sentative directly, perceived within these characteristics clearnessand distinctness, emerging are not in theirimmediatenature the same as the operations, ofconformity between ideasand things which relation transcendental 3 orientation must calls"truth," so thatthemethodological Descartes one culminating in the divine be supplemented by a metaphysical likeSpinoza,were laterrationalists, This addition, which guarantee. indicatesfromthe side of thingsthe circumto findsuperfluous, Descartes'sinternal controls approachto spectionwhichsimilarly It is by subjecting the mind themselves. and distinctness clearness exercisedby the internalmeaningsof ideas, to the coerciveness thoseideas to the whimsof a dogmatic ratherthan by subjecting That thisis Descartes's mind,that thesequalitiesare ascertained. has been overlooked real emphasis by the traditional interpretation

it also includesthegenus (cf.Met. VII I2, Io37b, 29 ff.); so forDesdifferentia idea contains that mixture of simple natures which cartes if a definitory not necesthe "formalnature" of its object, but otheringredients represents the idea is clear but not distinct, but if it is sarily connected therewith, distinctit is also clear (cf.Princ. I, 46). IlIae Resp., VII, 138. Cf. Med. V, VII, 67-8. Conversation, V, I6I. 2 Cf. Reg. XIV, X, 439. 3 To Mersenne, I6 Oct. 1639; II, 597.

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CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS IN DESCARTES becauseoftheopposition, insisted ofhis method uponin thatintertherationalistic and theexperimental between approaches pretation, of clearness themselves to science.Yet both the formulae and distinctnessand Descartes's actual applicationof them show that methodsof these qualitiespertainas much to the experimental he in difference which his and employed physical operaagreement in natures tionsas to the operations dealingwiththe "intellectual" no senseexperience which plays part. The purposeof physicalscienceforDescartesis to explainthe ofideas whose nature ofmaterial system by a deductive phenomena of and motion, are the figure, simpleconcepts extension, principles of all The clearness distinctbodies. and the essence which represent of physics of willrequire ness of the ideas or propositions necessity the deductive itself but within not then, connection, system only and the class of phenoalso betweeneach explanatory proposition or effects, or to explain:the phenomena, menawhichit is designed or or causes, and the explanations, directcontents, interpretive have to be "provedso to dependupon one willsimilarly contents, anotherthat the one can in no way be changedwhile the other ofthismutualdependence, The ascertainment remains unchanged." it is to "crucial" experiments in turn,involvesrecourse whereby each a certain whichof variouspossibleexplanations, determined natures ofthematerial or "mixture" simple logically "composition" is in fact of the the with system, propositions prior compatible "in order in the with connected question: phenomenon necessarily whichof thesecauses is the trueone, it is to be able to ascertain cannotagreebothwiththe which to consider experiments necessary "to seek out one and withthe other";' or, in anotherstatement, willnot be outcome which willbe suchthattheir someexperiments is to be explained, thesameifit is in oneofthesewaysthattheeffect idea in physics, A clear and distinct as if it is in another."2 then, be dealt must are detailed when with, being problems especially to be idea: a proposition verified an experimentally purporting mustbe "equal" to thatphenoofa givenphenomenon explanatory ofthisrequires and not"other"thanit,buttheascertainment menon of must be the actually science because to recourse experiment, alone reveal the senses as whose world, objects, existing, existing would the whereas the to mind, pureunderstanding determinately ideas of its which be unable to differentiate actually represented and whichonlypossibleones. Nor is this materialthings existing the intrafrom a departure and experiment appeal to phenomena the For as method. ofDescartes's orientation ideational phenomena, "ideas" directly are themselves dealt within the method, perceived of the the senses,and representative, although confusedly, through
du CorpsHumain, XVIII, XI, 242. Description
2

Disc. VI, VI, 65.

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PHILOSOPHY ideas represent whichthe scientific material clearly things existing A scientific and distinctly. idea, then,findsits place as clear and in virtueof a triplenecessary of physics the system within distinct and of extension, connection: motion, (I) withthe basic principles essence the wax of the as the showed, which, represent example figure it in the deductive of material things;(2) withthe ideas preceding causedby the and with physically phenomena particular (3) system; which existents material of the particular and hencerepresentative are to be explained.' is and distinctness ofclearness ofthe method The basic emphasis ideas: the of scientific thus upon the testingand confirmation
principle is that "for right philosophizing. . . the greatest care

as truewhich we cannotprove mustbe takennotto admitanything ideas are representawhich And thefactor to be true."2 determining tiveoftheessencesofvariousobjects,and henceclearand distinct, consistsin that whichthe ideas themselves compelthe mind to them to elements and triedto has reduced their after it perceive in There combine them various and is, indeed,a ways. separate is of method as the shown,forexample, also, aspect psychological as "a of intuition in Descartes's description pure and attentive that so facile and distinct there remainsno mind's conception, Butthisfacility and thatwhichwe understand."3 doubtconcerning rather thanas causes are regarded indubitableness by himas effects in thelogicaland perceptual ofclearness and distinctness senses,as the mindrecognizes the contents the processwhereby culminating themin any ofideas to be ofsuchsortthatit is unableto perceive before it. It is in thissense,not in a way otherthantheconnection one, that Descartes can say, as Burman narrowly psychological or not perceptions are clear we shall know that "whether reports, and forthis it is of the greatest our own consciousness, best from whichthe authorset of things help to knowall thoseelucidations The method in the first book of the Principles."4 of clearness forth as Descartesdevelopsit henceexhibits no merely and distinctness but rather or and criteria, logical perceptual psychological subjective the conformity ones whichthe mindis to use in orderto ascertain external to it. witha world ofits thought
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.
2 Vae Resp., VII, 354. 4 Conversation, V, I60. Cf. Princ. I, 47 ff.

I Cf. IIae Resp., VII, 135.

3 Reg. III, X, 368.

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