The Development and Role of the eyhlislam in Early Ottoman History Author(s): Michael M.

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AND ROLE OF THE SEYHIULISLAM THE DEVELOPMENT IN EARLY OTTOMAN HISTORY

MICHAEL M. PIXLEY
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

has primarily been concentrated on his Research and investigation of the eeyhiilislam post-Siileymanic role. Generally, these studies are very vague, at best, when describing the chief Ottoman mifti and frequently avoid any significant discussion of the early development of his office. The result of this situation is that students of Ottoman history are all too frequently unfamiliar with the early history of the geyhiilislamas well as the process of his growth in power through the end of the sixteenth century. This article in the first one hundred and fifty years presents a general examination of the yeyhiulislam of his existence as well as a discussionof how he fits within the complex Ottoman bureaucratic hierarchy.
WITHIN THE OTTOMAN JUDICIAL STRUCTURE. the

qeyhiilislam1 was the leading miifti (jurisconsult) and as such a major spokesman for the ulema. Yet despite his prominence, the qeyhiulislam has rarely been the object of scholarly investigation, particularly with regard to his early development. Most works dealing with the Ottoman judiciary are limited to post-sixteenth century matters and do not discuss, save in summary, the chief Ottoman miifti prior to this period. The only major modern study of the Seyhiilislam is included in
Ismail Hakki UzunCarsili's Osmanli Devletinin II-

ination extends from the creation of the Seyhiilislamlik (office and duties of the Seyhiilislam) in 1424 to 1574, the last year of Selim II's reign (1566-1574) and is subdivided into four periods; 1424-1480, 1481-1517, 1518-1542 and finally 15431574. Some general and preliminary remarks on the Ottoman legal structure can help to explain the context in which the seyhiilislam operated.
OTTOMAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM

miye TeSkilati (Ankara, 1965). In this book, Prof. Uzunfarsili provides a fuller presentation of the Ottoman learned class than has been available and displays the fruits of much research. Although heavy with information, there is only a limited amount of analysis and it is frequently up to the reader to grasp the meaning of the material. In short, many basic questions still remain to be answered or even presented. The purpose of this study is to examine the origin, evolution and role of the chief Ottoman miufti as a leading judicial figure and thus to clarify his importance. The period under exam-

The judiciary constituted the major portion of the Ottoman bureaucratic class referred to by some scholars as the "Men of Religious Knowledge (ehl-i iIm)."2 This group was responsible for the application and interpretation of law throughout Ottoman domains, a task of profound importance in Islamic societies. Roughly speaking,
judges we can divide the judicial system into two portions, (kadis) and jurisconsults Kadis, (miiftis).

situated in all major cities and towns in the empire and of the Hanefi legal persuasion,3 possessed the authority to pass sentence on all cases in their courts (mahkemes), while the local administrative ruler actually implemented the decision. The counterpart of the judge was the jurisconsult

1 There were numerousother titles for the 2 Cf. Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman qeyhiilislam. Empire; the Classical See Ilmiye Salnamesi (Istanbul, 1334), p. 305 and Joseph Age, 1300-1600 (New York, 1973), p. 100. 3 H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, Islamic Society and von Hammer, Staatsverfassung und Staatsverwaltung des osmanischenReiches (Vienna, 1815), vol. II, p. 373. In the West(London, 1950-1957),vol. I, pt. 2, p. 135. After most Ottoman sources, he is frequently termed the miiuti, their conquest by the Ottomans, the Arab provinces without any other titles. were still allowed to use miitis and kadis of the three Throughout this study, modern Turkish orthography other "orthodox" legal schools. See Gibb and Bowen, is used. loc. cit. 89

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Journal of the American Oriental Society 96.1 (1976) equally, prestigious post elsewhere in the empire after the completion of his term of office.4 There was, however, no guarantee that he would succeed and might in fact suffer demotion. The mufti, on the other hand, knew his position to be secure and tenable even for life,5 but in the process he surrendered his ambition to gain higher posts. The irony of this situation is that in our period the seyhiilislam, as the chief miiti of the Ottoman Empire, never served as a miifti before his investiture.6 It was the "active" kadi system that provided the candidate for seyhiilislam, men who through their ability and practical experience were entrusted with helping to guide the state, now via their fetvas. Throughout this study, the principal Ottoman jurisconsult is described as essentially a giver of fetvas. It was expected and assumed that a miiti was well-versed in Islamic law, hence any opinion he gave was usually accorded the utmost in respect by a judge or any other recipient. While deference to a fetva may have been the norm, it was by no means obligatory, a fact of tremendous importance in understanding the Seyhilislam's position in the Ottoman government. Any fetva of the seyhiilislam could be used, ignored or even sat upon until a propitious moment as a kind of insurance policy for future possibilities.7 In discussing the legal opinions of the seyhiilislam, we must take care to differentiate between 4 Ismail Hakki Uzuncarsili,Osmanli Devletinin Ilmiye Teqkilati (Ankara, 1965), pp. 94-95. 5 Gibb and Bowen, vol. I, pt. 2, p. 135. 6 For biographiesof the Seyhiilislams, see Ilmiye Salnamesi, pp. 322-641, Usameddin bin Ahmet Taskopriliizade, $akayikal- Numanihe, trans. Mehmet Mecdi (d. 1590-91), (Istanbul, 1269), Abdiilkadir Altunsu, Osmanli Seyhulislamlari (Ankara, 1972). 7 See Uriel Heyd, "Some Aspects of the Ottoman

who acted as a kind of legal advisor to the court and issued, when requested by either the kadi or the litigants, a legal opinion (fetva) based upon the law. Normally a kadi would heed the recommendation of his miifti but he was not legally obliged to do so, a point which we will discuss at greater length later. By far the vast majority of kadis and miiftis destined for large towns and cities were recruited from the professors (miiderrises) of the theological colleges (medreses). The highest grade of judge or jurisconsult to which a candidate for office (miilazim) might aspire depended upon four major factors of variable importance: 1. the degree of his education; 2. where he was taught; 3. the prestige of his teachers and; 4. his patrons and contacts within the Ottoman government. In most cases, the first two points were the most significant. Obviously scholastic ability determined the degree to which a cadidate could function well within a judicial system based upon familiarity with complex and different legal codes. As for the second element, the medreses of the capital were far and away the most important schools in the empire. After the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, that city became, quite understandably, the center of Ottoman learning with the former capitals of Edirne and Bursa retaining great secondary prestige. The best and most erudite professors usually gravitated to the main medreses of the empire and their students frequently held an edge over their fellow classmates even in the same school, a factor which underscores the frequently personal nature of Ottoman education. The fourth factor, that of contacts within the government or familial prestige increased only as the scholarly class deteriorated and the state regressed. Still, patrons were considered a natural acquirement for any student but, in the healthier periods of the state, resulted not from preconceived or pressured prejudice but rather from the demonstration of significant ability on the part of the student. After completing his education as a student and thereafter working through the ranks, this time as a professor, a milazim faced two choices with regard to future employment outside of education. He could seek a position as a judge or, secondly, as a jurisconsult. In terms of promotional opportunities, he faced a gamble in the active hierarchy as opposed to the passive yet secure role of a mifti. A kadi held limited periods of employment and hoped to secure a greater, if not

Fetva," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African

Studies, vol. XXXII, (1969), pt. 1, p. 56. In his article on "fatwa- Ottoman Empire (Encyclopedia of Islam (new ed.)," J. R. Walsh states that the power to grant fetvas was invested strictly in the seyhiilislam. This is incorrect. See Uzuncarili, op. cit., p. 174, n. 1; D. B. MacDonald, "fatwa" (Encyclopedia of Islam (old ed.), M. Z. Pakalin, Osmanli Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri S6zliigii (Istanbul, 1971), vol. II, p. 599. Provincial miiftis also were in a position to give legal opinions. On the use of fetvas for various eventualities, see A.D. Alderson, The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty (Oxford, 1956), p. 29, n. 4.

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two broad categories; administrative fetvas and those of the general public. The first group would include answers to queries made by the sultan, the grand vezir or other high officials. The second group, that is, private citizens involved in court, used the qeyhilislam as a source of fetvas for resolving purely local issues of law. By the beginning of the sixteenth century this latter task had become so burdensome that an aide, the fetva emini (official in charge of fetvas) was created in order to deal with the growing number of plaintiffs seeking legal opinions.8 The nature and use of administrative fetvas is a key point in clarifying the relationship between the eeyhiilislam and the government. Whereas fetvas for the kadi were intended to resolve a dispute between two parties, the legal opinion of the qeyhiulislam concerning bureaucratic or political problems did not involve this kind of situation. If, for example, the sultan wished to declare war on the Habsburgs, no one summoned the emperor from Vienna to present his side of the issue. An administrator was merely asking whether or not he could apply his legitimate authority in a specific situation. Implicit in this process is the possibility of an official presenting the qeyhiilislam with a "loaded" question predetermining the response. In matters between the contestants in a kadi's court, the opinion of the mifti was acceptable only insofar as the theoretical problem (mesele) was correctly represented, thus making the judge an intermediary figure. When no such figure was included in a legal question, such as in the case of an administrative fetva, it could be a simple matter to describe an affair in a biased fashion.9 The $eyhiilislam obviously fulfilled a useful capacity in the state legal system through his judicial opinions discussed above. His role in the Ottoman Empire did not, however, crystallize instantane9 A good example of this is the fetva of Mehmet Ebussuut (d. 1574) authorizing the death of Siileyman elKanuni's son, Bayezit. The text of the fetva's problem begins with the words, "(if) one of the sons of a righteous
sultan . . .," and concludes, after describing acts of trea8 Heyd, p. 48.

ously but rather followed a series of discernable stages which eventually transformed him into an intensely political figure by the mid-sixteenth century. The first step in this process began with the formation of the Ottoman qeyhiulislamlik in the early fifteenth century. 1424-1480 The century in which the Seyhiilislam emerged was a period of both profound chaos and amazing recovery and success for the Ottoman Empire. The interregnum period (fetret devri), lasting from 1402 to 1413, represented years of civil and military strife yet nevertheless resulted in an organized state which engineered the conquest of one of Europe's most fabulous cities. Bayezit I (1389-1402) had embarked upon a policy of direct conquest in Anatolia which, more for geo-political than religious reasons, aroused the concern of his co-religionist Timur. His invasion of Anatolia and the subsequent defeat of Bayezit at the battle of Ankara (1402) threw the nascent Ottoman state into a four-way civil war waged by four of Bayezit's sons. While Mehmet I (14131421) emerged as the victor in this conflict, his reign was by no means secure. Challenged by ?eyh Bedreddin and his pantheistic and communal views as well as Diizme (the False) Mustafa, Mehmet was hard-put to deter their ominous threats to his sovereignty. Although he crushed and executed Bedreddin by 1416,10 he was unable to eliminate the elusive Mustafa. Mehmet had nevertheless bequeathed to his son, Murad, a re-vitalized state and thus the means to deal with dissent. Murad II (1421-1451) faced several serious revolts at the beginning of his reign, the most pressing of which was that of Diizme Mustafa. Murad finally silenced him in 1422, only to be faced with yet another rebellious Mustafa, this time Murad's younger brother. Moving quickly, Murad destroyed him in 1423, leaving Mustafa hanging from a fig tree before an Iznik storefront." Murad had quelled the most immediate threats to his rule but absolute control still evaded him.
10 H. J. Kissling, "Badr al-Din B. Kadi Samawna" (Encyclopedia of Islam (new ed.). There is, however, considerable disagreement as to this date. Uzungarsili suggests 1420 as the correct date, together with mentioning other possibilities. See Uzungarsili, Osmanli Tarihi (Ankara, 1961), vol. I, p. 365, and n. 2. 11 Ismail Hami Dani?mend, Izahli Osmanli Tarihi Kronolojisi (Istanbul, 1971), vol. I, p. 189.

son, asking whether or not execution is in orderaccording

to the ?eriat. ($erafettin Turan, Kanuni'nin Oglu $ehzade

Bayezid Vak'asi (Ankara, 1961), p. 110). The permission of Ebussuut was given since, as he had to reply to a technically theoretical question, he had no other choice. In any event, Ebussuut knew exactly who was requesting the fetva and what was expected.

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reasons for his action. First, in creating a highIslamic state, it was necessary, a priori, to allow religion an important place. Second, a high religious dignitary could be used to undermine internal opponents of the sultan. Both of these suggestions fit within Murad's overall efforts to centralize and strengthen the state in addition to symbolizing a more developed sense of self-importance for the Ottomans in the Islamic realm. The appointment of Fenari in 1424 was not a spectacular event in the eyes of the Ottomans, and chroniclers of that century, such as Uruc and Asikpasazade do not even deign to mention the matter. Aside from his responsibility as the feyhulislam, Fenari also kept his positions as the kadi of Bursa and a professor in a Manastir medrese,l6 which implies that Fenari was not wholly occupied with his new office. In return for his service in giving fetvas, Fenari apparently received thirty akce per day, while at the same time the kazasker (judge of the army) earned a daily wage (yevmiye) of around five-hundred ak9e, a comparison that underscores the low profile of the qeyhilislam.17 Despite the humble nature of the eyhiilislamlik at this time, Murad had created an office with potential for growth within the Ottoman central bureaucracy. The limited scope of the office of the chief miiti was essentially a reflection of the limited power of the Ottoman Empire which still 12 Inalcik, p. 20 and p. 23. relied upon the Cairene ulema for some fetvas.l8 13 Ibid., p. 18. See also Paul Wittek, The Rise of the Great changes, however, were in store for the OttomanEmpire (London, 1938), p. 47 and Ernst Werner, state and consequently for the .eyhilislam, with Die Geburt einer Grossmacht-die Osmanen (1300-1481) the death of Murad II and the accession of his (Berlin, 1966), pp. 180-218. son, Mehmet II (1451-1481). 14 Inalcik, p. 18. Werner, on pp. 198-213, discusses With his dramatic capture of Constantinople, the appeal of $eyh Bedreddin and Borluce Mustafa's Mehmet, usually known as the "Conqueror (Faideas to the Christians. tih)," could have resigned from his position and 15 Ilmiye ..., p. 322, Altunsu, p. 1. Cf. Ta?kopriiliiyet still have left his name high on the list of zade, p. 49. There is, nevertheless, another figure de- famed Muslim figures. Besides his military prowscribed as an appointedseyhiilislamwho pre-dates Fenari ess, Mehmet displayed a host of more delicate by around seventy years, Elvan Fakih. The Ilmiye proclivities. A competent poet, builder and genSalnamesi (p. 317, n. 1), as well as Mehmet Pakalin, eral patron of culture, the sultan also evinced a Osmanli Tarih Deyimleri... (pp. 600-601) quote the talent for administration and did much to further Miin$eat-iSelatin of Feridun Bey (d. 1583) as describing the similar efforts of his father and grandfather. Elvan Fakih in a ferman to Evrenos Bey as the "?ey- One of the most notable manifestations of this hilislam to the whole of the province of Rum (umum Rumeli vilayetine seyhiilislam tayin [olup])." Yet this was mentioned only as the miifti to Rumeli tells us that appointment would appear to be ad hoc in nature and he was definitely not in charge of the empire as a whole. 16 hence atypical of Ottoman administrationat the time for Ta?kopriiluzade, p. 49, Ilmiye Salnamesi, p. 322. a number of reasons. First, between the reigns of Murad 17 Uzungarsili, Ilmiye . .., p. 175, n. 2. 18 Halil Inalcik, "The I and MuradII we do not find any other figure described Emergence of the Ottomans," as a seyhiilislam which further implies that Fakih's The Cambridge History of Islam, ed. P. M. Holt, et. al. position was pro tempore. Secondly, the fact that Fakih (Cambridge, 1970), vol. I, p. 290. The Byzantines maintained in their court a cousin of Murad, Orhan, and used him as a threat to Murad's throne.l2 Such a danger did not stop Murad from sending Ottoman armies to Morea, Wallachia and Albania where they engaged Hungarian and Venetian forces in 1423. In attempting to cope with both external and internal dangers, Murad sought to centralize the regenerated Ottoman state, especially through his use of deviirme personnel as kapi kulu ("slaves of the gate"), men who, because of their dependence upon the sultan, were considered more loyal and amenable to the Ottoman monarch. This effort of the sultan aroused considerable concern and apprehension among several layers of Ottoman society. The Turkish artistocratic class viewed with dismay any efforts to control their power and even for the poorest gazis centralization was anathema.13 Impoverished non-Muslim elements as well as some Muslims found refuge in the socialistic doctrines of *eyh Bedreddin and also his important followers, Borkluce Mustafa and Torlak Kemal, and thereby further strained the fabric of the state, especially in Rumeli.l4 With the foregoing in mind, it is possible to speculate as to why Murad II named Mehmet ?emsiddin Fenari (1350-1431) as the first ieyhiilislam of the state.l5 There were probably two

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ability was an administrative kanunname (codebook) issued in 1480.19 In this decree, the eeyhiulislam was described as the "chief of the ulema."20 Pre-dating this kanunname, in Mehmet's reign the salary of the chief jurisconsult had risen to two-hundred akce daily, another apparent sign of the Seyhiilislam's increasing power.21 But what did these words and financial rewards mean in reality? As it turned out they signified very little for the chief mifti. The sultan, on the other hand, realized several advantages from his masterful stroke. In the first place, it was utterly meaningless for the seyhiilislam to be the leader of the ulema while the kazaskers, grand vezir and sultan controlled the appointment of all miiderrises, miiftis and kadis in the state.22 For Mehmet, his action allowed him to emulate the models of the great Arab empires and the Mamluks insofar as the Ottomans, as a leading Muslim power, could claim to maintain a high religious figure superficially similar to the caliph.23 A second result of Mehmet's ploy was a closer identification of religious and secular interests, thus enabling the sultan to govern more effectively the ulema in the state. Devoid of active authority or a seat in the imperial council (Divan-i Hiimayun), the seyhiilislam was little more than a sacred figurehead in the affairs of state. 1481-1517 It is only in the period 1481-1517 that we first encounter many significant accounts of the Seyhiilislam and his relationship with the sultan. Lybyer claims that Bayezit II (1481-1512) placed the chief miiti on a throne above his own.24 More interesting are the stories relating the confrontations between the seyhiilislam and the sultan wherein the former emerged victorious, implying the pious nature of the state. Such narratives are centered in the reign of Selim I (1512-1520) and recount the efforts of his seyhiilislam, Zem19 Tarih-i Osmani Enciimeni Mecmuasi (1330), suppl.

billi Ali (d. 1526), to defend the holy law.25 The celebrated nature of these encounters, however, proves their rarity, and such incidents by no means represented the norm. The Ottoman attitude towards the seyhiilislam was severely tested in 1517, the year in which the Ottomans captured Cairo and the Abbasid caliph, al-Mutawakkil (d. 1543). At this point it is appropriate to discuss one of the most prominent theories for the role of the seyhiilislam; i.e., that he was an Ottoman version of the Abbasid caliph.28 Such an explanation is not without merit insofar as both figures served to justify various state actions through religious sanction. It would be a mistake, however, to assume the seyhiilislam to be merely a carbon-copy of the caliph. Were such a line of reasoning true, the Ottoman sultans could have maintained the Abbasid line, thus removing the Seyhiilislam's raison d'etre. This was not Ottoman policy, however, and the chief muiti continued to exist whereas al-Mutawakkil was eventually allowed to return to Cairo where he quietly passed away into oblivion. The seyhiilislam represented a distinctly Ottoman institution which had as of this date existed for almost a century and admirably met the requirements of statecraft. More importantly, there was no question, theoretical or practical, that the head jurisconsult was an official subordinate to the sultan. The same cannot be said of the potential relationship between the caliph and the sultan. Al-Mutawakkil could have, in theory, challenged the sultan's rule of the state had Selim recognized him as the spiritual head of the empire. On a more practical plane, the caliph might have served as a strong rallying point for dissidents in the newlyconquered Arab provinces of the empire. By refraining from recognizing al-Mutawakkil as the religious leader of the Ottoman Empire, Selim removed a potential rival and reconfirmed the
25

Ilmiye Salnamesi, pp. 312-313. Inalcik mentions (The Ottoman Empire, p. 94) one of these anecdotes, pp. 9-32. involving the questionable arrest of one hundred and 20 Uzuncarsili, Ilmiye .., p. 175, n. 1. fifty treasury officials. Inalcik states that the sultan 21 Ibid., p. 176. prevailed over the protests of Zembilli Ali who argued 22 Ibid., p. 179. that Selim had violated the $eriat. This presentation is 23 The idea of the feyhiilislam as an Ottoman caliph contradicted by the account in the Ilmiye Salnamesi is discussed below. (p. 312) which concludes that the feyhiilislam did, in 24 A. H. Lybyer, The Governmentof the Ottoman fact, effect the release of these men. Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent (Cam26 Gibband Bowen, vol. I, pt. 2, p. 85 and J. H. Kramer bridge, Mass., 1913), p. 209. "Shaikh al-Islam," Encyclopedia of Islam (old ed.).

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Journal of the American Oriental Society 96.1 (1976) plications first befell Koca Qivizade (1476-1547), the eleventh chief Ottoman miufti.28 The reasons for the dismissal of Koca Qivizade in 1542 by Stileyman el-Kanuni (1520-1566) are not entirely clear. The advisory capacity of the eeyhiilislam clearly implied the importance of the personal relationship between him and the sultan, and it is apparently within this area that Koca Civizade ran afoul of the sultan. While some accounts describe the mifti as a proponent of Sufism and thence the object of Sileyman's orthodox wrath,29 the real cause probably lies in the dispute between Qivizade and the Rumeli kazaskeri, Mehmet Ebussuut (1490-1574), who later became one of the most celebrated eeyhiilislams in history. A favorite of the sultan, Ebussuut objected to some of Civizade's fetvas, describing them as ilThe center, if not the only, legal (nameiru).30 basis for the controversy was (Qivizade's opposition to the creation of vakfs using cash (vakf-i nikiid) and on this point Civizade was on solid legal ground.31 Nevertheless, in the face of the seyhiilislam's continued intransigence, Stileyman acted out of personal expediency and dismissed the uncompromising Civizade, thereby inaugurating a dangerous precedent.32 Knowing full well that opposition to the will of the government, in particular the sultan, might lead to dismissal, the chief miifti was compelled to seek the continence
28 30

seyhiilislam as the principal ulema leader, yet still an official subject to the will of the sultan. It is convenient now to mention the only other general theory for the existence of the chief mifti, which asserts that he was a model of the Greek patriarch.27 As with the caliph-theory mentioned above, this notion suffers from too much emphasis on the generic role of legitimization and too little scrutiny of the actual officials involved. Together with sanctioning, or at least condoning, state actions, the patriarch kept his own identity within the government. He was in charge of church affairs and administration and was not infrequently engaged in the seemingly endless task of determining orthodoxy. The seyhiilislam was not entrusted with such affairs and only by the last quarter of the sixteenth century did he even acquire limited administrative powers. There was no clear bifurcation of the Ottoman Empire into church and state as existed in the Byzantine Empire, so to ascribe to the patriarch and seyhiilislam identical positions in the state is to ignore the realities of their respective statures. In his service to the state, the seyhiilislam did not mirror the caliph nor the patriarch but rather possessed his own unique position in society and government. The eyhiilislam carried with him the idea of the unity of "church-state" interests along with the necessity for moral/legal guidance in imperial affairs, points which suffered a considerable re-adjustment in the next period. 1518-1542 Throughout the years of this period, the chief miiti continued to serve in his capacity as a legal advisor and did not acquire any new powers. In fact, it was at this time that the seyhiilislam suffered a drastic blow that both severely weakened his office and also transformed it into an almost purely political position. For the first time in Ottoman history, the seyhiilislam was removed from office. Among the factors which contributed to the power of the 'grand' mifti, such as authoritative legal knowledge and access to the sultan's ear, the most important was the traditional life-long tenure of his office. This last concept fortified his position in matters wherein he was opposed to the aspirations of the sultan. Whether ignored or listened to, the first ten seyhiilislams all died in office. The onus of dismissal with all its im27 Ibid.

29 Altunsu,

Ilmiye Salnamesi, p. 361, Ta?kopriilizade, p. 446.

pp. 22-23, n. 1. Ibid., p. 22, Ibrahim PeCevi, Tarih-i Pefevi (Istan-

bul, 1283), vol. I, p. 49.

31 M. C. Baysun, "Ebiissuud Efendi," Islam Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, 1941), p. 94. On cash vakfs, see Henry Cattan, "The Law of Waqf," Law in the Middle East, ed. Majid Khadduri (Washington, D.C., 1955), p. 205. There may have been a very practical reason as to why Ebussuud favored cash vakls when we recall his tendency to seek the gratitude of those in power. High officials might oftentimes possess much money yet little land that was not directly connected with their posts. Hence, after dismissal, especially under unfavorable circumstances, it would be very beneficial and useful for security to turn immediately any available cash in an almost untouchable vakf, thereby insuring the well-being of the household. 32 Between 1542 and 1559, only three seyhiilislams were dismissed. From 1599 to 1703, no less than thirty of the forty-two chief miiutis were removed from office, representing a staggering 75% rate of dismissal. See Altunsu, pp. 276-277.

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of the sultan or else engage in more indirect means of persuasion. More than ever the strength of the .eyhiilislam resided in his ability to influence the sultan rather than any appeal to the applicability of religious law. 1543-1574 When scholars such as Schacht or Bulliet describe the reign of Silleyman el-Kanuni as the period in which the qeyhiilislam achieved his apogee of power, they are implicitly discussing Mehmet Ebussuut. Schacht depicts the authority of the ?eyhilislam saying, "Abul-Su'ud succeeded in bringing the kanun, the administrative law of the Ottoman Empire, into agreement with the shari' a."33 If anything, this contention should be reversed, and one should argue that Ebussuut reconciled the qeriat with the imperial kanun. Ebussuut was notoriously willing to perform legal acrobatics in questions dealing with the state and sought thereby to ingratiate himself with men in power.34 The mere fact that he remained in office almost twenty-nine years, longer than any other eeyhiilislam, suggests that Ebussuut was very successful in cultivating a good relationship with the sultan. The major gain for the qeyhiilislamlik under Ebussuut, aside from an increase of pay to six hundred akfe per diem,35 was the right to nominate kadis receiving over one hundred fifty akce daily and miiderrises earning over forty akce a day.36 These nominations, first given in 1574,37 had hitherto been granted to the kazaskers and confirmed or rejected by the grand vezir and/or sultan.38 UzunCarsili suggests that the grand vezir, Sokollu Mehmet Pasa, gave this authority to the eeyhiilislam owing to the former's preoccupation with the more pressing task of running the empire at a time when the sultan reduced his own participation in state matters.39 While to some degree plausible, this explanation leaves two other ques33 Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford, 1964), p. 90. Cf. Richard W. Bulliet, "The Shaikh al-Islam and the Evolution of Islamic Society,' Studia Islamica, no. 35 (1972), p. 54. 34 Joseph Schacht, "Abu'l Su'ud," Encyclopedia of Islam (new ed.).
35 Uzungaraili, Ilmiye..., pp. 176-177. 36 Ibid., p. 179. 37 Ibid., p. 179. 38 Ibid., pp. 154-155 and p. 179.

tions unanswered. First, if the grand vezir were seeking solely to divest himself of laborious involvement in appointing upper-level judicial and education figures, why did he usurp the authority of the kazaskers in this process? Second, since nominees of the chief miiti still required confirmation by the grand vezir, how much authority was really given to the Seyhiilislam?40 In attempting to solve either of these two queries, there is little evidence to rely upon. The answer to the first may have been Mehmet Sokollu Pasa's desire to reduce the power of the kazaskers as potential rivals. This would be analogous to the apparent motivation of an earlier grand vezir who, in 1480, effected the creation of two kazaskers in lieu of a single military judge.41 As for the second question, it is at present impossible or at least presumptive to offer any solid explanation. It is known that the grand vezir did grant some of his personal authority in naming top-level ulema to the seyhiilislam but the extent of this action remains unknown. The resolution of this problem, of course, lies in a complete and detailed understanding of the functions of the grand vezirate and, more exactly, the process by which nominees for office were confirmed. It is possible that after 1574, the grand vezir merely rubber-stamped the requests of the seyhiilislam whereas, when such nominations were the prerogative of the kazaskers, the grand vezir engaged in a more extensive and, hence, time-consuming examination of the nominees. Unfortunately, pertinent information remains unavailable and the question is still to be solved. Whatever the obscure nature of details, it is immediately evident that the seyhiilislam had assumed a more political and temporal role than had been typical before this last period. Having at last an active voice in the religious hierarchy of the Ottoman Empire, the seyhiilislam assumed an administrative status burdened with the exigency of maintaining his position. The result of this was the subordination of religion in the state and the modification of sacred theory in favor of practical statecraft.
CONCLUSIONS

This study has presented a brief analysis of the first one hundred and fifty years of the Ottoman 40 Ibid., p. 179. 41 C. Huart, "Kazi-asker,"Encyclopediaof Islam (old ed.).

39 Ibid., p. 179.

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Journal of the American Oriental Society 96.1 (1976) lamlik was essentially only an honored and venerated post which nevertheless possessed precious little real authority in the matters of state. As mentioned earlier, when scholars mention the power of the chief mifti, they cite the famed Ebussuut and it is here that we can trace the genuine strength of the chief Ottoman jurisconsult. It was a function of personality and his access to the sultan. The ability of the qeyhiilislam to sway the head of state was the principal weapon at his disposal and it was this quality that determined the power of the Ottoman seyhiilislam.

.eyhiilislamlik. Within this period, the chief miifti rose from an obscure role in Ottoman society to a position as the supreme religious leader in an Islamic state, yet was concurrently secondary to the conduct of state policy. In short, Islamic legal theory, as represented by the ieyhiilislam, was a tool of the empire, readily used or reshaped in order to befit the circumstances of the moment. The mistake of most scholars when describing the power of the qeyhiilislam is to confuse the strength of the office with that of its holder. Even by the close of the sixteenth century, the eeyhilis-