Mallilin vs Castillo Mallilin vs. Castillo GR No. 136803, June 16, 2000 FACTS: Eustaquio Mallilin Jr.

and Ma. Elvira Castillo were alleged to be both married and with children but separated from their respective spouses and cohabited in 1979 while respective marriages still subsist. They established Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation during their union of which petitioner was the President and Chairman and respondent as Vice President and Treasurer. They likewise acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondents name. Due to irreconcilable conflict, the couple separated in 1992. Petitioner then demanded his share from respondent in the subject properties but the latter refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name. Furthermore, respondent denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because they were still legally married at the time of cohabitation. Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-ownership shares while respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. Trial court dismissed the former and granted the latter. ISSUE: WON petitioner can validly claim his share in the acquired properties registered under the name of the respondent considering they both have subsisting relationship when they started living together. HELD: The Court ruled that trial court erred that parties who are not capacitated to marry each other and were living together could not have owned properties in common. Under Article 148, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution, property or industry, shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. Hence, there is co-ownership even though the couples in union are not capacitated to marry each other. Furthermore, when CA dismissed petitioners complaint for partition on grounds of due process and equity, his right to prove ownership over the claimed properties was denied. Such dismissal is unjustified since both ends may be served by simply excluding from the action for partition the properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo, not parties in the case. The case was remanded to lower court for further proceedings Valdes vs RTC Valdes vs. RTC 260 SCRA 221 FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer. Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father. ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family Francisco vs Master Iron Works Francisco vs. Master Iron Works Construction Corporation GR. No. 151967, February 16, 2005 FACTS: Josefina Castillo was 24 years old when she and Eduardo Francisco got married on January 1983. The latter was then employed as Vice President in a Private Corporation. Josefina acquired two parcels of land where Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina, married to Eduardo. An affidavit of waiver was executed by Eduardo where he declared that prior to his marriage with Josefina, the latter purchased the land with her own savings and that he waived whatever claims he had over the property. When Josefina mortgaged the property for a loan, Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed. In 1990, Eduardo who was then a General Manager, bought bags of cement from defendant but failed to pay the same. The latter filed a complaint for recovery and trial court rendered judgment against Eduardo. The court then issued a writ of execution and the sheriif issued a notice of levy on execution over the alleged property of Josefina for the recovery of the balance of the amount due under the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a third party claim over the 2 parcels of land in which she claimed as her paraphernal property.

ISSUE: WON the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina and Eduardo. HELD: The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she was the sole owner. The Deed of Absolute Sale on record showed it was issued after her marriage. Their case fall under Article 148 and since they got married before the Family Code, the provision, pursuant to Art 256, can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested rights. Petitioner likewise failed that she had any vested right. Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that invalidates such marriage, Art 148 should be applied. In the absence of proof that the wife/husband has actually contributed money, property, or industry to the properties acquired during such union the presumption of co-ownership will not arise. The petition was denied for lack of merit. The decision of CA that the property was conjugal was affirmed. Tumlos vs Fernandez Tumlos vs Fernandez GR No. 137650, April 12, 2000 FACTS: Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed against Guillerma, Gina and Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building that through their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos to occupy the apartment for the last 7 years without payment of any rent. It was agreed that Guillerma will pay 1,600 a month while the other defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month which was not complied with. Demand was made several times for the defendants to vacate the premises as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new building. Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous relationship and that they acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was likewise alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for about 10 years and that Gullerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of their marriage. ISSUE: WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148. HELD: SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the subject property. The claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were no other evidence presented to validate it except for the said affidavit. Even if the allegations of having cohabited with Mario and that she bore him two children were true, the claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario is validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other. The property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual contribution is required by the said provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisitions of common property by one who has no salary, income, work or industry. Such is not included in Art 148. If actual contribution is not proven then there can be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. Carlos vs Abelardo Carlos vs. Abelardo GR No. 146504, April 4, 2002 FACTS: Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law for recovery of the $25,000 loan used to purchase a house and lot located at Paranaque. It was in October 1989 when the petitioner issued a check worth as such to assist the spouses in conducting their married life independently. The seller of the property acknowledged receipt of the full payment. In July 1991, the petitioner inquired from spouses status of the amount loaned from him, the spouses pleaded that they were not yet in position to make a definite settlement. Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner. In 1994, petitioner made a formal demand but the spouses failed to comply with the obligation. The spouses were separated in fact for more than a year prior the filing of the complaint hence spouses filed separate answers. Abelardo contended that the amount was never intended as a loan but his share of income on contracts obtained by him in the construction firm and that the petitoner could have easily deducted the debt from his share in the profits. RTC decision was in favor of the petitioner, however CA reversed and set aside trial courts decision for insufficiency of evidence. Evidently, there was a check issued worth $25,000 paid to the owner of the Paranaque property which became the conjugal dwelling of the spouses. The wife executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not sign. ISSUE: WON a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged against the conjugal partnership. HELD:

Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not deny that the same served as their conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the spouses are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan. Abelardos contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share in the construction firm is untenable since there was no proof that he was part of the stockholders that will entitle him to the profits and income of the company. Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in the amount of $25,000 plus legal interest including moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees