172 Yer HS PSM 0101

Yanbu Export Refinery Project
PROJECT DESIGN BASIS 172A.5.3 PPHA Report Product Storage & Loadout Facilities Document No.: 172-YER-HS-PSM-0101 Revision No.: FF Issue Date: 22 April 2008
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.0 2.1 2.2 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 4.0 5.0 6.0 6.1 6.2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................. 4 General........................................................................................................................ 4 Process Hazards Analysis........................................................................................... 4 Definitions and Acronyms............................................................................................ 4 INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................... 5 Scope and Overview ................................................................................................... 5 Process Description .................................................................................................... 5 METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................ 6 Introduction.................................................................................................................. 6 Objective ..................................................................................................................... 6 Review Process........................................................................................................... 6 What if? Technique ................................................................................................... 7 Software ...................................................................................................................... 7 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS ...................................................................................... 8 TEAM MEMBERS ....................................................................................................... 9 RESULTS.................................................................................................................... 9 Action Items................................................................................................................. 9 Action Item Tracking.................................................................................................... 9
General Confidential Page 2 of 13

TABLES: TABLE 1 P&IDs Reviewed During PPHA .................................................................................. 8 TABLE 2 PPHA Participants....................................................................................................... 9 APPENDICES: APPENDIX A APPENDIX B APPENDIX C PPHA Worksheets............................................................................................ 11 PPHA Action & Response Sheets .................................................................... 12 Piping & Instrument Diagrams ......................................................................... 13

1.0 1.1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY General The Yanbu Export Refinery Project comprises the development and installation of a new Grassroots refinery in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that will process 400,000 BPD of Arabian Heavy crude into gasoline and diesel products for export. New facilities for import of crude feed and export for products are also provided. The refinery will be located in Yanbu Industrial City on the west coast of Saudi Arabia. The entire project includes refinery process units, utilities and interconnecting piping, associated feedstock and refined product storage/logistic facilities, as well as the offsite services necessary to support the safe and efficient operation of the refinery.
1.2
Process Hazards Analysis This report presents the FEED team findings of the Preliminary Process Hazards Analysis (PPHA) for the Yanbu Export Refinery, Unit 172 Product Storage & Loadout Facilities. The PPHA team for this study systematically reviewed the unit's ICA issue Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams, and other relevant documentation to identify potential hazards and operability problems, evaluate if designed safeguards were adequate, and recommend action when warranted. The methodology used was based on the guidelines published by the Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers. The report contains all the recommendations agreed upon by the PPHA team; these items are documented on the PPHA Work sheets (Appendix A). Within the PPHA there was one (1) action item identified.
1.3
Definitions and Acronyms P&ID IOU KBR PFD YERP YER PPHA API MSDS Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Infrastructure, Offsites, & Utilities Kellogg Brown & Root Process Flow Diagrams Yanbu Export Refinery Project Yanbu Export Refinery Preliminary Process Hazards Analysis American Petroleum Institute Material Safety Data Sheets

2.0 2.1
INTRODUCTION Scope and Overview The Unit 172- Product Storage & Loadout Facilities PPHA was conducted to identify any items in the FEED design that could result in unsafe conditions or unexpected operational or mechanical difficulties. The PPHA sessions were held on 12 December 2007 at the KBR Offices located in Houston, Texas. A complete list of PPHA team members is found in Section 5. The What if? methodology was used for this PPHA. This methodology is used for many similar facilities around the world and is accepted by numerous regulatory agencies for Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals. This methodology is a team exercise that requires input and agreement from all team members. A discussion of the What if? methodology is found in Section 3. This technique was selected as an appropriate method to identify any features of the design or operating practices that could cause unforeseen hazards. The technique is in widespread use in the process industries, and is recommended by industry groups. The technique has been applied successfully to many similar projects and facilities. The PPHA Work sheets are a record of the teams discussion during the sessions. These work sheets contain the wording agreed upon by all team members. The PPHA work sheets are in Appendix A. The study resulted in one (1) recommendation. The P&IDs that were reviewed are included as Appendix C.
2.2
Process Description The Product Storage & Loadout Facilities (WBS 172) will include tanks for storing and transferring Diesel and Gasoline products to be shipped from the NGL facility. Diesel export will include four 600,000 barrel storage tanks for a total capacity of 2,400,000 barrels, three transfer pumps and two circulation pumps. Gasoline export will include four 500,000 barrel tanks for a total capacity of 2,000,000 barrels, three transfer pumps and two circulation pumps. (Note: Since the PPHA review, the numbers of tanks and volumes have changed. This has no impact on this PPHA validity.) Pipelines between YER and NGL will be covered under WBS 170. All capacities within this document comply with the following: Tank capacities are Working capacities Unit capacities are Design Capacities Pump flow rates are Normal Flow Rates with no margin added.

There will be no storage of refinery products at NGL.
3.0 3.1
METHODOLOGY Introduction The What if? methodology was chosen as the appropriate technique for this project to ensure a rigorous examination of process hazards as well as potential operational problems that could propagate into "serious events." The What if? is a disciplined method of providing a Preliminary Process Hazards Analysis (PPHA) team with the means to visualize the ways a plant, process, or piece of equipment can fail, malfunction, or be improperly operated. The technique provides opportunities for reviewers to think creatively concerning the ways hazards or operating problems might arise in a plant or process. Identification of hazards associated with the processing of chemicals or hydrocarbons is the focus of a PPHA. Within the PPHA, the process under investigation is systematically examined to determine the consequences (hazards) of deviations from the design intent. The premise of the technique is that a problem can exist if the process deviates from the design intent.
3.2
Objective The objective of the PPHA was an assessment of the design and the potential hazards associated with its operation. The review aimed at systematically examining the design documentation in order to identify potential hazards and significant operability problems. The study resulted in the documentation of the findings, identifying possible conditions, design modifications, or further studies that may be required by others. Except in obvious cases, the purpose of the review was not to resolve the action items or provide a quality check. Its purpose was to identify credible deviations from the design intent and their consequences.
3.3
Review Process The PPHA Facilitator presented a description of the methodology and the goals of the review. As desired by the PPHA team members, the KBR Process Engineer presented a process overview of the unit using available documentation (e.g. PFDs, Process Description, Heat and Material Balances, etc.) to provide those members of the PPHA team who were not design team members with an understanding of the design basis and intent. The team then applied the review methodology to the various sections of the unit.

3.4
What if? Technique The first step in the What if? review is to select the locations where the process deviations will be examined, called "nodes" on the PHA work sheets. Process Safety Engineers review the drawings provided, then select the nodes to be considered. The descriptions of these nodes are entered into the "HAZOP Manager" computer program in preparation for the review. This computer program produces the PPHA work sheets which serve as a record of the PPHA sessions and are found in Appendix A. The nodes are numbered for recording purposes and highlighted on P&IDs posted for all team members to inspect during the review meetings. The Process Safety Engineer then formulates various what if? scenarios for each node characterizing hypothetical deviations from the design intent. The team considers the scenarios. The next topic usually addressed when examining a particular scenario is the potential consequence(s) of the process deviation at that node. If there is no or only an insignificant consequence resulting from that deviation, that scenario is usually not fully discussed. This enables the team to concentrate on process deviations which could cause unsafe conditions or operating problems. The team is free to suggest additional what if? scenarios to those that have been formulated prior to the review sessions. When such a process deviation that could cause unsafe conditions or operating problems to arise is suggested, possible consequences are discussed and recorded in the CONSEQUENCE column of the work sheet. The "what if?" study technique used in this analysis involves documenting the reasonable worst case consequences for a scenario without taking into account design safeguards. This allows the team to examine the hazards or consequences associated with failures of engineering and administrative controls for these process areas. Once the consequences are evaluated and documented, the team focuses on the identification of existing SAFEGUARDS for the what if? or its consequences. More severe consequences require existing specific, reliable safeguards, or action items are developed by the team to improve safety or operability. If system safeguards, such as instrumentation, alarms and shutdowns, relief valves, or operator action could help mitigate the situation, the expected system response is entered in the SAFEGUARDS column on the work sheet. If the team decides that a change is warranted to improve safety or operability, those suggestions are noted in the ACTION column. These changes could involve addition/removal of hardware, instrumentation and control, or suggestions for proposed operating procedures. In some cases, further study is needed to evaluate the question, and a recommendation for outside study is noted.
3.5
Software The review was recorded using HAZOP Manager Version 6.0 from Lihou Technical Software Services. This software is integrated recording, reporting, and analysis systems for the management of PHA studies. The program provides all traditional functions for recording the PPHA review utilizing the "What if?" methodology of

analysis. It features the ability to customize standardized wording for scenarios, consequences, safeguards and actions for individual processes being reviewed. 4.0 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS Current status design documents were required to perform the PPHA. The following documents were available for reference during the Yanbu Export Refinery Project PPHA Process: PFDs for the unit Unit preliminary Plot Plan Applicable MSDS sheets
Record copy Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) were used for the PPHA review. The drawing numbers and titles are listed below. Copies of the P&IDs are included as Appendix C.
Drawing Number 172-YER-PE-PID-0021 172-YER-PE-PID-0022 172-YER-PE-PID-0023 172-YER-PE-PID-0024 172-YER-PE-PID-0025 172-YER-PE-PID-0026 172-YER-PE-PID-0027 172-YER-PE-PID-0028 172-YER-PE-PID-0029 172-YER-PE-PID-0030 172-YER-PE-PID-0031 172-YER-PE-PID-0032
Drawing Title Diesel Export Storage Tanks-1 Diesel Export Storage Tanks-2 Diesel Export Pumps Diesel Export Circulation Pumps Gasoline Export Storage Tanks-1 Gasoline Export Storage Tanks-2 Gasoline Export Pumps Gasoline Export Circulation Pumps Diesel Export Sump Pumps Gasoline Export Sump Pumps-1 Gasoline Export Sump Pumps-2 Benzene Export Storage Tanks & Pumps
Revision F2 F2 F2 F2 F2 F2 F2 F2 F2 F2 F2 F1
Node 7.01 7.01 7.01 7.01 7.02 7.02 7.02 7.02 7.03 7.03 7.03 7.04
TABLE 1
P&IDs Reviewed During PPHA

5.0
TEAM MEMBERS The team assembled to conduct the PPHA was comprised of individuals from KBR and YERP (ConocoPhillips and Saudi Aramco) with experience in production, process engineering, utilities, plant safety, process safety, operations, and project engineering. The following table lists the participants in the PPHA.
Name Javed Akhtar Robert Farrell Ujjal Kumar Basu Rosemary Jones Olaleye Ahmad Aldhubabian Riley West Adnan Al-Subhi Roger Cratin Ty Walraven
Company KBR KBR KBR KBR YERP YERP YERP KBR (consultant) KBR
Responsibility Project Engineer Process CSE Process Project Engineer Operations Project Engineer Facilitator Scribe
TABLE 2
6.0 6.1 RESULTS Action Items
PPHA Participants
Through the course of the PPHA review recommendations were made concerning the addition/removal of hardware, instrumentation, or controls, suggestions for proposed operating procedures, or outside study. The review generated one (1) action item. The action items are documented on Study Action & Response sheets (Appendix B). 6.2 Action Item Tracking Each of the action items generated as a result of the Unit 172 Product Storage & Loadout Facilities PPHA Review is assigned to one or more responsible parties for closure. The KBR Process Safety Group manages the action item tracking process to ensure that each recommendation is considered and appropriate resolution is achieved in a timely manner. Action responders are instructed to carefully weigh the recommendations of the PPHA team, but they are ultimately responsible for the actual response.

When a recommendation is very straightforward and is succinctly carried out (e.g. add a high alarm to an existing instrument, or delete a valve from the indicated location), the responder need only indicate that the action has been carried out and that the resulting change can be found on the revision of the drawing, data sheet, or other document specified in the response (a copy of the newly revised document could also be attached to the action response sheet). When the PPHA teams recommendation is not warranted, the responder is expected to include documentation to support not carrying out the PPHA teams suggestion. This support includes, but is not limited to, project specifications, engineering codes and standards, engineering recommended practices, etc. Excerpts from the applicable supporting literature should be attached to the response sheet along with any correspondence among project personnel sustaining the response. Action items are generated, distributed and responded by means of Word/Excel files generated by the HAZOP Manager software. Files are generated and placed in the appropriate Documentum file folder. The assigned party can then enter resolution and save the completed Action/Response Sheet for inclusion in the PPHA final report. If the assigned party thinks that the action should be assigned to someone else for response, the assigned party will notify Process Safety who will then work with the appropriate Project Engineers to reassign the action item to the appropriate party. Process Safety reviews action item responses for clarity and completeness. If a response is sufficient, the resolution will then be included in the final PPHA report sent to Client for final approval and sign off. On a regular basis, Process Safety reviews the status of the PPHA action items to report to the Project. For this review, there are three levels of status: Open: No resolution for the recommendation has been achieved. Answered: Sufficient resolution for the action item has been achieved, however the resolution still requires future action before it can be considered Closed. Closed: Sufficient resolution for the action item has been achieved and Process Safety approves and has included the resolution in the final report. In some cases an action item is deferred to another study (i.e. QRA, POC SOA/SIL Review) for resolution. These action items will remain open until the referenced study is complete. When completed, the resolution of the action item will be contained within the context of the deferred study. For these action items, the resolution will contain a reference to the deferred study and will be considered closed. The action item will achieve Issue status when the deferred study has been formally issued.

APPENDIX A PPHA Worksheets
PPHA Work Sheets

Project No: J6491
Client: YERP Unit Name & No: Product Storage & Loadout - 172
NODE: 7.01 ITEM: WBS 172 - Product Storage and Loadout - Diesel Tanks and Pumps Storage of export diesel product and pumps for delivery. DRAWINGS AND DOCUMENTS 172-YER-PE-PID-0021 172-YER-PE-PID-0022 172-YER-PE-PID-0023 172-YER-PE-PID-0024 WHAT IF?... 3 LIT-0001 malfunctions? 1 0 CONSEQUENCE Loss of level indication on 172-D-0001
DATE REVIEWED: December 2007
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION
LIT0003 is available. LIT0001 No further action required is a GWR with excellent reliability and self diagnostic functions. Fieldbus will alert operator, valve has hand wheel. No further action required
3 XV-0002 malfunctions? 1 1 3 XV0007 malfunctions? 1 2 3 ZV-0099 malfunctions 1 closed? 3
Potential inability to load into tank.
potential inability to flow from Fieldbus will alert operator, tank, possible pump damage. valve has hand wheel. potential pump damage, loss ZC0010 interlock will trip of diesel delivery. pump, spare pump. minimum flow, spare pump, SIS will trip pump. fieldbus will give position indication. Spare pump. fieldbus will give position indication. Spare pump.
No further action required
See SIL. No further action required No further action required (SIL analysis similar to ZV0099) No further action required
3 ZV0100 malfunctions closed? potential pump damage 1 4 3 FCV0091 fails open? 1 5 3 FCV0091 malfunctions 1 closed? 6 3 172-G0001A fails in service 1 7 3 172-G-0003 fails in service? 1 8 3 ZIT0003 malfunctions? 1 9 loss of pumping delivery.
potential pump damage.
Potential interruption of diesel Operator will get status delivery. indication and start spare pump. Loss of circulation, possible non-homogenous diesel. Circulation is a batch process, status will alert operator.
loss of volume indication and LIT0001 is available. RTG level indication. design is reliable and self diagnostic.
General Confidential
A-1
Preliminary Process Hazards Analysis
PPHA Work Sheets

Project No: J6491 NODE: 7.02
Client: YERP Unit Name & No: Product Storage & Loadout - 172 DATE REVIEWED: December 2007
ITEM: WBS 172 - Product Storage and Loadout - Gasoline Tanks and Pumps DRAWINGS AND DOCUMENTS 172-YER-PE-PID-0025 172-YER-PE-PID-0026 172-YER-PE-PID-0027 172-YER-PE-PID-0028 WHAT IF?... 3 dwg 0025 and 0026 is 2 analgous to 0021 and 0022 0 3 FCV-0255 fails open? 2 1 pump will decrease delivery to customer and recycle a part of flow. Fieldbus will alert operator of No further action required valve position. Ability to manually start the spare pump. Valve position status notification to operator. Operator intervention, can open FCV bypass, start up spare pump, then trip this pump. No further action required CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION
No significant issue during 3 FCV-0255 malfunctions 2 closed when flow is required? normal operation but 2 potential pump damage if discharge is closed or throttled. 3 ZV-0261 malfunctions 2 closed? 3
Interruption of pump suction ZC0020 will trip pump. flow, potential pump damage.
3 gasoline export pump 172-G- Decrease of flow to shipping. Operator will observe status No further action required 2 0002A fails in service? and can manually start spare 4 pump. 3 ZV-0262 malfunctions 2 closed? 5 interruption of flow to shipping. potential pump damage. Operator will get valve indication for ZV closure. FCV-0255 will open up to allow min flow. Significant discussion took place comparing logic of discharge valve trips of diesel pump and gasoline pumps. Recommend that this be pursued in a separate forum to obtain a recommendation from client for a revised scheme.
ACTION NO: 29 ASSIGNED TO: Project - Bill Soo, Mike Nixon, Process - DC 3 gasoline export circulation 2 pump 172-G-0005/6 fails in 6 service? Inability to circulate gasoline Operator observation and intervention - pump run Potential to develop layers of indication and ability to start material in Gasoline tanks spare pump Potential to supply off specification gasoline No further action required
A-2
PPHA Work Sheets

ITEM: WBS 172 - Product Storage and Loadout - Misc Sumps DRAWINGS AND DOCUMENTS 172-YER-PE-PID-0029 172-YER-PE-PID-0030 172-YER-PE-PID-0031 WHAT IF?... CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS LI-0310, level indication with high alarm Operator observation and intervention - pump run indication, draining to sump is an operator attended function, ability to call vacuum truck to empty sump if needed Sump is located within tank dike area 3 LIT-0310 malfunctions? 2 8 Inability to remotely monitor level in sump; increased potential for sump overfill and spill to surrounding area Level instrument is a guided wave radar type with high reliability and internal diagnostics and alarm upon malfunction Sump is located within tank dike area No further action required ACTION No further action required
3 sump pump 172-G-0007 fails Inability to empty sump; 2 in service? potential to overflow sump to 7 surrounding area
A-3
PPHA Work Sheets

ITEM: WBS 172 - Benzene Export Storage Tank and Pumps Node addresses Benzene Export Storage Feed Tank, 172-D-0009, Benzene Export Pumps, 172-G-0011A/B (one spare pump). Operating Conditions: ambient temperature and pressure, pumped to 13.5 barg, 650 m3/hr (pump rated capacity) DRAWINGS AND DOCUMENTS 172-YER-PE-PID-0032 WHAT IF?... 3 LIT-0420 malfunctions? 2 9 CONSEQUENCE Potential inability to remotely monitor tank level Potential to pump tank dry and damage pumps Potential to overfill tank 3 LIT-0405 malfunctions? 3 0 Potential inability to remotely monitor tank level Potential to pump tank dry and damage pumps Potential to overfill tank 3 XV-0410 malfunctions closed Cessation of feed to tank; 3 when desired open? lower than desired level in 1 tank (not increasing) Potential interruption at upstream tanks 3 XV-0410 malfunctions open 3 when desired closed? 2 No issues identified by the team Valve position indication Operator observation and intervention - ability to manually operate valve No further action required SAFEGUARDS LI-0405A, independent level indication with low, low-low, high, and high-high alarms Level instrument is a high reliability type with internal diagnostics and alarm upon malfunction LI-0420A, independent level indication with low and high alarms Level instrument is a high reliability type with internal diagnostics and alarm upon malfunction Valve position indication Operator observation and intervention - ability to operate valve manually No further action required No further action required ACTION No further action required
3 XV-0411 malfunctions closed Potential inability to provide 3 when desired open? material to metering skid; 3 possible process upset Potential to starve operating pump; possible pump damage 3 XV-0411 malfunctions open 3 when desired closed? 4 No issues identified by the team
A-4
PPHA Work Sheets

Project No: J6491
Client: YERP Unit Name & No: Product Storage & Loadout - 172 DATE REVIEWED: December 2007 SAFEGUARDS PI-0415, pressure indication with high alarm PZV-0955 Operator observation and intervention - ability to operate bypass valve manually ACTION No further action required
NODE: 7.04 (continued) ITEM: WBS 172 - Benzene Export Storage Tank and Pumps WHAT IF?... CONSEQUENCE
3 PRV-0400 malfunctions open Potential increased pressure 3 more than desired? in tank; possible over 5 pressure and tank damage
3 PRV-0400 malfunctions 3 closed more than desired? 6
Potential inability to provide nitrogen blanket on tank Potential tank damage when emptying tank Potential contamination of tank contents with air
PI-0415, pressure indication with low alarm PZV-0955 Operator observation and intervention - ability to operate bypass valve manually No further action required
Highly reliable valve that is 3 ZV-0445 malfunctions closed Potential inability to provide 3 when desired open? feed to unit; possible process routinely tested 7 upset Valve position indication Potential to starve operating with interlock to trip pumps pumps; possible pump damage Operator observation and intervention - ability to manually operate valve Operator observation and 3 172-G-0011A/B pump fails in Potential reduced ability to 3 service? provide feed to metering skid; intervention - pump run 8 possible process upset indication and ability to start spare pump FIC-0440, flow indicating controller with low alarm 3 FCV-0440 fails open? 3 9 Unintended recirculation of material back to tank Potential reduced ability to provide material to metering skid; possible process upset 3 FCV-0440 malfunctions 4 closed more than desired? 0 Inability to provide minimum flow protection for pump; potential pump damage (if needed) Operator observation and intervention - valve position indication, ability to operate bypass valve manually
Valve position indication FIC-0440, flow indicating controller with low alarm Operator observation and intervention - ability to operate bypass valve manually
A-5
PPHA Work Sheets

Project No: J6491
Client: YERP Unit Name & No: Product Storage & Loadout - 172 DATE REVIEWED: December 2007 SAFEGUARDS Highly reliable valve that is routinely tested Pump minimum flow protection Valve position indication with interlock to trip pumps ACTION No further action required
NODE: 7.04 (continued) ITEM: WBS 172 - Benzene Export Storage Tank and Pumps WHAT IF?... CONSEQUENCE
3 ZV-0450 malfunctions closed Potential to dead head 4 when desired open? pumps; possible pump 1 damage
A-6

APPENDIX B PPHA Action & Response Sheets
PPHA Actions
Project No: J6491
Client: YERP Unit Name & No: Product Storage & Loadout - 172 WHAT IF? STUDY ACTION AND RESPONSE SHEET
ACTION ON: Project - Bill Soo, Mike Nixon, Process - DC ACTION NO: 29 MEETING DATES: December 2007
RESPOND BY: A.S.A.P
DRAWINGS AND DOCUMENTS: 172-YER-PE-PID-0025 172-YER-PE-PID-0026 172-YER-PE-PID-0027 172-YER-PE-PID-0028 ITEM: WBS 172 - Product Storage and Loadout - Gasoline Tanks and Pumps WHAT IF?...: ZV-0262 malfunctions closed? CONSEQUENCE: interruption of flow to shipping. potential pump damage. SAFEGUARDS: Operator will get valve indication for ZV closure. FCV-0255 will open up to allow min flow. ACTION: Significant discussion took place comparing logic of discharge valve trips of diesel pump and gasoline pumps. Recommend that this be pursued in a separate forum to obtain a recommendation from client for a revised scheme. RESPONSE: (Action 29) DATED: 4-22-2008 (Hazop Node 7.02)
This action has been recorded in the Hazard Register for addressing during the EPC phase of this project. Additional details will be available then for the valves and pumps and a more accurate scheme can be formuated.
SIGNED: Bill Soo ENTER YOUR RESPONSE IN THE BOX ABOVE, THEN SIGN AND RETURN TO: NOTES (for use of Hazop Secretary only)
B-1

APPENDIX C Piping & Instrument Diagrams

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Yanbu Export Refinery Project

General Confidential Page 2 of 13

Yanbu Export Refinery Project

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Yanbu Export Refinery Project

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Yanbu Export Refinery Project

Yanbu Export Refinery Project

There will be no storage of refinery products at NGL.

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Yanbu Export Refinery Project

Yanbu Export Refinery Project

P&IDs Reviewed During PPHA

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Yanbu Export Refinery Project

Yanbu Export Refinery Project

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Yanbu Export Refinery Project

APPENDIX A PPHA Worksheets

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PPHA Work Sheets

DATE REVIEWED: December 2007

3 XV-0002 malfunctions? 1 1 3 XV0007 malfunctions? 1 2 3 ZV-0099 malfunctions 1 closed? 3

Potential inability to load into tank.

No further action required

potential pump damage.

No further action required

No further action required

No further action required

No further action required

Preliminary Process Hazards Analysis

PPHA Work Sheets

No further action required

Preliminary Process Hazards Analysis

PPHA Work Sheets

Preliminary Process Hazards Analysis

PPHA Work Sheets

Preliminary Process Hazards Analysis

PPHA Work Sheets

3 PRV-0400 malfunctions 3 closed more than desired? 6

No further action required

No further action required

No further action required

Preliminary Process Hazards Analysis

PPHA Work Sheets

Preliminary Process Hazards Analysis

Yanbu Export Refinery Project

APPENDIX B PPHA Action & Response Sheets

General Confidential Page 12 of 13

RESPOND BY: A.S.A.P

Preliminary Process Hazards Analysis

Yanbu Export Refinery Project

APPENDIX C Piping & Instrument Diagrams

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