Nordlinger, Eric (1977) Soldiers in Politics. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. Ch.

1: The Study of Praetorianism Refer to interventionist officers as praetorian soldiers, to consciously evoke Gibbons' analysis of Rome, in which increasing intervention of military in politics was both syumptom and cause of decline. "Praetorianism refers to a situaiton in which militayr officers are major or predominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threatened use of force." Thesis that this is a "characteristic and a distinctive phenomenenon". That is, that praetorian rule has many characteristics in common, and that there is a significant difference between this and civilian rule. In L.A., only C.R. and Mex have not had praetorian situations since 1945 Overall, appears that military have intervened in 2/3 of >100 non-Western states since 1945 As Janowitz notes, "presistent patterns of civil supremacy are the deviant cases taht requrie special explanation" 1st coup has a permanent impact upon the rules of the game: military enters the political arena; even after military gives up power, civilian rulers have been "put on notice" Three models of civilian control: Traditional model: both military and civilian elites sprang from a common social elite, and there was little conflcit between them. [CAse of 17th and 18th C European monarchies?] Military leaders would have severely damaged their civilian perogatives through intervention This model, of course, is of little interest today. The liberal model: premised on differentiattion of elites; and of functions of the two: dual foundation, military must respect civilian rule, but civilians must also respect the military institution; eg not interfere with promotion, etc This 2nd part of the model has often been transgressed: this has led to "defensive" military interventions Problem that it can take more than a generation for tradition of respect for civilian rule to permeate armed forces... [and of course, the 1st coup negates that possibiltiy for a long time to come] Penetration model: civilian rulers penetrate the armed forces with political ideas and personnel. Case of Communist regimes Mao's quote has two parts: "Power grows out of the barrel of teh gun. Our principle is that teh party commands the gun and the gun shall never be allowed to command the party." Fully 40% of Chinese military training is ideological! Tanzania: service in the army limited to party members. Model has been successful: only one coup attempt (unsuccessful) in states with this model. BUT: almost impossible to implement unless one is starting from scratch. Also can only be implemented where there is a single locus of power... otherwise the military would be penetrated by several sets of ideas and personnel.. Public rationales for praetorianism [P] Interesting that 2/3 of L.A. countries' constitutions give military some explicit role as guardians of the constitution Gen. Ongania of ARG: people have right to resist tyranny, but since they are unarmed they cannot do so, so military must do it on their behalf. Military will also often claim capacity to restore country to good economic and political health, claiming their unity, lack of partisan and class divisions, etc. will enable them to do this. Very occasionally, military proclaims plan for more far-reaching social change. Generally, upon taking power, military will announced intention to hand it back to civilians within a specified time period [Pinochet of course an

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exception to this] Typology of P Common elements: bias against politicians and mass politica activity; defense of military's corporate interests; creation of authoritarian structures But differences: can distinguish: i) Moderators: seek to retain veto power, in order to preserve the status quo; will back up demands with coup threats; May engage in "displacement-type coups", quickly push a govt out of power and replace it with another, eg when popular sectors have managed to elect someone This is an unstable category; tends to pass into: ii) Guardians: govt control, to preserve status quo and/or correct certain deficiencies and malpractices iii) Rulers: more profound project: effect political and maybe socioeconomic change See rulers in perhaps 10% of military interventions: may seek to create mobilization structures Will seek to destroy existing power centres, and perhaps even traditioanl oligarchies, etc.; this may involve military in agrarian reform to destroy oligarchies' economic base Important to note that there is not always a pure distinction between Prule and civilian rule: eg in Cuba, we have military occupying 1/2 of Central Committee seats; 1/3 in China Def: Military regimes "are those in which soldiers have seized power through the coup d'etat, officers or former officiers hold the highest govt positions, and they rely primarily upon the officer corps in retaining them, even though civilians play a greater or (most commonly) a lesser role." Ch. 6 Coups frequently condemned because they respond merely to corporate interests of army On the other hand, one can find justifications: coups tend to act against govts with serious performance failures: corruption, violation of constitution "the military only act against less than legitimate governments" [???] If they act on basis of corporate interest, are they more self-interested than the civilians they replace? Moreover, the soldiers usually see themselve as serving a higher purpose (so what???) But we must also evaluate performance of military in power: while civilian govts tend to spread over the spectrum form high to lower performance, military govts almost universally perform badly. Look at following criteria: 1. govt legitimacy: very few military govts have successfully legitimized themselves 2. non-coercive rule 3. minimization of violence: military govts are even less successful than civilian ones in keeping conflict from turning into violence 4. popular responsiveness: military tend to act on behalf of middle-class interests 5. economic change: GNP performance about the same; but military have rarely been able to bring about modernizing change Milt govts often try to establish open regimes upon leaving power; theory here is that they believe such a regime will be less able to challenge military interests than an authoritarian or mobilization regime In addition, military will tend to extract guarantees before returning to the barracks

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Such open regimes will generally be compatible with middle-class interests, esp. since military will generally have weakened popular mobilization and oligarchical power Types of restrictions they will place: "restrictions upon the kinds of political papeals that may be made by the competing parties; the exclusion of 'objectionable' parties and leaders from the electoral process; and the promulgation of electoral laws and arrangements that are advantageous to 'acceptable' political parties." BUT: The " 'iron surgeons' regularly cut in teh wrong places": destroy parties, etc. Thus, no civilian infrastructure in place civilian govts can have even more serious problems upon taking power because the military have often left them with fucked up situations "the most frequent sequel to military coups and govt is more of the same" in L.A., 70% of military who turned power over seized it anew shortly; on average within 6 yrs. One factor here, as noted above, is that the 1st coup weakens, for a long time to come, the civilian ethic. Military also know that they can carry it off again, having done it once On the other hand, they may be hesitant, after 1st experience in govt: among other things, this often threatens unity of office corps Also, civilians in power may now tread warily, avoid provoking military

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