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Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**Routing Games with Progressive Filling
**

Kevin Schewior TU Berlin, COGA Group

Presentation of my Master’s Thesis Advisor: Martin Hoefer (now MPII Saarbrucken) ¨ Computer Science 1, RWTH Aachen

May 23, 2013

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

1/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Motivation

Consider a network modelling e.g. a road or computer network.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

2/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Motivation

Consider a network modelling e.g. a road or computer network. Players (logistics companies, computer users) want to send trafﬁc from a speciﬁc source to a speciﬁc sink.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

2/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Motivation

Consider a network modelling e.g. a road or computer network. Players (logistics companies, computer users) want to send trafﬁc from a speciﬁc source to a speciﬁc sink. In order to achieve that, they choose paths from their source to their sink nodes (as actions in a game).

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

2/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Motivation

Consider a network modelling e.g. a road or computer network. Players (logistics companies, computer users) want to send trafﬁc from a speciﬁc source to a speciﬁc sink. In order to achieve that, they choose paths from their source to their sink nodes (as actions in a game). We are considering a fair way to distribute bandwidth conform to capacity constraints.

max-min fairness

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

2/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Motivation

Consider a network modelling e.g. a road or computer network. Players (logistics companies, computer users) want to send trafﬁc from a speciﬁc source to a speciﬁc sink. In order to achieve that, they choose paths from their source to their sink nodes (as actions in a game). We are considering a fair way to distribute bandwidth conform to capacity constraints.

max-min fairness

**Players may have different priorities.
**

progressive ﬁlling as a generalization of max-min fairness

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

2/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Related Work

**analysis of routing games with max-min fair allocations
**

Yang, Xue and Fang at ICNP ’10

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

3/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Related Work

**analysis of routing games with max-min fair allocations
**

Yang, Xue and Fang at ICNP ’10

**analysis of bottleneck congestion games
**

Harks, Hoefer, Klimm and Skopalik at ESA ’10

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

3/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Related Work

**analysis of routing games with max-min fair allocations
**

Yang, Xue and Fang at ICNP ’10

**analysis of bottleneck congestion games
**

Harks, Hoefer, Klimm and Skopalik at ESA ’10

**analysis of the maximum k -splittable ﬂow (Mk SF) problem
**

¨ Bailer, Kohler and Skutella at ESA ’02 Koch, Skutella and Spenke at WAOA ’06

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

3/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Goals

We want to...

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

4/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Goals

We want to... efﬁciently ﬁnd equilibrium states (with a preferably high throughput or other properties) in special cases or in general.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

4/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Goals

We want to... efﬁciently ﬁnd equilibrium states (with a preferably high throughput or other properties) in special cases or in general. efﬁciently compute or approximate optimal states in special cases or in general.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

4/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Goals

We want to... efﬁciently ﬁnd equilibrium states (with a preferably high throughput or other properties) in special cases or in general. efﬁciently compute or approximate optimal states in special cases or in general. describe equilibrium states and optimal states in terms of throughput (PoA, PoS).

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

4/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Overview

1

Introduction Progressive Filling Game Theoretic Approach Computational Complexity Efﬁciency of Equilibria Future Work

2

3

4

5

6

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

5/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Max-Min Fairness

We are given a set of paths and want to determine the capacity sent along the paths. Idea of Max-Min Fairness:

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

6/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Max-Min Fairness

We are given a set of paths and want to determine the capacity sent along the paths. Idea of Max-Min Fairness: Firstly, maximize the minimum bandwith.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

6/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Max-Min Fairness

We are given a set of paths and want to determine the capacity sent along the paths. Idea of Max-Min Fairness: Firstly, maximize the minimum bandwith. Secondly, maximize the second minimum bandwith.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

6/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Max-Min Fairness

We are given a set of paths and want to determine the capacity sent along the paths. Idea of Max-Min Fairness: Firstly, maximize the minimum bandwith. Secondly, maximize the second minimum bandwith. ...and so on...

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

6/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Progressive Filling for Max-Min Fairness

Idea:

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

7/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Progressive Filling for Max-Min Fairness

Idea: Set the bandwidth of all players initially to 0.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

7/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Progressive Filling for Max-Min Fairness

Idea: Set the bandwidth of all players initially to 0. Let the bandwidths of all players uniformally rise.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

7/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Progressive Filling for Max-Min Fairness

Idea: Set the bandwidth of all players initially to 0. Let the bandwidths of all players uniformally rise. When a link gets saturated, ﬁx the bandwidths of the players on this link and continue with the other players.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

7/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Progressive Filling for Max-Min Fairness

Idea: Set the bandwidth of all players initially to 0. Let the bandwidths of all players uniformally rise. When a link gets saturated, ﬁx the bandwidths of the players on this link and continue with the other players. Theorem This algorithm computes the max-min fair bandwidth allocation.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

7/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

General Progressive Filling

Players may have different priorities.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

8/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

General Progressive Filling

Players may have different priorities. Thus, allow (Riemann) integrable functions vi : R` Ñ R` assigning an allocation rate to each point in time.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

8/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

General Progressive Filling

Players may have different priorities. Thus, allow (Riemann) integrable functions vi : R` Ñ R` assigning an allocation rate to each point in time. Further requirement: ż8 vi pt q dt “ 8.

0

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

8/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

General Progressive Filling

Players may have different priorities. Thus, allow (Riemann) integrable functions vi : R` Ñ R` assigning an allocation rate to each point in time. Further requirement: ż8 vi pt q dt “ 8.

0

A formalization will not be given here; we focus on more important parts.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

8/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Example for Progressive Filling

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

9/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**Example for Progressive Filling
**

v1 pt q

v2 pt q

t

v3 pt q

t

t

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

9/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**Example for Progressive Filling
**

v1 pt q

v2 pt q

t

v3 pt q

t

t

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

9/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**Example for Progressive Filling
**

v1 pt q t‹

v2 pt q

t

v3 pt q

t

t

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

9/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**Example for Progressive Filling
**

v1 pt q t‹

v2 pt q

t

v3 pt q

t

t

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

9/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Formal Description (1)

Introduce an allocation model M “ pN , R , pcr qr PR , pSi qi PN q where

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

10/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Formal Description (1)

Introduce an allocation model M “ pN , R , pcr qr PR , pSi qi PN q where N “ t1, ..., nu is the set of players,

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

10/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Formal Description (1)

Introduce an allocation model M “ pN , R , pcr qr PR , pSi qi PN q where N “ t1, ..., nu is the set of players, R “ t1, ..., mu is the set of resources,

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

10/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Formal Description (1)

Introduce an allocation model M “ pN , R , pcr qr PR , pSi qi PN q where N “ t1, ..., nu is the set of players, R “ t1, ..., mu is the set of resources, cr P R is the capacity of resource r , for each r P R ,

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

10/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Formal Description (1)

Introduce an allocation model M “ pN , R , pcr qr PR , pSi qi PN q where N “ t1, ..., nu is the set of players, R “ t1, ..., mu is the set of resources, cr P R is the capacity of resource r , for each r P R , Si Ď P pR q is the set of strategies of player i , for each i P N .

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

10/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Formal Description (2)

Introduce a corresponding progressive ﬁlling game (PFG) to the allocation model M and allocation rate functions pvi qi PN :

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

11/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Formal Description (2)

Introduce a corresponding progressive ﬁlling game (PFG) to the allocation model M and allocation rate functions pvi qi PN : Strategic game G pM, pvi qi PN q “ pN , pSi qi PN , pbi qi PN q where

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

11/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Formal Description (2)

Introduce a corresponding progressive ﬁlling game (PFG) to the allocation model M and allocation rate functions pvi qi PN : Strategic game G pM, pvi qi PN q “ pN , pSi qi PN , pbi qi PN q where the players and strategies are kept,

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

11/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Formal Description (2)

Introduce a corresponding progressive ﬁlling game (PFG) to the allocation model M and allocation rate functions pvi qi PN : Strategic game G pM, pvi qi PN q “ pN , pSi qi PN , pbi qi PN q where the players and strategies are kept, bi : S Ñ R` is the bandwidth function of Player i , for each i P N , calculated by progressive ﬁlling using the functions pvi qi PN .

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

11/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Formal Description (2)

Introduce a corresponding progressive ﬁlling game (PFG) to the allocation model M and allocation rate functions pvi qi PN : Strategic game G pM, pvi qi PN q “ pN , pSi qi PN , pbi qi PN q where the players and strategies are kept, bi : S Ñ R` is the bandwidth function of Player i , for each i P N , calculated by progressive ﬁlling using the functions pvi qi PN . If the allocation is calculated with uniform allocation rate functions, we call the corresponding game max-min fair game (MMFG).

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

11/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Formal Description (2)

Introduce a corresponding progressive ﬁlling game (PFG) to the allocation model M and allocation rate functions pvi qi PN : Strategic game G pM, pvi qi PN q “ pN , pSi qi PN , pbi qi PN q where the players and strategies are kept, bi : S Ñ R` is the bandwidth function of Player i , for each i P N , calculated by progressive ﬁlling using the functions pvi qi PN . If the allocation is calculated with uniform allocation rate functions, we call the corresponding game max-min fair game (MMFG). The social welfare in S P S will be deﬁned to be ř SW pS q :“ i PN bi pS q.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

11/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Considered Subclasses

According to the structure of allocation models, we distinguish different subclasses of PFGs.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

12/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Considered Subclasses

According to the structure of allocation models, we distinguish different subclasses of PFGs. A PFG G “ pN , pSi qi PN , pbi qi PN q is called

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

12/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Considered Subclasses

According to the structure of allocation models, we distinguish different subclasses of PFGs. A PFG G “ pN , pSi qi PN , pbi qi PN q is called symmetric game if we have Si “ Sj for all i , j P N (otherwise it is called asymmetric),

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

12/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Considered Subclasses

According to the structure of allocation models, we distinguish different subclasses of PFGs. A PFG G “ pN , pSi qi PN , pbi qi PN q is called symmetric game if we have Si “ Sj for all i , j P N (otherwise it is called asymmetric), network game if it is played on the edges of a graph as resources and the strategies of player i are the paths between certain source and sink nodes si and ti , for each i P N ,

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

12/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Considered Subclasses

According to the structure of allocation models, we distinguish different subclasses of PFGs. A PFG G “ pN , pSi qi PN , pbi qi PN q is called symmetric game if we have Si “ Sj for all i , j P N (otherwise it is called asymmetric), network game if it is played on the edges of a graph as resources and the strategies of player i are the paths between certain source and sink nodes si and ti , for each i P N , single-commodity network game if G is a symmetric network game and

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

12/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Considered Subclasses

According to the structure of allocation models, we distinguish different subclasses of PFGs. A PFG G “ pN , pSi qi PN , pbi qi PN q is called symmetric game if we have Si “ Sj for all i , j P N (otherwise it is called asymmetric), network game if it is played on the edges of a graph as resources and the strategies of player i are the paths between certain source and sink nodes si and ti , for each i P N , single-commodity network game if G is a symmetric network game and multi-commodity network game if G is an asymmetric network game.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

12/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Considered Subclasses

According to the structure of allocation models, we distinguish different subclasses of PFGs. A PFG G “ pN , pSi qi PN , pbi qi PN q is called symmetric game if we have Si “ Sj for all i , j P N (otherwise it is called asymmetric), network game if it is played on the edges of a graph as resources and the strategies of player i are the paths between certain source and sink nodes si and ti , for each i P N , single-commodity network game if G is a symmetric network game and multi-commodity network game if G is an asymmetric network game. Sometimes we will w.l.o.g. consider multigraphs instead of graphs.

Kevin Schewior Routing Games with Progressive Filling 12/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

k -Strong Equilibria

k -Strong Equilibrium (k -SE) S P S is a k -SE ô Ś 1 No C Ď N with |C | ď k and SC P i PC Si exist such that ` 1 ˘ bi SC , S´C ą bi pS q, for all i P C .

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

13/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

k -Strong Equilibria

k -Strong Equilibrium (k -SE) S P S is a k -SE ô Ś 1 No C Ď N with |C | ď k and SC P i PC Si exist such that ` 1 ˘ bi SC , S´C ą bi pS q, for all i P C . Special cases: k “ 1: Nash Equilibrium (NE) k “ n: Strong Equilibrium (SE)

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

13/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Existence of SE in PFGs

Let S be a state in a PFG. For a player i , we call the point in time where his bandwidth gets ﬁxed his ﬁnishing time ti pS q.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

14/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Existence of SE in PFGs

Let S be a state in a PFG. For a player i , we call the point in time where his bandwidth gets ﬁxed his ﬁnishing time ti pS q. Now consider the sorted vector of ﬁnishing times of all players N , in ascending order.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

14/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Existence of SE in PFGs

Let S be a state in a PFG. For a player i , we call the point in time where his bandwidth gets ﬁxed his ﬁnishing time ti pS q. Now consider the sorted vector of ﬁnishing times of all players N , in ascending order. With each improvement step of a coalition C Ď N from S to a state T , this vector lexicographically increases.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

14/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Existence of SE in PFGs

Let S be a state in a PFG. For a player i , we call the point in time where his bandwidth gets ﬁxed his ﬁnishing time ti pS q. Now consider the sorted vector of ﬁnishing times of all players N , in ascending order. With each improvement step of a coalition C Ď N from S to a state T , this vector lexicographically increases. Reason: let i ‹ be the player from C with the minimum ﬁnishing time in S

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

14/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Existence of SE in PFGs

Let S be a state in a PFG. For a player i , we call the point in time where his bandwidth gets ﬁxed his ﬁnishing time ti pS q. Now consider the sorted vector of ﬁnishing times of all players N , in ascending order. With each improvement step of a coalition C Ď N from S to a state T , this vector lexicographically increases. Reason: let i ‹ be the player from C with the minimum ﬁnishing time in S all the players who are ﬁxed earlier than or at the same time as i ‹ in S cannot be negatively affected by the improvement step

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

14/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Existence of SE in PFGs

Let S be a state in a PFG. For a player i , we call the point in time where his bandwidth gets ﬁxed his ﬁnishing time ti pS q. Now consider the sorted vector of ﬁnishing times of all players N , in ascending order. With each improvement step of a coalition C Ď N from S to a state T , this vector lexicographically increases. Reason: let i ‹ be the player from C with the minimum ﬁnishing time in S all the players who are ﬁxed earlier than or at the same time as i ‹ in S cannot be negatively affected by the improvement step all the other players still get ﬁxed after ti ‹ pS q

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

14/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Existence of SE in PFGs

Let S be a state in a PFG. For a player i , we call the point in time where his bandwidth gets ﬁxed his ﬁnishing time ti pS q. Now consider the sorted vector of ﬁnishing times of all players N , in ascending order. With each improvement step of a coalition C Ď N from S to a state T , this vector lexicographically increases. Reason: let i ‹ be the player from C with the minimum ﬁnishing time in S all the players who are ﬁxed earlier than or at the same time as i ‹ in S cannot be negatively affected by the improvement step all the other players still get ﬁxed after ti ‹ pS q ñ PFGs have a lexicographical potential function

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

14/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Existence of SE in PFGs

Let S be a state in a PFG. For a player i , we call the point in time where his bandwidth gets ﬁxed his ﬁnishing time ti pS q. Now consider the sorted vector of ﬁnishing times of all players N , in ascending order. With each improvement step of a coalition C Ď N from S to a state T , this vector lexicographically increases. Reason: let i ‹ be the player from C with the minimum ﬁnishing time in S all the players who are ﬁxed earlier than or at the same time as i ‹ in S cannot be negatively affected by the improvement step all the other players still get ﬁxed after ti ‹ pS q ñ PFGs have a lexicographical potential function ñ PFGs possess SE

Kevin Schewior Routing Games with Progressive Filling 14/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

An Important Decision Problem

The following problem is known to be NP-hard: 2 Directed Arc-Disjoint Paths Problem (2DADP Problem) Input: A directed graph D “ pV , Aq and source-sink pairs ps1 , t1 q , ps2 , t2 q P V 2 . Output: The information whether there exist arc-disjoint paths from s1 to t1 and from s2 to t2 .

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

15/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**Computation of SE in single-commodity network PFGs
**

Let v1 ‰ v2 be two constant allocation rate functions and consider the class of single-commodity network PFGs with 2 players and v1 , v2 as allocation rate functions.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

16/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**Computation of SE in single-commodity network PFGs
**

Let v1 ‰ v2 be two constant allocation rate functions and consider the class of single-commodity network PFGs with 2 players and v1 , v2 as allocation rate functions. Theorem In this class, the computation of SE is NP-hard.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

16/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**Computation of SE in single-commodity network PFGs
**

Let v1 ‰ v2 be two constant allocation rate functions and consider the class of single-commodity network PFGs with 2 players and v1 , v2 as allocation rate functions. Theorem In this class, the computation of SE is NP-hard. We reduce from 2DADP. W.l.o.g., v1 ” 1 and v2 ” λ ă 1.

1`λ s λ`ε s2 s1 Digraph D from the 2DADP instance; capacity 1 ` λ each t1 t2 1`λ t λ`ε

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

16/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**Computation of SE in single-commodity network PFGs
**

Let v1 ‰ v2 be two constant allocation rate functions and consider the class of single-commodity network PFGs with 2 players and v1 , v2 as allocation rate functions. Theorem In this class, the computation of SE is NP-hard. We reduce from 2DADP. W.l.o.g., v1 ” 1 and v2 ” λ ă 1.

1`λ s λ`ε s2 s1 Digraph D from the 2DADP instance; capacity 1 ` λ each t1 t2 1`λ t λ`ε

**We show that each SE certiﬁes whether the 2DADP-instance is solvable or not:
**

Kevin Schewior Routing Games with Progressive Filling 16/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**Computation of SE in single-commodity network PFGs
**

We reduce from 2DADP. W.l.o.g., v1 ” 1 and v2 ” λ ă 1.

1`λ s λ`ε s2 s1 Digraph D from the 2DADP instance; capacity 1 ` λ each t1 t2 1`λ t λ`ε

We show that each SE certiﬁes whether the 2DADP-instance is solvable or not:

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

16/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**Computation of SE in single-commodity network PFGs
**

We reduce from 2DADP. W.l.o.g., v1 ” 1 and v2 ” λ ă 1.

1`λ s λ`ε s2 s1 Digraph D from the 2DADP instance; capacity 1 ` λ each t1 t2 1`λ t λ`ε

We show that each SE certiﬁes whether the 2DADP-instance is solvable or not: a) Each SE with two arc-disjoint paths from s to t certiﬁes that the instance is solvable: in any SE, player 1 always uses a path of the form ps, s1 , . . . , t1 , t q since player 2 uses an arc-disjoint path, he must indeed connect s2 and t2

Kevin Schewior Routing Games with Progressive Filling 16/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**Computation of SE in single-commodity network PFGs
**

We reduce from 2DADP. W.l.o.g., v1 ” 1 and v2 ” λ ă 1.

1`λ s λ`ε s2 s1 Digraph D from the 2DADP instance; capacity 1 ` λ each t1 t2 1`λ t λ`ε

We show that each SE certiﬁes whether the 2DADP-instance is solvable or not: b) Each SE without two arc-disjoint paths from s to t certiﬁes that the instance is not solvable: if the players share a common edge in a SE, player 1 gets bandwidth 1 and player 2 gets bandwidth λ if there were two arc-disjoint paths in D , the players could switch to these paths and strictly improve

Kevin Schewior Routing Games with Progressive Filling 16/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Complexity Results for PFGs

computing SE general PFGs network PFGs symmetric PFGs single-commodity network PFGs NP-hard NP-hard NP-hard NP-hard

computing optima NP-hard NP-hard NP-hard NP-hard

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

17/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Complexity Results for MMFGs

computing SE general MMFGs network MMFGs symmetric MMFGs single-commodity network MMFGs NP-hard NP-hard NP-hard polynomial time via Dual Greedy

computing optima NP-hard NP-hard NP-hard NP-hard

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

18/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**Dual Greedy Algorithm
**

”Dual Greedy“ (Harks et al., ESA’10) can be used to compute a SE in bottleneck congestion games the following way:

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

19/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**Dual Greedy Algorithm
**

”Dual Greedy“ (Harks et al., ESA’10) can be used to compute a SE in bottleneck congestion games the following way: Introduce upper bounds for players on each edge.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

19/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**Dual Greedy Algorithm
**

”Dual Greedy“ (Harks et al., ESA’10) can be used to compute a SE in bottleneck congestion games the following way: Introduce upper bounds for players on each edge. Iteratively reduce the bounds on undesirable edges as long as the bounds still allow a feasible state.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

19/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**Dual Greedy Algorithm
**

”Dual Greedy“ (Harks et al., ESA’10) can be used to compute a SE in bottleneck congestion games the following way: Introduce upper bounds for players on each edge. Iteratively reduce the bounds on undesirable edges as long as the bounds still allow a feasible state. Fix the players who prevent the bounds from being reduced and continue with the other ones.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

19/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**Dual Greedy Algorithm
**

”Dual Greedy“ (Harks et al., ESA’10) can be used to compute a SE in bottleneck congestion games the following way: Introduce upper bounds for players on each edge. Iteratively reduce the bounds on undesirable edges as long as the bounds still allow a feasible state. Fix the players who prevent the bounds from being reduced and continue with the other ones. Theorem Dual Greedy can be modiﬁed to calculate a SE in MMFGs.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

19/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**Dual Greedy Algorithm
**

”Dual Greedy“ (Harks et al., ESA’10) can be used to compute a SE in bottleneck congestion games the following way: Introduce upper bounds for players on each edge. Iteratively reduce the bounds on undesirable edges as long as the bounds still allow a feasible state. Fix the players who prevent the bounds from being reduced and continue with the other ones. Theorem Dual Greedy can be modiﬁed to calculate a SE in MMFGs. Theorem Dual Greedy can be implemented to run in polynomial time for single-commodity network MMFGs.

Kevin Schewior Routing Games with Progressive Filling 19/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**Approximation Guarantee of Dual Greedy
**

Consider symmetric MMFGs. We utilize some ideas and constructions from work on the Mk SF problem.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

20/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**Approximation Guarantee of Dual Greedy
**

Consider symmetric MMFGs. We utilize some ideas and constructions from work on the Mk SF problem. Theorem

1 Dual Greedy computes a (2 ´ n )-approximation to the social optimum.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

20/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**Approximation Guarantee of Dual Greedy
**

Consider symmetric MMFGs. We utilize some ideas and constructions from work on the Mk SF problem. Theorem

1 Dual Greedy computes a (2 ´ n )-approximation to the social optimum.

Theorem If we ﬁx n “ 2, computing any better approximation is NP-hard.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

20/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**Approximation Guarantee of Dual Greedy
**

Consider symmetric MMFGs. We utilize some ideas and constructions from work on the Mk SF problem. Theorem

1 Dual Greedy computes a (2 ´ n )-approximation to the social optimum.

Theorem If we ﬁx n “ 2, computing any better approximation is NP-hard. Theorem Asymptotically, computing any approximation with a guarantee smaller than 6 5 for ﬁxed n is NP-hard.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

20/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**k -Strong Price of Anarchy/Stability
**

k -Strong Price of Anarchy (k -SPoA) ´ S PS SWpS q k -SPoApG q :“ minmax “ S PS :S is k -SE SWpS q

the optimal social welfare the worst social welfare possible in a k -SE

¯

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

21/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**k -Strong Price of Anarchy/Stability
**

k -Strong Price of Anarchy (k -SPoA) ´ S PS SWpS q k -SPoApG q :“ minmax “ S PS :S is k -SE SWpS q k -Strong Price of Stability (k -SPoS) ´ S PS SWpS q “ k -SPoSpG q :“ maxmax S PS :S is k -SE SWpS q

the optimal social welfare the worst social welfare possible in a k -SE

¯

the optimal social welfare the best social welfare possible in a k -SE

¯

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

21/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**k -Strong Price of Anarchy/Stability
**

k -Strong Price of Anarchy (k -SPoA) ´ S PS SWpS q k -SPoApG q :“ minmax “ S PS :S is k -SE SWpS q k -Strong Price of Stability (k -SPoS) ´ S PS SWpS q “ k -SPoSpG q :“ maxmax S PS :S is k -SE SWpS q Special cases: k “ 1: Price of Anarchy/Stability (PoA/PoS) k “ n: Strong Price of Anarchy/Stability (SPoA/SPoS)

the optimal social welfare the worst social welfare possible in a k -SE

¯

the optimal social welfare the best social welfare possible in a k -SE

¯

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

21/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**k -Strong Price of Anarchy/Stability
**

k -Strong Price of Anarchy (k -SPoA) ´ S PS SWpS q k -SPoApG q :“ minmax “ S PS :S is k -SE SWpS q k -Strong Price of Stability (k -SPoS) ´ S PS SWpS q “ k -SPoSpG q :“ maxmax S PS :S is k -SE SWpS q Special cases: k “ 1: Price of Anarchy/Stability (PoA/PoS) k “ n: Strong Price of Anarchy/Stability (SPoA/SPoS) Extension to classes of games: The k -SPoA/S is the supremum of the individual k -SPoA/S.

Kevin Schewior Routing Games with Progressive Filling 21/29

the optimal social welfare the worst social welfare possible in a k -SE

¯

the optimal social welfare the best social welfare possible in a k -SE

¯

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**PoS in single-commodity network PFGs
**

Theorem The PoS in single-commodity network PFGs is at least n.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

22/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**PoS in single-commodity network PFGs
**

Theorem The PoS in single-commodity network PFGs is at least n.

cap. 1 cap. 1 (top edge: cap. (bot. edge: 1 ` ε) 1 ` ε) 1`ε

. . .

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

22/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**PoS in single-commodity network PFGs
**

Theorem The PoS in single-commodity network PFGs is at least n.

cap. 1 cap. 1 (top edge: cap. (bot. edge: 1 ` ε) 1 ` ε) 1`ε

Players: one player (‚) with constant allocation rate function v1 ” 1 n ´ 1 players (‚,‚,‚,...) with constant allocation rate ε functions vi ” n

. . .

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

22/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**PoS in single-commodity network PFGs
**

Theorem The PoS in single-commodity network PFGs is at least n.

cap. 1 cap. 1 (top edge: cap. (bot. edge: 1 ` ε) 1 ` ε) 1`ε

any NE: player ‚ takes the path with capacity 1 ` ε

. . .

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

22/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**PoS in single-commodity network PFGs
**

Theorem The PoS in single-commodity network PFGs is at least n.

cap. 1 cap. 1 (top edge: cap. (bot. edge: 1 ` ε) 1 ` ε) 1`ε

any NE: player ‚ takes the path with capacity 1 ` ε all the other players ‚,‚,‚,... must hence share an edge with player ‚

. . .

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

22/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**PoS in single-commodity network PFGs
**

Theorem The PoS in single-commodity network PFGs is at least n.

cap. 1 cap. 1 (top edge: cap. (bot. edge: 1 ` ε) 1 ` ε) 1`ε

optimal state: All the players choose parallel paths with capacity 1 each through the network.

. . .

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

22/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**PoS in single-commodity network PFGs
**

Theorem The PoS in single-commodity network PFGs is at least n.

cap. 1 cap. 1 (top edge: cap. (bot. edge: 1 ` ε) 1 ` ε) 1`ε

Price of Stability: social welfare in a NE: ď 1 ` 2ε if ε ď 1 social welfare in optimal state: n

. . .

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

22/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**PoS in single-commodity network PFGs
**

Theorem The PoS in single-commodity network PFGs is at least n.

cap. 1 cap. 1 (top edge: cap. (bot. edge: 1 ` ε) 1 ` ε) 1`ε

Price of Stability: social welfare in a NE: ď 1 ` 2ε if ε ď 1 social welfare in optimal state: n ! ) n sup 1` | 1 ě ε ą 0 “n 2ε

. . .

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

22/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

PoA in PFGs

Theorem The PoA in PFGs is at most n.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

23/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**PoS in symmetric MMFGs
**

By the approximation guarantee of Dual Greedy, we know that the 1 SPoS in this case is at most 2 ´ n .

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

24/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**PoS in symmetric MMFGs
**

By the approximation guarantee of Dual Greedy, we know that the 1 SPoS in this case is at most 2 ´ n . We ﬁnd the same lower bound on the PoS. Theorem

1 . The PoS in single-commodity MMFGs is at least 2 ´ n

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

24/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**PoS in symmetric MMFGs
**

By the approximation guarantee of Dual Greedy, we know that the 1 SPoS in this case is at most 2 ´ n . We ﬁnd the same lower bound on the PoS. Theorem

1 . The PoS in single-commodity MMFGs is at least 2 ´ n

consider a network consisting of source and sink nodes s and t and n parallel edges

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

24/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**PoS in symmetric MMFGs
**

By the approximation guarantee of Dual Greedy, we know that the 1 SPoS in this case is at most 2 ´ n . We ﬁnd the same lower bound on the PoS. Theorem

1 . The PoS in single-commodity MMFGs is at least 2 ´ n

consider a network consisting of source and sink nodes s and t and n parallel edges one of these edges has capacity n and the other n ´ 1 edges have capacity 1 ´ ε

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

24/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**PoS in symmetric MMFGs
**

By the approximation guarantee of Dual Greedy, we know that the 1 SPoS in this case is at most 2 ´ n . We ﬁnd the same lower bound on the PoS. Theorem

1 . The PoS in single-commodity MMFGs is at least 2 ´ n

consider a network consisting of source and sink nodes s and t and n parallel edges one of these edges has capacity n and the other n ´ 1 edges have capacity 1 ´ ε any NE: everyone uses the n-edge, social welfare n

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

24/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**PoS in symmetric MMFGs
**

By the approximation guarantee of Dual Greedy, we know that the 1 SPoS in this case is at most 2 ´ n . We ﬁnd the same lower bound on the PoS. Theorem

1 . The PoS in single-commodity MMFGs is at least 2 ´ n

consider a network consisting of source and sink nodes s and t and n parallel edges one of these edges has capacity n and the other n ´ 1 edges have capacity 1 ´ ε any NE: everyone uses the n-edge, social welfare n optimal state: everyone uses an individual edge, social welfare asymptotically 2n ´ 1

Kevin Schewior Routing Games with Progressive Filling 24/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**PoS in multi-commodity network MMFGs
**

Theorem The PoS in multi-commodity network MMFGs is in Ω pnq.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

25/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**PoS in multi-commodity network MMFGs
**

Theorem The PoS in multi-commodity network MMFGs is in Ω pnq. W.l.o.g. 2 | n.

0

... 1

s1 “ s n `1 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ sn

2

1

t1 “ s2 t2 “ s3

1

t3 “ s4

1

tn 2 “ t n `1 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ tn

2

1

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

25/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**PoS in multi-commodity network MMFGs
**

Theorem The PoS in multi-commodity network MMFGs is in Ω pnq. W.l.o.g. 2 | n.

0

... 1

“ s n `1

2

1

t1 “ s2 t2 “ s3

1

t3 “ s4

1

s1 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ sn

tn 2 “ t n `1 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ tn

2

1

any equilibrium state: 0-edge is not chosen at all

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

25/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**PoS in multi-commodity network MMFGs
**

Theorem The PoS in multi-commodity network MMFGs is in Ω pnq. W.l.o.g. 2 | n.

0

... 1

“ s n `1

2

1

t1 “ s2 t2 “ s3

1

t3 “ s4

1

s1 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ sn

tn 2 “ t n `1 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ tn

2

1

**any equilibrium state: 0-edge is not chosen at all hence, each 1-edge is used by
**

n 2

` 1 players

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

25/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**PoS in multi-commodity network MMFGs
**

Theorem The PoS in multi-commodity network MMFGs is in Ω pnq. W.l.o.g. 2 | n.

0

... 1

“ s n `1

2

1

t1 “ s2 t2 “ s3

1

t3 “ s4

1

s1 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ sn

tn 2 “ t n `1 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ tn

2

1

any equilibrium state: 0-edge is not chosen at all hence, each 1-edge is used by overall, the social welfare is n ¨

Kevin Schewior

n 2

` 1 players “

2n n `2

1 n 2 `1

“ O p1q

25/29

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**PoS in multi-commodity network MMFGs
**

Theorem The PoS in multi-commodity network MMFGs is in Ω pnq. W.l.o.g. 2 | n.

0

... 1

“ s n `1

2

1

t1 “ s2 t2 “ s3

1

t3 “ s4

1

s1 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ sn

tn 2 “ t n `1 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ tn

2

1

**optimum state: 0-edge is chosen by players
**

n 2

` 1, . . . , n

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

25/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**PoS in multi-commodity network MMFGs
**

Theorem The PoS in multi-commodity network MMFGs is in Ω pnq. W.l.o.g. 2 | n.

0

... 1

“ s n `1

2

1

t1 “ s2 t2 “ s3

1

t3 “ s4

1

s1 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ sn

tn 2 “ t n `1 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ tn

2

1

**optimum state: 0-edge is chosen by players
**

n 2

` 1, . . . , n

hence, each 1-edge is used by exactly one player

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

25/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**PoS in multi-commodity network MMFGs
**

Theorem The PoS in multi-commodity network MMFGs is in Ω pnq. W.l.o.g. 2 | n.

0

... 1

“ s n `1

2

1

t1 “ s2 t2 “ s3

1

t3 “ s4

1

s1 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ sn

tn 2 “ t n `1 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ tn

2

1

**optimum state: 0-edge is chosen by players
**

n 2

` 1, . . . , n

**hence, each 1-edge is used by exactly one player overall, the social welfare is
**

Kevin Schewior

n 2

“ Ω pnq

25/29

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**PoS in multi-commodity network MMFGs
**

Theorem The PoS in multi-commodity network MMFGs is in Ω pnq. W.l.o.g. 2 | n.

0

... 1

“ s n `1

2

1

t1 “ s2 t2 “ s3

1

t3 “ s4

1

s1 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ sn

tn 2 “ t n `1 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ tn

2

1

**Price of Stability: any NE: social welfare of O p1q optimal state: social welfare of Ω pnq thus, PoS is
**

Kevin Schewior

Ωpnq O p1q

“ Ω pnq

Routing Games with Progressive Filling 25/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**k -SPoA in single-commodity network MMFGs
**

First let k “ 1, i.e., consider the PoA and the following network: n players

. . .

in optimum social welfare of n

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

26/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**k -SPoA in single-commodity network MMFGs
**

First let k “ 1, i.e., consider the PoA and the following network: n players

. . .

**in optimum social welfare of n; in a NE social welfare of 1 ñ PoA=n
**

Kevin Schewior Routing Games with Progressive Filling 26/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**k -SPoA in single-commodity network MMFGs
**

Now let k arbitrary but ﬁxed and consider the k -SPoA and the following network:

n k

players each

... . . . . . . . . .

n disjoint paths per gadget

k gadgets

**in optimum social welfare of n
**

Kevin Schewior Routing Games with Progressive Filling 26/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

**k -SPoA in single-commodity network MMFGs
**

Now let k arbitrary but ﬁxed and consider the k -SPoA and the following network:

n k

players each

... . . . . . . . . .

n disjoint paths per gadget

k gadgets

**in optimum social welfare of n; in a k -SE social welfare of k n ñ k -SPoA= k
**

Kevin Schewior Routing Games with Progressive Filling 26/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

k -SPoA in single-commodity network MMFGs

**Theorem The k -SPoA for single-commodity network MMFGs is in Ω `n˘
**

k

.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

26/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

k -SPoA in single-commodity network MMFGs

Theorem The k -SPoA for single-commodity network MMFGs is in Ω Conjecture The k -SPoA for single-commodity network MMFGs is in Θ `n˘

k

`n˘

k

.

.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

26/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

SPoA in symmetric MMFGs

**Theorem For n “ 2, it holds that SPoA “ 2 ´
**

1 n

“3 2.

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

27/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

SPoA in symmetric MMFGs

**Theorem For n “ 2, it holds that SPoA “ 2 ´ Theorem For arbitrary n, we have SPoAď
**

4 n ´2 n `1 1 n

“3 2.

(i.e. asymptotically 4).

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

27/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

SPoA in symmetric MMFGs

**Theorem For n “ 2, it holds that SPoA “ 2 ´ Theorem For arbitrary n, we have SPoAď Conjecture
**

1 For arbitrary n, we conjecture SPoA“ 2 ´ n . 4 n ´2 n `1 1 n

“3 2.

(i.e. asymptotically 4).

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

27/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Overview of results on PoS/PoA for MMFGs

PoS general MMFGs network MMFGs symmetric MMFGs single-commodity network MMFGs

SPoS

SPoA

PoA

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

28/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Overview of results on PoS/PoA for MMFGs

PoS general MMFGs network MMFGs symmetric MMFGs single-commodity network MMFGs Θ pn q Θ pn q

SPoS Θ pn q Θ pn q

SPoA Θ pn q Θ pn q

PoA n n

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

28/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Overview of results on PoS/PoA for MMFGs

**PoS general MMFGs network MMFGs symmetric MMFGs single-commodity network MMFGs Θ pn q Θ pn q 2´ 2´
**

1 n 1 n

SPoS Θ pn q Θ pn q 2´ 2´

1 n 1 n

SPoA Θ pn q Θ pn q ď ď

4 n ´2 n `1 4 n ´2 n `1

PoA n n n n

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

28/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Future Work

For single-commodity network MMFGs:

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

29/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Future Work

For single-commodity network MMFGs: ﬁnd a tight bound on the SPoA for n ą 2

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

29/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Future Work

For single-commodity network MMFGs: ﬁnd a tight bound on the SPoA for n ą 2 ﬁnd a tight bound on the k -SPoA for ﬁxed k

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

29/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Future Work

For single-commodity network MMFGs: ﬁnd a tight bound on the SPoA for n ą 2 ﬁnd a tight bound on the k -SPoA for ﬁxed k ﬁnd a tight bound on the inapproximability of optimal states for n ą 2 (and possibly a better approximation than Dual Greedy if 1 2´ n is not yet tight)

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

29/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Future Work

For single-commodity network MMFGs: ﬁnd a tight bound on the SPoA for n ą 2 ﬁnd a tight bound on the k -SPoA for ﬁxed k ﬁnd a tight bound on the inapproximability of optimal states for n ą 2 (and possibly a better approximation than Dual Greedy if 1 2´ n is not yet tight) Other tasks:

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

29/29

Introduction

Progressive Filling

Game Theoretic Approach

Computational Complexity

Efﬁciency of Equilibria

Future Work

Future Work

For single-commodity network MMFGs: ﬁnd a tight bound on the SPoA for n ą 2 ﬁnd a tight bound on the k -SPoA for ﬁxed k ﬁnd a tight bound on the inapproximability of optimal states for n ą 2 (and possibly a better approximation than Dual Greedy if 1 2´ n is not yet tight) Other tasks: consider other subclasses of PFGs such as matroid games

Kevin Schewior

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

29/29

- Exploratory Input
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- 15_chapter6
- Selfish Routing
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