Prediction of Bankruptcy and Financial Risks:

Using the Z-Score Model for

AEX- and AMX- Investment Decisions

Bachelor Thesis Economics and Business, Finance Track

Finance group
Faculty of Economics and Business
University of Amsterdam

Date:

July 2010

Name student:

Maurits Kruithof

UvA student number:

5603404

Supervisor:

Dr. Zacharias Sautner

Contents
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.
6.

Introduction ..3
Literature Study.. ..4
2.1. First Studies Related to Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy... ..4
2.2. Discriminant Analysis and Financial Ratios Theory. ..4
2.2.1. Beavers Univariate Discriminant Analysis (1966) .. ..4
2.2.2. Altmans Multivariate Discriminant Analysis (1968)... ..5
2.2.3. Developments After Beavers and Altmans Work .. ..6
2.2.4. Ohlsons Probabilistic Approach (1980)... ..7
2.2.5. Financial Ratios versus Structural Approach Theory.... ..8
2.3. The Z-Score Model ..8
2.3.1. Component Ratios of the Model ..8
2.4. Practical Use of the Z-Score Model.. ..9
2.4.1. Z-Score Model Accuracy and Type I and II Errors... ..9
2.4.2. Linking Z-Scores with Bond Ratings 10
Model & Data. 11
3.1. Z-Score Model and Research Sample 11
3.2. Dataset AEX- and AMX-listed Firms 12
3.3. Z-Score Trends of AEX- and AMX-indices.. 12
Analysis.. 15
4.1. AEX- and AMX-sectors Analysis... 15
4.2. Investment Decisions.. 17
4.2.1. High Z-Scores 17
4.2.2. Low Z-Scores 18
4.2.3. Z-Scores and S&P Bond Ratings... 19
Conclusion.. 20
References.. 21

Appendices
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
Appendix 3

AEX-index Dataset. 23
AMX-index Dataset... 27
Sector-overview AEX- and AMX-index (Z-Scores) 31

1. Introduction
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 was for many people the beginning of
uncertain times. The world was facing a financial crisis, which was followed by a recession.
Bankruptcies and financial distress lie in wait for many businesses. What impact does the
recession have on the financial health of companies? Are the reserves big enough to deal with
liquidity problems and decreasing sales and profits?

In this thesis, all the non-financial companies of the AEX- and AMX-indices will be checked on
their financial health by using the Z-Score Model. This model was developed by Edward
Altman in 1968. It was used to predict corporate defaults, but it is also useful as a tool to
recognize financial difficulties. The financial companies are excluded because this model is not
suitable for banks, insurance companies and real estate investment companies.

In chapter two, after the introduction, this model will be explained and compared with other
models in a literature study. Is it really true that one can predict corporate defaults (Altman,
1968; Beaver, 1966; Wilcox, 1971)? If so, would it not be a self-fulfilling prophecy, because no
one trusts a firm that is likely to go bankrupt? What kind of information is valuable to predict
default? And, are the models and outcomes reliable or accurate?

During uncertain times like these investors have nothing to go by. Calculating the Z-Score of a
company may help in the process of investing. Chapter three describes the research sample and
data that are used for the calculations. The research in this thesis shows that the Z-Scores of
2008 and 2009 are the lowest of the six-year period 2004-2009. Most ratios used from the
balance sheets have been decreased substantially.

The differences between sectors are analyzed in chapter four. The companies are divided in six
main sectors, namely industrials, materials, IT & telecom, food & beverage, consumer
discretionary and energy. The Z-Scores are demonstrating similarities between the industrials
and materials sectors with almost equal movements. These sectors are the only two sectors with
a recovery in 2009, where the others did not recover at all. This chapter ends with an analysis of
high and low Z-Scores , and what investors could do with this information.

As is usual, this thesis will be completed with discussion and concluding remarks in chapter five.

2. Literature Study
In the academic literature many articles and books have been published on the prediction of
bankruptcy. Most of this work is not solely about the prediction of bankruptcy; it also covers the
detection of financial difficulties and other financial risks (Altman, 2006). Investors, regulators,
security analysts, lawyers, managers, consultants and many more need this information for their
judgments.

2.1. First Studies Related to Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy

Winakor and Smith (1935) concluded that failing firms exhibit significantly different ratio
measurements than continuing companies. Thirty years later in the late 1960s the knowledge,
methods and theories of the prediction of bankruptcy began to develop rapidly.

According to Altman (1968), literature in that time suggested that a gap has arisen between
theory (more rigorous statistical techniques with sophisticated models) and practice
(traditional ratio analysis with data from financial statements) and empirical verification
would ensure that that gap could be bridged again. The questions which ratios are the most
important in detecting bankruptcy potential, what weights should be attached to those ratios and
how the weights should be established, needed to be answered (Altman, 1968).

2.2. Discriminant Analysis and Financial Ratios Theory

2.2.1. Beavers Univariate Discriminant Analysis (1966)
In 1966 Beaver found that a number of indicators could discriminate between matched samples
of failed and nonfailed firms for as long as five years prior to failure (Beaver, 1966). These 30
indicators or financial ratios perform best to predict a bankruptcy if they are tested one ratio at a
time (univariate). Beaver has categorized these 30 financial ratios in six groups (see Table 1).
This table shows that Beaver explored a wide range of ratios in his study and that there is some
overlap. When for example 30% of the Working Capital of the examined companies is in Cash
or Quick Assets, the ratios 1 and 2 of Group IV and 1 and 4 of Group VI will reveal a similar
behavior, which is not desirable. The data can be analyzed by a comparison of the mean values
and the likelihood ratios. Beaver explains that the multiratio analysis should reduce the common
elements to a minimum to prevent this amount of overlap (Beaver, 1966).

Table 1

List of Ratios tested by Beaver (1966)

Group I (Cash-Flow Ratios)

1. Cash-Flow to Sales
2. Cash-Flow to Total Assets
3. Cash-Flow to Net Worth
4. Cash-Flow to Total Debt

Group II (Net-Income Ratios)

Group V (Liquid Asset to

Current Debt Ratios)
1. Cash to Current Liabilities
2. Quick Assets to Current Liabilities
3. Current Ratio (Current Assets
to Current Liabilities)

1. Net Income to Sales

2. Net Income to Total Assets
3. Net Income to Net Worth
4. Net Income to Total Debt

Group VI (Turnover Ratios)

Group III (Debt to Total-Asset

Ratios)

4. Quick Assets to Sales

1. Current Liabilities to Total Assets

2. Long-Term Liabilities to Total Assets
3. Current plus Long-Term Liabilities
to Total Assets
4. Current plus Long-Term Liabilities
plus Preferred Stock to Total Assets

Group IV (Liquid-Asset to
Total-Asset Ratios)
1. Cash to Total Assets
2. Quick Assets to Total Assets
3. Current Assets to Total Assets

1. Cash to Sales
2. Accounts Receivable to Sales
3. Inventory to Sales
5. Current Assets to Sales
6. Working Capital to Sales
7. Net Worth to Sales
8. Total Assets to Sales
9. Cash Interval (Cash to Fund Expenditures for Operations)
10. Defensive Interval (Defensive
Assets to Fund Expenditures for
Operations
11. No-credit Interval (Defensive
Assets minus Current Liabilities
to Fund Expenditures for Operations)

4. Working Capital to Total Assets

Source: Beaver (1966)

Beaver made use of paired samples of 79 failed and 79 non-failed companies with comparable
asset-size and operating within the same industry. The ability to predict failure is strongest in
the cash-flow to total debt ratio. The net income to total assets ratio predicts second best and the
total debt to total assets next best (Beaver, 1966). The question why these three perform better
than the other 27 ratios is not answered. Besides that, these three ratios only perform best in this
sample and may not be significant in other samples. None of these three ratios are used in
Altmans Z-Score model, which is remarkable. Beaver suggested in his next study (1968) that
multivariate models may yield better results than his univariate model.

2.2.2. Altmans Multivariate Discriminant Analysis (1968)

It so happened that Altman presented the results of his study in 1968. He selected 33 pairs of
sample companies (bankrupt and non-bankrupt), all in the manufacturing industry. Altman
introduced a function according to the Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) and not the
(popular) regression analysis, although a carefully devised and interpreted multiple regression

analysis methodology could have been used (Altman, 1968). Altman advocates for MDA
because of the successful use in consumer credit evaluation and investment classification
(Altman, 1968). He collected almost similar data as Beaver and sorted this data into 22 financial
ratios. MDA then attempts to derive a linear combination of these financial ratios which best
discriminates between the groups bankrupt and non-bankrupt. So the linear function that
appears from the computer is the best model for that particular sample. If Altman used
another sample the outcome would be different.

The multivariate model can reach greater statistical significance than the univariate model and
the MDA creates an entire profile of financial ratios relevant to the selected companies, as well
as the interaction of these ratios. Analyzing these ratios together could remove possible
ambiguities (the early mentioned overlap) and misclassifications.
The result of Altmans study is the following model (Altman, 1968):
Z = .012X1 + .014X2 + .033X3 + .006X4 + .999X5

(1)

where: X1 = working capital total assets

X2 = retained earnings total assets
X3 = (earnings before interest and taxes) total assets
X4 = (stock price * outstanding shares) total liabilities
X5 = Sales total assets
The gap between practice and theory is bridged by presenting an application for the real
credit world: a firm with a Z-Score greater than 2.675 is classified as a nonbankrupt firm.
Firms with a deteriorating financial future have a Z-Score between 1.81 and 2.675, also called
the grey area. The grey area is not really safe, but also not in serious trouble. Potentially
insolvent companies have a Z-Score below 1.81. Chapter 2.3 provides a full explanation of the
Z-Score model.

2.2.3. Developments After Beavers and Altmans Work

Beaver and Altman have set the mainstream theoretical framework for decades to follow.
Altman explains in his book that additional research was undertaken by various researchers, like
Blum, Deakin and Libby (Altman, 2006), addressing several methodological issues. But the
most notable contribution from the 1970s comes from Wilcox (Hillegeist et al, 2004).

According to Hillegeist, most of the research on the predictive power of financial ratios has
been focused on the statistical methodology (Hillegeist et al, 2004). Altman himself was the first
one to recognize that the MDA was not as widely used as Regression Analysis (1968). It was
more difficult to do valid regression analysis (considering assumptions of normality etc.) than to
calculate a linear formula using MDA with the technology of 1968. The only thing that has to be
done is to discriminate between the two groups (bankrupt and non-bankrupt) and MDA does the
job well. Later, some major statistical developments took place in the early 1980s. An
alternative statistical methodology called the probabilistic or logit methodology was introduced
by Ohlson (Altman, 2006).

2.2.4. Ohlsons Probabilistic Approach (1980)

In his study Ohlson (1980) addresses a number of modelling issues and summarizes the many
statistical problems in using the MDA. Until then, MDA was the most popular methodology in
the financial ratio theory and calculations. Ohlsons main issues were (1) the small company
samples; (2) the source of the data (comes from one database Moodys); and (3) not knowing if
the financial statements were published before or after the bankruptcy.

Ohlson (1980) summarizes the statistical problems of MDA as follows:

(i)

Looking at the distributional properties of the coefficients, e.g. the variancecovariance matrices should be the same for bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. A
violation of this condition may be unimportant or irrelevant if the model only has to
discriminate. Ohlson wants to go further than the traditional econometric analysis
and finds it urgent to test variables for statistical significance.

(ii)

The score that an MDA model gives has little intuitive interpretation. It may help
for decision problems, but it does not take away the chance of a misclassification.

(iii)

As mentioned before, if a different sample is used it may not lead to the same
conclusions. Classified as an MDA problem by Ohlson the matching procedures to
get a set of paired samples are arbitrary. This is in fact a data collection issue.

In contrast with Beaver and Altman the sample used in Ohlsons study was over 2,000 firms, of
which 105 companies failed. Beaver and Altman research after the bankruptcy has taken place
(ex-post), while Ohlson researches ex-ante. Ohlson also estimates a probability of default.
The Probability of Bankruptcy is known as the O-Score (Ohlson, 1980). Together with the ZScore they are widely used by banks and investors as credit scoring models to analyze credit
risk.

2.2.5. Financial Ratios versus Structural Approach Theory

Since 1980 more statistical developments were made and Financial Ratios Theory was replaced
by Structural Approach Theory. Formulas like Black and Scholes, Merton, KMV, Jones and
Trussel became more popular and accurate. According to Hillegeist et al (2001), a combination
of the two theories is the most powerful. Apparently, the information captured by the accounting
based theory holds more information than the marked-based theory, and vice versa.

2.3. Z-Score model

The Z-Score model is doing more than just calculating a number which predicts bankruptcy.
The model can also be used as an analytical technique/tool to discover financial risks faced by
the corporation. Critical (financial) problems could be: (1) liquidity problems; (2) operational
problems; (3) shareholders confidence; and (4) leverage problems. The Z-Score is a summary
statistic of these (potential) problems (Arnold and Earl, 2006).

2.3.1. Component Ratios of the Model

The Z-Score model consists of five ratios mentioned in paragraph 2.2.2.; where X1 (Working
Capital/Total Assets) is covering liquidity issues. This ratio is a measure of the net liquid assets
of the firm relative to the total capitalization (Altman, 2006). The working capital ratio is the
most instable ratio of all. For example, banks do not have a clear working capital ratio which
can be used for Z-Score calculations. Therefore they are excluded from the sample used in this
thesis.

X2 (Retained Earnings/Total Assets) covers shareholder claims against assets. When a firm has
high retained earnings relative to their total assets it is financed with profits from previous years
and though have not utilized much debt. This ratio also implicitly shows the age of the firm and
the cumulative profitability over the life of the company (Altman, 2006).

Profitability is measured in X 3 (EBIT/Total Assets). This ratio measures the pure productivity of
the firm, independent of tax, leverage or interest factors. It is an important ratio for credit risk
analysis, because it shows the ability of making profits given the total assets. The X3 ratio is the
most significant ratio of the Z-Score model. Thus, a small change of this ratio results in a bigger
change of the Z-Score compared to the other four ratios.

The variable with the smallest coefficient, but still an important ratio, is X4 (Market Value of
Equity/Total Liabilities). The measure shows how quick the firm can be insolvent and what the
shareholders level of confidence is. If total equity plus debt exceeds the firms assets, the firm
will be insolvent and will go bankrupt. The shareholders confidence is measured by market
stock prices. Thus, share prices should be positively related with Z-Scores.

The fifth ratio of the Z-Score model is X5 (Sales/Total Assets). This capital turnover ratio ranks
high in its contribution to the overall discriminating ability if the Z-Score Model, but is the least
significant. This is because its relationship to other variables. Although there is a wide variation
among industries, the importance of MDA is its ability to separate groups using multivariate
measures. In the end, the Z-Score Model is an indicator whether firms are financially healthy,
risky or completely insolvent.

The coefficients of the Z-Score Model are determined by the computer algorithm and not by
Altman himself. A computer algorithm is a finite and well-defined sequence of instructions that
describe computations and eventually terminating in a final ending state. If Altman had changed
his sample, other variables and/or different coefficients would be the outcome of the Z-Score
Model. This is also the case for the boundaries of the critical areas. Now, below 1,81 is very
critical, but with a different sample it could have been lower or higher.

2.4. Practical Use of the Z-Score Model

2.4.1. Z-Score Model Accuracy and Type I and II Errors
Since the introduction of the Z-Score Model in 1968, many tests of the Z-Score Models
accuracy were performed. In his book, Altman (2006) provides outcomes of three important
tests. Again, the research was done after firms went bankrupt or were already distressed (expost). The Z-Score Model, using a cut off score of 2.675, was between 82 percent and 94
percent accurate, one financial reporting period prior to the Chapter 11 (Altman, 2006). On the
other hand, the Type II error (classifying firms as distressed when they do not go bankrupt or
default in their obligations) increased to 25 percent having Z-Scores below 1.81.
The Type I error (firms that go bankrupt or default in their obligations, and are missed by the
Z-Score Model) seems to be quite acceptable (less than 20 percent). Altman concludes that in
almost four decades of research U.S. firms are far more risky than in the past (Altman, 2006).
Firms are more leveraged (debt-equity ratio) and have less retained earnings relative to the total
assets.

Other tests (Al-Rawi, 2008, Altman 1984, 2002, Gerantonis, 2009 and Moyen, 2005) have
shown similar results. In each test the Z-Score Model is accurate and reliable. But authors also
mention the fact that the Z-Score Model is not the only tool for checking a firms financial
status. One should always consider other tools, facts, calculations and information to determine
distress or default probabilities.

2.4.2. Linking Z-Scores with Bond Ratings

Investors, security analysts, regulators and other parties also look at Bond Ratings, such as the
S&P ratings, Moodys and Fitch. Since there has been a large database and number of defaults
that had ratings attached to their securities, Altman (2006) can link his Z-Score Model to these
ratings and compare them. The results are as follows:

Table 2

AAA
AA
A
BBB
BB
B
CCC
Da

Average Z-Scores by S&P Bond Rating, 1996-2001

Average
Annual
Number
Average Standard
of firms
Z-Score
Deviation
66
6,2
2,06
194
4,73
2,36
519
3,74
2,29
530
2,81
1,48
538
2,38
1,85
390
1,8
1,91
10
0,33
1,16
244
-0,2
n.a.

Median, based on data from 2000 to 2004.

Source: Altman (2006), Compustat data tapes, 1996-2001
Altman uses a three-step process for the assignment of appropriate default probabilities on
corporate credit assets:

1. Credit Scoring Models (Z-Score, O-Score Models)

2. Capital Market Risk Equivalents usually bond ratings.
3. Assignment of Probability of Default and possibly Loss Given Default (LGD) on portfolio.

Some argue step 3 is a combination of step 1 and 2, but Altman uses different methods in order
to calculate PDs and LGDs (Altman 2006). This bachelor thesis focuses on step 1 (Z-Scores)
and step 2 (S&P Bond Ratings), and gives an analysis of the financial status of AEX- and
AMX-listed firms after the financial crisis of 2008 and the recession of 2009.

10

3. Model and Data

The Z-Score Model is introduced and explained in the previous chapter. The third chapter
provides the data and Z-Score calculations of all non-financial AEX- and AMX-listed
companies over the period 2004-2009.

3.1. Z-Score Model & Research Sample

As mentioned before in chapter 2, the Z-Score Model provides scores which determine if
companies are potentially in distress or not. The total amount of AEX- and AMX-listed
companies is 50, but in this bachelor thesis only 39 firms will be part of the sample. This is
because some errors aroused with DataStream and the working capital ratio. It seems that
financial companies such as banks, insurance and (real estate-) investment companies do not
have a clear working capital ratio to work with, at least DataStream did not provide the ratio
properly. The companies that are excluded from this sample are AEGON, Corio and ING from
the AEX-index. And from AMX-index: BinckBank, Delta Lloyd, EUROCOMMERCIAL, SNS
Reaal and VastNed Retail.

Other firms are recently added to the stock exchange and therefore listed too short (AEX:
TomTom and AMX: Mediq). The AMX firm AMG accessed the stock exchange on 11th July
2007, data for the year 2004 werent available. DataStream did not provide any useful figures of
Reed Elsevier (too many errors), therefore this company is also not included.

Although the Dutch stock exchange has a strong and large financial sector (12,6 percent), the
industry and materials sectors (28 percent) are represented even more in the weighted index.
Furthermore, some of the (world) market leaders have a stock exchange quotation in the
Netherlands and are originally Dutch firms. For example Royal Dutch Shell (15,83 percent),
Philips (8,0 percent), Ahold (4,1 percent), Heineken (3,4 percent) and Akzo Nobel (3,3 percent).
An analysis of the developments and trends of the Z-Scores per sector will be given in chapter
four.

11

3.2. Dataset Z-Scores AEX- and AMX-listed Firms

Balance sheets from the six-year period 2004-2009 are used for this dataset. The figures are
imported with DataStream, directly into Excel. The ratios Working Capital, Total Assets, Sales,
EBIT, Equity, Debt and Retained Earnings are extracted from these balance sheets and the
following formula calculated the final Z-Score: Z = .012X1 + .014X2 + .033X3 + .006X4 +
.999X5. The full AEX-overview can be found in Appendix 1 from page 23 to 26 and for AMXlisted firms from page 27 to 30 in Appendix 2.

The outcomes of the Z-Score calculations are summarized in an overview (Table 3, page 13).
This table is the most important table of this bachelor thesis, because it contains all relevant
information in one overview. Again, Z-Scores below 1,81 means that firms are in the danger
zone, scores between 1,81 and 2,675 are in the grey area and scores above 2,675 are in the
safe zone.

3.3. Z-Score Trends of AEX- and AMX-indices

The average Z-Score over this six-year period is 3,07 for the AEX-index and 2,94 for the AMXindex (Figure 1, page 14). The lowest score in this research sample is achieved in the year 2008,
for both stock exchanges with 2,50 and 2,60 as average Z-Scores. This is within Altmans grey
area, and therefore demonstrates the danger and strength of the 2008 financial crisis. The
retained earnings declined because firms immediately made depreciations. Also the debt/equity
ratio changed due to losses on stock exchanges and increasing amounts of debt.

Most figures and ratios are very volatile over the period 2004-2009, where 2004 is the best year
(expressed in Z-scores) and 2008 is the worst. The decline of Z-Scores starts from 2005 until
2008 for the AMX-index. The AEX on the other hand goes up and down each year and shows
no clear pattern. The recovery after the 2008 financial crisis already starts in 2009. Although,
the 2009 average AEX Z-Score is still below the average score over the six-year period. The
2009 AMX Z-Score is slightly above the six-year average score (3,12 vs. 2.94), which indicates
a strong recovery.

12

Table 3

Summary overview of test results: Z-Scores of 39 AEX and AMX firms

AEX-Index

Ahold
Air France KLM
Akzo Nobel
Arcelor Mittal
ASML Holding
BAM
Boskalis
DSM
Fugro
Heineken
KPN
Philips
Randstad
Royal Dutch Shell
SBM Offshore
TNT
Unilever
Unibail-Rodamco
Wereldhave
Wolters Kluwer

2004
2,64
1,55
2,55
3,96
2,86
3,26
17,21
3,03
1,46
2,11
1,44
4,30
5,27
6,08
1,65
3,29
1,97
1,42
1,66
1,17

2005
2,56
1,04
2,62
2,06
2,96
1,91
7,28
3,78
2,44
2,21
0,53
4,47
5,08
6,49
1,73
3,73
2,22
2,34
1,49
1,25

2006
3,03
1,50
2,85
1,82
6,03
1,71
6,64
4,32
2,29
2,64
0,61
5,51
8,70
6,65
1,77
3,15
2,67
2,65
2,85
1,19

2007
3,50
1,63
4,08
2,19
4,54
1,82
6,58
3,85
2,49
2,93
0,58
6,27
4,61
6,87
1,99
2,59
2,84
1,62
2,47
1,56

2008
3,95
1,78
1,80
2,35
4,44
2,01
2,93
3,29
2,56
1,30
0,61
4,20
2,02
5,77
1,51
2,42
2,90
0,93
2,01
1,26

2009
2,87
0,95
2,31
2,82
3,24
1,83
11,20
3,45
2,78
1,65
0,87
3,96
3,70
4,83
1,88
2,37
2,97
0,78
1,87
1,21

20042009
3,09
1,41
2,70
2,53
4,01
2,09
8,64
3,62
2,34
2,14
0,77
4,79
4,90
6,12
1,76
2,93
2,60
1,62
2,06
1,27

3,44

2,91

3,43

3,25

2,50

2,88

3,07

2004
1,87
4,83
2,06
6,73
2,73
1,81
2,92
5,08
2,26
3,54
3,20
3,05
3,16
3,46
3,65
1,66
1,45
5,27

2005
1,83
1,72
3,04
1,94
7,23
3,94
1,80
2,50
5,26
2,50
3,86
3,77
1,74
2,54
2,86
1,06
1,66
1,01
5,62

2006
1,81
1,77
2,89
2,67
5,86
3,07
1,92
2,41
3,80
2,08
4,38
2,98
2,11
2,87
4,21
1,72
1,77
1,73
5,05

2007
2,15
2,72
2,43
3,22
4,49
3,55
2,30
2,47
3,10
2,49
3,16
3,21
2,42
2,54
2,88
2,68
1,81
1,91
4,34

2008
1,88
1,84
2,52
3,45
4,54
3,31
2,70
2,19
2,18
3,11
3,06
1,56
2,22
1,99
2,62
2,94
1,53
1,96
3,78

2009
1,99
2,31
2,76
1,76
9,13
3,96
2,92
2,91
2,65
3,80
4,24
2,87
2,09
3,32
3,46
3,50
1,73
2,68
1,28

3,26

2,94

2,90

2,84

2,60

3,12

Average

S&P Credit
Rating
BBBBBB+
BBB+
BBB-

A-

BBB+
AAA+
BBB+
A+

BBB+

AMX-Index

Aalberts Indust.
AMG
Arcadis
ASM International
Crucell
CSM
Draka
Heijmans
Imtech
Logica
Nutreco
Ordina
Oc
Smit International
Ten Cate
USG People
Vopak
Wavin
Wessanen
Average

#NA

2004- S&P Credit

2009 Rating
1,92
2,07
3,08
2,52 BB6,33
3,43
2,24
2,57
3,68
2,71
3,71
2,93
2,27
2,74
3,25
2,59
1,69
1,79
4,22
2,94

Source: DataStream and author calculations using the Z-Score Model, June 2010

13

Figure 1

Average Z-Scores AEX- and AMX-index (2004-2009 period)

Source: DataStream and author calculations using the Z-Score Model, June 2010

More operational ratios such as EBIT and Sales achieved their lowest values in 2009. The
liquidity and banking crisis took place in 2008 and therefore also the financial difficulties and
risks, but the real recession and economic depression affected the balance sheets in 2009, which
were operational difficulties.

Since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008, the AMX-index performs better than the
AEX-index, expressed in value changes (percentages). In this research sample the average ZScores are higher since 2008. It is not unusual that mid caps perform better in a bull market than
large caps, because investors are risk-seeking. In a bear market, risky assets (mid caps in this
case) are sold more often.

Besides the differences of the AEX- and AMX-indices, there are also discrepancies among
sectors. Some sectors made strong recoveries in 2009, whereas others did not recover at all.
Chapter four will give an analysis of this phenomenon.

14

4. Analysis
This chapter analyzes the Z-Scores more detailed per sector. It also covers the patterns, trends,
rationale and developments of the Z-Scores from the dataset used in this bachelor thesis. Finally,
this chapter explains where the Z-Score can be used for and which parties may benefit from the
calculations if investment decisions have to be made.

4.1. AEX- and AMX-sectors Analysis

The AEX- and AMX-indices can be divided into six main sectors (seven if the financial sector
was included). Table 4 provides an overview of how the companies are scattered:

Table 4
IT &
Telecom
ASML
ASM Int.
Imtech
KPN
Logica
Ordina

Food &
Beverage
Ahold
CSM
Heineken
Nutreco
Unilever
Wessanen

Companies per sector

Consumer
Discretionary
Oc
Philips
Wolters Kluwer

Industrials (1)

Industrials (2)

Materials

Energy

Aalberts
Air-France KLM
Arcadis
BAM
Boskalis
Fugro
Heijmans
Randstad

SBM
Smit
TNT
Unibail Rodamco
USG People
Wavin
Wereldhave

Akzo Nobel
AMG
Arcelor Mittal
Crucell
Draka
DSM
Ten Cate

Shell
Vopak

Source: author compilation, June 2010

The sectors are the same as Bloomberg uses in its analysis. The industrials are very well
represented with 15 companies, while the energy and consumer discretionary on the other hand
only consists of respectively two and five companies. The energy sector has a very high Z-Score,
but that is because Royal Dutch Shell has a very strong financial structure and solvency. At the
same time Royal Dutch Shell is the only firm with a AA+ credit rating. Therefore, the image of
a strong energy sector is distorted.

Each sector of the stock exchange has different Z-Scores over the period 2004-2009. The
materials and industrials sector demonstrate similar patterns and trends, with strong recoveries
in 2009 after a huge drop in 2008. The other four sectors also point out similar movements with
further decreases in 2009. Figure 2 provides an overview of the Z-Scores per sector.

15

Figure 2

Z-Scores of all AEX- and AMX-sectors

Source: DataStream and author calculations using the Z-Score Model, June 2010

The reason why the materials and industrials sectors move together has to do with their business
cycles. Each sector has a different business cycle within the economic and market cycle. The
Sector Rotation Model (Figure 3) shows that investors try to anticipate how the market reacts to
economic changes.

Figure 3

Sector Rotation Model

Source: www.stockcharts.com, Legend: Market Cycle and Economic Cycle

16

The difficulty for investors is to identify in which cycle the economy is. The very low Z-Scores
of 2008 and many recoveries in 2009 indicate that the market bottom (Market Cycle) and full
recession (Economic Cycle) of this Sector Rotation Model are behind us. Therefore, the best
moment to invest (at the lowest point in the market) is already behind us.

Appendix 3 provides a full overview of all sectors with the linked Z-Scores. This shows
together with Figure 2 that the weakest sectors (expressed in Z-Scores) during the financial
crisis are the Industrials and IT & Telecom sectors and the strongest are the Energy and Food &
Beverage sectors. It is up to the investor if he or she wants to invest in a strong or weak sector.
The growth and profitability perspectives of weak sectors are maybe better, but could also be
more risky because failure or default is nearby. This trade off is the basic principle of most
investments.

4.2. Investment Decisions

According to the Sector Rotation Model and with the recoveries taken into account, the Market
Cycle is now bull market. This means investors are more risk-seeking than before and thus will
take more positions in the AMX-index. The performance of this index will be better than the
larger AEX-index, if we follow the above explanation. But there is also a lot of uncertainty and
volatility around markets, because investors and other parties expect a second crisis.

4.2.1. High Z-Scores

Good or wise investment decisions are above all a matter of experience rather than science.
Tools like the Z-Score model can make decisions more sophisticated, but not comprehensive.
Firms with high Z-Scores are generally financed very safe and have a solid financial structure.
They do not have a high leverage ratio (X4) and mostly keep a lot of retained earnings (X2).
High profits from shareholding cannot be made very quickly in a short time. In most cases,
these companies are stable in the long run. Companies from the AEX- and AMX-indices with
average Z-Scores above the value of 2,675 are considered high and safe (Altman, 2006).
The risk is relatively low, but this also means returns and/or yield are low, according to the
Capital Asset Pricing Model. Investors should have a long time horizon for these types of
companies and should not expect high returns or profits in the short-run (Table 5).

17

Table 5

Companies with high Z-Scores for safe and long-term investments

AEX-index
Ahold
AkzoNobel
ASML
Boskalis
DSM
Philips
Randstad
Royal Dutch Shell
TNT

AMX-index
Arcadis
Crucell
CSM
Imtech
Logica
Ordina
Nutreco
Smit
Ten Cate
Wessanen

Source: author compilation, July 2010

4.2.2. Low Z-Scores

Firms with low Z-Scores have an aggressive type of financing compared to firms with high ZScores. Short-term profits are easier made and the shares (or securities) are far more risky to
hold. In some cases firms are shortcoming of sales or working capital. This means weak
productivity (X5) and a fragile financial structure (X1). The Z-Score tells the investor to be
careful with this company and he or she should do more analysis and research before investing
in this particular company. There are 19 companies with an average Z-Score above 2,675 and
20 with an average Z-Score below 2,675.

Table 6

Companies with low Z-Scores (within Altmans grey area or below)

AEX-index
Air France-KLM
Arcelor Mittal
BAM
Fugro
Heineken
KPN
SBM Offshore
Unilever
Unibail-Rodamco
Wereldhave
Wolters Kluwer

AMX-index
Aalberts Industries
AMG
ASM International
Draka
Heijmans
Oc
USG People
Vopak
Wavin

Source: author compilation, July 2010

Companies with red marking have Z-Scores below Altmans 1,81 and are considered dangerous
and risky. If an investor wants to invest in these companies, he or she should check other
models.

18

4.2.3. Z-Scores and S&P Bond Rating

In the end, the Z-Score is not the only factor or model to check when making investment
decisions. As mentioned before in chapter 2.4.2., bond ratings are step 2 in the Altman (2006)
process. These ratings are very important for investors and they rely on it. Not every AEX- and
AMX-company has a S&P credit rating, therefore not all 39 companies are included in Table 7.

Table 7

S&P bond ratings compared with Z-Scores

Company
Avg. Z-Score S&P Credit Rating
Royal Dutch Shell
6,12
AA+
Philips
4,79
AASML Holding
4,01
BBBDSM
3,62
AAhold
3,09
BBBTNT
2,93
BBB+
AkzoNobel
2,70
BBB+
Unilever
2,60
A+
Arcelor Mittal
2,53
BBB+
ASM International
2,52
BBWolters Kluwer
1,27
BBB+
KPN
0,77
BBB+

Source: DataStream and author calculations using the Z-Score Model, June 2010

There are four discrepancies (compared to Table 2) in this table, namely ASML Holding,
Unilever, Wolters Kluwer and KPN. The imperfection of ASML Holding is a low debt/equity
ratio (three times more equity than debt) which makes the Z-Scores very high. Unilever has a
very large and negative working capital ratio, which causes the low Z-Scores. The problem with
Wolters Kluwer is that the company has two times more debt than equity and also has a
negative working capital ratio. KPN beats them all with four times more debt than equity,
negative retained earnings, a small EBIT and a negative working capital ratio.

19

5. Conclusion
Over the last four decades, many articles have been published on corporate financial distress
and bankruptcy. In summary, the first methodology tries to predict default based on a number of
financial ratios. Beaver and Altman (1966 and 1968) both used the Discriminant Analysis
within the framework of the Financial Ratios Theory. The Z-Score Model became the most
popular and widely used model until a more structural approach was introduced by Wilcox
(1971). In 2001, Hillegeist found that a combination of the two theories was the strongest.
Although the Z-Score Model is linear, the underlying hypotheses of Altmans model may not be
formulated as linear equations. It is not clear if the interdependence between variance, variables
and volatility influence the results of the researches. Therefore, further (statistical) methods
need to be developed in the near future.

Nevertheless, the information and accuracy of the Z-Score Model should not be underestimate.
Until today, many tests have shown that the Z-Score Model is a good indicator for financial
difficulties. In this thesis, Z-Scores of all the AEX- and AMX-index companies were calculated,
excluding the financials. The influence of the 2008 financial crisis is reflected by the Z-Scores
calculated in Table 3, with the lowest scores in that particular year as a first result of the test.
There are some recoveries in 2009, but in most cases the Z-Scores are still not above the
average score of the period 2004-2009. The recoveries demonstrate that the worst part of the
crisis is behind us.

The sector analysis shows the similarities of the industrials and materials sectors. These sectors
are the only two sectors with a higher Z-Score in 2009 compared to 2008. The Sector Rotation
Model explains why the sectors have different patterns. This is because sectors have their own
business cycle within the Economic and Market Cycles. This is important information for
investors, given the fact that they want to invest at the lowest point of the market. Because the
industrials and materials sectors showed recoveries, other sectors will show these in 2010.
Investors should take advantage of this information and analysis.

The Z-Scores also separate chaff from wheat. Companies with high Z-Scores in combination
with high credit ratings are considered as safe investments. Low Z-Scores tell the investor to
be cautious. This thesis showed that, by using the Z-Score Model, investments decisions can be
well thought-out and that the model is a practical and useful tool to support in that process.

20

6. References

Al-Rawi, K. et al. (2008) The Use Of Altman Equation For Bankruptcy Prediction In An
Industrial Firm, International Business & Economics Research Journal, Vol. 7, pp. 115-128.

Altman, Edward I. (1968) Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of
Corporate Bankruptcy, Journal of Finance, Vol. 23, pp. 589-609.

Altman, Edward I. (1984) The Succes Of Business Failure Prediction Models, Journal of
Banking and Finance, Vol. 8, pp 171-198.

Altman, Edward I. (2000) Predicting Financial Distress of Companies: Revisiting the Z-Score
and Zeta Models, Working Paper.

Altman, Edward I (2002) Corporate Distress Prediction Models In A Turbulent Economic And
Basel II Environment, Working Paper, Stern School of Business, NY University.
Altman, Edward I. and Hotchkiss, E. (2006) Corporate Financial Distress and Bankruptcy, 3rd
edition, John Wiley and Sons Ltd.
Arnold, T. and Earl Jr., J.H. (2006) Applying Altmans Z-Score in the Classroom, Journal of
Financial Education, Vol. 32, pp. 98-103.

Beaver, W. (1966) Financial Ratios as Predictors of Failure, Journal of Accounting Research,

Vol. 4, pp. 71-111.

Berk, J. and DeMarzo, P (2007) Corporate Finance, Pearson Addison Wesley.

Eisdorfer, A. (2008) Empirical Evidence of Risk Shifting in Financially Distressed Firms,

Journal of Finance, Vol. 63 no. 2, pp. 609-637.

Hillegeist, S., Keating, E., Cram, D., Lundstedt, K. (2004) Assessing the Probability of
Bankruptcy, Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 9, pp. 5-34.

Gerantonis, N. et al. (2009) Can Altman Z-Score Models Predict Business Failures in Greece,
Research Journal of International Studies, Vol. 12, pp. 21-28.

21

Moyen, N and Bhagat, S (2005) Investment and Internal Funds of Distressed Firms, Journal of
Corporate Finance, Vol. 11, pp. 449-472.

Ohlson, J. (1980) Financial Ratios and the Probabilistic Prediction of Bankruptcy, Journal of
Accounting Research, Vol.19, pp. 109-131.

Ramaswami, M. and Moeller, S. E. (1990) Investing in Financially Distressed Firms, Quorum

Books

Winakor, A., and Smith, R. (1935). Changes in the Financial Structure of Unsuccessful
Industrial Corporations. Bulletin No. 51, University of Illinois, Bureau of Business

Websites:

Euronext, Index Announcement 2009, http://www.euronext.com/fic/000/055/017/550171.pdf

Standard and Poors Credit Ratings, www.standardandpoors.com

StockCharts, investors website, www.stockcharts.com

22

Appendix 1

Z-Score Calculations of 20 AEX-listed Firms (DataStream/Excel)

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

AHOLD
TOTAL ASSETS
20096000
19367010
17914000
13574000
13234000
13504000

AIRF/KLM
TOTAL ASSETS
12844000
21390000
26472000
26644000
30661010
27962000

AKZO NOBEL
TOTAL ASSETS
11700000
11530000
11832000
18613010
17844000
18087010

ARCELORMITTAL
TOTAL ASSETS
13485630
25597420
83755970
90417260
95017970
85755580

ASML
TOTAL ASSETS
3042666
3549139
3750657
3926720
3791261
3594234

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

AHOLD
WORKING CAPITAL
1311000
516000
835000
894000
1158000
1080000

AIRF/KLM
WORKING CAPITAL
-221000
-910000
402000
274000
957000
-3337000

AKZO NOBEL
WORKING CAPITAL
3438000
2951000
3393000
10540000
660000
1681000

ARCELORMITTAL
WORKING CAPITAL
2502115
5158062
11219920
8986515
9803572
6475346

ASML
WORKING CAPITAL
1868871
1785836
2244625
2309176
1964906
1704714

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

AHOLD
EBIT
284000
280000
1486000
1265000
1328000
1330000

AIRF/KLM
EBIT
177000
758000
1585000
1521000
1515000
-883000

AKZO NOBEL
EBIT
1319000
1479000
1661000
829000
-457000
714000

ARCELORMITTAL
EBIT
5120831
4072676
6569930
12124400
9241871
-1965105

ASML
EBIT
406911
487546
920286
903552
359542
-122247

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

AHOLD
SALES
56068000
54107010
52000000
45643010
44014000
25722000

AIRF/KLM
SALES
12325000
12337000
19078000
21448000
23073010
24660000

AKZO NOBEL
SALES
13051000
12902000
12705000
13351000
12846000
15415000

ARCELORMITTAL
SALES
4766153
4956951
21355890
24599060
58084420
85018940

ASML
SALES
1542737
1678180
2696572
2473677
3927957
2218095

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

AHOLD
EQUITY
4508000
4651000
5030000
3810000
4676000
5440000

AIRF/KLM
EQUITY
4043000
5134000
7734000
8299000
10536000
5622000

AKZO NOBEL
EQUITY
3035981
3414981
4144000
11032000
7463000
7775000

ARCELORMITTAL
EQUITY
4308502
8586900
31932270
38829230
39632160
42609410

ASML
EQUITY
1391601
1711836
2156455
1907617
1988769
1774768

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

AHOLD
TOTAL DEBT
9270000
7082000
5983000
4882000
3744000
3203000

AIRF/KLM
TOTAL DEBT
4337000
8189000
9081000
8555000
7920000
9419000

AKZO NOBEL
TOTAL DEBT
2952000
3059000
2961000
3589000
3679000
3872000

ARCELORMITTAL
TOTAL DEBT
1459260
7028568
20137790
20979490
24466580
17318780

ASML
TOTAL DEBT
825056
878911
388839
603222
647050
663102

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

AHOLD
RETAINED EAR.
-8110000
-9756000
-8993000
-6923000
-5260000
-4598000

AIRF/KLM
RETAINED EAR.
93000
359000
913000
891000
748000
-814000

AKZO NOBEL
RETAINED EAR.
770000
860000
1067000
9225000
-1179000
215000

ARCELORMITTAL
RETAINED EAR.
3492643
6675786
11350290
16133120
21829360
20757120

ASML
RETAINED EAR.
351570
663034
1239689
1526201
1698929
1450156

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Z-SCORES
2,638930214
2,559460828
3,031145751
3,499963329
3,951564354
2,86620682

Z-SCORES
1,552924902
1,041738789
1,49506045
1,6337665
1,784614978
0,950983209

Z-SCORES
2,548201702
2,622554844
2,846054632
4,08125076
1,803677346
2,314660185

Z-SCORES
3,96291202
2,058458846
1,815466528
2,19385916
2,349016155
2,820459917

Z-SCORES
2,858689137
2,95964833
6,036369973
4,535919359
4,441420332
3,244150964

AVG.

3,09

1,41

2,70

2,53

4,01

23

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

BAM
TOTAL ASSETS
3228950
4953802
6393628
6968671
6691222
6700800

BOSKALIS
TOTAL ASSETS
1070434
1325495
1580829
2198047
2544813
2544813

DSM
TOTAL ASSETS
8576000
9508000
9595000
9482000
9261000
9292000

FUGRO
TOTAL ASSETS
958723
1117148
1382167
1682093
2097017
2340640

HEINEKEN
TOTAL ASSETS
10401000
11543000
12602000
12632000
20304000
19619010

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

BAM
WORKING CAPITAL
-57923
223432
528797
1065194
1035530
786500

BOSKALIS
WORKING CAPITAL
-132200
-52189
-2063
12161
-264284
33531

DSM
WORKING CAPITAL
2084000
1774000
1478000
1627000
1380000
2251000

FUGRO
WORKING CAPITAL
-95348
222485
150773
171347
57542
140301

HEINEKEN
WORKING CAPITAL
126000
-474000
229000
-349000
-309000
-1203000

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

BAM
EBIT
140774
267004
301748
303458
304546
2500

BOSKALIS
EBIT
43053
84593
156389
257571
321005
245333

DSM
EBIT
514000
754000
813000
650000
842000
141000

FUGRO
EBIT
101262
149065
206748
321881
416749
359599

HEINEKEN
EBIT
1155000
1368000
1895000
1544000
1166000
1934000

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

BAM
SALES
7732023
6342257
7485975
7712231
8747131
8834766

BOSKALIS
SALES
1045523
980523
1136603
1170721
1555814
2093800

DSM
SALES
6050000
6470000
7516000
8096000
8430000
9297000

FUGRO
SALES
830321
905821
1046008
1294815
1608219
2154474

HEINEKEN
SALES
9255000
9474000
10345000
11392000
12218000
14319000

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

BAM
EQUITY
501913
581677
692594
993530
847400
875000

BOSKALIS
EQUITY
464979
542851
618636
768050
860118
1295767

DSM
EQUITY
4745000
5408000
5718000
5244000
4567000
4883000

FUGRO
EQUITY
223913
465460
562417
699989
929811
1187731

HEINEKEN
EQUITY
3379000
3969000
5009000
5404000
4471000
5351000

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

BAM
TOTAL DEBT
442981
1008959
1849107
2175727
2128527
2106800

BOSKALIS
TOTAL DEBT
17213
54525
71401
87081
319160
81430

DSM
TOTAL DEBT
1588000
1710000
1514000
1752000
2293000
2204000

FUGRO
TOTAL DEBT
453173
337305
441886
534860
616449
634721

HEINEKEN
TOTAL DEBT
3571000
3255000
3299000
2656000
10053000
7862000

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

BAM
RETAINED EAR.
154897
199360
284577
580723
623387
587059

BOSKALIS
RETAINED EAR.
30170
386355
448250
576681
742829
907589

DSM
RETAINED EAR.
262000
4850000
5509000
5180000
4663000
5142000

FUGRO
RETAINED EAR.
49317
99412
141011
216213
283412
263410

HEINEKEN
RETAINED EAR.
2050000
2617000
3559000
3928000
3761000
3679000

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Z-SCORES
3,261525107
1,913238803
1,711717418
1,823373653
2,011156072
1,831073437

Z-SCORES
17,20768252
7,284031979
6,638694999
6,584699491
2,928022624
11,20278636

Z-SCORES
3,029732306
3,777069522
4,316866665
3,845806462
3,288146801
3,444355868

Z-SCORES
1,462888425
2,441883699
2,287044616
2,487905594
2,549102336
2,778772313

Z-SCORES
2,113595816
2,210771354
2,644502382
2,927259383
1,29857257
1,651749185

AVG.

2,09

8,64

3,62

2,33

2,14

24

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

KPN
TOTAL ASSETS
21519010
21354000
20240000
22612000
22180000
22777010

PHILIPS
TOTAL ASSETS
29260000
32338000
37353010
35372000
32488000
29284000

RANDSTAD
TOTAL ASSETS
1604900
1961800
2248800
3034700
7300800
5992800

SHELL
TOTAL ASSETS
140631400
183543100
176089500
182358600
200309800
200778300

SBM
TOTAL ASSETS
2005179
2081926
2220002
2483828
3110428
3242485

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

KPN
WORKING CAPITAL
-593000
-1884000
-761000
-2517000
-2026000
-748000

PHILIPS
WORKING CAPITAL
4148000
4731000
5832000
8198000
3938000
3859000

RANDSTAD
WORKING CAPITAL
583000
669300
522200
639600
1354500
500600

SHELL
WORKING CAPITAL
872608
10937090
11473850
14393910
7927438
8144264

SBM
WORKING CAPITAL
117612
-149230
109061
140410
-242896
-96197

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

KPN
EBIT
2542000
2356000
2211000
2485000
2541000
2811000

PHILIPS
EBIT
2129000
2176000
1556000
4744000
338000
745000

RANDSTAD
EBIT
229100
297100
432000
551800
12900
98800

SHELL
EBIT
22212940
36562000
35823060
37071220
34923940
15458450

SBM
EBIT
101779
230344
212830
235377
203721
219285

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

KPN
SALES
11870000
11105000
11716000
11896000
11936000
14427000

PHILIPS
SALES
29037010
29169010
29615010
31134000
25593010
26385010

RANDSTAD
SALES
5257400
5294100
5919500
7042800
8474800
14038400

SHELL
SALES
176707700
172292000
221750900
253676000
244556100
311914200

SBM
SALES
1619367
1230419
784764
1424550
1893974
2082518

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

KPN
EQUITY
6821000
5076000
4195000
4490000
3730000
3838000

PHILIPS
EQUITY
14860000
16666000
22997010
21684000
16243000
14595000

RANDSTAD
EQUITY
341700
536200
790300
1021600
2251100
2325200

SHELL
EQUITY
62332510
76917470
80140300
84912610
91390620
95228830

SBM
EQUITY
564064
757207
847975
913404
886535
1258227

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

KPN
TOTAL DEBT
9442000
9258000
9068000
11755000
12041000
13371000

PHILIPS
TOTAL DEBT
4513000
4487000
3869000
3557000
4158000
4267000

RANDSTAD
TOTAL DEBT
220800
247800
96200
528300
2472000
1284800

SHELL
TOTAL DEBT
10629010
10926940
11955930
12397820
16707140
24453040

SBM
TOTAL DEBT
1000981
808392
706557
791431
1216500
1107078

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

KPN
RETAINED EAR.
1511000
-8771000
-8153000
-6465000
-6103000
-4982000

PHILIPS
RETAINED EAR.
19346000
21710000
22085010
25559010
20577010
15947000

RANDSTAD
RETAINED EAR.
191000
241900
375900
597900
447900
509400

SHELL
RETAINED EAR.
77594136
79542610
78165710
78851730
92543740
91491740

SBM
RETAINED EAR.
385496
451702
513648
610127
756614
849007

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Z-SCORES
1,439558109
0,531671376
0,607272242
0,583557456
0,606692914
0,866628617

Z-SCORES
4,302887521
4,467171249
5,510974763
6,269310685
4,197358717
3,956841688

Z-SCORES
5,27470533
5,075986755
8,705378041
4,607469418
2,020380208
3,699715725

Z-SCORES
6,075043336
6,496904578
6,650822291
6,870015303
5,771409672
4,829296621

Z-SCORES
1,651928143
1,735265004
1,772476348
1,989878637
1,508536661
1,877682591

AVG.

0,77

4,78

4,90

6,12

1,76

25

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

TNT
TOTAL ASSETS
7887000
8208000
6097000
6892000
6980000
7462000

UNILEVER
TOTAL ASSETS
32902000
38107010
36612000
36818000
35406000
36608000

UNIBAIL-RODAM.
TOTAL ASSETS
6335000
8677200
10842900
25500800
24871810
22633810

WERELDHAVE
TOTAL ASSETS
2049700
2440640
2650173
2802637
2823185
2595599

WOLTERSKLUWER
TOTAL ASSETS
4615000
5417000
5597000
5234000
6350000
5946000

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

TNT
WORKING CAPITAL
584000
1249000
-119000
-660000
-209000
-27000

UNILEVER
WORKING CAPITAL
-3704000
-3917000
-3959000
-3214000
-2366000
-481000

UNIBAIL-RODAM.
WORKING CAPITAL
2854700
3465400
2289400
2765400
3001800
3187400

WERELDHAVE
WORKING CAPITAL
0
-910000
402000
274000
957000
1135800

WOLTERSKLUWER
WORKING CAPITAL
-169000
-927000
-1569000
-1521000
-1099000
-884000

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

TNT
EBIT
1192000
1216000
1392000
1283000
1008000
632000

UNILEVER
EBIT
3521000
5414000
5321000
5594000
7507000
5284000

UNIBAIL-RODAM.
EBIT
379100
1720400
2529400
1339300
-774700
-1443300

WERELDHAVE
EBIT
194200
253853
454939
288402
35298
-114306

WOLTERSKLUWER
EBIT
330000
462000
527000
533000
502000
232000

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

TNT
SALES
11785000
11853000
9372000
9412000
9980000
10707000

UNILEVER
SALES
42693010
42254000
38771010
39941010
39635010
40523010

UNIBAIL-RODAM.
SALES
640400
674700
657100
767900
713600
1786200

WERELDHAVE
SALES
174300
181400
167060
194823
214258
227281

WOLTERSKLUWER
SALES
3436000
3422000
3242000
3482000
3406000
3374000

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

TNT
EQUITY
2765000
3262000
1983000
1931000
1733000
2060000

UNILEVER
EQUITY
4032000
8361000
11230000
12387000
9948000
12065000

UNIBAIL-RODAM.
EQUITY
1924000
4076100
6053100
14603700
12885100
11312900

WERELDHAVE
EQUITY
1442400
1542162
1776209
1850065
1740283
1569554

WOLTERSKLUWER
EQUITY
775000
1098000
1194000
1178000
1414000
1334000

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

TNT
TOTAL DEBT
1491000
1284000
1566000
2085000
2241000
2016000

UNILEVER
TOTAL DEBT
12266000
12492000
8664000
9525000
11081000
9834000

UNIBAIL-RODAM.
TOTAL DEBT
2172000
2869100
2923500
7468800
8445900
8190500

WERELDHAVE
TOTAL DEBT
500000
630100
541039
592597
739586
712814

WOLTERSKLUWER
TOTAL DEBT
2446000
2155000
2175000
1954000
2597000
2421000

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

TNT
RETAINED EAR.
572000
559000
561000
871000
434000
247000

UNILEVER
RETAINED EAR.
6097000
10015000
12724000
15162000
15812000
17350000

UNIBAIL-RODAM.
RETAINED EAR.
219000
1701400
2495200
2005800
-1054000
-1467800

WERELDHAVE
RETAINED EAR.
62036
101350
125443
146656
152961
143529

WOLTERSKLUWER
RETAINED EAR.
135000
918000
1227000
2032000
1564000
1540000

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Z-SCORES
3,294546856
3,733771166
3,154198194
2,596294016
2,420038001
2,368025954

Z-SCORES
1,970999218
2,222734089
2,672007042
2,837192286
2,901699676
2,966027993

Z-SCORES
1,419104909
2,338121631
2,648197673
1,616826107
0,92673827
0,775338999

Z-SCORES
2,170864437
1,496691576
2,847534047
2,472781174
2,011533142
1,865817303

Z-SCORES
1,166869893
1,250137784
1,189278899
1,557175797
1,260541959
1,210429925

AVG.

2,93

2,60

1,62

2,14

1,27

26

Appendix 2

Z-Score Calculations of 19 AMX-listed Firms (DataStream/Excel)

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

AALBERTS
WORKING CAPITAL
3310
13274
65524
90692
94568
68588

AMG
WORKING CAPITAL
#NA
128403
74925
210663
144212
154862

ARCADIS
WORKING CAPITAL
77615
129167
131513
96020
173834
257694

ASM int.
WORKING CAPITAL
293958
336264
381204
392213
372029
419535

CRUCELL
WORKING CAPITAL
69384
108290
226819
188520
204017
496905

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

AALBERTS
TOTAL ASSETS
788554
971115
1266640
1418185
1677946
1558164

AMG
TOTAL ASSETS
#NA
447758
416072
590477
790405
558446

ARCADIS
TOTAL ASSETS
390465
636909
728179
907600
1046138
1297194

ASM int.
TOTAL ASSETS
823054
811772
831245
839382
765513
843155

CRUCELL
TOTAL ASSETS
98891
169737
652907
624920
636297
1010923

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

AALBERTS
SALES
784589
826789
959911
1252919
1601547
1750800

AMG
SALES
#NA
684536
732396
732736
837668
979602

ARCADIS
SALES
848457
862957
910205
1063943
1280279
1740239

ASM int.
SALES
581868
659972
693101
798179
881094
639370

CRUCELL
SALES
7424
9309
22943
40852
151313
294861

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

AALBERTS
EBIT
91921
120426
164804
195007
165367
89309

AMG
EBIT
#NA
43803
31002
41195
44972
-9611

ARCADIS
EBIT
34259
58895
76587
101066
120100
125699

ASM int.
EBIT
90136
23730
134132
142423
72510
-55931

CRUCELL
EBIT
-16597
-15446
-96379
-46706
8995
40915

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

AALBERTS
EQUITY
226837
298440
383649
530448
577010
615657

AMG
EQUITY
#NA
-23526
-25854
168280
182872
148416

ARCADIS
EQUITY
145669
176203
188881
187715
207585
351704

ASM int.
EQUITY
256716
238594
276458
318878
317682
241229

CRUCELL
EQUITY
78535
137609
497300
437242
453492
738265

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

AALBERTS
TOTAL DEBT
350665
408730
512571
514801
765298
630667

AMG
TOTAL DEBT
#NA
218392
209785
96436
166600
142250

ARCADIS
TOTAL DEBT
42443
122801
143208
226382
281491
374562

ASM int.
TOTAL DEBT
297253
257400
228500
186936
153682
243249

CRUCELL
TOTAL DEBT
4597
10278
46413
52795
60751
52300

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

AALBERTS
RETAINED EARNINGS
56344
78767
100030
118690
92753
41471

AMG
RETAINED EARNINGS
#NA
-129732
-112821
-94146
-161589
-138830

ARCADIS
RETAINED EARNINGS
20139
124617
151357
172361
210366
271881

ASM int.
RETAINED EARNINGS
24631
-15586
18748
73965
92111
16145

CRUCELL
RETAINED EARNINGS
-274524
-160559
-247872
-293819
-275597
-254005

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Z-SCORES
1,871851024
1,827810956
1,808175727
2,148492192
1,876140615
1,987455449

Z-SCORES
#NA
1,723966223
1,76691693
2,721806896
1,837830672
2,306346562

Z-SCORES
4,830309746
3,036916181
2,894887896
2,428903827
2,524834584
2,755170443

Z-SCORES
2,05631149
1,935020076
2,673291793
3,217463488
3,454335858
1,757559724

Z-SCORES
6,727043635
7,228991755
5,862153973
4,491562521
4,541455827
9,132601795

AVG.

1,92

2,07

3,08

2,52

6,33

27

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

CSM
WORKING CAPITAL
249800
336200
324400
275300
359200
284000

DRAKA
WORKING CAPITAL
346000
243700
172500
294200
321600
211400

HEIJMANS
WORKING CAPITAL
349146
425707
510292
488581
341839
214946

IMTECH
WORKING CAPITAL
309676
232138
196801
138186
75663
116589

LOGICA
WORKING CAPITAL
317100
222900
106600
-78800
204200
-92300

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

CSM
TOTAL ASSETS
2563100
2133700
2167800
2004700
2043000
1950700

DRAKA
TOTAL ASSETS
1599600
1585100
1692300
1706200
1599600
1537400

HEIJMANS
TOTAL ASSETS
1577522
1901870
2124205
2199655
2355484
1853407

IMTECH
TOTAL ASSETS
952353
1292144
1563852
1880725
2453369
2564411

LOGICA
TOTAL ASSETS
1160800
1759300
3420200
3291300
4086500
3577300

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

CSM
SALES
3516800
3502200
2677200
2543400
2423800
2599300

DRAKA
SALES
1420200
1518600
1792300
2170400
2756100
2706800

HEIJMANS
SALES
2509323
2549323
2742194
2916317
3278078
3630990

IMTECH
SALES
2098465
2145265
2066338
2823980
3056576
3858635

LOGICA
SALES
1706600
1661500
1746000
2185500
2825900
3588000

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

CSM
EBIT
233900
124600
104600
69300
109000
141800

DRAKA
EBIT
-5600
49600
90200
174100
94100
9200

HEIJMANS
EBIT
84026
137887
126086
99958
42697
-45961

IMTECH
EBIT
70277
81886
112213
148357
181817
200496

LOGICA
EBIT
61900
126600
159100
117800
84200
71800

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

CSM
EQUITY
726400
946400
844900
957700
941600
997800

DRAKA
EQUITY
479100
360200
424400
414800
440400
549500

HEIJMANS
EQUITY
456643
389152
441843
462478
426483
425825

IMTECH
EQUITY
323692
288091
328920
366691
395935
498053

LOGICA
EQUITY
385300
820100
1525000
1597000
2041500
1897200

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

CSM
TOTAL DEBT
957200
433600
522100
410100
503900
392400

DRAKA
TOTAL DEBT
443000
448900
535100
611600
588700
368400

HEIJMANS
TOTAL DEBT
323885
509865
624237
534031
642673
366448

IMTECH
TOTAL DEBT
98547
58669
105487
215240
546420
529133

LOGICA
TOTAL DEBT
301100
341400
734400
591900
565000
429900

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

CSM
RETAINED EARNINGS
881600
920400
812400
863100
899000
955700

DRAKA
RETAINED EARNINGS
29400
81700
104400
98800
108800
84500

HEIJMANS
RETAINED EARNINGS
44945
266562
314874
336396
286447
267434

IMTECH
RETAINED EARNINGS
185647
212185
252560
310111
388691
489606

LOGICA
RETAINED EARNINGS
-401100
-343200
314600
282800
347400
289600

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Z-SCORES
2,725685498
3,935023069
3,068178474
3,550243425
3,309484283
3,957338609

Z-SCORES
1,809596456
1,798446494
1,918482958
2,302442892
2,700737564
2,915526917

Z-SCORES
2,916269595
2,501113028
2,405998208
2,474693578
2,192671893
2,913695466

Z-SCORES
5,078666276
5,259453059
3,804756895
3,101547138
2,182754702
2,647796536

Z-SCORES
2,256536857
2,501164394
2,075586982
2,491887836
3,105768126
3,798468976

AVG.

3,42

2,24

2,57

3,68

2,70

28

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

NUTRECO
WORKING CAPITAL
398879
106700
584300
262000
317100
272900

ORDINA
WORKING CAPITAL
50590
34526
-4817
-14238
-67067
-34477

OCE
WORKING CAPITAL
828908
99726
401283
461968
349216
245704

SMIT INT
WORKING CAPITAL
41227
28895
42019
66290
81481
39200

TEN CATE
WORKING CAPITAL
124500
157700
149700
198800
242700
148800

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

NUTRECO
TOTAL ASSETS
1759100
1737300
1753600
1957200
2161300
2106100

ORDINA
TOTAL ASSETS
224376
284429
450891
527198
453866
400669

OCE
TOTAL ASSETS
2126487
2720860
2521421
2404230
2442827
2114444

SMIT INT
TOTAL ASSETS
407817
516455
577040
756152
1186781
1183100

TEN CATE
TOTAL ASSETS
378500
483700
477200
708300
875000
728700

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

NUTRECO
SALES
3674300
3787400
2944500
2874800
3296300
4943100

ORDINA
SALES
345398
351572
418859
485471
583920
696473

OCE
SALES
2769300
2714463
2652853
2808575
3085423
2695660

SMIT INT
SALES
355614
339218
315962
421938
520894
704818

TEN CATE
SALES
569600
566900
684700
702000
772200
1032600

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

NUTRECO
EBIT
115300
125400
140700
161600
177400
161300

ORDINA
EBIT
22466
31626
37974
46066
-94310
-200

OCE
EBIT
114403
114615
110847
135335
49783
-8250

SMIT INT
EBIT
33468
43022
80135
99374
119562
104600

TEN CATE
EBIT
33800
39100
49300
69500
88000
29000

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

NUTRECO
EQUITY
537781
698200
744100
643400
655000
730200

ORDINA
EQUITY
128501
152947
194039
254591
163280
181100

OCE
EQUITY
704068
770830
674514
667133
635535
534244

SMIT INT
EQUITY
203654
247749
288638
364626
566988
644100

TEN CATE
EQUITY
175900
181800
238700
310100
366900
380800

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

NUTRECO
TOTAL DEBT
444400
377200
274000
429500
540900
401000

ORDINA
TOTAL DEBT
79874
60312
85885
97362
110864
114484

OCE
TOTAL DEBT
481251
896328
712746
599869
611101
499598

SMIT INT
TOTAL DEBT
67814
103134
108557
175134
334009
170045

TEN CATE
TOTAL DEBT
96200
157300
93900
235200
336500
208300

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

NUTRECO
RETAINED EARNINGS
297800
318700
506900
507100
558900
598200

ORDINA
RETAINED EARNINGS
14882
102682
139585
174194
81283
82982

OCE
RETAINED EARNINGS
339224
78838
283482
286989
171710
70497

SMIT INT
RETAINED EARNINGS
27520
38280
74969
105604
107808
102384

TEN CATE
RETAINED EARNINGS
45000
118200
181700
221300
265900
298300

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Z-SCORES
3,538134544
3,857195486
4,376157333
3,162017764
3,05914616
4,243134506

Z-SCORES
3,196947875
3,774395085
2,982114689
3,207387841
1,556626759
2,870711732

Z-SCORES
3,047414925
1,736202596
2,112345454
2,417742715
2,222987811
2,088457064

Z-SCORES
3,15960035
2,543291904
2,869874728
2,541051534
1,999011627
3,320508246

Z-SCORES
3,456324272
2,864390808
4,20907302
2,879209223
2,626008252
3,46197817

AVG.

3,71

2,93

2,27

2,74

3,25

29

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

USG PEOPLE
WORKING CAPITAL
63883
-116549
-87703
101892
23319
-138920

VOPAK
WORKING CAPITAL
80400
65600
-27200
-54500
-128700
14900

WAVIN
WORKING CAPITAL
67563
213260
158163
129370
106034
128220

WESSANEN
WORKING CAPITAL
260700
230000
269600
248400
206000
-37700

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

USG PEOPLE
TOTAL ASSETS
514297
1972788
1847048
1918384
1918660
1581980

VOPAK
TOTAL ASSETS
1554600
1720100
1799600
2116800
2627700
3130400

WAVIN
TOTAL ASSETS
802087
1593766
1452843
1482709
1365965
1304460

WESSANEN
TOTAL ASSETS
880500
882600
857700
824300
806100
633600

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

USG PEOPLE
SALES
1297800
1269879
1317337
2460096
3651695
3815941

VOPAK
SALES
749600
697400
652300
740200
819000
923500

WAVIN
SALES
981621
1017522
1302781
1411141
1580519
1581200

WESSANEN
SALES
2431800
2392900
1960300
1690200
1570400
752800

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

USG PEOPLE
EBIT
28405
60866
198211
246492
101891
2807

VOPAK
EBIT
162400
181500
208900
288700
294900
391200

WAVIN
EBIT
77508
99178
155764
155065
79109
34988

WESSANEN
EBIT
10900
41800
42400
61200
56100
-55900

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

USG PEOPLE
EQUITY
200057
472209
574420
684684
655061
638812

VOPAK
EQUITY
525500
584000
651500
790300
913600
1231500

WAVIN
EQUITY
-51355
5620
295464
363196
329015
551653

WESSANEN
EQUITY
482800
484100
469700
409700
363800
149900

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

USG PEOPLE
TOTAL DEBT
157385
979205
650739
624559
648311
417372

VOPAK
TOTAL DEBT
617000
588800
543600
698300
1046000
1207100

WAVIN
TOTAL DEBT
568029
1082046
614800
561863
509900
295400

WESSANEN
TOTAL DEBT
137000
150100
163200
212300
259400
235300

Name
Code
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

USG PEOPLE
RETAINED EARNINGS
14784
138616
236867
347708
332462
302319

VOPAK
RETAINED EARNINGS
289500
326100
418100
552600
710400
907500

WAVIN
RETAINED EARNINGS
-77312
-5903
64423
125954
133040
134464

WESSANEN
RETAINED EARNINGS
1800
318300
304500
309900
263400
31400

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Z-SCORES
3,655162891
1,061686042
1,718819071
2,680359518
2,940018074
3,496073227

Z-SCORES
1,660223694
1,65953088
1,771394156
1,813029561
1,525488633
1,730808442

Z-SCORES
1,453389711
1,00165668
1,730686961
1,907380409
1,963689835
2,682200304

Z-SCORES
5,272542504
5,617488241
5,047439494
4,339267675
3,781462475
1,276012591

AVG.

2,59

1,69

1,79

4,22

30

Appendix 3

Sector

Sector-overview AEX- and AMX-index (Z-Scores)

IT & TELECOM
2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

ASML
ASM International

2,86
2,06

2,96
1,94

6,03
2,67

4,54
3,22

4,44
3,45

3,24
1,76

Imtech
KPN

5,08
1,44

5,26
0,53

3,8
0,61

3,1
0,58

2,18
0,61

2,65
0,87

Logica
Ordina

2,26
3,2

2,5
3,77

2,08
2,98

2,49
3,21

3,11
1,56

3,8
2,87

Z-Scores

2,82

2,83

3,03

2,86

2,56

2,53

Sector

Ahold
CSM
Heineken
Nutreco

2005
2,56
3,94
2,21
3,86

2006
3,03
3,07
2,64
4,38

2007
3,50
3,55
2,93
3,16

2008
3,95
3,31
1,30
3,06

2009
2,87
3,96
1,65
4,24

Unilever
Wessanen

1,97
5,27

2,22
5,62

2,67
5,05

2,84
4,34

2,90
3,78

2,97
1,28

Z-Scores

3,04

3,40

3,47

3,39

3,05

2,83

Oc
Philips
Wolters Kluwer

2005
1,74
4,47
1,25

2006
2,11
5,51
1,19

2007
2,42
6,27
1,56

2008
2,22
4,20
1,26

2009
2,09
3,96
1,21

Z-Scores

2,84

2,49

2,94

3,42

2,56

2,42

2004
1,87
1,55
4,83
3,26
17,21

2005
1,83
1,04
3,04
1,91
7,28

2006
1,81
1,50
2,89
1,71
6,64

2007
2,15
1,63
2,43
1,82
6,58

2008
1,88
1,78
2,52
2,01
2,93

2009
1,99
0,95
2,76
1,83
11,20

1,46
2,92

2,44
2,5

2,29
2,41

2,49
2,47

2,56
2,19

2,78
2,91

Aalberts
Air-France KLM
Arcadis
BAM
Boskalis
Fugro
Heijmans

avg.

3,20

avg.

2,78

CONSUMER
DISCRETIONARY
2004
3,05
4,30
1,17

Sector

2,77

FOOD&BEVERAGE
2004
2,64
2,73
2,11
3,54

Sector

avg.

INDUSTRIALS

31

Randstad
SBM
Smit
TNT
Unibail-Rodamco
USG people
Wavin
Wereldhave

5,27
1,65
3,16
3,29
1,42
3,65
1,45
1,66

5,08
1,73
2,54
3,73
2,34
1,06
1,01
1,49

8,70
1,77
2,87
3,15
2,65
1,72
1,73
2,85

4,61
1,99
2,54
2,59
1,62
2,68
1,91
2,47

2,02
1,51
1,99
2,42
0,93
2,94
1,96
2,01

3,70
1,88
3,32
2,37
0,78
3,5
2,68
1,87

Z-Scores

3,64

2,60

2,98

2,67

2,11

2,97

2004
2,55

2005
2,62

2006
2,85

2007
4,08

2008
1,80

2009
2,31

3,96
6,73
1,81

1,72
2,06
7,23
1,8

1,77
1,82
5,86
1,92

2,72
2,19
4,49
2,3

1,84
2,35
4,54
2,7

2,31
2,82
9,13
2,92

DSM
Ten Cate

3,03
3,46

3,78
2,86

4,32
4,21

3,85
2,88

3,29
2,62

3,45
3,46

Z-Scores

3,59

3,15

3,25

3,22

2,73

3,77

Royal Dutch Shell

Vopak

2004
6,08
1,66

2005
6,49
1,66

2006
6,65
1,77

2007
6,87
1,81

2008
5,77
1,53

2009
4,83
1,73

Z-Scores

3,87

4,08

4,21

4,34

3,65

3,28

Sector

Sector

2,83

avg.

3,29

avg.

3,90

MATERIALS

AkzoNobel
AMG
Arcelor Mittal
Crucell
Draka

avg.

#NA

Energy

32