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Effects of Distributed Generation (DG) Interconnections on Protection of Distribution Feeders

Gurkiran Kaur, Mohammad Vaziri Y., Member, IEEE California State University, Sacramento
Abstract: Application of Distributed Generation (DG) to supply the demand of a diverse customer base has been gaining popularity. Various DG technologies are being integrated into power systems to provide alternatives to energy sources or to improve reliability. In this paper, the effects of DG on system protection have been identified. Changes in system fault duties and associated concerns are presented. Commonly raised issues of Relay De-sensitization, Unintentional Islanding, Series Resonance, and Ferroresonance are identified, and some methods of their detection are discussed and analyzed. Documented examples of actual cases are presented. Efficient recommendations to protect the distribution feeders against these conditions are proposed. Index Terms: Distributed Generation, DG, Protection, Tripping, Islanding, Automatic Reclosing, Ferroresonance, Over Voltages, Unintentional Islanding.

tripping can occur due to inadequacies in design, equipment or settings of the devices. In the following sections the most common protection related challenges of Relay Desensitization, Nuisance Tripping, Automatic Reclosers, Ground fault detection, Unintentional Islanding and Resonance are addressed and some recommendations are proposed. II. PROTECTION CONCERNS AND CHALLENGES A. Overstressed Equipment The fault duty at any point in an electrical system is increased when a generating source or any rotating machinery of considerable size is added. It has been shown in [2] that the I2t effects are most severe in the close proximity of the added unit. Fault units should be calculated with the lowest unit impedance (Xd for salient pole machines & Xs for cylinder rotor type machines) for conservative results. In figure 1 the I2t increases vs clearing times for 3- phase faults have been shown. I2t increases vs clearing times for single line to ground faults can be tabulated similarly.
I2t at fault location (x106 A2 sec)

I. INTRODUCTION Large-scale implementation of distributed generation interconnections to distribution feeders has put challenging demands on system protection. The fault duty at any point in an electrical system is increased when a generating source is added to the system. Expanding existing buses, larger transformers in the system and customers requesting parallel services are some other factors, which result in fault control problem. I2t effects are most severe in proximity of the added unit [1]. The main power system protection issues, which arise by DG interconnections, are relay de-sensitization, automatic reclosers out of synchronism, nuisance tripping, unintentional islanding and ferroresonance. Designing a dedicated distribution feeder to better accommodate DG is infeasible now but maybe an option in the future. DG must be able to adapt to the way utility system works. But DG can interfere with the protection relaying on distribution feeders [2]. In order to accommodate DG interconnections expeditiously, utilities have adopted simplified interconnection requirements for generators. Interconnection protection must reliably disconnect the DG from utilitys distribution system under various circumstances. Protective relays should automatically disconnect the generator in the cases where there is loss of utility supply to the feeder (anti-islanding), shunt faults on the utility system, and system-originated disturbances and abnormal conditions. Most protective relay elements are designed to trip the DG off the distribution system in 1030 cycles. Even though the tripping times are stated in some of the standard interconnection requirements, such as the IEEE 1547 and the California CPUC Rule 21, undesirable tripping outside of the limits or nuisance


139 .2 169

.1 18% 67 56 0 32% 0 50 82



A. Feeder w /out dispersed generator . (1250 A of fault current available ) B. Feeder with 100 KW generator C. Feeder with 1000 KW generator D. Feeder with 2000 KW generator



Fig. 1 I 2t for a 3-phase Fault on a 12.47 kV Feeder with various DG

B. Relay Desensitization Interconnection of DG to a distribution feeder tends to desensitize the feeder protection relays under fault conditions. Fault contributions from the utility system as well as DG at the end of the protective zones for each protective device between utility source and DG must be checked to ensure End of Line (EOL) protection. Additional protective equipment may be required if any

1-4244-0493-2/06/$20.00 2006 IEEE.

protective device becomes desensitized such that it could no longer detect the faults at the end of its protective zone. For a utility system, sequential tripping is undesirable. Sequential fault detection refers to a case where the protective relays of a terminal are unable to detect the fault until after another terminal has been opened. Sequential tripping of the source terminals is generally acceptable. However, sequential fault detection is undesirable and should be avoided. This is because of the fact that a breaker failure in one terminal could result in a sustained fault on the system where neither source can be isolated [1]. C. Nuisance Tripping Nuisance tripping is referred to as separation of the DG or any of the utility breakers for faults beyond its protective zone (i.e. for faults in the protective zone of remote circuit breakers). It maybe, caused by in-rush or transient currents associated with certain electrical components - primarily motors, transformers, solenoids, and large capacitors. To avoid Nuisance Tripping, fault currents for critical locations should be calculated and the relays set such that adequate coordination timing is maintained between the series protective equipment [1]. D. Automatic Reclosures Many of the three phase interrupters used on the utility system are equipped with automatic reclosing devices. DG may continue operation during the open interval of the autorecloser, sustaining voltage and feeding fault current. Thus it could prevent fault arc extinction. This leads to unsuccessful reclosure, and the fault that would have been temporary becomes permanent. By preventing successful reclosing, DG may deteriorate the reliability of networks and increase the number of customer minutes lost. Distributed generation units should be disconnected before the reclosure, so that there is enough time for arc extinction and arc path dissipation. Otherwise the arc will reignite immediately after the reclosing. On an average, the de-energized time for the fault arc to de-ionize and restrike is given by [3]; kV t= + 10.5cycles 34.5 Also, when DG units are not separated from the grid during the open interval of the autorecloser, generators can accelerate or decelerate so that the reclosure occurs at the moment when the voltages in the islanded part of the network and in the main grid have a significant phase angle difference. In this condition, extremely high voltages are impressed across breaker contacts. Voltages as high as, 2.00 pu L-L in the case of 180 degrees out of phase and 2.73 pu L-G in the case of 150 degrees out of phase conditions, can be developed. This condition is more

pronounced on a breaker that interconnects a grounded system to an ungrounded system. Overvoltages, overcurrents, and large mechanical torques are possible [4]. E. Neutral Shift Neutral shift can occur during a ground fault after the utility breaker has been opened. If the main transformer at DG has a delta connection (or Ungrounded Wye) on the utility system side, then this neutral shift causes high voltages on the un-faulted phases. The high voltages of 1.73 pu are damaging for the single phase loads that are served from the un-faulted phases. Figure 2 shows the voltage shifts in normally balanced voltage triangle during a phase A to ground fault. It is pictorially evident and it can be shown that the neutral shift (Vng) is equal to the zero sequence voltage (E0) [1].
(a) Van = Vag n=g Vbn = Vbg (c) Vcn = Vcg (c) (a) normal balanced system (b) Vcg

GROUND (G) (a) V ag = 0

Van = -Vng - Vbg (b)

V bn Vcn (b) phase a solidly grounded

Fig. 2 Voltage Shift for a Phase -A-to-Ground Fault

F. Unintentional Islanding Unintentional islanding occurs when a portion of the distribution system becomes electrically isolated from the remainder of the power system, yet continues to be energized by DG connected to the isolated subsystem [19, 20].It can occur due to utility breaker tripping or deenergizing of feeder for maintenance [1, 5]. Islanded operation of DGs should be avoided for two major reasons: 1) Potentials for negative effects on voltage, frequency, and power quality. 2) An islanded generator complicates both automatic reclosing and manual switching [6]. Synchronous generators are generally able to sustain islanded condition as long as the load is small or closely matches the input. Induction generators are generally incapable of supplying isolated load when separated from the utility but they can become self-excited if a sufficient amount of capacitance exists at their output terminals [7]. The minimum capacitance requirement for self-excitation of induction generator under no load condition is

Cmin =


V (X ls + X s max ) Where = base frequency in rad/s V = per unit speed X ls = per phase stator reactance at base frequency X s max = maximum saturated magnetizing reactance at base frequency [1]

interaction of the two systems can enhance the ability of the system to produce extreme ferroresonance overvoltages. This type of ferroresonance may cause arrester failures especially with tightly rated arresters. The situation is more critical where the primary arrester rating is applied such that its MCOV (maximum continuous operating voltage) has little margin above the nominal system rating. For example, an arrester with an 8.4-kV MCOV applied on a 13.8-kV feeder with a line-to-ground voltage of 7.97 kV [10]. III. EXAMPLES A. Relay Desensitization Typical desensitization of protective equipment is shown in Figure 3. In this example, R1 and R2 are 3-phase interrupters with reclosing capability. 3-phase and Line to Ground faults were simulated for location F1. 3-Phase and Line to Ground (3I0) fault current contributions from the substation and DG are shown above and below the arrows respectively at each location. Despite the increase of the total fault current value at F1 as shown, the contribution from the substation has been drastically reduced specially for the line to ground fault. In this example, the ground relay at the station, even with a minimum pick up value as low as 60 A, is so desensitized that it can no longer detect a ground fault at F1 [1].
Without DG Substation 323 198 R1 3-Phase 3I0 323 A 198 A R2

G. Resonance Conditions 1) Series Resonance If islanding of the DG occurs, it is possible for a series resonant condition to develop between the generator and power factor correction capacitor banks connected on the feeder. This resonance can occur during faulted or unfaulted conditions with any type of connection (wye or delta) for the transformer interface. Series resonance can occur during a ground fault where systems positive, negative, and zero sequence diagrams are connected in series, example of which is shown in the next section. 2) Ferroresonance during Islanding Ferroresonance can occur with DG as the driving source in the circuit during islanding conditions. The peak voltage during this ferroresonance can reach three to four per units. This type of ferroresonance can occur with both induction and synchronous generators, and it can occur with all three phases connected. It is independent of the main transformer connection at DG [8]. The most susceptible transformer connections are the ungrounded ones. Grounded wye transformers are not immune to this type of ferroresonance but the overvoltages are lower than with ungrounded connections, typically ranging from 120 to 200 percent. Sometimes, the voltages are not high enough to cause transformer failures [2]. There are four conditions necessary for DG islanding ferroresonance to occur: 1. The generator must be operating in an islanded state. 2. The generator must be capable of supplying the island load. 3. Sufficient capacitance must be available on the island to resonate (typically 30-400% of the generator rating). 4. A transformer must be present on the island to serve as the non-linear reactance [9]. The size of the capacitance, the transformer and the load are not critical for resonance to occur although the magnitude and severity are related to those characteristics. Capacitive kVar of one-third the kVA rating of the generator is normally sufficient to support ferroresonance overvoltages. The use of synchronous generators does not eliminate ferroresonance. In fact, if both synchronous and induction generators are connected to the same circuit, the

F1 200 246 DG


With DG 199 24 R1 R2

Substation DG 3-Phase 3I0 3-Phase 3I 0 199 A 24 A 200 A 246 A

399 270


Fig. 3 Densitization of Recloser R 1 after interconnection of DG

B. Nuisance Tripping In the example shown by Figure 4, the fault occurs at location F2. Note that in this example, the voltage-sensing scheme is used for ground fault detection. Ground fault detection schemes are explained in the next section.

In this example, the DG phase relays must coordinate at 768 Amps with the Recloser R2 at 1530 Amps. The DG Overvoltage Ground Relay must coordinate at 0.729 pu voltage with the same Recloser Ground Overcurrent relay at 616 Amps [1].
Without DG Substation 762 616 R1 F2 R2

V C1 VA1 V B1 VB2 VA2 - VG = 2.73 * VL-G VA2 VC2

3-Phase 762 A

3I 0 616 A F2 1530 616 R2 768 0

Fig. 6 Voltage developed when the systems are 1500 out of phase.

D. Resonance Conditions
With DG Substation 762 616 R1

1) Series Resonance Figure 7 shows the series resonant condition developed between the generator and power factor correction capacitor banks connected on the feeder. Connection of the sequence networks for a single line to ground fault on a sample 12.47 kV feeder is shown in Figure 7. Resonant frequency 0 is given by;
0 = 1 (K 1 L1 + K 2 L 2 )C 0

3E0 Substation 3-Phase 762 A DG 3I0 3-Phase 3I0 3E0 616 A 768 A 0 A 0.729 pu

Fig. 4 Coordination Against Nuisance Tripping

C. Automatic Reclosers on out of phase systems Figure 5 vectorially illustrates the effects of shorting Bphase between a grounded and an ungrounded system when the two systems are 180 degrees out of phase. This is the worst case from the standpoint of voltage from the line side to the DG side across the open phases.

1 1 , K2 = , and the 2 2 1 0 L1C1 1 0 L2C 2 subscripted circuit elements are the sequence quantities of each parameter [12].

Where, K 1 =


Ferroresonance creates high voltage on line Impedance

Capacitor Bank

VA1 VB2 VA2 VB1 VC2 VC1 = 2.00 * VL-L VC2

Fig. 5 Voltage developed when systems are 1800 out of phase .
Fig. 7 Series resonance condition between DG and feeder capacitor bank

Voltage Source

The worst case for phase to ground voltages appears when the two systems are 150 degrees out of phase as shown in figure 6 [11]. Automatic reclosers between such systems usually create a severe voltage flicker on the utility system and can cause significant damage to the DG system. Reclosers on out of phase systems also pose a safety hazard for the personnel at the DG site due to possibility of equipment disintegration.

In figure 8, Es and Esdg represent the Substation and the DG Voltages. Subscripted Zs pertain to equivalent System impedances and subscripted R, L & C represent Resistances, Inductances, and Capacitances of the resonant system in each of the sequence networks respectively. 2) Ferroresonance during Islanding A typical power system configuration, giving rise to ferroresonance is shown in figure 9. In this case, a grounded voltage transformer is connected to an isolated



Z S1

1 jC1



breaker to the DG breaker. So, whenever utility breaker is called to open, DG breaker will also open, thereby, eliminating the possibility of Sequential fault detection [1]. C. Coordination to avoid Nuisance Tripping

1 jC 2



1 jC0



jL0 Fig. 8 Connection of sequence networks for a single phase -toground fault on the 12.47 kV feeder .

neutral system. A voltage transformers wye grounded primary is connected to a 34.5 kV system that could become ungrounded. One side of the circuit is fed through generator and other through utility. The wye- grounded to delta generator step up transformer provides no ground to the 34.5 kV system. Opening of recloser R1 isolates the DG from the grounded utility source and will make the 34.5 kV section of line ungrounded. During this condition, occurrence of ferroresonance is highly probable [13].
DG Generator step up transformer 5 kV 34.5 kV 3 PTs R1 Utility System (grounded )

A method proposed by [14], examines the captured waveforms for the various scenarios- including pre-event currents, voltages and power flows at the point of common coupling at the DG facility and the utility. Based on analysis of this information, conclusions can be made as to where the event originated (in the DG facility or on the utility grid), and if the trip decision was correct. If the trip is considered a nuisance trip, the captured waveforms can help determine a remedial course of action, which includes setting adjustment (pick up and time delay) and use of alternative protective elements such as directional, voltage restraint, or voltage control relay elements. Care should be taken to avoid miscoordination between the DG required relays and protective equipment on the utility system. Allowance of adequate coordination timing for critical faults is usually the preferred method to avoid nuisance tripping. D. Protection against out of phase Automatic Reclosures Generators with standalone capabilities such as synchronous units must be protected against out of phase automatic reclosures. Reclosing must be delayed until the machines are disconnected from circuit. After separation of the synchronous generator, automatic reclosing can restore voltage and pick up the static and non-synchronous loads at the station. Over- and underfrequency relays with under- and overvoltage relays can be used for this purpose. Transfer trip is used to disconnect islanded machines that can carry load connected to them in the island. For large induction motors, reclosing should not take place until their residual voltage has decreased to 33% of rated value [14]. Appropriate interlocks to prevent an unsafe, damaging, or undesirable reclosing operation should supervise all reclosing operations. The common interlocks for reclosing are Voltage check, Synchronizing check and Equipment check. Voltage check is used when it is required that a certain piece of equipment be energized from a specific side (High voltage or Low voltage side in the case of a transformer). Synchronizing check is used when the reclosing operation energizes a piece of equipment from both sides. Equipment check ensures that a certain equipment is not energized inadvertently. These interlocks can be used either in manual or automatic mode [15]. E. Fault Detection Methods By IEEE Standard 1547 [16] and the California CPUC Rule 21[17], DG is required to sense and trip for three

Fig. 9 Typical power system configuration favorable to ferroresonance

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS A. Recommendations about Overstressed Equipment The interrupting capability of devices especially in the vicinity of the added DG should be checked. If the increased fault duties due to additional DG units have caused significant over-stress in the interrupting capability of the protective equipment, then the replacement of equipment should be considered. B. Protection against Relay Desensitization The combined system should be studied to ensure that both the utility and the DG protective relays can detect faults on the utility feeder independently and non sequentially. If sequential fault detection using the conventional relaying schemes is unavoidable, then one solution is installation of a Direct Transfer Trip Scheme. In this scheme, a Trip signal is transmitted over a communication channel from the location of utility

phase, phase to phase, and phase to ground faults on the utility feeder. Three phase and phase-to-phase faults maybe detected from generator side of main transformer. However, depending on the transformer connection, phase-ground fault may not be. In such cases, a separate Ground Fault Detection Scheme would be required. Ground fault sensing can be achieved by a Current Sensing scheme or a Voltage Sensing scheme on strictly three wire distribution systems. 1) Voltage Sensing Scheme For detection of ground faults on three-wire unigrounded distribution systems or ungrounded after the utility breaker has been opened, the Zero Sequence voltage rise at the DG is detected. If the utility side connection of the main transformer at DG is Wye, a single-phase voltage transformer (VT), a Ballast Resistor (usually 13 ohms, 1 kW) and an overvoltage relay is sufficient for ground fault detection. The connection diagram is shown in figure 10.

12 kV


3 PTs 12 kV 240 V

R = 13 59 N

Fig. 11 Voltage Sensing for Ground Faults using the voltage developed in the broken Delta secondary .


2) Current Sensing Scheme In solidly grounded systems, the ground fault currents can vary considerably depending on power system configuration and constants, location of the fault, and fault impedance. In this case, a current sensing scheme comprised of a Current Transformer (CT) and an overcurrent relay is used. The CT installed in the solidly grounded neutral of the main transformer is used to operate time-overcurrent relays. The connection diagram is shown in Figure 12.

12 kV 240 V

R = 13


Fig. 10 Voltage Sensing for Ground Fault with a Single Phase Transformer

If the utility side connection of the main transformer at DG is Delta, then a separate grounding Transformer is necessary. Wye-grounded-broken delta voltage transformer connections are preferred. The connection diagram is shown in figure 11. The voltage developed across the relay during a ground fault is 3E0. Vrelay = Vag + Vbg + Vcg = 3E0 The continuous voltage rating of the relay should be greater than, or equal to the minimum voltage developed. The pick up should not be lower than the standing E0 rise due to Open Delta regulation. Otherwise, an auxiliary stepdown voltage transformer must be used. Voltage sensing schemes are not allowed on transmission-interconnected projects or on distribution interconnections where Lineneutral loading is present. This is because during a single line to ground fault, excessive voltages are impressed on the Line-neutral loads. That is, the healthy phase-toground voltages are increased by 3 . Therefore, these systems require line-to-line voltage insulation [1].



Fig. 12 Current Sensing for Ground Fault Detection with a Single Phase Transformer

If the utility system side of the main transformer at DG is Delta connected, then a Grounding transformer must be connected with a solidly grounded Wye configuration on the utility system side. The secondary is connected in delta configuration. Delta configuration provides a path for the Zero sequence current during the system ground fault conditions. The grounding bank should be large enough to provide 3I0 current which can be detected by the overcurrent relay for End of Line (EOL) ground faults in the protective zone of the DG. Short Circuit studies should be performed to ensure EOL protection [1]. F. Protection against Unintentional Islanding Anti-islanding protection is difficult to accomplish by traditional means. Basic under/over-voltage and under/over-frequency relays may fail to operate if the

power mismatch created in the islanding situation is close to zero. There are two ways to address the issue of antiislanding. One method is application of proper relaying techniques. Another approach is to make requirements for the operating mode for the DG while interconnected so that the chance of having a match between the load and the generation output is reduced. Inverters operating in parallel are less likely to form an island if they are acting as current sources and have a destabilizing signal that is constantly trying to shift the frequency reference out of band [2]. Transfer trip scheme can also be used to separate the DG, thus inhibiting formation of an island, when the utility source has been opened. The basic idea is to monitor the status of all circuit breakers and reclosers that could island a DG in a distribution system. When any of the tiebreakers to the utility has been opened, a central algorithm determines the islanded area. A signal is then sent to trip DGs in the islanded area. Figure 13 illustrates the basic idea of this scheme.
130 kV Substation 1 25 kV A B C DG 1 DG 2 X (normally open) Trip Signal Y (normally closed) Status signals

Central Algorithm D

ferroresonance phenomena. Standard overvoltage elements typically employ RMS value of the waveform and may not be able to detect the high peaks as they will be averaged with low peak values [10]. Overvoltage relays should be set to about 1.5 per unit with no intentional time delay. They should be installed on each of the three phases rather than on one phase. A second set of overvoltage relays set at about 1.1 per unit but with 1 to 2 seconds time delay would prevent sustained operation just below the strong harmonic overvoltage condition. Time delayed Undervolatge relays set at about 0.9 per unit can prove useful to detect continuing self excitation where the load is sufficiently large. Isolated feeders can continuously deliver low-level fault currents and maintain lethal low voltages in the order of 0.3 p.u. [1]. Although detection of ferroresonance can take place at the substation interruption device, there is little that can be done at that location, as the breaker or recloser is already tripped. If ferroresonance is detected at a tripped interrupting device on load side (the islanded feeder), it indicates that the amount of induction and/or synchronous generators left connected to the islanded feeder, combined with the capacitance connected to the islanded feeder, is favorable for ferroresonance to occur. The detection can alert the protection engineer to investigate the occurrence and devise a remedial scheme that may consist of changing capacitor bank values or providing additional protection at the DG installations to detect and trip when islanding and ferroresonance occurs [10]. V. CONCLUSION This paper has focused on the common protection related concerns of DG interconnections to the utility distribution systems. Interconnection of DGs to the system tends to desensitize the protective equipment on other utility sources. We discussed that fault contributions from the utility system as well as from the DGs must be checked to ensure end of line protection and coordination against nuisance tripping. Relays should be set such that adequate coordination timing is maintained between series protective equipment. Sequential tripping must be avoided. If there are automatic reclosing devices between DG and utility sources, steps must be taken to protect against Outof Phase reclosures. Reclosing interval timings depend on the device and coordination needs. Reclosure blocking schemes are installed to prevent out of phase reclosures. DG units must be able to detect Ground faults on the utility system. We discussed that Current detection and Voltage detection schemes are possible methods for ground fault detection. Voltage detection scheme should be avoided on 4-Wire primary distribution systems or if there is Line-Neutral loading on the system. It has been shown that DG units having stand alone capability such as synchronous generators can easily get

Substation 2

Fig. 13 A Transfer Trip Scheme from a central control area

Some operating scenarios may require opening the disconnect switch Y and closing the disconnect switch X. If this happens, DG2 in this example will be transferred to substation 2. As a result, reclosers associated with substation 2 should also be monitored to decide the islanding status of DG2. The central algorithm thus needs to have the most up-to-date information on the topology of the distribution system. A communication channel such as Radio, Microwave or a Leased Telephone line is used in this scheme [18]. G. Ferroresonance Detection Ferroresonance detection at the substation can be accomplished with a peak detecting overvoltage element. This type of element is able to respond to the sub cycle high peak voltages that are characteristic of the

islanded and serve an isolated load. This possibility also exists for large induction generators if adequate capacitance is available on the system. If conventional relaying cannot eliminate sequential fault detection or the possibility of islanding conditions, installation of Direct Transfer trip scheme should be considered. It has been discussed that resonant conditions can occur during some Ground Faults, and, during Islanding. Ferroresonance during islanding can result in significant overvoltages. We concluded that conventional Frequency and Voltage relaying is not sufficient for detection of these overvoltage conditions. Two sets of overvoltage relays with different threshold settings for each of the three phases have been recommended for this situation. Direct Transfer Trip is recommended as a secure means for protection against islanding conditions [1]. REFERENCES [1] Mohammad Yazdi Vaziri, Effects of Cogeneration on distribution systems, Thesis V3933, California State University, 1991. [2] Roger C. Dugan, Mark F. McGranaghan, Surya Santoso, H. Wayne Beaty, Electrical power systems quality, Mc Graw Hill, Second edition, 2002. [3] J. Lewis Blackburn, Protective Relaying Principles and Applications, CRC Press, Second edition, 1997 [4] Lauri Kumpulainen and Kimmo Kauhaniemi, Distributed generation and reclosing coordination, Nordic Distribution and Asset Management Conference, 2004. [5] Shyh-Jier Huang and Fu-Sheng Pai, A new approach to Islanding detection of dispersed generators with self-commutated static power converters, IEEE Transactions on power delivery, vol 15, no 2, April 2000. [6] Charles J. Mozina, Protecting dispersed generators using digital Interconnection technology, Reprinted from ON-PEAK Performance, EGSA (Electrical Generating Systems Association) Supplement, November 2000. [7] SRP (Salt River Project) Interconnection Guidelines For Distributed Generation, December 2000. [8] Tom Short, Surge Protection Issues with Distributed Generation, EPRI PEAC Corp, Prepared for the Fall 2000 Surge Protective Devices Committee Meeting, Cincinnati, Ohio. [9] Phil Barker, Overvoltage Considerations in Applying Distributed Resources on Power Systems, Reprinted from IEEE PES (Power Engineering Society) Summer Power Meeting, 2002. [10] A report to the Line Protection Subcommittee of the Power System Relay Committee of The IEEE Power Engineering Society prepared by working group D3,Impact of Distributed Resources on Distribution Relay Protection, August 2004

[11] R. Lee Sellers, Jr. and Robert J. Deaton, Analyses of the Failures of Circuit Breakers Applied Between Unsynchronized 13.8 kV Electrical Distribution Systems. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, CH2207 pp.376-381 September 1985. [12] Robert H. Jones, Measuring the Effects of Dispersed Generation, Rochester Gas and Electric Company. Transmission & Distribution, a Cleworth Publication, pp. 50-54, August 1987. [13] Technical Bulletin 004a Ferroresonance, Cadick Corporation; High technology solutions for producers, distributors, and users of electric power, 2002. [14] W.G. Hartmann, How to Nuisance Trip Distributed Generation, Rural Electric Power Conference, 2003. [15] Stanley H. Horowitz, Arun G. Phadke, Power system relaying, John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1992 [16] IEEE 1547 Standard for Interconnecting Distributed Resources with Electric Power Systems, 2003. [17]http://www.energy.ca.gov/distgen/interconnection/cali fornia_requirements.html [18] Wilsun Xu, Konrad Mauch, Sylvain Martel, An Assessment of Distributed Generation Islanding Detection Methods and Issues for Canada, Report # CETC-Varennes 2004-074 (TR), CANMET Energy Technology Centre Varennes, Natural Resources Canada, July 2004. [19] F. Noor, R. Arumugam, M. Vaziri, Unintentional Islanding and Comparison of Prevention Techniques Proceedings of the 37th Annual IEEE NAPS (North American Power Symposium) 0-7803-9255-8105, October 23 -25, 2005. Iowa State University [20] R. A. Walling, Senior Member, IEEE, and N. W. Miller, Fellow, IEEE, Distributed Generation Islanding Implications on Power System Dynamic Performance. Proceedings of the IEEE/PES Summer Power Meeting, Chicago, July, 2002. AUTHORS
Gurkiran Kaur received Bachelor of Technology EEE 2001 from Punjab Technical University, India and is currently pursuing a Masters degree in EE at California State University, Sacramento. She has served as an executive member in various inter-college engineering committees. Her area of interest is Power System Protection and Control. Mohammad Vaziri received BS EE- 1980, MS EE -1990, and Ph.D. EE - 2000 degrees form UC, Berkeley, CSU, Sacramento, and WSU, Pullman WA, respectively. He has 18 years of professional experience at PG&E, and CA ISO, and over 12 years of academic experience teaching at CSU Sacramento, and WSU Pullman, has authored and presented technical papers and courses in US, Mexico, and Europe. He is an active member and serves on various IEEE and other technical committees. Currently, he is a Supervising Protection Engineer at PG&E, and a part time faculty at CSU Sacramento and San Francisco. Dr. Vaziri is a registered professional engineer in the state of California, and his research interests are in the areas of Power System Planning and Protection.