Persons Chalc PC Finals - Atty. Legarda

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW
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211. Atilano v Chua Ching Beng () March 29, 1958 Felix *Monster-in-laws Facts: 1. Chua Ching Beng and Pilar Atilano were married in Zamboanga in 1951, after that they sailed to Manila and started living with Ching Bengs parents (well they tried to, at least). Two years later, the wifey filed a complaint for support with the CFI of Zamboanga, alleging estrangement due to incessant bickering and quarrels as the main reason. She also complained about the fact that they had to live with his parents. She claimed that shed rather stay with her own parents while receiving his support. 2. The hubby contended that their married life was actually harmonious, and the pro blem came about only because of the wifeys parents (who he claimed alienated her from him). He said that he wants her back and that he is willing to establish his own dwelling away from his folks if that was what she really wanted . 3. Trial ensued and the decision was made in favor of the wifey (with the requested support reduced to a more reasonable amount). Upon learning about this the hubby filed a petition for the court to allow him to fulfill his obligation by receiving her in his own house (by then he already had one) in Pasay, and that he be left alone by the law if she still refused. 4. That petition was denied, and the poor guy went to the one Supreme Court :) Issue: Is the wife still entitled to support if she refuses to live with him just because she cant stand his parents? Held: No. The decision was MODIFIED. Ruling: The court (with all the wisdom and confidence brought about by first-hand experience), started off by saying that disagreement among in-laws is a problem as old as the world itself , and that life will forever be miserable if we do not learn to deal with this fact :) While the husband here does not dispute the fact that the civil code imposes on him the duty of maintaining and supporting his wife and the rest of his family, he nevertheless argues that Article 229 of that code gives him the option to fulfill that duty in two ways. He can either pay an allowance fixed by the court, or maintain and support them in his own home (how it should really be done). The same article provides that the only way the second option will be prohibited is if there is a moral or legal obstacle. These obstacles need to be serious to be considered sufficient ground, like physical maltreatment. Disagreement with the in-laws, who can be treated as third parties to any marriage, is not one of these obstacles. While the court did say that they cannot compel a wife to live with her husband (despite their obligation to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and shit), it also said that there is likewise no provision of law which grants her the right to support if she has no moral or legal justification for leaving. Concept: The law, in giving the husband authority to fix the conjugal residence, does not prohibit him from establishing the same at the patriarchal home (or anywhere, for that matter) :) 39. Goitia vs. Campos Rueda () November 2, 1916- TRENT * Atty Legarda to Mr. Maronilla: BLOW JOB; girls reminder this is still a GOOD LAW Facts: 1. The wife left her husband because if unusual demands made by her husband during sexual intercourse. 2. He demanded that the wife perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organ. 3. Because she spurned such obscene demands, refusing any act other than normal sexual intercourse, he maltreated her and inflicted bodily harm upon her. 4. This made her leave the conjugal home and demand for a separate maintenance Issue: Can the wife demand support or maintenance from her husband? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. She was entitled to separate maintenance, because she was forced to leave the marital home without the fault on her part. 2. When the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the spouses and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some ways be obtainable Source: Tolentino page 340 212. Mariano ARROYO v. Dolores VASQUEZ DE ARROYO () 1921 Street, J.: *hubby cant compel wife to come back Facts: 1. In 1910, the two were married in the year 1910, and since that date, with a few short intervals of separation, they have lived together as man and wife until 1920 when the wife went away from their common home with the intention of living separate from her husband

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After efforts had been made by the husband without avail to induce her to resume marital relations, this action was initiated by him to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife 3. Wife in defense said that she was compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the part of her husband; she in turn prayed for legal separation (this wasnt granted because of lack of sufficient justification ) 4. Evidence showed that wifes leaving was not justified Issue: Can the Court order the wife to come back to husband? Held: No Ruling: 1. Its not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. 2. Court is unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo is entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile 3. Court declared that wife Dolores has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. P.S. its just her duty to return- but shes not being ordered to return. So if she didnt return to Mariano, no contempt issues. She was just admonished, nothing serious 213. Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno () 28 Nov 1964 Barrera *wife wants to be a billionaire so freaking bad Facts: 1. Husband: Angel Cuaderno and Wife: Lourdes Ramirez. 2. Lived separately since 17 Nov 1956 after Angel inflicted bodily injuries to Lourdes and brought her back to her mothers house. 3. On 15 Aug 1957, Lourdes filed a complaint for support. Grounds: maltreatment and abandonment. 4. Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court granted complaint and ordered Angel for a monthly support of 150. 5. Court of Appeals reversed so that they may again resume cohabitation. They were admonished to live together. Issue: Is Lourdes entitled to support from Angel? Held: Yes. Even before the filing of the complaint, he had been giving support. Hes also the reason for the separation. Ruling: 1. Even before the filing of the complaint, Angel had been giving support for her. He only stopped when she asked for more. 2. He inflicted injuries on Lourdes and was even the one who brought her to her mothers house. Thus, the separation was brought about by him. On Court of Appeals order to live together 1. Even if marriage entitles both parties to cohabitation, it should be because of spontaneous, mutual affection between them and not because of any legal mandate or court order. 214. Lacson vs. Lacson () August 30, 1968---Castro *Mother agrees to an agreement in order to takes custody of her children and then retreats Facts: Note: This focuses only on property 1. Alfono and Carmen Lacson were married and had 4 children. 2. Carmen left Alfonso and the conjugal home in Bacolod City and began to live in Manila. 3. She filed a case for custody of all their children and support for them and herself. 4. Both spouses reached an amicable settlement or compromise agreement, which included the separation of property. 5. Carmen later filed a motion to dismiss the agreement on the grounds that she only signed it in order to obtain immediate custody over their children. 6. She questions the legality of the agreement, especially the part concerning the custody of their children. Issue: Is the separation of property which is cited in the agreement valid? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. The law provides that the husband and wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. 2. The court cannot force the spouses to live together. Concept: 1. Court does not legalize the de facto separation of spouses, which is an abnormal state fraught with grave danger. 2. In this jurisdiction, the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. The law therefore makes it as difficult as possible for married couples to abandon each others company.
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215. POTENCIANO ILUSORIO vs MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER () May 12, 2000- Pardo *Wife filed writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her. Facts: 1. H&W: Potenciano Ilusorio and Erlinda Kalaw 2. Potenciano Ilusorio a lawyer and a rich business man is married to Erlinda Kalaw and had 6 children 3. 1972, they separate from bed and board 4. December 30, 1997, Upon Potencianos arrival from the US he stayed in Antipolo with Erlinda for 5 months 5. Their children alleged that their mother overdosed him as a result of his deteriorating health 6. Erlinda filed a petition for guardianship over the properties due to his health problems and advanced age 7. After attending a meeting in Baguio city he did not return to their house in Antipolo but instead lived in Makati 8. Erlinda filed a petition for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband and visitation rights 9. CA granted the petition for humanitarian reasons 10. SC reversed the CAs decision Issue: Whether or not a wife can secure for a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss? Held: No. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife Ruling: 1. Writ of habeas corpus should not be issued 2. Writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention or by which the rightful custody of a persons withheld from one entitled. 3. Evidence show that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Ilusorio that would justify the issuance of the writ 4. Even though he is in medication and his age of 86 years old- does not render him mentally incapacitated 5. Ilusorio was in sound and alert mind and can still make his own choices 6. He did not also request not to allow his wife and other children from seeing or visiting him. 216. Abella vs. COMELEC () September 3, 1991 Gutierrez *Cant be governor for lack of residence, COMELEC relied on the Family Code Facts: 1. Adelina Larrazabal may have won in the local elections (elected Leyte Governor), but she was later declared by the COMELEC as lacking in both residence and registration qualifications for the position. 2. She is the wife of Emeterio Larrazabal, the original candidate of the Lakas ng Bansa-PDP-Laban who was disqualified by the COMELEC for lack of residence. 3. She filed her certificate of candidacy in substitution of her husband the day before the election. 4. A registered voter of Tacloban City filed a petition to disqualify her for alleged false statements in her candidacy certificate regarding her residence. 5. The COMELEC found that Adelina was neither a resident of Kananga, Leyte nor a registered voter there. 6. She argues that the decision is erroneous because the COMELEC relied on the provisions of the Family Code to rule that she lacked the required residence. 7. She opines that under the Election Law, the matter of determination of the residence is more on the principle of intention, the animus revertendi rather than anything else. 8. In this regard, she states that her subsequent physical transfer of residence to Ormoc City (1975), did not erase or remove her Kananga residence, for as long as she had the animus revertendi, as shown by her regular acts of returning there in the course of the years. Issue: Was it proper for the COMELEC to have relied on the Family Code provisions to rule that she lacked residence? Held: YES Ruling: **For the purpose of running for public office, the residence requirement should be read as legal residence or domicile, not any place where a party may have properties and may visit from time to time. 1. In the absence of any evidence to prove that she and her husband maintain separate residences (she Kananga, he Ormoc), the reliance on such provisions was proper. 2. Arts. 68 and 69 of the Family Code, E.O. No. 209 also provide as follows: Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if there are other valid and compelling reasons **Benjamin Abella, who placed second in the elections, was not allowed to assume the vacated position.
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199. Diego DE LA VIA v. Antonio VILLAREAL () 1920 Johnson, J.: *Wifes domicile doesnt always follow that of the husband Facts: 1. Narcisa (Diego de la Vinas wife) filed for divorce (with a Court in ILOILO) and also of course the partition of the conjugal property. 2. She filed again an amended complaint: she prayed that a preliminary injunction be issued against the defendant restraining and prohibiting him in the premises of their conjugal properties because she learned that since her filing of the complaint, Diego was trying to alienate or encumber the property which belonged to the conjugal partnership 3. Diego answered the complaint, saying that: a) Iloilo courts dont have jurisdiction over this case because his residence was Negros Oriental, and the rule is that wifes domicile follows that of the husband (Narcisa was actually forced to leave their conjugal home because Diego evicted her so he could freely toy with his other girl) **this next part isnt the main issue here, but decided not to remove it, it might still help** b) He cant be issued that injunction because his acts dont fall under the conditions on which preliminary injunction can be issued (Act 190); and also because under the laws (CC) husband is the manager of the conjugal partnership and so he is empowered to alienate and encumber and conjugal property without the consent of the wife (wife has no right daw to intervene accdg to him, so since she has no right, his acts of encumbering the conjugal properties did not deprive any of her non-existent rights, so again, that injunction accdg to him isnt justified. Paikot-ikot ba? ) Issue: 1. Can Iloilo, and not Negros Oriental, be Narcisas domicile and thus grant the Iloilo court jurisdiction? 2. Can Diego be issued preliminary injunction? Held: 1. Yes, because Narcisas case is an exception to the rule 2. Yes, because Diego falls under the conditions on which preliminary injunction can be issued Ruling: 1. Issue on domicile: 1 XCPN to the rule - wife may acquire another and separate domicile where the husband has given cause for divorce; In one case it was held that if the wife is justified in leaving the husband because his conduct has been such as to entitle her to a divorce, and she really does leave him and go into another state for the purpose of there permanently residing, she acquires a domicile in the latter state. Plus, Diegos unlawful act of evicting her is tantamount to consenting (ACQUIESCENCE!!!) to Narcisas leaving; therefore her acquiring of a new domicile is really justified and an exception 2. Issue on preliminary injunction: the right of the husband under the law which makes him the sole administrator of the property of the conjugal partnership is CURTAILED during the pendency of the action, insofar as alienating or encumbering the conjugal property is concerned; which is only just and proper, in order to protect the interests of the wife The explanation of the SC goes something like this: if the husband would be allowed to encumber the conjugal properties during the pendency of the action, definitely the rights and interests of the wife would be prejudiced. And accdg to the rules on preliminary injunction (Act 190), one of the conditions on which it can be issued is that the act would probably be "in violation of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual." So, the preliminary injunction is in order. Diego is wrong in saying that wife has no right re conjugal properties. She has a right to share in the conjugal property upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership; its that right that this injunction is trying to protect, not her (non -existent) right to administer the property. 3. CONCLUSION: The wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband, prohibiting the latter from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action 217. SSS vs. Delos Santos () August 29, 2008 Reyes *estranged wife not qualified for support Facts: 1. Antonio and Gloria were married in 1964, one year after Gloria left and married another man. She returned to Antonio in 1969 and they had 3 children. 2. On 1983, Gloria left for the United States and subsequently got a divorce against Antonio and waived all her rights to their conjugal properties. 3. Each eventually contracted another marriage, Antonio with Cirila with whom they had a daughter May-Ann and Gloria with an American citizen.

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Antonio amended his SSS beneficiaries to accommodate her wife Gloria, their daughter and one of her daughter from the first relationship. He then retired and began receiving monthly pension; 3 months after he died, and Cirila began receiving pension . 5. On December 1999 Gloria filed for claims for Antonios death benefits from the SSS. Issue: Does Gloria have the right to receive support from Antonios death benefits as a dep endent? Held: No. She doesnt qualify as beneficiary for failing the required dependency. Ruling: 1. Although the marriage of Gloria and Antonio is still subsisting because the divorce obtained by Gloria was not binding because she was a Flipino citizen; she is still disqualified to be his primary beneficiary under the SS Law for failing the dependency requirement. For it is not presumed for the marriage alone if one is actually a dependent for support. 2. The ruling in SSS vs Aguas provides that a wife who left her family until her husband died and lived with other men, was not dependent upon her husband for support, financial or otherwise, during the entire period. 3. The mere fact that Gloria left the conjugal abode on two separate occasions to live with another man contracting marriage with them removes her from qualifying as a primary beneficiary for her deceased husband. Concept: Dependent (Court definition)- one who derives his or her main support from another . Meaning, relying on, or subject to, someone else for support; not able to exist or sustain oneself, or to perform anything without the will, power or aid of someone else. Note: The Court ruled in Dycaico v. SSS that the proviso as of the date of retirement in Section 12-B(d) of R.A. No. 8282 which qualifies the term primary beneficiaries is unconstitutional for it violates the due process and equal protection clauses. 165. Yasin v. The Honorable Judge Shari'a District Court () 1995 Bidin, J.: *Muslim ex-wife allowed to use again her maiden name Facts: 1. Yasin alleged that shes a divorcee. They were granted a divorce decree March 1984. 2. She claims that the petition she filed (use of maiden name) is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim 3. Her reasons: The (1) dissolution of her marriage, and (2) her legal right to resume the use of her maiden name and surname. Issue: Can Yasin be allowed to resume to the use of HER surname? Held: Yes Ruling: Law grants her such right Discussion: 1. Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husband's surname during the marriage, after annulment of the marriage and after the death of the husband is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation (Art. 372, Civil Code). 2. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right. 3. Similarly, when they got divorced, she need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her; this action is actually unnecessary 4. Although there is no legal prohibition against obtaining a judicial confirmation of a legal right, nevertheless, no law or rule provides for the procedure by which such confirmation may be obtained. 5. Yasin does not seek to change her registered maiden name but, instead, prays that she be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name in view of the dissolution of her marriage 6. When she married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status; The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil register 7. Onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced woman to resume her maiden name and surname. Concept: Articles 370 and 371 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 370. A married woman may use: (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or (2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or (3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs." Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless: (1) The court decrees otherwise, or (2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
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218. Sharica Mari Go Tan v Spouses Tan () Sept. 30, 2008 Austria-Martinez *The Battle of StatCon Principles Facts: 1. Sharica and Steven were married April 1999. They lived together, and came up with two children. Barely six years into the marriage though (January 2005), Sharica filed a petition for a Temporary Protective Order against Steven and his parents, alleging verbal, psychological, and economic abuse in violati on of section 5 of RA 9262 (Katrina Legardas pride and joy, hehe). 2. A few days after the filing, the RTC gave her the requested TPO. The next month, Stevens folks filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that that court lacked jurisdiction since they are not covered by RA 9262. Claiming that a liberal interpretation in her favor would promote the interests of the law, Sharica filed an opposition to the motion (and so the battle begins). 3. March that year (for some reason the trial was quick), the RTC dismissed the case; invoking the expressio unius rule to deny coverage of the spouses Tan under RA 9262. 4. On the same month, Sharica filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that the doctrine of necessary implication should be applied in the interests of substantial and due process . The spouses commented right away, still invoking the same argument that the liberal construction unduly broadened the provisions of the AVAWC law. 5. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration, hence the present petition :) Issue: Can the folks be included in the petition for a protective order in accordance with RA 9262? Held: YES. The petition was GRANTED. Ruling: Since RA 9262 is a special penal law which has a section (section 47) that provides for the suppletory application of the RPC (which has its own Article 10), then the decision can be based on such an application . The specific provision of the RPC that warrants this application is that of conspiracy, since Sharica explicitly alleged it in her original complaint. While it is true that section 3 of the AVAWC law explicitly provides the kind of relationship that the offender must have with the victim, the court did say that conspiracy IS a valid way for the spouses to be included in the complaint . The expressio unius rule does not apply here, and a liberal application of the law in favor of Sharica will best serve its interests. Concept: Of course, we have the Civil Code and the Family Code to tell the husband and wife what their responsibilities to each other are. But when it comes to abuse of the extraordinary kind, count on special laws like RA 9262 to protect the rights of women in marriage. 219. Rustan ANG v. CA, Irish Sagud () 2010 Abad, J.: *MMS of naked Irish Facts: 1. Irish and Rustan were ex-couple; she broke up with him when she found out he was living in with another woman, whom he had gotten pregnant 2. Rustan asked Irish to elope with him but she refused; she changed her number few times but hes still able to know the numbers Irish was using 3. One day, he MMS-ed her a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irishs face superimposed on the figure; he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet 4. Irish sought help; so with the help of the police, they were able to set Rustan up and arrest him 5. Rustan claims that it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture; Michelle, Rustans wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent the six pictures (but in these pictures, Irish wasnt naked, sexy pose lang). Issue: WON Rustans act of MMS-ing (inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on her) is in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262 Held: Yes Ruling: 1. Provisions in RA 9262 indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment are: a) The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman Since the 2 of them were romantically involved as Rustan admitted b) The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and First, Court didnt believe that it was Irish who sent the pictures Second, the Court didnt side with Rustan when he said that todays women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications Court said that it cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustans low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of todays youth. What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case.

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The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her. The naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irishs head and face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
220. Solis vs. Barroso () 30 Oct 1928 Avancena *mom gave land but took it away when son died Facts: 1. Husband: Alejo Lambino and Wife: Fortunata Solis were married: 8 Jun 1919 2. Alejos parents made a donation proper nuptias of parcels of land in consideration of their marriage on 2 Jun 1919. Condition: in case one of the donees (couple) dies, one-half of the lands donated would revert to the donors. The other half would be retained by the surviving spouse. 3. On 3 Aug 1919, Alejo died. His father died the same year. After their deaths, his mother recovered possession of the lands. 4. Fortunata filed an action demanding his mother for the execution of the proper deed of donation. 5. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of Fortunata and ordered the mother to execute a deed of donation. Issue: Should the mother issue the deed of donation? Held: No. The donation was not valid because it was not made in a public instrument. Ruling: 1. A donation propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument (Article 633 of the old Civil Code). The donation was not made in a public instrument (notarized?). 2. In donations propter nuptias, the marriage is really a consideration, but not in the sense of being necessary to give birth to the obligation. In Article 1333, if the marriage does not happen and a donation is validly made, the donation remains valid unless a proper action for its revocation is instituted. Concept: Donation propter nuptias donations by reason of marriage are those which are made before its celebration, in consideration of the same, and in favor of one or both of the future spouses (Family Code, Article 82). 221. Matabuena vs. Cervantes () March 31, 1971--Fernando *Donation of land prior to marriage Facts: 1. Felix Matabuena and Petronila Cervantes had a live in relationship. 2. Felix made a donation of land to Petronilla on Feb 20, 1956. 3. They got married in 1962. 4. Felixs sister is the current plaintiff who claims that the donation is null and void because the donation was made while he was living martially without benefit of marriage to Petronilla. 5. Petronilla on the other hand claims that the law provides only that donations made during the marriage are void, but the donation was made prior to marriage. 5. Felix died without a will thus the controversy. Issue: Are donations made during a live in relationship valid? Held: No Ruling: 1. The purpose of prohibiting donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law. 2. There is every reason to apply the same policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. 3. It is the spirit of the law that should prevail over the letter. 101. Bienvenido vs. Court of Appeals () 24 Oct 1994 J. Mendoza *three times a lady given a house in QC Facts: 1. Husband: Aurelio Camacho and First Wife: Consejo Velasco. Married: 3 Oct 1942 Second Wife: Luisita Camacho. Married: 6 Feb 1962 (bigamous) Third Wife: Nenita Bienvenido. Cohabitation since June 1968 to May 1988. 2. Without getting his marriage being dissolved, he contracted another marriage to Luisita Camacho on 6 Feb 1962 and had one child, Chito. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo where they had been living since 1958. Because of their quarrels, one or the other usually leaves the dwelling place for long periods of time (Aurelio left this time).

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In 1967, Aurelio met Nenita Bienvenido. From June 1968 to May 1988, they had lived together in 84 Scout Delgado St., QC. Nenitas daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as did Chito, who stayed for about a year in 1976. 4. On 30 Apr 1982, Aurelio bought the house in Scout Delgado. In the deed of sale, he described himself as single. 5. On 26 Nov 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of sale in favor of Nenita in consideration of 250,000 pesos. 6. On 28 May 1988, Aurelio died. Initially, the body was with Nenita. Having returned from the US upon being informed of his death, Luisita took the body of Aurelio. 7. Luisita was granted death benefits by the AFP as the spouse. She also claimed ownership of the house in Scout Delgado. 8. On 7 Sep 1988, Luisita and Chito brought a case in the QC RTC to seek the annulment of the sale of the house to Nenita. 9. On 29 Aug 1989, the RTC rendered a decision upholding the sale of the property to Nenita. 10. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision on 4 Jun 1993. It ruled that in the absence of proof to the contrary, Consejo must be presumed to have been absent for seven years without Aurelio having news of her being alive when he married Luisita. It declared the house as their conjugal property . Issue: Was the sale of the house to Nenita valid? Held: Yes. There was no basis for holding that the house was property of the conjugal partnership with Luisita. Ruling: 1. Aurelios marriage with Luisita was void for being bigamous. She did not present proof that when they got married, the first wife had been absent for 7 years. 2. There is no basis for holding that the property in question was the conjugal property of Aurelio and Luisita since there was no such partnership in the first place (marriage being void). 3. An action for declaration of the nullity of such donations can only be brought by the innocent spouse (Consejo) and not Luisita whose marriage to Aurelio is void. 4. The sale must be presumed. There was a valid deed of absolute sale, Transfer Certificate of Title, and Nenita has possession. 5. There was no basis for ruling that Nenita was a buyer in bad faith since it was not shown that Nenita knew Aurelios marriage with Luisita. Chito could be a son by a woman not his wife. 222. EMILIE T. SUMBAD and BEATRICE B. TAIT, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEAL () June 21, 1999- Mendoza *donations between common law wife, the Sum-at Property Facts: 1. Husband : George Tait 2. 1st wife : Agata Tait 3. Common law relationship Maria Tait (Beatrice Taits testimony is only to the effect that in 1941 Maria F. Tait became their stepmother ) 4. George donated to Maria Tait a parcel of land in Sum-at April 2, 1974 5. Upon the death of George Tait, 1977, Maria Tait sold lots included within the Sum-at Property in favor of the respondents herein. 6. Petitioners Emilie T. Sumbad and Beatrice B. Tait brought an action for quieting of title, nullification of deeds of sale, and recovery of possession with damages against private respondents. 7. They alleged that they are the children and compulsory heirs of the spouses George K. Tait, Sr. and Agata B. Tait of Bondoc, 8. Petitioners further alleged that from 1982 to 1983, Maria F. Tait, without their knowledge and consent, sold lots included within the Sum-at property to private respondents 9. Respondents: - alleged that the Sum-at property, covered by Tax Declaration No. 399, did not belong to the conjugal partnership of George K. Tait, Sr. and Agata B. Tait - Maria F. Tait, did not need the consent of petitioners to be able to sell 10. One of the witness (Shirley Eillinger) raised that the deed of donation was forged by Raquel Tait during the time they were in the boarding house. 11. Petitioners contended, during the Supreme court trial, that the deed of donation, dated April 2, 1974 is void a. it is a forgery; b. it was made in violation of Art. 133 of the Civil Code, now Art. 87 of the Family Code; and c. it was notarized by a person who had no authority to act as a notary public Issue: Is the donation valid? Held: No. Ruling: I. Forgery 1. The alleged forgery could have been proven with more competent evidence, such as by handwriting experts. This, the plaintiffs failed to do.

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Notarization Issues They contend that the person who notarized the deed had no authority to do so. However, petitioners have not shown this to be the case.
III. Deed of donation contravenes Art 133 of the Civil Code (donation between spouses during marriage is void) 1. Court has ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice. 2. Even assuming that they are not thus precluded, petitioners were unable to present evidence in support of such a claim . 3. The evidence on record does not show whether George K. Tait, Sr. was married to Maria F. Tait and, if so, when the marriage took place. 4. If, as petitioners claim, Maria F. Tait was not married to their father, evidence should have been presented to show that at the time the deed of donation was executed, their father and Maria F. Tait were still maintaining common-law relations. 5. Beatrice Taits testimony is only to the effect that in 1941 Maria F. Tait became their stepmother . 6. There is no evidence on record that George K. Tait, Sr. and Maria F. Tait continuously maintained common-law relations until April 2, 1974 when the donation was made. Concept: Where it is alleged that a donation was made by a man to his common-law wife, evidence should be presented to show that at the time the deed of donation was executed, the man and the woman were maintaining common law relations. 223. Arcaba vs. Tabancura () November 22, 2001 Mendoza *Donation granted to the maid is void Facts: 1. January 16, 1956 Francisco Comille and Zosima Montallana became registered owners of lots (totaling 418 sq. m) in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte. 2. After the death of Zosima in 1980, Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her share consisting. Francisco then registered the lot in his name with the Registry of Deeds. 3. Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece, his nieces cousin, and Cirila Arcaba, then a widow, to take care of his house, as well as the store inside. 4. When the two married, only Cirila (the supposed mistress, and not just a mere helper) was left to take care of Francisco , who was then 75 years old (became bed-ridden eventually.) 5. January 24, 1991 - A few months before his death, Francisco executed a deed in which he ceded a portion of his lot, together with his house to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument . He left the larger portion in his name. The deed stated that the donation was being made in consideration of "the faithful services [Cirila Arcaba] had rendered over the past ten (10) years. The deed was notarized and later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner . 6. February 18, 1993 Franciscos nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession respondents filed a complaint against Cirila 'for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and damages, alleging that she was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation is void under Article 87 of the Family Code, which provides: Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. Issue: Should the donation to Cirila be declared null and void? Held: YES Ruling: 1. Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long time. It is very possible that they consummated their relationship, since she gave him therapeutic massage and that they slept in the same bedroom according to the nieces testimony. Their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of a common-law relationship. 2. Documents (application for a business permit to operate as a real estate lessor, a sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor, and the death certificate of Francisco) show that Cirila signed using the surname Comille. 3. The fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an indication that she was not simply a caregiveremployee, but Francisco's common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the law. 4. Having proven that Cirila and Francisco were live-in partners, the donation is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code. 224. SSS vs. Davac () July 30, 1966 Barrera *Innocent common wife deserves death benefits Facts: 1. Petronio Davac had two marriages: the first was with Lourdes Tuplano and the second with Candelaria Davac. While he worked he declared in his SSS that his beneficiary is Candelaria.

2.
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He died and thereupon both wives filed for claim benefits. SSS ruled that it is Candelaria who is entitled to receive death benefits. Issue: Is it the common wife who is qualified to receive the death benefits? Held: Yes. The SS benefits are not part of properties of conjugal partnership. Ruling: 1. Lourdes contends that the due to the bigamous marriage of Candelaria and Petronilo she is prohibited by Art. 739 to receive such donation. However, the court ruled that it is not applicable because Candelaria was not proven to be guilty of concubinage for lack of knowledge of his husbands previous marriage. 2. Furthermore the benefits accruing from the membership in the SSS do not form part of the conjugal partnership covered by the member. As provided for by SS Act as amended by RA. 1792, the benefit receivable is in nature of a special privilege or an arrangement secured by the law to provide social security to the working man. It does not form part of the property earned during the members lifetime. 3. The lawmakers did not intend the benefits to form part of the estate of the members as expressed stated in the SS Act on the provision of non-transferability of benefit. It is only when there is no designated beneficiary or when the designation is void , that the laws of succession are applicable. Furthermore it has been held that the SS Act is not a law of succession. 225. Mateo v Lagua () Sept. 30, 2008 Austria-Martinez *How much can you take back? Facts: 1. Cipriano Lagua and wife Alejandra Dumlao signed a public document sometime in 1917, donating a couple of lots to their son Alejandro in consideration of his marriage to Bonifacia Mateo . The two happy kids were married, took possession of the lots, and lived happily ever after. Well, not quite :) 2. In 1923, Alejandro died, wifey Bonifacia then lived with her father-in-law who by then took care of the farming work. Life then was pretty much normal with dad-in-law giving Bonifacia her share of the harvest on a regular basis. 3. In 1941, Cipriano sold the property to his son Gervasio without telling Bonifacia . She found out about the sale in 1956 when her share of the harvest stopped coming. Bonifacia lost no time in filing a petition for annulment of the deed of sale, which the CFI eventually granted in 1957. 4. The same year, Gervasio and his wife filed an action to recover the amount they spent on improvements made on the property, which the court denied. They appealed that decision and about the same time filed another petition for annulment of the donation of one-half of the lots, claiming that the original donation prejudiced Gervasios legitime. 5. The lower court heard and ruled on the two cases jointly, denying both. The Laguas appealed to the CA, which affirmed the first decision regarding the claim for the improvements, but reversed the second, giving 494.75 square meters of the 11888 to the spouses as a form of reduction of the donation propter nuptias in light of the prejudiced legitime of Gervasio. Bonifacia went straight to the mighty Supreme Court after that. Issue: (1) Can a donation propter nuptias be reduced for being inofficious? (2) If yes, was the reduction made by the CA correct? Held: YES and NO. The decision of the CA was SET ASIDE. Ruling: (1) YES. Donations propter nuptias CAN be reduced. These donations are not oppressive obligations, because the marriage is merely the occasion or motive for the donation, not its cause. Being liberalities, they remain subject to reduction if they prejudice a more important right (in this case, the inheritance right of a lawful heir). (2) NO. The CA however made a mistake in ordering the reduction on several unsupported assumptions. They did not verify the following: whether the 3 lots were the only properties that composed the net estate; whether Alejandro and Gervasio were the only legal heirs; and whether Cipriano had any debts or charges left to pay . The CA also hurriedly used the area to compute the reduction and not the value, which would best serve the purpose of the law. The SC gave the right formula for computing the reduction: Estate-Obligs+Donations=Hereditary Estate. Hereditary Estate/# of heirs=Legitimes. If Donation>Legitime, then Donation-Legitime=Valid Reduction Concept: Inofficious means the disinheritance of an heir without sufficient reason. If a donation propter nuptias creates this effect, it can definitely be reduced to serve the interests of justice.
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226. Luzon Surety Co. Inc. v. De Garcia () 1969 Fernando, J: *sugar QUEDANS! Facts: 1. Chavez and Luzon Surety (Luzon) executed a surety bond in favor of PNB to guaranty a loan obtained by Chavez. De Garcia was one of the guarantors who were to jointly and severally, to indemnify now petitioner Luzon 2. PNB sued Chavez and Luzon to recover a certain amount; Luzon, in turn, sued the guarantors (one of them was De Garcia) for indemnification The lower court (LC) ordered that Chavez and Luzon pay PNB, and the guarantors pay Luzon; 3. A writ of garnishment was executed to this effect to levy and garnish the sugar quedans of the De Garcias, from their sugar plantation, 4. De Garcias contested this, because the sugar quedans were part of their conjugal property.. The LC ruled in their favour. SC agreed with the LC. Issue: Can the conjugal property be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband (to guaranty a thir d party), absent any showing of benefits received by both the spouses/family? Held: No Ruling: 1. Its true that under the CC, husband is the administrator of the conjugal property. But the only obligations incurred by the husband that are chargeable against the conjugal property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career, profession or business with the honest belief that he is doing right for the benefit of the family. 2. And that isnt the case here. Remember, husband entered into that agreement for the benefit of someone else (Chavez- to guaranty her loan), not his family. 3. While the husband by signing the indemnity agreement may be said to have added to his reputation or esteem and to have earned the confidence of the business community, such benefit is too remote and fanciful to come within the express terms of the law. 227. Gelano vs. CA () 24 Feb 1981 De Castro *wife doesnt want to pay husbands debts with tenant Facts: 1. Husband: Carlos Gelano and Wife: Guillermina Gelano own property in Paco being rented by Insular Sawmill for 1,200 a month. 2. Between 19 Nov 1947 to 26 Dec 1950, Carlos obtained from Insular Sawmill cash advances of 25,950 on the agreement that it can be deducted from the monthly rental. He was able to pay only 5,950 thereby leaving a balance of 20,000. 3. Guillerma refused to pay. Grounds: amount was for the personal account of her husband without her knowledge. 4. Between 4 May 1948 to 11 Sep 1949, the Spouses made credit purchases of lumber materials for the repair of their house amounting to 1,120.46. They were able pay only 91 (and a discount of 83) leaving a balance of 946.46. 5. On 14 Jul 1952, Insular Sawmill executed a joint promissory note with Carlos so that he may obtain a 8,000 loan with Chinabank. Carlos failed to pay thus Insular had to pay the bank 9,106. 6. Carlos paid Insular only 5,000 leaving a balance of 4,106. Guillerma refused to pay saying she had no knowledge of the deal. 7. On 29 May 1959, Insular filed a complaint for collection. Before trial ended, Insular Sawmills corporate existence has dissolved in 1960. The trial court was not notified of such dissolution. 8. On 20 Nov 1964, four years after Insulars dissolution, the court ordered the spouses to pay. Carlos for 19,650 (cash advances) + 4,106 (loan guarantee) + 2,000 (attorneys fees). The Spouses jointly for 946.46 (lumber) + 550. 9. Upon appeal, Court of Appeals modified the judgment by holding the spouses jointly and severally liable on the debts. 10. After receiving the decision, the Spouses became aware of Insulars dissolution and filed a motion to dismiss. CA denied. Issue: Is the conjugal property liable for the debts? Held: Yes. The obligations contracted benefited the family. Ruling: 1. The Court of Appeals found that the obligations contracted by Carlos redounded to the benefit of the family. 2. The conjugal property is liable for his debt pursuant to Article 161 (1) of the New Civil Code. 3. Only the conjugal partnership is liable, not joint and several as erroneously described by the CA, since the conjugal partnership is a single entity. On Insular Sawmills capacity to sue as a corporation 1. A corporation that has a pending action and which cannot be terminated within the three-year period after its dissolution is authorized to convey all its properties to trustees to enable it to prosecute and defend suits by or against the corporation beyond the three-year period. 2. Insular Sawmill filed the complaint for collection before its dissolution.
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Concept: Family Code, Article 94: The absolute community of property shall be liable for: (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; (4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs, upon the community property. 228. G-Tractors Inc. VS CA () February 28, 1985Cuevas *producer and exporter of mahogany logs Facts: 1. The following respondents: Luis and Josefina Narciso are married. 2. Luis is engaged in a business that operates a logging concession. 3. Luis entered into an agreement of lease with Petitioner for heavy equipment (tractors, bulldozers) 4. Luis was unfortunately unable to pay and they ended up with a compromise agreement which he also did not pay. 5. It came to the point that the sheriff of Q.C. began to auction the parcels of land that Luis owned to the highest bidder. 6. Luis filed a complaint alleging that the land that the sheriff was going to sell was conjugal property, thus also belonged to his wife. The nature of the sale clearly stated that only the property of the husband may be sold to satisfy the money judgment against him. Issue: Can conjugal property be seized because of the poor business decisions of the husband? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. The land is conjugal property because the land in Camarines Sur (which is the designated job site for the use of the heavy equipment) does not belong exclusively to him but is property of the family. 2. It is very clear that his business decision to enter into an agreement with petitioner was for the benefit of the family. 3. It is well settled that the debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts. Concept: As long as the husband believes that he is doing the right thing for his family, he should not be made to suffer and answer alone. Thus, if he incurs any indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of his career or profession or suffers losses in a legitimate business, the conjugal partnership must equally bear the indebtedness and the losses, unless he acted to the prejudice of his family. 229. LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN AND CECILIA SUNGA VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND LAMBERTO T. CHUA () June 25, 2008- Velasco Jr. * Shellite gas business Facts: 1. In 1977, Chua and Jacinto Sunga formed a partnership to engage in the marketing of liquefied petroleum gas. 2. The business, name, Shellite Gas Appliance Center (Shellite) 3. Registered as a sole proprietorship in the name of Jacinto 4. After Jacinto's death in 1989, his widow, petitioner Cecilia Sunga, and married daughter, petitioner Lilibeth Sunga-Chan, continued with the business without Chua's consent. 5. Chua's subsequent repeated demands for accounting and winding up went unheeded 6. June 22, 1992 a Complaint for Winding Up of a Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment 7. Claims: a. Per Lilibeths CPA 3, 154, 736.65 b. Per Chuas CPA P 8, 733, 644.75 8. RTC's approval of Chua's computation of claims in the amount of PhP 8,733,644.75, the sheriff of Manila levied upon petitioner Sunga-Chan's property located along Linao St., Paco, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 208782 9. In the auction sale of the levied lot, Chua, with a tender of PhP 8 million,emerged as the winning bidder. Issue: Whether or not the absolute community of property of spouses Lilibeth Sunga Chan with her husband Norberto Chan can be lawfully made to answer for the liability of Lilibeth Chan under the judgment Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. Given the solidary liability of petitioners to satisfy the judgment award, respondent sheriff cannot really be faulted for levying upon and then selling at public auction the property of petitioner Sunga-Chan to answer for the whole obligation of petitioners. 2. The fact that the levied parcel of land is a conjugal or community property , as the case may be, of spouses Norberto and SungaChan does not per se vitiate the levy and the consequent sale of the property . 3. Property is not among those exempted from execution under Section 13 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 4. The records show that spouses Sunga-Chan and Norberto were married on February 4, 1992, or after the effectivity of the

5. 6.
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7.
Family Code on August 3, 1988. Thus, their absolute community property may be held liable for the obligations contracted by either spouse. Absent any indication otherwise, the use and appropriation by petitioner Sunga-Chan of the assets of Shellite even after the business was discontinued on May 30, 1992 may reasonably be considered to have been used for her and her husband's benefit. Amounts to only PhP 5,529,392.52, whereas Sunga-Chan's auctioned property which Chua acquired, as the highest bidder, fetched a price of PhP 8 million. Thus, Chua owes petitioner Sunga-Chan the amount of PhP 2,470,607.48.
230. Francisco vs. Gonzales () September 17, 2008 Austria-Martinez *Mama and his boyfriend are in debt, Property of children cant be answerable Facts: 1. June 12, 1986 Cleodualdo and Michele Francisco got married. 2. November 29, 2000 - In a partial decision for declaration of nullity of Cleodualdo and Michelle Franciscos marriage, the compromise agreement they entered into was granted. 3. The agreement contained their obligations, rights and responsibilities on matters relating to t heir childrens support (Cleodia and Ceamantha, both minors), custody, visitation as well as to the dissolution of their CPG. 4. The property subject is a house and lot located in Taal St., Ayala, Alabang. 5. The title and ownership of this house shall be transferred by way of a deed of donation to the children, as co-owners, when they reach 19 (Cleodia) and 18 (Ceamantha) . 6. Michele had a partner (Matrai) and they lived together in Lanka Drive, Ayala Alabang. (Wow, a good example of sumakabilang bahay.) 7. In a case for unlawful detainer, Michele and Matrai were ordered to vacate the said house leased to them by the spouses Jorge and Purificacion Gonzales, and to pay back rentals and unpaid telephone bills. 8. October 18, 2001 The marriage between Cleodualdo and Michele was declared null and void. 9. A notice of sale by execution was then issued by the sheriff covering the house in Taal St. WHY? In accordance with the obligations of Michele and Matrai 10. When the grandmother of the minors, Dra. Uriarte, learned of the scheduled auction, she, as guardian-in-fact of the girls, filed a very urgent motion to stop execution of sale. (Lola to the rescue!!!) 11. Petition for Certiorari The girls, represented by their grandmother, argue that: 1) they are the rightful owners of the house in Taal St., 2) their parents already waived in their favor their rights over the property, 3) the adjudged obligation in the ejectment case redound to the benefit of the family, 4) Micheles obligation is a joint obligation betwee n her and Mantrai, not joint and solidary. Issues: 1. Is the subject property conjugal in nature? 2. Can the property be answerable for Micheles obligation? Held: NO for both. Ruling: First Issue: 1. Prior to the issuance of the Notice of Levy on Execution on November 28, 2001, there was already annotated on the title the inscription that the marriage has been nullified and that the title of ownership of the conjugal property shall be transferred to the children when they reach 19 and 18. The parents had already waived their rights. 2. There is a condition that Cleodualdo shall retain usufructuary rights over the property until he reaches the age of 65. 3. The property used to be Cleodualdo and Micheles. Second Issue: 1. In the first place, the annotation (in first issue, no. 1) should have put the RTC and the sheriff on guard, and they should not have proceeded with the execution of the judgment debt of Michele and Matrai. 2. The judgment debt for which the subject property was being made to answer was incurred by Michele and Matrai (not Michele and Cleodualdo). By no stretch of one's imagination can it be concluded that said debt/obligation was incurred for the benefit of the conjugal partnership or that some advantage accrued to the welfare of the family . 3. A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family Failure to establish any of these circumstances means that the conjugal asset may not be bound to answer for the wife's personal obligation. The TRO is made permanent! (They can now live peacefully. Hayyyyy)
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231. Buado vs. CA () April 24, 2009 Tinga *slanderous wife but Conjugal Partnership saves the day (property) Facts: 1. Erlinda Nicol was held liable for damages for the crime of slander against the spouses Roberto and Venus Ruado. 2. The court issued a writ of execution on her property but finding it insufficient issued a levy on property which was carried out by the sheriff despite the affidavit of third party claim by Arturo Fulo. The conjugal property of Erlinda which was valued at Php 500,000 was auctioned, bided and won by the spouses Buado for only Php 51,685. 3. A year after, the husband of Erlinda, Romulo filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against the spouse and the sheriff. Issue: Could the conjugal property be levied for the personal obligation of the wife? Held: No. Under the CPG it cannot be held liable without any advantage or benefit benefiting the conjugal partnership. Ruling: 1. The Court, in Naguit v. Court of Appeals and Sy v. Discaya stated that a spouse is deemed a stranger to the action wherein the writ of execution was issued and is therefore justified in bringing an independent action to vindicate her right of ownership over his exclusive or paraphernal property. 2. Pursuant to Mariano vs. CA, it must further be settled whether the obligation of the judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not; and the court ruled that the conjugal property of Erlinda and Romulo is not chargeable to the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability. 3. The conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.( Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property , in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse) 4. Furthermore it cannot be said that the concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership . Concepts: Remedy of terceria is available to a third person other than the judgment obligor or his agent who claims a property levied on. Redound - to contribute, to accrue 232. Yu Bun Guan v Ong () Oct 18, 2001 Panganiban *Yu, the tricksy trickster Facts: 1. Yu and Elvira were married according to Chinese rites on April 30, 1961, and they had three children. Then in 1968 Elvira bought a parcel of land in JP Rizal out of her personal funds and had it registered in her name. 2. Yu left in 1992, apparently because of his volcanic temper and other vicious vices. Before their separation, however, she reluctantly agreed to sell her property to Yu in a simulated sale. The agreement was that Yu will not have to pay for the property but will put up a commercial building on it so their kids can run around and break windows and stuff. 3. Stupid Elvira then went on to sign the deed of sale (tagged at P200k) and a new TCT was issued in Yus name. Since Yu didnt want to pay, she held on to the title instead. 4. Yu threatened her with Kung Fu and executed an affidavit of adverse claim on the property (smartass). Elvira tried some damage control, even attempting to reconcile with her buwitre of a husband, all to no avail. When the court ordered a new title to be issued in Yus name, she filed her own affidavit of adverse claim. She prayed that the sale be declared null and void; that the title in Yus name be cancelled; that damages be paid ; and that they give him a kick in the crotch. 5. Yu claimed that the only reason why the property was in Elviras name in the first place was that he couldnt purchase it before since he was a Chinese citizen. She could only have been a dummy because she didnt have enough money on her own to pay for it. Either way, he said that they are in pari delicto since they are both parties to the simulated sale and that the property should be given to him instead. 6. The RTC ruled in favor of Elvira, the CA affirmed the RTC, and Yu went straight to the heavens for help (he should have hired a better lawyer). Issue: (1) Is the property conjugal in nature? Held: NO (2) Was the sale valid? Held: NO (3) Are they in pari delicto? Held: NO (4) Did the CA err in cancelling his title and issuing a new one for Elvie? Held: NO Held: AFFIRMED. Ruling: (1) NO. The factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA show that Elvie had enough money to pay for the property. In fact, it was Yu who wasnt able to prove that he had the money to purchase the lot. His testimony kept changing as to where he was able
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to get the money from, so the 3 courts thought he was unreliable. Elvies capacity was well established, she had her: sa vings from work; savings from school; money from her personal property; and money from her sister. The CA even took note of the fact that her parents were well off. She purchased the property for herself out of her own funds. (2) NO. There was no valid sale. It was completely simulated and hence, void and without effect. The payment was not even made. It was executed merely to facilitate the transfer of the property to Yu as stipulated in their agreement that he would put up a building for his kids (which he didnt do either). (3) NO. The pari delicto principle as to contracts only applies when there is an illegal contract. It does not apply with respect to inexistent and void contracts. Only Yu is guilty in this case. (4) NO. The sale was void and inexistent; therefore transferring the title to its rightful owner is the right thing to do. Concept: Couples cant sell stuff to each other, period. 233. Philip MATTHEWS v. Benjamin and Joselyn TAYLOR () 2009 Nachura, J.: *British Benj and his Bora property Facts: 1. Benjamin (British) and Joselyn (Fil) got married (1988). 2. During their marriage, they got several properties (allegedly using Benjs money). One of which was the Boracay prop where allegedly again funds used were Benjs. This Bora property became a tourist resort (named Admiral Ben Bow Inn). 3. Taylors had a falling out, separated and in 1992, Joselyn executed an SPA authorizing Benj take over the property. He could basically do whatever like sell, lease, etc. 4. In this same year, Joselyn entered into a lease agreement with Matthews. Matthews then took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort 5. This was contested by Benj. He instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease against Matthews and Joselyn. He said that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his consent. 6. Matthews claimed good faith in transacting with Joselyn. Since Joselyn appeared to be the owner of the Boracay property, he found it unnecessary to obtain the consent of Benjamin. Plus, it appeared in the contract that Benjamin signed as a witness to the contract, indicating his knowledge and conformity of the transaction. 7. Both RTC and CA considered the Boracay property as community property of Benjamin and Joselyn; thus, the consent of the spouses was necessary to validate any contract involving the property. They in effect ruled against Matthews. Issue: Is Lease Agreement entered into by Filipina Joselyn (with Matthews) without the consent of her British husband valid? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. First of all, aliens cannot own lands in our country. Constitution mandates. 2. Benj has no right to nullify the Agreement between Joselyn and Matthews. Benj, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring lands in the Philippines. 3. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership 4. This is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contr act knowing that it was illegal, no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. 164. Buenaventura vs. CA () March 31, 2005 Azcuna *Liquidation based on equal co-ownership due to marriage declared void ab initio Facts: 1. Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura. 2. After she filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage . 3. The Marriage between plaintiff Noel and defendant Isabel on July 4, 1979 is null and void ab initio on pysch incapacity of both. 4. Liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership : plaintiff's separation /retirement benefits from the Far East Bank and Trust Company, paying to her 50% of it or P1, 837,667.89 with 12% interest per annum and one-half (1/2) of his outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies; 5. Custody of their son was also given to the mother, and Noel was to regularly support his son. 6. The CA affirmed the decision, and so Noel, on certiorari, alleged that he acquired the said properties before his marriage.
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Issue: How does the procedure on liquidation apply in this case, and what are its effects? Ruling: 1. Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership. 2. The provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code should aptly prevail. The property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. 3. It must be stressed, nevertheless that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses. 4. Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found , both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. 5. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution. 234. Delizo vs. Delizo () 30 Jan 1976 Antonio *properties divided accdg to duration of each marriage Facts: 1. Husband: Nicolas Delizo and First wife: Rosa Villasfer from 20 Apr 1891 up to Rosas death on 7 Dec 1909. 3 children. Second wife: Dorotea de Ocampo from Oct 1911 up to Nicolas death on 3 May 1957. 9 children. 2. On 15 Apr 1957, an action for partition was instituted by the children with the first wife. 3. Involved are properties acquired by Nicolas: a) 66 hectares of agricultural land in San Jose City (obtained during the first marriage) b) 58 hectares of rice land in Munoz (obtained during the second marriage) c) 150-sq meter lot in Sampaloc, Manila (obtained during the second marriage) 4. On 27 Apr 1964, the lower court rendered judgment distributing the properties: to the children of the first marriage, to Dorotea, and in equal shares to the children of both marriages. 5. The Court of Appeals modified the distribution. It gave 20% of the properties acquired during the second marriage to Rosas children because: a) San Jose City land obtained during the first marriage was able to produce fruits due to the labor of the second marriage b) Munoz land acquired during second marriage but partly due to fruits of San Jose City property c) Sampaloc property obtained due to the fruits of San Jose City property Issue: Should Rosas children partake of the properties acquired during the second marriage? Held: Yes. Subsequent properties acquired during the second marriage were obtained due to the fruits of the first. Ruling: 1. There is established fact that the produce of the San Jose lands contributed considerably to the acquisition of other properties. Children of the first marriage should share in the others. 2. Since the contribution of each spouse cannot be determined , the total mass of the properties should be divided between the two conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each partnership . First marriage entitled to 9/32. Second marriage to 23/32. 3. CPG of the two marriages would amount to of the whole estate divided 1/13 share for each child and Dorotea. Dorotea is entitled to of the net remainder of the second conjugal partnership. 4. Hence, divided as follows: Share of Rosa, 1st wife 9/64 of the whole estate divided among the three children Share of Dorotea, 2nd wife 23/64 of the whole estate plus her share in Nicolas estate Share of Nicolas, husband 32/64 of the whole estate divided into 13 equal parts (3 + 9 + Dorotea) Concept: Family Code, Article 104. Whenever the liquidation of the community properties of two or more marriages contracted by the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income of each community shall be determined upon such proof as may be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which community the existing properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different communities in proportion to the capital and duration of each.
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235. Belcodero vs. CA () October 20, 1993 - Vitug *Husband buys property and gives it to his Live in and dies Facts: 1. Alayo D Bosing was first married to Juliana Oday. (LAWFUL WIFE) 2. Alayo then left her and started living with Josefa Rivera. (LIVE-IN) 3. Alayo bought land in an installment basis from Magdalena Estate and claimed in the deed that he was married to Josefa Bosing (his common law wife) 4. Alayo sent a letter to Magdalena Estate authorizing them to transfer the lot in the name of his Josefa (Live in) 5. A transfer certificate was issued in the name of Josefa R Bosing married to AlayoBosing. 6. Alayo then married Josefa and later died in March 1967. 7. Josefa and her child (begot by Alayo) executed a document of extrajudicial partition and sale of the lot, which was described as conjugal property. 8. Juliana and her children (first wife and first set of children begot by Bosing) filed an action for reconveyance of the property claiming that it should be theirs because they are the legal heirs. Issue: Who has the right to the property? Live in or first wife? Held: First Wife Ruling: 1. It cannot be seriously contended that, simply because the property was titled in the name of Josefa at Alayos request, she should thereby be deemed to be its owner. 2. The property was acquired by Alayo and that even she recognized his ownership, when 3 years after he died, they executed a deed of extrajudicial partition assessing a interest in the property in what may be described as her share in the conjugal partnership. This cannot be done because she is not the legal heir. 3. As regards the property relation between common-law spouses, the Civil Code provides that the rule on co-ownership is repudiated (rejected) when either of the spouses suffered from an impediment to marry. 4. There was also no sign on the part of Alayo to fix that through an action for legal separation within his lifetime. 236. MOISES JOCSON vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA () February 16, 1989- Medialdea * Contract of sale between father and daughter Facts: 1. Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-Vasquez are the only surviving offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete 2. Alejandra Poblete predeceased her husband without her intestate estate being settled. 3. Emilio Jocson also died intestate on April 1, 1972. 4. The validity of the 3 Documents involved were being assailed. (these are contracts executed by Emilio Jocson with his daughter Agustina) - 1st Contract of Sale: >>Four Parcel of Lands in Naic, Cavite for 10,000 Pesos (owned by Emilio Jocson only) - 2nd Contract of Sale: >>Two Rice Mills and Camarin (camalig) in Naic, Cavite for 5,000 Pesos - 3rd Contract: Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Adjudication with Sale >>Exclusive Properties of Alejandra Poblete >>Without the participation of Moises >>Emilio sold to Agustina his 1/3 share for Php 8,000 5. Petitioner contended that the said Contracts of Sale must be declared void because a. There is a vitiation of consent, like inducement, fraud and machination b. There is a simulated and fictitious sale between Emilio and Agustina c. There is an Inadequacy of Price d. Also he said that the respondents cannot buy such properties because the latter have no enough source of income e. Unliquidated Conjugal Properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete cannot be validly sell f. The improbability of the sale between Emilio Jocson and Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, taking into consideration the circumstances obtaining between the parties; and that the real intention of the parties were donations designed to exclude Moises Jocson from participating in the estate of his parents. 6. The transfer certificates of title covering the properties therein in the name of Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete," Issue: 1. Whether the properties sold by the deceased father with his daughter, which have been registered in the name of the deceased father married with the deceased mother is presumed to be conjugal?Held:No 2. Whether the contracts involved are valid? Held: Valid
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Ruling: 1. Presumption of conjugal property - Proof of acquisition during the coverture(condition of being married woman) is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership - The fact that the properties were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete " is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture. - Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing - It may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to the latter. - "married to' preceding "Alejandra Poblete' are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson 2. With regards to vitiation of consent (fraud) to declare the contract void - SC said that it is only voidable there must be annulment of the said contract which prescribes in four years - the action of the petitioner already prescribed 237. Ansaldo vs. Sheriff() February 19, 1937 Abad-Santos *assets of the CP are not liable for the payment of personal obligations of the husband Facts: 1. Upon the express guaranty of the appellant Fidelity & Surety Company of the Philippine Islands, the Philippine Trust Company granted RomaricoAgcaoili a credit not to exceed P20,000. 2. Angel A. Ansaldo, in turn, agreed to indemnify the Fidelity& Surety Company of the Philippine Islands for any and all losses and damages that it might sustain by reason of having guaranteed Agcaoili's obligations to the said Philippine Trust Company. 3. Agcaoili defaulted, and the surety company, as his guarantor, paid the Philippine Trust Company the sum of P19,065.17. 4. Thereafter, the surety company brought an action against the appellee Angel A. Ansaldo for the recovery of the said sum of P19,065.17, and after obtaining a judgment on its favor, caused the sheriff of the City of Manila to levy on the following properties:The joint savings account of Angel A. Ansaldo and Margarita Quintos de Ansaldo in the said bank amounting to P165.84. 5. Upon learning of the action taken by the sheriff, the Ansaldos filed with him a third party claim alleging that the money on which he levied execution was the property of the conjugal partnership existing between them and not liable for the payment of personal obligations of Angel A. Ansaldo. 6. But upon execution of an indemnity bond by the appellant Luzon Surety Company, the sheriff retained the money in his possession. 7. Subsequently, the Ansaldos instituted an action against the sheriff and the surety company in the CFI of Manila to have the execution declared null and void. 8. The court below granted the relief prayed for and sentenced the sheriff and the surety company, jointly and severally, to pay the Ansaldos the sum of P636.80 with interest at the rate of 10% per annum from June 6, 1934 until paid, and the costs of suit. Issue: Is the joint savings account and a joint current account, in a bank, of a husband and his wife, liable for the payment of the obligation of the husband? Held: No. Ruling: It is undisputed that the sum of P636.80 which is now in controversy was derived from the paraphernal property of the appellee, Margarita Quintos de Ansaldo, the wife of the other appellee Angel A. Ansaldo. It therefore belongs to the conjugal partnership of the said spouses. The fruits of the paraphernal property which become part of the assets of the conjugal partnership are not liable for the payment of personal obligations of the husband, unless it be proved that such obligations were productive of some benefit to the family. In the case now before us no attempt has been made to prove that the obligations contracted by the appellee, Angel A. Ansaldo, were productive of some benefit to his family. The right of the husband to one-half of the property of the conjugal partnership does not vest until the dissolution of the marriage when the conjugal partnership is also dissolved. 238: Sps. Estonina vs CA () Jan. 27, 1997 Francisco *The land is inherited from deceased Mom Facts: 1. The controversy involves a lot owned by Santiago Garcia. Who after six years (in 1973) of his death the lot became part of a notice of attachment in favor of Trinidad Estonia granted by the Court of First Instance arising from the civil case between

2.
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Trinidad Estonia v. Consuelo Garcia. Between the years of 1977-1980 the heirs of Santiago Garcia sold their pro indiviso share in the same land comprising 9/10 of it to the Atayan spouses. 3. In 1979, subsequent to the favorable decision to Estonina an execution pending appeal was made and the land was auctioned and was won by Estonina. The Intermediate Appelate Court rendered a decision transferring the ownership of the property to Estonina. 4. In 1985 spouses Atayan filed a complaint of annulment of the sheriffs sale and transfer. It ruled that the land was acquired during Santiagos marriage with Consuelo and the ownership should only be 55% pro indiviso with 45% belonging to the heirs of Santiago. 5. The Court of Appeals ruled that the land was not a conjugal property but Santiagos exclusive property. Consuelo only inherited 1/10 pro indiviso share which could be validly attached . Issues: Does the land in question form part of the conjugal property of Consuelo and Santiago? Held: No. It is the exclusive property of Santiago. Ruling: 4. The presumption in Art. 160 that all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal property applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. In this case the petitioners failed to provide evidence that the land was acquired during the marriage of Consuelo and Santiago. 5. The land as correctly found out in the findings of the CA was acquired by Santiago from his deceased mother and formed part of a large tract of land which was divided among Santiago and his sisters. 6. The sale of the land in its entirety at the public auction above the 1/10 pro indiviso share of Consuelo is therefore null and void. 239. Castro v Miat () February 11, 2003 Puno *Father and Sons Facts: 1. Moises and Concordia, parents of Romeo and Alexander, bought a piece of property in Paco on installment basis on May 17, 1977. While at the UAE, Moises agreed that the said property, along with another located in Paraaque, would go to his sons. He recanted later on when he came back for good, claiming the Paraaque property for himself and leaving the one in Paco to his sons, both of them agreed. 2. The two boys and their families proceeded to live in the Paco property. Alexander eventually left for personal reasons and made arrangements with Romeo regarding his share. Life was pretty much normal until Romeo heard from his godmother, Mrs. Rosalina Castro, mother of Virgilio Castro. 3. She told him that Moises was planning to sell her the Paco property and that she had already given a down payment of P30000 for it. Along with her son, she brought the brothers Miat to court to talk about the sale. Moises told his sons that he would be forced to sell the property because he mortgaged it when he came to some dire financial straights. 4. The sale was eventually finalized and the proceeds went to Moises and Alexander. Romeo didnt get a single cent but was allowed to till their lands in Nueva Ecija (pampalubag-loob, haha). 5. Romeo filed the case to nullify the sale and to compel his father and brother to convey the property to him, as well as damages. 6. The trial court decided in favor of Romeo as far his and Alexanders share are concerned. With regard to their fathers sale though, the court said that he should consider it as valid. 7. On appeal to the CA, the decision was modified, stating that the sale was not considered valid and the conveyance be ordered executed as well (as well as payment of costs against the appellees). The petitioners elevated the case then to the Supreme Court claiming the CA gravely erred in all accounts. Issue: (1) Is the Paco property conjugal? Held: YES (2) Was there a valid oral partition? Held: YES (3) Were the spouses Castro buyers in good faith? Held: NO The decision was AFFIRMED. Ruling: (1) The property IS conjugal because it was purchased during Moises and Concordias marriage. Even though it was made on installment basis and the purchase was finalized after Concordias death, it is still conjugal because what applies here woul d be Article 153(1) of the New Civil Code. The provision states that all property acquired by onerous title during the marriage is considered conjugal. Purchasing on installment is considered onerous title because onerous means burdensome, an installment payment imposes a burden on a person to pay regularly. (2) The oral partition is valid because it was corroborated by pretty much everyone involved, even Moises himself. The requirement that it must be in a public document is only for the benefit of creditors whose rights may be infringed by the arbitrariness of oral agreements.
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(3) The Castro spouses are not buyers in good faith because they knew all along that the brothers Miat were in possession of the property. They knew full well that Moises had agreed to give the property to his sons. A buyer in good faith, especially of property, must inquire with due diligence on the rights of other persons in possession of their desired purchase before making any solid moves Concept: Conjugal partnership of gains commences at the time of marriage, and the effects of the reg ime subsist in the marriages subsistence. 240. Neng Kagi Kadiguia MALANG v. Moson () 2000 Gonzaga-Reyes: *Muslim man and his 8 wives Facts: Quick Facts: This case is in connection with the settlement of the estate of the deceased husband, HadjiAbdula Malang (HAM for short, please). All his 8 marriages were celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Muslim Code. Ham died after Muslim Code took effect. 1. Malang, a Muslim, contracted marriage with Aida Limba (1). They begot three sons. During the subsistence of their marriage, he bought a parcel of land in Sousa, Cotabato. 2. Then he married for the second time another Muslim named JubaidaKado (2). Later on, HAM divorced Aida. HAM married another Muslim, Nayo Omar (3). Then another one, HadjiMabai (4). Not long after, HadjiAbdula married three other Muslim women named Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai (5,6,7) but he eventually divorced them. 3. HadjiAbdula then migrated to Tambunan where he married petitionerNeng KaguiKadiguia Malang (8), his fourth wife, excluding the wives he had divorced.They established residence in Cotabato City but they were childless. For a living, they relied on farming and on the business of buying and selling of agricultural products . HAM acquired vast tracts of land in Sousa and Talumanis, Cotabato City. He also deposited money in several banks. 4. Then HAM died intestate on December 18, 1993, after the Muslim Code and Family Code took effect. Malang filed a petition for the settlement of his estate. 5. According to PETITIONER MALANG : she was the wife of HAM and that he left seven (7) parcels of land all in Cotabato, five (5) of which are titled in HadjiAbdulas name married to Neng P. Malang, a pick-up jeepeney and bankdeposits. All that she claimed were part of conjugal property. And the properties outside Cotabato were exclusive property of the deceased husband. She claims that NCC should govern over these matters (under NCC, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership). 6. According to the OPPOSITORS: a) HAM had no conjugal partnership with petitioner because his having contracted eight (8) marriages with different Muslim women was in violation of the Civil Code that provided for a monogamous marriage; a conjugal partnership presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a bigamous marriage or a common-law relationship b) thepresumption that propertiesacquiredduring the marriage are conjugal properties is inapplicable because at the time he acquired the properties, the decedent was married to four (4) women. c) properties are not conjugal in nature despite that some of these properties were titled in the name of the decedent married to Neng Malang because such description is not conclusive of the conjugal nature of the property. Issue: What law governs the property regime of a Muslim marriage celebrated prior the passage of the Muslim Code? Held: Civil Code Ruling: 1. The dates in the record of the case is simply inadequate for purposes of arriving at a fair and complete resolution of the petition. So the case is remanded to the lower court for proper resolution. 2. So SC just set out certain guidelines in the interpretation and application of pertinent laws to facilitate the task of the lower court 3. MAIN collateral ISSUE:Law(s) Governing Property Relations of Muslim Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code Civil Code is still the Code that determines and governs the property relations of the marriages in this case, for the reason that at the time of the celebration of the marriages in question the Civil Code was the only law on marriage relations, including property relations between spouses, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. The co-ownership provided in Article 144 of the Civil Code to require that the man and woman living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage must not in any way be incapacitatedto marry . Thus, the co-ownership in Article 144 cannot apply to HadjiAbdulas marriages celebrated subsequent to a valid and legally existing marriage, since from the point of view of the Civil Code HAM is not capacitated to marry. Absent proof that property acquired during their cohabitation with HAM is their exclusive property, the presumption is that property acquired during the subsistence of a valid marriage --- and in the Civil Code, there can only be one validly existing marriage at any given time --- is conjugal property of such subsisting marriage.

4.
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On Succession and Dissolution of Property Regimes: HAM died intestate on December 16, 1993. Thus, it is the Muslim Code which should determine the identification of the heirs in the order of intestate succession and the respective shares of the heirs.
241. PNB vs. Quintos and Ansaldo () 6 Oct 1924 Villamor *PNB debt chargeable to conjugal property; spouses jointly liable Facts: 1. On 20 Jun 1918, the PNB granted the spouses Angel Ansaldo and Margarita Quintosa credit to the amount of 31,284. As security, they pledged to the bank several shares of stocks. 2. In Sep 1922, there remained a balance of 31,785.96. The PNB asked them to pay their debt as the securities they issued were found to be insufficient. 3. The Ansaldos claim that the debt is not solidary in nature and should only bind Angel. The bank presented evidence that both or either of them could sign checks against the bank. 4. PNB then filed an action to collect payment of the debt. The court ruled that the debt is chargeable to the conjugal property of the spouses. It also ordered an execution against any property of the conjugal partnership and, in default thereof, against the personal property of each of them if the sale of the securities were insufficient. Issue: Should the debt be applied to the conjugal property, and in default thereof, to their separate properties? Held: Yes. Article 1408 of the Civil Code states that all the debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the husband, as well as those incurred by the wife in those cases in which she may legally bind the partnership are chargeable to the conjugal partnership. Ruling: 1. It is immaterial whether the debt was contracted by one or the other, for in either case as the debt was contracted during the marriage, it must be paid for the account of the conjugal partnership in accordance with Article 1408 of the Civil Code. 2. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Court additionally held that they are jointly liable for the payment of the debt given that the conjugal properties were insufficient. 3. The conjugal partnership maintains the separation of the properties bought by each spouse. It does not produce the merger of properties. Concept: A solidary or joint and several obligation is one in which each debtor is liable for the entire obligation, and each creditor is entitled to demand the whole obligation. In a joint obligation each obligor answers only for a part of the whole liability and to each obligee belongs only a part of the correlative rights. 242. ROBERTO LAPERAL, JR. AND PURIFICACION M. LAPERAL, vs. RAMON KATIGBAK and EVELINA KATIGBAK () March 31, 1964- Regala *Mommy giving money to daughter to buy properties Facts: 1. H&W: Ramon Katigbak & Evelina Kalaw 2. This litigation is a sequel to the one instituted by the Laperals against Katigbak and Kalaw way back in August, 1950. - the Laperals sought the "recovery of P14,000 evidenced by various promissory notes executed in favor of the Laperals by Katigbak, - the return of jewelry valued at P97,500.00, delivered by the Laperals to Katigbak for sale on commission, or a total of P111,500.00." - Judgment : Katigbak should pay the Laperals the sum of P14,000.00, and to return the jewelry involved, or in lieu thereof, to pay plaintiffs P97,500.00, with interest from August 8, 1950 3. Kalaw filed a complaint against her husband Katigbak, for "judicial separation of property and separate administration ," 4. Declaring the property covered by TCT No. 57626 in the City of Manila to be the separate or paraphernal property of the defendant-appellee Evelina Kalaw. 5. Laperals filed another complaint to annulment of the proceedings had in Civil Case No. 12860 for "judicial separation of property and separate administration," to enforce the judgment secured. Issue: Whether or not the property is part of the conjugal property Held: No. Ruling: 1. There is no denying that all properties acquired during the marriage are, by law, presumed conjugal. (Art. 160, Civil Code) 2. The presumption, however, is not conclusive but merely rebuttable 3. We hold that this is a case where the presumption has been sufficiently and convincingly disproven. - the deed to the disputed land is in the name of the wife - the property was already of such substantial value the husband, by himself could not have afforded to buy , source of income then was his P200.00 a month

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Evelinatestified, and was believe by the trial court, that the purchase price was furnish by her mother established during the trial that it was a practice of Evelina's parents to so provide their children with money The husband expressly acknowledged in the deed of sale that he did not have any interest in the property
243. MARIANO VELOSO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. LUCIA MARTINEZ () October 24, 1914- Johnson *Jewelry of the wife used as collateral Facts: 1. H&W: Domingo and Lucia 2. Before the death of Domingo Franco he borrowed from Mariano the sum of P4,500 and gave as security for the payment of said sum the jewelry described in the complaint. 3. It is not clear whether or not the jewelry, at the time of the execution of said document (Exhibit C), was in fact delivered to the Mariano. 4. Mariano attempted to show that the jewels in question were pawned to him by Domingo Franco, with the full knowledge and consent of the defendant. 5. He further attempts to show that after the death of Domingo Franco, Lucia promised to pay the amount for which the said jewels were pawned. 6. Lucia positively denies that she knew that her husband had pawned her jewels or that she promised to redeem the same by paying the amount due. Issue: Can Mariano take the jewelry as payment for the money borrowed by Domingo? Held: No. Paraphernal property (wedding gifts to wife) Ruling: 1. Record shows that the jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife, acquired from her mother 2. in the absence of further proof, we must presume that they constituted a part of her paraphernal property . 3. As such paraphernal property she exercised dominion over the same. (Article 1382, Civil Code.) 4. She had the exclusive control and management of the same, until and unless she had delivered it to her husband, before a notary public, with the intent that the husband might administer it properly. (Article 1384, Civil Code.) 5. There is no proof in the record that she had ever delivered the same to her husband, in any manner, or for any purpose. 244. Berciles vs. GSIS () 1984 *Illuminada: Legal Wife retirement benefits, etc. presumed conjugal, for her and her children Facts: 1. Judge Pascual Berciles died of cardiac arrest. 2. His retirement benefits, unpaid salary, retirement premiums and terminal leave, as well as representation and transportation allowances are being contested in this case by two families. 3. Illuminada Ponce Berciles and her four children allege that they are the lawful legal heirs of the deceased. 4. Illuminada presents as proof, evidence of her marriage with the deceased which entitled her and their legitimate children to a share in the said benefits. 5. On the other hand, Flor Fuentabella and her four children also claim a share in the benefits. 6. The GSIS resolved to grant the benefits in the following proportion: 77/134 for Illuminada as surviving spouse 10/134 each for the legitimate children (of Illuminada) 5/134 for Pascual Voltaire (son of Flor) as an acknowledged natural child 4/134 each for the illegitimate children (of Flor) 7. Both parties appealed: a. The lawful heirs contend that the GSIS ruling is erroneous and that they are the only legal heirs under the law. b. The contending claimants claim that they should be the only ones entitled to the benefits. Issue: Is the GSIS decision valid? Held: No. Ruling: The marriage between Illuminada and the deceased was sufficiently proven and ruled upon by this court, fully supported by appropriate evidence as certified by the civil registry; therefore, the 4 children begotten by said spouses during their marital union are all legitimate. THEY ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR SHARE IN THE BENEFITS. On the other hand, the marriage between Flor and the deceased was not proven . She only presented a certification that their marriage records could not be found or located in the civil registry. As for Pascual Voltaire, his paternity cannot be sufficiently proven. His birth certificate was not signed by either the father or mother
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and under the law, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, the putting of his name by the mother and the doctor is null and void. Pascual, therefore, cannot be considered as a natural child. Under the law, illegitimate children are entitled to support and such successional rights as long as there is admission or recognition of paternity. As a result, the illegitimate children of Flor cannot share in the benefits as the marriage between Flor and the deceased was not sufficiently proven and paternity was not established . The retirement benefits and the terminal leave pay, unpaid salary and allowances accruing to the deceased shall be distributed equally to Illuminada and her children. As for the retirement premiums, it is also presumed conjugal, there being no proof that the premiums were paid from the exclusive funds of the deceased. One-half belongs to the wife as her property in the conjugal partnership and the other half to the estate of the deceased to be distributed to his legal heirs. 245: Plata vs. Yatco () December 28, 1964 JBL Reyes *land acquired when she was still a single lady Facts: 1. Amalia Plata acquired a tract of land while she was still single. She then sold that property but seven months after bought it back. This time he was already married to Gaudencio Begosa. 2. The land was then mortgaged in consideration of a loan to Ceasaria Villanueva. And for failure to pay the loan it was extrajudicially foreclosed with the mortgagee as the highest bidder. 3. Subsequently, Villanueva sued Gaudencio alone for illegal detainer. A writ of execution was issued but Amalia resisted all efforts to be evicted and filed third-party claims averring ownership of the property. Issues: 1. Is the land in question part of the conjugal property? Held: No. 2. Could Amalia be be bound by the detainer judgement against Gaudencio? Held: No. Ruling: 1. Despite the validity of the marriage between Amalia and Gaudencio the paraphernal character of the property which was acquired by Amalia while she was still single. 2. There is no proof that the money used in the reconveyance of the land came from the common or conjugal property of the spouses. The signing as co-mortgagor of the Gaudencio does not suffice to make it a conjugal property. 3. The illegal detainer judgment against the husband is not binding to the wife nor affects her paraphernal for she holds and administers independently. 4. She is also exempt from the writ of execution and contempt of court as the action not lawful against her. Concept: unlawful detainer - ordinarily refers to the conduct of a tenant who is in possession of an apartment or leased property and refuses to leave the premises upon the expiration or termination of the lease. Typically, the landlord wishes to evict the tenant for not paying the rent or for endangering the safety of the other tenants or the landlord's property. Paraphernal property - refers to property over which the wife has complete control. 246. Lim v Garcia () January 11, 1907 Carson *The weeping widow and the greedy son Facts: 1. Hilario Lim died and left a considerable amount of property in his estate, which was to be administered by Luis Lim, the plaintiffappellant. 2. The administrator and Isabel Garcia, Hilarios widow, fought over the property. 3. The first items would be the lot on Calle Magallanes as well as some amounts which were brought to the marriage. 4. The real item in issue, however, would be the three parcels of land which the administrator claimed were only donated by Hilario to Isabel during their marriage, therefore being void. The trial court refused all the requests made in Luis case an d he elevated it to the mighty Supreme Court. Issue: Are the three parcels of land considered as part of the conjugal property? Held: NO. The decision was affirmed. Ruling: 1. To dispose of the first few errors, the trial court was right to assert that the presumption of conjugal property prevailed. The evidence offered in support of the contention that Hilario brought the properties into the marriage on his own was not sufficient to dispute the presumption. 2. With regard to the second set of properties, the court found that they were not acquired by Isabel through conveyance by her dead husband, but instead through exchange of properties which she inherited from father. They are her own separate property in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of article 1396 of the Old Civil Code.

3.
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The claim that the property might be considered as dowry is unfounded, the evidence instead strongly supports the presumption that it is part of her own separate property. Concept: Property acquired by exchange for other property belonging separately to either the husband or the wife is his or her own separate property, whether done before or during the marriage. 247.Ma. Darlene Laurena V. CA, Jesse Lauro Laurena, Respondents () 2008 Carpio: *Husbands parents property not part of CPG Facts: 1. The Laurenas were married. Wife filed for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity. She also prayed for dissolution of CPG. 2. She alleged that during their marriage, she and husband acquired the ff properties which were all part of their conjugal partnership of gains: duplex house and lot located at Palanan, Makati City; house and lot in Tanauan, Batangas; dealership of Jeddah Caltex Service Station in Tanauan, Batangas (Jeddah Caltex Station); Personal vehicles consisting of a Mitsubishi Lancer, Safari pick-up, L-300 van and L-200 pick-up; and Jeddah Trucking. Issue: Do the aforecited properties form part of the CPG? Held: Not all, most are husbands parents properties Ruling: 1. The transfer of the parcels of land in Batangas was merely an accommodation so that petitioner, who was then working at the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), could acquire a loan from BSP at a lower rate[25] using the properties as collateral. 2. Jeddah Caltex Station was husbands parents business. 3. Jeddah Trucking was established from the proceeds and income of the Jeddah Caltex Station. 4. But duplex house and lot in Makati City should be included in the conjugal partnership of gains. 248. Manotok Realty vs. Court of Appeals () 30 Apr 1987 Gutierrez Jr. *Legarda property sold by the husband Facts: 1. In 1949, Felipe Madlangawa started occupying a parcel of land in the Clara de Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision with the understanding that he would eventually buy the lot. 2. On 2 Apr 1950, Clara Tambunting, the owner of the lot, died. Her entire estate including her paraphernal properties were placed under custodia legis. 3. On 22 Apr 1950, Felipe made a deposit of 1,500 for the lot to Vicente Legarda, Claras husband. The area of the lot was 240 square meters and sold at 30 per sq.m. A balance of 5,700 remained that Felipe did not or was not able to pay. 4. On 28 Aug 1950, Don Vicente was appointed as a special administrator of the Clara Tambunting estate. 5. Subsequently, Manotok Realty became the successful bidder and vendee of the Tambunting-Legarda subdivision. In its effort to clear it of squatters and occupants, it published several notices and sent circulars for the occupants to vacate. 6. Felipe refused to vacate the lot which led Manotok Realty to file an action to recover the lot. 7. The trial court dismissed the action. The Court of Appeals reversed and ruled that the only right remaining to Manotok Realty is to enforce the collection of the balance. The area occupied by Felipe was reduced to 115 square meters for a balance of 2,551.85. 8. Manotok Realty appealed and contended that the sale was invalid since Don Vicente had no authority to sell the land. Issue: Did Don Vicente Legarda have authority to sell the land? Held: No. He was not the owner or administrator of the property. Ruling: 1. Since the sale was made before Claras death, the sale was void ab initio because Don Vicente was neither an owner nor administrator of the property. 2. Void contracts cannot be ratified. After Don Vicentes appointment as administrator, he should have applied before the probate court for authority to sell the property in favor of Felipe. 3. The Court ordered Felipe to surrender the lot and pay rentals amounting to Twenty Centavos per square meter from May 1950. It also ordered Manotok Realty to return Felipes 1,500 deposit. 249. Ong vs. CA () November 29, 1991 Paras *Wife claims that conjugal property cannot be the target of her negligent business Facts: 1. Plaintiffs wife, Teodora Ong, conducted her own logging business and secured a loan from Francisco Boix (Private Respondent) 2. She was unable to pay back, thus Respondent was awarded by the court a parcel of land that was to be auctioned. 3. Petitioner wants to annul the auction claiming that the property was conjugal thus could not be held liable for personal debts
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contracted by the wife. Issue: 1. Is It Conjugal Property? Held: No 2. If it had been, would it have saved it from being auctioned? Held: No Ruling: 1. The mere use of the surname of the husband in the tax declaration of the subject property is not sufficient proof that said property was acquired during the marriage and is therefore conjugal. 2. It is undisputed that the subject parcel was declared solely in the wifes name, but the house built thereon was declared in the name of the spouses. 3. Conjugal property may still be held liable for the debts of the wife. 4. Art 117 of the CC provides that the wife may engage in business although the husband may object, but there are no signs that he objected and in fact even approved said business. 250. Palanca vs. Smith, Bell & Co. and Bonca () 16 October 1907 JOHNSON *Husband built a house on the wifes lot becomes conjugal propert y Facts: 1. Alejandra Palanca was the owner of certain property in the city of Manila, which was given by the said Emiliano Boncan, with the consent of the said Alejandra Palanca, as a guaranty for the payment of the sum of P14,000, which Emiliano Boncan borrowed from the International Banking Corporation . 2. With the money so borrowed the said Emiliano Boncan constructed the house in question, and later, by a public document executed on the 20th of September, 1904, conveyed the house in question to the Alejandra as a guaranty for the payment of the debt to the International Banking Corporation. 3. Alejandra commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against Smith Bell, asking that said court dictate a sentence declaring her to be the only and exclusive owner of the property described in the complaint, with a right to the possession of the same, and that said attachment be dissolved Issue: Is the property part of the conjugal property? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. When a loan is negotiated by a husband upon property belonging to his wife, with the consent of the latter, the money becomes conjugal property and if the funds are invested in the construction of a house the building id likewise conjugal property and is liable for the debts of the husband. 2. This P14,000, borrowed by the said Emiliano Boncan upon the credit of the property of his wife, became conjugal property 251. Lim Queco vs. De Cartagena () December 19, 1940 J. Diaz *Wife borrowed money, community not involved, repayment sought from her exclusive properties FACTS: 1. Elena De Cartagena and Rodolfo Schneckenburger are husband and wife and as such lived together since their marriage on March 1926. 2. While living in harmony, they built a house on Cartagenas four contiguous urban properties, but for it, it was necessary that she obtain loan from The Insular Savings. 3. In 1933, she obtained a loan of P3,500. To ensure the payment of such loan, The Insular Savings, with her consent , listed four farms for mortgage. 4. She then entered into a contract with the Lim Queco to sell her four contiguous urban properties , with the newly constructed house. Lim Queco purchased all of them, under the conditions that Scheckenburger will consent to the sale later on. 5. Schneckenburger granted the contract. 6. Shortly after, the husband and wife separated. They had an agreement to dissolve the conjugal partnership they established by virtue of their marriage, that their community property is liquidated and they are committed to waive their right to create a double bond on the property of one or the other. The effect of which is that any kind of assets acquired by each of them will not be considered marital property, but as separate property and exclusive of whom had acquired. 7. From certain periods of time, both of them had been alternately receiving payments from Lim Quenco. 8. From May 1936, the monthly installments were paid, corresponding the loan with "The Insular Savings." 9. In 1935, without leaving the Philippines, Schneckenburger obtained a divorce in the State of Chinhuahua, Mexico. 10. A year later, he remarried in the Magistrates Court of Malabon in Rizal Province. The woman was Julia Medel. 11. Aware of this appeal, her husband marrying another woman, while she was still alive, Schneckenburger was accused of concubinage in the CFI of Manila. 12. Also with the CFI, Schneckenburger requested that he and his wife be required to prove at the trial which of them has the right to receive payment from Lim Queco for the sale of the said properties.
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13. However, the court stated that it was Cartagena who had a better right, and ordered that she make this demand for payment until the obligation with The Insular Savings is fully satisfied. 14. Schneckenburger, unsatisfied, lodged an appeal against it. ISSUE: Should the payment be given to the wife? HELD: Yes. RULING: The wife alone borrowed the money from "The Insular Savings" although she guaranteed repayment with a mortgage on her parapherna executed with her husband's consent. Since the wife does not have the management or representation of the conjugal partnership where the husband is qualified, the loan to her constituted a transaction that did not involve the community, and the creditor could seek repayment exclusively from her properties. Logically, the money loaned to the wife, as well as the property acquired thereby, should be deemed to be the wife's exclusive property. It then follows that the payment by Lim Queco should be made to her since the properties are deemed to be of her exclusive ownership. 252: Wong vs IAC () August 19, 1991 Fernan *Wifes j ewelry fiasco is her fault alone Facts: 1. Romarico Henson and Katrina Pineda are married with three children but have since lived separately. During their marriage the husband bought a parcel of land from his father paid for by a loan from his officemate. 2. Katrina on the other hand consigned jewelries from Anita Chan worth P321,830 which she failed to return within 20-day period. Thus Anita Chan and her husband filed an action for collection of money wherein the trial court ordered Remerico and Katrina to pay the Wongs the amount plus interest. 3. A writ of execution was thus levied involving four lots all in the name of Romarico. The lands was sold in a public auction and was individually both by Juanito Santos and Leonardo Joson. 4. A month before such redemption Romarico filed an action for annulment of the said decision as well as the writ and levy if execution and the auction of sale of the properties because he was not given his day in court. 5. The court ruled in favor of Romarico and as he had nothing to do with the transactions and ruled for reconveyance. Issues: Can the conjugal property be levied for Katrinas nonpayment of her obligation? Held: No. Ruling: 1. The properties are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership as it was acquired during their marriage but even if they are conjugal they cannot answer for Katrinas obligation as it did not have the consent of the husband nor the administration of conjugal properties conferred to her. 2. Furthermore Romarico was did not act or failed to act on the belief that he was not involved in the dealings of his estranged wife. The court also found that he was not represented by Katrinas counsel and was not given the opportunity to defend himself in court. 3. The decision in the civil case is null and void as it was rendered without jurisdiction for having failed to observe the notice requirement prescribed by law. The writ of execution is cannot be issued against him for he has not been given his day in court thus the auction sale is null and void. 4. Katrinas rights over the properties are merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership , the consent of her husband and her authority to incur such indebtedness had not been alleged in the complaint and proven in the trial. 5. Moreover, the wife may only bind the conjugal partnership when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family or when she borrows money necessary for the support of the family. Terms: Inchoate - imperfect; partial; unfinished; begun, but not completed 253. Torela vs. Torela () October 11, 1979 Abad Santos Son and daughter v Father and Stepmother Facts: 8. December 21, 1929: Decree 440157 was issued in favor of Felimon Torela, husband of Graciana Gallego, saying that he is the owner of a certain parcel of land. 9. March 5, 1958, Felimon Torela, filed a Motion Ex-Parte alleging that Lot No. 3770 of the Cauayan Cadastre having been acquired by him by way of inheritance prior to his marriage to his first wife. He, therefore, prayed that the court order the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental to change his civil status, appearing on the face of the original certificate of title, "from Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego to Felimon Torela, married to Marciana Gepanago . The court granted the motion.
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10. Felimon, Torela executed a definite deed of sale whereby, for and in consideration of P3,000.00, he sold Lot No. 3770 of the Cadastral Survey of Cauayan to Marcos P. Mahilum and Maria Luna Mahilum. 11. The children filed a case claiming that the land was conjugal property and they were entitled to the proceeds. They claim that while in their youth they had seen their father Felimon and their mother Graciana Gallego clean the lot in question. 12. Their father claimed that it was not part of conjugal property because he inherited it. Issue: Is the parcel of land considered as part of the conjugal property? Held: NO. The decision was affirmed. Ruling: 1. The property in question is not one of those enumerated in Article 1401 of the Old Civil Code . On the other hand, as it was inherited by Felimon from his parents and brought to the marriage with his first wife, the same is deemed his separate property (Art, 1396, Old Civil Code). For these reasons, defendant Felimon Torela had lawfully disposed of his property to the exclusion of his children by his first marriage. 2. Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals failed to take into account Article 1407 of the Spanish Civil Code, which now correspond to Article 160 of the New Civil Code, and which reads as follows: 3. Art. 1407, All property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. 4. Petitioners also claim that since the lot in question was registered in the name of Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego, it must be presumed to be the conjugal property of Felimon and Graciana so that one-half thereof should be adjudicated to them as their inheritance from their mother. This is wrong. 5. Decree No. 440157 which confirmed the ownership of Felimon Torela over the land in question described him as married to Graciana Gallego was merely descriptive of his civil status at that time and cannot be taken as proof that the land was acquired during their coverture. The further circumstance that the land was registered during their marriage cannot in itself constitute proof that it was acquired during their marriage for land registration under Act No. 496, as amended, does not confer title; it merely confirms a title already existing. Concept: While it is true that all property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, as above stated, nonetheless, the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. This proof is a condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption. 254. Epifania MAGALLON, v. Hon. Rosalina MONTEJO, and private respondents Concepcion Lacerna, Eleceria Lacerna And Purita Lacerna () 1986 Narvasa: *2nd wife not owner of a CPG property but only a TRUSTEE Facts: 1. There was a civil case (prior to this) where Lacernas (herein private respondents ) filed a case against their father, Martin Lacerna to compel partition of a parcel of land. 2. The Lacernas claiming to be the common children of Martin Lacerna and his wife, Eustaquia Pichan (who died in 1953) asserted a right to one-half of the land as their mother's share in her conjugal partnership with Martin . 3. In the questioned propertys ceritificate of title, it states that it is issued in the name of "MARTIN LACERNA married to Epifania Magallon Issue: Is Magallon entitled to the land which is part of the CPG property relations between Martin Lacerna and Eustaquia Pichan? Held: No Ruling: 1. The land in question, was, through fraud or mistaken, registered in the names of Martin Lacerna and petitioner Epifania Magallon; when it rightfully pertained to the conjugal partnership of Martin Lacerna and Eustaquia Pichan. The Civil Code provides that: If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. Clearly, therefore, the petitioner Magallon, as the trustee of a constructive trust, has an obligation to convey to the private respondents that part of the land in question. Said portion rightfully pertaining to the respondents' deceased mother as her share in the conjugal partnership with Martin Lacerna . 2. Now, on the question of whether Magallon is bound by final judgment in action to which she was not made a party (only Martin Lacerna was impleaded): she is bound by the judgment against Martin Lacerna . This ruling presumes that Magallon is, as she claims, the legal wife of Martin Lacerna though no marriage contract was presented by the latter. 3. On the fact that the certificate of title to the land carries Magallons name as the "wife" of the owner, Martin Lacerna: It has already been established as being procured thru fraud or as a result of a mistake. Moreover, such entry is not controlling. Its merely descriptive of the civil status of Martin Lacerna and does not necessarily prove that the land is " conjugal" property of

4.
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Lacerna and Magallon The presumption established in Article 160 of the Civil Code that property acquired during the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership cannot work in favor of Magallon there being no proof of her alleged marriage to Martin Lacerna.
255. Heirs of Engracia Basadre-Cuenca vs. Restituto and Meladora Cuenca () 8 Dec 1988 Gutierrez Jr. *surviving spouse only entitled to share husbands inheritance from first wifes paraph ernal Facts: 1. Husband: Agripino Cuenca and Wife: Maria Bangahon nd 2 wife: Engracia Basadre after Marias death. 2. The action was instituted by siblings Restituto and Meladora Cuenca to recover lands owned by their mother. The lower court granted the petition but the Court of Appeals reversed and entitled Engracia a share to the properties left by Agripino (as the surviving spouse). 3. Subject lands belong to Maria Bangahon as her paraphernal property by inheritance from her parents. Agripino acknowledged the same in a declaration for extrajudicial settlement. 4. Engracias children appeal to show that the properties were conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia. Issue: Are the properties conjugal property of Maria and Agripino? Held: No. The properties were Marias paraphernal. Agripinos share was only as an heir. Ruling: 1. The presumption of Article 160 of the New Civil Code refers only to property acquired during marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. 2. The evidence presented in the Court of Appeals conclusively show that the properties were paraphernal properties of Maria which she inherited from her parents. 3. The new evidence presented by Engracias party that the lands were surveyed for Agripino and approved during his marriage with Engracia does not determine that they are Agripino and Engracias. 4. The titles were in the names of either Meladora or Restituto. The presumption cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. Concept: New Civil Code, Article 160: All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife . 256. Titan vs. David () March 15, 2010 - Del Castillo *wife forges signature of husband for an SPA to sell house Facts: 1. Manuel and Martha got married and owned property. 2. The marriage went bad and they had a de facto separation. 3. The wife sold the property to the Petitioner. 4. She had an SPA from her husband claiming that he was authorizing her to make the sale. 5. The husband filed a case to void the contract of sale because he claims that the property is conjugal thus requires his permission, which she did not get and that the SPA was a forgery. 6. The company claims that it purchased the property in good faith. 7. The company also asserts that the husband did not show proof he had money to buy the property originally thus it should be the sole property of the wife. Issue: 1. Is the sale valid? Held: No 2. Does the property belong solely to the wife? Held: No 3. Is the company a buyer in good faith? Held: No Ruling: 1. SC agrees with the lower courts that the SPA was indeed a forgery, thus his consent was not obtained making the deed of sale void. 2. The property was bought during the time of marriage thus the presumption is that it is conjugal property, thus not requiring the husband to furnish financial proof that he had the financial capacity to buy it. 3. The property was registered in both their names (husband and wife), but the deed of sale only included the wifes name. Th is is quite peculiar that an SPA would have been needed. This should have made the petitioner company question. The court presumes that Titan was aware that Manuels consent may be necessary . In addition, Titan sent their representative to the Register of Deeds of QC to verify the SPA, thus they would have been aware that the SPA was never registered before the Register of Deeds.
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257. THOMAS C. CHEESMAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ESTELITA PADILLA, respondents. () January 21, 1991- NARVASA *Wife selling her property without the knowledge of her American Husband Facts: 1. Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married on December 4, 1970 but have been separated since February 15,1981 2. On June 4, 1974, a "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights" was executed by Armando Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered land and the house in favor of "Criselda P. Cheesman, 3. Thomas Cheesman, although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife 4. Tax declarations for the property purchased were issued in the name only of Criselda Cheesman and 5. Criselda assumed exclusive management and administration of said property , leasing it to tenants 6. On July 1, 1981, Criselda Cheesman sold the property to Estelita M. Padilla , without the knowledge or consent of Thomas Cheesman. 7. Thomas Cheesman brought suit against his wife, Criselda, and Estelita Padilla , praying for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent. 8. Defendants, alleging that (1) the property sold was paraphernal, having been purchased by Criselda with funds exclusively belonging to her (2) Thomas Cheesman, being an American, was disqualified to have any interest or right of ownership in the land; and (3) Estelita Padilla was a buyer in good faith. Issue: Is the property exclusive owned by Criselda? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. Both Courts found that the fact that the funds used by Criselda Cheesman was money she had earned and saved prior to her marriage to Thomas Cheesman Being an American Citizen 2. Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; 3. the sale as to him was null and void. 4. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. 5. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. 6. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. 7. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have. Good faith of Padilla 1. Estelita Padilla is a purchaser in good faith, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court having found that Cheesman's own conduct had led her to believe the property to be exclusive property of the latter's wife, freely disposable by her without his consent or intervention. 258. Villanueva vs. CA () April 14, 2004 - Carpio *Legal wife at the mercy of his husband and querida, BUT.. karma! Facts: 1. Eusebia Retuya is the legal wife of Nicolas Retuya having been married in 1926 , and they begot 5 children. 2. During their marriage they acquired real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City, Consolacion and Cebu. (22 stipulated properties) 3. In 1945, he no longer lived with Eusebia and cohabited with Pacita Villanueva, wherein Procopio, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then was the only person who received income from these properties. 4. Pacita, from the time she started living in with Nicolas, has no occupation, she had no properties of her own from which she could derive income. 5. In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke, cannot talk anymore and in the long run became senile and had a child-like mind. 6. Natividad Retuya, the eldest child of Eusebia, went to Procopio to negotiate about the properties . At this time, Procopio was still the receiver of the income of these properties. 7. However, things were not settled. From a failed barangay mediation, it was raised to a court proceeding by Natividad . The ruling was to transfer the sole administration of the spouses Eusebia-Nicolas to Eusebia because these were conjugal properties, reconveyance of the lands, and ordering Procopio to account and turn-over all proceeds or rentals/income of the conjugal properties when he took over as administrator until he shall have ceased administering.
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8. Eusebia died in November 23,1996, and so Eusebias heirs substituted her, whic h the CA upheld. 9. Pacita and Nicolas were married on December 16, 1996 Take note: Nicolas was already in child-like state at this time. Issue: Are the subject properties conjugal? Held: YES. Ruling: 1. The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnership govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 105 Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the FC w/o prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. 2. Presumption: If properties are acquired during the marriage conjugal 3. Petitioners point out that the deed of sale, the transfer certificalte of title and tax declaration of Lot. No. 152 are all in the name of Pacita and that Pacita is the real owner No. This is just one of the scheme Nicolas employed to deprive Eusebia of their conjugal property. 4. Tax declarations are in the name of Nicolas alone, proving exclusive ownership No. Tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the presumption (See No.2). Article 116 (FC) Presumption remains even if the property is registered in the name of one or both of the spouses. 5. Nicolas, in some documents, misrepresented his civil status by claiming that he was single, proving exclusive ownership No. Whether a property is conjugal or not is determined by law and not by the will of the spouses. No unilateral declaration by one spouse can change the character of conjugal property. 6. Petitioners: The lot cannot be deemed conjugal of Eusebia and Nicolas because Pacita and Nicolas were already cohabiting. JUSTICE CARPIO, ANNOYED: Petitioners keep belaboring this point in their petition and memorandum. The cohabitation of a spouse with another, even for a long period, does not sever the tie of a subsisting marriage. 7. Proof of actual contribution by both live-in partners is required, otherwise, there is no co-ownership and no presumption of sharing. Concept: FC 177 Conjugal properties include: those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, obtained from work of either or both spouses, fruits and net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse, share of each spouse in the hidden treasure, livestock upon the dissolution of the partnership and those acquired by chance (losses, however, shall be born exclusively by the loser-spouse) 259. Zulueta vs. Pan-Am () Jan. 8, 1973 Concepcion *conjugal funds for airfare = conjugal property Facts: 6. Spouses Zulueta and their daughter had just ended their stay in Wake Islands, Hawaii. The wife and their daughter were on already board the PANAM airplane while Mr. Zulueta came in late because he had to answer the call of nature somewhere on the beach. 7. On his way to the ramp Capt. Zentner remonstrated at him in an intemperate manner causing him to answer back in the same vein which eventually lead to an altercation and the Capt., in an act of retaliation for being embarrassed, ordered the Zuluetas to be off-loaded. 8. Eventually only Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded, he was even given a note by the airport manager that he would be staying there for at least one week and be paying for $13.30 per day. 9. Both parties are now appealing the decision of the court awarding exemplary damages to the Zuluetas. Issues: Are the damages involved in this case form part of the conjugal partnership? Held: Yes, because the spouses paid for their fare with funds from the conjugal partnership. Ruling: 7. It is presumed that in the absence of proof that the trip was for the common benefit of the Zuluetas and the money had come from the conjugal funds. 8. The courts ruled that the damages in question falls under par. 1 of Art. 153 (now 117) of the Civil Code the right thereto having been acquired by onerous title during the marriage. The court also made a clear distinction that it does not fall under the exclusive property of each spouse as provided in Art. 148. 9. The court also ruled that in the absence of proof that contract of marriage with PANAM or the money paid belongs to Mrs. Zulueta the property involved or the rights arising from it forms part of the conjugal partnership. 10. In consideration for the amount settled by Mrs. Zulueta with PANAM the court ordered that it be deducted from the aggregate award in favor of the plaintiffs (Zuluetas) for the simple reason that upon liquidation if the conjugal partnership and as provided by law, said amount would have to be reckoned with as part of the support due to her as the wife.
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260. Mendoza v Reyes () October 11, 1979 Abad Santos The sneaky Julia Reyes Facts: 1. The properties in question were bought under installment basis from Araneta. 2. Ponciano and Julia had to borrow money to pay; jointly obtained a loan to complete the construction of building and to pay balance on price of lot. A deed of sale was made by Julia, with Poncianos signature under the phrase with my marital consent. The titles of land were named after Julia Reyes, married to Ponciano Reyes. 3. On March , 1961, while Ponciano was absent attending his farm in Pampanga, Julia sold the lots in question together with their improvements to the Medozas without his knowledge and consent. 4. Julia and Ponciano were living separately and were not in speaking terms. 5. A complaint was then filed by Ponciano for the annulment of a deed of sale for 2 parcels of land with their improvements executed by his wife, Julia Reyes as vendor and the spouses Efren Mendoza and Inocencia De Mendoza as vendees. 6. Ponciano claims that the properties were conjugal properties and were sold without his knowledge and consent. The spouses Mendoza alleged that properties were paraphernal properties of Julia (Julia herself supported this). 7. CFI: dismissed complaint and said that Julia can validly dispose of properties without the consent of her husband. CA reversed the decision. Hence :) Issue: Are the parcels of land paraphernal property? Held: NO. The decision was affirmed. Ruling: 1. Art. 135. (1) says what is conjugal property : that which is acquire by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether acquisition be for the partnership or for only one of the spouses. 2. There was no question that the disputed property was acquired by onerous title during marriage. 3. The question of a common fund was not sufficiently addressed by the petitioners. 4. The records say that funds from loans that were obtained by the spouses were used. Under Art. 161 all debts and obligations contracted by husband and wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the partnership. 5. Julias testimony is without merit, so it doesnt help the petition at all. 6. The fact that the land is later registered in the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature. 261. Lita De Leon and Felix TARROSA v. Anita B. DE LEON, Danilo B. De Leon, and Vilma B. De Leon () 1986 Narvasa: *Lot bought from PHHC on installment basis under contract to SELL Facts: 1. In 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the PHHC entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a parcel of land 2. In 1968, Bonifacio married respondent Anita de Leon. 3. In 1970, following the full payment for the, a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio was executed. Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued in 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, "single." 4. Subsequently, Bonifacio sold the subject lot to her sister, Lita, and husband Felix Rio Tarrosa (Tarrosas), petitioners herein. The conveying Deed of Sale dated January 12, 1974 did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. 5. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died. Three months later, the Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale and had the former TCT cancelled. 6. Getting wind of the cancellation of their fathers (and Anitas husband) title, Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit. 7. Tarrosas assert that, since Bonifacio purchased the lot from PHHC on installment before he married Anita, the land was Bonifacios exclusive property and not conjugal, even though some installments were paid and the title was issued to Bonifaci o during the marriage. Issue: Is the property part of the CPG? Held: Yes, therefore Bonifacios sale, without his wifes consent, to the petitioners is void Ruling: 1. Tarrosas assertion is wrong. Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time Bonifacio an d Anita contracted marriage, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. 2. Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the property is conjugal. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply , and the properties will still be considered conjugal. 3. In the case at bar, ownership over the lot and covered by the Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita; as such, ownership to the property is, by law, presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. 4. The mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. What is material is the

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time when the property was acquired. Since the sale of the CPG lot was without Anitas consent, its void. And even on the supposition that Bonifacio only sold his portion of the conjugal partnership, the sale is still theoretically void, for the right of the husband or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
262. Castillo vs. Pasco () 29 May 1964 JBL Reyes *fishpond case part 2 Facts: 1. Husband: Marcelo Castillo Jr. and Wife: Macaria Pasco (a woman of means even before her marriage to Marcelo) 2. On 22 Dec 1932, they purchased a fishpond for the sum of 6,000 payable in three installments. 3. The first installment of 1,000 was paid from Macarias personal funds. The second installment of 2,000 was paid with the proceeds of the loan from Dr. Jacinto. The last installment paid after Marcelos death was secured by a mortgage on 2 parcels of land in the name of Macaria. 4. On 3 Apr 1933, Marcelo died. A year after, Macaria married her fourth husband. Marcelo died without enough assets to pay his debts. 5. The heirs of Marcelo from his first wife filed an action for partition. Court of Appeals declared that the fishpond was paraphernal property of Macaria since it was purchased with her excusive funds. Issue: Is the fishpond paraphernal property of Macaria? Held: No. The property was obtained through the proceeds of a loan obtained by the conjugal partnership. Ruling: 1. The deeds show the loans were acquired by Marcelo and Macaria as joint borrowers. Thus, the loans became obligations of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and the money loaned is conjugal. The loan becomes an obligation of the conjugal partnership which is the one bound for its repayment. 2. The Palanca ruling applies. Since the property was obtained through the proceeds of the loan, it was conjugal. 3. Since first installment was purchased with Macarias exclusive funds, 1/6 was deemed paraphernal. The remaining 5/6 was conjugal. 4. The heirs of Marcelo were entitled to ask for partition and liquidation of the proceeds. 263. Padilla vs. Padilla () BocoboOctober 4, 1943 *A grandmother fighting for conjugal property against a dead wife Facts: 1. Narcisco and Concepcion Padilla were married. 2. Narcisco executed a will that gave his mom (appellant) the whole estate. He died afterwards. 3. Concepcion, the respondent (note: she died while this case was ongoing but SC recognizes she is alive in this case), contests that some of the property which the mother of her deceased husband is trying to claim ownership over is part of her EXCLUSIVE property. 4. The mother says that the 7 property in question are registered in both their names (the couple), thus she concludes it should be part of the conjugal partnership. 5. Mother wishes to invoke (in relation to Article 1404 see concept below] that the conjugal partnership became the owner of the property when the construction of a building on the property happened during the time of marriage. Issue: 1. Do the 7 properties belong to the conjugal partnership? Held: No 2. Should the wife be reimbursed for the expenses for the demolition of the paraphernal buildings? Held: yes 3. Should the debts of the husband be paid for by the conjugal partnership? Held: No Ruling: Issue 1: 1. It is important to note that the conjugal partnership at the time of marriage was brought about almost entirely from the fruits of the paraphernal property. 2. The property belongs solely to the wife. The presumption is that even if the property was placed in the names of the couple, they trust each other to distinguish what is theirs and what is part of the conjugal property. 3. The ownership of the land is retained by the wife until she is paid the value of the lot, as a result of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. The mere construction of a building from common funds does not automatically convey the ownership of th e wifes land to the conjugal partnership. 4. Wife may only demand reimbursement when the liquidation of conjugal partnership is finished because it is neither necessary nor appropriate to transfer to the partnership the dominion over the land, which is lawfully held in usufruct by the conjugal partnership during the marriage
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Issue 2 1. SC believes that the conjugal partnership derived a positive advantage form the demolition, which made it possible to erect new constructions for the partnership, thus she should be reimbursed. Issue 3 1. No, there is no proof that the debts were made for the benefit of the family. Concept: 1. Art 1404- Value of the paraphernal land to be reimbursed to the wife is that obtaining at the time of the construction of the building, or the value at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership) 2. Wife may not demand payment of the lot during marriage and before liquidation because thus would disturb the husbands management of the conjugal partnership. 3. Fruits of the paraphernal property are considered conjugal property. 264. CALTEX (PHILIPPINES) INC., petitioner, vs. FELISA FELIAS, respondent. () June 30, 1960 Montemayor *Wifes lot with building b eing levied by the Court Facts: 1. H&W: Felisa and Simeon 2. On March 26, 1941, the trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 1527, entitled Texas Company (Phil.,) Inc., plaintiff, vs. Simeon Sawamoto, defendant, ordering the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P661.94, with legal interest from the date complaint was filed, plus attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the award, and the costs. 3. A writ of execution was issued to the provincial sheriff who levied upon Lot No. 107, together with the improvements thereon described Issue: Can the Court levy the Lot No. 107? Held: No. Ruling: 1. Lot No. 107 aforementioned was originally owned by the spouses Juliano Felias and Eulalia Felion. 2. On March 31, 1928, said spouses donated said Lot No. 107 to their daughter, Felisa Felias, making said lot her paraphernal property. 3. The donation transmitted to her the rights of a landowner over a building constructed on it. 4. Therefore at the time of the levy and sale of the sheriff, Lot No. 107 did not belong to the conjugal partnership 5. As such, it was not answerable for the obligations of her husband 265. Vda. De Padilla vs. Paterno () December 26, 1961 JBL Reyes *Battle of inheritance in the affluent Padilla Family Facts: 1. Narciso Padilla died in 1934, leaving behind a child-less widow, Concepcion Paterno, whom he had married in 1912. 2. However, in his last will, his mother, Ysabel Bibby Vda. De Padilla, was instituted as universal heiress. 3. Concepcion wanted to retrieve / separate her paraphernal properties from those of her husbands; however, Narcisos mother contested. 4. The court, in the proceedings for settlement of Narcisos estate, rendered a decision naming her paraphernal properties included land and buildings on: Calle Arquiza, Calle Juan Luna, Calle Camba, part of the Calle Martin Ocampo property, Callejon de la Fe, part of the Calle Regidor property, and 9/29 of the Calle R. Hidalgo property. The court ordered to divide the matrimonial assets into two equal parts for the spouses. 5. The executrix appealed to the SC, but it upheld the Manila courts decision, with a slight modification as to payment of interest. 6. This is the case that FINALLY makes the decision FINAL. Issue: Should the executrix be made to account for the income of the paraphernal properties belonging to Concepcion Paterno? Held: YES. Ruling: 1. The Civil Code of 1889 provided that upon dissolution of marriage, the husband or his heirs may be compelled to make immediate restitution of the paraphernal property which has been turned over to the husband for administration. 2. Upon the death of Narciso Padilla, his marriage with Concepcion Paterno was dissolved. From the moment of his death, his heir was bound to return the paraphernal properties of Concepcion, and from said moment, any income or fruit derived from it belonged to the owner. 3. The separate properties in this case never became conjugal because the conjugal improvements constructed thereon were destroyed before the value of the paraphernal land on which these improvements were erected was paid to the spouse who owned the paraphernal land.

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However, Concepcion does not have the exclusive right to the fruits of 6-B of the Camba property, the interior portion of the Ocampo property and 9/29 of her share in the R. Hidalgo property. Although originally paraphernal, it had finally become converted to conjugal assets after their values were reimbursed or paid to her estate. The conversion of these said properties from paraphernal to conjugal assets should be deemed to retroact to the time the conjugal buildings were first constructed thereon or at the very latest, to the time immediately before the death of Narchiso A. Padilla that ended the conjugal partnership. Once paid, the effects of the fulfillment of the condition should be deemed to retroact to the date the obligation was constituted. As a consequence, all the fruits of these properties, after the dissolution of the partnership by the death of the husband, until final partition, logically belonged to the universal heir and to the surviving spouse in co-ownership. Since there has been equal distribution between these two parties of the current income of the estate, there is no need for the executrix to make any new accounting for the fruits of these properties.
266. Calimlim vs. Fortun() June 22, 1984 Melencio-Herera *concubine denied of land, house and coconuts. Facts: 4. In 1962, Fernando Canullas was married to Mercedes Camlimlim. They begot five children. They lived in a house and lot which Fernando inherited from his father. 5. In 1978, Fernando left the conjugal home and lived with Corazon Daguines. He sold the subject house and lot to Corazon, where his legitimate wife and children lived, to her for P2,000. 6. On June 19, 1980, as she was unable to take possession of the land she initiated a complaint for quieting of title and damages against Mercedes. During the pendency of the case Corazon and Fernando were convicted of concubinage. 7. Mercedes asserts that the house in dispute are including the trees were built and planted using their conjugal funds and that the sale of it together with the land is null and void because they were done without her consent. Issues: Does the land in question form part of the conjugal partnership? Held: Yes, as provided for by Art. 158 of the Civil Code Ruling: 5. Both the land and the house form part of the conjugal partnership but the conjugal partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of the land. 6. Following the rule enunciated by JBL Reyes which explains that conversion of conjugal from paraphernal to conjugal assets should be deemed to retroact to the time the conjugal buildings were first constructed ; Fernando couldnt have alienated the house and lot without the consent of her wife. 7. Furthermore the sale was contrary to morals and public policy as it was made by the husband in favor of the concubine after he had left their conjugal home. Furthermore, similar to the prohibition of donation between spouses, the same prohibition should be applied to common-law partnership. 267. Embrado v CA () October 11, 1979 Abad Santos Ventahan ng lupa Facts: 1. Lot 564 was sold to Lucia Embrado, as was shown in a Venta Definitiva by the spouses Carpitanos. The deed was prepared and signed on July 2, 1946, although it was effective since 1941. 2. 1943: Petitioners got married to each other. 3. Feb 13, 1948: The sale was registered and Transfer Certificate No. T-99 was issued in her name alone. Originally, her status on the Title was single, but it was changed to married to Oreste Torregiani by the CFI of Zamboanga del Norte. 4. The couple established their home on the lot and in 1958, constructed a residential/commercial building. 5. 1971: Lucia sold for P1000 Lot 564 to her adopted daughter, Eda Jimenez. 6. Jimenez proceeded to selling parts of the lot to Cimafranca and Salimbagat. 7. Petitioners instituted an action for declaration of nullity of contract, annulment of sales, reconveyance and damages against private respondednts. 8. Alleging that the initial sale of Lucia to Eda was void because of lack of consideration and Oreste did not consent to the sale of the conjugal property. 9. Lucia was misled into signing the deed of sale. She thought that the lot was only intended as a security for a loan of the Jimenez spouses. 10. They also believe that Cimafranca and Salimbagat are buyers in bad faith. 11. CA ruled for the respondents, saying that Lucia does not need the consent of Oreste because the lot is her paraphernal property. CA also believes that Cimafranca and Salimbagat are buyers in good faith. Issue: Is lot 564 part of conjugal property? Held: YES.
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Ruling: 1. First of all, the sale was not completed until the DELIVERY of the object to the creditor. (Art 1496 of the Civil Code) 2. The construction of the building on the lot was done during the marriage already and according to Art. 158, the land becomes conjugal upon 2 conditions: o Construction of building was at the expense of the partnership o Land is owned by one of the spouses. 3. On the question of the sale to the Jimenezes, it follows that the same is not valid. Evidence shows that the Jimenez spouses had no sufficient means of livelihood so it is questionable how they were able to obtain the money for the property. Eda never proved also how she obtained the money to pay. Also, based on the decision in the first issue, the land beng conjugal needed the consent of Oreste as well. The sale is void ab initio being contrary to law. Thus this also applies to Cimafranc and Salimbagat quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum. Cimafranca and Salimbagat are also not buyers in good faith. Their relationship to the Jimenez spouses show that it would be impossible that they did not know of their financial situation. It is a general rule that a buyer of real property must be wary before buying property and invstigate the rights of those in possession of a certain property. The fact that they looked in the Register of Deeds to see the title is not an excuse, especially if they know about the bad financial status of the Jimenezes.
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268. Wilfredo RAVINA v. Mary Ann P. VILLA ABRILLE, and in behalf of INGRID D'LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, et al. () 2009 Quisumbing: *2 adjoining lots, 1 under CPG, the other exclusive property Facts: 1. Respondent Mary Ann Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have four children, who are also parties to the instant case and are represented by their mother, Mary Ann. 2. In 1982, the spouses acquired a parcel of land. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is registered solely in his name 3. Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from DBP, the spouses built a house on those 2 lots. When the house was finished, the spouses continuously made improvements on those properties. 4. In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. He offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Anns consent; she didnt sign the deed of sale. 5. Thus, respondents Mary Ann and her children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale. During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with his own money. Issue: Is the sale of the 2 lots by Pedro, (w/o Anitas consent) valid? Held: Only the sale of his exclusive property is valid Ruling: 1. That 1 lot which was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann is conjugal in nature . 2. Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property , having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house 3. A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code in 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done without the consent of both the husband and the wife 4. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the contract. Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale. 5. As to the other lot, there is no issue with it which was an exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann. 269. Mariano vs. CA () 7 Jun 1989 Narvasa *conjugal property liable to wifes RTW business Facts: 1. This action originated from a suit by Esther Sanchez against Lourdes Mariano in Caloocan RTC for recovery of RTW she delivered to Lourdes. This resulted in the seizure of Lourdes property worth 15,000. 2. Lourdes appealed to the Court of Appeals and it ordered the trial court to receive evidence. Upon trial, it was found that the attachment had been improperly issued and consequently dissolved it. The Court ordered Esther to pay Lourdes for damages. 3. In virtue of the writ of execution, the sheriff levied real and personal property belonging to the conjugal partnership of Esther and her husband Daniel Sanchez. Esther prayed for annulment of the execution pending appeal but was denied.

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Daniel then filed his own petition. He claimed that the conjugal assets could not validly be made to answer for obligations contracted by Esther. QC RTC agreed and ordered the sheriff of Caloocan RTC to desist from auctioning the property. 5. Lourdes appealed to the CA but was dismissed. The CA held that the QC RTC did not interfere with the execution of the Caloocan RTC because Daniels action raised an issue different from that in the Caloocan RTC. Issue: Should the Sanchez conjugal property be held liable to Esthers obligations? Held: Yes. Daniel consented to the business of Esther and the benefit redounded to the partnership. Ruling: 1. The conjugal partnership of Daniel and Esther was liable for the debts and obligations contracted by Esther in her business since the income derived from it had redounded to the benefit of the partnership . 2. Esther engaged in business not only without the objection of the part of Daniel but in truth with his consent and approval. 3. The intervention of the QC RTC was erroneous since the Caloocan RTC had jurisdiction over the case. Daniel cannot be deemed a stranger to the case prosecuted and adjudged against Esther. Only strangers may initiate an entirely separate and distinct action for preliminary injunction against the sheriff. 270. Ayala vs. CA () February 12, 1998 - Martinez *Bloomberg and Ayala Case Facts: 1. Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching are married. 2. Alredo is the vice president of Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM). 3. The company asked for a loan from petitioner. Alfredo made himself jointly liable for any problems that may arise from the not paying back the loan. 4. The company was not able to pay of the loan thus petitioner executed a complaint. 5. The sheriff began levying the conjugal partnership of Alfredo and Encarnacion. 6. Alfredo claims that the conjugal partnership should not be held liable, while petitioner thinks otherwise. 7. Petitioners claim that it would benefit Alfredo by: a. The employment of Alfredo would be extended, as well as his salary b. The shares of the stock of his family members would appreciate. c. His prestige in the corporation would be enhanced, thus boosting the survival of PBM Issue: Is the conjugal property liable for the loan made by the company? Held: No Ruling: 1. There is no proof to show that the loan was made to directly benefit the family. 2. The benefits cannot be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself. (p.285) 3. Those benefits mentioned by Petitioner could have happened, but the gravity of the funds involved (50,000,000,.00), the probable prolongation of employment and increase in the value of stocks would be too small to qualify the transaction as a benefit for the suretys family. 4. In conclusion, the loan is a corporate loan and not a personal one. 271. ALFREDO & ENCARNACION CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL () February 23, 2004- Callejo Sr. *Loan of the company with Allied Bank Corp and the Court levied the 100,000 share Facts: 1. Encarnacion T. Ching and Alfredo Ching married on January 8, 1960 2. Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan of P9,000,000.00 from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). 3. PBMCI, through its Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note for the said amount promising to pay on December 22, 1978 at an interest rate of 14% per annum. 4. As added security for the said loan, on September 28, 1978, Alfredo Ching, together with Emilio Taedo and Chung Kiat Hua, executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to the extent of P38,000,000.00. 5. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans 6. on August 21, 1981, the ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against the PBMCI to collect the P12,612,972.88 7. On July 26, 1983, the deputy sheriff of the trial court levied on attachment the 100,000 common shares of Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching 8. On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment. She alleged that a. the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds after the Citycorp Investment Philippines was established in 1974. b. the indebtedness covered by the continuing guaranty/comprehensive suretyship contract executed by petitioner Alfredo
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Ching for the account of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership . Issue: Can the court levy the 100,000 common share to pay the obligation arose from the default of PBMCI? Held: No. Ruling: 1. For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone, there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. 2. In this case, the Allied Bank failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the petitionerhusbands act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. 3. The contract of loan was between the Allied and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. 4. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited . 5. The Allied was burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership 6. It could be argued that the petitioner-husband was a member of the Board of Directors of PBMCI and was one of its top twenty stockholders 7. That are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the New Civil Code 8. This is different from the situation where the husband borrows money or receives services to be used for his own business or profession 272. Homeowners Savings and Loan vs. Dailo () March 11, 2005 Tinga *Ei incumbit probation qui dicit, non qui negat Facts: 1. Miguela and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. 2. During their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot in Bgy. San Francisco, San Pablo City from a certain Sandra Dalida. 3. The subject property was declared for tax assessment purposes under Assessment of Real Property. 4. The deed of absolute sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee to the exclusion of his wife. 5. Marcelino executed an SPA in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing her to obtain a loan from Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses house and lot in San Pablo City. 6. Gesmundo obtained a P300,000 loan, and as security, she executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of the Bank. 7. However, this transaction, including the execution of the SPA, took place without Miguelas knowledge. 8. The loan was not paid, and so the Bank instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. And subsequently, the Bank, being the highest bidder in the public sale, was issued a Certificate of Sale. 9. Marcelino died in 195. 10. In one of her visits to the subject property, she learned that the Bank had already employed Roldan Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford seldan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises. 11. Claiming she had no knowledge of the mortgage on the subject conjugal property, she instituted a civil case for the nullity of the certificate of sale. The bank was ordered to reconvey the said property. 12. On appeal, the CA declared as void the mortgage on the subject property since it was constituted wi thout the wifes knowledge and consent. Issue: Is the conjugal partnership liable for the payment of the loan? Held: NO. Ruling: (4) In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, the court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. (5) In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations between them. With the effectivity of the FC, Chapter 4 on CPG was made applicable to the CPG already established, unless vested rights have already been acquired. (6) The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership, unlike in absolute community which is rules on co-ownership. (7) Under FC 121, The conjugal partnership shall be liable for debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited. (8) There is nothing in the records to compel a finding that indeed, the loan obtained by Marcelino redounded to the benefit of the family, and so, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of principal obligation. (9) Ei incumbit probation qui dicit, non qui negat (He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove) --the bank was not able to prove

Concept: Under the Spanish Civil Code, the wifes consent to the sale of conjugal property is not required.
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229. LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN AND CECILIA SUNGA VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND LAMBERTO T. CHUA () June 25, 2008- Velasco Jr. * Shellite gas business Facts: 10. In 1977, Chua and Jacinto Sunga formed a partnership to engage in the marketing of liquefied petroleum gas . 11. The business, name, Shellite Gas Appliance Center (Shellite) 12. Registered as a sole proprietorship in the name of Jacinto 13. After Jacinto's death in 1989, his widow, petitioner Cecilia Sunga, and married daughter, petitioner Lilibeth Sunga-Chan, continued with the business without Chua's consent. 14. Chua's subsequent repeated demands for accounting and winding up went unheeded 15. June 22, 1992 a Complaint for Winding Up of a Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment 16. Claims: c. Per Lilibeths CPA 3, 154, 736.65 d. Per Chuas CPA P 8, 733, 644.75 17. RTC's approval of Chua's computation of claims in the amount of PhP 8,733,644.75, the sheriff of Manila levied upon petitioner Sunga-Chan's property located along Linao St., Paco, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 208782 18. In the auction sale of the levied lot, Chua, with a tender of PhP 8 million,emerged as the winning bidder. Issue: Whether or not the absolute community of property of spouses Lilibeth Sunga Chan with her husband Norberto Chan can be lawfully made to answer for the liability of Lilibeth Chan under the judgment Held: Yes. Ruling: 8. Given the solidary liability of petitioners to satisfy the judgment award, respondent sheriff cannot really be faulted for levying upon and then selling at public auction the property of petitioner Sunga-Chan to answer for the whole obligation of petitioners. 9. The fact that the levied parcel of land is a conjugal or community property , as the case may be, of spouses Norberto and SungaChan does not per se vitiate the levy and the consequent sale of the property . 10. Property is not among those exempted from execution under Section 13 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 11. The records show that spouses Sunga-Chan and Norberto were married on February 4, 1992, or after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. 12. Thus, their absolute community property may be held liable for the obligations contracted by either spouse. 13. Absent any indication otherwise, the use and appropriation by petitioner Sunga-Chan of the assets of Shellite even after the business was discontinued on May 30, 1992 may reasonably be considered to have been used for her and her husband's benefit. 14. Amounts to only PhP 5,529,392.52, whereas Sunga-Chan's auctioned property which Chua acquired, as the highest bidder, fetched a price of PhP 8 million. Thus, Chua owes petitioner Sunga-Chan the amount of PhP 2,470,607.48. 231. Buado vs. CA () April 24, 2009 Tinga *slanderous wife but Conjugal Partnership saves the day (property) Facts: 1. Erlinda Nicol was held liable for damages for the crime of slander against the spouses Roberto and Venus Ruado. 2. The court issued a writ of execution on her property but finding it insufficient issued a levy on property which was carried out by the sheriff despite the affidavit of third party claim by Arturo Fulo. The conjugal property of Erlinda which was valued at Php 500,000 was auctioned, bided and won by the spouses Buado for only Php 51,685. 3. A year after, the husband of Erlinda, Romulo filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against the spouse and the sheriff. Issue: Could the conjugal property be levied for the personal obligation of the wife? Held: No. Under the CPG it cannot be held liable without any advantage or benefit benefiting the conjugal partnership. Ruling: 1. The Court, in Naguit v. Court of Appeals and Sy v. Discaya stated that a spouse is deemed a stranger to the action wherein the writ of execution was issued and is therefore justified in bringing an independent action to vindicate her right of ownership over his exclusive or paraphernal property. 2. Pursuant to Mariano vs. CA, it must further be settled whether the obligation of the judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not; and the court ruled that the conjugal property of Erlinda and Romulo is not chargeable to the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability.
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3. The conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.( Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property , in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse) 4. Furthermore it cannot be said that the concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership . 273. Javier vs. Osmea () March 23, 1916 CJ Arellano *fruits and revenues of wifes property to pay for hubbys debt Facts: 1. Floranto Collantes is the husband of Petrona Javie r. He worked for her wifes father in a commission business until he assumed the business when her father retired. 2. During the course of their business her wifes father incurred a debt to Tomas Osmea, whom they represented for the sale of tobacco consigned to them, amounting to 4 or 5 thousand pesos which Floranto assumed. 3. No action was taken to collect the debt. But upon the death of Tomas Osmea, a judgement for collection together with the 12% interest as part of the debt. 4. The lower court then rendered judgment for the collection of the amount of P26, 467.94 on the estate of Petrona that is two parcels of land and her usurfuctory interest from Pascuala Santos (her fathers second wife). 5. Petrona claimed that her husband has no rights whatsoever in the said two pieces of land and usurfuctory interest. Issues: Could the debt of the husband be charged on fruits and revenuesof the property inherited by the wife? Held: Yes. As long as it is proven that it benefited the family. Ruling: 1. The natural presumption is whatever Florante contributed towards the defraying of expenses to his family came from what he earned in the commission business. 2. Art. 1408 of the civil code provides that conjugal partnership shall be liable for debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the husband including those used for the support of the family. Also the fruits, revenue and interest from the partnership property forms part of the community property. As well as the fruits of the paraphernal shall form part of the assets of the conjugal partnership. 3. It could not be said that the debts incurred by the husband in the exercise of his profession be deemed his personal and private debts and excepted from payment out of the wifes own property which are liable similar to his husband properties in the discharge of their liabilities as married couple. 4. Petrona, herself established the presumption that whatever her husband earned was contributed to the support of the family. 5. The court also ruled that there is no need to appoint the receiver as there is no cause to deprive herself and his husband the management of her property. 274. Vda de Sta. Romana v PCIB () November 15, 1982 Vasquez Ill meet you halfway Facts: 1. PCIB Administrator of the estate of the deceased C.N. Hodges 2. PCIB filed for the recovery of a parcel of land (Lot 1258-G) purchased by Ramon Sta. Romana from C.N. Hodges 3. Sheriff levied on the rights and interests of Ramon Sta. Romana over Lot 1258-F and improvements, also purchased from C.N. Hodges 4. Third party claim was filed by Emilio Sta. Romana who claimed that Lot 1258-F and its improvements had been sold to him 5. RTC: rescinded Contract and ordered return of possession of Lot 1258-G 6. CA affirmed decision 7. Trial judge issued a writ of execution Sheriff issued a notice of sale at public auction of the rights and interests of Ramon Sta. Romana over over Lot 1258-F 8. Ramon Romana died intestate 9. Petitioner Socorro L. Vda. De Sta. Romana, surviving spouse, filed a motion to quest the writ of execution 10. Petitioner prayed that the writ of execution and levy on execution made on Lot 1258-F and the improvements existing theron be annulled insofar as her share in the said properties 11. Respondent moved to dismiss on ground of res judicata 12. CFI: granted motion to dismiss. Issue: Can the wife get half of the property of the husband who died when the land in question is used to pay off a debt? Held: NO.
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Ruling: 1. As long as conjugal partnership subsists, there can be no share of husband or wife. Only when conjugal partnership is dissolved between husband and wife can they claim it. Any levy on conjugal partnership property to satisty monety judgment against husband is null and void 2. In this case, the auction was made before the conjugal property was dissolved thus wife cant claim it. 3. Also, the debt was for the benefit of the family, so it was charged to the CPG. 4. Non-inclusion of wife in suit to enforce obligation is immaterial. A hubby need not be joined by the wifey in a suit against conjugal partnership (section 4, rule 3of rules of court and Art 113 of CC) Concept: CPG shares charges as long as the benefit redounded to the family. 228. G-Tractors Inc. VS CA () February 28, 1985Cuevas *producer and exporter of mahogany logs Facts: 1. The following respondents: Luis and Josefina Narciso are married. 2. Luis is engaged in a business that operates a logging concession. 3. Luis entered into an agreement of lease with Petitioner for heavy equipment (tractors, bulldozers) 4. Luis was unfortunately unable to pay and they ended up with a compromise agreement which he also did not pay. 5. It came to the point that the sheriff of Q.C. began to auction the parcels of land that Luis owned to the highest bidder. 6. Luis filed a complaint alleging that the land that the sheriff was going to sell was conjugal property, thus also belonged to his wife. The nature of the sale clearly stated that only the property of the husband may be sold to satisfy the money judgment against him. Issue: Can conjugal property be seized because of the poor business decisions of the husband? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. The land is conjugal property because the land in Camarines Sur (which is the designated job site for the use of the heavy equipment) does not belong exclusively to him but is property of the family. 2. It is very clear that his business decision to enter into an agreement with petitioner was for the benefit of the family. 3. It is well settled that the debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts. Concept: As long as the husband believes that he is doing the right thing for his family, he should not be made to suffer and answer alone. Thus, if he incurs any indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of his career or profession or suffers losses in a legitimate business, the conjugal partnership must equally bear the indebtedness and the losses, unless he acted to the prejudice of his family. 275. DBP v. Hon. ADIL and spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte () 1989 Gancayco: *Congressmans debt binds CPG property Facts: 1. On February 10, 1940 spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte obtained a loan from DBP, evidenced by a promissory note where they bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the account in 10 equal yearly amortizations. 2. As the obligation remained unpaid even after the lapse of the ten-year period, Confesor executed a second promissory note on April 11, 1961 expressly acknowledging said loan and promising to pay the same on or before June 15, 1961 3. Said spouses didnt pay the obligation on the specified date, so DBP filed a complaint. Issue: In signing the second promissory note, can Patricio Confesor bind the conjugal partnership? Held: Yes. The Conjugal property is liable in this obligation. Ruling: 1. Under Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. As such administrator, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, are chargeable to the conjugal partnership. 2. No doubt, in this case, respondent Confesor signed the second promissory note for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence the conjugal partnership is liable for this obligation. 252. Wong vs IAC () August 19, 1991 Fernan *Wifes j ewelry fiasco is her fault alone Facts: 1. Romarico Henson and Katrina Pineda are married with three children but have since lived separately. During their marriage the husband bought a parcel of land from his father paid for by a loan from his officemate. 2. Katrina on the other hand consigned jewelries from Anita Chan worth P321,830 which she failed to return within 20-day
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period. Thus Anita Chan and her husband filed an action for collection of money wherein the trial court ordered Remerico and Katrina to pay the Wongs the amount plus interest. 3. A writ of execution was thus levied involving four lots all in the name of Romarico. The lands was sold in a public auction and was individually both by Juanito Santos and Leonardo Joson. 4. A month before such redemption Romarico filed an action for annulment of the said decision as well as the writ and levy if execution and the auction of sale of the properties because he was not given his day in court. 5. The court ruled in favor of Romarico and as he had nothing to do with the transactions and ruled for reconveyance. Issues: Can the conjugal property be levied for Katrinas nonpayment of her obligation? Held: No. Ruling: 1. The properties are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership as it was acquired during their marriage but even if they are conjugal they cannot answer for Katrinas obligation as it did not have the consent of the husband nor the administration of conjugal properties conferred to her. 2. Furthermore Romarico was did not act or failed to act on the belief that he was not involved in the dealings of his estranged wife. The court also found that he was not represented by Katrinas counsel and was not given the opportunity to defend himself in court. 3. The decision in the civil case is null and void as it was rendered without jurisdiction for having failed to observe the notice requirement prescribed by law. The writ of execution is cannot be issued against him for he has not been given his day in court thus the auction sale is null and void. 4. Katrinas rights over the properties are merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership , the consent of her husband and her authority to incur such indebtedness had not been alleged in the complaint and proven in the trial. 5. Moreover, the wife may only bind the conjugal partnership when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family or when she borrows money necessary for the support of the family. 249. Ong vs. CA () November 29, 1991 Paras *wifes business does not go well and husband attempts to protect the land Facts: 1. Ramon and Teodora Ong were once married. 2. Teodora had her own logging business and she secured a loan which she could not pay back due to the mismanagement of her business. 3. Ramon filed a complaint against the sheriff who attempted to auction a land which he claims to be conjugal and cannot helpd liable for personal debts contracted by the wife. Issue: Is the property conjugal? Held: No Ruling: 1. The mere use of the surname of the husband in the tax declaration of the subject property is not sufficient proof that said property was acquired during the marriage and is therefore conjugal. 2. The land was declared solely in the wifes name, but the house built was declared in the name of the spouses. 3. The property is thus peraphernal and IS liable for the personal debts of his wife. 4. Even if it were conjugal, the property may still be held liable since the wife engaged in a business that benefitted the family. 276. SECURITY BANK and TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. MAR TIERRA CORPORATION, WILFRIDO C. MARTINEZ, MIGUEL J. LACSON and RICARDO A. LOPA, Respondents () November 29, 2006- Corona *Credit accommodation to a company result of nonpayment levied the conjugal house Facts: 1. Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a P12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company 2. On July 2, 1980, the credit line agreement was amended and increased to P14,000,000 3. It was able to pay P4,648,000 for the principal loan and P2,729,195.56 for the interest and other charges. 4. However, the corporation was not able to pay the balance as it suffered business reversals, eventually ceasing operations in 1984. 5. Security Bank complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against respondent corporation and individual respondents 6. RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of respondent corporation and individual respondent Martinez 7. The conjugal house and lot of the spouses Wilfrido and Josefina Martinez was levied on Issue: Can the RTC levy the conjugal house?
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Held: No. Ruling: 1. The conjugal partnership is liable for "all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." 2. The principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and corporation, was solely for the benefit of the corporation. 3. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the corporations benefit. 4. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. 5. It failed to discharge that burden. 6. To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to the husband alone defeats the objective of the Civil Code to protect the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. 7. The underlying concern of the law is the conservation of the conjugal partnership 226. Luzon Surety Co. Inc. v. De Garcia () 1969 Fernando, J: *sugar QUEDANS! Facts: 5. Chavez and Luzon Surety (Luzon) executed a surety bond in favor of PNB to guaranty a loan obtained by Chavez. De Garcia was one of the guarantors who were to jointly and severally, to indemnify now petitioner Luzon 6. PNB sued Chavez and Luzon to recover a certain amount; Luzon, in turn, sued the guarantors (one of them was De Garcia) for indemnification The lower court (LC) ordered that Chavez and Luzon pay PNB, and the guarantors pay Luzon; 7. A writ of garnishment was executed to this effect to levy and garnish the sugar quedans of the De Garcias, from their sugar plantation, 8. De Garcias contested this, because the sugar quedans were part of their conjugal property.. The LC ruled in their favour. SC agreed with the LC. Issue: Can the conjugal property be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband (to guaranty a third party), absent any showing of benefits received by both the spouses/family? Held: No Ruling: 4. Its true that under the CC, husband is the administrator of the conjugal property. But the only obligations incurred by the husband that are chargeable against the conjugal property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career, profession or business with the honest belief that he is doing right for the benefit of the family. 5. And that isnt the case here. Remember, husband entered into that agreement for the benefit of someone else (C havez- to guaranty her loan), not his family. 6. While the husband by signing the indemnity agreement may be said to have added to his reputation or esteem and to have earned the confidence of the business community, such benefit is too remote and fanciful to come within the express terms of the law. 277. BA Finance Corp vs. CCA () GutierrezMay 28, 1988 Facts: 1. Augusto and Lily are married. 2. Augusto left the conjugal home and showed no intent to return. 3. Augusto executed a loan, claiming on behalf of Lilys business. 4. Augusto could not pay the loan back. 5. Petitioner, bank, filed a case against Lilys business. 6. Petitioner was able to take most of the machines for the business but claimed that it was not enough to pay back the loan. 7. Lily claims that the loan obtained by Augusto was for himself and not for the benefit of the family, thus her business should not have been made to suffer. 8. Lily claims that her business is her sole property and not part of the conjugal partnership. Issue: 1. Is Lilys business part of the conjugal partnership? Held: Yes 2. Should the business suffer due to the loan made by the husband? Held: No Ruling: Issue 1 1. The business was formed during the time of marriage, thus it is conjugal.
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Issue 2 1. Augusto left the conjugal home 2 weeks before securing the loan. 2. It is clear that Augusto borrowed the money for his own personal gain and not for the benefit of the family. 3. Lily should be given compensation for the machines that were taken from her. 278. Costuna vs. Domondon () December 19, 1989 Sarmiento *Sale without consent is not valid, but not if husband really needs it for medical expenses Facts: 1. Spouses Amadeo and Estela Costuna during their marriage acquired three parcels of land in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, and registered in the name of Amadeo Costuna. 2. Amadeo executed his last will and testament. He was then 68 years old. 3. Following the execution of the last will and testament aforesaid, the spouses were beset with marital problems. 4. Amadeo sustained third degree burns on his legs for which he was treated at various hospitals. While already ill, relatives of Amadeo requested that he be brought to Samar as there were documents that needed his signature pertaining to his Samar properties. 5. Since then, Amadeo was never returned to Estela and stayed with his sister. Thus, a feud ensued among Amadeo's relatives and Estela over his custody prompting the latter to institute a petition for habeas corpus before the then CFI of QC. 6. Five days later, Amadeo filed an action for partition before the then Juvenile Domestic and Relations Court. He was really in need of money for his hospital expenses. 7. Failing to get his wifes consent to the desired partition notwithstanding repeated demands, Amadeo was constrained to execute a deed of sale, over the one-half (1/2) undetermined portion of the conjugal property, without his wife's consent, in favor of Laureana Domondon. 8. The death of Amadeo,however, rendered the cases moot and academic. 9. With Amadeo's death, Special Proceedings was instituted by his widow, claiming pro indiviso share over the earlier mentioned three lots by virtue of the deed of sale. 10. Laureana Domondon opposed the allowance of the will. 11. For lack of jurisdiction, no ruling was however made on her claim, but the probate court decreed the allowance of the last will and testament and ordered the issuance of testamentary letters in favor of the widow. 12. Consequently, an action to compel the petitioner to give her conformity to the deed of sale executed by her husband in favor of Laureana was instituted by the latter in the RTC. 13. The court decided in favor of plaintiff Laureana Domondon and ordered the defendant Estela Costuna to affix her signature on the deed of sale. Issue: Was the sale of the conjugal property valid even without the wifes consent? Held: YES. Ruling: 1. The husband is allowed to sell his of the conjugal property even without the wifes consent because the wife unjustifiably withheld her consent to the sale, even if the proceeds of it were to be used for the sick husbands hospital expenses. 2. The Court said that the wife was greedy because previously, the husband had executed a will naming her as the sole heir. Naturally, the wife greedily refused to consent to the sale because she wanted the whole conjugal property intact to herself. 279: Carlos vs. Abelardo () April 9, 2002 Kapunan *ingrate son-in-law pay your $25K debt!! Facts: 10. Honorio Carlos loaned to his son-in-law Manuel Abelardo and his wife Maria Theresa $25K for the purchase of their conjugal house in order to help them start-off as a family. 11. When he inquired on the loan he gave them they told them that they are not yet in the position to pay. Thereafter they have expressed violent resistance to petitioners inquiries this included dead threats. 12. Hence a formal demand for payment was filed in the court but this time the couple was already separate for more than one year and they filed separate answers the wife claiming that indeed she together with her husband secured a loan from his father. Her husband on the other hand claimed that the $25K was not a loan but his share of income on contracts he obtained from the Construction Co. of Honorio. Issues: Could the loan be charged to conjugal partnership of the Abelardos? Held: Yes, because it is clear that a loan was executed and was used for the benefit of their family. Ruling: 11. Honorio was able to show evidence an instrument execited by Maria Theresa acknowledging their accountability to the $25K as advanced payment for their house.
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12. The checks Manuel showed to show that it was claims on his profit were in all in account of the Construction company, on the other hand the amount loaned was drawn from the personal account of his father-in-law thus showing that it was indeed a loan and not his share of income. Moreover he was not able to show that he is entitled to the profits and income of the corporation as he was neither an employee nor agent. 13. More importantly it clearly shows that the loan redounded to the benefit of the family as it was used to purchase their conjugal home. Also the acknowledgment of the wife of the loan binds the conjugal partnership. Hence they are jointly and severally liable in the payment of loan. 280. Vda de Ramones v Agabayani () September 30, 2005 Sandoval-Gutierrez The kubeta that caused a lawsuit Facts: 8. Spouses Santos and Aldegonda Ramones owned a 358sqm lot In Calamagui, Isabela. 9. On May 23, 1979 (of course, BEFORE the Family Code), Santos sold a 100sqm portion of the property to Aurora Agbayani for P5000. The deed was annotated to the TCT but no actual transfer was made. 10. Santos died on March 7, 1980. Subsequently, Aldegonda and her daughters built a restroom and septic tank on the portion of the lot that was sold to Agbayani. 11. Agbayani filed a complaint with the Isabela RTC for quieting of title and recovery of possession against the Aldegonda and her girls. Aldegonda filed an answer claiming that the lot is the conjugal property of her marriage with the deceased Santos and that even if he made the sale during his lifetime, it would be void because it was executed without her consent. 12. The RTC ruled in favor of Aldegonda. Agbayani appealed and the CA ruled for her, hence the certiorari case filed by Aldegonda with the mighty SC. Issue: In the Civil Code, is a sale made by the husband of real property belonging to the conjugal relationship without his wifes consent void? Held: NO. The decision was affirmed. Ruling: 1. The CA held that the sale was valid by reconciling the two relevant provisions of the Civil Code, Articles 166 and 173. 2. Article 166 prohibits alienation (disposition) or encumbrance of real property by the husband withou t his wifeys consent. This should be read with Article 173 which says that the wife can only question such an action by her husband by filing an annulment of contract within ten years from the date it was made, DURING THE MARRIAGE. 3. This reconciliation between the two provisions is the source of the disposition/encumbrance rule for conjugal property BEFORE the Family Code (remember Kats matrix). 4. Aldegonda did not file an annulment of contract during their marriage; and she cannot institute action anymore because her husband is DEAD. Their marriage is OVER, DONE WITH. 5. The lack of consent on her part when her husband made the sale only makes it voidable. 187. Villanueva vs. Chiong () QuisumbingJune 5, 2008 Facts: 1. January 1960- H (Florentino Chiong) and W (Elisera Chiong) were married but separated on 1975. 2. During their marriage they acquired the talked about lot. 3. Florentino sold of the lot to petitioners which were paid in installments. 4. FLorentino allowed petitioners to occupy the lot and build a store and a house. 5. December 13, 1986, shortly after their last installment payment, petitioners demanded from respondent the execution of a deed of sale in their favor. Elisera refused to sign the deed of sale. 6. May 13, 1992- Florentino executed the deed of absolute sale without his wifes consent. 7. July 19, 2000- RTC annulled the deed of absolute sale and ordered petitioners to vacate the lot and remove all improvements. 8. Petitioners claim the lot belongs only to Florentino because he split up with Elisera. Issues: 1. Is the lot conjugal property? Held: Yes 2. Can the husband sell the land without his wifes consent? Held: No Ruling: 1. The separation did not dissolve the conjugal nature of the property. 2. All property acquired by the spouse during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or wife. 3. A tax declaration acknowledges the two as owners of the lot. 4. The memorandum of agreement they executed states that the lot is conjugal property. 5. Without the wifes consent, the husbands alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the effectively of the F amily
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Code on August 3, 19888 is NOT VOID but merely voidable. 6. Petitioners should return to respondents the land with its fruits and Florentino should return the sum which was received as the price of the land together with interest. 268. Wilfredo RAVINA v. Mary Ann P. VILLA ABRILLE, and in behalf of INGRID D'LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, et al. () 2009 Quisumbing: *2 adjoining lots, 1 under CPG, the other exclusive property Facts: 6. Respondent Mary Ann Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have four children, who are also parties to the instant case and are represented by their mother, Mary Ann. 7. In 1982, the spouses acquired a parcel of land. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is registered solely in his name 8. Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from DBP, the spouses built a house on those 2 lots. When the house was finished, the spouses continuously made improvements on those properties. 9. In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. He offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Anns consent; she didnt sign the deed of sale. 10. Thus, respondents Mary Ann and her children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale. During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with his own money. Issue: Is the sale of the 2 lots by Pedro, (w/o Anitas consent) valid? Held: Only the sale of his exclusive property is valid Ruling: 6. That 1 lot which was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann is conjugal in nature . 7. Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property , having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house 8. A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code in 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done without the consent of both the husband and the wife 9. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the contract. Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale. 10. As to the other lot, there is no issue with it which was an exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann. 281. Manuel Fuentes and Leticia FUENTES v. Conrado ROCA, Annabelle Joson, Rose Marie Cristobal () 2010 Abad *Husband forges signature of wife who lives from a faraway land Facts: 1. Sabina Tarroza a lot. Then she sold it to her son, Tarciano Roca (Tarciano) 2. Six years later (1988), Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). 3. Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Roca (Rosario), to the sale. Upon Tarcianos compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take possession of the lot and pay him. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the lot without any further formality and payment. 4. The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on the other requirements of the sale. According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one of his trips to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent. As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions, Atty. Plagata notarized Rosarios affidavit 5. Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses. A new title was issued in the name of the spouses who immediately constructed a building on the lot. 6. Then Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died nine months afterwards. Eight years later (in 1997), the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses 7. The Rocas (petitioners) claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since Tarcianos wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged. Issue: Was the sale to the Fuentes spouse valid? Held: No, because wife didnt consent to it and her signature was forged Ruling: 1. Notably, Rosario had been living separately from Tarciano for 30 years since 1958. And she resided so far away in Manila. It would have been quite tempting for Tarciano to just forge her signature and avoid the risk that she would not give her consent

2. 3. 4.
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to the sale The law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect And of course, FC doesnt allow selling of CPG property without both spouses consent. In fairness to the Fuentes spouses, however, they should be entitled to recover from Tarcianos heirs, the Rocas, the amount they paid Tarciano.
282. People vs. Lagrimas () 28 Aug 1969 Fernando *conjugal property may answer to civil indemnity upon meeting 161 responsibilities Facts: 1. Froilan Lagrimas murdered Pelagio Cagro on 15 Feb 1960. He was then charged for murder on 19 Feb 1960. 2. The heirs of Pelagio filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment on the property of Froilan. Granted. 3. The trial court then found Froilan guilty and sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua and indemnity of 6,000 plus 10,000 in damages. Judgment became final. 4. A writ of execution on 11 parcels of land was then issued to cover the civil indemnity. Mercedes, wife of Froilan, filed a motion to quash on the ground that the properties belonged to the conjugal partnership. 5. The lower court granted Mercedes motion and nullified that order of attachment and writ of execution. Another judge of the same court reversed the nullification and sustained the attachment. A third judge then revived the nullification order. Issue: Can the conjugal property answer for the civil indemnity? Held: Yes. The case is remanded to the lower court to receive evidence according to Article 161 of the Civil Code. Ruling: 1. Fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in article 161 of the Civil Code (primarily the maintenance of the family and the education of the children) have been covered/satisfied. 2. Since the law contemplates that the responsibilities be complied first, it is obvious that the termination of the conjugal partnership is not necessary. 3. It is incumbent upon the one who seeks to enforce personal obligations against the conjugal property to show that the requisites for Article 161s applicability are obtaining . 4. The proof required of the beneficiaries of the indemnity should not be of the most exacting kind. Otherwise, this will tempt the spouses to magnify its obligation so as to defeat the right to recovery of the offended party. 283. SPS. JOSEPHINE MENDOZA GO, ET AL. VS. LEONARDO YAMANE () May 3, 2006- Panganiban *Attorney running after the lot for the payment of service (atto rneys lien) Facts: 1. Involved in the suit is a 750 square meters parcel of lot registered in the name of Muriel Pucay Yamane, wife of Leonardo Yamane, 2. Atty. Guillermo F. De Guzman filed a case against Florence Pucay De Gomez, Elsie Pucay Kiwas and Muriel Pucay Yamane to satisfy the lien for attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000. 3. The said property was scheduled to be sold at public auction on August 11, 1981 4. Four days prior to the auction sale, Leonardo filed a Third-Party Claim with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff to stop the public auction on the ground that the subject property is conjugal property and, therefore, should not be held answerable for the personal obligation of the Pucay sisters. Issue: Whether the subject property is conjugal or paraphernal Held: Conjugal. Ruling: 1. The purchase of the property had been concluded in February 27, 1967, before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988 2. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." 3. As a conditio sine qua non for the operation of this article in favor of the conjugal partnership, the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. 4. Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence. 5. They acquired it from Eugene Pucay on February 27, 1967,28 or specifically during the marriage. It is clear enough that the presently disputed piece of land pertains to the conjugal partnership . 6. Despite that his wife claimed during the previous case that the land is her exclusive paraphernal property - the court said that the nature of a property -- whether conjugal or paraphernal -- is determined by law and not by the will of one of the spouses 7. Further, the mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature

8.
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The contract or transaction between Atty. De Guzman and the Pucay sisters appears to have been incurred for the exclusive interest of the latter. Muriel was acting privately for her exclusive interest when she joined her two sisters in hiring the services of Atty. De Guzman to handle a case for them 9. Therefore, This piece of land may not be used to pay for her indebtedness, because her obligation has not been shown to be one of the charges against the conjugal partnership Concept: Under the New Civil Code, a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when a. she purchases things necessary for the support of the family, or b. when she borrows money for that purpose upon her husband's failure to deliver the needed sum; c. when administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband; or d. when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. 231. Buado vs. CA () April 24, 2009 Tinga *slanderous wife but Conjugal Partnership saves the day (property) Facts: 1. Erlinda Nicol was held liable for damages for the crime of slander against the spouses Roberto and Venus Ruado. 2. The court issued a writ of execution on her property but finding it insufficient issued a levy on property which was carried out by the sheriff despite the affidavit of third party claim by Arturo Fulo. The conjugal property of Erlinda which was valued at Php 500,000 was auctioned, bided and won by the spouses Buado for only Php 51,685. 3. A year after, the husband of Erlinda, Romulo filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against the spouse and the sheriff. Issue: Could the conjugal property be levied for the personal obligation of the wife? Held: No. Under the CPG it cannot be held liable without any advantage or benefit benefiting the conjugal partnership. Ruling: 1. The Court, in Naguit v. Court of Appeals and Sy v. Discaya stated that a spouse is deemed a stranger to the action wherein the writ of execution was issued and is therefore justified in bringing an independent action to vindicate her right of ownership over his exclusive or paraphernal property. 2. Pursuant to Mariano vs. CA, it must further be settled whether the obligation of the judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not; and the court ruled that the conjugal property of Erlinda and Romulo is not chargeable to the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability. 3. The conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.( Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property , in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse) 4. Furthermore it cannot be said that the concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership . 284. Guiang vs. CA () PanganibanJune 26, 1998 Facts: 1. Gilda and Judie are married. 2. Judie sold one half of their conjugal property to the petitioner spouses. 3. Gilda was not informed of the sale. 4. Gilda filed a case to declare the sale to be void because her consent was not obtained. 5. Petitioners (the buyers) say they were buyers in good faith and that Under Article 1390 the sale should only be considered voidable. [rocky- I do not know why the petitioner would want to argue if it were voidable, they still lose it even if it were] Issue: Is the sale valid? Held: No Ruling: 1. Article 1390 is inapplicable because consent was inexistent. Article 1390 requires that consent is given, even if it were one of those stated below. 2. No consent means that the sale was void and NOT VOIDABLE. Follow Article 124. Law: 1. Article 1390- Those where consent is vitiated by mistake, violence or fraud 2. Article 124- in the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
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285. Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar Reyes vs. Mijares () August 28, 2003 Panganiban *alienation or encumberance by husband is voidable; wife sought annulment within the period Facts: 1. Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960, but had been separated de facto since 1974. 2. Sometime in 1984, Ignacia learned that Vicente sold the lot (and the apartments built upon), which were part of their conjugal properties (purchased using conjugal funds from their garments business) to spouses Cipriano and Florentina Mijares . 3. She likewise found out that Vicente filed a petition for administration and appointment of guardian with the MTC of QC. Vicente misrepresented therein that his wife, Ignacia, died on March 22, 1982, and that he and their 5 minor children were her only heirs. The court appointed Vicente as the guardian of their minor children. 4. Subsequently, in its Order, the court authorized Vicente to sell the estate of Ignacia. 5. Ignacia, through her counsel, sent a letter to spouses Mijares demanding the return of her share in the lot. 6. Failing to settle the matter amicably, Ignacia moved for annulment of sale against the spouses. The complaint was thereafter amended to include Vicente Reyes as one of the defendants. 7. In their answer, the spouses claimed that they are purchasers in good faith. Vicente Reyes, on the other hand, contended that what he sold to the spouses was only his share in the lot, and that he never represented that the latter was already dead. 8. He likewise testified that the spouses Mijares, through the counsel they provided him, took advantage of his illiteracy by filing a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and appointment of guardian without his knowledge. 9. The court a quo rendered a decision declaring the sale of the lot void with respect to the share of Ignacia. 10. The Register of Deeds was ordered to cancel the TCT in the names of spouses Mijares and to issue a new TCT in the name of Ignacia Reyes as owner in of said lot and the other half in the names of the spouses, upon payment of the required fees. 11. Ignacias motion for modification: Court declared the sale null and void. 12. However, another motion led to the court, directing to issue a new title in the name of Ignacia Reyes and Vicente Reyes, which led to both Ignacia and the spouses Mijares to appeal. 13. Pending the appeal, Ignacia died and she was substituted by her compulsory heirs. 14. The CA ruled that the sale was valid. Issue: Is the sale of the conjugal lot valid? Held: No. Ruling: 1. The husband could not alienate or encumber any conjugal or real property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife otherwise, the contract is voidable. 2. In several cases the Court had ruled that such alienation or encumbrance by the husband is void. The better view, however, is to consider the transaction as merely voidable and not void, consistent with Article 173 of the Civil Code pursuant to which the wife could, during the marriage, and within 10 years from the questioned transaction, seek its annulment. 3. There is no dispute that the lot is a conjugal property. Her action to annul the March 1, 1983 sale which was filed on June 4, 1986, before her demise is perfectly within the 10 year prescriptive period under Article 173 of the Civil Code. Even if we reckon the period from November 25, 1978 which was the date when Vicente and the respondent spouses entered into a contract concerning the lot, Ignacias action would still be within the prescribed period. 4. The trial court correctly annulled the voidable sale of the lot in its entirety. 5. Furthermore, spouses Mijares were buyers in bad faith. There were obvious flaws in Ignacias death certificate that should have prompted them to investigate further. Moreover, respondent spouses had all the opportunity to verify the claim of Vicente that he is a widower because it was their lawyer, who represented Vicente in the special proceedings before the MTC. 286. Roxas v CA () June 26, 1991 Paras *Battle of the flea market: Marital consent required for alienation and encumbrance Facts: 8. Melania and Antonio Roxas were married but living separately. 9. Antonio, without Melanias consent, entered into a contract of lease with respondent Antonio Cayetano for a portion of their conjugal lot on March 30, 1987. 10. That same lot was where Melania was planning to put up her flea market business , when she attempted to renew her license to do so, she was surprisingly rejected by the Mayor because Antonio had already secured the license before she applied. This prompted her to file a complaint with the court. 11. Cayetano moved to dismiss the complaint based on a single premise, that she had no cause of action against him. Antonio Roxas filed an answer as well. 12. The lower court dismissed the complaint. Melania moved to reconsider, but the motion was also denied. She then appealed straight to the Supreme Court. 13. The SC remanded the case to the CA for proper determination and disposition. The CA affirmed the decision in toto, hence the present case.
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Issues: Can the husband lease out conjugal property without the wifes consent? Held: No. Art. 166 requires the marital consent of the wife. Ruling: 8. This case is under the NCC because the contract was made in 1987. Under Article 165 of that law, it says that the husband is the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership. This means that he has authority since he is also principally responsible for the partnership. He is not an ordinary administrator, he does not need to render an accounting, and some of his actions do not need his wifes consent. 9. However, alienation and encumbrance is not one of act of administration and requires the consent of the wife as provided by Art. 166 if the NCC unless the wife has been declared non-compos mentis or a spendthrift or is under civil interdiction. 10. Action by the husband against in violation of said prohibition is voidable and subject to annulment by the aggrieved wife . 11. Lease is considered as an encumbrance of the land because the lessor transfers his right of use in favor of the lessee hence impairing the right of the lessor. 12. Moreover the lease is not only an encumberance but also a qualified alienation , with the lessee becoming, for all legal intents and purposes, and subject to its terms, the owner of the thing affected by the lease. Concept: Alienation: mean the transfer of the property and possession of the lands, tenements, or other things form one person to another. Encumberanc: every right to, or interest in, the land which may subsist in third persons, to the diminution of the value of the land, but consistent with the passing of the fee of conveyance; any (act) that impairs the transfer of property or real estate. 287. Ysasi v Fernandez () June 25, 1968 Sanchez The richass family from Spain Facts: 1. A very well-written case about Juan Ysasi and his wife Maria Aldecoa Ysasi. 2. The couple and their family are wealthy Spanish landowners who own property in both Spain and the Philippines. They travel back and forth between the countries to administer and manage their land. 3. The particular property in question is Hacienda Manucao-A (ibig sabihin may B pa, yamaaaan), which was maintained by Valentin Bilbao for Juan from 1952-1965. Juan sent his son Jon to manage it in 1965; then he sent his other son Jose to help. 4. Jon didnt let Jose participate and soon enough dissension grew between the two. Their mother then went to the Philippines to help them get along (she also claimed that she brought a letter from her husband authorizing her to inquire about the hacienda but the Juan denied it). Later on Jon resigned and Juan assigned Valentin again. 5. Valentin tried to manage the land but Jon wont let him, Jon said it was because his mom was taking over. Mar ia then filed a petition seeking administration of the conjugal properties (or an alternative separation just in case), claiming that her husband cannot continue his administration anymore because hes too old and his left eye is blind. She also said he abandoned her and her children without just cause. The respondent judge granted her petition. 6. Juan opposed it, and Maria soon asked the court to modify the judgment, praying that the BPI be the receiver instead of her. The court granted it as well. 7. Juan moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and to make his wife and son desist from interfering with Valentins management of the property. 8. The lower court ruled for Maria yet again and ordered the land be placed under receivership of BPI and for the bank to provide support to Maria and pay her some expenses. Juan moved for reconsideration but he was denied. He then hired our good Deans father and went to the Supreme Court Issue: Was the order of the lower court valid? Held: NO. The decision was reversed. Ruling: 1. Under the Civil Code, the husband is the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership. This is a right granted to him by la w. The wifes right is nothing compared to the husbands. 2. Of course, a wife CAN challenge a husbands abusive administration by filing a complaint and asking for receivership. Maria here is claiming that she deserves the grant because of Juans abandonment and fraud, which the judge readily accepted. But when Juan asked for an injunction so the claims of fraud and abandonment filed against can be proven, the judge ignored him. This is a clear case of inferior rights being given priority over a superior kind. Bare allegations of fraud are not enough to take away Juans exclusive right as sole administrator. 3. The receivership granted to BPI just magnifies the respondent judges error because it even placed the land in a third party s hands. Receivership should not be used to deprive the same rights that it is meant to preserve. 4. However, the injunction should be granted ONLY after a posting of bond because there might actually be a case of fraud or abandonment (or whatever) that the RTC needs to discover. Juan should post the bond so the injunction can issue. Concept: The husband is the SOLE ADMINISTRATOR in the CPG under the Civil Code. All rights to management, administration, or the like are

inferior to his.
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288. Antonio DOCENA and Alfreda DOCENA v. Hon. Ricardo LAPESURA, Casiano Hombria () 2001 Gonzaga-Reyes *1 spouse is enough on signing Certificate of Non-forum shopping Facts: 1. Private respondent Casiano Hombria filed a complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The petitioners claimed ownership of the land based on occupation since time immemorial. 2. The property subject for recovery is conjugal. 3. CA dismissed the appeal because the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the spouses-petitioners, among other things. 4. The petitioners argue that since they are spouses with joint or indivisible interest over the alleged conjugal property,the signing of the certificate of non-forum shopping by only one of them would suffice, especially considering the long distance they had to travel just to sign the said certificate. 5. Moreover, according to petitioners, there is substantial compliance with the Rules of Court where the certification was signed by the husband who is the statutory administrator of the conjugal property . Issue: Is the signing of the Certificate of Non-Forum shopping by only one of the spouses deemed to constitute substantial compliance? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. The subject Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping signed by the petitioner Antonio Docena alone should be deemed to constitute substantial compliance with the rules. There are only two petitioners in this case and they are husband and wife. 2. Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. In fact, he is the sole administrator, and the wife is not entitled as a matter of right to join him in this endeavor. The husband may defend the conjugal partnership in a suit or action without being joined by the wife. Corollarily, the husband alone may execute the necessary certificate of nonforum shopping to accompany the pleading. 3. If suits to defend an interest in the conjugal properties may be filed by the husband alone, with more reason, he may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping to be attached to the petition 4. It is believed that even under the provisions of the Family Code, the husband alone could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals without being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached certificate of non-forum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect. 5. Plus this action is clearly intended for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and the wife, as pointed out in the Motion for Reconsideration in respondent court, was in the province of Guian, Samar, whereas the petition was prepared in Metro Manila. 272. Homeowners Savings and Loan vs. Dailo () March 11, 2005 Tinga *Conjugal partnership not liable for loan; SPA and mortgage without wifes consent Facts: 13. Miguela and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. 14. During their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot in Bgy. San Francisco, San Pablo City from a certain Sandra Dalida. 15. The subject property was declared for tax assessment purposes under Assessment of Real Property. 16. The deed of absolute sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee to the exclusion of his wife. 17. Marcelino executed an SPA in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing her to obtain a loan from Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses house and lot in San Pablo City. 18. Gesmundo obtained a P300,000 loan, and as security, she executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of the Bank. 19. However, this transaction, including the execution of the SPA, took place without Miguelas knowledge. 20. The loan was not paid, and so the Bank instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. And subsequently, the Bank, being the highest bidder in the public sale, was issued a Certificate of Sale. 21. Marcelino died in 1995, and soon after, she filed to declare the sale null and void, claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage on the subject conjugal property. Issue: Is the conjugal partnership liable for the payment of the loan? Held: No. Ruling: (10) In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, the court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. (11) In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the
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property relations between them. With the effectivity of the FC, Chapter 4 on CPG was made applicable to the CPG already established, unless vested rights have already been acquired. (12) The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership, unlike in absolute community which is rules on co-ownership. (13) There is nothing in the records to compel a finding that indeed, the loan obtained by Marcelino redounded to the benefit of the family, and so, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of principal obligation. 289. SPOUSES ONESIFORO AND ROSARIO ALINAS, VS. SPOUSES VICTOR AND ELENA ALINAS. () April 14, 2008- AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ *2 lots, one with bodega the other with the house Facts: 1. Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas (petitioners) married were married before the enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1988,separated sometime in 1982. 2. They left behind two lots identified as Lot 896-B-9-A with a bodega standing on it and Lot 896-B-9-B with their house. 3. Petitioner Onesiforo Alinas (Onesiforo) and respondent Victor Alinas (Victor) are brothers. 4. Onesiforo allege that they entrusted their properties to Victor and Elena Alinas (respondent spouses) with the agreement that any income from rentals of the properties should be remitted to the Social Security System (SSS ) and to the Rural Bank of Oroquieta City (RBO), as such rentals were believed sufficient to pay off petitioners' loans with said institutions. 5. Onesiforo alleges that he left blank papers with his signature on them to facilitate the administration of said properties. 6. Sometime in 1993, Onesiforo discovered that their two lots were already titled in the name of spouses Victor. Lot 896-B-9-A with a bodega 1. Records show that after Lot 896-B-9-A was extra-judicially foreclosed 2. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-11853[3] covering said property was issued in the name of mortgagee RBO on November 13, 1987. On May 2, 1988, the duly authorized representative of RBO executed a Deed of Installment Sale of Bank's Acquired Assets conveying Lot 896-B-9-A to spouses Victor. Lot 896-B-9-B 1. Foreclosed by the SSS and on November 17, 1986, 2. However, pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney signed by Onesiforo in favor of Victor, dated March 10, 1989, the Victor was able to redeem, on the same date, Lot 896-B-9-B from the SSS for the sum of P111,110.09. 3. On June 19, 1989, a Certificate of Redemption[8] was issued by the SSS. 4. Onesiforo's signature also appears in an Absolute Deed of Sale likewise dated March 10, 1989, selling Lot 896-B-9-B to spouses Victor. 5. The records also show a notarized document dated March 10, 1989 and captioned Agreement whereby petitioner Onesiforo acknowledged that his brother Victor used his own money to redeem Lot 896-B-9-B from the SSS and, thus, Victor became the owner of said lot. 6. In the same Agreeement, petitioner Onesiforo waived whatever rights, claims, and interests he or his heirs , successors and assigns have or may have over the subject property. 7. On March 15, 1993, by virtue of said documents, TCT No. 17394[11] covering Lot 896-B-9-B was issued in the name of respondent spouses. Issue: Is the deed of sale of Lot 896-B-B (Conjugal House) valid? Held: No. Without the consent of the wife. Ruling: Lot 896-B-9-A with a bodega 1. The CA did not commit any reversible error in affirming the trial court's factual findings as the records are indeed bereft of proof to support the petitioners' allegations that they left the care and administration of their properties to respondent spouses; and that there is an agreement between petitioners and respondent spouses regarding remittance to the SSS and the RBO of rental income from their properties. 2. Thus, spouses Victor may not be held responsible for the non-payment of the loan with RBO and the eventual foreclosure of petitioners' Lot 896-B-9-A. 3. Onesiforo do not assail the validity of the foreclosure of said lot but argues that respondent spouses merely redeemed the property from RBO. This is, however, belied by evidence on 4. However, records which show that ownership over the lot had duly passed on to the RBO , as shown by TCT No. T-11853 registered in its name; and subsequently, RBO sold the lot with its improvements to respondent spouses. Needless to stress, the sale was made after the redemption period had lapsed. 5. Correctly held that respondent spouses acquired their title over the lot from RBO and definitely not from petitioners . Lot 896-B-9-B (with house) 1. However, with regard to Lot 896-B-9-B (with house), the Court finds it patently erroneous for the C A to have applied the

2. 3. 4.
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5.
principle of equity in sustaining the validity of the sale of Onesiforo's one-half share in the subject property to respondent spouses. Although petitioners were married before the enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, the sale in question occurred in 1989. Thus, their property relations are governed by Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code. Thus, pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code and jurisprudence, the sale of petitioners' conjugal property made by petitioner Onesiforo alone is void in its entirety. It should be noted that Vicotr were well aware that Lot 896-B-9-B is a conjugal property of petitioners. They also knew that the disposition being made by Onesiforo is without the consent of his wife, as they knew that petitioners had separated, and, the sale documents do not bear the signature of petitioner Rosario . The fact that Onesiforo had to execute two documents, namely: the Absolute Deed of Sale dated March 10, 1989 and a notarized Agreement likewise dated March 10, 1989, reveals that they had full knowledge of the severe infirmities of the sale. Verily, the sale of Lot 896-B-9-B to respondent spouses is entirely null and void.
290. Uy vs. CA () Pardo - November 29, 2000 Facts: 1. Gilda and Ernesto are Married. 2. Ernesto suffered a stroke which rendered him comatose. 3. Gilda was made guardian of Ernesto and the trial court found him to be incompentent due to the effects of the stroke. 4. Gilda is now asking the court if she can sell the conjugal land in order to pay off the medical debts incurred by her incompetent husband. 5. RTC claims she is entitled under Article 124. Issue: Is Article 124 the proper remedy? Held: No Ruling: 1. The RTC declared Ernesto to be an incompetent, while the wordings in Article 124 refer to someone who is incapacitated. 2. Incompetent and incapacitated are not the same. 3. Incompetent spouses should be under Rule 93 of the Revised Rules of Court (not supplied by case) 4. RTC made a mistake when they used Article 124. Laws: Article 124 In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the admin of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. 200. Sabalones vs. Court of Appeals () 14 Feb 1994 J. Cruz *Ambassador wants to sell conjugal properties Facts: 1. Husband: Samson Sabalones and First Wife: Remedios Gaviola Second wife (paramour): Thelma Curameng on 5 Oct 1981 2. Samson was a diplomat and left the administration of the conjugal properties to Remedios. 3. In 1985, Samson retired and returned to the country but not to Remedios and their children. 4. In 1989, Samson filed for an action for judicial authorization to sell their Greenhills property. 5. Remedios opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. Ground: bigamy. She also prayed for liquidation of the conjugal properties with forfeiture of Samsons share because of adultery. 6. After trial, the court issued legal separation and forfeiture of Samsons share in the conjugal properties. Samson appealed. 7. At the Court of Appeals, Remedios filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Samson from interfering with the administration of their properties. 8. On 7 Apr 1992, the Court of Appeals granted the preliminary injunction . Samson appealed. Issue: Can Remedios act as administrator of the conjugal properties during the pendency of the proceedings? Held: Yes. In the absence of a court-appointed administrator, she may continue administering the properties. Ruling: 1. Pending the appointment of an administrator of the conjugal assets under Art. 61 of the Family Code, the CA was justified in allowing Remedios to continue with her administration . 2. The trial court implicitly designated Remedios as its decision denied Samson of his share in the conjugal properties. This was in effect approved by the CA in the issuance of the preliminary injunction. 3. The injunction is necessary to protect the interests of Remedios and her children and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal assets. Samson transferred the US property to Thelma, sold their Cebu properties to his brothers, and harassed the Forbes Park tenant.

4.
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The injunction has not permanently installed Remedios as administrator. It has merely allowed her to continue administering the properties in the meantime without interference from Samson, pending the express designation of an administrator. Concept: Family Code, Art. 61 (2): The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. 291. Felipe vs. Heirs of Maximo Aldon () 16 Feb 1983 Abad Santos *wife sold conjugal property without husbands consent, contract is void able Facts: 1. Husband: Maximo Aldon and Wife: Gimena Almosara married: 1936. Spouses bought several pieces of land. 2. In 1951, Gimena sold the lots to the spouses Felipe without the consent of Maximo. 3. On 26 Apr 1976 (25 yrs after the alleged sale), the heirs of Maximo and Gimena filed a complaint to recover the property. 4. The trial court declared the spouses Felipe as the lawful owners of the properties. CA reversed. Issue: Is the sale of the conjugal property without the husbands consent valid? Held: No. The contract is voidable. Ruling: 1. Gimena sold the lands belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of the husband and the sale is not covered by the exceptions. 2. It is a voidable contract. Voidable contracts are those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract. 3. The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to annulment by Maximo only during the marriage because he was the victim who had an interest in the contract. Unfortunately, Maximo has died. 4. Gimena, who was the party responsible for the defect, cannot seek its annulment. Only the children of Maximo acquired the right to question the defective contract as it deprived them of their inheritance. 5. Thus, the children are entitled to 2/3 of Maximos share of of the property. 6. The spouses Felipe were buyers in bad faith. They shall make an accounting of the fruits and deliver it to the children. 257. THOMAS C. CHEESMAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ESTELITA PADILLA, respondents. () January 21, 1991- NARVASA *Wife selling her property without the knowledge of her American Husband Facts: 9. Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married on December 4, 1970 but have been separated since February 15,1981 10. On June 4, 1974, a "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights" was executed by Armando Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered land and the house in favor of "Criselda P. Cheesman, 11. Thomas Cheesman, although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife 12. Tax declarations for the property purchased were issued in the name only of Criselda Cheesman and 13. Criselda assumed exclusive management and administration of said property , leasing it to tenants 14. On July 1, 1981, Criselda Cheesman sold the property to Estelita M. Padilla , without the knowledge or consent of Thomas Cheesman. 15. Thomas Cheesman brought suit against his wife, Criselda, and Estelita Padilla , praying for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent. 16. Defendants, alleging that (1) the property sold was paraphernal, having been purchased by Criselda with funds exclusively belonging to her (2) Thomas Cheesman, being an American, was disqualified to have any interest or right of ownership in the land; and (3) Estelita Padilla was a buyer in good faith. Issue: Is the property exclusive owned by Criselda? Held: Yes. Ruling: 8. Both Courts found that the fact that the funds used by Criselda Cheesman was money she had earned and saved prior to her marriage to Thomas Cheesman Being an American Citizen 9. Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; 10. the sale as to him was null and void. 11. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. 12. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition . 13. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right

over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. 14. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
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Good faith of Padilla 2. Estelita Padilla is a purchaser in good faith, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court having found that Cheesman's own conduct had led her to believe the property to be exclusive property of the latter's wife, freely disposable by her without his consent or intervention. 292. Frenzel vs. Catito () July 11, 2003 Callejo Sr. Facts: 1. Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel, a German, married Teresita Santos in 1976 but the couple separated in fact without obtaining divorce in 1981. 2. While in Australia, Frenzel met Erlinda Catito, who unknown to him, was married to another German. 3. They fell in love and went back to the Philippines and agreed to start a business (beauty parlor). 4. Ederlina found a building in Manila for the parlor and used P 20,000 from Frenzel to purchase the rights over the property and P300,000 to buy equipment. 5. January 23, 1984 Frenzel bought a house and lot from Victoria Binuya Steckle for $20,000 and had it named under Catito 6. Frenzel sold all his property in Australia and Papua New Guinea and transferred them to an account under Catitos name in Manila, and HSBC Macao 7. July 28, 1984 Frenzel discovered that Catito was married to another German since October 1978 . 8. He confronted Catito who promised him that she would get a divorce. Frenzel paid for the lawyers services 9. More and more properties bought allegedly using the funds of Alfred 10. The divorce in Germany was denied 11. The German husband of Catito filed a charge for bigamy 12. Alfred decided to live separately from Ederlina and cut off all contacts with her. In one of her letters to Alfred, Ederlina complained that he had ruined her life. She admitted that the money used for the purchase of the properties in Davao were his. 13. The last straw for Alfred came on September 2, 1985, when someone smashed the front and rear windshields of Alfred's car and damaged the windows 14. Alfred thereafter executed an affidavit-complaint charging Ederlina and Sally MacCarron with malicious mischief. Issue: Can the court compel Catito to return the money and other properties to Alfred? Held: No. In pari delicto Ruling: I. In pari delicto and Constitutional Prohibition 1. Where the wrong of one party equals that of the other, the defendant is in the stronger position . . . it signifies that in such a situation, neither a court of equity nor a court of law will administer a remedy. 2. The rule is expressed in the maxims: EX DOLO ORITUR ACTIO and IN PARI DELICTO POTIOR EST CONDITIO DEFENDENTIS 3. Alfred was fully aware that he was disqualified from acquiring and owning lands under Philippine law even before he purchased the properties in question; and, to skirt the constitutional prohibition, the petitioner had the deed of sale placed under the respondent's name as the sole vendee 4. The Catito was herself married to Klaus Muller, a German citizen. Thus, the petitioner and the respondent could not lawfully join in wedlock. 5. The evidence on record shows that the petitioner in fact knew of the respondent's marriage to another man , but nonetheless purchased the subject properties under the name of the respondent and paid the purchase prices therefor. 6. Even if it is assumed gratia arguendi that the respondent and the petitioner were capacitated to marry, the petitioner is still disqualified to own the properties in tandem with the respondent 7. From the evidence on record, the three parcels of land subject of the complaint were not mortgaged to the petitioner by the owners thereof but were sold to the respondent as the vendee, even though with the use of the petitioner's personal funds. 293. Ayuste vs. CA () GonzagaSeptember 1999 Facts: 1. Christina and Rafael are married (1961) 2. Couple purchased land in 1982. 3. Rafael sold the land, with a deed that bears the signature of Christina. (1987) 4. Rafael dies in 1989. 5. Christina finds out that the title to the land is missing and only then later finds out of the sale made in 1987 (Fact #3)
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6. Christina files a case to annul the sale (1990) in accordance with Article 173 of the Civil Code. 7. People who bough the land from Rafael claim that the sale was valid and that Christina cannot file the case because of latches. Issue: Can Christina recover the land? Held: No Ruling: 1. The law provides that she has the right to declare the sale void because her consent was not obtained. This is no longer possible however because: 2. The law provides that the action must be filed: a. Within 10 years from the transaction AND b. During the marriage. 3. Rafael, her husband was dead when she filed the case, thus the 2nd requirement is lacking. 294. Villaranda vs. Spouses Villaranda () February 23, 2004 Ynares-Santiago *The deed is valid until, and unless annulled; real property of the conjug. part. voidable Facts: 1. A 471-square-meter parcel of land located at Divisoria, Cagayan de Oro City, was left to the two brothers and their eight other siblings by their parents. 2. Estate Administrator Bebiano Luminarias leased 124 square meters of the property to Honorio starting on May 1, 1976, until May 31, 1986. 3. Vicente, on the other hand, inherited 64.22 square meters of the property that had not been leased to Honorio. 4. On July 6, 1976, the two brothers executed the assailed Deed of Exchange. Under this instrument, Vicente agreed to convey his 64.22-square-meter portion to Honorio, in exchange for a 500-square-meter property in Macasandig, Cagayan de Oro City. 5. After the execution of the Deed, Honorio took possession of the 64.22-square-meter lot and constructed a building thereon. 6. Years later, a subdivision plan for the 64.22 square-meter share of Vicente was completed. He was issued his TCT, while the other heirs were issued their own TCTs for their respective shares. 7. Honorio and his wife, Ana Maria Villaranda, then moved for specific performance before the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City to compel Vicente to comply with his obligations under the Deed of Exchange . 8. The spouses alleged that they could not fully use or dispose of their Macasandig property, because Vicente had yet to identify and delineate his undivided 500- square-meter portion of the property. They asked the court to compel him to do so, as well as to convey to them the 64.22-square-meter Divisoria lot, in compliance with his obligations under the Deed. 9. During the pendency of the case, Honorio conditionally sold the Divisoria lot to Colorhouse Laboratories . 10. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent spouses. 11. On appeal, the CA held that the provisions of the Civil Code were applicable to the case at bar , since the Deed of Exchange had been entered into prior to the enactment of the Family Code. Thus, the absence of the wifes signature on the Deed made it only voidable, not void. 12. The CA further found that Ana was aware of the execution of the Deed, and yet she brought no action for its annulment within ten (10) years from its execution. Her omission or refusal to rescind it, as well as her act of joining her husband in filing the case for specific performance, points to the conclusion that she assented to the Deed. Issue: Was there a perfected and consummated deed of exchange? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. According to Article 166, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. This provision, however, must be read in conjunction with Article 173 of the same Code. 2. The latter states that an action to annul an alienation or encumbrance may be instituted by the wife during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned. Ana was aware of the execution of the deed, but brought no action for its annulment within 10 years from its execution. 3. The lack of consent on her part will not make the husbands alienation or encumbrance of real property of the conjugal partnership void, but merely voidable. 4. The Deed is valid until and unless annulled. 295. Ainza vs. Padua () June 30, 2005 Ynares-Santiago *voidable sale by the wife but husbands right barred due to prescription Facts: 1. August 1987, Concepcion Ainza bought of an undivided property of the spouses Eugenia and Antonio Padua for Php 100K. No deed of absolute sale was executed but cash payment was received and ownership was transferred through physical delivery to her attorney-in-fact daughter, Natividad, who eventually settled on the disputed land with her husband Ceferino. 2. Then without Concepcions consent the spouses Padua subdivided the property into three and registered it under their name .
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Antonio averred that he only allowed the spouses to temporarily occupy the property in 1994 and requested them to vacate it but they claimed that it is Concepcion who owns the land prompting Antonio to file an ejectment suit on April 1, 1999. Issues: Is the contract of sale of the land between Eugenia and Concepcion valid? Held: No. The contract is voidable without the consent of the husband but his rights has prescribed. Ruling: 1. The court in deciding on the main legal ground on the legal effect of the land belonging to the conjugal partnership which was sold without the husbands consent referred to Felipe v Heir of Aldon which provides that a property sold by the wife without the husbands consent and not belonging to the exceptions provided by law is deemed voidable . It could not be unenforceable because it does not fit Art. 1403 and not void or inexistent as well because it is not one of those mentioned in Art. 1409 of the Civil Code. 2. The consent of Antonio is necessary for the sale of the conjugal property to be valid but the action annul an oral contract must be commenced within six years from the time the right of action accrued . But since the Eugenia sold the property in 1987 the action has already prescribed in 1993. Even if the prescription in Art. 173 is applied he is barred by the 10 year prescription. 3. So even though the sale is voidable, it is binding until annulled. Antonios failure to file the case within the prescribed period not prohibits him from questioning the validity of the sale. 296. Siochi v Gozon () March 18, 2010 Carpio Alfedo the sole administrator/offending spouse Facts: 1. Alfredo and Elvira Gozon, owners of the subject property, were involved in a legal separation case filed by the wife on December 1991. She filed a notice of lis pendens on the property which the Cavite City RTC granted and was duly annotated on the title. 2. On August 1993, while the legal separation case was pending, Alfredo entered into an agreement to sell the property to Mario Siochi for the price of 18 million pesos. Mario tried to make sure that the sale would be made properly by making stipulations: that Alfredo would secure an affidavit from Elvira that says the property is exclusively his and annotate it on the title; secure the approval of the RTC to exclude the property from the legal separation case; and to remove the lis pendens annotation. 3. Alfredo failed to comply with any of these stipulations, but Mario went ahead and took possession after paying 5 million pesos. 4. The RTC then granted the legal separation case, holding that the property is conjugal as well. 5. Alfredo executed a deed of donation of the property to his daughter Winifred and had a new title issued in her name, the new one being without any of the previous annotations (lis pendens or the deed of sale). He then secured an SPA from Winifred, and with it sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI). The company paid the 18 million right away and another title was issued to them. 6. Mario filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint. The RTC ruled that the sale between Alfredo and Mario is valid, but should exclude the share of Elvira, it also ruled that the donation between father and daughter is void (so consequently the sale of the property to IDRI is also void). 7. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC with one very important modification, nullifying the sale between Alfredo and Mario as well. Mario and IDRI then appealed to the SC, hence! Issue: (1) Is the sale between Alfredo and Mario valid? Held: NO. (2) Has Alfredo forfeited his rights to half of the property? Held: NO. (3) Is IDRI a buyer in good faith? Held: NO. Held: The decision was affirmed with modifications. Ruling: 1. The case is covered by the Family Code since the first sale was made in 1993. The applicable provision is Article 124, which states that administration shall belong to both spouses. In case of incapacity to participate in the administration, the capable spouse may enjoy sole administration ONLY IF HE OR SHE SECURES THE AUTHORITY OF THE COURT OR THE CONSENT OF THE OTHER SPOUSE. This means (contrary to what the court said here) that Alfredo could have enjoyed sole administration since Elvira was separated from him in fact, but only if he secures authority from the court or Elviras consent (I smell another tirade from Katrina: WRONG!) 2. However, even if Alfredo is the sole administrator, alienation or encumbrance would still require the consent of his wife. He did not do this so the sale was void. 3. The only modification in the decision though is the part about Alfredo forfeiting his right to half of the conjugal property in light
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of the ruling in the legal separation case (apparently he is the offending spouse). This is wrong because the only thing he forfeits as the offending spouse is his share in the net profits of the partnership, not his ACTUAL share of the conjugal partnership property. 4. IDRI was not a buyer in good faith because they had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances which would compel a reasonably cautious person to WALK AWAY FROM THE FRICKIN SALE OF CONTESTED PROPERTY Concept: The Family Code grants sole administration only under the right circumstances to someone who has secured court authority or consent of the other spouse. 297. Prima PARTOSA-JO v. CA, Ho Hang (with aliases JOSE JO and CONSING), () 1992 Cruz *Act of the husband refusing to accept wife is abandonment Facts: 1. In 1980, the Partosa-Jo filed a complaint against Jo (private respondent) for judicial separation of conjugal property 2. CA dismissed the complaint on the ground that the separation of the parties was due to their agreement and not because of abondonment. 3. CA relied mainly on the testimony of the petitioner, who declared that she left Dumaguete City, where she and Jo were living together "because that was our agreement." It held that an agreement to live separately without just cause was void and could not sustain any claim of abandonment by the aggrieved spouse. 4. Its conclusion was that the only remedy available to the petitioner was legal separation and by virtue of which the conjugal partnership of property would be terminated. 5. But according to Partosa-Jo, the agreement between her and the private respondent JO was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to separate permanently. And even if they did, this arrangement was repudiated and ended in 1942, when she returned to him at Dumaguete City and he refused to accept her. 6. She invokes Article 178 (3) of the Civil Code (see concept), which has been superseded by Article 128 of the Family Code which states that the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation on either of these grounds: 1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and 2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if she said spouse does not leave the other spouse. [Discussion fn Abandonment in Concept below] Issue: Can abandonment in this case be ground for judicial separation of the spouses conjugal property? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had already rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. 2. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property. 3. In addition, the petitioner may also invoke the second ground allowed by Article 128, for the fact is that he has failed without just cause to comply with his obligations to the family as husband or parent. Apart form refusing to admit his lawful wife to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City, Jo has freely admitted to cohabiting with other women and siring many children by them. 4. The order of judicial separation of the properties in question is based on the finding of both the lower courts that the private respondent, JO, is indeed their real owner. It is these properties that should now be divided between him and the petitioner , on the assumption that they were acquired during coverture and so belong to the spouses half and half. Concept: Art. 178. The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval, shall not affect the conjugal partnership, except that: (3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, she may petition the court for a receivership, or administration by her of the conjugal partnership property or separation of property. Abandonment: implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause. There must be absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation.
298. Metrobank vs. Pascual () 29 Feb 2008 Velasco Jr. *after nullity of marriage but no liquidation of partnership, CPG continues Facts: 1. Husband: Nicholson (Nelson) Pascual and wife: Florencia Nevalga married: 19 Jan 1985. They acquired a 250 sq.m. lot in Makati. 2. On 31 July 1995, their marriage was declared void ab initio under Article 36. The court also ordered the liquidation of the

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conjugal partnership but they went separate ways without liquidating. On 30 Apr 1997, Florencia mortgaged the land to obtain a 58 million loan. She presented the decree of absolute nullity and a waiver from Nicholson allegedly waiving his rights to the conjugal property (incidentally did not include questioned land). 4. Florencia failed to pay. Metrobank then foreclosed the property. 5. On 28 Jun 2000, Nicholson filed an action to nullify the mortgage on the ground that it was still conjugal property and mortgaged without his consent. 6. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Nicholson. Lot was conjugal property thus Nicholsons consent was needed to mortgage. 7. CA affirmed. It also held that Metrobank failed to overcome the presumption of conjugal property. Issue: Did the declaration of nullity of marriage automatically dissolve the conjugal partnership? Held: No. Although it severed the marital bond, the conjugal partnership subsists until the conjugal properties are liquidated. Ruling: 1. The character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership. 2. Since the lot was acquired during the marriage, it was conjugal. Metrobank did not overcome the presumption. 3. Under Art. 493 of the Civil Code (co-ownership), Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2) undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of Nicholson. Therefore the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. 261. Lita De Leon and Felix TARROSA v. Anita B. DE LEON, Danilo B. De Leon, and Vilma B. De Leon () 1986 Narvasa: *Lot bought from PHHC on installment basis under contract to SELL Facts: 8. In 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the PHHC entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a parcel of land 9. In 1968, Bonifacio married respondent Anita de Leon. 10. In 1970, following the full payment for the, a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio was executed. Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued in 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, "single." 11. Subsequently, Bonifacio sold the subject lot to her sister, Lita, and husband Felix Rio Tarrosa (Tarrosas), petitioners herein. The conveying Deed of Sale dated January 12, 1974 did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. 12. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died. Three months later, the Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale and had the former TCT cancelled. 13. Getting wind of the cancellation of their fathers (and Anitas husband) title, Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit. 14. Tarrosas assert that, since Bonifacio purchased the lot from PHHC on installment before he married Anita, the land was Bonifacios exclusive property and not conjugal, even though some installments were paid and the title was issued to Bonifacio during the marriage. Issue: 1. Is the property part of the CPG? Held: Yes, therefore Bonifacios sale, without his wifes consent, to the petitioners is void 2. Is the sale of one half of the CPG without liquidation valid? Held: No Ruling: 1. Tarrosas assertion is wrong. Ownership over the lot and covered by the Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita; as such, ownership to the property is, by law, presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. The mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. What is material is the time when the property was acquired. 2. Sale of one-half of the conjugal property without liquidation is void. Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into a title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs. Therefore, even on the supposition that Bonifacio only sold his portion of the conjugal partnership, the sale is still theoretically void, for, as previously stated, the right of the husband or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. 3. As a matter of fairness and equity, the share of Bonifacio after the liquidation of the partnership should be liable to reimburse the amount paid by the Tarrosas.
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163. Albano Sales vs. Sales () July 13, 2009- Quisumbing *Wife sold houses of his husband, rents collected without proper accounting Facts: 1. Present controversy stemmed from Civil Case No. Q-94-19236 filed by Marywin Albano Sales against her husband, Mayor Reynolan T. Sales, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and separation of properties, and Civil Case No. Q-97-32303 filed by Mayor Reynolan T. Sales for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly. 2. On June 16, 2003, after the decision became final, Marywin filed a motion for execution and a manifestation listing her assets with Reynolan for the purpose of having them partitioned . 3. Reynolan opposed the motion arguing that the RTC Decision had ordered the distribution of their common properties without specifying what they were. He also claimed that Marywin has no share in the properties she specified because said properties were the fruits solely of his industry. 4. He added that their property relations should not be governed by the rules of co-ownership because they did not live together as husband and wife. 5. He also alleged that Marywin appropriated the rentals of his properties and even disposed one of them without his consent , in violation of Article 1477 of the Family Code. 6. Marywin opposed Reynolans motion and argued that the issues of alleged fraudulent sale and non-accounting of rentals were already waived by Reynolan when he failed to set them up as compulsory counterclaims in the case. RTC: On April 12, 2004, the RTC denied Reynolans motion for reconsideration. It ruled that reception of evidence is no longer necessary because the parties were legally married prior to its nullification and the fact that they begot a son whom they raised together proved that their connubial relations were more than merely transient. CA: Favored Reynolan. The Court of Appeals held that the RTCs recall of its previous order for further reception of evidence deprives and violates Reynolans constitutional right to property. While the RTC is not prohibited from se tting aside an interlocutory order, the Court of Appeals said that due process must still be observed. Issue: Did the Court of Appeals err when it entertained respondents appeal from an order granting the issuance of a writ of execution? Held: The issue on dissolution was remanded to the lower courts because some factual issued should still be settled for a reasonable division and distribution of the properties. Ruling: 1. what is being questioned by respondent was not really the January 4, 2000 Decision of the RTC declaring their marriage void ab initio on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity, but the Orders of the trial court dividing their common properties in accordance with the proposed project of partition without the benefit of a hearing. 2. genuine concern that had to be addressed prior to the dissolution of the property relations of the parties as a result of the declaration of nullity of their marriage 3. Allegations regarding the collection of rentals without proper accounting , sale of common properties without the husbands consent and misappropriation of the proceeds thereof, are factual issues which have to be addressed in order to determine with certainty the fair and reasonable division and distribution of properties due to each party. 164. Buenaventura vs. CA () March 31, 2005 Azcuna *Liquidation based on equal co-ownership due to marriage declared void ab initio Facts: 7. Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura. 8. After she filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. 9. The Marriage between plaintiff Noel and defendant Isabel on July 4, 1979 is null and void ab initio on pysch incapacity of both. 10. Liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership : plaintiff's separation /retirement benefits from the Far East Bank and Trust Company, paying to her 50% of it or P1, 837,667.89 with 12% interest per annum and one-half (1/2) of his outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies; 11. Custody of their son was also given to the mother, and Noel was to regularly support his son. 12. The CA affirmed the decision, and so Noel, on certiorari, alleged that he acquired the said properties before his marriage.
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Issue: How does the procedure on liquidation apply in this case, and what are its effects? Ruling: 6. Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership. 7. The provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code should aptly prevail. The property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. 8. It must be stressed, nevertheless that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses. 9. Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found , both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. 10. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution. 299. Santero vs. CFI of Cavite () September 14, 1987Paras Facts: 1. Princesita Santero-Morales, Federico Santero and Winy Santero are the children begotten by the late Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa 2. Private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are four of the seven children begotten by the same Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz. 3. Both sets of children are the natural children of the late Pablo Santero since neither of their mothers, was married to their father Pablo. 4. Pablo Santero in turn, who died on November 30, 1973 was the only legitimate son of Pascual Santero who died in 1970 and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who died in 1976. 5. Private respondents filed another Motion for Allowance 6. Petitioners argue that private respondents are not entitled to any allowance since they have already attained majority age, two are gainfully employed and one is married as provided for under Sec. 3 Rule 83, of the Rules of Court. 7. They further allege that the administrator of the estate of Pablo Santero does not have sufficient funds to cover said allowance Issue: Whether or not the respondents are entitled to the allowance coming from the Estate of Santero despite of reaching the majority age? Held: They are still entitled. The civil code did not distinguish. Ruling: 1. The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed , or married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188. 2. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. 3. Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. 4. Be it noted however that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate spouse" not common-law spouses who are the mothers of the children here. 300. Maquilan vs. Maquilan () AustriaJune 8, 2007 Facts: 1. Petitioner and Respondent were married. 2. Respondent had an adulterous relationship. 3. Petitioner filed a criminal case and succeeded, thus his wife and his paramour were sentenced to suffer the penalty of Prision Correcional. 4. Afterwards, the respondent filed a case of Declaration of Nullity due to Psychological Incapacity. 5. During pre-trial a compromise agreement was settled, agreed upon by both parties, and agreed upon by the court in relation to Article 143 of the Family Code.
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6. The Petitioner (husband) claims that the compromise agreement should be considered void because it is against the law and government policy. He uses Article 43 as support. Issue: Is the compromise agreement valid? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. Article 43 cannot be used because it refers to Article 42 (when a subsequent marriage is terminated because of reappearance of spouse) 2. Article 63 cannot be used because it refers to what happens in Article 55 (or legal separation). 3. The case at hand does not tackle either topics above, BUT FOCUSES ON psychological incapacity. (Article 36) 4. Prission Correcional does not have the penalty of Civil Interdiction, thus the wife (or respondent guilty of adultery) still has the right of ownership over property. Thus the use of Article 143 is valid. 5. Article 143 provides that the separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. Laws: 1. Article 43 if ether spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children. 2. Article 63- offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits 214. Lacson vs. Lacson () August 30, 1968Castro Facts: 1. Alfonso and Carmen Lacson were married and had 4 children. 2. Carmen left Alfonso and the Conjugal home in Bacolod and lived in Manila 3. She filed a case for custody of all their children and support for them and herself. 4. Both spouses reached an amicable settlement or compromise agreement, which included the separation of property. 5. Carmen later filed a motion to dismiss the agreement on the grounds that she only signed it in order to obtain immediate custody over their children. 6. She questions the legality of the agreement, especially the part concerning the custody of their children. Issue: Is the separation of property which is cited in the agreement valid? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. The law provides that the husband and wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. 2. The court cannot force the spouses to live together. 301. Maxey vs. CA () May 11, 1984 Gutierrez, Jr. *Marriage in military fashion, Married in church, lands conjugal Facts: 1. Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales (both deceased) lived together as husband and wife in 1903. 2. Out of said union were born six (6) children: John or Carlos, Lucille, Margaret, Florence, Fred and George. 3. Their children claim that their parents were united in 1903 in a marriage performed "in the military fashion". 4. During the period of their cohabitation, in 1911 and 1912, respectively, the late Melbourne acquired parcels of land. 5. The couple, in 1919, had a church marriage. 6. Regina Morales Maxey died in 1919 sometime after the church wedding. 7. Except for the youngest son, all the children were born before the disputed properties were acquired. 8. The husband remarried and in 1953 to Julia Pamatluan. 9. Melbourne Maxey, through his attorney-in-fact Julia Pamatluan sold in favor of the spouses Beato and Alacoupue Macayra in 1953 the parcels of land, which fact of sale was not controverted by the Maxey children. Since then, the spouses have taken immediate possession of it continuously up to the present. 10. The 6 Maxey children instituted the present case on January 26, 1962, praying for the annulment of the documents of sale, and to recover possession with damages, alleging, that the lands were common properties of their parents, having been acquired during their lifetime and through their joint effort and capital. 11. Also, they allege that the sales of the of the said lands, after the death of their mother, Regina Morales, was executed by their father, Melbourne Maxey, without their knowledge and consent; and that they came to know of the sales only in 1961. Issue: 1. Were the couple married in 1903? Held: NO 2. Were the properties acquired during their legal marriage (Melbourne and Regina)? Held: YES
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Ruling: First Issue: 1. Act No. 3613, the Revised Marriage Law, recognized "military fashion" marriages as legal is rejected by the court. 2. The marriage law in 1903 was General Order No. 70. There is no provision in General Order No. 68 as amended nor in Act No. 3613 which would recognize as an exception to the general rule on valid marriages, a so called "Military fashion" ceremony or arrangement. 3. Maxey and Morales were legally married at a church wedding solemnized on February 16, 1919. Second Issue: 1. Article 144 is applicable to the case. It retroacted and there is no showing that vested rights would be impaired or prejudiced through its application. 2. This new article in the Civil Code recognizes that it would be unjust and abnormal if a woman who is a wife in all aspects of the relationship except for the requirement of a valid marriage must abandon her home and children, neglect her traditional household duties, and go out to earn a living or engage in business before the rules on co-ownership would apply. 3. The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and the estate of his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold. 302. Domingo vs CA () September 17, 1993 Romero *judicial declaration of nullity to separate your properties Facts: 1. On November 29, 1976, Delia and Roberto Domningo were married at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg 2. Unknown to her Roberto has a subsisting and valid marriage that was held on April 25, 1969 3. Delia has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since 1983 up to the present(1989), he has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and administration of Roberto. 4. Sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession and administration of said properties. 5. She then filed a TRO enjoining Roberto of disposing and administering the properties , as well as a declaration of nullity of their marriage and to declare her as the sole exclusive owner and that those properties be placed under administration to his Atty.in-fact brother. 6. Roberto filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary which was denied by the courts because there is still a need for a judicial declararion of nullity as ruled in Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS. 7. After appealing for reconsideration and being denied again, instead of filing an answer he filed a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss. Issue: Is a judicial decree of separation of nullity of a void marriage required before the separation of properties? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. The separation and subsequent distribution of the properties acquired during the union can be had only upon proper determination of the status of the marital relationship between said parties. To avoid multiplicity of suit the declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and distribution of the properties involved. 2. The Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 3. Roberto's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. 4. When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses , the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage , one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them.
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235. Belcodero vs. CA () October 20, 1993 - Vitug *Husband buys property and gives it to his Live in and dies Facts: 1. Alayo D Bosing was first married to Juliana Oday. (LAWFUL WIFE) 2. Alayo then left her and started living with Josefa Rivera. (LIVE-IN) 3. Alayo bought land in an installment basis from Magdalena Estate and claimed in the deed that he was married to Josefa Bosing (his common law wife) 4. Alayo sent a letter to Magdalena Estate authorizing them to transfer the lot in the name of his Josefa (Live in) 5. A transfer certificate was issued in the name of Josefa R Bosing married to AlayoBosing. 6. Alayo then married Josefa and later died in March 1967. 7. Josefa and her child (begot by Alayo) executed a document of extrajudicial partition and sale of the lot, which was described as conjugal property. 8. Juliana and her children (first wife and first set of children begot by Bosing) filed an action for reconveyance of the property claiming that it should be theirs because they are the legal heirs. Issue: Who has the right to the property? Live in or first wife? Held: First Wife Ruling: 1. It cannot be seriously contended that, simply because the property was titled in the name of Josefa at Alayos request, she s hould thereby be deemed to be its owner. 2. The property was acquired by Alayo and that even she recognized his ownership, when 3 years after he died, they executed a deed of extrajudicial partition assessing a interest in the property in what may be described as her share in the conjugal partnership. This cannot be done because she is not the legal heir. 3. As regards the property relation between common-law spouses, the Civil Code provides that the rule on co-ownership is repudiated (rejected) when either of the spouses suffered from an impediment to marry. 4. There was also no sign on the part of Alayo to fix that through an action for legal separation within his lifetime. 162. Valdes v. QC-RTC () Facts: 1. Consuelo and Antonio were married on Jan 1971 and had 5 children. 2. Antonio sought the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity and RTC granted it. 3. Consuelo was then ordered to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Art. 147 of the Fam code and comply with Art 50, 51, and 52. 4. Consuelo asserted that the Fam Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage, and questions Articles 50, 51, and 52. 5. Antonio submits that the Articles above are controlling. Issue: Do Art 147 and Art 148 of the family code apply to the case at hand? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. Antonio and Consuelo own equal shares in the family home as well as in concluding that in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil code, not Articles 50, 51, and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code should prevail. 2. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. 158. Carino vs. Carino () February 2, 2001- Ynares-Santiago * 2 Susans of Santiago fighting over the death benefits of the deceased police Facts: 1. Santiago S. Cario(1) Susan Nicdao - on June 20, 1969; two offsprings; (2) Susan Yee - on November 10, 1992; no children; almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982 2. SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis 3. He passed away under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses 4. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies 5. Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against Susan Nicdao

6.
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to return to her at least one-half of P146,000.00 collectively denominated as death benefits Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the s ubsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. 7. she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased 8. Yee contended that the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license a. the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number b. a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads Issue: Can Susan Yee have the half on the death benefit? Held: No. Ruling: I. Validity of the First Marriage (Nicdao) - VOID - In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. - A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. - the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license II. Validity of Second Marriage (Yee) - VOID Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Property Regime One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage. In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the coownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime
III. -
A. Yee Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage thenpresumed to be valid (Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order. The disputed P146,000.00 from AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc., NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them. B. Nicdao As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. In contrast to Article 148, wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto even if the disputed death benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof.

-
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As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. one-half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs
303. Mercado-Fehr v Fehr () October 23, 2003 Puno Elna and Brunos Suite 204 was purchased during their cohabitation Facts: 13. Elna and Bruno started living together in 1983 after two years of courtship. They were married on March 14, 1985. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in March 1997. It was granted by the Makati RTC in January 1998. 14. The RTC also issued an order dissolving the conjugal partnership between the two. In this order, Elna got the ground floor of the subject condominium as well as their Tamaraw FX while Bruno got the upper basement of the condominium along with their Sentra. Suite 204 was deemed as exclusive property of Bruno, and Elna was ordered to transfer its ownership to him . 15. Elna field a motion for reconsideration of this order, alleging that Suite 204 was purchased on installment basis while they were living exclusively as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Accordingly, she argued that the property is covered by Article 147 (paragraph 4) of the Family Code and that she should be able to use to support their children since it would be hard for her to keep asking him for support. 16. The lower court took notice of the argument (and somehow agreed), but also took note of the fact that the former spouses have already entered into an agreement dividing the property into 1/3 shares between them and their children. 17. Elna eventually filed certiorari with the CA, which dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA claimed that it should an ordinary appeal and not a petition for certiorari. Elna moved to reconsider but the CA denied it, hence this petition. Issue: (1) Did Elna lose her chances by filing a petition for certiorari after withdrawing her appeal? Held: NO. (2) Should half of the property be defaulted to their children in accordance with Article 147? Held: NO. The decision was affirmed. Ruling: (1) No, Elna did not make a fatal boo-boo when she filed the certiorari petition. The order she wants to question may have deprived her of some rights, and the court has held that when there is a possible miscarriage of justice, some rules can be broken. The certiorari may substitute for the appeal. (2) The property WAS purchased during their cohabitation. The court gave credit to Elnas testimony that the suite was purchased sometime in 1983. For Article 147 to operate, these elements must be present: (1) they must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) they must live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these elements are present here, so the provision applies. The pronouncement of the lower court regarding their agreement to split the property is without basis. Article 147 applies and Elna should get what she is asking for. 304. Joaquino vs. Reyes - removed 305. Gonzales vs. Gonzales () 16 Dec 2005 Sandoval-Gutierrez *pizza tycoons properties to be divided equally with wife Facts: 1. Husband: Francisco Gonzales and Wife: Erminda Gonzales were married: 4 Feb 1979. 2. On 29 Oct 1992, Erminda filed a complaint for nullity under Art. 36. Grounds: satyriasis (excessive and promiscuous sex hunger), beats her for no justifiable reason, humiliates and embarrases her, and denies her love, sexual comfort, and loyalty. 3. On 12 Feb 1997, the trial court nullified the marriage and dissolved the CPG. It ordered equal partition of properties. 4. Dissatisfied with the partition, Francisco appealed to the CA. CA affirmed trial courts decision. Issue: Should the spouses split the properties equally? Held: Yes. The partition is governed by Art. 147 of the Family Code. Ruling: 1. Art. 147 applies when a man and a woman live together under a void marriage. 2. Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts and will be owned by them in equal shares . 3. If the other party did not participate in the acquisition, it shall be deemed that he/she has contributed jointly in the acquisition if his/her efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. 4. Francisco himself admitted that Erminda was not a plain housewife and that she helped him in managing their pizza business. 5. Erminda started managing the business in 1976. She worked daily without receiving any salary or allowance. 306. Juaniza vs. Jose ()
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March 30, 1979 De Castro * Jeepney Business of Husband got an accident, is the kabit liable? Facts: 1. Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways that took place on November 23, 1969 which resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of its passengers. 2. A civil case judged asking Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo jointly and severally to pay damages to the victims. 3. At the time of the accident, Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendantappellant, Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen (16) years in a relationship akin to that of husband and wife. 4. Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia Arroyo praying that the decision be reconsidered insofar as it condemns her to pay damages jointly and severally with her co-defendant, Issue: (1) whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a case where one of the parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry, and (2) whether or not Rosalia who is not a registered owner of the jeepney can be held jointly and severally liable for damages with the registered owner of the same. Held: No. The jeepney business is a conjugal property of Eugenio and Socorro Ruling: 1. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the aforecited provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. 2. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife. 3. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of the jeepney which figured in the collision. 4. Furthermore, Rosalia Arroyo, who is not the registered owner of the jeepney can neither be liable for damages caused by its operation. 5. It is settled in our jurisprudence that only the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation, or maybe caused to any of the passengers therein. 307. Yap vs. CA removed 308. Agapay vs. Palang () July 28, 1997 Romero *Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic that she contributed P3,750.00 as her share Facts: 1. Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage with Carlina on July 16, 1949. 2. A few months after the wedding, in October 1949, he left to work in Hawaii. 3. Miguel and Carlinas only child, Herminia Palang, was born on May 12, 1950. 4. Miguel returned in 1954 for a year. 5. In 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. 6. His next visit to the Philippines was in 1964 and during the entire duration of his year-long sojourn he stayed in Zambales with his brother, not in Pangasinan with his wife and child. 7. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with his wife and child, but stayed alone in a house in Pangasinan. 8. On July 15, 1973, the then 63-year old Miguel contracted his second marriage with 19-year old Erlinda Agapay. 9. Two months earlier, on May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101736 covering said rice land was issued in their names. 10. A house and lot was also purchased, allegedly by Erlinda as sole vendee. 11. In 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. They agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child. 12. Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang, born on December 6, 1977 . 13. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. 14. Two years later, on February 15, 1981, Miguel died. 15. In the same year, Carlina Palang and her daughter sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with her. Issue: Who owns the two pieces of property in question? Held: YES. Ruling: 1. The sale of the Riceland was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and

2.
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3.
4.
Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still susbsisting and unaffected by the latters de factoseparation. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, Erlinda was only around 23 and Miguel Palang was already 64 and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property. With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 in 1975 when she was only 22. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim. He testified that Miguel provided the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlindas name alone be placed as vendee. The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code.
309. Tumlos vs. Sps. Fernandez () April 12, 2000 Panganiban *Battle of ownership of love-nest between legal wife and concubine Facts: 1. Mario Fernandez and Guillerma Tumlos are not capacitated to marry each other. She was aware of his prior existing marriage and was promised by Mario to have it annulled which never happened. She was living in their love-nest acquired during their cohabitation. 2. The spouses Mario and Lourdes now filed an ejectment suit against them to vacate the property alleging absolute ownership and failure by her to pay rental despite repeated demand. 3. Guillerma avers that she is a co-owner of the property as evidenced by the contract to sell wherein she is the co-vendee. 4. The RTC settled the case by ruling in favor of the Guillerma for the reason that they needed the support. 5. The CA on the other hand reversed the ruling on the basis that she failed to prove her co-ownership of the disputed property. Issue: What provision should be used in this case to determine ownership Art. 144 of the CC or 148 of the FC? Held: Art. 148. They are incapacitated to marry and Art. 144 refers only also to those whose marriage is void ab initio. Ruling: 1. The land belongs rightfully to the spouses Fernandez because Guillerma failed to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase the subject property. Indeed, she anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with Respondent Mario Fernandez. Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. 2. The basis of the RTC for need for support cannot be presumed. Article [298] of the [New Civil Code] expressly provides that the obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same need it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial and extrajudicial demand .
310. Mallilin v Castillo () June 16, 200 Mendoza The super-adulterous origin of Superfreight Corp Facts: 18. Eustaquio Mallilin and Elvira Castillo started their courtship in 1979 while their marriages were still subsisting. During this time they set up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation, with Eustaquio as President and Elvira as Vice. The business grew eventually which allowed them to purchase some more property. 19. They broke up in 1992, the guy filed a case asking for his share of the properties but the girl said they were registered solely in her name. 20. She answered that the firm was set up by her with other people and that it was her exclusive property (along with everything else that came from it). She even denied that they were together at all since they were still married to other people at the time. She moved that the case be summarily adjudged since the issues were not genuine. 21. The trial court agreed that it only involved a question of law and that summary judgment is proper. It also agreed with Elvira that the case was an attack on the validity of title and not a claim for rightful shares. It argued that upon the end of their cohabitation, an action for partition could not be allowed if the property are exclusively owned by one of the parties (if it says so on the title). It dismissed the civil case. 22. On appeal, the CA remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits. It said that even if a party asserts exclusive ownership in a case like this, the action for partition should not be dismissed right away. It ruled that the one asserting ownership should prove it. It also said that Eustaquios actions actually show that he recognizes the validity of the titles under Elviras na me. 23. Eustaquio moved to reconsider that decision, the CA granted the motion and issued another order, saying pretty much the same things as it did in the first decision. Eustaquio moved to reconsider again but was denied, hence! Issue: (1) Should a summary judgment be issued?
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(2) Can Article 144 apply? Held: NO. (3) Can Article 148 apply? Held: YES. (4) Is it a collateral attack on the Torrens title? Held: NO. Held: NO. The decision was REVERSED and the case was REMANDED to the Makati RTC for trial on the merits. Ruling: 1. A summary judgment can only be used if after the pleadings, depositions, and admissions, there is no veritable issue that surfaced. That is not the case here. Eustaquio claims that eh property was purchased when they were cohabiting, and that he only agreed to have the properties registered in her name due to an agreement they made (thus giving rise to an implied trust under Arts 1452 and 1453 of the NCC). 2. The lower court was wrong to assume that co-ownership cannot exist between them since Article 144 cannot apply (due to the fact that their relationship was adulterous). 3. Article 148 provides that a limited co-ownership can exist between couples like Eustaquio and Elvira. An implied trust can also exist between them since they are co-owners of property acquired during their sexy-time together 4. It is not a collateral attack on property title since it is a valid (not automatically meritorious) action for partition. 311. Saguid vs. CA - removed 258. Villanueva vs. CA () April 14, 2004 - Carpio *Legal wife at the mercy of his husband and querida, BUT.. karma! Facts: 1. Eusebia Retuya is the legal wife of Nicolas Retuya having been married in 1926 , and they begot 5 children. 2. During their marriage they acquired real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City, Consolacion and Cebu. (22 stipulated properties) 3. In 1945, he no longer lived with Eusebia and cohabited with Pacita Villanueva, wherein Procopio, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then was the only person who received income from these properties. 4. Pacita, from the time she started living in with Nicolas, has no occupation, she had no properties of her own from which she could derive income. 5. In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke, cannot talk anymore and in the long run became senile and had a child-like mind. 6. Natividad Retuya, the eldest child of Eusebia, went to Procopio to negotiate about the properties . At this time, Procopio was still the receiver of the income of these properties. 7. However, things were not settled. From a failed barangay mediation, it was raised to a court proceeding by Natividad . The ruling was to transfer the sole administration of the spouses Eusebia-Nicolas to Eusebia because these were conjugal properties, reconveyance of the lands, and ordering Procopio to account and turn-over all proceeds or rentals/income of the conjugal properties when he took over as administrator until he shall have ceased administering. 8. Eusebia died in November 23,1996, and so Eusebias heirs substituted her, which the CA upheld. 9. Pacita and Nicolas were married on December 16, 1996 Take note: Nicolas was already in child-like state at this time. Issue: Are the subject properties conjugal? Held: YES. Ruling: 1. The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnership govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 105 Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the FC w/o prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. 2. Presumption: If properties are acquired during the marriage conjugal 3. Petitioners point out that the deed of sale, the transfer certificalte of title and tax declaration of Lot. No. 152 are all in the name of Pacita and that Pacita is the real owner No. This is just one of the scheme Nicolas employed to deprive Eusebia of their conjugal property. 4. Tax declarations are in the name of Nicolas alone, proving exclusive ownership No. Tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the presumption (See No.2). Article 116 (FC) Presumption remains even if the property is registered in the name of one or both of the spouses. 5. Nicolas, in some documents, misrepresented his civil status by claiming that he was single, proving exclusive ownership No. Whether a property is conjugal or not is determined by law and not by the will of the spouses. No unilateral declaration by one spouse can change the character of conjugal property. 6. Petitioners: The lot cannot be deemed conjugal of Eusebia and Nicolas because Pacita and Nicolas were already cohabiting. JUSTICE CARPIO, ANNOYED: Petitioners keep belaboring this point in their petition and memorandum. The cohabitation of a spouse with another, even for a long period, does not sever the tie of a subsisting marriage. 7. Proof of actual contribution by both live-in partners is required, otherwise, there is no co-ownership and no presumption of
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sharing. Concept: FC 177 Conjugal properties include: those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, obtained from work of either or both spouses, fruits and net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse, share of each spouse in the hidden treasure, livestock upon the dissolution of the partnership and those acquired by chance (losses, however, shall be born exclusively by the loser-spouse) 312. Francisco vs Master Iron Works - removed 313. LUPO ATIENZA, Petitioner, vs. YOLANDA DE CASTRO, Respondent. () November 29, 2006- Garcia *After cohabitation, the Husband was assailing that the property was his but the women is CPA Facts: 1. Lupo Atienza, then the President and General Manager of Enrico Shipping Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation, hired the services of respondent Yolanda U. De Castro as accountant for the two corporations. 2. Lupo and Yolanda became intimate. 3. Despite Lupo being a married man, he and Yolanda eventually lived together later part of 1983. 4. Out of their union, two children were born. However, after the birth of their second child, their relationship turned sour until they parted ways. 5. On May 28, 1992, Lupo filed a complaint against Yolanda for the judicial partition between them of a parcel of land with improvements located in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City 6. Lupo alleged that the subject property was acquired during his union with Yolanda as common-law husband and wife, hence the property is co-owned by them. 7. Lupo averred in his complaint that the property in question was acquired by Yolanda sometime in 1987 using his exclusive funds and that the title thereto was transferred by the seller in Yolandas name without his knowledge and consent. 8. In her answer, Yolanda denied Lupos allegations. According to her, she acquired the same property for Two Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,600,000.00) using her exclusive funds. 9. She insisted having bought it thru her own savings and earnings as a businesswoman. Issue: Is the property an exclusive property or a co-owned property? Held: It is an exclusive property of Yolanda. Ruling: 1. Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way before the Family Code, Article 148 still applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. 2. Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 3. we now remind the petitioner that here, as in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. 4. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. In this case: 5. It is the petitioners posture that the respondent, having no financial capacity to acquire the property in question, merely manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his two (2) corporations to raise the amount needed therefor. 6. Lupo failed to overcome this burden. 7. Rather than presenting proof of his actual contribution to the purchase money used as consideration for the disputed property, [Lupo] diverted the burden imposed upon him to [Yolanda] by painting her as a shrewd and scheming woman without the capacity to purchase any property. 8. He presented documents pertaining to the ins and outs of the dollar accounts of ENRICO and EURASIAN, which unfortunately failed to prove his actual contribution in the purchase of the said property. 9. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, the respondent sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase the property from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail. 10. She presented her clientele and the promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with her clients. 11. She also presented her bank account statements and bank transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay the purchase price of the subject property. Concept:

A. Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to 1. bigamous marriages, 2. adulterous relationships, 3. relationships in a state of concubinage, 4. relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and 5. multiple alliances of the same married man.
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Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ... Proof of actual contribution is required. B. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal. 314. Acre vs. Yutiki () September 27, 2007 Sandoval-Gutierrez Facts: 1. Sofranio and Acre (Petitioner) are married. 2. Sofranio left the conjugal dwelling because of marital disputes (1972) 3. Sofriano married Envangeline [Respondent] (May 1972) 4. The couple bought land and a car. 5. Sofriano died. (1996) 6. Acre claims the property obtained during her h usbands second marriage is hers because of Article 148 which demands coownership. Issue: Does Sofranios legal wife have the right to the property purchased during Sofrianos bigamous marriage? Held: No Ruling: 1. The relationship is bigamous, however the property in dispute was not proved to have been conjugal. 2. Acre failed to present evidence to establish that the husband made actual contributions to acquiring the property. 3. The property was registered in the name of Evangeline Acre, married to Sofronio Acre BUT was later found out that the property was actually registered in the names of Evangeline Acre, married to Sofronio Acre. 4. The rule is well settled that the words married to preceding Sofronio Acre, are merely descriptive of the civil status 5. Said property was exclusively owned by Evangeline.
315. Signey vs. SSS () January 28, 2008 Tinga *The SSS benefits go to (drum roll) the illegitimate children, 100%! Facts: 1. Rodolfo Signey, Sr., a member of the SSS, died on 21 May 2001. 2. In his member records, he had designated Yolanda Signey as primary beneficiary and his four children with her as secondary beneficiaries. 3. She filed a claim for death benefits with the public respondent SSS. She revealed in her SSS claim that the deceased had a common-law wife, Gina Servano (Gina), with whom he had two minor children namey, Ginalyn and Rodelyn. 4. Her declaration was confirmed when Gina herself filed a claim for the same death benefits in which she also declared that both she and petitioner were common-law wives of the deceased and that Editha Espinosa (Editha) was the legal wife. 5. In addition, in October 2001, Editha also filed an application for death benefits with the SSS stating that she was the legal wife of the deceased. 6. The SSS denied the death benefit claim of Yolanda. 7. However, it recognized Ginalyn and Rodelyn, the minor children of the deceased with Gina, as the primary beneficiaries under the SSS Law. 8. The SSS also found that the 20 March 1992 marriage between Yolanda and the deceased was null and void because of a prior subsisting marriage contracted on 29 October 1967 between the deceased and Editha, as confirmed with the Local Civil Registry of Cebu City. Issue: Who is entitled to the SSS benefits of a member who was survived not only by his legal wife, but also by two common-law wives with whom he had six children? Ruling:

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
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6.
The legal wife, Editha, waived her rights subsequently. However, this waiver cannot be a strong ground for Yolanda to claim. Yolanda did not even try to allege and prove any infirmity in the marriage between the deceased and Editha. Yolanda is disqualified to be a beneficiary and Rodolfo has no legitimate child, it follows that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall be entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries. The SSS Law is clear that for a minor child to qualify as a dependent, the only requirements are that he/she must be below 21 years of age, not married nor gainfully employed. Had the legitimate child of the deceased and Editha survived and qualified as a dependent under the SSS Law, Ginalyn and Rodelyn would have been entitled to a share equivalent to only 50% of the share of the said legitimate child. Since the legitimate child of the deceased predeceased him. Ginalyn and Rodelyn, as the only qualified primary beneficiaries of the deceased, are entitled to 100% of the benefits.
316. Borromeo vs. Descallar () February 24, 2009 Puno, CJ *German smitten by scheming waitress na ambisyosa Facts: 1. Willhelm Jambrich a German national working in the country was smitten by a Filipina waitress, Antonietta Descalar who was working in a hotel. He initially asked him to teach him English wherein he eventually fell for her. Willhelm helped her get through her hard life as they lived together and even adopting Anotniettas two children from previous marriage. 2. Willhelm bought three parcels of land that was named after Anotnietta because she told him that he couldnt legally own properties being an alien but his signature was put on it anyway. 3. Their relationship turned sour and both found new lovers. 4. To pay for his debt, Willhelm sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to petitioner for P250,000, as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment. Then he found out that titles to the three lots have been transferred in the name of respondent, and that the subject property has already been mortgaged. 5. Camilo Borromeo to whom Wilhelm is indebted, then filed a case for recovery of property. He alleged that Antonietta did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid for the properties using his exclusive funds. She claimed that she "solely and exclusively used her own personal funds to defray and pay for the purchase price of the subject lots in question Issue: Does Antonietta have the right over the said property? Held: No. They were not capacitated to cohabit as she had a previous subsisting marriage, Ruling: 1. The Court ruled that Jambrich was rightfully the owner of the said properties as it was clear that he had the means to pay for the properties while Antonietta was only a waitress and couldnt have afforded to purchase the properties amounting to 700K. 2. Also the DSWD home report used for the adoption of her two children by Wilhelm showed that Antonietta who was miserable and financially distressed at that time accepted the offer for the sake of the children . 3. The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not apply. In the instant case, respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists between the parties 4. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply . 5. The transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner, Borromeo, who is a Filipino citizen. 317. Heirs of Maramag v Maramag () June 5, 2009 Nachura Illegitimate Insurance Facts: 1. Loreto cohabited with Eva while he was still married to Vicenta (he had children with both), and it was during this time that he purchased insurance policies with Insular Life and Grepalife. 2. Loreto died, and to Vicentas disbelief, the policies were not added to his estate. Instead they were awarded to Loretos illegitimate children. She filed a case asking for the money to be transferred to Loretos estate, and she included everyone involved in the pleading. 3. The illegitimate family did not respond (as they were out of sight, perhaps enjoying Loretos money i n the Bahamas or wherever), but the two companies were forced to. Insular Life claimed that they discovered Loretos assignment of Eva as bein g wrong, which is why they awarded the policy to the children. Grepalife said that the only recipients assigned were the illegitimate children. 4. Both companies claimed that the proceeds belong to the designated beneficiaries, and that nevertheless the rule on succession does not apply when the designation of beneficiaries is not clear.

5.
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The lower court ruled that the illegitimate children are off the hook, but that the two companies and Eva were not. Insular and Grepalife both moved for reconsideration again, and the petitioner-heirs just repeated their contentions. 6. The lower court granted the motion for reconsideration and basically ruled that the proceeds cannot go to the estate. The heirs appealed to the CA, which was dismissed, hence the present case. Issue: Should the petition be denied? Held: YES. The petition was DENIED for lack of merit. Ruling: 1. First and foremost, the civil code provides that insurance policies are to be governed by special laws. And the proper provision states that whoever is designated will get the proceeds. 2. The petitioners are only third parties to the case and are thus not entitled to the proceeds. 318. Atilde ALAVADO v. City of Tacloban () 1985 Cuevas *wife submits church document as proof of marital status to get husbands death benefits Facts: 1. The late Ricardo Alavado was employed as a carpenter-foreman by the City Engineer's Office. His last day of service was on April 19, 1974 since he was on leave from April 23, 1974 to May 23, 1974. 2. On August 6, 1974 when he reported for work, he was no longer under the supervision of respondent city. He suffered severe headache when he was supervising laborers on a construction project in Tolosa, Leyte. He died the following day of CVACerebral Hemorrhage. 3. Petitioner, the surviving spouse, filed a claim for death benefits in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children. 4. This was denied because of lack of marriage contract that petitioner could present. What was submitted by her is a mere copy issued by the church authorities where the questioned marriage was solemnized. Issue: May a marriage certificate considered satisfactory proof of marital status? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. Court didnt mind because Alavado later on submitted a marriage certificate. The said document indubitably establishes claimant marriage to the deceased Alavado. 319. Gayon vs. Gayon () 26 Nov 1970 Concepcion *brother-in-law not part of the family Facts: 1. On 31 Jul 1967, Pedro Gayon filed a complaint against spouses Silvestre and Genoveva Gayon. Silvestre is his brother. 2. Pedro alleged that on 1 Oct 1952, the spouses sold a land to Pedro Gelera for 500 subject to redemption within 5 years. They did not exercise the right of redemption. 3. On 21 Mar 1961, Pedro Gelera sold the land to him for 614. He had since introduced improvements on the land worth 1,000. 4. He filed the suit to obtain a decree for the consolidation of the title to a land acquired through a conditional sale. 5. In Genovevas answer, she stated that Silvestre died on 6 Jan 1954. Also, she argued that being a brother of Silvestre, Pedro did not exert efforts for the amicable settlement of the case. She then filed a motion to dismiss. 6. On 16 Sep 1967, the lower court dismissed the case and held that Silvestre is the absolute owner of the land. Issue: Is Pedro required to exert efforts to amicably settle the case? Held: No. Silvestres heirs are not included in the family. Ruling: 1. Since Genoveva (sister-in-law) and her children (nephews/nieces) were not included in the enumeration under Art. 217 included in the family, Pedro was not required to exert efforts to amicably settle the case. 2. The enumeration in Art. 217 should be construed strictly for Art. 222 to apply. Concept: Civil Code, Article 217. Family relations shall include those: 1. Between husband and wife; 2. Between parent and child; 3. Among other ascendants and their descendants; 4. Among brothers and sisters. Civil Code, Article 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035.
320. Wainright Versoza vs. Versoza ()
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November 27, 1968 Sanchez *Compromise for support was not alleged in the information, proper? Facts: 1. On March 4, 1964, a verified complaint for P1,500.00 monthly support, support in arrears, and damages, and custody of children, with a petition for support pendente lite was lodged against Jose Ma. Versoza by his wife, Margaret Ann Wainright Versoza, and their three minor children 2. Jose Versoza attacked the complaint on the claim that it is premature and/or that it states no cause of action. 3. the complaint which involves members of the same family does allege earnest efforts toward a compromise before the complaint was filed as set forth in the statute mentioned at the start of this opinion. Issue: Should there be compromise made and alleged in the information before a complaint can be file for support? Held: No. Ruling: 1. The text of Article 222 of the Civil Code is this: "No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035." 2. GENERAL RULE: The cumulative impact of the statute and the rule just adverted to is that earnest efforts to reach a compromise and failure must be alleged in the complaint. Attempt to compromise and inability to arrive thereat is a condition precedent to the filing of the suit 3. Future support operates outside the ambit 4. The right to support cannot be: (1) renounced; (2) transmitted to third persons; nor (3) compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor . 5. Compensation may not even be set up against a creditor who has a claim for support due by gratuitous title. 6. Of course, support in arrears is a different thing altogether, may be compensated, renounced and transmitted by onerous or gratuitous title 7. Plaintiffs ask for support past, present and future. There is also the prayer for alimony pendente lite. Since the present action also revolves on the right to future support and because compromise on future support is prescribed then the conclusion is irresistible that an attempt at compromise of future support and failure thereof is not a condition precedent to the filing of the present suit. Concept: ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1) The civil status of persons; (2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation; (4) Future support; (5) The jurisdiction of courts; (6) Future legitime. 321. Magbaleta vs. Gonong () BarredoApril 22, 1977 *Third party should not be made to depend on the bickering of family members Facts: 1. Rufino and Romana are married. (1st and 2nd petitioner) 2. Susan bought a parcel of land from the couple. (3rd petitioner) 3. The land is covered by a free patent title in the name of Rufino. 4. Private respondent is Rufinos brother and claims ownership over the said land. 5. Petitioners say that the respondent did not state in his suit that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made be fore the case was filed. 6. Respondent in this current case is the judge who ruled in favor of private respondent (brother of Rufino) Issue: Was it necessary to stipulate in the suit that there were earnest efforts were made to form a compromise? Held: No Ruling: 1. It is neither practical nor fair that the determination of the rights of a stranger to the family who just happened to have innocently acquired some kind of interest in any right or property disputed among its members should be made to depend on the way the latter would settle their differences among themselves. 2. Since Susana is a stranger and a third party, the legal provision does not apply. 322. De Guzman vs. Genato ()
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April 30, 1979 Concepcion, Jr. *H enlisted the help of the Constabulary to reach a compromise, but failed Facts: 1. H & W: Aurelio Jutba and Jovencia de Guzman 2. H was seriously ill and hospitalized, W and her paramour left for Manila for unknown destination. 3. In 1974, W and her paramour were living as husband and wife in Davao City. 4. They were twice summoned by the Philippine Constabulary for confrontation and arrangement but refused to appear. 5. H filed a complaint against W and Federico Recario (paramour), for indemnification of damages incurred by him on account of their adulterous acts and for his share in the fruits of the conjugal partnership properties during the time when the conjugal partnership was administered by his wife. 6. W and Federico filed their respective motions to dismiss based on: a) H has no cause of action since this is a suit between members of the same family and there is no allegation to show the earnest efforts towards a compromise, but that the same have failed, b) the venue is improperly laid, should have been filed where the properties are found. 7. The motion to dismiss was denied. Issue: Is the contention of the wife correct, that there is no cause of action since the suit is between a husband and a wife without any allegation of earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed? Held: NO. Ruling: 7. The husband has exerted efforts to meet his wife and even enlisted the help of the Philippine Constabulary who summoned his wife for confrontation and arrangement, but the wife refused to see him. There is substantial compliance with the law. 8. It is not necessary that Aurelio should expressly use the terms in the statute that earnest efforts towards a compromise hav e been made, but the same have failed in his pleadings in order to comply with the requirement. 9. (Issue of venue) The action is purely personal and is for the recovery of damages. Although Aurelio had mentioned real properties belonging to the conjugal partnership, he is not asking to be declared the rightful owner or lawful possessor of such, nor is he asking for its partition, in order to classify it as a real action. 10. The court lifts the TRO that Aurelio filed to restrain his wife from selling certain parcels of land belonging to the conjugal partnership. 323. Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank vs. Acua () August 31, 2006 Austria Martinez *No way bank &others, 151 is exclusive for family only Facts: Alberto Romulo filed a cancellation of mortgage against Hiyas Savings & Loan, his wife and spouses Owe, contending that he did not sign a contract of loan and mortgage that it was his wife in conspiracy with spouses Owe who made it appear that he signed it. He couldnt have done so because he was working abroad. The bank contends Art. 151 provides that a no suit may prosper between family members unless it appears on the verified complaint that an earnest effort towards a compromise has been made. Issues: Could the Art. 151 be applicable in this case? Held: No, it is exclusive for family only. Ruling: The court ruled that once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the s ame family the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that an earnest effort towards compromise before action can prosper. The ruling in Magbeleta now prevails where the case involving brothers and a stranger to the family who claims ownership of the property that efforts to a compromise is not a jurisdictional pre-requisite when a stranger becomes a party. It is for reason that it would be inconvenient for the stranger and neither practical for him to depend on how the family members would settle it to themselves. 324. Intestate estate of Gonzales vs. People () February 11, 2010 Corona "Mediatrix the Executrix VS William Sato the thieving Jap" Facts: 1. William Sato made his mother-in-law Manolita Gonzales sign a document granting special power of attorney to his daughter Wendy over Manolita's property. The old woman died after that on November 24, 1992. 2. William then sold 4 parcels of property by having Wendy sign three deeds of sale. Mediatrix, his sister-in-law and the executrix of the estate of Manolita, found out about it and filed an estafa case against him. 3. The thieving Japanese then opposed the complaint, arguing that according to Article 332 of the RPC, he cannot be made liable to the criminal case owing to the fact that he is Manolita's son-in-law. 4. The trial court granted the opposition, stating that the Article was meant to prevent scandal and preserve harmony. A
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motion for reconsideration was filed by the estate, claiming that the exempting circumstance was not available anymore since William's wife, Zenaida was already dead (thereby dissolving the defense of relationship by affinity to Manolita). It was denied. 5. The CA also dismissed the appeal filed by the estate, finding merit in the ruling of the trial court. The reconsideration was denied as well, hence this case. Issue: (1) Was Mediatrix correct in her argument regarding the effect of death on relationship by affinity? Held: NO. (2) Should William be abloved of the estafa? Held: NO. Ruling: 1. The effect of death on the absolutory cause of relationship by affinity has never been dealt with in Philippine jurispridence. However, American jurisprudence does offer two different views on the subject: the terminated affinity and the continuing affinity. 2. The continuing affinity rule applies when we are confronted with question regarding Article 332, because it is more in tune with the provision's goal of providing lenity (?) to the accused. 3. However, the crime alleged in the information (and the one shown by the FACTS included in the information) is that of estafa through falsification of public documents. It is not included in Article 332. 4. William should not be absolved because Article 332 cannot be used to exempt him from liability. It works to take out liability when the issue involved is a property right due to family relation, but it loses force when the issue is "of paramount public interest". Concept: There are various effects of affinity or familial relations on criminal and even civil liability. Most of the time it works to save one's ass, just don't get the state involved. 325. Republic v. Cayetano SERRANO, Heirs of Catalino Alaan () 2010 Carpio-Morales Facts: 1. Respondent Cayetano Serrano (Cayetano) filed on September 1988 an application for registration over a parcel of land which he claimed to have acquired the lot by inheritance from his deceased parents, Simeon Serrano (Simeon) and Agustina Luz 2. The Heirs of Catalino Alaan, represented by Paulita Alaan intervened and filed an application for registration, their predecessorin-interest Catalino Alaan (Catalino) having purchased7 an undivided portion of the lot from Cayetano on February 1989 during the pendency of Cayetanos application for registration. 3. Cayetanos brother-attorney-in-fact Leonardo Serrano (Leonardo) represented him at the hearings of the application. During the pendency of the case, Cayetano passed away and was substituted by his heirs. 4. Leonardo declared that his family had lived on the lot since pre-war time, his father Simeon having built a house on it; that after his fathers death in 1931, his mother and his brother Cayetano continued to possess the lot in the concept of owners and Cayetano in fact built his own house and a bodega thereon; that Cayetano religiously paid real estate taxes from 1951 up to the current year 1997; that the lot was assigned to him and Cayetano as their share of the inheritance by virtue of a private document, which was executed by all of the heirs, the contents of which document were subsequently confirmed in a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement 5. On the other hand, Paulita, wife of Catalino who represented the heirs of Catalino, declared that in February 1989, Cayetano sold to her husband a certain portion of the lot and that Catalino religiously paid its taxes Issue: Is the property in questionable an alienable one? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed . 2. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; 3. In one case, the Court held: "to prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute." 4. Here, the petitioner admits that the subject property was released and certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR. 5. While Cayetano failed to submit any certification which would formally attest to the alienable and disposable character of the land applied for, the Certification by DENR Regional Technical Director clearly indicates that the lot in question had been verified as belonging to the alienable and disposable area as early as July 18, 1925. 6. On what constitutes open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation as required by statute: for an

7.
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applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. Finally, the official receipts of realty tax payments religiously made by Cayetano from 1948 to 1997 further serve as credible indicia that Cayetano, after his fathers death in 1931, continued to exercise acts of dominion over the lot. The totality of the evidence thus points to the unbroken chain of acts exercised by Cayetano to demonstrate his occupation and possession of the land in the concept of owner, to the exclusion of all others.
326. Taneo Jr. vs. Court of Appeals () 9 Mar 1999 Kapunan *registration of family home done to avoid execution Facts: 1. Pablo Taneo bought a land on 18 Sep 1941. 2. On 19 Jul 1951, Abdon Gilig filed a case for recovery of property against Pablo Taneo. On 24 Jun 1964, the court ruled in favor of Abdon and ordered Pablo to pay damages in the amount of 5,000. 3. On 22 Nov 1965, a writ of execution was issued against the properties of Pablo. It was finally sold to Abdon on 2 Mar 1966 through a sheriffs sale. 4. On 7 Mar 1964, Pablo constituted a house erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares as a family home. It was registered with the Register of Deeds on 24 Jun 1966. 5. To forestall conveyance, the heirs of Pablo Taneo filed a suit to declare the deed of conveyance in favor of Abdon void claiming that the property conveyed was their family home extrajudicially constituted. Pablo died on 12 Feb 1977. 6. RTC dismissed the complaint. Court of Appeals affirmed. Issue: Is the house of Pablo Taneo exempt from execution? Held: No. At the time the debt was incurred by Pablo, the family home was not yet constituted thus falling under the exception of Article 243 (2). Ruling: 1. A family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family . Under the Civil Code, it may be constituted judicially (by the filing of a petition and the approval of the court) and extrajudicially (by the recording of a public instrument in the Registry of Deeds). 2. Under the Family Code, registration was no longer necessary . Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied in the family residence . However, the retroactive effect of the Family Code cannot be applied. 3. Civil Code provisions apply where registration of the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite. 4. Pablo constituted the house in 7 Mar 1964 but was registered as a family home only on 24 Jan 1966. The money judgment against Pablo was rendered on 24 Jan 1964. Thus, at the time when the debt was incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or even registered. 5. The house erected was not even on the land in question but on the land of Plutarco Vacalares. The law is understood that the house should be constructed on a land not belonging to another (should be the familys own land) . 6. Thus, the constitution of a family home by Pablo was merely an afterthought in order to escape the execution of their property. Concept: Civil Code, Article 43. The family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, except: (2) For debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the Registry of Property. Family Code, Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. 327. Patricio vs. Dario III () November 20, 2008 Ynares-Santiago * Grandchild wanted to stay inside the family home Facts: 1. Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. 2. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III 3. Petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario 4. Private respondent refused to partition the property which is the FAMILY HOME because while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the decedent the same continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of age. 5. Petitioner alleges that the subject property remained as a family home of the surviving heirs of the late Marcelino V. Dario
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only up to July 5, 1997, which was the 10th year from the date of death of the decedent. Issue: Is the said property still be considered as the Family Home within the Family Code? Held: No. Failed to comply the third requisite for the child of the respondent to be considered beneficiary of the Family Home. Ruling: 1. Dr. Tolentino that as a general rule, the family home a. may be preserved for a minimum of 10 years following the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who constituted the family home, or of the spouse who consented to the constitution of his or her separate property as family home. b. After 10 years and a minor beneficiary still lives therein , the family home shall be preserved only until that minor beneficiary reaches the age of majority. 2. The intention of the law is to safeguard and protect the interests of the minor beneficiary until he reaches legal age and would now be capable of supporting himself. 3. However, three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code ; - private respondent's minor son, who is also the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario satisfies the first requisite. (2) they live in the family home, and - the son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite. (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. - Grandchild cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. - The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents. - cralawMarcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother , but from his father. - Despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite Concept: What is Family Home? - The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during one's lifetime. - It is the dwelling house where husband and wife, or by an unmarried head of a family, reside, including the land on which it is situated. - It is constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family - The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence . - From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law Who should occupy? The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by 'any of its beneficiaries' must be actually occupying. Actual is something real, or actually existing. Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters , whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. What is legal support? Legal support, also known as family support, is that which is provided by law, comprising everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Legal support has the following characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on family ties which bind the obligor and the obligee;

(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) It is intransmissible; It cannot be renounced; It cannot be compromised; It is free from attachment or execution; It is reciprocal; It is variable in amount.
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328. Modequillo vs. Breva () Gancayco--- May 31, 1990 Facts: 1. July 7, 1988- the sheriff levied a parcel of residential land and an agricultural land, both of which were registered to Jose Modequillo (Petitioner). 2. Petioner moved to quash the levy of execution because the residential land is where the family home was built in 1969, thus exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152, 153 and except Art 155 the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated in Ar. aticle 155 of the family code. 3. Petitioner claims the residential house and lot was first occupied in 169. 4. Petitioner claims that it was duly constituted as a family home under the family code which took effect n August 4, 1988, thus it should be exempt from payment of the obligations enumerated in Article 155 of the Family Code. Issue: Is the residential lot the family home? Held: No Ruling: 1. The residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extra judicially under the Civil Code. 2. The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken 3. It does not mean that Articles 152- 153 of the Family Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectiviy of the family code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effecitivity of the family code. 4. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the family code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. 329. Honrado vs. CA () November 25, 2005 Callejo, Sr. *property is a family home, but since he did not object right away, bye bye property Facts: 1. Premium Agro-Vet Products, Inc. filed a complaint for sum of money against Jose Honrado, who was doing business under the name J. E. Honrado Enterprises. Premium sought to collect money representing the total price of veterinary products purchased on credit by Honrado. 2. Honrado failed to appear, as well as his counsel, at the pre-trial conference and so he was declared in default. 3. It turned out that Spouses Jose and Andrerita Honrado filed a petition for the judicial constitution of the parcel of land registered in Honrados name, located in Calamba, and the house thereon, as their family house. (Honrado and his family had been occupying it as early as 1992). 4. Premium won the case, and so after Honrados appeals were denied, the sheriff levied that parcel of land in Calamaba. The sheriff set the sale of the property, Honrado was served with a notice copy, but he opposed. 5. The property was sold to Premium, being the highest bidder. The Certificate of Sale was then issued, and Honrado failed to redeem the property. 6. In the meantime, in the case filed by the spouses for judicial constitution, the property was declared a family home. 7. This led to Honrado filing a motion to declare properties exempt from execution under Art. 155 of the Family code. He alleged that the property is exempt because it is a family home which had been constituted as such before he concurred his indebtedness with premium. He also alleged that he and his family had no other real property except that land. 8. Premium opposed on the ground that Honrado was already stopped, and that the claim has been mooted by the lapse of the redemption period. Also, Premium averred that Honrado and his family even vacated the said property. 9. The court ruled that Honrado is deemed to have waived the exemption, and Honrado did not assail the said order. 10. Premium filed a motion for issuance of final deed of conveyance and write of possession, but AGAIN (kuya ang kulit mo) Honrado opposed the said motion claiming that the said property was declared a family home. Issue: Is their justification in levying the property, the alleged family home? Held: YES.
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Ruling: 1. While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under FC 153, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption. 2. He was deemed to have waived the exemption: a) He allowed the sale to proceed, b) He vacated the property after the sale, c) he even surrendered the key to the house. Plus, d) Honrado opposed the motion of premium, but did not file any reply to it, AND he did not reveal to the RTC right away the judgment declaring the property a family home. 3. Spouses filed a case to declare house family home December 11, 1997 February 3, 1999: Premiums Case March 29, 2000 May 23, 2001: Levy, Sale, Issuance of Title April 29, 2002: Property declared family home May 3, 2002 Sept 18, 2002: Honrados case to exempt said property November 25, 2002: When Honrado finally opposes the final deed of conveyance See? Even before November 25, he should have informed the court of the April 29, 2002 decision. 4. There was even no showing during the hearing that Honrado adduced evidence to prove the value of the property and that it is, indeed, a family home. 5. We now rule that claims for exemption from execution of properties under Section 12 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court must be presented before its sale on execution by the sheriff. 330. Cabang vs. Basay () March 20, 2009 Ynares-Santiago *Wrong lot for a family home Facts: The Cabangs owns a land (Lot. 7777) which they bought in 1987 from the heirs of a certain Mr. Felix Odong. Meanwhile Sps. Guillermo Basay have been living on the same land since 1956 believing that it was the land (Lot. 7778) awarded to them in a cadastral proceeding when in fact it is not. When it was known the Cabangs filed a Recovery of Property. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants-Basays for the recovery has been barred by laches. But upon appeal to the CA, judgment is reversed. The defendants then filed an appeal to the Suprem Court that was denied for late filing and lack of appropriate service. Subsequently, the resolution has become final and executory. During the proceeding for enforcement, the Basays refused the payment of 21K for the improvements they made alleging that it is a family home and cannot be subject to execution. An order for execution was ordered for them to remove or an Order of Demolition will be issued. Issues: Could the defense of family home be used by the Basays ? Held: No. The decision is final and executory and owned by the Cabangs. Ruling: The purpose of the proceeding was the enforcement of the final and executory judgments. It can no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. 11 The only exceptions to this rule are the correction of (1) clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments. Furthermore it was already determined by the appellate court that it was already of judicial notice that the improvements introduced by petitioners on the litigated property are residential houses not family homes. Belatedly interposing such an extraneous issue at such a late stage of the proceeding is tantamount to interfering with and varying the terms of the final and executory judgment and a violation of respondents right to due process. There can be no question that a family home is generally exempt from execution, provided it was duly constituted as such. It is likewise a given that the family home must be constituted on property owned by the persons constituting it . Concept: Family home: is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memorie s that last during ones lifetime. It is the dwelling house where the husband and wife, or an unmarried head of a family reside, including the land on which it is situated. It is constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family. The family home must be established on the properties of (a) the absolute community, or (b) the conjugal partnership, or (c) the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the other. It cannot be established on property held in co-ownership with third persons.
331. Cabreza v Cabreza ()
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September 11, 2009 Peralta Sell the house Facts: 1. Ceferino filed a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Amparo, which the RTC granted. The conjugal partnership was dissolved by the court in accordance Article 129 of the Family Code. 2. After the declaration, Ceferino filed a motion for execution of the judgment dissolving their conjugal partnership, and since it was composed of a single piece of property (their house), the motion was aimed toward its sale. 3. The RTC granted the motion and the sale (even authorizing Ceferino to sign on behalf of Amparo). Amparo moved to reconsider, but the motion was denied. 4. The RTC then granted a writ of possession in favor of the buyer, BJD Holdings. A notice to vacate was then served on Amparo and her family. 5. Amparo tried to stop the orders through a motion for abeyance, arguing that Article 129 (9) of the Family Code says that she should get the house since she's the spouse whom majority of the children chose to stay with. 6. The RTC denied the motion and the subsequent motions for reconsideration. Issue: Should Amparo's motions be granted? Held: NO. The decision was AFFIRMED. Ruling: 1. The Article relied on by Amparo applies only to a situation where there are other properties aside from the property subject of the motion. 2. Since Amparo was not able to prove that there were other properties, the motion cannot be granted. 3. Even if she's telling the truth, the order has already become final and executory. The wheels are in motion, so to speak. Concept: Perhaps the concept behind this case is that an order dissolving the property regime, as well as a subsequent order declaring the partition of properties, are final and executory and there's nothing the spouses can do about it except question the amount of partition. I seriously think the ruling here is WRONG. 332. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Edgardo VIRAY () 2010 Carpio *bank cant take away debtors property thats protected by a 5-yr shield law Facts: 1. Rico Shipping, Inc., represented by its President, Erlinda Viray-Jarque, together with respondent Edgardo D. Viray (Viray ) obtained 3 loans (one in 1979, two in 1981) from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (MBTC). Then as usual, they executed a promissory note promising to pay. As usual again, they failed to pay. So of course, MBTC filed a complaint for sum of money against the debtors. 2. Meanwhile, on 29 December 1982, the government issued Free Patents in favor of Viray over three parcels of land. Now there is an attached prohibition to this land title saying that as required by Section 118 of CA 141 the land thereby acquired shall be inalienable and shall not be subject to encumbrance for a period of five (5) years from the date of this patent, and shall not be liable for the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period 3. On 6 March 1984, the RTC of Manila issued a writ of execution over the lots owned by Viray. On 12 October 1984, pursuant to the writ of execution, the Sheriff sold the lots at public auction in favor of MBTC as the winning bidder. 23 August 1990, the sheriff executed a Deed of Final Conveyance to MBTC. 4. Viray filed an action for annulment of sale. 5. Petitioner MBTC insists that the five-year prohibition period against the alienation or sale of the property provided in Section 118 of CA 141 does not apply to an obligation contracted before the grant or issuance of the free patent or homestead. The alienation or sale stated in the law pertains to voluntary sales and not to forced or execution sales. Issue: Does the auction sale fall within the five-year prohibition period laid down in Section 118 of CA 141 ? Held: Yes, so it cannot be liable for Virays debts to MBTC Ruling: 1. The execution sale of the lots occurred less than two years after the date of the issuance of the patents . This clearly falls within the five-year prohibition period provided in the law, regardless of the dates when the loans were incurred. 2. For a period of five years or from 29 December 1982 up to 28 December 1987, Section 118 of CA 141 provides that the lots comprising the free patents shall not be made liable for the payment of any debt until the period of five years expires. 3. It is immaterial that the satisfaction of the debt by the encumbrance or alienation of the land grant was made voluntarily, as in the case of an ordinary sale, or involuntarily, such as that effected through levy on the property and consequent sale at public auction. In both instances, the law would have been violated. 4. This simply means that it is not material whether the debt is contracted before the five-year prohibitory period; what is
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material is that the debt must be contracted before or prior to the expiration of the five-year prohibitory period from the date of the issuance and approval of the patent or grant. 333. Tan vs. Trocio () 27 Nov 1990 Melencio-Herrera *Jewel presumed legitimate son but not of the rapist Facts: 1. Sometime in April 1971, Felicidad Tan, owner of a school, was allegedly raped by her lawyer, Atty. Galileo Trocio, inside her office. As a result of the rape, a son named Jewel Tan was born. 2. Because of Galileos threat that he will have her alien spouse deported and considering her position as a school directress, she did not file a complaint. After eight years and thorough soul-searching, she filed an administrative complaint. 3. The Court referred the case to the OSG for investigation. On 16 May 1986, OSG recommended that he be disbarred. 4. Galileo denies raping Felicidad. He argues that her motivation in filing the charge was to get even with him after he refused her request to commit a breach of trust in overcharging her mother and also to escape her indebtedness to him arising both from his legal fees. Issue: Is Atty. Trocio the father of her son, Jewel? Held: No. The presumption was he is the legitimate son of Felicidad and her husband. Ruling: 1. The testimonies of her domestic helpers as to the closeness between Galileo and Jewel are not convincing enough to prove paternity as well as the pictures of Jewel and Galileo showing their alleged physical likeness to each other. 2. Jewel was born in 1972 during the wedlock of Felicidad and her husband thus presumption should be in favor of legitimacy unless physical access between the couple was impossible. 3. Jewel was registered in his birth certificate as the legitimate child of Felicidad and her husband , Tan Le Pok. 4. There was insufficient basis to disbar Atty. Trocio based on her charges. a) The threat to deport her alien husband was already inexistent since the husband left her upon knowledge that she was raped. b) She continued having dealings with Galileo as if nothing had happened. These dealings are far from being the normal reaction of a woman who has been wronged. c) The fact that she kept her peace for so many years can even be construed as a condonation of his alleged immoral conduct. d) It is strange that an unwanted son be called Jewel. 335. Angeles vs. Maglaya () September 2, 2005- Garcia *Daughter wanted to be the administrator but turned out to be not a legitimate daughter Facts: 1. Francisco, died intestate on January 21, 1998 leaving behind four (4) parcels of land and a building, 2. That there is a need to appoint an administrator of Francisco's estate; 3. Corazon is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and, together with petitioner, 4. Belen S. Angeles, decedent's wife by his second marriage, are the surviving heirs of the decedent; and 5. Belen opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of Corazon, be made the administratrix of Francisco's estate - Belen married Francisco on August 7, 1948 Francisco represented in their marriage contract that he was single at that time. - Corazon could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco's legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by Francisco - Corazon has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. - Belen and Francisco had, during their marriage, legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et al. 6. Corazons defense: - Records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. - She also testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child . - Four (4) other witnesses testified on her behalf, - Respondent also offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained an entry stating handwritten word 'Yes appears on the space below the question 'Legitimate? (Legitimo?); - pictures taken during respondent's wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; and - a copy of her marriage contract. - offered were her scholastic and government service records. Issue: Whether or not Corazon is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado Held: No. Ruling:
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Marriage Contract 1. To stress, no marriage certificate or marriage contract ' doubtless the best evidence of Francisco's and Genoveva's marriage, if one had been solemnized' was offered in evidence. 2. No priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority was called to the witness box to declare that he solemnized the marriage between the two. 3. None of the four (4) witnesses respondent presented could say anything about, let alone affirm, that supposed marriage. 4. In all, no evidence whatsoever was presented of the execution of the Francisco Angeles-Genoveva Mercado marriage contract; when and where their marriage was solemnized; the identity of the solemnizing officer; the persons present, and like significant details. 5. While petitioner may have submitted certifications to the effect that the records of marriages during the war years . . . were totally destroyed, no secondary evidence was presented by petitioner to prove the existence Pictures 6. Petitioner presented pictures. x x x However, it is already settled law that photographs are not sufficient evidence of filiation or acknowledgment. Birth Certificate 7. the Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was signed by the attending physician. 8. Such certificate, albeit considered a public record of a private document is, under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its execution: the fact of birth of a child . 9. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses Appointment of Administrator 10. it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. 336. SSS vs. Aguas () CallejoFeb 27, 2006 *fight for sss pension by a wife who slept with someone else Facts: 1. Pablo and Rosanna are married. 2. Pablo died in Dec 8, 1996. 3. Rosanna immediately wanted to transfer the pension to her as his beneficiary. Their Children: A. Jeylnn is their lawful child. (based on accepted witness) B. Janet is their claimed adopted child. 4. Leticia, is Pablos sister, who claims that Rosanna should not be entitled to the pension because she left the family 6 ye ars before and lived with another man. Thus, she cannot be considered a dependent under SSS rules. 5. Leticia also says that Janet and Jeylnn (their supposed children) should not be considered as legitimate children because Pablo was infertile, thus incapable of coitus. 6. Leticia says that she married Romeo (Nov 1990) after she left and had children with him. 7. SSS suspended the pension because of Leticias letter to them that contained the facts above stated. Issue: A. Is Rosanna entitled to the pension? Held: No B. Is Jeylynn entitled to the pension? Held: Yes C. Is Janet entitled to the pension? Held: No Ruling: A. 1. Rosanna has produced insufficient evidence to prove that she is still dependent for support. 2. Court gives credence to the witness who testified that the couple separated due to a fight over the need to change the name of one of their children. (402) 3. Thus, the burden of proof is placed on the wife who separated de facto from her husband. Concept: if it had been proved that they lived together at the time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on the husband for support. (this was not proven) B.
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1. She is entitled to the pension because her birth certificate shows the signature of her father Pablo. 2. She was born during the marriage. Concept: Birth cert. signed by father is competent evidence of paternity (p.399) C. 1. She is not entitled because of insufficient proof to show that she was a legitimate heir. 2. The birth certificate was a mere photocopy and was not registered from the civil registry. This is not binding in court. 3. Thus, there was no reliable evidence to prove the date of birth. 337. Rivera vs. Heirs of Romualdo Villanueva () July 21, 2006 Corona Daughter is not sole heir, Adulterous relationship, Heirs at War Facts: 1. Petitioners: half-brothers (Elino and Dominador), half-sister-in-law (Soledad), and the children of a half-brother (Teofila and Cecilia) of the deceased Pacita Gonzales 2. Respondents: full-blooded siblings (Catalino, Lucia, Purificacion and Melchor) and half-brother (Arnaldo V. Avendano) of Romualdo Villanueva The heirs of Villanueva, represented by Melchor, who were allowed to substitute for Villanueva upon his death; (remaining respondents) Angelina Villanueva (daughter) and huband Victoriano de Luna (son-in-law) 3. From 1927 until her death in 1980, Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva (no marriage) because Villanueva was married to Amanda Musngi, who died in 1963. 4. In the course of their cohabitation, they acquired several properties : lands, shares of stocks, jewelries, savings deposit, etc. 5. Gonzales died without a will. 6. Villanueva and Angelina executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with sale (settlement of Gonzales estate). In this docume nt, Villanueva, for P30,000, conveyed his interests in the estate to Angelina. 7. The half-brothers of Pacita filed a case for partition of Gonzales estate and annulment of titles with damages. The court dismissed: 1) Gonzales was never married to Villanueva, 2) Angelina was her illegitimate child by Villanueva and therefore her sole heir. 8. Petitioners appealed to the CA: Angelina is not Gonzales illegitimate daughter because there was an appointed administrator of the estate, Epifanio Rivera, declared in Special Proceedings No. SD-144; CA, however, affirmed the trial courts decision. Issue: Are the findings in SD-144 conclusive and therefore res judicata? Held: NO. Is Angelina, Gonzales illegitimate daughter? Held: NO. Are the real properties owned by Villanueva and Gonzales real properties? Held: No. Ruling: First Issue: SD-144 is not res judicata because the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over Angelinas person. She was not a party there. There was also no identity of cause of action between the two suits. Second Issue: No, and so she cannot inherit from Gonzales 1. A closer examination of the birth certificate reveals that Angelina was listed as adopted by both Villanueva and Gonzales. 2. The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate, as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption. 3. Angelina was not Gonzales daughter, whether illegitimate or adopted. Gonzales was 44 years old, on the verge of menopause at the time of the alleged birth. 4. Gonzales had also been living childless with Villanueva for 20 years. Third Issue: Gonzales sole property must accrue entirely to heirs 1. Romulado claimed that he and Pacita were married, but it turned out that he was not because his marriage with Amanda was still subsisting Adulterous relationship from 1927-1963 2. Their property relations were not governed by Art. 144 of the Civil Code while applies only if the couple living together is not in any way incapacitated from getting married. 3. There is only one parcel of land registered solely in Gonzales name which was acquired between t hose years. 4. Villanueva sought to prove that he alone had purchased the properties, but he never actually challenged the validity of the registration in her name. 5. The rest of the properties registered solely in Gonzales name were also acquired after Amandas death These are therefore governed under Art. 144, and so half to Gonzales heirs and the other half to Villanueva PETITION GRANTED BUT CASE REMANDED for the determination and identification of Pacita Gonzales heirs and partition of her estate. 338. Moore vs. Republic ()
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June 26, 1963 Bautista Angelo *minor child cant change surname to new father Facts: 1. Elaine Moore is an American Citizen separated from his first husband, also an American citizen, Mr. Velarde with whom they had a child William Michael Velarde. Their marriage has been dissolved. 2. She is now married to Don Moore with William, who now is still minor at 14yrs of age and is treated by him like a true son. She now asks the court to have her sons name be changed to his current husbands name, Moore . Issues: Could William be named after his stepfather? Held: No, the law clearly provides that legitimate children should follow the name of his father. Ruling: 1. The Art. 369 provides a legal barrier as it says that children born before the annulment of a voidable marriage shall use the surname of their real father. 2. The court further reasoned that if it will be allowed it may cause confusion as to his real paternity and may redound to the prejudice of the child in the community. 3. Furthermore the child is still minor and it could not be yet fathomed how he wishes to decide the matter for himself when he comes of age, the action taken thus being premature. 339. Naldoza v Republic () March 15, 1982 Aquino Dioney, Bombi, magnanakaw ba tatay nyo? Facts: 24. Zosima Naldoza and Dionesio Divinagracia were married on May 30, 1970. They begot two kids named Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto. 25. Dionesio left Zosima and his children after he was confronted by Zosima about his previous marriage with another woman. Before he left he also swindled a total of P60K from a number of individuals. 26. Zosima, aware of the fact that her children are being teased in school for carrying the surname of a swindler, wanted so much to detach her children from their fathers memory that she filed a petition for change of surname for the two kids. She wanted them to use her own surname. 27. The trial court didnt find any merit in her application, claiming that the mere desire of their mother to make the c hange for them so they can avoid being associated with their thieving father is not sufficient. 28. Zosima appealed straight to the Supreme Court after that, using the changes to the Judiciary Act (RA 5440) that allowed her (at the time) to appeal right away to the mighty tribunal of plagiarists (hahaha, peace). Issue: Should the mothers petition to change the surnames of her two children be granted? Held: NO. The decision was AFFIRMED. Ruling: 5. The children, being presumably legitimate (operative word: PRES UMABLY), should ideally use their fathers surname instead of anything else. 6. A change of name is a serious matter which entails many consequences, so the minors themselves and their father should be consulted. Granting it at merely the mothers request is wrong because her desire is not the sole consideration. 7. It can only be allowed when there are proper and reasonable causes. Since the subjects are minors, the courts should then consider if the change will redound to their welfare. 8. It will not redound to their benefit, because changing their surnames while they are still minors might cause some more problems. They might be perceived as illegitimate (which if added to the previous labels of being their swindling fathers sons, will definitely NOT help them get any more respect). 9. The decision also cannot rely on the cases of Oshita and Bartolome because those cases involved petitioners who are of age. Concept: Children should use their fathers surname to avoid confusion as to their filiation. 340. Marquino v. IAC () 1994 Puno *child dies during pendency of her action for recognition Facts: 1. Bibiana was a natural child. She was born out of wedlock on December 2, 1926, of Gregoria Romano and allegedly of Eutiquio Marquino who at that time was single. 2. Bibiana sued for compulsory recognition while Eutiquio was still alive. Sadly, she died on March 17, 1983 before she could present her proof of recognition. Issue: 1. WON the right of action to compel recognition is intransmissible in character? Held: Yes 2. WON after the death of the putative father the action for recognition of a natural child can be continued against the heirs of the former? Held: No Ruling:

1 issue 1. Her death tolled the action considering its personal nature and intransmissibility.
st
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2nd Issue 1. In an action for compulsory recognition, the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself. 2. Article 285 provides only two (2) exceptions when an action for recognition transcends the death of the putative parent, these are: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; (2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child. Neither of these exceptions obtains in the case at bench. Firstly, the death of Eutiquio did not occur during the minority of Bibiana. In fact, she was already forty-five (45) years old when the recognition case was filed on January 10, 1971. Secondly, no document was discovered, before unknown, in which Bibiana was expressly acknowledged as a natural child.
341. Ong vs. CA () 29 May 1997 Mendoza *adult male presumed to have powers to impregnate Facts: 1. Father: Manuel Ong a.k.a. Alfredo Go and Mother: Saturnina Caballes had 2 illegitimate sons Alfredo Jr. and Robert Surviving spouse: Miguela Campos Ong 2. On 20 Dec 1953, Manuel, introducing himself as Alfredo Go, met Saturnina at a night club. They later had a relationship and lived together for 4 months. 3. On 28 Jun 1955, Alfredo Jr. was born. On 17 Aug 1956, Robert was born. However, Roberts lastname was Caballes as the midwife told Saturnina that since she was not married to Manuel, the child should carry her lastname. 4. After the financial support from Manuel dwindled, Saturnina asked for financial support but he refused. 5. In two instances, Manuel gave 100 to Alfredo Jr. first as graduation gift and second for his school needs. 6. After Manuel turned down request to defray Alfredo Jr.s educational expenses, Alfredo Jr. filed a complaint for recognition and support on 30 Sep 1982. 7. Trial court held that Alfredo Jr. and Robert were illegitimate children of Manuel in accordance with Art. 283 of the Civil Code. 8. Manuel died on 21 May 1990 during the pendency of the case in the Court of Appeals. 9. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Miguela appealed. Issue: Are Alfredo Jr. and Robert illegitimate children of Manuel? Held: Yes. They were conceived and born during Manuels cohabitation with Saturnina. Ruling: 1. They were the illegitimate children under Article 283 par. 4 any other evidence showing that Manuel Ong was the father . 2. The testimony of Saturnina, although marred with inconsistencies, did not put in doubt that Manuel was the father of Alfredo Jr. and Robert. The sexual relations from 1954-1957 is proof that Alfredo Jr. and Robert were conceived and born during such relationship and constitutes evidence of paternity. 3. Grant of 100 to Alfredo Jr. twice cannot be considered proof of continuous possession of the status of a child under par. 2 of Art 283. Manuel met Alfredo Jr. only four times. No proof that Robert was treated as a son. 4. It also does not fall under Art. 283 par. 3 because the cohabitation of Saturnina and Manuel was not open and public so as to constitute cohabitation. They should not act clandestinely or secretly. 5. Even if Saturnina had a relationship with a paralytic before Manuel, the children could not have been conceived during cohabitation with the paralytic. Saturnina and the paralytic separated in 1953. She started having an affair with Manuel in 1954. First son was born on 1955, more than a year after the paralytic left Saturnina. 6. Manuels claim that he was sterile was doubtful as no medical testimony was presented. He acknowledged Lourdes Balili as his natural child. Presumption on a males powers of virility. Concept: Civil Code, Article 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognized the child as his natural child: 2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or his family; 3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father; 4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.
342. Republic vs. CA ()
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December 14, 1998--- Quisumbing *kid is ashamed of her last name and wants to change it to her father in law. Facts: 1. Pablo Vicencio and Espereanza Leabres are married and had a child. 2. This child is Cynthia Vicencio. (petitioner) 3. Pablo left the conjugal dwelling and was later considered an absentee. 4. Ernesto Yu came to the rescue of the Cynthia and her mother. 5. Ernesto Yu was recognized by Cynthia as her real father. 6. Cynthia has changed her last name to Yu, in the past in order to avoid embarrassing moments, such as when she participat ed in several beauty contests. 7. Cynthia is now before the court requesting that she be able to change her name from Vicencio to Yu. She uses the guidelines in Republic vs. Hernandez as her support. (142) She claims that the use of her real fathers name causes embarrassment, thus fal ls under one of the grounds stipulated in the said case. Issue: Does Cynthia have the legal ground to request to change her name? Held: No Ruling: 1. The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be a proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought. 2. She is a legitimate child (she was born during a valid marriage), thus she should bear the surname of his or her father. It must be stressed that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right. 3. It is held that the change of name to Yu would create confusion. 4. Padilla vs. Republic: To allow said minors to adopt the surname of their mothers second husband, who is not their father, could result in the con fusion in their paternity. It could also create the suspicion that said minors, who were born during the coverture of their mother with her first husband, were in fact sired by (Ernesto Yu), thus bringing their legitimate status into discredit. 343. De La Cruz vs. Gracia () July 31, 2009 Carpio- Morales * Father died left an autobiography acknowledging his child. Facts: 1. 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. 2. On September 4, 2005, Dominique died. 3. After almost two months, she gave birth to her minor child Christian Dela Cruz "Aquino" at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City. 4. Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth, using Dominiques surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar 5. She submitted the childs Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominiques father Domingo Butch Aquino. 6. During the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child in an "AUTOBIOGRAPHY" 7. THEN WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. 8. City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent ), denied Jenies application for registration of the childs name because Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1 stated that the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child (either through the back of Municipal Form No. 102 Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father) 9. Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint the denial of registration of the childs name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father under Article 176. 10. They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes an admission of paternity in a "private handwritten instrument" within the contemplation of the above-quoted provision of law. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A "PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT" WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176. Held: Yes. The Autobiography is a private handwritten instrument in the purview of Article 176 Ruling: 1. Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not expressly require that the private handwritten instrument containing the putative fathers admission of paternity must be signed by him. 2. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature.

3.
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That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code (related to 175) 4. In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominiques Autobiography , though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law. a. First, Dominique died about two months prior to the childs birth. b. Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. c. Third, Jenies testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominiques father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child. 5. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominiques Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts extant herein that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents house; she was pregnant when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is Dominiques. 6. It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children 7. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration Concept: the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made: 1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and 2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence. 344. Continental Steel vs. Montano () October 13, 2009 Nazario *Even a child inside the womb already has life. Facts: 1. Hortillano was an employee of Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation. 2. He filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, in accordance with the CBA. 3. The claim was based on Hortillanos unborn child. His wife had a premature, and the fetus died during labor. 4. Continental Steel granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denie d his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits. 5. Continental Steel argued that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. 6. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillanos case. 7. It also said that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. 8. Labor arbiter Montao argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support. Issue: Can a fetus be considered as a dependent? Held: YES Ruling: 4. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child could not have reached 38 -39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillanos wife, for sustenance. 5. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality. Without such qualification, the child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mothers womb. 6. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. 7. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as

death.
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345. Joanie Surposa vs Jose Ngo Chua () September 18, 2009 Chico-Nazario *2M each from father to settle filiation &paternity Facts: 1. Jose who was married, then had an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa (Irene). They had two children, namely, Joanie and her brother, Allan. 2. Before she got married Jose has been giving them allowances and required to work in his family business. He was also known as his illegitimate children within the Chinese community. 3. Now petitioner files for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation but Jose Ngo Chua contends that the case has been barred by res judicata because of the compromise agreement they had she and her brother were paid Php 2M each in consideration that they declare that they have absolutely no more claims, causes of action or demands against him. 4. The case has deemed final and executory by the RTC because no appeal has been filed in the given period. Issues: Can the status and filiation of a child be compromised ? Held: No. Its against the law and public policy. Ruling: 1. The Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code. 2. Advincula v. Advincula has a factual background closely similar to the one at bar. Wherein the court ruled that a compromise did not bar the subsequent filing by an action for acknowledgement because the compromise affecting a persons civil status cannot be the subject of compromise. 3. Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. 4. The case cannot be barred by res judicata because it is against public policy being null and void for having been rendered by RTC-Branch 9 without jurisdiction and could not have attained finality or been considered a judgment on the merits. Concept: ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1) The civil status of persons;(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;(3) Any ground for legal separation;(4) Future support;(5) The jurisdiction of courts;(6) Future legitime.
346. Osmea de Valencia v Rodriguez () August 2, 1949 Paras Anak nya rin kami! Facts: 1. Pio Valencia, married to Catalina Osmea, cohabited with Emilia Rodriguez. He begot children with both women. 2. Pios illegitimate children with Emilia used his surname. When the plaintiffs (the Osmea de Valencia children) learned about this, they instituted an injunction case against them from doing so. They claimed that since they are the legitimate children of Pio Valencia, only they can use his last name. 3. The lower court sustained the defendants motion to dismiss and the Osmea de Valencias went straight to the Supreme Court (of plagiarists) Issue: Are illegitimate children barred from using their fathers surname? Held: NO. The decision was AFFIRMED. Ruling: 1. There is nothing in the law that says that legitimate children have an exclusive right to their fathers surname. 2. The reliance of the plaintiffs on the combination of certain provisions in the civil code is misplaced. Article 114, which says that legitimate children have the right to use their fathers surname, and Articles 139 and 845 which say illegitimate children shall be entitled only to support, will not work to create an exclusive right for legitimate children (the concurring opinion agrees with this). 3. The evidence shows that Pio acquiesced to the illegitimate childrens use of his surname even if they have come of age. And even if he did not agree the children can still use his surname in the absence of a law expressly prohibiting them from doing so (this is where the concurring opinion digressed, he believed that a person should not use a name without the owner s consent if it may result to the latters prejudice). Concept: Illegitimate children can use their fathers surname too.
347. Dorotea Uyguangco, et al. v. CA, Graciano Uyguangco ()
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1989 Cruz *child tries to establish filiation with a dead father Facts: 1. Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, Dorotea, four legitimate children (her co-petitioners herein), and considerable properties which they divided among themselves. 2. Claiming to be an illegitimate son of the deceased Apolinario, and having been left out in the extrajudicial settlement of his estate, Graciano Uyguangco filed a complaint for partition against all the petitioners. 3. In the course of his presentation of evidence at the trial, the petitioners elicited an admission from Graciano that he had none of the documents mentioned in Article 278 to show that he was the illegitimate son of Apolinario Uyguangco. These are "the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or (in) any authentic writing." 4. But Graciano Uyguangco invokes Art 172 provision on open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child as his ground Issue: Can Uyguangco be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of his claimed father, who is already dead? Held: No Ruling: 1. Since he seeks to prove his filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, his action is now barred because of his alleged father's death in 1975. 2. Private respondent GracianoUyguangco can no longer be allowed to introduce evidence of his open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove his alleged filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. 348. Mangulabnan vs. IAC () 31 May 1990 Gancayco *once paternity provisionally established, illegitimate child can ask for support Facts: 1. Edna Mangulabnan, mother of Alfie Angelo, filed an action for actual, compensatory, and moral damages and support against Ambrocio Acero. 2. Pending litigation, she applied for support pendent lite. Granted by the RTC at 1,500 per month. Ambrocio asked for reconsideration but was denied. 3. Ambrocio filed petition for certiorari with the CA. CA annulled the RTC decision granting support pendente lite. Issue: Is the illegitimate child entitled to support pendente lite pending final resolution of his status? Held: Yes. Court restored support pendente lite since Alfies status has already been provisionally established. Ruling: 1. Parents and illegitimate children are also obliged to support each other under Article 291 par. 5 of the Civil Code. 2. Edna established the paternity of the child by her own affidavit, affidavits of two witnesses, and Alfies birth certificate . 3. A declaration of the status of the child from which the right to support is derived is required . Such a declaration may be provisional, that is, by affidavits. 4. Recognition is not required for illegitimate children before support may be granted but in all cases, filiation must be proved. 5. With the documents presented to prove paternity, the status of Alfie had been provisionally established. Concept: Civil Code, Article 287. Illegitimate children other than natural in accordance with Article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction are entitled to support and such successional rights as are granted in this Code. 349. Mendoza vs. CA () September 24, 1991 Cruz *Relatives of the father testified that is why Teopista was declared illegitimate child Facts: 1. Teopista Toring Tufiacao, respondent, alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. 2. Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old, denied the plaintiffs allegations and set up a counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees. 3. She lived with her mother because Casimiro was married but she used to visit him at his house. 4. When she married Valentin Tufiacao, Casimiro bought a passenger truck and engaged him to drive it so he could have a livelihood. 5. Casimiro later sold the truck but gave the proceeds of the sale to her and her husband . 6. In 1977, Casimiro allowed her son, Lolito Tufiacao, to build a house on his lot and later he gave her money to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente Toring. 7. Casimiro opened a joint savings account with her as a co-depositor 8. Two years later, Margarita Bate, Casimiro's adopted daughter, took the passbook from her, but Casimiro ordered it returned to her after admonishing Margarita.
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9. Two other witnesses testified for Teopista, namely, Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, both relatives of Casimiro. 10. Guadencio - Casimiro himself told him she was his sweetheart . Later, Gaudencio acted as a go-between for their liaison, which eventually resulted in Brigida becoming pregnant in 1930 and giving birth to Teopista. 11. Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista because his father Hipolito, Casimiro's brother, and his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza, so informed him. Issue: Is Teopista the illegitimate child of Casimiro Held: Yes. Ruling: I. Whether or not Teopista was in continuous possession of her claimed status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza 1. We agree with the trial court that Teopista has not been in continuous possession of the status of a recognized illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza, under both Article 283 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. (see guidelines below) 2. The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with the Casimiro 3. In fact, Vicente Toring, who also claimed to be an illegitimate child of Casimiro, lived with the latter and his wife, apparently without objection from the latter. 4. Teopista did not use the surname of Casimiro although this is, of course, not decisive of one's status. But although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless established that status by another method. II. 1. 2. 3. 4. "by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to the Family Code Requisites (see below) for an act or declaration regarding pedigree, in this case has been complied with The persons who made the declarations about the pedigree of Teopista The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very issues involved The declarations were made before the complaint was filed by Teopista or before the controversy arose between her and Casimiro. 5. Toring Tufiacao has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza a 6. Osh: Basically because a relative of Casimiro testified of the pedigree of Teopista thus the court held in favor of Teopista. Concept: To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,"it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements. A. Continuous" does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. - The possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not through others, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate). - There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own , by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care. By evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to the Family Code, such evidence may consist of his 1. baptismal certificate, 2. a judicial admission, 3. a family Bible in which his name has been entered, 4. common reputation respecting his pedigree, 5. admission by silence, 6. the testimonies of witnesses, and 7. other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court The following requisites that have to be complied with before the act or declaration regarding pedigree may be admitted in evidence: 1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify. 2. The pedigree must be in issue. 3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue. 4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose. 5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such declaration. 350. Lim vs. CA ()
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March 18, 1997---Romero *knocking up a 16 year old girl from a nightclub Facts: 1. Petitioner went to a nightclub and developed a relationship with Maribel. 2. Maribel got pregnant and later went to Japan to work as an entertainer. 3. While she was there, they frequently exchanged love letters that showed Petitioner acceptance of the child being his. 4. Maribel returned to the Philippine and Petitioner did not pay for support and he eventually got married to another woman. 5. Petitioner says she got pregnant in Japan and that when they met, he was only interested in friendship. Issue: Is the petitioner the father of the child? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. The letters constitute proof that he admits the child is his. In one letter he even says that I promise to be a loving and caring husband and father to both of you. 2. Other proof involve: a. He signed the birth certificate that recognized him as the father. b. He openly admitted that that child was his and only began saying the contrary when he married another woman. 3. DNA being relatively new cannot yet be relied upon as evidence. 351. Eceta vs. Eceta () May 20, 2004 Ynares-Santiago *Recognition of an illegitimate child in any authentic writing is an act of acknowledgement Facts: 1. Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta in 1926. 2. During their marriage, they begot a son, Vicente. 3. The couple acquired several properties, among which is the disputed property located at Stanford, Cubao,Quezon City. 4. Isaac died in 1967 leaving behind Rosalina and Vicente as his compulsory heirs. 5. In 1977, Vicente died. 6. During his lifetime, however, he sired Maria Theresa, an illegitimate daughter. 7. Thus at the time of his death, his compulsory heirs were his mother, Rosalina, and illegitimate child, Maria Theresa . 8. In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case against Rosalina alleging that by virtue of her fathers death, she became Rosalinas co-heir and co-owner of the Cubao property. 9. In her answer, Rosalina alleged that the property is paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to her exclusively. 10. During the pre-trial conference, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts wherein they both admitted their relationship to one another, i.e., that Rosalina is Maria Theresas grandmother. 11. The court ruled that both are co-heirs and co-owners of the lands, and that Maria Theresa is entitled to of the property. 12. On appeal, the decision was affirmed, but Maria Theresas share was reduced to 1/8. 13. With Maria Theresa still having a share, Rosalina appealed. Issue: 1. Is the certified xerox copy from a xerox copy of the certificate of live birth a competent proof of the filiation? 2. Is the admission made by Rosalina that Maria Theresa is her granddaughter, enough to prove filiation? Ruling: 1. What was filed and tried before the trial court and the Court of Appeals is one for partition and accounting with damages only. The filiation, or compulsory recognition by Vicente Eceta of Maria Theresa, was never put in issue. In fact, both parties have already agreed that Maria Theresa is Rosalinas granddaughter. 2. Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed Maria Theresas birth certificate thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter. Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa. 3. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. 352. Briones vs. Miguel () June 26, 1963 Bautista Angelo *Father wants custody of illegitimate child so badly Facts: 1. Loreta Miguel and Joey Briones has an illegitimate child Michael Kevin Pineda who was born in Japan since they are both working there. Now they are battling for possession of the child. Joey claims that he brought Kevin back in the Philippines to take care of him and send him to school. 2. But one day the Mother and sister of Loreta asked to bring the child, Kevin, to SM for recreation but never returned him. He now asks the court for a writ of habeas corpus and custody of the child him being the biological father and since Loreta is not always in the Philippines and is now with another man. 3. But the court ruled that Loreta P. Miguel shall have custody over the child until he reaches ten (10) years of age wherein the
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Court may allow him to choose. Issue: Does Joey have the right to have custody of his illegitimate child? Held: No, the law strictly provides that illegitimate child will be in the custody of the mother. Ruling: 1. Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. 2. The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. 3. In David v. Court of Appeals held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly confers to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor . 4. There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parental authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him. She has the right to keep him in her company. She cannot be deprived of that right, and she may not even renounce or transfer it "except in the cases authorized by law. 5. And since Loreta and Joey were never married the CA disposition that the Courts may allow the child to choose when he reaches the age of 10yrs is deleted. Concept: Illegitimate: All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage
353. Cabatania v Court of Appeals () October 21, 2004 Corona Mam nabuntis po ako ni Ser Facts: 1. Florencia Regodos served as a maid for Camelo Cabatania and his wife for a certain time. The she got pregnant and gave birth to a child she named Camelo Regodos, claiming that the kid is Camelos son. 2. Her version goes like this: after her husband left (or died, or whatever), she went to Negros Occidental to look for work and was hired as the couples maid. After a certain time Camelo brought her to Bacolod and he sexed her in the Visayan Motel. She claimed that he promised he would support her if she got knocked up. When she learned she was pregnant she told Camelo, who sexed her again. Then she was sent home by Camelos wife because the wife noticed she was pregnant, after which Camelo brought her to Bacolod again where she gave birth. 3. Heres Camelos version: Florencia worked as their maid for a time but was fired by h is wife because she kept leaving the house. He said that after she was fired he met her at a bus station where he invited her to dinner. She told him that she needed money and then he sexed her. He said that while he was inside her, he felt something jerking and he asked about it, Florencia told him she was already pregnant by her own husbands child. He then claimed that Florencia went to work for them again, but his wife sent her home after being told that he got Florencia pregnant. 4. The trial court believed Florencias testimony despite her misrepresentation (apparently her husband is still alive), and granted her petition. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court entirely. 5. Camelo then went to the Supreme Authority on Plagiarism Issue: Should Florencia petition be granted? Held: NO. The decision was REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Ruling: 1. The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide the sufficient means by which filiation can be proven by children, legitimate or illegitimate. 2. The evidence presented by Florencia, the birth and baptismal certificates, are not sufficient enough. This is because the birth certificate can only serve as proof of filiation if the father had a hand in it, and the baptismal certificate is nothing more than a public document attesting to the fact that the baptism actually happened. 3. Florencia failed miserably to prove voluntary recognition on the part of Camelo. 4. The brushing aside of Florencias misrepresentation in her testimony is also a fatal flaw in the assailed decision, this i s because if her husband is still alive, then the presumption is that the child is his. This presumption is based on the broad principles of natural justice, not merely on statutes. 5. Physical resemblance nowadays is not good proof of paternity and filiation, what with the preponderance of DNA tests and like methods.
335. Angeles vs. Maglaya ()
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September 2, 2005- Garcia *Daughter wanted to be the administrator but turned out to be not a legitimate daughter Facts: 7. Francisco, died intestate on January 21, 1998 leaving behind four (4) parcels of land and a building, 8. That there is a need to appoint an administrator of Francisco's estate; 9. Corazon is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and, together with petitioner, 10. Belen S. Angeles, decedent's wife by his second marriage, are the surviving heirs of the decedent; and 11. Belen opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of Corazon, be made the administratrix of Francisco's estate - Belen married Francisco on August 7, 1948 Francisco represented in their marriage contract that he was single at that time. - Corazon could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco's legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by Francisco - Corazon has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. - Belen and Francisco had, during their marriage, legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et al. 12. Corazons defense: - Records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. - She also testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child . - Four (4) other witnesses testified on her behalf, - Respondent also offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained an entry stating handwritten word 'Yes appears on the space below the question 'Legitimate? (Legitimo?); - pictures taken during respondent's wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; and - a copy of her marriage contract. - offered were her scholastic and government service records. Issue: Whether or not Corazon is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado Held: No. Ruling: Marriage Contract 11. To stress, no marriage certificate or marriage contract ' doubtless the best evidence of Francisco's and Genoveva's marriage, if one had been solemnized' was offered in evidence. 12. No priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority was called to the witness box to declare that he solemnized the marriage between the two. 13. None of the four (4) witnesses respondent presented could say anything about, let alone affirm, that supposed marriage. 14. In all, no evidence whatsoever was presented of the execution of the Francisco Angeles-Genoveva Mercado marriage contract; when and where their marriage was solemnized; the identity of the solemnizing officer; the persons present, and like significant details. 15. While petitioner may have submitted certifications to the effect that the records of marriages during the war years . . . were totally destroyed, no secondary evidence was presented by petitioner to prove the existence Pictures 16. Petitioner presented pictures. x x x However, it is already settled law that photographs are not sufficient evidence of filiation or acknowledgment. Birth Certificate 17. the Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was signed by the attending physician. 18. Such certificate, albeit considered a public record of a private document is, under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its execution: the fact of birth of a child. 19. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly , or by the mother alone if the father refuses Appointment of Administrator 20. it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent.
355. Guy vs. CA ()
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15 Sep 2006 - Ynares-Santiago *illegitimate children to present evidence to prove filiation and prescription Facts: 1. Father: Sima Wei (died 29 Oct 1992) and Mother: Remedios Oanes had children: Karen and Kamille (illegitimate) 2. On 13 Jun 1997, minors Karen and Kamille Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes, filed a petition for letters of administration. 3. Heirs of Sima, represented by son and administrator Michael Guy, opposed and filed a motion to dismiss . They argued that Remedios had already waived the claims when she received financial and educational assistance for Karen and Kamille and that they should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code. 4. RTC denied the motion to dismiss. It ruled that no renunciation of right occurred in the waiver of claim signed by Remedios as it had not been established that she was the duly constituted guardian of her minor daughters. 5. Michael filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA denied and affirmed RTC decision. Issue: Were Karen and Kamille barred by prescription from proving their filiation? Held: No. They have yet to produce evidence to prove their filiation to determine prescription. Ruling: 1. A ruling on their filiation would be premature considering that they have yet to present evidence. It is clear that the prescription depends on the type of evidence to be presented to prove their filiation . 2. Under the Family Code, when a filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may be brought during the lifetime of the child. 3. If the action is based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. 4. There was no waiver of hereditary rights in the Release and Waiver of Claim signed by Remedios. The document did not specifically mention her daughters hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei thus cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights. 5. Parents and guardians may not repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval under Article 1044 of the Civil Code. The Release and Waiver of Claim is void since it had not been judicially authorized. 356. Verceles vs. Posada () April 27, 2007 - QUISUMBING, J. *Mayor of Pandan Catanduanes made some advancement to his office employee Facts: 1. Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), a young lass from the barrio of Pandan, Catanduanes, sometime in 1986 met a close family friend, petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor of Pandan. 2. He made amorous advances during a said seminar but failed because she panicked and hide 3. But on the second attempt, Teofistos advancement succeeded and led to her pregnancy on January 1987 4. She told him she was pregnant. In a handwritten letter dated February 4, 1987. In the letter he mentioned that they should rejoice and have a common responsibility over the child. 5. Clarissa explained petitioner used an alias "Ninoy" and addressed her as "Chris," probably because of their twenty-five (25)year age gap. In court, she identified petitioners penmanship which she claims she was familiar with as an employee in his office. 6. Clarissa avers that on March 3, 1987, petitioner, aware of her pregnancy, handed her a letter and P2,000 pocket money to go to Manila. P2,000 for her delivery 7. Clarissa presented three other handwritten letters sent to her by petitioner, two of which were in his letterhead as mayor of Pandan. 8. She also presented the pictures petitioner gave her of his youth and as a public servant, all bearing his handwritten notations at the back. Issue: Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner was proven Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. Clarissas averments therein, her meeting with petitioner, his offer of a job, his amorous advances, her seduction, their trysts, her pregnancy, birth of her child, his letters, her demand for support for her child , all clearly establish a case for recognition of paternity. 2. We have held that the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child , and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval . 3. The letters of petitioner are declarations that lead nowhere but to the conclusion that he sired Verna Aiza.

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Although petitioner used an alias in these letters, the similarity of the penmanship in these letters vis the annotation at the back of petitioners fading photograph as a youth is unmistakable. Verceles admitted his affair with Clarissa, the exchange of love letters between them, and his giving her money during her pregnancy. The letters, are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aizas filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. NO damages. We, however, cannot rule that respondents are entitled to damages. Article 221924of the Civil Code which states moral damages may be recovered in cases of seduction is inapplicable in this case because Clarissa was already an adult at the time she had an affair with petitioner.
357. Montefalcon vs. Vasquez () June 17, 2008Quisumbing *the seaman father who vanished Facts: 1. Dolores (Petitioner) filed a complaint for acknowledgment and support against respondent (Ronnie). 2. She claimed that her son Laurence is the illegitimate child of Ronnie, thus he is obliged to give support to Laurence. 3. Her proof is that Ronnie signed the Birth Certificate as Laurences father. 4. A sheriff tried to serve summons to Ronnie by visiting his home in Naga. 5. Sheriff realized that he was not there and sought the aid of the sheriffs in Taguig, Manila for them to serve summons. 6. Ronnie was not in the country throughout the period of the trial and claimed that the court never obtained jurisdiction over him because of lack of summons. Issue: Does the Birth Certificate with Ronnies signature as father provide good evidence to prove that the child is his son? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. The birth certificate is an authentic, relevant and admissible piece of evidence to prove paternity and filiation. Vasquez did not deny that Laurence is his child with Dolores. 2. He signed as father in the certificate of live birth, a public document. 3. Thus, it is competent evidence of filiation as he had a hand in its preparation. 4. A reasonable period of 8 months was given for the RTC sheriffs to serve him notice. SC believes that this was more than enough time. Obviously, personal service of summons was not practical since the defendant was temporarily out of the country. 358. Go vs. Ramos () September 14, 2009 - Quisumbing *Father failed to prove he was illegitimate to follow his moms Filipino citizenship Facts: 1. The case stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration against Jimmy T. Go, alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. 2. Luis presented Jimmys birth certificate, which indicated his citizenship as FChinese. 3. Although it appears from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. 4. Luis also averred that Jimmy managed to cover up his true citizenship and was able to procure a Philippine passport from DFA. 5. Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1, paragraph 4 of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625, as evidenced by his having taken the Oath of Allegiance and having executed an Affidavit of Election of Philippine citizenship in 1950. 6. Although the said oath and affidavit were registered only on September 11, 1956, the reason behind such late registration was sufficiently explained in an affidavit. 7. Jimmy alleged that is father was born and raised in the Philippines, and in fact, speaks fluent Ilonggo and Tagalog. 8. Jimmy added that he had even voted in the 1952 and 1955 elections. 9. FChinese: He maintained that such was not his own doing, but maybe by the Local Civil Registrars. 10. As regards the entry in his siblings certificates of birth, that their father is Chinese, Jimmy averred that the entry was erroneous because it was made without prior consultation with his father. 11. Associate Commissioner Linda L. Malenab-Hornilla dismissed the complaint for deportation against Jimmy. 12. The Board of Commissioners reversed said dismissal, holding that Carlos election of Phil citizenship was made out of time. 13. In 2001, Jimmy was charged with violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940: He is an alien, but has formally and officially represented and introduced himself as a Filipino citizen. 14. On account of his subsequent detention, pending his deportation to China, Jimmy once again filed a petition for habeas corpus of which the trial court dismissed. 15. On appeal with the CA, his petition was granted and enjoined the deportation of Jimmy until the issue of his citizenship is settled with finality by the court.
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Issue: Are the evidence adduced by Carlos and Jimmy to prove their claim to Philippine citizenship substantial and sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction from continuing with the deportation proceedings? Held: NO Ruling: 1. Neither will the Philippine Bill of 1902 nor the Jones Law of 1916 make Carlos a citizen of the Philippines. His bare claim that his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of the said laws, without any supporting evidence whatsoever will not suffice. 2. One of the arguments raised to sustain Carlos claim to Philippine citizenship is the doctrine of jus soli, or the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth. The doctrine of jus soli was for a time the prevailing rule in the acquisition of ones citizenship. However, the Supreme Court abandoned the principle of jus soli in the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor. 3. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. Moreover, an illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen. 4. However, absent any evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina, the aforestated established rule could not be applied to him. 5. It is true that the 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship may be extended as when the person has always regarded himself as a Filipino. But not a single circumstance was sufficiently shown meriting the extension of the 3-year period. The fact that Carlos exercised his right of suffrage in 1952 and 1955 does not demonstrate such belief, considering that the acts were done after he elected Philippine citizenship. 6. This is not to say that we are ruling that they are not Filipinos, for that is not what we are called upon to do. This Court necessarily has to pass upon the issue of citizenship only to determine whether the proceedings may be enjoined in order to give way to a judicial determination of the same. 359. Andal vs. Macaraig () May 30, 1951 Bautista Angelo *child born within the 300 days of separation is lucky to inherit Facts: 1. Mariano Andal claims to be the legitimate son of Maria Dueas and Emilio . He files now a suit for recovery of land to a property donated proper nuptias by Eduvigis Macaraig to his father. 2. The land in question was given by Eduvigis Macaraig to her son Emiliano Andal by virtue of a donation propter nuptias she has executed in his favor on the occasion of his marriage to Maria Dueas. If the son born to the couple is deemed legitimate, then he is entitled to inherit the land in question 3. January 1941Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis in. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his house to help him work his farm. His sickness became worse that on or about September 10, 1942, he became so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. 4. On September 10, 1942, Maria Duenas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father, until the middle of 1943. 5. Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife. 6. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even attend his funeral. 7. On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueas gave birth to a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal. Issue: Is Mariano the legitimate child of Maria and Emilio? Held: Yes, he was born within 300 days of the dissolution of marriage. Ruling: 1. As provided by Art. 108 of the Civil Code, Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1, 1943, that boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife , he having been born within three hundred (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. 2. There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent during the initial period of conception, especially during the period comprised between August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942, which is included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child Mariano Andal. On the contrary, there is enough evidence to show that during that initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife were still living under the marital roof . 3. Also experience shows that this does not prevent carnal intercourse. There are cases where persons suffering from this sickness can do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage because they are more inclined to sexual intercourse. 4. The court ruled that Emiliano and his wife were living together, or at least had access one to the other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was born within three (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts no other presumption can be drawn than that the issue is legitimate.
360. Macadangdang v Court of Appeals ( )
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September 12, 1980 Makasiar The Pinoy Billie Jean (but the kid is not my son) Facts: 1. Sometime in March, 1967, Elizabeth Mejias, married to Crispin Anahaw, had sex with Antonio Macadangdang. Crispin learned about it later on and left her. 2. On April 25, 1972, she filed a petition for recognition in CFI of Davao, claiming that the kid is Antonios son. The lower court dismissed the petition based on some provisions of the civil code and the rules of court. 3. On appeal to the CA, Elizabeth was granted her request and the appellate court reversed the decision, claiming that the collateral attack was not barred by the fact that Crispin was not consulted. 4. Antonio appealed to the Supreme Court of Plagiarism after that. Issue: (1) Can the mother bastardize her son without her husbands consent? (2) Is Antonio the putative father of Rolando? Held: NO. The decision was REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Ruling: 1. The claim of separation is based entirely on Elizabeths testimony, which is not sufficient to make it binding on the courts. 2. The cut-off time of 120 days (within the 300-day rule that precedes the birth of the child) was used by the court in the decision, stating that the actual separation of the Elizabeth and Crispin wouldnt really matter anyway as long as there was proof that they had access to each other within the 120-day period. This was supported by more evidence than the self-serving testimony of Elizabeth that she was in fact left by her husband. 3. The other cut-off period of 180 days after a marriage (again within the 300-day rule) was also present here (heck, they were married for quite some time and already had four children), the presumption, therefore, persists. Crispin (being a very potent man) is presumably the father of Rolando. The fact that the pregnancy was normal also erases doubts about the presumption. 4. Moreover, Antonio and Elizabeth allegedly sexed each other 7 months before she gave birth. If she had a normal 9-month pregnancy, then the kid is not Antonios son (cue in Michael Jacksons Billie Jean). 5. Elizabeth is barred from presenting evidence which would bastardize her son without Crispins consent; this is founded on principles of law and morality. Concept: There are so many concepts to choose from in the case, guys. We can treat this as a sort of compendium for all kinds of stuff regarding paternity and filiation 361. Gerardo Concepcion v. CA, Theresa Almonte () 2005 Corona *no physical impossibility between 2 people both living in QC Facts: 1. Its been established that Theresa was married to Mario Gopiao, and that she had never entered into a lawful marriage with th e Gerardo (but they did get married) since the so-called 'marriage with the latter was void ab initio. It was Gerardo himself who had established these facts. 2. In other words, Theresa was legitimately married to Mario Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990. Issue: Who is the legitimate father of Jose Gerardo? Held: Mario Gopiao Ruling: 1. Gerardo has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa's husband Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. 2. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child. 3. On physical impossibility: a) The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. b) The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child. To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital intimacy impossible. c) Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City. d) Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence at all was presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering these circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act. e) Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands. 4. As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to him in any way.
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362. Jao vs. CA () 28 Jul 1987 Padilla *blood test admissible and conclusive as to non-paternity Facts: 1. Husband: Perico Jao and Wife: Arlene Salgado had daughter: Janice (paternity in question) 2. Arlenes facts: She met Perico on 3rd or 4th week of Nov 1967. They had their first sex on 30 Nov 1967 and stated cohabitation on 16 Dec 1967. 3. Pericos facts: He met Arlene on 14 Dec 1967. They had their first sex on 18 Jan 1968 (a week after his birthday) and started cohabitation on May 1968. 4. On 16 Aug 1968, Janice was born after completing 36 weeks of pregnancy. Indicates that Arlene must have conceived Janice on or about the first week of Dec 1967. 5. Upon her birth, Perico refused to acknowledge Janice. He even filed a petition to delete his name as father of Janice in her birth certificate. Thus, no continuous possession of status of a child under Art 283 par. 2. 6. At the time of conception, Arlene also had carnal knowledge with two other men. Thus, Art. 283 par. 3 cannot apply since Janice was not conceived during the time Arlene cohabited with Perico . 7. On 28 Oct 1968, Janice, represented by Arlene, filed a case for recognition and support against Perico. 8. They agreed to a blood grouping test conducted by the NBI. The result showed that Janice COULD NOT have been the possible offspring of Perico and Arlene. 9. Trial court initially found the result conclusive. Upon second motion for reconsideration by Arlene, Janice was declared the child of Perico. 10. Perico appealed to the CA and it reversed the trial courts decision. Issue: Is the result of the blood grouping test admissible and conclusive? Held: Yes. The result of the blood grouping test is admissible and conclusive on the non-paternity of Perico vis--vis Janice. Ruling: 1. Rulings have been more definite their conclusions in blood grouping tests to disprove paternity. 2. Blood grouping test is conclusive as to non-paternity blood type of the child is NOT the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and the alleged father are crossmatched, then the child CANNOT be possibly that of the alleged father . 3. Blood grouping test is inclusive only as to paternity blood type of the child is a possible product of the mother and the alleged father but does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents. 4. Tolentino affirms the rule on blood tests as proof of non-paternity. When the supposed father and the alleged child are not in the same blood group, they cannot be the father and child by consanguinity. 5. Moreover, if it can be proved by blood tests that the child and the supposed father belong to different blood groups, the cohabitation (between the mother and the father) cannot be a ground for recognition. 6. The NBIs forensic chemist who conducted the tests has had extensive practice in this area. The blood tests were conducted 6 times using 2 scientifically recognized blood grouping systems. 7. Two years after the first blood test, Arlene declined to undergo the same blood test to prove or disprove paternity even if Perico was willing. 363. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MORENO L. TUMIMPAD, () August 19, 1994 Kapunan *Rape of 2 security guard to a 15-year old Mongoloid child Facts: 1. Constable Moreno L. Tumimpad and co-accused Constable Ruel C. Prieto were charged with the crime of rape committed against a 15-year old Mongoloid child 2. Sandra Salcedo at the time of the incident was a 15-year old Mongoloid and daughter of Lt. Col. Teofisto Salcedo and Pastora Salcedo. 3. Col. Teofisto Salcedo has been assigned with 4 security men two of whom were accused 4. Basically, she got raped and revealed to be pregnant. 5. Sandra identified in open court accused Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto as the persons who raped her and said she wished them dead 6. During the trial, the accused moved that a blood test, both "Major Blood Grouping Test" and "Pheno Blood Typing" be conducted on the offended party, her child Jacob and the two accused. The result of the test conducted by the Makati Medical Center showed that Jacob Salcedo has a type "O" blood, Sandra Salcedo type "B", accused Ruel Prieto type "A" and accusedappellant type "O". 7. Trail court - Ruel Prieto is hereby declared ACQUITTED Issue: Is the crime of rape properly proven? Held: Yes. The consistency of the testimony of the victim. Ruling:

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Victim more than once positively identified accused-appellant Moreno Tumimpad as one of the perpetrators of the crime. First, during the investigation conducted by the CIS, Sandra singled out accused-appellant and his co-accused from among the thirty (30) pictures of different persons shown to her. 3. Second, at the police lineup of several persons, likewise conducted by the CIS, Sandra once again unerringly pointed accusedappellant and his co-accused as the ones who raped her. 4. Third, in open court, Sandra without hesitation, pointed to accused- appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Concept: ( PERSONS CONCEPT) 1. Paternity Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother, the child, and the alleged father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not the father of a particular child . 2. But group blood testing cannot show only a possibility that he is. Statutes in many states, and courts in others, have recognized the value and the limitations of such tests. Some of the decisions have recognized the conclusive presumption of non-paternity where the results of the test, made in the prescribed manner, show the impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one of the few cases in which the judgment of the Court may scientifically be completely accurate, and intolerable results avoided 3. The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact of paternity as they show only a possibility that the alleged father or any one of many others with the same blood type may have been the father of the child. 364. Tijing Vs. CA () March 8, 2001---Quisumbing *child was kidnapped and went missing for 4 years Facts: 1. Edgardo and Bienvendia are husband and wife (petitioners) and have a son named Edgardo. 2. Bienvenido worked for Angelita (Private Respondent) as a laundry woman. 3. Angelita had come over to Petitioners home and requested her to do a laundry job. 4. Angelita was left alone with Edgardo. 5. When Bienvendio came back her child and Angelita had vanished. 6. The couple sought to find their child for four years. Finally, the death of the common law husband of Angelita was published in the newspapers. 7. They jumped on the chance and immediately went to the funeral, where they found their child Edgardo, who had been renamed as John Lopez. 8. The petitioners filed a case of habeas corpus. 9. The Trial Court ruled in their favor. 10.The CA overruled the Trial Court and the child was returned to Angelita. 11. Thus the appeal. Issue: Is Edgardo the son of the petitioners? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. The evidence presented by Bienvenida and her husband included: a. 1st witness was the nurse who testified she had delivered the child on April 1989. She was complete with a logbook and discharge orders. b. 2nd witness was the brother of the deceased common law husband of Angelita. He claims that because of a boating accident, it would have been impossible for Angelita and his brother to conceive of a child because it had rendered him sterile. c. Trial court took notice that the physical resemblance between the boy and his parents was uncanny and that such evidence is competent and material. d. Angelita had admitted that she could no longer bear children because in 1970 she underwent a ligation before she lived with her deceased common law husband. She then offered no evidence that she conceived of any children between the years of 1978-1988 2. The evidence presented by Angelita: a. She had given birth to the child when she was 42, yet she has no witness to testify this nor logbook or discharge orders. b. Birth certificate of John Lopez, yet there was something odd about it because it was filed by the common law husband and not the midwife, as it usually is. 3. The Supreme Court rules that the evidence presented favors that the child belongs to Bienveida and her husband. 365. Herrera vs. Alba () June 15, 2005 - Carpio *DNA test is valid probative tool in establishing paternity Facts: 1. On 14 May 1998, Rosendo Alba (13), represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against Rosendo Herrera. 2. He denied that he is the biological father. He also denied physical contact with Armi.

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She filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To support the motion, she presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D., an Associate Professor at De La Salle University where she taught Cell Biology; head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute (UPNSRI'), a DNA analysis laboratory. 5. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity. 6. He opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability, and that it violates his right against selfincrimination. 7. The trial granted the DNA testing, the CA affirmed. Issue: Is DNA test a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child. 2. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face : A prima facie case - exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the putative father; a corroborative proof is required to carry the burden forward and shift it to the putative father Affirmative defenses - the putative father may show incapability of sexual relations with the mother (either physical absence or impotency); may also show that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception presumption of legitimacy - a child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate; child's legitimacy may be impugned only under the strict standards provided by law physical resemblance between the putative father and child - however, although likeness is a function of heredity, there is no mathematical formula that could quantify how much a child must or must not look like his biological father; this kind of evidence appeals to the emotions of the trier of fact 3. In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four aspects. Armi Alba put forward a prima facie case when she asserted that petitioner is respondent's biological father. Aware that her assertion is not enough to convince the trial court, she offered corroborative proof in the form of letters and pictures. Petitioner, on the other hand, denied Armi Alba's assertion. He denied ever having sexual relations with Armi Alba and stated that respondent is Armi Alba's child with another man. Armi Alba countered petitioner's denial by submitting pictures of respondent and petitioner side by side, to show how much they resemble each other. 4. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation . 5. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available . Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when completely obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. 6. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the test. 7. In a paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of the child's DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged father's profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. Following the highest standard adopted in an American jurisdiction, trial courts should require at least 99.9% as a minimum value of the Probability of Paternity (W') prior to a paternity inclusion. 366. Agustin vs. Court of Appeals () June 15, 2005 Corona *After Birthday sex: Refuses DNA testing to avoid support but willing to settle Facts: 1. Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 2. The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child. 3. In one incident Fe was hit by the open car door Arnel was driving whie he was carrying their 5month old-child. Now as Fe is

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being diagnosed with leukemia, Fe and Martin are now suing for support. Arnel denies having sired Martin as their illicit relationship ended long before his conception and that she has a secret lover a certain Jun. Fe was also devious, scheming and possessive and has been trying to alienate Arnel from his wife and children. 5. During the pre-trial brief filed Arnel vehemently denied having sired Martin but expressed willingness to consider any proposal to settle the case. 6. Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court 7. Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. He also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery and that, under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative father . He also claims that the order and resolution of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, effectively converted the complaint for support to a petition for recognition, which is supposedly proscribed by law. He alleges that Martin, as an unrecognized child, has no right to ask for support and must first establish his filiation in a separate suit under Article 283 Issues: Is subjecting Arnel to DNA testing against his right to privacy and self-incrimination? Held: No. The court has now accepted DNA testing as a valid procedure to determine filiation and paternity. Ruling: 1. The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for recognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and order effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with an action for support, such was valid and in accordance with jurisprudence in Tayag v. Court of Appeals wherein the Court allowed the integration of an action to compel recognition with an action to claim ones inheritance. 2. Although the court initially was hesitant to accept DNA tests as evidence, it has been recently admitting it as evidence in certain cases. In the case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity . In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing. 3. The Court has upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. In that case, DNA samples from semen recovered from a rape victims vagina were used to positively identify the accused Joel "Kawit" Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction of his blood sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself, violated his right against self-incrimination, as embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution. 4. With regards to the intrusion to his private rights the court cites In Ople v. Torres,where we struck down the proposed national computerized identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said: In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy . The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good. 5. The court also looks into US jurisprudence on the acceptance of DNA testing and cites the case of Wilson v. Lumb which shows that DNA testing is so commonly accepted that, in some instances, ordering the procedure has become a ministerial act. The Supreme Court of St. Lawrence County, New York allowed a party who had already acknowledged paternity to subsequently challenge his prior acknowledgment. The Court pointed out that, under the law, specifically Section 516 of the New York Family Court Act, the Family Court examiner had the duty, upon receipt of the challenge, to order DNA tests. 6. The court ends with the statement that illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. And hence believes in that DNA testing is a valid means to determine paternity . 367. Estate of Rogelio Ong v Minor Joanne Diaz () December 17, 2007 Chico-Nazario DNA Testing: SC turned into CSI Facts: 1. While she was married to Hasegawa Katsuo, Jinky Diaz met, fell in love with, and sexed Rogelio Ong. She got pregnant sometime in 1997 and gave birth to Joanne of February 25, 1998. 2. Rogelio took care of all the arrangements for her delivery, paid all the bills and provided for the mother and her baby during the first few months. 3. In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned and stopped supporting the two. After some time, Jinky filed a case for support. 4. The RTC ruled in favor of Jinky, which Rogelio moved for reconsideration. The motion was denied, and Rogelio filed a petition for review with the CA. 5. In the course of the petition with the CA, however, Rogelio died and was substituted by his estate. Eventually the CA granted his petition and remanded the case to the trial court to schedule a DNA test (yikes for the estate, haha).
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6. The estate then appealed to the Supreme Plagiarism Court Issue: Was the order for DNA testing erroneous because of the fact that Rogelio Ong is already dead? Held: NO. The decision was AFFIRMED in toto Ruling: 1. The discussion of the other issues (whether or not the presumption is operative here and whether the compulsory recognition complaint should be dismissed), was foregone by the court in its decision. Instead, the issue of whether or not DNA testing will be helpful in the case was chosen by the court as the most important. 2. DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire genetic make -up. It is found in all human cells and bears the same appearance every time. 3. When checking on paternity, the scientist looks as the allele, which is a pair of str ands inherited from each parent. One half should be inherited from the mother, and the other half is from the father. From there it becomes easy to trace if one has a paternal relation with another. 4. Despite the strong aversion of the petitioner toward DNA testing, it might be the definitive key to the resolution of the issue of support. 5. Rogelios death does not bar the use of DNA testing because one can obtain DNA even from a dead persons body. Concept: The use of DNA testing is not too novel for the SC. They watch TV din naman 368. Chua Keng Giap v. IAC, Chua Lian King() 1988 Cruz *always-denied kid never tires of filing a petition Facts: 1. Chua Keng Giap insists that he is the son of the deceased Sy Kao but private respondent claims that he former had been declared as not the son of the spouses Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao in a case which involved the settlement of the estate of the late Chua Bing Guan (Sy Kao v. CA). The decision in that case had long become final and executory. Issue: Can Chua Keng Giap still prove that hes the son of the deceased Sy Kao? Held: No more Ruling: 1. The petitioner is beating a dead horse. The issue of his claimed filiation has long been settled, and with finality, by no less than this Court. That issue cannot be resurrected now because it has been laid to rest in Sy Kao v. Court of Appeals. In that case, Sy Kao flatly and unequivocally declared that she was not the petitioner's mother. 2. Who better than Sy Kao herself would know if Chua Keng Giap was really her son? More than any one else, it was Sy Kao who could say as indeed she has said these many years--that Chua Keng Giap was not begotten of her womb. 369. Rodriguez vs. CA () June 19, 1995Quiason *mother being not allowed to testify who the actual father was. Facts: 1. An action for compulsory recognition and support was brought to the RTC by Alarito (Respondent) against Bienvenido (Petitioner). 2. At the trial, the plaintiff presented his mother as witness. 3. In the course of her direct examination, she was asked by counsel to reveal the identity of the plaintiffs father but the defendants counsel raised an objection. 4. Thus, the petition. 5. Bienvenido (Petitioner) contends that the mother should not be allowed to reveal the name of the father of private respondent because such revelation is prohibited under Article 280 of the Civil Code. 6. Alarito (Respondent) believes that his mother should be allowed to testify under paragraph 4, Article 283 of the Civil Code. Issue: Can the mother reveal who the father is? Held: Yes. The prohibition was not adopted in the Family Code. Filiation may now be proved by any evidence. Ruling: 1. Article 280 of NCC was repealed by the Family Code, which now allows the establishment of illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children (Art 175) 2. Article 172 of the Family Code has adopted Article 283 of NCC. Thus, filiation may be proven by any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father. Laws / Concepts 1. Art 283 NCC- In any of the ff cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child: (4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father. 2. Article 280 NCC- When the father of the mother makes the recognition separately, he or she shall not reveal the name of the person with whom he or she had the child; neither shall he or she state any circumstance whereby the other party may be

identified.
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370. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDGARDO QUITORIANO () January 20, 1997 Puno *Got raped in the kitchen Facts: 1. Private complainant Edna P. Pergis testified that in the evening of December 24, 1992, she was in the kitchen located at the back of their house 2. Edgardo Quitoriano entered the kitchen, poked a knife on her neck, and dragged her to the bamboo bed and raped her 3. However, in June 1993, her aunt, Teresa Pergis, discovered that she was pregnant. 4. Accused-appellant interposed the defense of alibi. He testified he was at the house of Paulino Rioflorido in Barangay Pakaskasan, Torrijos, Marinduque. He was then having a drinking session with Reynaldo Rioflorido, the son of Paulino. At 10:00, they attended a party at the house of Jose Ampiloquio which was about 400 meters from the Rioflorido residence. The party ended at around 1:00 in the morning, after which, they proceeded to accused-appellant's house. 5. Note raped Dec 1992, gave birth October 31, 1993 10 months Issue: Is he guilty of the crime of rape? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. Private complainant's testimony is clear and detailed. 2. Even in the cross-examination, her answers were consistent and unwavering. 3. It is settled that in rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim, if credible, is enough to sustain a conviction 4. Edna positively identified accused-appellant as the rapist 5. Edgardo failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of its commission PERSONS 6. The fact that private complainant gave birth more than ten months after the alleged rape does not discredit her testimony. 7. Dr. Honesto Marquez, a physician from the Marinduque Provincial Hospital, explained that the normal gestation period is 40 weeks or 280 days, but it can also extend beyond 40 weeks if the woman is having her first pregnancy. 8. It is undisputed that the child delivered by private complainant on October 31, 1993 was her first. 9. Hence, it is not impossible that the child was conceived in December, 1992, the date of the alleged rape. 371. Cabatbat-Lim vs. IAC () October 18, 1988 Grino-Aquino *Not a legitimate child; the case is not even an action to impugn legitimacy Facts: 1. The sisters of the late Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat filed a complaint for the partition of the estate of Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat , who died without issue on April 23, 1977. Part of her estate was her interest in the business partnership, the Calasiao Bijon Factory, now in the possession of Violeta Lim who claims to be the child of Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat. 2. Esperanza Cabatbat was survived by her husband, Proceso Cabatbat, her sisters, Consorcia Maria, Benedicta, Bonifacia, and the children of her deceased brothers Daniel and Domingo. 3. They alleged that Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not a child of Esperanza, but was only a ward (ampon) of the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat who sheltered and supported her from childhood, without benefit of formal adoption proceedings. 4. The evidence on the non-filiation of Violeta to Esperanza Cabatbat were: the absence of any record that Esperanza Cabatbat was admitted in the hospital where Violeta was born and that she gave birth to Violeta on the day the latter was born the absence of the birth certificate of Violeta Cabatbat in the files of certificates of live births of the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital for the years 1947 and 1948, when Violeta was supposedly born certification dated March 9, 1977, of the Civil Registry coordinator Eugenio Venal of the Office of the Civil Registrar General, that his office has no birth record of Violeta Cabatbat alleged to have been born on May 26, 1948 or 1949 in Calasiao, Pangasinan certification dated June 16, 1977 of Romeo Gabriana, Principal II, that when Violeta studied in the Calasiao Pilot Central School, Proceso Cabatbat and Esperanza Cabatbat were listed as her guardians only, not as her parents testimony of Amparo Reside that she was in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital on May 21,1948 to watch a cousin who delivered a child there and that she became acquianted with a patient named Benita Lastimosa who gave birth on May 26, 1948 to a baby girl who grew up to be known as Violeta Cabatbat 5. The evidence of Violeta consisted of: Violeta Cabatbat's birth record which was filed on June 15,1948 showing that she was born on May 26, 1948 at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital and that she is a legitimate child of the spouses Proceso and Esperanza Cabatbat testimony of Proceso Cabatbat that Violeta is his child with the deceased Esperanza Frianeza
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testimony of Benita Lastimosa denying that she delivered a child in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital and that Violeta Cabatbat Lim is that child the marriage contract of Violeta and Lim Biak Chiao where Esperanza appeared as the mother of the bride Deed of Sale dated May 14, 1960, wherein the vendee Violeta Cabatbat, then a minor, was represented and assisted by her "mother," Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat Another Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 21, 1961, wherein Violeta Cabatbat was assisted and represented by her "father," Proceso Cabatbat 6. Upon the evidence, the trial court, Violeta Cabatbat is not a child by nature of the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat and that hence, she is not a legal heir of the deceased Esperanza Cabatbat. Issue: 1. Is Violeta the legitimate child of Esperanza and Proceso? Held: NO 2. Is the case an action to impugn legitimacy? Held: NO Ruling: First Issue: 1. This is very strange and odd because the Registry Book of admission of the hospital does not show that Esperanza Frianeza was ever a patient on May 26, 1948. 2. Furthermore, the absence of a record of the birth of petitioner Violeta Cabatbat in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, puts a cloud on the genuineness of her evidence. Second Issue: 1. Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the Civil Code is not well-taken. This refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. 2. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. 3. They do not claim that she is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all.
372. Gaspay vs CA () November 15, 1994 Puno *despite parents death voluntary acknowledged daughter gets her s hare Facts: 1. On October 14, 1983Flaviano Gaspay died without a last will and testament. He was then married to Agueda Denoso and were childless. 2. On July 6, 1988, private respondent Guadalupe Gaspay Alfaro alleges that she is the acknowledged illegitimate daughter of the deceased Flaviano Gaspay, and claims inheritance on the real and personal properties. She identified her mother as Claudia Pason with whom decedent allegedly had an illicit relationship. 3. Flaviano S. Gaspay, Jr., and Eriberta Salvatieva Gaspay opposed the petition with motion to dismiss. Flaviano, Jr., is an adopted son of the decedent while Eriberta is also not a next of kin. They alleged that private respondent is a stranger and even assuming her illegitimate status, there is no proof of her recognition or acknowledgment. Issues: Can an action to impugn legitimacy be allowed despite the death of the parent? Held: No. In cases of voluntary acknowledgement it is allowed. Ruling: 1. The death of Flaviano Gaspay, Sr., does not constitute a time bar to private respondent's claim as his acknowledged illegitimate daughter. Settled is the rule that "actions based on voluntary acknowledgment may be brought even after the father's death." 2. The letters provided by principal witness Martin Garin are vital evidence for the private respondent for they show that the decedent acknowledged her as his daughter. Wherein Flaviano has sent him money for medical assistance and gave her one of his property as a gift. 3. The court is also satisfied that the evidence profusely proved that private respondent consented to her voluntary recognition as an illegitimate child by the decedent as she has been sporting the name Guadalupe Gaspay since childhood up to the time she got married. 4. Crucial is that the petitioners (the adopted) neglected to apply for letters of administration thirty (30) days after the death of Gaspay, Sr as provided by Section 6 of Rule 78 (b) (b) If much surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person , it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve. Thus proved Lupes entitlement to be administrator of the estate.
373. Benitez-Badua v Court of Appeals ()
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January 24, 1994 Puno Ako ang nag-iisang tagapagmana! Facts: 1. Vicente and Isabel died and left a considerably large estate without an administrator. Vicentes sister and nephew, Victoria and Feodor then instituted an action to grant them the power of administration. 2. The petitioner, Marissa, then opposed the petition, claiming that she is the only surviving heir of the dead spouses. 3. The respondents countered by saying that Isabel was sterile, and that the spouses could not possibly have been able to procreate. 4. The trial court decided in favor of Marissa. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court and ruled in favor of Victoria and Feodor. 5. Marissa went to the Supreme Court after that. Issue: Can Victoria and Feodor impugn the validity of the presumption that Marissa is the child of Vicente and Isabel? Held: NO. The decision was AFFIRMED in toto Ruling: 1. The reliance of petitioner Marissa on the provisions of the Family Code on impugning the legitimacy of a child is misplaced. The provisions cited are meant for a father questioning a child of his wife. They do not apply to the case at bench because it merely involves the claim by the respondents that Marissa was not born to Vicente and Isabel. 2. Victoria and Feodor are not questioning her legitimacy, but her claim that she is the only surviving heir. It is useless therefore to use the provisions of the Family Code to bar the respondents from filing this action. 3. The evidence uncovered by the lower courts was sufficient to establish the fact that Marissa is NOT Vicente and Isa bles biological daughter. The couple was incapable of bearing a child which supports the factual finding that Vicente actually took Marissa from somewhere as a baby. 4. The letter left by Isabel praying for the recognition of Marissa as the sole heir would be totally unnecessary if she was in fact their LEGITIMATE BIOLOGICAL daughter. 5. Despite the fact that Marissa presented her certificate of live birth, which listed Vicente and Isabel as her parents , the totality of evidence to the contrary clearly rebuts her claim. Concept: The rules on who can impugn the legitimacy of a child are strict, but they dont apply where they are unnecessary. 374. Liyao, Jr. v. Liyao() 2002 De Leon *child questions his legitimacy Facts: 1. William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, filed an action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao 2. Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for ten (10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born. Issue: May Liyao Jr. impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao? Held: No Ruling: 1. The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs 2. Thus the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. 3. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. 4. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. 5. Now, do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter? NO. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings. 375. Diaz vs. CA () 22 Jun 1984 Melencio-Herrera *niece appointed administratrix of uncle from a huge family Facts: 1. Father: Isidro Azarraga (died in 1911) and Mother: Calixta Lozada had: Filomena (No. 9) legitimate Mistress: Valentina Abaracoso had: 7 children (1-7) illegitimate

2. 3. 4.
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In question: legitimacy of Leodegario (No. 8) and Pastora (No. 10) Leodegario died intestate on 10 Sep 1949 without descendants. He had properties in Capiz. On 15 Oct 1949, Maria Diaz, his niece from Filomena (No. 9), filed a petition for issuance of Letters of Administration to settle Leodegarios estate. Amador Azarraga (No. 4) opposed. Pastora Azarraga (No. 10) supported Marias petition. 5. On 1 Mar 1950, the court appointed Maria as administratrix. 6. Twenty years later, the heirs of children 1-7 (oppositors) filed a petition to remove Maria as administratrix for failure to submit a final accounting of her administration. The court denied. 7. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, declared oppositors as legal heirs, and removed Maria as administratrix. 8. The oppositors claim that Leodegario was their brother from Isidro and Valentina, thus illegitimate also. This claim makes Maria barred from inheriting from Leodegario. 9. Maria claims that Leodegario was a legitimate son of Isidro and Calixta, her mothers parents. Issue: Is Leodegario a legitimate child of Isidro thereby making Maria and Pastora his legitimate heirs? Held: Yes. Presumption of Leodegarios legitimacy has not been successfully contradicted. Ruling: 1. The evidence presented proves Leodegarios legitimacy . a. The school records of Leodegario showed him enrolled as Leodegario Azarraga y Lozada b. Dropping of maternal surname in correspondence or written documents is commonplace for convenience and/or brevity. His Certificate of Admission to the Bar only names him as Leodegario Azarraga c. Last Will and Testament of Pastora (No. 10) indicates that she, Leodegario, and Pastora are full blood siblings. d. Court Order of 1 Mar 1950 already mentioned Pastora as the legitimate and sole surviving sister of Leodegario . e. In Sison vs. Azcarraga, Leodegario was appointed executor of his father Isidros estate. Isidros Final Will and Testament showed his appointment. 2. The evidence presented is an additional index of legitimacy and serves to corroborate Marias testimony that it was her uncle who attended to her personal and proprietary interests . 376. Reyes vs. Court of Appeals () March 19, 1985 Makasiar *She is already 35 years old and thus barred to get recognized, father dead Facts: 1. Heirs of Francisco Delgado filed a case against Irene Reyes for reconveyance in favor of them the parcels of lot. 2. Irene Delgado alleged that she was the sole child of the deceased Francisco Delgado and entitled to inherit the parcels of lands described in the complaint; 3. Proof: that for several years preceding the birth of Irene Delgado, her mother Genoveva Ramero had separated from her lawful husband Justino Reyes and never reconciled since then; and that Irene was born during the cohabitation of Francisco Delgado and Genoveva Ramero as common law husband and wife, and since her birth, lived with Francisco Delgado and Genoveva Ramero, who reared and treated her as their child, maintaining her and sending her through college . 4. Bu the respondents here assailed that that defendant Irene Delgado is not the illegitimate daughter of Francisco Delgado , who died without issue, but is the legitimate daughter of Genoveva Ramero and Justino Reyes Issue: Whether or not Irene Reyes is the illegitimate child of Francisco Delgado Held: No. Her action has already prescribed Ruling: 1. It is the contention of the petitioners that the silence of the Civil Code as to the recognition of illegitimate children other than natural, in contrast to natural children who are expressly required to be recognized in order to inherit, only meant that illegitimate children need not be recognized in order to inherit from his or her alleged parent COURT SAID: NO 2. Unrecognized natural children can inherit not the share of a natural child but the share of a spurious child so long as his filiation shall be duly proved. 3. It is an elementary and basic principle under the old and new Civil Code, that an unrecognized natural child has no rights whatsoever against his parent or his estate. His rights spring not from the filiation itself, but from the child's acknowledgment by the natural parent Birth Certificate 4. A copy of another birth certificate issued by the municipal treasurer and local civil registrar of the municipality of Alitagtag (Exhibit "20") stated therein that the name of the child is Irene Ramero, and the name of the father is "Francisco" and the mother "Genoveva Ramero." Any of these records of birth cannot be sufficient recognition under the law. The birth certificate, to be sufficient recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly , or by the mother alone if the father refuses, otherwise she may be penalized 5. Since any of the certificates of birth presented were not signed by Francisco Delgado, it cannot be taken as record of birth to prove recognition of Irene Delgado; nor can this birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument
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Certificate of Baptism 6. Irene's certificate of baptism cannot be taken as proof of recognition 7. baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates Student Records 8. Irene's secondary student permanent record nor the written consent given by Irene to the operation of her alleged father cannot be taken as an authentic writing. 9. Irene's secondary student permanent record and her written consent to the operation of her father, not being signed nor written in the handwriting of Francisco Delgado, cannot be taken as an authentic writing to prove her recognition by her alleged father. Marriage Contract 10. The marriage contract of Irene Delgado and Moises Villanueva, wherein it was stated that Francisco Delgado gave his consent or advice for Irene Delgado to marry, and that he was her father cannot be also taken as recognition in an authentic document because it was not signed nor in the handwriting of Francisco Delgado Pictures 11. The family pictures presented by Irene, showing Irene posing with Francisco Delgado, cannot be a sufficient proof of recognition. In the case of Bercilles vs. GSIS, supra, it was held that pictures do not constitute proof of filiation. Court Said that 12. What Irene may have proved is that she had been in continuous possession of a status of an illegitimate child who is not natural. 13. that the action for the. recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents 14. Irene was already of age (35 years old) when her alleged father died, and she had not presented any discovered document wherein her presumed father recognized her, the action to compel recognition is already barred 377. Tison vs. CA () RegaldoJuly 31, 1997 *nephews are entitled to of the property Facts: 1. Martin and Teodora were married. They owned land. 2. 1983- Teodora died. 3. Martin made himself sole heir of the land. 4. 1986- Martin sold the land to respondents. 5. 1988 Martin died. 6. Petitioners are the nephews and nieces of Teodora. 7. They claim they are entitled to of the property because they are the surviving heirs. 8. Petitioners produce the ff evidence: a. Family picture b. Baptismal Certificate of their aunt (Teodora) and father to prove their affiliation. c. Certificates of destroyed birth certificates of aunt (Teodora) and father to prove affiliation. d. Death certificates destroyed of their aunt and father to prove affiliation. e. Joint affidavits of 2 witnesses attesting to their (petitioners) birth which recognizes their parents [shows that their father is the brother of Teodora] f. Marriage Certificate of Martin and Teodora. 9. Respondents claim that the testimony of the witnesses are self-serving and that it falls short of the quantum of proof required under Article 172 of the Family Code. 10. Respondents claim that the certification issued by the office of the local civil registrar is merely proof of the alleged destruction of the records. 11. Respondents claim that the joint affidavit is inadmissible as hearsay since the affiants were never presented for cross examination. 12. RTC and CA ruled for respondents. Issue: Do they have the right to inherit? Held: Yes Ruling:
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1. Legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. There is a very strong presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. 2. The burden of proof does not rest on Petitioners but on private respondents. 3. The primary proof to be considered is the testimony of Corazon Tison, wherein she alleged during 1946 that the petitioner was Teodoras neice. a. Declarant is dead or unable to testify. b. declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry. c. such relationship be shown evidence other than declaration. d. the declaration was made BEFORE the commencement of the suit but before any controversy. 5. Declaration made by Teodora Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, not withstanding the fact that there was no other prelim evidence. 6. More importantly respondents never refuted the declaration made by the decedent. 7. At no point did the counsel for respondents claim that the testimony of the witness was inadmissible or raised any objection. Instead, they solicited answers from the witness. 8. The certificate of marriage helps establish proof. 9. It is also good proof that the declarant and the claimants bear the same surname. 378. Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals () April 20, 1998 - Panganiban *Family pictures of harmonious filiation! Facts: 1. Arturio Trinidad was born on July 21, 1943 and at 23, he got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar. 2. On August 10, 1978, Arturio Trinidad filed with the CFI of Kalibo, Aklan, an action for partition of 4 parcels of land, claiming that he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of 3 children of Patricio Trinidad, the original owner of the parcels of land. 3. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the 4 parcels of land to his 3 children: Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix . 4. In 1970, Arturio demanded from Felix and Lourdes to partition the land into 3 equal shares and to give him the 1/3 individual share of his late father, but they refused. 5. Lourdes and Felix denied that he was the son of the late Inocentes. They contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before Arturios birth. 6. They also denied that Arturio had lived with them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in the complaint had been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that they had not given Arturio a share in the produce of the land. 7. Arturio presented witnesses who testified that he was indeed the son of Inocentes, and they shared the following information: a. Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato are the parents of Arturio, and were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a protestant pastor by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. b. Inocentes died in 1944 and his wife died very much later. c. Patricio died before the war and after his death the land went to his 3 children, but the land was never partitioned. d. Upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him when he was still small, about 3 years old, until Arturio grew up and got married. e. While Arturio was growing up, he had also enjoyed the produce of the land while he was being taken care of by Lourdes Trinidad. f. A misunderstanding later on arose when Arturio Trinidad wanted to get his father's share but Lourdes Trinidad will not give it to him. g. (Picture 1) Lourdes was identified. A man with a hat holding a baby was identified by as Felix. The other woman in the picture was pointed as the wife of Arturio. h. (Picture 2) Lourdes was again identified, who was there present during the baptism of Arturios child. 8. As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Felicidad, Arturio showed a certificate of baptism. His birth certificate was burned during World War 2. He has a certificate of loss issued by the Civil Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan. 9. At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad died without issue and he was survived by his only sister, Lourdes Trinidad, who is his codefendant in this case. 10. The defendants also presented their own witnesses that refuted the said filiation. 11. When Arturio was presented as rebuttal witness, he was not able to present a marriage contract of his parents but instead a certification dated September 5, 1978 issued by one Remedios Eleserio of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of New Washington, Aklan, attesting to the fact that records of births, deaths, and marriages in the municipality of New Washington were destroyed during the Japanese time. Issue: Is Arturio the child of Inocentes? Held: YES Ruling: 1. When the question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to

2.
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3. 4.
the matrimony, the couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents. Although the marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the marital union, petitioner's failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place. Aside from the witnesses testimonies, Arturio submitted a certification that records relatives to his birth were either destroyed during the last world war or burned when the old town hall was razed to the ground on June 17, 1956. There were also family pictures that proved the filiation of Lourdes and Felix to Arturio. Furthermore, Arturio consistently used Inocentes' surname (Trinidad) without objection from private respondents a presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes' legitimate child.
** 5. Lourdes and Felix have not acquired ownership of the property in question by acquisitive prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of one benefits all the other co-owners, unless the former repudiates the co-ownership. Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership. 6. Although Lourdes and Felix had possessed these parcels openly since 1940 and had not shared with Arturio the produce of the land during the pendency of this case, still, they manifested no repudiation of the co-ownership. 379. Jison vs CA () February 24, 1998 Davide *Ironic: a spoiled illegitimate child struggles for recognition Facts: 8. Francisco is a married to to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end of 1945 he impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes). It was testified that FRANCISCOs wife suffered a miscarriage or abortion, thereby depriving FRANCISCO of consortium; thereafter, FRANCISCOs wife managed a nightclub on the ground floor of Nelly Garden which operated daily from 6:00 p.m. till 3:00 a.m. of the following day, thereby allowing FRANCISCO free access to MONINAs mother. 9. As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and since childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family . 10. Monina has been well received by the family of both Francisco and her wife as their own relative; she has also been receiving allowance, has been given support for her education and other expenses. Although when she goes to meet his father it is made sure that Franciscos wife is not there because she doesnt want to see her. 11. When one day, Monina was asking for money to go to Spain her father refused but later promised to give him the money after she went on tantrums broke some glasses and hurt her hand. But then what happened later was she was made to sign an affidavit stating that she was not her daughter . She signed it because she needed the money and instead of going abroad spent the proceeds of the P15,000.00 check for her CPA review, board exam and graduate studies 12. In view of FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly recognize her, MONINA prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status Issues: Has Monina proven her status as an illegitimate child? Held: Yes. She proved this through her open and continuous possession of status as an illegitimate child. Ruling: 5. The court said that to prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his , by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously. 6. The court agrees with MONINA that this was broad enough to cover the fourth quarter of said year , hence her birth on 6 August 1946 could still be attributed to sexual relations between FRANCISCO and MONINAs mother. In any event, since it was established that her mother was still in the employ of FRANCISCO at the time MONINA was conceived as determined by the date of her birth, sexual contact between FRANCISCO and MONINAs mother was not at all impossible. 7. FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his overt acts and conduct which the Court of Appeals took pains to enumerate, thus: [L]ike sending appellant to school, paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms, books, board and lodging at the Colegio del Sagrado de Jesus, defraying appellants hospitalization expenses, providing her with [a] monthly allowance, paying for the funeral expenses of appellants mother, acknowledging appellants paternal greetings and calling appellant his Hija or child, instructing his office personnel to give appellants monthly allowance, recommending appellant for employment at the Miller, Cruz & Co., allowing appellant to use his house in Bacolod and paying for her long distance telephone calls, having appellant spend her vacation in his apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes residence, allowing appellant to use his surname in her scholastic and other records. Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested throughout the years publicly, spontaneously, continuously and in an uninterrupted manner.

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Although according to Rule 130, Section 40 on the Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The inadmissibility of various notes and letters written by FRANCISCOs relatives because they are not family possessions following the rule of ejusdem generis. Notwithstanding, may, in like manner as MONINA's school records, properly be admitted as part of her testimony to strengthen her claim that, indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO recognized her as his daughter. 9. Furthermore if truly that she is not FRANCISCOs illegitimate daughter, it would have been unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that MONINA denounce her filiation. 10. MONINAs evidence hurdled the high standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish ones illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding open and continuous possession or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws; moreover, MONINA proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence . Also a denial then of her action on ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust . Concept: Rule 130, Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. -- The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereonbe also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. (underscoring supplied) 380. Labagala v Santiago () December 4, 2001 Quisumbing Poor, unschooled sisters going after the non-daughter Facts: 29. Jose was sued by his sisters (Nicolasa and Amanda) for recovery of partial share from a parcel of land. The sisters won, and they were each awarded with 1/3 share of the property in 1981. Jose died intestate three years after that. 30. The sisters then filed a recovery of title and possession case against Ida, the supposed daughter of Jose. They claimed that the sale made by their brother to Ida was invalid because he only affixed his thumb mark, instead of his signature. They also said that Idas last name is Labagala and not Santiago, thus she is not the daughter of Jose. 31. Ida countered by claiming that the sale was valid because it was actually a donation made to her by her father. She lived in the house ever since she was a kid and she considered herself as the daughter of Jose. She also claimed that since the previous two ejectment cases filed by the sisters against her were dismissed, it shows that they really are without merit. 32. The trial court ruled in favor of Ida. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court. Hence this case. Issue: (1) Are respondents barred from impugning Idas filiation to Jose? Held: NO. (2) Is Ida entitled to Joses share? Held: NO. Held: The decision was AFFIRMED. Ruling: 1. Reliance on article 263 here is misplaced. The provision refers to cases wherein the legitimacy of a child is being questioned. It does not apply where the question is whether Ida is a child of Jose at all (Illegit OR legit). 2. Moreover, this is a recovery of title and possession, which is clearly not within the coverage of article 263. 3. Ida was underage when the sale was made, and she did not pay a single centavo so she is not entitled to Joses share. Concept: Third parties may impugn a childs filiation in recovery cases. 381. Jinkie Christie De Jesus and Jacqueline De Jesus minors, represented by their mother, Carolina DE JESUS v. The Estate Of Decedent Juan Gamboa DIZON, et al () 2001 - Vitug *kids want to impugn legitimacy w/ real father and establish illegitimacy w/ another man Facts: 1. Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus got married in August 1964. It was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus were born 2. In a notarized document, dated June 1991, Juan Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. 3. Juan G. Dizon died intestate in March 1992 4. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint in July 1993 for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate 5. Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon , including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. 6. They also contended that an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to ascertain the question of paternity and

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filiation, an issue that could only be taken up in an independent suit or proceeding. But petitioners maintain that their recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a separate action for judicial approval Issue: Whats the status of Jinkie and Jacque? Held: Legitimate kids of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus (not Juan Dizon) Ruling: 1. A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father. 2. In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon , petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesu s. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. 3. The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. 4. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally , one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Concept: Any writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, (compulsory recognition) a claim for recognition is predicted on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court or record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's acknowledgement. 367. Estate of Rogelio Ong v Minor Joanne Diaz () December 17, 2007 Chico-Nazario *woman impregnated by paramour while husband was in Japan Facts: 7. While she was married to Hasegawa Katsuo, Jinky Diaz met, fell in love, and had sex with Rogelio Ong. They cohabited from Jan 1994 to Sep 1998. 8. On 25 Feb 1998, Jinky gave birth to Joanne. Rogelio took care of all the arrangements for her delivery, paid all the bills and provided for the mother and her baby during the first few months. 9. In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned and stopped supporting the two. After some time, Jinky filed a case for support. 10. The RTC ruled in favor of Jinky and ordered Rogelio to recognize Joanne as his natural child. Rogelio moved for reconsideration. The motion was denied, and Rogelio filed a petition for review with the CA. 11. In the course of the petition with the CA, however, Rogelio died and was substituted by his estate. Eventually the CA granted his petition and remanded the case to the trial court to schedule a DNA test. 12. The estate then appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: Should Rogelio recognize Joanne? Held: Yes. DNA test to confirm paternity. Ruling: 6. Even though the law presumes that Joanne is legitimate to Jinky and Hasegawa, the ev idence proved that Hasegawa was outside and never arrived in the country during the conception of Joanne in 1997. 7. There is no evidence that Jinky had sexual relations with other men other than Rogelio . Rogelio even shouldered the medical bills. 8. The DNA testing will decisively lay to rest the issue of filiation of Joanne. It can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father. 9. Despite the strong aversion of the heirs toward DNA testing, it might be the definitive key to the resolution of the issue of support. Rogelios death does not bar the use of DNA testing because one can obtain DNA even from a dead persons body. 383. Castro vs. Court of Appeals () May 31, 1989 Gutierrez *Her mother left her own wedding party to be with her true love, her father : ) Facts: 1. Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro, and Eustaquio Castro who was already dead were the children of the deceased spouses Pedro Castro and Cornelia Santiago. 2. Marcelina Bautista, one of the plaintiffs, is the surviving spouse of the deceased Eustaquio Castro. 3. Pricola Maregmen, the natural mother of Benita C. Naval was wedded to Felix de Maya of Anoling Canaling ,

4. 5. 6.
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Pricola Maregmen surreptitiously left her wedding and lived with Eustaquio Castro as husband and wife until the death of Pricola on September 11, 1924. Action for partition of properties against defendant Benita Castro Naval alleging, among other things, that they are also compulsory heirs of Eustaquio Castro who died in Mayantoc The defendants in their amended answer in both cases allege that Benita Castro Naval is the only child of the deceased Eustaquio and that said Eustaquio Castro is the son of Pedro Castro, therefore, the complaint for partition has no cause of action
Issue: whether or not respondent Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro. Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. The recognition of Benita Castro as a natural child of Eustaquio Castro appears in the records of birth and partition 2. There is no question that the private respondent is an illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro. 3. Her father Eustaquio was a widower when Pricola Maregmen, her mother, went to live with him. The two could not validly enter into a marriage because when Pricola fled from her own wedding party on May 23, 1913 , the wedding rites to Felix de Maya had already been solemnized. In other words, the marriage was celebrated although it could not be consummated because the bride hurriedly ran away to join the man she really loved. 4. The appellate court ruled that the private respondent was voluntarily recognized by her father , Eustaquio Castro through the record of birth, hence there was no need for any judicial pronouncement. 5. Strictly speaking, a birth certificate to be sufficient for purposes of recognizing a child must be signed by the father and mother jointly and if the father refuses, by the mother alone otherwise she may be penalized . 6. What is signed is a loose form whose contents are later transferred by a municipal employee to the local registry book of births which is preserved. 7. An examination of Birth Certificate of Benita Castro, Folder of shows that this " birth certificate" was in turn copied on October 17, 1961 from Book page No. 28, and Registry No. 47 of the book bound records where "Eustaquio Castro" appears under the column "Remarks." 8. This is no question that Eustaquio himself reported the birth of his daughte r but this record is not determinative of whether or not he also signed the easily lost looseleaf form of the certificate from where the entry in book bound or logbook record was taken in March, 1919. Summary 1. Benita Castro Naval is unquestionably the daughter of the late Eustaquio Castro who was qualified to legally marry when she was conceived and born 2. The rule on separating the legitimate from the illegitimate family is of no special relevance here because Benita and her mother Pricola Maregmen were the only immediate family of Eustaquio. 3. Eustaquio himself who had the birth of Benita reported and registered . There is no indication in the records that Eustaquio should have known in 1919 that apart from reporting the birth of a child, he should also have signed the certificate and seen to it that it was preserved for 60 years. Or that he should have taken all legal steps including judicial action to establish her status as his recognized natural child during the reglementary period to do so. 4. Eustaquio who gave away Benita during her wedding to Cipriano Naval . The couple continued to live with the father even after the wedding and until the latter's death. 5. the certificate of baptism and the picture of the Castro family during the wake for Eustaquio may not be sufficient proof of recognition under the Civil Code but they add to the equities of this case favoring the petitioner. There can be no dispute that Benita Castro enjoyed the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro and that the action of Benita in defending her status in this case is similar to an "action to claim legitimacy" brought during her lifetime. (personal note, I think there is something wrong, if you are to prove continuous possession of status it should be during the lifetime of the parents right? Not the child?) 384. Lim vs. CA () July 18, 1975Castro *Two kids claim to be the natural kids of a dead mom Facts: 1. Susana owned property. 2. Susana died. 3. Felisa and Uy both CLAIM to be the natural children of Susana and wish to inherit that property. 4. Uy claims that she is the only daughter of Susana, thus Felisa should not be allowed to inherit. 5. Felisa produced the ff evidence to prove that Susana was her mom:
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a. Her Certificate of Baptism (which showed that Susana was her mom) b. Her Marriage Contract (where Susana gave her consent [acting as mother] to allow Felisa to get married. 6. Felisa claims that her Marriage contract is a public document. A requirement of the requisites to prove that he or she is the natural child of said Susana. 7. Uy produced the ff evidence to prove that Susana was her mom: a. his application for alien registration in the Bureau of Immigration, which names Susana as her mother. b. order of the BIR cancelling her alien registration, which describes Uy as a Filipino citizen derived from her Filipino Mother Susana. c. Identification Certificate issued the BIR (that says the same thing as the evidence above [b]) 8.Uy claims that her husband bought the land with his own money before Susanas death thus Uy is entitled to it because of the concept of Implied Trust (refer to concept area of digest) Issue: Who is entitled to the land? Held: No one Ruling: 1. A marriage certificate is not a public document because it is not notarized. It is simply a declaration by the parties to be wed. 2. None of them can inherit because neither of them have been recognized by Susana as her child through means provided by law. 3. The concept of Implied trust fails because Uy did not produce sufficient evidence to prove that her husband did actually purchase the land. Concept: Implied Trust- where a person purchases land with his own money and takes conveyance thereof I nthe name of another. The property is held on a resulting trust in favor of the one furnishing the consideration for the transfer, unless a different intention or understanding appears. The trust does not arise from contract or agreement of the parties, but from the facts and circumstances. It results from equities and implications or operation of law. 385. Heirs of Raymundo Banas vs. Heirs of Bibiano Banas () January 3, 1985 - Makasiar *He believes his uncle acknowledged him as a natural child long case! Facts: 1. The late Raymundo Baas was a natural child being born out of wedlock on March 15, 1894, in Sampaloc, Manila, of Dr. Dolores Castillo and of an unknown father. 2. During this time, Dr. Bibiano Baas, his uncle, was still single. 3. It was Bibiano who shouldered his school expenses, and this lasted until he became a public school teacher. 4. The records are bereft of any evidence to show whether or not Bibiano lived with Raymundo and his mother. 5. But the records show that by the year 1922, Raymundo used to go to the place of Bibiano once or twice a week, and it was in one of his visits, that he met Trinidad Vecino, a niece of Bibianos wife (Faustina), and who lived with Bibianos family. 6. Raymundo married Trinidad in 1926. In their marriage certificate, the name of Raymundos father was Bibiano. Pedro Baas' name appeared in the marriage certificate as one of the sponsors. 7. Sworn statements of Raymundo and Pedro were filed, stating that the real father of Raymundo was Pedro and not Bibiano. 8. Consequently, in the certified copy of the marriage contract of Raymundo and Trinidad, it was added that Pedro and not Bibiano, was the father of Raymundo. 9. Likewise, Bibiano executed a sworn statement that Raymundo is Pedros child. 10. Pedro also wrote to M.R.P. Juez del Arzobispado de Manila" wherein he reiterated that he had recognized his natural son born of Dolores Castillo and baptized on March 25, 1984 as Raymundo Castillo 11. That according to the medical certificate issued by Dr. Dolores, Raymundo suffers from mental deficiency 12. That he was requesting to correct the certificate of baptism of Raymundo and those of the latter's children, Luis and Jose 13. Raymundo and Trinidad, after marriage, established their own home with Dr. Dolores living with them until she died in 1940. 14. They moved to 1444 Kalimbas St., Santa Cruz, Manila, and this property belonged to Bibiano, which was transferred to Raymundo's name on August 4, 1936 by virtue of a Deed of Sale. 15. On April 25, 1954, Bibiano Baas died survived by his wife and children. 16. In May, 1955, Raymundo Baas wrote two letters in which he complained bitterly about the alleged injustices by Faustina. 17. More than a year after Bibianos death, his heirs extra-judicially settled his estate by means of a deed of extra-judicial settlement among themselves. The deed was notarized by Atty. Angel Vecino, brother of Trinidad Vecino 18. On November 7, 1955, the spouses Raymundo Baas and Trinidad Vecino executed a mortgage over their house and lot in Sta. Cruz in favor of Angel V. Baas for P17,000.00, of which the contract was also prepared by Atty. Vecino. 19. After the spouses had paid more or less, twelve thousand pesos (Pl2,000.00), the mortgage was cancelled by Angel V. Baas 20. On February 25, 1962, Raymundo died survived his wife and children. 21. Almost three years after, his heirs moved for partition or recovery of his hereditary share in the said property . 22. In support of their claim, Raymundos children and grandchildren presented Trinidad, who testified that after the death of her
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husband in 1962, she discovered certain documents in his aparador which established his filiation. They presented these documents as evidence of their contention that the late Raymundo was the acknowledged natural son of the late Bibiano . 23. One of this is a handwritten note preserved in glass: addressed to Mundo and ends with the complimentary with the ending Su padre, B. Baas. 24. They also presented Raymundo and Trinidads marriage certificate as evidence. 25. While, the heirs of Bibiano presented Bibiano Banas, Jr., who presented the sworn statements of Raymundo, Bibiano and Pedro. 26. It is not disputed that Raymundo had the status of a natural child, but the trial court ruled that he is not an acknowledged natural child of Bibiano. Issue: Is Raymundo an acknowledged natural child of Bibiano? Held: NO Ruling: FIRST: 1. NCC 278 which provides that: Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a wilt a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing, is heavily relied upon Raymundos heirs; however, this should be given a retroactive effect. 2. Trinidads testimony that she is familiar with Bibianos handwriting since she had often seen him write is very much strained for it is dated 23 May 1907. While according to Trinidad Vecino, she saw Bibiano Baas write only as early as 1917. 3. Assuming that it is an authentic document as contemplated by NCC 278, the same does not constitute a sufficient proof of a valid voluntary recognition. 4. WHY? Voluntary recognition of a natural child to be effective under the law (Art. 278), must be made expressly by the recognizing parent, either in the record of birth, in a will in a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. 5. The said note is addressed to Mundo and ends with the complimentary with the ending Su padre, B. Baas. The words Su Padre considering the evidence for the defendants are not sufficient to constitute an intent to recognize. SECOND: 1. Raymundos heirs have erroneously applied the rule of incidental acknowledgment. They have completely failed to note that all of the authorities they cited endorse incidental acknowledgment, in cases of voluntary recognition, if the alleged voluntary recognition were made in a public document. 2. Nowhere in these cited cases can be found any statement that incidental voluntary acknowledgment may be made in a private writing, simply because all of these cited cases were decided long before the adoption of the New Civil Code. 3. Under the regime of the Old Civil Code, a voluntary recognition can only be made in a record of birth, will or other public document (Art. 131). A private writing or document, under the Old Civil Code, may be considered as an "indubitable writing" which is a ground for compulsory recognition according to Art. 135. THIRD: 1. They also presented the school records of Raymundo Baas and a certified copy of his marriage certificate. However, these school records could not be said to be confirmative of any intention no the part of Bibiano Baas to recognize Raymundo as his natural son since school records are prepared, not by Bibiano, but by the school authorities concerned. 2. The same can also be said of the marriage certificate of Raymundo Baas and Trinidad Vecino which was prepared by the church authorities concerned. 3. Although Bibianos signatures appeared at the back of the report card of Raymundo, it was not in the space provided for the signatures of the parent or guardian, and so it still does not constitute a sufficient act of recognition for it could very well be that Bibiano affixed his signatures on the report card as a guardian and not as parent of the latter. 4. The evidence shows that Pedro, even during his marriage, had always lived with the spouses Bibiano and Faustina. It would appear, therefore, that Pedro was unable to support himself and his wife, and it could very well be that Bibiano Baas had sort of adopted de facto, the son of his brother. FOURTH: 1. The claim of voluntary recognition on the part of Bibiano runs counter to the established facts of the case. 2. The sworn statement executed by Bibiano clearly shows that he had no intention whatsoever to recognize Raymundo as his natural son, nor had he ever treated Raymundo as such. 3. Even if the evidence presented constitute a sufficient proof of a voluntary recognition, still their complaint will not prosper since it is evident that if there was acknowledgment on the Bibianos, he had rectified/repudiated it by his sworn statement. 4. Trinidad claims that Raymundo affidavit was allegedly executed in consideration of Bibiano Baas promise to give them an additional lot. But this testimony must fail in the face of her insistent testimony that she came to know of the sworn statement, only after the death Raymundos death in 1962. 5. In other words, how can Trinidad Vecino Vda. de Baas be believed in her testimony that it was executed in consideration of said promise, since it was executed without her knowledge way back in 1928?

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Moreover, the sworn statement of Raymundo was executed almost two years before Raymundo and his family moved to the Kalimbas lot, and more than six years before the said property was transferred to Raymundo's name.
FIFTH: 1. Raymundo Baas failed to file a formal claim or demand during the eight-year period between the death of Bibiano Baas in 1954 and his own in 1962. 2. He was just obviously bitter and discontended because he was not given a share in the estate of Bibiano Baas. 3. The urgency of such action is heightened in the case of Raymundo since it can be deduced that they were having financial difficulties from the mortgage executed by the spouses Raymundo and Trinidad over their own house and lot in favor of Angel V. Baas, a legitimate son of Bibiano, a few months after the settlement of Bibiano's estate. SIXTH: 1. The documents tending to prove Raymundo's filiation were only discovered after his death. 2. Included in those documents allegedly discovered were the letters of Raymundo to Atty. Andres Faustino wherein he complained bitterly about the alleged injustices done to him by Faustina. 3. He even adverted that he had proofs of his claim and that he would know what to do when the proper time comes. 4. These letters could not have been written without the knowledge of Trinidad since it is only natural for Raymundo, as a husband, to share his sentiments with Trinidad, his wife. 5. It must be noted that Trinidad once stayed with and served the family of Bibiano aside from being the niece of Faustina. It is highly improbable that Raymundo will hide from his wife whatever proofs he has to support his claim to a share in the estate. 6. Furthermore, anything of sentimental value, such as old school records, autobiographies, letters, etc., is normally shared between husband and wife. Hence, it is likewise not normal for Trinidad not to have seen before Raymundo's death. 7. Trinidads conflicting testimonies lend credence to the view that the documents presented as evidence were already known to Raymundos heirs long before Raymundo's death. SEVENTH: 1. Raymundo should and could have filed an action for compulsory recognition during Bibiano's lifetime, alleging continuous possession of the status of a natural child by direct acts of Bibiano or of his family, and that he has in his favor proof that Bibiano is his father. 2. Raymundo was born in 1894, and was already of majority age in 1915, long before Bibiano's death in 1954 (Raymundo already 60). 3. Article 137 of the Old Civil Code and Article 285 of the New Civil Code provide that the action of the natural child for compulsory recognition prescribes, if not taken during the lifetime of the alleged parents, unless the case falls within the exceptions which allow the filing of such action even after the death of the alleged parents. 4. In the second exception, the document discovered after the death of the alleged parents, should be one in which the natural child is expressly acknowledged by either or both parents. 5. Granting that, after the death of Bibiano, Raymundos heirs could file an action for compulsory recognition against Bibiano's heirs; however, it still cannot invoke Raymundo's right to file such action, because it is not transmissible to the natural child's heirs; the right is purely a personal one to the natural child. SEPARATE OPINION: 1. In 1930, the Child allegedly wrote an autobiography wherein it appears: My Early School Life My parents love education. This is proven by the letter of my father, a surgeon who because of work at the Farmacia de San Fernando owned by Juan Jimenez, would only come home once or twice a week. The day when he arrived home one morning, I was out playing. So before he departed, he wrote a short note which he left to my mother for me. When I returned home, she let me read the letter. 2. No mention was made of his affidavit, declaring that he was the son of Pedro. 386. In re Christensen () January 31, 1963 Labrador *Edwards will gives all the love to his 1st daughter Facts: 6. Edward E. Christensen, an American citizen, was already residing in Davao and became a manager of Minadano Estates. He met Bernarda Camporendondo, who became an assistant to the cook. Edward and Bernarda then started living together as husband and wife. They had 2 children, Lucy and Helen Christensen. 7. Edward died on April 30, 1953, he named Adolfo Cruz Aznar as executor.He declared on his will that he has but one (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN and gave most of his estate, which amounts $485,000 to her. He also declared that Helen
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Christensen is not her daughter and left her Php 3,600. He also left a meager Php 1,000 to his wife Bernarda. Thus causing them to file an opposition, the wife alleging that she has share over the estate and Helen that she had the same status as Lucy and is his natural child. 8. The executor and Lucy opposed the claim saying that Edward had verbally and in writing disavowed his relationship with Helen as she has used the surname Christensen illegally and that their mother at the time was having an affair with 3 other men. 9. The trial court and the appellate court rendered a decision finding Helen in continous possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased Edward Christensen notwithstanding the fact that she was disowned by him in his will. And ordered Lucy to acknowledge her a natural child. Issues: Has Helen proved his filiation as a natural child? Held: Yes. It was proved by the attitude and direct acts of his father in whole. Ruling: 3. Helen introduced documentary (Family portraits, greeting cards and letters) and testimonial (teachers, friends) evidence to support her claim that she, Lucy,was a natural child of the deceased and, therefore, entitled to the hereditary share corresponding to such descendant. He also provided for her maintenance; shouldered the expenses for her education to the extent that she was even enrolled as an intern in an exclusive college for girls in Manila; tolerated or allowed her carrying the surname "Christensen", and in effect gave her the attention and care that a father would only do to this offspring 4. In was determined that Helens relationship with Edward turned sour when Bernarda and Edward parted ways in March, 1950, and Helen took sides with her mother. Furthermore, it seems that despite that decedent's desire that she continue her studies , Helen ignored the same and got married to a man for Christensen held no high esteem. 5. The testator' last acts cannot be made the criterion in determining whether oppositor was his child or not , for human frailty and parental arrogance may draw a person to adopt unnatural or harsh measures against an erring child or one who displeases just so the weight of his authority could be felt. In the consideration of a claim that one is a natural child, the attitude or direct acts of the person against whom such action is directed or that of his family before the controversy arose or during his lifetime if he predeceases the claimant, and not a single opportunity or an isolated occasions but as a whole, must be taken into account. The possession of such status is one of the cases that gives rise to the right, in favor of the child, of compulsory recognition. (Art. 283, Civil Code). 6. The Court finds the order for Lucy to acknowledge Helen as heir of decedent as improper . It would be sufficient that a competent court, after taking into account all the evidence on record, would declare that under any of the circumstances specified by Article 283 of the Civil Code, a child has acquired the status of a natural child of the presumptive parent and as such is entitled to all rights granted it by law, for such declaration is by itself already a judicial recognition of the paternity of the parent concerned which is her against whom the action is directed, are bound to respect. 387. Ilano v CA () February 23, 1994 Nocon Article 284 par 4 case which proved spurious nature of filiation Facts: 1. Leoncia and Artemio met when Artemio was the client of Leoncias boss. They started a quick affair but stopped after some time. Then they met again and rekindled their flame. They eloped and Artemio made Leoncia stay in a Pampanga apartment which he owned (and was procured for him by his employee Melencio), as the president and GM of Filipinas Telephone Company. 2. Leoncia and petitioner made two more moves (from Pampanga to Pasay, then from Pasay to Makati), and in between Leoncia gave birth to a still-born baby. After some time, she gave birth again (successfully this time) at the Manila Sanitarium to a baby named Merceditas Ilano. 3. Their support was provided allegedly by Artemio in many ways (through Melencio, Elynia, and Merceditas herself). Merceditas was treated by Artemio like a father would his own child. 4. But when the case was filed, Artemio set up a defense of total and complete denial of everything that happened. He secured the help of a number of individuals, among them Melencio and his wife, who all testified that Merceditas was not his daughter (Melencio even claimed Merceditas as his own, yan ang faithful service, haha). 5. The trial court ruled in favor of Artemio and disclaimed Merceditas. However, The CA reversed the trial court on appeal and hence the present case. Issue: Is Merceditas Artemios daughter? Held: YES. The decision was REVERSED. Ruling: 1. The evidence presented by Merceditas is too overwhelming to ignore. There IS the possibility that she could be Artemios spurious child (which means she is an illegitimate child by two people who are incapacitated to marry each other) and the trial court was wrong to overlook this. 2. The fact that Artemio and Leoncia stayed at Guagua (and many other places), that he wrote a letter, that he signed the report
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cards, and other pieces of evidence prove the fact that Artemio really IS the spurious father of Merceditas. Even Melencios admirable act of undying loyalty to his employer didnt fool this court. 3. And even if there werent enough evidence, the CA corr ectly held that par 4 of article 283 is a blanket provision that can be used by children like Merceditas. Hearsay evidence and the like can be used if this provision is invoked. Concept: The SC will make sure that a kid is declared the offspring of another, no matter what the situation is Kawawa naman kasi yung bata 388. Victoria Baluyut, Ma. Theresa Baluyut and Ma. Flordeliza U. BALUYUT, all minors, represented by their mother, Norma Urbano v. Felicedad BALUYUT () 1990 Medialdea *unsuccessful petitioners want some legal rights over some guys wealth Facts: 1. In the settlement of the "Intestate Estate of Deceased Enrique Baluyut petitioners contend that they have a legal interest in the estate of the deceased Baluyut; that petitioners-minors are the illegitimate children of the deceased, begotten out of wedlock by said deceased and petitioners' mother Norma Urbano; that petitioners were conceived and born at the time when Norma Urbano cohabited with the deceased while the latter was already married to Felicidad S. Baluyut; that they were in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of children of the deceased during his lifetime Issue: Are the kids entitled to anything from the Enrique Baluyuts estate? Held: No, they failed to establish that theyre Baluyuts illegitimate children Ruling: 1. Evidence shows that there is absence of positive and convincing proof that Enrique treated the intervenors as his children in all relations in society and in life: he didnt pay hospital bills himself (he just asked someone to do it), Norma Urbanos being Baluyuts mistress was kept in secret. 2. The birth certificates shown do not help their case for these are not evidence of recognized filiation by the deceased Enrique Baluyut because they are merely evidence of the fact that gave rise to their execution, that is, the fact of birth and nothing else, much less of recognition as they are not signed by Enrique Baluyut. 389. Mendoza vs. CA () September 24, 1991 Cruz *Relatives of the father testified that is why Teopista was declared illegitimate child Facts: 12. Teopista Toring Tufiacao, respondent, alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. 13. Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old, denied the plaintiffs allegations and set up a counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees. 14. She lived with her mother because Casimiro was married but she used to visit him at his house. 15. When she married Valentin Tufiacao, Casimiro bought a passenger truck and engaged him to drive it so he could have a livelihood. 16. Casimiro later sold the truck but gave the proceeds of the sale to her and her husband . 17. In 1977, Casimiro allowed her son, Lolito Tufiacao, to build a house on his lot and later he gave her money to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente Toring. 18. Casimiro opened a joint savings account with her as a co-depositor 19. Two years later, Margarita Bate, Casimiro's adopted daughter, took the passbook from her, but Casimiro ordered it returned to her after admonishing Margarita. 20. Two other witnesses testified for Teopista, namely, Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, both relatives of Casimiro. 21. Guadencio - Casimiro himself told him she was his sweetheart . Later, Gaudencio acted as a go-between for their liaison, which eventually resulted in Brigida becoming pregnant in 1930 and giving birth to Teopista. 22. Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista because his father Hipolito, Casimiro's brother, and his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza, so informed him. Issue: Is Teopista the illegitimate child of Casimiro Held: Yes. Ruling: III. Whether or not Teopista was in continuous possession of her claimed status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza 5. We agree with the trial court that Teopista has not been in continuous possession of the status of a recognized illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza, under both Article 283 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. (see guidelines below) 6. The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with the Casimiro 7. In fact, Vicente Toring, who also claimed to be an illegitimate child of Casimiro, lived with the latter and his wife, apparently

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without objection from the latter. Teopista did not use the surname of Casimiro although this is, of course, not decisive of one's status.
But although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless established that status by another method. IV. 7. 8. 9. 10. "by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to the Family Code Requisites (see below) for an act or declaration regarding pedigree, in this case has been complied with The persons who made the declarations about the pedigree of Teopista The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very issues involved The declarations were made before the complaint was filed by Teopista or before the controversy arose between her and Casimiro. 11. Toring Tufiacao has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza a 12. Osh: Basically because a relative of Casimiro testified of the pedigree of Teopista thus the court held in favor of Teopista. Concept: To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,"it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements. B. Continuous" does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. - The possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not through others, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate). - There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own , by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care. By evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to the Family Code, such evidence may consist of his 8. baptismal certificate, 9. a judicial admission, 10. a family Bible in which his name has been entered, 11. common reputation respecting his pedigree, 12. admission by silence, 13. the testimonies of witnesses, and 14. other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court The following requisites that have to be complied with before the act or declaration regarding pedigree may be admitted in evidence: 6. The declarant is dead or unable to testify. 7. The pedigree must be in issue. 8. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue. 9. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose. 10. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such declaration. 340. Marquino v. IAC () 1994 Puno *child dies during pendency of her action for recognition Facts: 3. Bibiana was born out of wedlock on December 2, 1926, of Gregoria Romano and allegedly of Eutiquio Marquino who at that time was single. 4. Bibiana sued for compulsory recognition while Eutiquio was still alive . Sadly, she died on March 17, 1983 before she could present her proof of recognition. Issue: 3. WON the right of action to compel recognition is intransmissible in character? Held: Yes 4. WON after the death of the putative father the action for recognition of a natural child can be continued against the heirs of the former? Held: No Ruling: 1st issue 2. Her death tolled the action considering its personal nature and intransmissibility. 2nd Issue

3. 4.
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In an action for compulsory recognition, the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself. Article 285 provides only two (2) exceptions when an action for recognition transcends the death of the putative parent, these are: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; (2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child. Neither of these exceptions obtains in the case at bench. Firstly, the death of Eutiquio did not occur during the minority of Bibiana. In fact, she was already forty-five (45) years old when the recognition case was filed on January 10, 1971. Secondly, no document was discovered, before unknown, in which Bibiana was expressly acknowledged as a natural child.
390. Fernandez v., Court of Appeals () February 16, 1994 Puno *Alleged father always in the Tennis Court Facts: 1. VIOLETA P. ESGUERRA, single, is the mother and guardian ad litem of the two petitioners, CLARO ANTONIO FERNANDEZ and JOHN PAUL FERNANDEZ, met sometime in 1983, at the Meralco Compound tennis courts. 2. A Meralco employee and a tennis enthusiast, CARLITO FERNANDEZ used to spend his week-ends regularly at said courts, where Violeta's father served as tennis instructor. 3. Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons . She claimed that they started their illicit sexual relationship six (6) months after their first meeting. 4. She averred they were married in civil rites in October, 1983. In March, 1985, however, she discovered that the marriage license which they used was spurious. 5. To bolster their case, petitioners presented the following documentary evidence: a. their certificates of live birth, identifying respondent Carlito as their father; b. the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro which also states that his father is respondent Carlito; c. photographs of Carlito taken during the baptism of petitioner Claro; and d. pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the home of Violeta Esguerra. Defense 6. Carlito denied Violeta's allegations that he sired the two petitioners. 7. He averred he only served as one of the sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Claro. 8. He disputed Violeta's allegation that she and respondent Carlito frequented the said restaurant during their affair. 9. he only learned he was named in the birth certificates of both petitioners as their father after he was sued for support in Civil Case Issue: Whether or not JOHN PAUL FERNANDEZ and CLARO ANTONIO FERNANDEZ are illegitimate child of Carlito Fernandez Held: No. Ruling: 1. documentary evidence offered by the petitioners which the respondent court rejected as insufficient to prove their filiation . 2. we hold that petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence of the private respondent in the baptism of petitioner 3. the pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private respondent showering affection to Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove paternity 4. the baptismal certificates of petitioner Claro naming private respondent as his father has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that private respondent participated in its preparation 5. the certificates of live birth do no show that private respondent had a hand in the preparation of said certificates 6. "a birth certificate no signed by the alleged father therein indicated is not competent evidence of paternity." 7. Testimony of Father Liberato Fernandez who solemnized the baptismal ceremony of petitioner Claro Not convincing on cross examination, Father Fernandez admitted that he has to be shown a picture of the private respondent by Violeta Esguerra to recognize the private respondent no proof that Father Fernandez is a close friend of Violeta Esguerra 392. Eceta vs. Eceta () May 20, 2004 Ynares-Santiago *Recognition of an illegitimate child in any authentic writing is an act of acknowledgement Facts: 1. Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta in 1926. 2. During their marriage, they begot a son, Vicente.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
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The couple acquired several properties, among which is the disputed property located at Stanford, Cubao,Quezon City. Isaac died in 1967 leaving behind Rosalina and Vicente as his compulsory heirs. In 1977, Vicente died. During his lifetime, however, he sired Maria Theresa, an illegitimate daughter. Thus at the time of his death, his compulsory heirs were his mother, Rosalina, and illegitimate child, Maria Theresa . In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case against Rosalina alleging that by virtue of her father s death, she became Rosalinas co-heir and co-owner of the Cubao property. 9. In her answer, Rosalina alleged that the property is paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to her exclusively. 10. During the pre-trial conference, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts wherein they both admitted their relationship to one another, i.e., that Rosalina is Maria Theresas grandmother. 11. The court ruled that both are co-heirs and co-owners of the lands, and that Maria Theresa is entitled to of the property. 12. On appeal, the decision was affirmed , but Maria Theresas share was reduced to 1/8. 13. With Maria Theresa still having a share, Rosalina appealed. Issue: 1. Is the certified xerox copy from a xerox copy of the certificate of live birth a competent proof of the filiation? 2. Is the admission made by Rosalina that Maria Theresa is her granddaughter, enough to prove filiation? Ruling: 4. What was filed and tried before the trial court and the Court of Appeals is one for partition and accounting with damages only. The filiation, or compulsory recognition by Vicente Eceta of Maria Theresa, was never put in issue. In fact, both parties have already agreed that Maria Theresa is Rosalinas granddaughter. 5. Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed Maria Theresas birth certificate thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter. Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa. 6. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. 393. Heirs of Gabatan vs CA () March 13, 2009 Leonardo-De Castro *Wanting haciendera fails to prove filiation of Mother Facts: 1. Lourdes Evero Pacana allege that she is the sole owner of 1.1062 hectare parcel of land, having inherited the same from her deceased mother, Hermogena Gabatan Evero. 2. Hermogena, is the only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito . Upon the death of Juan Gabatan, the lot was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo) , and Teofilos wife, Rita Gabatan, for administration. 3. On the other hand, petitioners denied that respondents mother Hermogena was the daughter of Juan Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue and that Juan was survived by one brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners predecessor-in-interest), Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land from Juan Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years. 4. The RTC and CA ruled that Lourdes was able to prove her filiation with Juan Gabatan and gave weight to the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Macaria Gabatan de Abrogar, Teofilo, Hermogena and heirs of Justa Gabatan, wherein Hermogena was identified as an heir of Juan Gabatan. Issue: Did Lourdes prove that she is the legitimate heir of the land? Held: No. Because she failed to provide proof of her mothers filiation to her father. Ruling: 1. The civil code provides various means to prove filiation one of them is Art. 265: The filiation of a legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment. 2. The birth certificate on its face is insufficient to prove respondents filiation to her alleged grandfather, Juan Gabatan. A ll that Exhibit A (Lourdes evidence), if it had been credible and authentic, would have proven was that respondents mother was a certain "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan." It does not prove that same "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan" is the daughter of Juan Gabatan. 3. The trial courts view is not sustained that since the entries in Exhibit 1 (Heirs evidence) were handwritten, Exhibit 1 was the one of dubious credibility. Verily, the certified true copies of the handwritten birth certificate of respondent were duly authenticated by two competent witnesses; namely, Rosita Vidal (Ms. Vidal), Assistant Registration Officer of the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City and Maribeth E. Cacho (Ms. Cacho), Archivist of the National Statistics Office (NSO), Sta. Mesa, Manila. Ms. Vidal likewise categorically testified that no other copy of respondents birth certificate exists in their rec ords except the handwritten birth certificate. Ms. Cacho, in turn, testified that the original of respondents handwritten birth certificate found in the records of the NSO Manila (from which Exhibit 8 was photocopied) was the one officially transmitted to

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their office by the Local Civil Registry Office of Cagayan de Oro. To prove the relationship of respondents mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register , or an authentic document or a final judgment. In the absence of these, respondent should have presented proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. 5. Respondents mothers (Hermogenas) birth certificate, which would have been the best evidence of Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the RTC. Neither did respondent present any authentic document or final judgment categorically evidencing Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan. 6. Also the admission of this Deed of Absolute Sale, including its contents and the signatures therein, as competent evidence was vigorously and repeatedly objected to by petitioners counsel for being a mere photocopy and not being properly authenticated was declared not admissible by the Courts. Concepts: civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. 343. Dela Cruz vs. Gracia () July 31, 2009Carpio Facts: 1. Jenie and Dominique lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. 2. Sep 4, 2005- Dominique died. 3. Jenie continued to live with his parents and gave birth to Christian, who is her co-petitioner. 4. Jenie applied for the registration of the childs birth using Dominiques surname. 5. She submitted: a. Christians birth certificate. b. Affidavit to use the surname of his father. c. a document entitled AUTOBIOGRAPHY written by her husband before he died [the pertinent portion reads: my wife is pregnant and we live together in our house. d. Testimony of Dominques father. e. Testimony of Dominques brother. 6. Respondents cannot allow the child to use the desired name. 7. Respondent basically says that the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died before his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his son. 8. Respondent also says: although illegitimate children may use the surname of their natural father (article 176) it may be proven trough a private hand-written instrument that MUST BE SIGNED by the father. It was not signed in this case. Issue: Does the Autobiography pass as necessary evidence to prove he is Dominques child? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation. 2. In this case, Jenies testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgement of Dominques father and testimony of his brother, whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child. 3. Alone, the Autobiography would not have prospered. 394. Joselito Musni Puno v Puno Enterprises () September 11, 2009 Nachura Mr. Muno wants to inspect the corporate records Facts: 1. Carlos Puno died on June25, 1963. Joselito filed a case for specific performance against the respondent company, claiming that he is the son of Carlos with the latters common-law wife, Amelia. He prayed that he be allowed to inspect the files and corporate book of Puno Enterprises. 2. The respondent company countered by arguing that Joselitos birth certificate actually showed Joselito Musni Muno instead of Puno. 3. Joselito acquired a corrected certificate from the Civil Registrar and presented it to court. The trial court agreed with him and gave him what he wanted. 4. The respondent company again countered, this time saying that the certificate was acquired without Carlos knowledge (hes dead). Moreover, Joselito is not a stockholder and is merely claiming rights as an heir. Finally, it argued that the proper action for Joselito would be to prove first that he really IS the heir of Carlos Puno. 5. The CA granted the appeal by the respondent company, Joselito moved to reconsider but it was denied. Hence this case.
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Issue: Was Joselito able to prove that he is an illegitimate child of Carlos? Held: The decision was AFFIRMED. Ruling: 1. The putative father has to have a hand in the preparation of the certificate of live birth for it to serve as proof of filiation. In this case, only Joselitos mother was able to do this. 2. The baptismal certificate has been disposed of in cases before. It is only a testament that the baptism actually happened. 3. Even if Joselito really was an heir, he couldnt have been able to exercise the rights that he claimed to have over his fathers stocks right away. The stock would have to be distributed first to the heirs estate proceedings, then the transfer would be recorded in the companys books. Concept: Strict rules are applied in cases where a child wants to prove his filiation, whether its for a legitimate status or otherwi se. 395. Ben-Hur NEPOMUCENO v. Arhbencel Ann LOPEZ, represented by her mother ARACELI LOPEZ () 2010 Morales *fathers handwritten note doesnt say anything about child recognition Facts: 1. Arhbencel Ann Lopez (Arhbencel), represented by her mother Araceli Lopez (Araceli), filed a Complaint recognition and support against Ben-Hur Nepomuceno 2. Born on June 8, 1999, Arhbencel claimed to have been begotten out of an extramarital affair of petitioner with Araceli; that petitioner refused to affix his signature on her Certificate of Birth ; and that, by a handwritten note dated August 7, 1999, petitioner nevertheless obligated himself to give her financial support. 3. Arguing that her filiation to petitioner was established by the handwritten note, Arhbencel prayed that petitioner be ordered to: (1) recognize her as his child, (2) give her support pendente lite, and (3) give her adequate monthly financial support until she reaches the age of majority. 4. Petitioner Benhur countered that Araceli had not proven that he was the father of Arhbencel; and that he was only forced to execute the handwritten note on account of threats coming from the National Peoples Army; that nowhere in the documentary evidence presented by Araceli is an explicit statement made by him that he is the father of Arhbencel ; and that absent recognition or acknowledgment, illegitimate children are not entitled to support from the putative parent; Issue: Is Arhbencels being illegitimate kid of Benhur sufficiently established? Held: No Ruling: 1. Arhbencels demand for support, being based on her claim of filiation to petitioner as his illegitimate daughter, is dependent on the determination of her filiation. 2. Arhbencel relies mainly on the handwritten note executed by Benhur but it does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencels filiation to him. It is not even notarized. 3. Also, not only has Benhur not admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it. 4. The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth , has no probative value to establish filiation to Benhur, the latter not having signed the same. 396. Liyao, Jr. v. Liyao () 2002 De Leon *child questions his legitimacy Facts: 3. William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, filed an action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao 4. Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for ten (10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born. Issue: May Liyao Jr. impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao? Held: No, only the father may question childs legitimacy Ruling: 6. The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo , at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs 7. Thus the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. 8. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress .
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9. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. 10. Now, do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter? NO. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings. 397. Republic vs. Capote () February 2, 2007 Corona * Child wanted to change his surname to his mothers surname because need to petition to US Facts: 1. Minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. 2. [He] was born on July 9, 1982 [,] prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code and as such, his mother used the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between them; and [Giovanni] has been known by that name since birth [as per his birth certificate registered at the Local Civil Register of San Juan, Southern Leyte]; 3. The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time [Giovanni] was born and up to the present, failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns 4. Giovanni is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he desires to have his surname changed to that of his mothers surname; 5. Giovannis mother might eventually petition [him] to join her in the United States and [his] continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the surname of his natural father, may complicate [his] status as natural child; 6. GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO to GIOVANNI NADORES Issue: Can the minor change his surname from his fathers surname to mothers surname? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. An illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mother surname , and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. 2. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. 3. Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. 4. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. 5. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son. 6. Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in a newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition including the OSG 358. Go vs. Ramos () September 14, 2009 - Quisumbing *Father failed to prove he was illegitimate to follow his moms Filipino citizenship Facts: 16. The case stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration against Jimmy T. Go, alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. 17. Luis presented Jimmys birth certificate, which indicated his citizenship as FChinese. 18. Although it appears from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered. 19. Luis also averred that Jimmy managed to cover up his true citizenship and was able to procure a Philippine passport from DFA. 20. Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1, paragraph 4 of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625, as evidenced by his having taken the Oath of Allegiance and having executed an Affidavit of Election of Philippine citizenship in 1950. 21. Although the said oath and affidavit were registered only on September 11, 1956, the reason behind such late registration was sufficiently explained in an affidavit. 22. Jimmy alleged that is father was born and raised in the Philippines. 23. In 2001, Jimmy was charged with violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940: He is an alien, but has formally and officially represented and introduced himself as a Filipino citizen. 24. On account of his subsequent detention, pending his deportation to China, Jimmy once again filed a petition for habeas corpus of which the trial court dismissed. Issue: Are the evidence adduced by Carlos and Jimmy to prove their claim to Philippine citizenship substantial and sufficient? Held: NO
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Ruling: 7. Neither will the Philippine Bill of 1902 nor the Jones Law of 1916 make Carlos a citizen of the Philippines. His bare claim that his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of the said laws, without any supporting evidence whatsoever will not suffice. 8. One of the arguments raised to sustain Carlos claim to Philippine citizenship is the doctrine of jus soli, or the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth. The doctrine of jus soli was for a time the prevailing rule in the acquisition of ones citizenship. However, the Supreme Court abandoned the principle of jus soli in the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor. 9. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. Moreover, an illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen. 10. However, absent any evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina, the aforestated established rule could not be applied to him. 399. Solinap vs. Locsin () December 10, 2001 Sandoval-Gutierrez *Fake Jr., spurious document Facts: 1. 11 months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. died intestate on December 11, 1990, Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed a "Petition for Letters of Administration" praying that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. 2. He alleged that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin , that during his lifetime and the surviving legal heir; 3. Also, he alleged that the deceased owned personal properties (undetermined savings, current and time deposits with various banks, and 1/6 portion of the undivided mass of real properties) owned by him and his siblings. 4. His siblings are Jose, Jr., Manuel, Maria Yulo, Lourdes and Ester. 5. Before the scheduled hearing, the siblings and their respective heirs opposed, averring that the alleged Juan, Jr. is not a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name. 6. The evidence presented by Juan, Jr: a. Machine copy of his Certificate of Live Birth found in the bound volume of birth records in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo b. Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, who produced and identified in court the bound volume of 1957 records of birth where the alleged original of the Certificate of Live Birth is included c. Photograph showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing Juan Locsin's dead body. (Claim: it shows that he and his mother have been recognized as family members of the deceased) 7. In their oppositions, the petitioners claimed that such Certificate of Live Birth is spurious. They submitted a certified true copy of it found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila indicating that his birth was reported by his mother and that the same does not contain the signature of the late Juan C. Locsin . 8. They observed as anomalous the fact that while he was born on October 22, 1956 and his birth was recorded on January 30, 1957, however, his Certificate of Live Birth was recorded on a December 1, 1958 revised form, which suggests that the Certificate of Live Birth presented by Juan, Jr. was falsified. 9. Petitioners presented as witness a handwriting expert, who testified that the signatures of Juan C. Locsin and Emilio G. Tomesa (then Civil Registrar of Iloilo City) appearing in such Certificate of Live Birth are forgeries. 10. The trial court, finding that Certificate of Live Birth and the photograph are sufficient proofs of Juan, Jr.s illegitimate filiation with the deceased, and so he is appointed as the Administrator of the Intestate Estate. Issue: Is Juan, Jr. an acknowledged natural child? Held: NO. The document he presented is spurious. Ruling: 1. The event about which Rocita Vencer testified on March 7, 1994 was the record of Juan, Jr.s birth which took place on Octobe r 22, 1956, on 37 or 38 years ago. The Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City at that time was Emilio G. Tomesa. Necessarily, Vencer's knowledge of respondent's birth record allegedly made and entered in the Local Civil Registry in January, 1957 was based merely on her general impressions of the existing records in that Office. 2. Asked how a 1958 form could be used in 1957 when respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer answered that during that time, maybe the forms in 1956 were already exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had requested for a new form and they sent us the 1958 Revised Form." Note: MAYBE 3. The back cover of the 1957 bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. The questioned certificate is merely pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like the other entries. The documents bound into one volume are original copies, while this certificate is a carbon copy. 4. A copy of the document sent by the Local Civil Registrar to the Civil Registrar General should be identical in form and in substance with the copy being kept by the latter. In the instant case, the document submitted by petitioners, as transmitted to
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5.
6.
7.
the Civil Registrar General is not identical with the document submitted by Juan, Jr. as appearing in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Such circumstance should have aroused the suspicion of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals and should have impelled them to declare Juan Jr.s document spurious. Petitioners document shows that Juan Jr.'s record of birth was made by his mother. Also, the signature and name of Juan C. Locsin listed as the father and the entry that he and Amparo Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on November 28, 1954 do not appear. Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of the father of the child born out of wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or made by him , but also, the statement of any information or circumstances by which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said child. Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation, lest we recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.
400. Dempsey vs. RTC () August 15, 1988 Guitierrez *Too bad recognition was not an issue taken up so it is not settled Facts: 1. Joel Dempsey and Janalita Rapada cohabited, without the benefit of marriage, they begot Christina Marie who was born on October 01, 1984. 2. Two separate informations were filed against him: first a criminal case for leaving the conjugal dwelling in 1985 and failure to give support to his child Christiana, and second, for failure to provide Christina with adequate support as provided by Art. 290 of the Civil Code. 3. At present she receives a monthly support of $150 and a promise from the accused to declare Christina Marie as his dependent and also a commitment to declare the child as his after his citizenship. This will entitle the child for all the benefits and privileges extended to dependents of American US Navy servicemen like free medical check-up. Efforts were made with the Naval Legal Service Office, US Naval Facilities, Subic Bay, Philippines to compel the accused to fulfill these commitments but to no avail. 4. He pleaded guilty to the charges against him and was sentenced by the MTC imprisonment, monthly support, to acknowledge Christiana as his natural child and exemplary damages which were reversed by the RTC. Thus the petition on purely questions of law. Issue: Could the court compel Joel Dempsey to compulsory acknowledge Christiana? Held: No. The issue of recognition was not specifically tried and heard in this case. Ruling: 1. As part of the civil liability in its judgment, the trial court required the accused to recognize Christina Marie as his natural child. This should not have been done. The recognition of a child by her father is provided for in the Civil Code and now in the new Family Code. 2. This criminal prosecution, where the accused pleaded guilty to criminal charges and the issue of recognition was not specifically and fully heard and tried, the trial court committed reversible error when it ordered recognition of a natural child as part of the civil liability in the criminal case. 3. The new Family Code erases any distinction between legitimate or adopted children on one hand and acknowledged illegitimate children on the other, insofar as joint parental authority is concerned. Article 211 of the Family Code, whose date of effectivity is approaching, merely formalizes into statute the practice on parental authority. 4. The respondent court further ruled that Christina Dempsey is not entitled to the rights arising from the parental responsibility of her father, she being an illegitimate child. Reliance was made on Art. 17 of P.D. 603 which defines the joint parental authority of parents over their legitimate or adopted children. The respondent court's observations are wrong because the law itself protects even illegitimate children. Illegitimate children have rights of the same nature as legitimate and adopted children. 5. Dept of Social Service Development cannot take cognizance of and enforce the criminal sanctions for Christina Marie Dempsey is not an abandoned child in the strict sense of the word as she is still in the custody and care of her mother.
401. People v Bayani ()
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October 3, 1996 Davide The promise made at the Dragon Hotel Facts: 1. Sgt. Moreno Bayani was Maria Elena Nietos neighbor. He was the friend of Elenas uncles and was called fondly by the girl as uncle as well. She was also considered as part of Morenos family. 2. One day, Moreno asked Elenas grandma to allow the girl to accompany him. What Elena and her grandmother didnt realize then was that the innocent request turned out to be a trap. 3. Moreno brought the girl to various places where she was mostly asked to wait in a corner while he talked to some people. Eventually however they went to a hotel, and she was forced to enter into a room. Moreno pinned Elena down on the bed, and with a gun pointed to her temple, forced her to undress. He sexed her three times against her will. 4. Moreno threatened the 15 year-old not to tell anyone about it or else he will kill her and/or her family. The girl tried to keep mum about it but when her family noticed her tummy was bulging, she had no choice but to confess. Then they eventually filed a case against him. 5. Morenos version used a defense of consent on the part of the complainant, claiming that she was more of his mistress than his victim. He said that he was kind to her and helped her out many times, which she greatly appreciated. When she asked how she could repay him, he said they should sex , and she agreed to it. He popped her cherry twice in the Dragon Hotel, and about 10 or so times in various places after that. He gave her a promise the first time that if she gets knocked up, he would claim the baby as his own, and he would support her until death. He agreed to do it however only if she would stay away from her boyfriend. Eventually, according to him he found out that she couldnt keep this promise and it prompted him to leave. 6. The trial court ruled in favor of Elena, taking into account the evidence presented and the testimonies of some of Elenas relatives, revealing an attempt by Moreno to settle (some prominent members of the city government came to their house to amicably settle the case). 7. Moreno naturally appealed to the SC after his conviction. Issue: (1) Did Moreno rape Elena? Held: YES. (2) Should Moreno be forced to recognize his illegitimate child? Held: NO. Held: The decision was AFFIRMED. Ruling: 1. The preponderance of the evidence for the conviction is overwhelming: (1) he was well-trusted by the girl and was fondly called as uncle; (2) he would definitely have had a gun to threaten her with; (3) he admitted himself that he sexed her; (4) the physical findings show force in way she was sexed. 2. The fact that she took some time to file the complaint wont work to absolve Moreno because the only reason why she took her time was that she was afraid. And the confusion as to whether he tried to settle or if he asked for forgiveness eventually fizzled out his defenses and didnt help his cause at all. 3. Finally, when Moreno said that Elena had nowhere to go since her boyfriend left her and that she went to him who promised to sustain her and the fruit of their love, it sealed the deal as to the question of whether he recognizes the child as his own (funny how the court honors this claim of Moreno and dismisses pretty much everything else, selective justice much). However, it doesnt mean that he should automatically be allowed to actually recognize it as his own. 4. Article 345 of the RPC says that the accused should acknowledge the offspring unless the law prevents him from doing so. It has been held that if one of the parties is married, acknowledgement is not allowed. Moreno should only be made to support his child because he cannot assert parental authority over it. Concept: The Inbred Modesty of the Filipina doctrine triumphs once again 402. People v. Magtibay () 2002 Ynares-Santiago *some pig rapes and impregnates a girl Facts: Accused was charged and convicted or rape of Rachelle. During the trial, it was found out that she was pregnant. Court said that it confirmed that rape incident as there was no showing that Rachelle has previously been sexually abused or she had sexual relations with other men during that time. Issue: Whats the responsibility of Magtibay over Rachelles child? Held: Hes ordered to indemnify and support the victims child Ruling: Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses parental authority over his children , no further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the childs status. Hence, accused-appellant should only be ordered to indemnify and support the victims child.
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403. People vs. Abella () 6 Jan 2010 Leonardo-de Castro *rapist of mental retardate required to recognize daughter Facts: 1. Marlon Abella was convicted of raping a 38-year old with moderate mental retardation as that of a 7-8 year old. He was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. 2. As a result of the rape, the victim gave birth to a baby girl. 3. The trial court also ordered him to recognize the child as his illegitimate daughter entitled to support. Issue: Is Marlon required to recognize and support his child? Held: Yes. Article 345 of the RPC applies. Ruling: 1. Marlon was the biological father of the victims two-year old daughter as a result of the rape and in view of their striking facial similarities and features. 2. In accordance with Article 345 of the RPC, he is required to acknowledge and support her. Concept: Revised Penal Code, Article 345. Civil Liability of persons guilty of crimes against chastity. Persons guilty of rape, seduction, or abduction, shall also be sentenced: 1. To indemnify the offended woman; 2. To acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing; 3. In every case to support the offspring. 404. MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE C. TABILIRAN, JR., () October 25, 1995 Per Curiam *Judge thought that his child with his live-in partner can be legitimate Facts: 1. Repondent Judge Tabiliran was married to Teresita Banzuela. 2. Sometime in 1965, Banzuela left and abandoned their family home in Zamboanga del Norte and thereafter her whereabouts could not be known. 3. In 1970, Tabiliran began cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan , with whom he had three children born in 1970, 1971 and 1975, respectively. 4. Tabiliran and Baybayan got married in 1986. 5. In the marriage contract, Tabiliran represented himself as single. 6. Petitioner is a clerk of court assigned in the sala of respondent, charging Tabiliran for gross immorality . Issue: Whether or not their children were legitimated by their subsequent marriage. Held: No. Ruling: 1. We hold the respondent culpable for gross immorality 2. He started to cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan only after his first wife, Teresita Tabiliran, had long abandoned hi m and the conjugal home in 1966, 3. It appears from the record that he had been scandalously and openly living with said Priscilla Baybayan as early as 1970 as shown by the fact that he begot three children by her, namely Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran. Buenasol was born on July 14, 1970; Venus was born on September 7, 1971; while Saturn was born on September 20, 1975. 4. Evidently, therefore, respondent and Priscilla Baybayan had openly lived together even while respondent's marriage to his first wife was still valid and subsisting. ( ONLY 4 Years after the abandonment and not the alleged 7 years) LEGITIMACY OF THE CHILDREN 5. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, the three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and Banzuela. 6. The applicable provision in this case is Article 269 of the Civil Code, which states that: Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by an impediment to marry each other, are natural. Concept: The reasons for this limitation on legitimation are as follows: (1) rationale of legitimation would be destroyed; (2) it would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights; (3) there will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change; (4) it is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of the marriage; and
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(5) it will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child. 405. Lazatin vs. Campos () July 30, 1979Teehankee *the safe deposit box case Facts: 1. Dr. Lazatin and Maragarita were married. 2. Nora and Irma are their adopted children. 3. Dr. Lazatin died (Jan 1974) 4. Margarita died (April 1974) 5. Margarita left a holographic will (she wrote it on March 1970) 6. The Will States: a. Cash, jewelry and stocks go to respondent Arlene (her grand daughter) b. Support for Rodolfo (son of her late brother) c. Education to Ramon (Son of Petitioner Renato Lazatin) 7. Nora (one of her adopted kids) opened the safe deposit box that Margarita kept. 8. She took out the stuff (stock certs, adoption papers of Nora and Irma, and Jewelry) 9. Renato (petitioner) filed a case against Nora, asking her to return the stuff of the safe deposit box. 10. Judge ordered her to do so. 11. Nora failed to return the things of the safe deposit box. 12. Renato filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margaria as an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit signed by the brother of Dr. Lazatin which says that Renato is the illegitimate son of Dr. Lazatin who was later adopted by him. 13. Renatos evidence that he was adopted: a. he had been supported by them until their death. b. his last name was Lazatin; however he has an alias (Renato Sta. Clara) because the spouses (in fact 1) did not want to consent to his marriage. c. he and his wife resided in the Mercy Hospital at Taft Avenue which the dead spouses owned d. Photograph of Irma (adopted child in fact 2) where she addressed herself as Renatos sister. Issue: A. Does the evidence prove that Renato was legally adopted by the couple? Held: No B. Can he intervene in the case? Held: No Ruling: A. 1. There are no juridical records of such adoption or copies. 2. There are no witnesses cited to that adoption proceeding. 3. A certification from the Court of First Instance reported that no file after diligent search has been found regarding the adoption of Renato by Dr. Lazatin and Margraita Lazatin. 4. IF there was really such adoption, petitioner could have secured a copy of the newspaper publication of the adoption. 5. The thrust of the evidence presented is to establish his status as an admitted illegitimate child, not an adopted child. 6. Does not matter if the spouses clothed, fed and educated him. These do not prove adoption. 7. Secondary evidence is admissible where the records of adoption proceedings were actually lost or destroyed BUT prior to the intro of such SECONDARY evidence, it must first be established that the records of adoption actually existed. B. He cannot intervene because it is a requirement that he has an interest in the estate, either as one who would be benifted as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate. Concept: 1. Adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence. 2. The destruction by fire of a public building in which the adoption papers would have been filed if existent does not give rise to a presumption of adoption nor is the destruction of the records of an adoption proceeding to be presumed. 3. In fact, absence of a record of adoption creates the presumption of its non-existence. 4. A child by adoption cannot inherit from the parent by adoption unless the act of adoption has been done in strict accord with the statute. 406. Cervantes vs. Fajardo () January 27, 1989 Padilla *With compelling reason, a child under 5 yrs. old can be separated from the mother Facts: 1. Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife 2. Conrado is legally married to a woman other than Gina. 3. Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child by another married man with whom she lived for almost three years

4. 5.
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but who eventually left her and vanished. Conrado and Gina had a daughter, Angelie. They offered this child for adoption to Ginas sister Zenaida Carreon -Cervantes and brother-in-law Nelson Cervantes, who took custody of the child when she was barely two weeks old. 6. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by the Cervantes couple was executed by Gina. 7. While petitioners were out at work, Gina took the child from her "yaya" at the petitioners' residence in Angono, Rizal, on the pretext that she was instructed to do so by her mother. 8. Gina brought the child to her house in Paraaque. 9. The Cervantes couple demanded that they return Angelie, but Gina refused, saying that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had executed was not fully explained to her. 10. The Cervantes couple, however, received a letter from Gina demanding P150,000.00 and they would get their child back. 11. They refused to accede to the demand. Issue: Is it allowable to have taken the child back? Held: NO Ruling: 1. In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's welfare is paramount. 2. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five years of age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. 3. Conrados open cohabitation with Gina Carreon will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person. 4. Besides, Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child by another married man. 5. On the other hand, the Cervantes couple who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her. 6. Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by the Cervantes couple with the full knowledge and consent of Conrado and Gina. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. 407. Republic vs. CA () January 24, 1992 Regalado *Adopted Bobiles cannot be taken away by retroactive application of law Facts: 1. Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) years old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old, before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, 2. The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. 3. However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals , Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. 4. Petitioner, the Republic of the Phil. Through the Sol.Gen., contends that the petition for adoption should be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argues that the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her petition for adoption. Issues: Should the family code be retroactively applied in this case? Held: No. The law in force at that time has already given vested right to the adoption. Ruling: 1. Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code , private respondent had the right to file a petition for adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law. 2. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. 3. The contention that the granting of the adoption should be in favor of private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only is rejected. Mr. Bobiles affidavit of consent, attached to the petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child.

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In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. The representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development unqualifiedly recommended the approval of the petition for adoption and the trial court dispensed with the trial custody for several commendatory reasons, especially since the child had been living with the adopting parents since infancy. Further, the said petition was with the sworn written consent of the children of the adopters. Concept: Vested Rights - is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. The term expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested. 408. In re petition for adoption of Michelle Lim () May 21, 2009 Carpio Monina Lim was not allowed to adopt as a single woman Facts: 1. Monina married Primo Lim. For some reason, they were childless and longed so much for children of their own. 2. Eventually they took care of Michelle and Michael who were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban. They gave them the surname Lim, sent them to exclusive schools, and treated them as their own. The couple eventually filed a petition for adoption. 3. Unfortunately, Primo died before it was decided. Monina eventually married Angel Olario, an American, and made use of a special law allowing her to continue the petition. 4. The lower court denied the petition, claiming that it should be filed as a joint petition by adopting couple. It further said in the motion for reconsideration that the husband would have to comply with certain requirements before they could adopt (an impossibility, apparently, since Olario was an American; they didnt even bother to try). 5. The trial court also said that it doesnt matter if the children are grown up and are emancipated, because adoption is not me rely for exercise of parental authority (it confers certain valuable rights). 6. Monina appealed straight to the SC. Issue: Should Monina be allowed to adopt the children? Held: NO. The decision was AFFIRMED. Ruling: 1. The law is explicit, the couple would have to file a joint petition for adoption. The only cases where they can separately adopt are those involving legitimate or illegitimate children, or when the spouses are legally separated. 2. The fact that Olario has consented to the adoption will not suffice. A joint adoption petition must be filed Monina with her husband in order for her to get what she wants. 3. The fact that the children are already of age and that parental authority is no longer necessary will not erase the fact that the law requires a joint adoption petition by the adopting spouses. The effects of adoption are so numerous and the rights conferred are so significant that parental authority becomes merely one of many considerations and not the overriding one. Concept: The law is clear, and even if the welfare of the children is at stake, the court cannot resort to judicial legislation. 409. Paulina SANTOS and Aurora SANTOS v. Gregoria ARANZANSO and Demetria Ventura () 1966 Bengzon *1st cousins of an adoptive mother oppose adoptees rights over the adoptives properties Facts: 1. A petition for adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was filed by Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes 2. Paulina Santos was then 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years old. The petition alleged that the whereabouts of the minors' nearest of kin, particularly their parents, were unknown; that since the outbreak of the war said minors have been abandoned by their respective parents; and that for years, since their infancy, said children have continuously been in petitioners' care and custody 3. A guardian ad litem Crisanto de Mesa, was thereafter appointed for the minors. Said guardian gave his written consent to the adoption. Paulina Santos, being over fourteen years of age, likewise gave her written consent thereto 4. CFI rendered a decision granting the adoption. 5. No appeal was taken from the decision. Subsequently eight years later on October 21, 1957, Juliana Reyes died without testament 6. Simplicio Santos filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes. In said petition he stated among other things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, as surviving spouse, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos. In the same petition, he asked that he be appointed administrator of the estate 7. Aranzanso and Ventura alleging that they are first cousins to the deceased, filed an opposition on the grounds that Simplicio Santos marriage to the late Juliana Reyes was bigamous and thus void ; and that the adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was likewise void ab initio for want of the written consent of their parents, who were then living and had not
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abandoned them 8. Ventura added that she is the mother of Paulina Santos Issue: Is the adoption of Paulina and Aurora void? Held: No, its valid Ruling: 1. If the natural parents have abandoned their children, consent to the adoption by the guardian ad litem suffices. 2. SC said that lower courts have sufficiently ruled on the abandonment so it cant be re-discussed anymore. They rely on the lower court findings that there was really abandonment on the part of Paulinas parents 3. Assuming that Simplicio Santos was not validly married to Juliana Reyes, it will not make any difference as far as the right of Aranzanso and Ventura to intervene in the intestate proceedings is concerned. 4. Juliana Reyes should then be deemed to have filed the petition for adoption as a person whose status is single, not married. The defect would then lie only as to Simplicio Santos, who, as allegedly married to another person (a point that we do not decide in this case), could not adopt without joining his wife in the petition. 5. It being the estate of Juliana Reyes that is the subject matter of the settlement proceedings, the flaw, if any, would not affect the consideration of the right of Paulina and Aurora Santos to succeed as adopted children of Juliana Reyes, to the exclusion of respondents. 6. So Aranzanso and Ventura cannot intervene in the settlement proceedings . 410. Daoang vs. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte () 28 Mar 1988 Padilla *spouses with grandchildren not disqualified to adopt Facts: 1. On 23 Mar 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition seeking the adoption of minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. 2. On 22 Apr 1971, minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, represented by their father, filed an opposition. They claim that the spouses Antero had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, their mother who died on 1 Mar 1971. 3. The court granted the adoption. Issue: Are the spouses Antero disqualified to adopt under Article 335 of the Civil Code? Held: No. Under the law, having legitimate children is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt. Only consent is needed. Ruling: 1. The words used in paragraph 1 of Article 335 are clear and unambiguous. It does not include grandchildren from the prohibition. 2. The Civil Code of Spain in its Article 174 disqualified persons who have legitimate or legitimated descendants from adopting. 3. However, instead of descendants, the Civil Code changed the word to children. 4. The present law is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life. Concept: Civil Code, Article 335. The following cannot adopt: 1. Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction. Section 9 of the Domestic Adoption Act requires written consent of the legitimate sons/daughters of the adopter. 411. Duncan vs. CFI of Rizal () February 10, 1976 Esguerra *Court do not want this child to be adopted because only the lawyer gave consent Facts: 1. Petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen are husband and wife, the former a British national residing in the Philippines for the last 17 years and the latter an American citizen born in and a resident of the Philippines. 2. Having no children of their own but having previously adopted another child, said spouses 3. filed a petition with respondent court for the adoption of a child previously baptized and named by them as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan. 4. The principal reason given for the dismissal of the petition was that ... the consent given in this petition is improper and falls short of the express requirement of the law 5. Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez received the infant from the child's unwed mother who told the former never to reveal her (the mother's) identity because she wanted to get married and did not want to destroy her future. 6. The mother instructed Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez to look for a suitable couple who will adopt the child. 7. The mother did not provide for the maintenance and support of her child 8. In the petition for adoption filed by petitioners in September, 1967, Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, as the de facto guardian or loco parentis of the child subject of the adoption petition, gave the written consent required by law

9.
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Testimony of witness Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez that the natural mother of the child sought to be adopted was still alive , the court then pressed upon the witness to reveal the identity of said mother 10. Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, under whose care the newly-born child was entrusted by the unwedded mother , could not reveal the identity of the mother because it would violate the privileged communications between the attorney and client, SUMMARY: Basically the case was saying that the court denied the adoption of the child because the one who gave consent was Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez and not the mother of the child, who by the ruling of the court of first instance is required for a proper adoption proceeding. However the problem now, the lawyer cannot reveal who is mother because of privilege communication. Issue: Can Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez be considered the guardian in Civil Code Art 340 who can give consent to the adoption? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. It seems to Us that when the 3-day old baby was left to and placed in the hands of Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the helpless infant was in dire need of someone who could give it protection and sustain its delicate and fragile life. 2. There clearly appears only one person who could be considered as the guardian exercising patria potestas over such abandoned child. Since there was no guardian ad litem appointed by the court and the child not being in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home or any benevolent society, there could not have been anyone other than Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez who could, with reason, be called the guardian of said infant. 3. She who had actual. physical custody of the infant and who, out of compassion and motherly instinct, extended the mantle of protection over the hapless and helpless infant which otherwise could have suffered a tragic fate 4. The spouses Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen, appear to be qualified to adopt the child. 5. There is no showing that they suffer from any of the disqualifications under the law . 6. Above all, they have the means to provide the child with the proper support, care, education and love that a growing child needs, even if they have previously adopted another child as theirs. 7. If we are now to sustain the decision of the court below, this Tribunal will be doing a graver injustice to all concerned particularly to said spouses, and worse, it will be imposing a cruel sanction on this innocent child and on all other children who might be similarly situated. 412. Landingin vs. Republic () July 27, 2006CALLEJO *Mother who did not abandon his children. Adoption denied Facts: 1. Manuel and Amelia were married. 2. The two of them had 3 children: a. Elaine b. Elma c. Eugene 3. Manuel died. 4. Amelia left the 3 children and remarried in Italy. 5. Amelia now has one child in her second marriage. 6. The 3 kids were then taken care of Manuels mother. 7. The mother died. 8. Petitioner, Landingin wants to adopt the 3 kids from the first marriage (the ones enumerated above) 9. Petitioner got the following to legalize the adoption: a. The three kids gave their consent. b. Petitioner also has other kids, who also consented to the adoption. c. Claims the consent of Amelia (their natural mother) was taken. 10. Petitioner wants to adopt them because he claims that the 3 children were ABANDONED. Issue: Can Petitioner adopt the kids? Held: No Ruling: 1. Petitioners failed to present Amelia as a witness or offer any evidence of her voluntary consent to the adoption. 2. A written consent from the biological parents is required for adoption. No written consent was brought. 3. She did not abandon her children. (concept of abandonment at concept) 4. Amelia still sends financial support to the children. 5. Amelia left for Italy because of economical reasons and not because she wished to abandon her kids. 6. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not abandonment. 7. Elaine (eldest child) still consults her mother for personal issues.
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8. More proof is necessary to show that Amelia has EMOTIONALLY ABANDONED the children if they are to be placed under adoption. Concept: Abandonment- if a parent withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the child. In such case, an party who may wish to adopt the child may get the written consent of the GUARDIAN instead of the natural parent. (This is an exception to the written consent rule) Not abandonment - Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not abandonment. 413. Pardo de Tavera vs. Cacdac () November 23, 1988 Melencio-Herrera *Since the filing of this case, the court had issued a circular on adoption cases Facts: 1. The Gordons sought to adopt the minor, Anthony Gandhi O. Custodio, a natural son of Adoracion Custodia and a petition was set for hearing on 31 July 1986, with notice published in a newspaper. 2. On the hearing day, nobody appeared to oppose. The OSG, which was notified of the hearing, failed to send any representative for the State. Thus, the Trial Court appointed the Branch Clerk of Court as Commissioner to receive the additional evidence . 3. The principal evidence disclosed that the Gordons, as British citizens, are allowed by their home country to adopt foreign babies specifically from the Republic of the Philippines-4. Husband is employed at the Dubai Hilton International Hotel as Building Superintendent and that they are financially secure 5. Anthony's mother had given her consent to the adoption realizing that her child would face a brighter future 6. The Case Study Report submitted by the Social Worker of the Trial Court gave a favorable recommendation after observing that there existed a parent-child relationship between the Gordons and Anthony 7. The Trial Court concluded that the Gordons possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for adoption. 8. The Gordons wrote MSSD for a travel clearance for Anthony. They also filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion because the Chief of the Passport Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to issue a passport without a Case Study of the MSSD. 9. Subpoenaed, the MSSD opposed the grant of a travel clearance on such grounds: a. The Report of the Court Social Worker and that of the Pastor of the International Christian Church of Dubai cannot take the place of a report of the MSSD or a duly licensed child placement agency b. That the required six-month trial custody had not been met nor the reasons therefore given as required by Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (P.D. No. 603) c. That the Gordons had given P10,000.00 to the natural mother, which is reflective of the undesirable attitude of the Gordons to shop for children as if they were shopping for commodities d. That under Muslim law, which is the law in Dubai, Anthony cannot inherit from the adopting parents e. That the Gordons had filed another petition for adoption of a baby girl before, but because she died a month later they tried to pass off another child, represented that she was the very same girl they were adopting f. That there being no Memorandum of Agreement between Dubai and the Philippines there is no guarantee that the adopted child will not be sold, exchanged, neglected or abused. 10. However, the Trial Court ordered the MSSD to issue the travel clearance under pain of contempt and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue the corresponding passport. Issue: Should the Gordons be allowed to adopt Anthony, and should therefore be granted a travel clearance? Held: YES Ruling: 1. Prior to Executive Order No. 91, issued on 17 December 1986, the Social Workers in Regional Trial Courts had the authority to conduct a case study of a child to be adopted. While Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts have been abolished by B.P. Blg. 129, their functions have been merged with Regional Trial Courts, which were then provided with Social Workers to assist the Court in handling juvenile and domestic relations cases. 2. The Trial Court had not complied strictly with the provisions of P.D. No. 603 on adoption; however, it was satisfied with the Case Study Report submitted by the Court Social Worker. 3. The P10,000 was handed to the mother as a gesture of assistance. By receiving the same, the latter had not thereby made a "hurried decision caused by strain or anxiety to give up the child," which is sought to be avoided by Article 32, P.D. No. 603. 4. The Gordons also wanted to adopt a baby girl in another proceeding, but that was aborted as this first baby was a "mongoloid". Their questionable attitude was belatedly raised and had yet to be proven and should not be made to prejudice Anthony. 5. The Gordons are British citizens and Muslim law, which is the law in Dubai, has no applicability to them. In the last analysis, it is not bureaucratic technicalities but the best interests of the child that should be the principal criterion in adoption cases. 6. The MSSD could have appealed through the Solicitor General when it learned of the Decision, but it did not. Its opposition to the issuance of a travel clearance cannot be equated with a motion for reconsideration. 7. Since the filing of this case, this Court had issued Circular No. 12 to all Judges of the Regional Trial Courts hearing adoption
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cases, dated 2 October 1986, directing them: (1) to NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Devt of the filing of adoption cases or the pendency to those already file d (2) to strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Art. 33 that: No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social Welfarehas made a case study of the child to be adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective adopting parents, and has submitted its report and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing such petition (3) To personally HEAR all adoption cases and desist from the practice of delegating the reception of evidence of the petitioner to the Clerk of Court 414. Republic vs. Toledano () June 8, 1994 Puno *Poor kid cannot be adopted by ALIENS! Facts: 1. Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United States of America . He married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America in Guam. 2. On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, private respondents spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. 3. Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son. The social worker assigned for the Home and Child study also favorably recommended the adoption. 4. RTC granted the petition To this effect, the Court gives the minor the rights and duties as the legitimate child of the petitioners. Henceforth, he shall be known as SOLOMON ALCALA CLOUSE. Issues: Could spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens to adopt under Philippine Law? Held: No. The Family Code Arts. 184-185 clearly bars them from adopting, mandating joint adoption of husband and wife. Ruling: 1. Alvin Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America . In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse . 2. When private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988. 3. Evelyn may appear qualified but the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. 4. Executive Order No. 91 issued on December 17, 1986 amended said provision of P.D. 603. It demands that both husband and wife "shall" jointly adopt if one of them is an alien. It was so crafted to protect Filipino children who are put up for adoption. The Family Code reiterated the rule by requiring that husband and wife "must" jointly adopt, except in the cases mentioned before. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. Concept: Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.: (3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law. Article 185 thereof expresses the necessity for a joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child ; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. 415. Tamargo v CA () June 3, 1992 Feliciano Airsoft Part II: the case of Adelberto Bundoc Facts: 1. Spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapesura filed a case to adopt Adelberto Bundoc, who was living with his natural parents (spouses Bundoc).

2.
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While the case was pending, Adelberto shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle, causing which resulted to her death. The criminal case was dismissed, with the trial court finding that Adelberto did not act with discernment, but the civil case for damages went on. 3. During the pendency of the civil case, the decision on the adoption petition was approved, granting parental authority to the spouses Rapesura. The spouses Bundoc, in turn, claimed that the civil case should not involve them because they no longer had authority over Adelberto. The Tamargos countered that the adoption decision did not rid the Bundocs of their liability and kept on with the case. 4. However, the trial court did not agree with their theory and ruled for the Bundocs. It then denied two motions for reconsideration. 5. The CA dismissed the petition filed by the Tamargos for mandamus, ruling that they had lost their right to appeal. The Tamargos went to the SC right after that. Issue: Should the Bundocs retain their liability in Adelbertos case? Held: YES. The decision was REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Ruling: 1. Parental authority is a species of vicarious liability which also gives rise to the concept of imputed negligence. The parents are indispensable parties to the suit for damages concerning their minor child. 2. The Bundocs are wrong to claim that parental authority transfers to the Rapesuras as of the time of filing of the adoption petition (which was before Adelberto shot Jennifer to death). Actual custody of the child during the time of the act is all that is necessary. 3. The actual custody was lodged in the Bundocs thus they are the ones responsible for Adelbertos tort. Concept: Who would want to adopt a kid like Adelberto anyway?? -_416. In the Matter of the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus of Minor Angelie Anne CERVANTES, Nelson L. Cervantes And Zenaida Carreon Cervantes, Petitioners v. Gina Carreon FAJARDO And Conrado FAJARDO () 1989 Padilla *mother kidnaps her child from adoptive parents demanding 150K Facts: 1. Angelie was born on 14 February 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife 2. Conrado and Gina offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of the child when she was barely two (2) weeks old . An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by herein petitioners, was also executed by respondent Gina Carreon on 29 April 1987. 3. Sometime in March or April 1987, the adoptive parents, petitioners Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes, received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand. 4. As a result, Gina kidnapped Angelie. She went to the Cervantes, took the child from her "yaya" on the pretext that she was instructed to do so by her mother. 5. Petitioners demanded the return of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had executed was not fully explained to her. She sent word to the petitioners that she will, however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the amount of P150,000 Issue: To whom should Angelie belong? Held: To the Cervantes Ruling: 1. Conrado Fajardo is married to another woman, not Gina. His open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person. 2. Besides, Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child by another married man with whom she lived for almost three 3 years but who eventually left her and vanished. 3. On the other hand, petitioners Cervantes who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother (herein respondent Gina Carreon), who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her. 4. Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. 5. So finally, SC said: the custody and care of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes are hereby granted to petitioners to whom they properly belong 417. In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Garcia ()
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31 Mar 2005 Sandoval-Gutierrez *adopted daughter allowed to use her mothers surname as middle name Facts: 1. Father: Honorato Catindig and Mother: Gemma Garcia had Illegitimate daughter: Stephanie Garcia 2. Honorato Catindig, petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. 3. He stated that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent and prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname . 4. The trial court granted the adoption. It freed Stephanie from all obligations to her mother and ordered that she be now known as Stephanie Catindig. 5. Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name. 6. The trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name . 7. OSG agrees that Stephanie should be permitted to use Garcia as her middle name for the following reasons: a. It is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her natural mother . b. There is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. c. It is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. Issue: Can Stephanie use Garcia, her natural mothers surname, as her middle name after the adoption? Held: Yes. There is no law which prohibits an adopted child to use his/her natural mothers surname as middle name. Ruling: 1. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption , it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother . 2. The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status. 3. Stephanies continued use of her mothers surname as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. 4. To allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship wit h her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy . 5. The law should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration. 6. There is no law regulating the use of a middle name. The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mothers surname shall be added (Article 375(1) of the Civil Code). 7. The members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the childs mother as his middle name and approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father. Concept: Name - the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. Two parts: (1) the given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals; and (2) The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. 418. ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO () July 14, 2003 Vitug * The adopting mother wanted to rescind the adoption of her nephew because the nephew is turning BAD Facts: 1. The spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into their care Isabelitas nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. 2. At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who treated the child like their own. . 3. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption. 4. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption because a. Respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection with his practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo. b. Petitioner has yearned for the care and show of concern from a son, but respondent remained indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year.

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respondent all the more remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is not expected of a son when the mother has a frequent checkup for her leg ailment d. respondent has recently been jealous of petitioners nephews and nieces whenever they would find time to visit her e. respondents insensible attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner 5. Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption . 6. Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely affect her right to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, both being vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws then in force. Issue: May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552? Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act Held: No. Ruling: 1. It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. 2. By then, the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. 3. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree , having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued. 4. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child . 5. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate . 6. Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the fiveyear bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. 419. Pelayo vs. Lauron () TorresJanuary 12, 1909 *the doctor who didnt get paid. Facts: 1. A husband and wife were married. 2. The parents of the husband called a doctor (plaintiff) because their daughter-in-law was giving birth. 3. The daughter in law died. 4. No one wanted to pay the doctor thus the case. 5. It is claimed that since the daughter in law lived independently from the husband before her death and that it was by mere chance the daughter in law was giving birth in the house of the husband which makes them not liable for the payment of services. Issue: Should the husband be the one to pay for the services? Held: Yes. Husband should pay the fees. Ruling: 1. Articles 142 and 143 of the Civil code provide that The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised a mong the mutual obligations to which spouses are bound by way of mutual support. 2. Just because it was the parents in laws who called for the doctor. It does not absolve the responsibility of the husband to pay for such costs. 3. In the end, husband did not have to pay because the court ruled that there was no contract between plaintiff and defendants that he would get paid for doing the service. 420. Sanchez vs. Zulueta () May 16, 1939 - Avancena *He will prove that the kid is not his; they should not be entitled to support Facts: 1. Josefa Diego and Mario Sanchez, wife and child, are plaintiffs in a civil case. 2. They ask that Feliciano Sanchez be sentenced to pay them monthly allowance for support. 3. Feliciano abandoned them without any justifiable cause. 4. Since 1932, Feliciano has refused to support them. 5. While the two have no means of subsistence, Feliciano receives from the US Army a monthly pension of P174.20. 6. On the other hand, Feliciano alleges that Josefa was the one who abandoned the conjugal home without his knowledge or consent because she committed adultery with Macario Sanchez. 7. According to him, Mario is the result of such illicit relations. He asked for an opportunity to adduce evidence.

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However, the court did not accede to the petition to adduce evidence, and ordered that he pay a monthly allowance pendent lite of P50 from July 1, 1936. Issue: Is Feliciano required to give support? Held: It is ordered that the he be given an opportunity to present evidence in support of his defense against the application for support pendente lite. Ruling: 1. Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support. 2. Consequently, as to the child, it is also a defense that it is the fruit of such adulterous relations, for in that case, it would not be the child of the defendant and, hence, would not be entitled to support as such. 3. If the defendant has a valid defense which calls for proof, and he asks for an opportunity to present evidence, it is error to deny him this opportunity. 421. Reyes vs. Ines-Luciano () Feb. 28, 1979 Fernandez *wife-beaten because of adultery still deserves alimony Facts: 13. On June 3, 1976 Celia Ilustre-Reyes filed against her husband, Manuel J. C. Reyes a case for legal separation on the ground that the defendant had attempted to kill plaintiff. She was almost killed by Manuel on two occasions if not for the intervention of her father on the first time and her driver the second time after she was beaten and down on the floor. 14. The plaintiff's prayer for alimony pendente litein the amount of P5,000.00 a month commencing from June 1976. Celia is presently unemployed and without funds, thus, she is being supported by her father with whom she resides: that defendant had been maltreating her and tried to kill her; that all their conjugal properties are in the possession of defendant who is also president, Manager and Treasurer of their corporation. 15. Manuel opposed the application for support pendente lite on the ground that his wife had committed adultery with her physician. 16. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not entitled to support during the pendency of the case, and, alleging that even if she entitled, the amount awarded was excessive. Issue: Could the Court compel Manuel to provide support pendent lite to his wife? Held: Yes. The action for support is based on the husbands responsibility to support his wife. Ruling: 14. The Court considering the plight of the wife during the pendency of the case for legal separation and that the husband appears to be financially capable of giving the support grants the petition for support. 15. Although adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support however, the alleged adultery of wife must be established by competent evidence. The allegation that the wife has committed adultery will not bar her from the right receive support pendente lite. Adultery is a good defense and if properly proved and sustained wig defeat the action. 16. The petitioner did not present any evidence to prove the allegation that his wife, private respondent Celia Ilustre-Reyes, had committed adultery with any person. 17. It is to be noted however, that as pointed out by the respondents in their comment, the "private respondent was not asking support to be taken from petitioner's personal funds but from the conjugal propertywhich, was her documentary evidence . It is, therefore, doubtful whether adultery will affect her right to alimony pendente lite. 422. De Asis v. CA () February 15, 1999 Purisima Girl: Sayo to! Boy: Hindi ah! Girl: OK Facts: 1. The first case for support filed against Manuel was brought to court by Vircel Andres sometime on October 14, 1988 (just after 08/03/88). She is the legal guardian/mother of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, the child Manuel is supposed to support. 2. Manuel entered a defense of denial of paternity of the child. He claimed in his counter-affidavit that since he does not recognize the child as his own, there would be no point in going after him for support. The action for support being a futile and a useless exercise, he moved for the first cases dismissal. Both parties agreed to the motion and the court accordingly issued the order. 3. A second complaint was filed, however, on September 7, 1995 (perhaps because Glen was about to enter high school and Vircel wanted him to go to Arreneo, haha). Vircel was the same person who instituted the action against Manuel, and it still prayed for pretty much the same thing (moolah, datung, bread, funds, pera! Hehe). 4. Manuel opposed the second action by saying that the agreement of the complainants in the first case barred the case based on the principle of res judicata. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and Manuel went straight to the Supreme Court. Issue: Are respondents barred from filing an action for support? Held: NO. No res judicata for future support. Ruling:

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The court began by invoking article 301 of the civil code which says that the right to receive support cannot be renounced, nor can it be transmitted to a third person. It also mentioned article 2035 which lists future support as one of the questions where no compromise will be deemed valid. 2. The rationale behind such a policy is that the right to support is clo sely connected to a persons survival. Allowing compromise in this area may subject the child to suicide or turn him into a public burden, both of these scenarios are against public policy. 3. In the same token, paternity or filiation is a relationship that must be judicially established, it is not up to the parties to decide or agree regarding the civil status of the child when the same is in question. 4. It is true that the prior agreement by the respondent is binding on her, but at most it is only evidentiary and cannot be used as a basis to dismiss the action for support. Concept: Support and civil status of persons: NO COMPROMISE HERE FOLKS. 423. Roberto DE GUZMAN v. PEREZ, Shirley Aberde () 2006 Corona *law students fooling around; super rich guy doesnt wanna support his kid Facts: 1. De Guzman and Aberde (law students) were sweethearts then their relationship ended when he impregnated her. 2. She gave birth to petitioners child, Robby Aberde de Guzman, on October 2, 1987. They never got married. De Guzman married someone else and had kids with her. 3. De Guzman sent money for Robbys schooling only twice the first in 1992 and the second in 1993. Other than these instances, petitioner never provided any other financial support for his son. 4. In 1994, to make ends meet and to provide for Robbys needs, Aberde accepted a job as a factory worker in Taiwan where she worked for two years. 5. However, she reached the point where she had ju st about spent all her savings to provide for her and Robbys needs. The childs continued education thus became uncertain. 6. On the other hand, petitioner managed the de Guzman family corporations. He apparently did well as he led a luxurious lifestyle. He sent his children (by his wife) to expensive schools . Despite his fabulous wealth, however, petitioner failed to provide support to Robby. 7. In a letter dated February 21, 2000, Aberde demanded support for Robby who was entering high school that coming schoolyear (June 2000) 8. De Guzman ignored Aberdes demand. The latter was thus forced to rely on the charity of her relatives so that she could enroll her son in De La Salle high school in Lipa City 9. A complaint against De Guzman was filed charging him with neglect of child punishable under Article 59(4) of PD 603 (see concept) 10. De Guzman denied everything; that he just depended on his father for support; that its actually Aberde who was the financial ly able parent; that he didnt have luxurious cars, blah blah blah. 11. He also claimed that Robby is not a neglected child. He has been given, albeit by Aberde who is the financially capable parent. 12. To prove de Guzmans financial capacity to support Robbys education, she attached a notarized copy of the General Information Sheet (GIS) of the RNCD Development Corporation. It showed that petitioner owned P750,000 worth of paid-up corporate shares. Issue: Is de Guzman guilty of the crime of neglect of child? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. There is a prima facie showing from the evidence that de Guzman is in fact financially capable of supporting Robbys education. The notarized GIS of the RNCD Development Corporation is one proof. 2. The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any parent. The irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from the consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parents faithful compliance with his or her own parental duties 3. So de Guzman is guilty. Concept: Art. 59. Crimes. Criminal liability shall attach to any parent who: (4) Neglects the child by not giving him the education which the familys station in life and financial conditions permit. 345. Joanie Surposa vs Jose Ngo Chua () September 18, 2009 Chico-Nazario *2M each from father to settle filiation &paternity Facts: 5. Jose who was married, then had an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa (Irene). They had two children, namely, Joanie and her brother, Allan.

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Before she got married Jose has been giving them allowances and required to work in his family business. He was also known as his illegitimate children within the Chinese community. 7. Now petitioner files for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation but Jose Ngo Chua contends that the case has been barred by res judicata because of the compromise agreement they had she and her brother were paid Php 2M each in consideration that they declare that they have absolutely no more claims, causes of action or demands against him. 8. The case has deemed final and executory by the RTC because no appeal has been filed in the given period. Issues: Can the status and filiation of a child be compromised? Held: No. Its against the law and public policy. Future support cannot be compromised as well. Ruling: 5. The Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code. 6. Advincula v. Advincula has a factual background closely similar to the one at bar. Wherein the court ruled that a compromise did not bar the subsequent filing by an action for acknowledgement because the compromise affecting a persons civil status cannot be the subject of compromise. 7. Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. 8. The case cannot be barred by res judicata because it is against public policy being null and void for having been rendered by RTC-Branch 9 without jurisdiction and could not have attained finality or been considered a judgment on the merits. Concept: ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1) The civil status of persons;(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;(3) Any ground for legal separation;(4) Future support;(5) The jurisdiction of courts;(6) Future legitime. 424. Lam vs. Chua () 18 Mar 2004 Austria-Martinez *evidence must be presented to determine proper amount of support Facts: 1. Husband: Jose Lam and Wife: Adriana Chua were married: 13 Jan 1984 and had child: John Paul 2. On 28 Feb 1994, Makati RTC approved dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains and the separation of present and future properties. In the same decision, Jose and Adriana agreed to contribute 250,000 each to a common fund for the benefit of the child. 3. On 11 Mar 1994, Adriana filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. She failed to claim and pray for the support of their child. 4. During the hearing, no evidence was presented regarding the amount of support needed by John Paul or the capacity of Jose to give support. After her testimony, Adriana formally offered the documentary evidence. 5. On 23 Jun 1994, Adriana filed an Urgent Motion to Re-Open on the ground that she was able to secure additional new evidence which were significant, material and indispensable. On 6 Jul 1994 , she presented proof of Joses previous marriages to two other women. Also, she testified that John Paul needed a 20,000 monthly support. 6. On 4 Aug 1994, the court declared the marriage null and void for being bigamous. It also ordered Jose to give a monthly support to his son John Paul Chua Lam in the amount of 20,000. 7. Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration but only insofar as the decision awarded monthly support to his son in the amount of 20,000. He argued that there was already a provision for s upport of the child in the Makati RTC decision. 8. The court denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision . Issue: Can the court motu propio set the amount for support? Held: No. Evidence must be presented to determine the proper amount of support. Ruling: 1. Judgment for support does not become final. The action for support may be filed again by the same plaintiff. The provision for a common fund as embodied in the compromise agreement approved by the Makati RTC cannot be considered final and res judicata since any judgment for support is always subject to modification, depending upon the needs of the child and the capabilities of the parents to give support. 2. In determining the amount of support to be awarded, such amount should be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient, pursuant to Articles 194, 201 and 202 of the Family Code. 3. It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence presented before it. The evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to support their children. 4. The testimony of Adriana is insufficient and does not establish the amount needed by the child nor the amount that the parents are reasonably able to give. 5. The case is remanded to the trial court to receive evidence for the determination of the proper amount of support.
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202. Lerma vs. CA () December 20, 1974 Makalintal *Double Teodoro, Double Grounds, Pendente lite Facts: 1. May 19, 1951 Teodoro Lerma and Concepcion Diaz got married, and had children (Gregory, being the youngest). 2. August 22, 1969 Teodoro filed a complaint for adultery against his wife and a certain Teodoro Ramirez. 3. November 18, 1969 Concepcion filed with the lower court, a complaint against the Teodoro for legal separation and/or separation of properties, custody of their children and support, with an urgent petition for support pendente lite for her and Gregory, who was then and until now is in her custody. 4. Her complaint for legal separation is based on two grounds: concubinage and attempt against her life. 5. He filed his opposition to the application for support pendente lite, setting up as defense the adultery charge he had filed. 6. The application for support pendente lite was granted, amended to the following effect: (1) He was declared entitled to support pendente lite from the date of the filing of the complaint; and (2) the amount of such monthly support was reduced from P2,250.00 to P1,820.00. 7. Teodoro opposed the amendment, filing an appeal for grave abuse of discretion, and an injunction to stop the enforcement. The CA granted it, but then it decided to dismiss the petition after Concepcion moved for reconsideration. 8. With the SC: It granted the TRO to stop the enforcement pendente lite. This was addressed to the judge and her representatives. 9. Among those that he alleged in his appeal with the SC were: 1) that new adultery charges were filed against her and her 2nd paramour that made him seek custody of their son, 2) that in connection with the first adultery charge, she and her co-accused, Teodoro Teddy Ramirez, had been convicted, and was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals. 10. The respondent filed an opposition. One of her arguments was: Article 292 of the New Civil Code - "during the proceedings for legal separation, or for annulment of marriage, the spouses and children shall be supported from the conjugal partnership property ...," such support is mandatory even if there be a showing that the wife is guilty of adultery . 11. The SC then denied the urgent motion for TRO. Issue: Is adultery is a good defense against the respondent's claim for support pendente lite? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. In Quintana v. Lerma, 24 Phil. 285, which was an action by the wife against the husband for support, based upon a written contract, this Court held that adultery is a good defense. This ruling was reiterated in subsequent cases. 2. Article 292, which was cited by Concepcion, is not in itself the source of the legal right to receive support. It merely states that the support, not only of the spouses but also of the children, shall be taken from the conjugal property during the pendency of the legal separation proceeding. Also, the said article contemplates the pendency of a court action and, a prima facie showing that the action will prosper. For if the action is shown to be groundless the mere filing thereof will not necessarily set Article 292 in operation. 3. Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that "the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse , provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage ... (and) where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them ..." It is true that the judgment of conviction is on appeal in the Court of Appeals, but the same satisfies the standard of provisional showing. If legal separation cannot be claimed by the guilty spouse in the first place, the fact that an action for that purpose is filed anyway should not be permitted to be used as a means to obtain support pendente lite. 4. This is not meant to be a prejudgment of either the legal separation proceeding pending in the lower court or the criminal case for adultery pending in the Court of Appeals. It is to be understood only in the light of Rule 61, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, which specifically governs the subject of support pendente lite. 425. Mangonon vs. CA () June 30, 2006 - CHICO-NAZARIO *Granddaughters wanted to study in USA, Papa has no money so LOLO will give money Facts: 1. On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite. 2. In said petition, it was alleged that on 16 February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married . 3. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old . 4. As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.5 5. On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage , petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. 6. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as

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private respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. 8. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education because of the following average annual cost for college education in the US is about US$22,000/year 9. Petitioner also alleged that Rica and Rina are her legitimate daughters by respondent Federico 10. Federico and the latters father, Francisco known to be financially well-off 11. Petitioner concedes that under the law, the obligation to furnish support to Rica and Rina should be first imposed upon their parents. She contends, however, that the records of this case demonstrate her as well as respondent Federicos inability to give the support needed for Rica and Rinas college education. Consequently, the obligation to provide support devolves upon respondent Francisco being the grandfather of Rica and Rina. Respondent 12. Respondent Francisco stated that as the birth certificates of Rica and Rina do not bear the signature of respondent Federico , 13. it is essential that their legitimacy be first established as "there is no basis to claim support until a final and executory judicial declaration has been made as to the civil status of the children." 14. Whatever good deeds he may have done to Rica and Rina, according to respondent Francisco, was founded on pure acts of Christian charity 15. he maintained that responsibility should rest on the shoulders of petitioner and her second husband 16. Respondent Federico, for his part, continues to deny having sired Rica and Rina Issue: Are the twins entitled to support? Held: Yes Ruling: LEGITIMACY OF THE CHILDREN 1. By and large, the status of the twins as children of Federico cannot be denied . 2. They had maintained constant communication with their grandfather Francisco . 3. As a matter of fact, respondent Francisco admitted having wrote several letters to Rica and Rina 4. In the said letters, particularly at the bottom, respondent Francisco wrote the names of Rica and Rina Delgado. 5. He therefore was very well aware that they bear the surname Delgado. 6. Likewise, he referred to himself in his letters as either "Lolo Paco" or "Daddy Paco." 7. In his letter of October 13, 1989 (Exh. G-21), he said "as the grandfather, am extending a financial help of US$1,000.00 ." 8. On top of this, respondent Federico even gave the twins a treat to Hongkong during their visit to the Philippines. 9. Indeed, respondents, by their actuations, have shown beyond doubt that the twins are the children of Federico .
WHO SHOULD GIVE SUPPORT 10. the obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely related to the recipient. However, the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are called upon to provide support do not have the means to do so. 11. Respondent Franciscos assertion that petitioner had the means to support her daughters education is belied by the fact that petitioner was even forced by her financial status in the USA to secure the loan from the federal government. 12. There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their childrens college education. 13. Under Article 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their parents . It having been established that respondent Francisco has the financial means to support his granddaughters education , he, in lieu of petitioner and respondent Federico, should be held liable for support pendente lite. 14. Anent respondent Francisco and Federicos claim that they have the option under the law as to how they could perform their obligation to support Rica and Rina, respondent Francisco insists that Rica and Rina should move here to the Philippines to study in any of the local universities. After all, the quality of education here, according to him, is at par with that offered in the USA. The applicable provision of the Family Code on this subject provides: 15. In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of the second option . Given all these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of those who have disowned them.
426. Lim vs. Lim ()
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CarpioOctober 30, 2009 *compromising situation with the midwife Facts: 1. Husband and wife had three children. The husband has a business that makes Php. 6,000.00 a month. 2. The 5 of them lived in a house in Forbes Park with the grandparents of their father. 3. The wife took the children away when she caught the father in a compromising situation with the midwife of his grandmother. 4. She demands support for her and the kids. 5. The trial court ordered the father and the grandparents to pay support amounting to Php, 40,000.00 (6k from father and the rest from grandparents) 6. The grandparents are now appealing. They claim they should not be liable to pay. Issue: Should the grandparents be made to pay for support? Held: Yes (but only to the children) Ruling: 1. The law provides that when a father cannot support his children. The grandparents are obligated to help support. 2. Article 195 of the Family Code is clear on this matter. Parents and their legitimate children are obliged to mutually support one another and this obligation extends down to the legitimate grandchildren and great grandchildren . 3. The grandparents are NOT obliged to provide support to their daughter in law . JUST their grandchildren. 4. The wife must get her support only from the husband. 5. This case is remanded back in order to determine how much the wife should get from the husband. 427. Canonizado vs. Benitez () May 7, 1987 - Cruz *lawyer involved in a case of support Facts: 1. It all began in an action for support filed by Bernarda against her estranged husband, Atty. Cesar Canonizado. 2. The trial court granted the claim for their minor child Christina in the amount of P100.00 monthly but denied similar support for Bernarda since she was gainfully employed. 3. She questioned this decision in a petition for certiorari with this Court, the court modified it by granting support both for the minor child and her the monthly amount of P100.00 each. 4. When the corresponding writ of execution was issued, Atty. Cesar filed an action to restrain the sale of certain properties over which he claimed to have lost ownership. 5. However, the trial court declared the supposed conveyance of such properties to be simulated and ordered the sheriff to proceed with the auction sale. 6. An alias writ of execution was issued, but was not satisfied because of an order of the court, which, while directing payment of support from January to May 1963, exempted from levy the books and office equipment used by him in the practice of his law profession. 7. A decision on the merits was promulgated by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court awarding arrearages in support pendente lite to her and her daughter plus current monthly support for the latter at the rate of P150.00 beginning October 1964. 8. This decision was affirmed on appeal, with the modification that a P100.00 monthly support was also to be given to petitioner beginning October 1964. 9. A writ of execution was accordingly issued, for the collection of the amounts of P16,150.00 and P17,200.00, respectively, representing Atty. Cesars liabilities for the support of daughter Christina up to the time she finished her studies in April 1969. 10. However, these amounts were not collected, and remain unliquidated to date because of a series of compromise agreements reached by the parties for deferment and moratorium. Issue: Should the court order the immediate enforcement of the alias writ of execution and the collection of arrearages in support due to the petitioner and to the daughter Christina? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. The motion affects only support from 1973 and does not at all involve the support adjudged against him before that date, specifically, from 1956 to 1972. Such support has already become due and has acquired the character of vested rights accruing to the petitioner and the daughter Christina. -----------There has been too much temporizing in this case that should not be permitted to continue even longer in defiance of the constitutional mandate for speedy justice. The respondent judge is directed to act with a possible dispatch on the pending incidents and to finally decide this protracted controversy once and for all. For contempt of this Court, the private respondent is also punished.
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428. Edward LACSON v. Maowee Daban LACSON and Maonaa Daban () 2006 Garcia *father wants some formal demand before he gives support to his daughters Facts: 1. The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of petitioner Edward Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later . 2. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, Edward left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. 3. The sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their own. 4. It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband Edward for support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in a note dated December 10, 1975 to give support to his daughters. But Edward reneged on his promise of support, despite Leas efforts towards having him fulfill the same. 5. Lea would admit, though, that Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school expenses . Through the years and up to the middle part of 1992, Edwards mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to help in the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa 6. Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that their father Edward, despite being gainfully employed and owning several pieces of valuable lands, has not provided them support since 1976 . They also alleged that, owing to years of Edwards failure and neglect, their mother had, from time to time, borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban 7. Edward alleged giving to Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to meet their needs. He explained, however, that his lack of regular income and the unproductivity of the land he inherited, not his neglect, accounted for his failure at times to give regular support. 8. Lower court ruled in favor of the sisters. It ordered Edward to pay the sisters support in arrears in the amount of P2M from which amount shall be deducted ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR (P124,000.00) PESOS that which they received from defendant for two years and that which they received by way of support pendent lite 9. Edward appealed from that decision which the CA affirmed. He contends that he should not be made to pay support in arrears, i.e., from 1976 to 1994, no previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand having been made by the respondents. 10. He invokes Art203 of the FC: The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand . Issue: Should Edward be ordered to pay his daughters such amount as ordered by the lower court? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. He abandoned the respondent sisters even before the elder of the two could celebrate her second birthday . To be sure, petitioner could not plausibly expect any of the sisters during their tender years to go through the motion of demanding support from him, what with the fact that even their mother (his wife) found it difficult during the period material to get in touch with him. 2. Also, it may be that Lea made no extrajudicial demand in the sense of a formal written demand in terms commonly used by legal advocates. Nonetheless, what would pass as a demand was, however, definitely made. Asking one to comply with his obligation to support owing to the urgency of the situation is no less a demand because it came by way of a request or a plea. 3. His insistence on requiring a formal demand from his wife is truly pointless, in the face of his acknowledgment of and commitment to comply with such obligation through a note in his own handwriting . Said note [stating that he will sustain his two daughters Maowee and Maonaa] also stated as requested by their mother thus practically confirming the fact of such demand having been made by [respondents] mother. 4. As for the amount of support in arrears, there is also no reason to disturb the absolute figures arrived at by the two courts below, appearing as they do to be reasonable and proper. 5. They fixed such amount based on the varying needs of the respondents during the years included in the computation and to the financial resources of the Edward 6. As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient 429. Sy vs. CA () 27 Dec 2007 Tinga *support may be ordered even in a habeas corpus proceeding Facts: 1. Father: Wilson Sy and Mother: Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy had children: Vanessa (6) and Jeremiah (4) 2. On 14 Jan 1994, Mercedes filed a habeas corpus petition against Wilson to produce and obtain custody of their children. 3. In his Answer, Wilson prayed that the custody be awarded to him . He alleged that Mercedes was unfit to take custody due to (a) her abandonment of the family in 1992, (b) she is mentally unstable, and (c) she cannot provide for her children. 4. After trial, the court issued the habeas corpus petition and awarded custody of the children to Mercedes. It also ordered

5. 6.
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Wilson to give them 50,000 monthly support. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that Wilson was not able to substantiate his contention that Mercedes was unfit. She instead was driven away by his family due to religious differences. On the matter of the grant of support, the CA held that Wilson was properly heard . Even though he did not present evidence on his income, a judgment of support is never final and he is not precluded at any time from seeking a modification of the same and produce evidence of his claim.
Issue: Was the order granting support properly issued? Held: Yes. He was aware that support was being discussed during trial. Ruling: 1. Article 203 of the Family Code states that the obligation to give support is demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. 2. Even if the action for support was not in the pleadings, Mercedes testified during the trial, without objections from Wilson, the need for support of the children. Since the issue of support was tried with the implied consent of the parties , it should be treated in all respects as if it had been raised in the pleadings. 3. His representations regarding his familys wealth and his capability to provide for his family more than provided a fair indication of his financial standing. He testified that he has shares of stocks in a company. Nevertheless, award of support is merely provisional as the amount may be modified or altered. On the custody of the children 1. In case of legal separation of the parents, the custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, unless otherwise directed by the court in the interest of the minor children. 2. The law favors the mother if she is a fit and proper person to have custody of her children so that they may not only receive her attention, care, supervision but also have the advantage and benefit of a mothers love and devotion f or which there is no substitute. 3. The trial court was correct in restoring the custody of the children to Mercedes since the children were at that time less than seven years of age. Article 213 of the Family Code: No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
430. ZENAIDA MEDINA, vs. DRA. VENANCIA L. MAKABALI, () March 28, 1969 JBL Reyes * Child wanted to stay with his foster parent doctor than his real mom Facts: 1. February 4, 1961, petitioner Zenaida Medina gave birth to a baby boy named Joseph Casero in the clinic of Dra. Venancia Makabali, single, who assisted at the delivery. 2. The boy was Zenaida's third, had with a married man, Feliciano Casero. 3. The mother left the child with Dra. Makabali from his birth . 4. The Dra. Venancia took care and reared Joseph as her own son; had him treated at her expense for poliomyelitis by Dra. Fe del Mundo, in Manila, until he recovered his health; and sent him to school. 5. From birth until August 1966, the real mother never visited her child, and never paid for his expenses . (5 years old) 6. Joseph on the witness stand, wanted to stay with his "Mammy!" (Dra. Vanancia) 7. Trail court held that - to allow the minor a free choice with whom to live when he reaches the age of 14, - it was for the child's best interest to be left with his foster mother Issue: Who has the right of custody over the child Joseph? Held: Dra. Venancia Makabili Ruling: 1. We see no reason to disturb the order appealed from 2. As a result, the right of parents to the company and custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of parental duties to provide the children with adequate support, education, moral, intellectual and civic training and development 3. petitioner Zenaida Medina proved remiss in these sacred duties; 4. She not only failed to provide the child with love and care but actually deserted him, with not even a visit, in his tenderest years, when he needed his mother the most.
431. Unson vs. Navarro ()
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BarredoNovember 17, 1980 *Father who wants to take his daughter away from mother who is sleeping with his brother. Facts: 1. Petitioner and respondent were married. 2. They have a child. 3. They decided to separate their property and live separately from one another. 4. There was no specific provision in the agreement as to whom the kid would go to. 5. The child stayed with the mother after the separation of property. 6. The petitioner (father) was always given a chance to visit the child and the respondent (mother) claims that she insisted that they develop a wholesome bond. 7. It is to be noted that Respondent has been having an ongoing relationship with her brother-in-law for quite some time. 8. She gave birth to 2 additional children, both according the medical records, to have the brother-in-law listed as the father. 9. Thus the petition by the father to claim full custody over the child. Issue: Should the father claim custody over his daughter? Held: YES Ruling: 1. It is in the best interest of the child to be free from the obvious unwholesome, not to say immoral influence, that the situation private respondent has placed herself in. 2. It may create a bad moral and social outlook of the child. 3. She should be however be given visitorial rights. 432. Bagtas vs. Hon. Santos () November 27, 2009 - Carpio *Should the girl be under the custody of her grandparents? Facts: 1. Antonio and Rosita S. Gallardo are the parents of Maricel S. Gallardo. 2. Two weeks after graduating from high school, Maricel ran away to live with her boyfriend. 3. Maricel became pregnant and gave birth to Maryl Joy S. Gallardo. Maricels boyfriend left her. 4. Maricel returned to her parents, but on the same day, she ran away again and lived with Noel B. Bagtas and Lydia B. Sioson. 5. Maricel went to Negros Occidental and left Maryl Joy in the custody of Bagtas and Sioson. 6. In a letter, Maricel relinquished her rights over Maryl Joy to Bagtas and his wife. 7. The Spouses Gallardo tried to obtain the custody of Maryl Joy from Bagtas and Sioson, but Bagtas and Sioson refused. 8. Unable to settle the matter, the Spouses Gallardo filed with the RTC a petition for habeas corpus. 9. The RTC issued a writ of habeas corpus directing the deputy sheriff to produce Maryl Joy before it and to summon Bagtas and Sioson to explain why they were withholding the custody of Maryl Joy. 10. The Spouses Gallardo, Bagtas and Sioson entered into a compromise agreement. that the child should be placed in custody of the petitioners on Friday, Saturday and Sunday; that the child should be returned to the respondents by the petitioners on Sunday at 8:00 oclock in the evening subject to visitorial rights of the petitioners anytime of the day; and that the child can be brought by the respondents to Valenzuela but should be returned to the petitioners on Friday morning. 11. Bagtas and Sioson learned that Rosita S. Gallardo brought Maryl Joy to Samar. 12. Bagtas and Sioson prayed that the Spouses Gallardo be directed to produce Maryl Joy before the RTC, that they be directed to explain why they violated Order, and that they be cited in contempt. 13. The RTC cited the Spouses Gallardo in contempt, fined themP500, and ordered them to produce Maryl Joy before the trial court. Issue: Should Maryl Joy be in the custody of the spouses Gallardo? Held: The case is remanded to determine the fitness of the spouses to take care of her. Ruling: 1. The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the RTCs 9 December 2002 and 21 April 2003 Orders. In its Orders, the RTC ruled that, since the sole purpose of the petition for habeas corpus was the production of Maryl Joy before the trial court, the action became moot when Maryl Joy was produced. 2. Section 1, Rule 102, of the Rules of Court states that the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the persons entitled thereto. 3. In cases involving minors, the purpose of a petition for habeas corpus is not limited to the production of the child before the court. The main purpose of the petition for habeas corpus is to determine who has the rightful custody over the child. 4. Petitioners are, under the law (Art. 214, Family Code), authorized to exercise substitute parental authority over the child in case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, the entitlement to the legal custody of the child being necessarily included therein to make possible and/or enable the petitioners to discharge their duties as substitute parents 5. Considering that the childs welfare is an all-important factor in custody cases, the Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally
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provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. 433. Eslao vs. CA () January 16, 1997 Torres *Grandma wants custody of child but Mom wants them to be California Girls Facts: 1. Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye (respondent) and Reynaldo Eslao were married they had two children. They were living at the house of the husbands mother, the petitioner Teresita Eslao. Reynaldo died and Teresita asked for the company of her grandchildren to assuage her sons loss. Maria entrusted custody of her children to her. 2. Maria met Dr. James Ouye and eventually decided to get married, the petitioner migrated to San Francisco, California, USA, to join her new husband. 3. Dr. James Ouye, expressed his willingness to adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for their support and education; however, Teresita resisted the idea by way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was ten days old and accuse Maria of having abandoned Angelica. 4. Petitioner also argues that it has been amply demonstrated during the trial that private respondent had indeed abandoned Angelica to her care and custody; that during all the time that Angelica stayed with petitioner, there were only three instances or occasions wherein the private respondent saw Angelica. 5. Teresita asserts that she is deserving to take care of Angelica; that she had managed to raise 12 children of her own herself; that she has the financial means to carry out her plans for Angelica Issues: Could the mother-in-law keep custody of the child from her natural mother? Held: No. The right of the parent to the custody of the child is inherent. Ruling: 1. There was no abandonment committed by the private respondent; that while judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for the purpose is not here obtaining as mandated in Art. 229 of the Family Code because petitioner failed to resort to such judicial action, it does not ipso facto follow that there was in fact no abandonment committed by the private respondent. 2. The Court considered the contrasting situation for the children if they will be with their mother, the probability is that they will be afforded a bright future. With the situation with the one prevailing in the Teresitas [grandmothers] house. Finally, considering that in all controversies involving the custody of minors, the foremost criterion is the physical and moral well being of the child taking into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parties 3. Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same. 4. When Maria entrusted the custody of her minor child to the petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. Concept: real and natural mother: legitimately, anxiously, and desperately trying to get back her child in order to fill the void in her heart and existence. She wants to make up for what she has failed to do for her boy during the period when she was financially unable to help him and when she could not have him in her house because of the objection of the father. Now that she has her own home and is in a better financial condition , she wants her child back, and we repeat that she has not and has never given him up definitely or with any idea of permanence. (Celis v. Cafuir, 86 SCRA 559) 434. Espiritu and Layug v CA () March 15, 1995 Melo T earful embrace in court? Not quite Facts: 1. Reynaldo and Teresita met while they were both working in the Philippines. They hit it off right away, but sadly Teresita had to leave for California. Eventually however Reynaldo was sent by his employer to Pittsburgh to become a liaison officer and they were reunited (and it felt so good, at first at least). 2. It was so good that they humped each other a lot, resulting in the birth of Rosalind Therese. The couple went home to the Philippines for a short vacation and they were eventually married (they also eventually bore a second child named Reginald). 3. The relationship began to deteriorate when they started accusing each other of all kinds of things (Reynaldo always nagged Teresita about money, and Teresita would rather spend on jewelry than take care of her household duties). Reynaldo begged for a second chance, but Teresita left all the same. She went back to California and left the children with Reynaldo. Reynaldo however also had to return to Pittsburgh (since he still had work there) and left the children with his sister, Guillerma Layug, in the Philippines.
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4. Teresita claimed that she was not able to follow her children back to the Philippines right away because a criminal case for bigamy was field against her. As soon as she was able to return, however, she filed a petition for habeas corpus against Reynaldo and Guillerma to gain custody over the kids. 5. The RTC dismissed the habeas corpus petition. Teresita appealed to the CA and was able to get the decision reversed. Reynaldo and Guillerma then went straight to the one Supreme Court. Issue: Was the reversal by the CA correct? Held: NO. The decision was REVERSED. Ruling: 1. The Supreme Court started off by saying that the CA used an automatic and blind application of some relevant provisions on custody in coming up with their decision. The two provisions support the idea of the code commission (as well as other authorities like Justice Sempio-Diy) that only the mother can provide the kind of care and nurturing that a child needs. That even if a mother has questionable morals; still she is the best choice for custody because the child wouldnt be able to comprehend such complex principles anyway. 2. However, upon an appreciation of the facts of this case, it is clear that the respondent court should have taken into account the most important consideration in custody cases, and that is the welfare and interests of the child. As culled from all relevant provisions on custody and previous rulings, compelling reasons may force the court to award custody to someone other than the mother. 3. The children are safely above the seven-year guideline, and the CA was wrong to assume that their interests would be best served if they are given to their mother simply because Teresita claimed that she was in agony. The CA did not take into account the testimony of the expert witness which showed a troubled young Rosalind who felt love neither from nor for her mother. The court also said that the CA ignored the report of the social workers who said that the children refused to go back to the United States to be reunited w ith their mother. 4. The court also said that the trial court cannot be amiss in its observation of the demeanor of the parties as well as the credibility of the expert witnesses. The CA cannot just brush aside the factual findings of the trial court without sufficient evidence. 5. Most importantly (I think) was that the trial court was able to prove that Teresita, being a lying, unfaithful, and deceitful b*tch, is not fit to take custody of the children (apparently her marriage with Reynaldo itself was bigamous). 6. Reynaldo was not proven to be unable to provide the emotional and material care that the children need, so they should stay with him Concept: The provisions on custody that support a mothers case are merely guides based on a strong presumption that th e mother is most likely more fit to take care of the children. 435. Johanna SOMBONG v. CA and Marietta Neri Alviar, Lilibeth Neri and all persons holding the subject child ARABELA SOMBONG in their custody () 1996 Hermosisima *turns out mother is fighting for the wrong baby. Oopsie. Facts: 1. Sombong is the mother of Arabella Sombong who was born on April 23, 1987 2. Sometime in November, 1987, Arabella, then only six months old, was brought to the Sir John Clinic. Sombong did not have enough money to pay the hospital bill in the amount of P300. Arabella could not be discharged, then, because of the Sombong's failure to pay the bill. Petitioner surprisingly gave testimony to the effect that she allegedly paid the private respondents by installments in the total amount of P1,700, knowing for a fact that the sum payable was only P300. Despite such alleged payments, the owners of the clinic, Dra. Carmen Ty and her husband, Mr. Vicente Ty, allegedly refused to turn over Arabella to her. 3. But in contrast to her foregoing allegations, Sombong testified that she visited Arabella at the clinic only after two years, in 1989. This time, she did not go beyond berating the spouses Ty for their refusal to give Arabella to her. Three years thereafter, in 1992, petitioner again resurfaced to lay claim to her child. Her pleas allegedly fell on deaf ears. 4. So Sombong filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus against the spouses Ty. Dr. Ty, in her counter-affidavit, admitted that petitioner's child, Arabella, had for some time been in her custody. Arabella was discharged from the clinic in April, 1989, and was, in the presence of her clinic staff, turned over to someone who was properly identified to be the child's guardian. This case against Ty didnt prosper. 5. Dra. Ty disclosed the possibility that the child, Arabella, may be found in a place in QC. The NBI agents went to the address as told by Ty and there found a female child who answered to the name of Cristina Grace Neri. Quite significantly, the evidence disclosed that the child, Cristina, had been living with respondent Marietta Neri ALVIAR since 1988 . When she was just a baby, Cristina was abandoned by her parents at the Sir John Clinic. On April 18, 1988, Dr. Fe Mallonga, a dentist at the Sir John Clinic and respondent Alviar, called the latter up to discuss the possibility of turning over to her care one of the several abandoned babies at the said clinic. Respondent Alviar was told that this baby whose name was unknown had long been abandoned by her parents and appeared to be very small, very thin, and full of scabies. Taking pity on the baby, respondent Alviar and her
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mother, Maura Salacup Neri, decided to take care of her. This baby was baptized. 6. So Sombong again filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus against Alviar Issue: Should baby Cristina Grace Neri be given to Sombong? Held: No, evidence is weak to prove that Cristina is the same person as Arabella Ruling: 1. Testimonial and circumstantial proof establishes the individual and separate existence of Sombong's child, Arabella, from that of Alvriars foster child, Cristina. 2. Heres the sparkling inconsistency: Sombong said Arabella was confined at the clinic in 1987 and that she saw her again only in 1989. Plus a statement from Ty that Arabella was confined in there from 1987 to 1989. Alviar, on the other hand, said that she obtained custody of her baby Cristina in 1988 and had her baptized in the same year. So clearly, Arabella and Cristina are 2 different babies. 3. Also there was a testimony given that, together with Arabella, there were several babies left in the clinic and so she could not be certain whether it was Arabella or some other baby that was given to private respondents, Alviar and company. 4. Also, private respondents and not Sombong, have the interest of the child Cristina at heart. Sombong filed a motion to litigate as pauper as she had no fixed income. She also admitted that she had no stable job, and she had been separated from a man previously married to another woman. She also confessed that she planned to go abroad and leave her other child Johannes to the care of the nuns. 436. Roehr vs. Rodriguez () 20 Jun 2003 Quisumbing *custody of German children may be determined by the court after foreign divorce Facts: 1. Husband: Wolfgang Roehr (German) and Wife: Carmen Rodriguez (Filipino) were married: 11 Dec 1980 in Hamburg, Germany Marriage ratified: 14 Fen 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental 2. Had two children: Carolynne (18 Nov 1981) and Alexandra Kristine (25 Oct 1987) [not too pretty I checked FB] 3. On 28 Aug 1996, Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before Makati RTC. 4. On 16 Dec 1997, Wolfgang obtained a divorce decree from CFI of Hamburg-Blankenese. It gave parental custody of the children to Wolfgang. 5. Because of the foreign divorce decree, Carmens petition was dismissed on 14 Jul 1999. Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of properties. 6. On 30 Sep 1999, Court issued order partially reconsidering for the purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children. 7. Wolfgang opposed claiming lack of jurisdiction which the court denied. He appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: Should the case be partially reopened to tackle the issue on support and custody of the children? Held: Yes. Court may determine the custody of the two children. Ruling: 1. A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality. Carmen timely filed her MR. 2. Divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of children, must still be determined by our courts . 3. Carmen did not participate and was not represented in the divorce proceedings in Germany. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was. 4. Absent any finding that Carmen is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. 5. On the matter of property relations, the court no longer has jurisdiction since the couple does not have properties. 437. GUALBERTO vs. GUALBERTO () June 28, 2005 - PANGANIBAN, J *Mother has lesbian relationship but still fit for child custody Facts: 1. On March 12, 2002, Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn D. Pablo Gualberto, with an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4-year-old son, minor Rafaello (the child, for brevity), whom Joycelyn allegedly took away with her from the conjugal home and his school (Infant Toddlers Discovery Center in Paraaque City) when shedecided to abandon Crisanto sometime in early February 2002 2. Despite efforts exerted by him, he has failed to see his child. 3. Joycelyn and the child are at present staying with the formers step-father 4. Renato Santos, President of United Security Logistic testified that he was commissioned by [Crisanto] to conduct surveillance on Joycelyn and came up with the conclusion that [she] is having lesbian relatio ns with one Noreen Gay Cuidadano 5. Cherry Batistel, a house helper of the spouses who stated that [the mother] does not care for the child as she very often goes out of the house and on one occasion, she saw Joycelyn slapping the child.
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Issue: Who will have the custody of the child? Held: Mother Jocelyn, lack of sufficient evidence to give custody to father Ruling: 1. Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody . It has indeed been held that under certain circumstances, the mothers immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody 2. But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence . 3. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child. 4. To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper parental care.52 5. It is therefore not enough for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian . 6. He must also demonstrate that she carried on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the childs proper moral development. 7. Such a fact has not been shown here. 8. There is no evidence that the son was exposed to the mothers alleged sexual proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a result. Concept: 1. The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be separated from their mother finds its raison detre in the basic need of minor children for their mothers loving care. 2. "In case of separation of his parents, no child under five years of age shall be separated from his mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to do so 3. The principle of "best interest of the child" pervades Philippine cases involving adoption, guardianship, support, personal status, minors in conflict with the law, and child custody. In these cases, it has long been recognized that in choosing the parent to whom custody is given, the welfare of the minors should always be the paramount consideration 4. The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mothers unfitness. 5. The mother has been declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances: a. neglect, b. abandonment, c. unemployment, d. immorality, e. habitual drunkenness, f. drug addiction, g. maltreatment of the child, h. insanity or i. affliction with a communicable disease 438. Vancil vs. Belmes () 19 Jun 2001 Sandoval-Gutierrez *American grandma cannot be a guardian Facts: 1. Father: Reeder Vancil (died 22 Dec 1986) and Mother: Helen Belmes had children: Valerie (6) and Vincent (2) illegitimate Grandmother: Bonifacia Vancil (an American living in Colorado) 2. In May 1987, Bonifacia commenced before RTC of Cebu City a guardianship proceeding over her grandchildren and their properties. She alleged that the childrens estate is estimated at 100,000 from their fathers death benefits. 3. On 15 Jul 1987, the court appointed Bonifacia as their legal and judicial guardian . 4. On 13 Aug 1987, Helen filed an opposition stating that she had filed a similar petition before RTC of Pagadian City. She added that as the natural mother, she was in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over her children. She further claimed that Bonifacia was an American citizen living in Colorado . 5. On 12 Oct 1988, the court denied Helens motion. It ordered Bonifacia to perform her duties as guardian. 6. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It held that the Civil Code considers the parents as natural guardian of minor children. Parents are ipso facto guardians of their minor children without need of a court appointment . 7. It also held that nothing on record showed any reason why Helen should be deprived of her legal rights as natural guardian. 8. Ten years later, Bonifacia filed before the Supreme Court this petition raising legal points. 9. In a Manifestation, Helen stated that Valerie had already turned 18 and requested that the case be dismissed with respect to Valerie. Issue: Who should exercise parental authority over the children?
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Held: Their mother, Helen. She is the natural mother, thus the guardian. Ruling: 1. Article 211 of the Family Code provides that the father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over their common children. Thus being the natural mother of Vincent, Helen has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. 2. Bonifacias claim to be the guardian can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority when in case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent (Article 214 of the Family Code). Helen is very much alive. 3. Bonifacia has also not offered convincing evidence that Helen is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Her argument that Helens live-in partner has raped Valerie several times no longer applies since Valerie is no longer a subject of the proceeding. 4. She also cannot qualify as substitute guardian by virtue of her American citizenship and her current residence. Having been convicted of libel in Cebu, it is doubtful that she will come back to the country just to fulfill the duties of a guardian to Vincent for two years (Vincent is now 16 by the time the Supreme Court resolved the case). Justice Vitug: The childs illegitimacy does not in any way affect the order of priority in the exercise of parental authority . Article 176 of the Family Code states that an illegitimate child shall be under the parental authority of the mother . 439. Medina vs. Makabali () March 28, 1969 JBL Reyes *The doctora is his mammy Facts: 1. Appellant's claim for custody of a minor boy, Joseph Casero, was sought to be enforced by habeas corpus. 2. After hearing, the writ was denied, and the case was appealed directly to this Supreme Court exclusively on points of law. 3. Petitioner Zenaida Medina gave birth to a baby boy named Joseph Casero in the Makabali Clinic in San Fernando, Pampanga, owned and operated by respondent Dra. Venancia Makabali, single, who assisted at the delivery. 4. The boy was Zenaida's third, had with a married man, Feliciano Casero. 5. The mother left the child with Dra. Makabali from his birth. The latter took care and reared Joseph as her own son. 6. From birth until August 1966, the real mother never visited her child, and never paid for his expenses. 7. The trial disclosed that petitioner Zenaida Medina lived with Feliciano Casero with her two other children apparently with the tolerance, if not the acquiescence, of Caseros lawful wife who resides elsewhere. 8. That Casero makes about P400.00 a month as a mechanic, and Zenaida herself earns from 4 to 5 pesos a day. 9. The Court, upon calling Joseph on the witness stand, observed that the boy is fairly intelligent as a witness. He never knew his mother, Zenaida. He was calling the respondent his "Mammy". 10. The Court informed him that his real mother is Zenaida. He was asked with whom to stay with his real mother or the respondent. The boy pointed to the respondent and said "Mammy!" The Court asked him, "Why do you choose to stay with your "Mammy?" He answered, "She is the one rearing me." 11. This confrontation was made in the presence of the two women, Zenaida, the petitioner, and the respondent, Dra. Makabali, in open court. 12. After extracting from Dra. Makabali a promise to allow the minor a free choice with whom to live when he reaches the age of 14, the Court held that it was for the child's best interest to be left with his foster mother and denied the writ prayed for. 13. The real mother appealed, as already stated. Issue: Should Zenaida, being the real mother, have custody of the boy? Held: NO. Ruling: 1. While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that "in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount" (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 363), and that for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered separated from the mother (Do.) 2. As a result, the right of parents to the company and custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of parental duties to provide the children with adequate support, education, moral, intellectual and civic training and development (Civil Code, Art. 356). 3. As remarked by the Court below, petitioner Zenaida Medina proved remiss in these sacred duties; she not only failed to provide the child with love and care but actually deserted him, with not even a visit, in his tenderest years, when he needed his mother the most. 4. It is hinted that respondent's motivation in refusing to surrender the boy is to coerce petitioner to pay for the rearing of the child. This is not acceptable, for Dra. Makabali knew (at least at the trial) that any expectation on her part is illusory, given Zenaida's meager resources, yet expressed willingness to care and educate him.
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440. Luna vs. IAC () May 16, 1951 Padilla *Suicidal kid picks Grandparents over real parents Facts: 1. Respondent Maria Lourdes Santos is an illegitimate child of the petitioner Horacio Luna who is married to his co-petitioner Liberty Hizon-Luna. Maria Lourdes Santos is married to her correspondent Sixto Salumbides, and are the parents of Shirley. 2. Two or four months after the birth of the said Shirley Salumbides on April 7, 1975, her parents gave her to the petitioners , a childless couple with considerable means, who thereafter showered her with love and affection and brought her up as their very own. She was enrolled in Maryknoll. 3. Luna spouses wanted to bring the child to Disney, USA and asked for a written consent for the child's application for a U.S. visa, the respondents refused to give it and Shirley was upset. They had to leave without her and just left instruction for the chauffer to bring her to school. 4. Upon return respondents had transferred Shirley to the St. Scholasticas College. The private respondents also refused to return Shirley to them. 5. The appellate court decided in favor of the respondents, ruling that the wishes and desires of the child is no hindrance to the parents' right to her custody since the right of the parents to the custody of their children paramount. 6. The petitioners opposed this and appealed that the subsequent emotional, psychological, and physiological condition of the child Shirley which make the enforcement of the judgment sought to be executed unduly prejudicial, unjust and unfair, and cause irreparable damage to the welfare and interests of the child. Shirley made manifest during the hearing that she would kill herself or run away from home if she should ever be separated from her Mama and Papa Issues: May the court deprive the parental authority of Shirley from her real parents? Held: Yes. For her best interest and welfare. Ruling: 1. Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latter's welfare is paramount. This means that the best interest of the minor can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of their children. Since, in this case, the very life and existence of the minor is at stake and the child is in an age when she can exercise an intelligent choice. (She was 10yrs old already) 2. Dra. Cynthia Dulay Bruce, a child psychologist, affirmed her findings that: Shirley depicted her biological parents as selfish and cruel and who beat her often; and that they do not love her. And, as pointed out by the child psychologist, Shirley has grown more embitered cautious and dismissing of her biological parents. To return her to the custody of the private respondents to face the same emotional environment which she is now complaining of would be indeed traumatic and cause irreparable damage to the child. The court believes that we should not destroy her future. 441. Cuadra v Monfort () September 30, 1970 Makalintal The tale of the two Maria Teresas Facts: 1. Maria Teresa Cuadra (Maria One) and Maria Teresa Monfort (Maria Two) were weeding the grass in the school premises one day. Sometime in the course of their activity, Maria Two tossed a headband she found in the ground toward Maria One, jokingly saying that she found an earthworm. It hit Maria One in her right eye, causing her to rub at it in pain. One thing led to another and eventually Maria One lost sight of her right eye. 2. The civil case naturally followed, which had Maria Twos dad as the main defendant. The trial court decided the case in Maria Ones favor and ordered Maria Twos dad to indemnify Maria One for medical expenses as well as other fees. Maria Twos parents appealed straight to the Supreme Court after that. Issue: Should Maria Monforts dad be liable for her tort? Held: No. The decision was REVERSED. Ruling: 1. The rationale behind the vicarious (and primary) liability that fathers have with regard to acts committed by their minor children is that the child cannot be expected to have committed the act with willfulness or intent. Someone else would have to take the blame for not exerting enough effort to keep the child well-behaved or in line, and naturally it is the father. 2. However, the degree of diligence contemplated by the law when liability is transferred to parents in cases like these is not a hard and fast rule. The court said that no meticulously calibrated measure is applicable to every case. A consideration of attendant circumstances should be made in every individual case. 3. In this case, the father did what he had to do. He sent his child to school (where she is supposed to be, given her age), and his not being able to personally watch over Maria Two is not proof of negligence on his part because children in school are supposed to be watched over by the teachers (or whoever). There was nothing he could have done about it and he should not be made to pay for the damages. Concept: In the beautifully crafted words of Justice Makalintal, only the moral compulsion of good conscience is enforceable here, and not the power of the courts.
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442. Luz PINEDA, Marilou Montenegro, Virginia Alarcon, Dina Lorena Ayo, Celia Calumbag and Lucia Lontok v. CA and THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY () 1993 Davide, Jr. *parents are legal guardians of properties of minors in a sunken vessel Facts: 1. Prime Marine Services, Inc. (PMSI), a crewing/manning outfit, procured Group PoIicy No. G-004694 from Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. to provide life insurance coverage to its sea-based employees enrolled under the plan. 2. In February 1986, during the effectivity of the policy, 6 covered employees of the PMSI perished at sea when their vessel sunk somewhere 3. They were survived by petitioners here, the beneficiaries under the policy. Following the tragic demise of their loved ones, petitioners (complainants) sought to claim death benefits due them 4. For this purpose, they approached the President and General Manager of PMSI, Capt. Roberto Nuval. The latter evinced willingness to assist petitioners to recover benefits arising from the deaths of their husbands/sons. 5. They were thus made to execute, with the exception of the spouses Alarcon, special powers of attorney authorizing Capt. Nuval to, among others, "follow up, ask, demand, collect and receive" for their benefit indemnities of sums of money due them 6. By virtue of these written powers of attorney, complainants were able to receive their respective death benefits. Unknown to them, however, the PMSI, in its capacity as employer and policyholder of the life insurance of its deceased workers, filed with Insular Life formal claims for and in behalf of the beneficiaries, through its President, Capt. Nuval. 7. Among the documents submitted by the latter for the processing of the claims were five special powers of attorney executed by complainants. On the basis of these and other documents duly submitted, Insular Life released 6 checks, (four for P200,00.00 each, one for P50,000.00 and another for P40,00.00) payable to the order of complainants. These checks were released to the treasurer of PMSI upon instructions of Capt. Nuva l 8. Capt. Nuval, upon receipt of these checks from the treasurer, who happened to be his son-in-law, endorsed and deposited them in his account 9. Then after complainants learned that they were entitled, as beneficiaries, to life insurance benefits under a group policy, they sought to recover these benefits from Insular Life but the latter denied their claim on the ground that the liability to complainants was already extinguished upon delivery to and receipt by PMSI of the six (6) checks issued in their names . 10. CA ruled that the powers of attorney were sufficient to authorize Capt. Nuval to receive the proceeds of the insurance pertaining to the beneficiaries. As for minor children of Dina Ayo and Lucia Lontok, it held that if the shares of the minors in the insurance proceeds are less than P50,000, their mothers could receive such shares without need of either court appointments. Issue: Is CA correct in holding that its only when the amount involved is less than 50k that a parent could receive such amount? Held: No, SC said amount is immaterial, parents ipso jure become legal guardian of the childs property Ruling: I. On Capt Nuvals authority: 1. The special powers of attorney "do not contain in unequivocal and clear terms authority to Capt. Nuval to obtain, receive, receipt from respondent company insurance proceeds arising from the death of the seaman-insured. Insular Life knew that a power of attorney in favor of Capt. Nuval for the collection and receipt of such proceeds was a deviation from its practice with respect to group policies. II. As to the share of the minor children of Dina Ayo and Lucia Lontok: 1. Art 225 of the FC states that that regardless of the value of the unemancipated common child's property , the father and mother ipso jure become the legal guardian of the child's propert y. However, if the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, a bond has to be posted by the parents concerned to guarantee the performance of the obligations of a general guardian. 2. It must, however, be noted that Article 225 speaks of the "market value of the property or the annual income of the child," which means, therefore, the aggregate of the child's property or annual income; if this exceeds P50,000.00, a bond is required. 3. There is no evidence that the share of each of the minors in the proceeds of the group policy in question is the minor's only property. Without such evidence, it would not be safe to conclude that, indeed, that is his only property. 443. Lindain vs. CA () 20 Aug 1992 Grino-Aquino *mother needs court approval to sell minor childrens property Facts: 1. Mother: Dolores Luluquisin (widow) and children: Elena, Oscar, Celia, Teresita, and Virgilio 2. When the children were still minors, they were already the registered owners of a parcel of land. 3. Acting as guardian, their mother Dolores sold the land for 2,000 to spouses Federico Ila and Apolonia Valienta. 4. The spouses were initially apprehensive on purchasing the property but upon advice of their counsel that the property could be sold without the written authority of the court considering its value was less than 2,000, they bought the land.

5.
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The children then filed a complaint for annulment of the sale. They contend that the sale was null and void because it was made without judicial authority or approval. 6. On 25 May 1989, the RTC decided in favor of the children and nullified the sale. 7. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision and upheld the sale. Issue: Is a judicial approval necessary for a mother to sell the property of her minor children? Held: Yes. A parent is only a legal administrator of the minor childrens property. Court approval is required. Ruling: 1. Article 320 of the Civil Code only makes a parent a legal administrator of the property of his/her minor children. This does not give the power to dispose of or alienate the property if the children without judicial approval. 2. The powers and duties of a legal administrator under Rule 84 of the Rules of Court are only powers of possession and management. 3. Under Rule 89, power to sell, mortgage, encumber or dispose of the property of minor children must proceed from the court i.e. requires court authority and approval. 4. The childrens action for reconveyance has not yet prescribed for real actions over immovables prescribe after 30 years (Art. 1141 of the Civil Code). 5. The spouses Ila were not buyers in good faith since they knew from the very beginning that the mother could not validly convey to them the property of her children without court approval. 444. MODESTA BADILLO, appellees, us. CLARITA FERRER, defendant () July 29, 1987. GANCAYCO * Mother sold her share and her childrens share over the estate to 3 rd party , unenforceable Facts: 1. Macario Badillo died intestate on February 4, 1966, survived by his widow, Clarita Ferrer, and five minor children : Alberto 16, Nenita 14, Hilly 12, Cristy 9, and Maria Salome 5. 2. He left a parcel of registered land of 77 square meters in Lumban, Laguna , with a house erected thereon, valued at P7,500.00, (the "PROPERTY", for short). 3. Hence, each of the five minor plaintiffs had inherited a 1/12 share of the P7,500.00, or P625.00 each, which is less than the P2,000.00 mentioned in Article 320 of the Civil Code. 4. On January 18, 1967, the surviving widow, in her own behalf and as natural guardian of the minor plaintiffs, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale of the PROPERTY through which the PROPERTY was sold to spouses Gregorio Soromero and Eleuteria Rana. T 5. On November 11, 1968, Modesta Badillo, a sister of Macario Badilla, was able to obtain guardianship over the persons and properties of the minor plaintiffs, without personal notice to their mother , who was alleged "could not be located inspite of the efforts exerted" 6. On July 23, 1970, their guardian mused the minor plaintiffs to file a complaint in the case below for the annulment of the sale of their participation in the PROPERTY to defendants-appellants and, conceding the validity of the sale of the widow's participation in the PROPERTY, they asked that, as co-owners, they be allowed to exercise the right of legal redemption. Issue: Is the Extrajudicial Partition and Sale of the PROPERTY valid contract? Held: No. It is unenforceable Ruling: CUSTODY OF CHILDS PROPERTY 1. The father, or in his absence the mother, is considered the legal administrator of the property pertaining to his child under parental authority without need of giving a bond in case the amount of his child's property does not exceed Two Thousand Pesos. 2. In the case at bar, the value of the property of each appellee minor does not exceed Two Thousand Pesos. 3. Therefore, after the minors' father died, their mother, Clarita Ferrer Badillo, automatically became their legal guardian , 4. As such, she acquired the plenary powers of a judicial guardian except that power to alienate or encumber her children's property without judicial authorization. PRESCIPTION TO REDEEM THE SHARE OF THEIR MOTHER IN THE PROPERTY SUBJECT OF THEIR CO-OWNERSHIP SOLD BY THE LATTER TO DEFENDANTS 5. When Clarita Ferrer Badillo signed and received on January 18, 1967, her copy of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale, the document evidencing the transfer of the property in question to the appellants, she also in effect received the notice in writing required by Article 1623 in behalf of her children. 6. This manner of receiving a written notice is specifically sanctioned by the case of Conejero, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.9 Thus, in this case, the period of redemption began to toll from the time of that receipt . 7. On the other hand, the judicial guardian of the appellee minors, Modesta Badillo, was only appointed as such on November 11, 1968.

8. 9.
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She thereafter manifested her desire to redeem the property from the appellants, formalizing such intention in the complaint that was finally filed for this case on July 23, 1970. Since the required written notice was served on January 18, 1967 and the offer to redeem was only made after November 11, 1968, the period for legal redemption had already expired and the appellants cannot now be ordered to reconvey to the appellees that portion of the undivided property which originally belonged to Clarita Ferrer Badillo .
NATURE OF THE CONTRACT OF SALE 10. In this case, however, the appellee minors are not even parties to the contract involved. Their names were merely dragged into the contract by their mother who claimed a right to represent them 11. The Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale is an unenforceable or, more specifically, an unauthorized contract under Articles 1403 (1) and 1317 of the New Civil Code. 12. Clearly, Clarita Ferrer Badillo has no authority or has acted beyond her powers in conveying to the appellants that 5/12 undivided share of her minor children in the property involved in this case. 13. The powers given to her by the laws as the natural guardian covers only matters of administration and cannot include the power of disposition. 14. She should have first secured the permission of the court before she alienated that portion of the property in question belonging to her minor children 15. The appellee minors never ratified this Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale. In fact, they questions its validity as to them. 16. Hence, the contract remained unenforceable or unauthorized . No restitution may be ordered from the appellee minors either as to that portion of the purchase price which pertains to their share in the property or at least as to that portion which benefited them because the law does not sanction any. In view of the foregoing, the appellants are hereby ordered to restore to the appellees the full ownership and possession of the latter's 5/12 share in the undivided property by executing the proper deed of reconveyance . The appellants' ownership over the remaining 7/12 share in the undivided property is hereby confirmed. Concept: The authority of the mother over the childs property which is only ADMINISTRATION and NOT DISPOSITION 445. Chua vs. Cabangbang () CastroMarch 28, 1969 *mother wants her kid back for leverage. Facts: 1. The petitioner has lived the life of a nightclub hostess who has slept with many men. 2. She has given birth twice. The first of which she merely gave away to a friend in Cebu. 3. The concern of this case revolves around the 2 nd child. 4. The father of the second child was a person she met at the club, she became his mistress thus resulting in the birth of the child. 5. The father left all of them and the petitioner had no money. 6. The petitioner resorted to giving the child to the respondent couple. (1958) 7. It is important to note that the mother and the father of said child were aware of this. 8. She returns to claim the child after a good number of years have lapsed (1963). 9. Respondents do not want to give the child back. 10. Petitioner argues that (Article 363 Civil Code) she cannot be separated from her child who was less than 7 years old and that she cannot be deprived of parental authority over the child because not one of the grounds for termination, loss, suspension, or deprivation of parental authority are present in the case. (Article 332 Civil Code) 11. Petitioner also argues that Private respondents are not at all related to the child thus they should not be allowed to keep the child. Issue: Should the child go back to petitioner? Held: No Ruling: 1.The court is bound that when a helpless child is at stake it is the duty of courts to respect, enforce, and give meaning and substance to a childs natural and legal right to live and grow in the proper physical, moral and intellectual environment. 2. The absence of any kinship between the child and the respondents alone cannot be a ground to give the child back. 3. It is shown that it is unsure if the father will provide support for the child. 4. The mother has no stable income and that her overt acts in the past resulted in her simply giving away her first child. 5. It is the belief of the court that she needs the child as leverage to obtain concessions financial and otherwise either from the alleged father or the Respondents. 6. She is thus not an appropriate mother. 339. Naldoza v Republic ()
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March 15, 1982 Aquino Dioney, Bombi, magnanakaw ba tatay nyo? Facts: 33. Zosima Naldoza and Dionesio Divinagracia were married on May 30, 1970. They begot two kids named Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto. 34. Dionesio left Zosima and his children after he was confronted by Zosima about his previous marriage with another woman. Before he left he also swindled a total of P60K from a number of individuals. 35. Zosima, aware of the fact that her children are being teased in school for carrying the surname of a swindler, wanted so much to detach her children from their fathers memory that she filed a petition for change of surname for the two kids. She wanted them to use her own surname. 36. The trial court didnt find any merit in her application, claiming that the mere desire of their mother to make the c hange for them so they can avoid being associated with their thieving father is not sufficient. 37. Zosima appealed straight to the Supreme Court after that, using the changes to the Judiciary Act (RA 5440) that allowed her (at the time) to appeal right away to the mighty tribunal of plagiarists (hahaha, peace). Issue: Should the mothers petition to change the surnames of her two children be granted? Held: NO. The decision was AFFIRMED. Ruling: 10. The children, being presumably legitimate (operative word: PRESUMABLY), should ideally use their fathers surname instead of anything else. 11. A change of name is a serious matter which entails many consequences, so the minors themselves and their father should be consulted. Granting it at merely the mothers request is wrong because her desire is not the sole consideration. 12. It can only be allowed when there are proper and reasonable causes. Since the subjects are minors, the courts should then consider if the change will redound to their welfare. 13. It will not redound to their benefit, because changing their surnames while they are still minors might cause some more problems. They might be perceived as illegitimate (which if added to the previous labels of being their swindling fathers sons, will definitely NOT help them get any more respect). 14. The decision also cannot rely on the cases of Oshita and Bartolome because those cases involved petitioners who are of age. Concept: Children should use their fathers surname to avoid confusion as to their filiation. 446. Johnston vs. Republic () April 30, 1963 Labrador *Little miss long name shall use Valdes, not Valdes Johnston Facts: 1. June 24, 1960 Isabel Valdes-Johnston filed a petition for adoption of Ana Isabel Henriette Antonio Concepcion Georgiana (dear, ang haba ng pangalan mo), 2 years and 10 months old, under the custody of the Hospicio de San Jose. 2. Johnston is 48 years old , married to Raymond Arthur Johnston, Filipino, residing at San Lorenzo Drive, Makati (where Assumption is located LOL). 3. They are childless, and they obtained the consent of the orphanages Mother Superior. 4. The court granted such petition, but the surname that she should use is Valdes. 5. Isabel filed a motion praying that instead of Valdes only, be changed into Valdes Johnston. However this was denied. 6. Her arguments: 1) Since she is now using the name of her husband by virtue of Art. 370, par. 1 NCC, 2) Valdes Johnston was the one she used in filing the petition, 3) If the child uses Valdes, it will create an impression that she is her illegimate child NAKAKAHIYA DAW. Issue: Can the girl with the bonggang long name use the surname Valdes Johnston? Held: NO Ruling: 1. Art. 341, par 4 of NCC entitles the adopted minor to the use of the adopters surname, refers to the adopters own surname. 2. Since she was the only one who adopted, it would not be automatic that the husband was part of such proceedings. He gave his consent, yes, but the adoption was not of both of them. 3. Other possible confusing situations may arise in the future, and the court does not want that. 4. When questions of successional rights arise later on, the husbands consent to the adoption might be presented to prove that he had actually joined in the adoption. 447. Ng Yao Sing vs Republic () March 31, 1966 Sanchez *Change of name is not a right. It is a privilege. Facts: 17. Petitioner, a Chinese resident of Dumaguete City, bears a number of names: (1) Jesus Ng, in his birth certificate and certificate of residence, (2) Jesus Uy, Keng Lee, in his school records, (3) Uy Keng Lee Jesus, also in his school records, (4) Keng Lee Uy, to his friends and to the general public, (5) Uy Keng Lee, in his income tax returns, and (6) Jesus Ng Yao Siong, in his alien certificate
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of registration. This according to him has caused so much confusion and unwarranted delay in his transactions. 18. To obviate all these, petitioner would want to be known only by one name Keng Lee Uy 19. The city attorney of Dumaguete opposed the petition, alleged that there is no necessity for the change of name and that petitioner is guilty of a violation of the laws regarding the use of 20. Change of name is a judicial proceeding in rem. Jurisdiction to hear and determine a petition therefor, by law, is acquired after publication of the "order reciting the purpose of the petition" and the "date and place for the hearing thereof" for three (3) successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object "to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established". 21. But, for that publication to be effective, it must give a correct information. To inform, the publication should recite, amongst others, the following facts: (1) the name or names of the applicant, (2) the cause for which the change of name is sought, and (3) the new name asked for. Issues: Could he be granted the change of name? Held: No. There is no proper and reasonable cause. Ruling: 18. Change of name is a matter of public interest. Petitioner might be in the gallery of wanted criminals ; he could be in hiding to avoid service of sentence or compliance with a judgment in a criminal case; he could have escaped a penal institution into which he had been confined. If an alien, he might have given cause for deportation or might be one against whom an order of deportation had actually been issued. And again the new name petitioner desires to adopt may be similar to that of a respectable person. The latter may have evidence that petitioner is with unsavory reputation. Naturally, it is to the interest of the person actually enjoying the good name to protect it against possible mistaken reference to him as the petitioner. 19. The failure in the heading of the application to give the true name sought to be changed is fundamental; such failure is noncompliance with the strict requirements of publication; it is fatal; and the court did not acquire jurisdiction to hear the case. Jesus Ng Yao Siong the name appearing in the petition, the order of publication, and the publication itself, is not the true name of petitioner. As heretofore stated, his name appearing in the civil register is merely "Jesus Ng" without the Yao Siong. The name is to be changed, if any, Jesus Ng not Jesus Ng Yao Siong. 20. The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be "proper and reasonable cause" for which the change is sought. His use of the various names is prohibited by law. Though the court are loathe to attach a felonious label to the use of these different names, we say that such use appears to be a violation of Section 1 of said Commonwealth Act 142, punishable with imprisonment ranging from 1 month to 6 months pursuant to Section 4 of said statute. Neither did he use these other names as "pen names" or "stage names"; and another statute prohibits him from using the same.To grant the petition here is to sanction an unlawful act which might reach the proportions of a crime. Tan vs. Republic, supra , warns that this cannot be done. Concept: In rem (Latin, power about or against "the thing") is a legal term describing the power a court may exercise over property (either real or personal) or a "status" against a person over whom the court does not have "in personam jurisdiction". Jurisdiction in rem assumes the property or status is the primary object of the action, rather than personal liabilities not necessarily associated with the property. (Wikipedia) 448. Llaneta v Agrava () May 15, 1974 Castro Teresita has always been a Ferrer Facts: 1. Atanacia Llaneta was married to Serafin Ferrer and had one child with him named Victoriano. 2. In 1942, Serafin died. Four years later, Atanacia had sexy relations with another man out of which Teresita was born. Shortly after Teresitas birth Atanacia brought her and Victoriano to Manila where they lived with Victoria vda. de Ferrer, Serafins mother. Teresita grew up in the household of the Ferrers and used their surname the whole time. 3. When she was about twenty years old, she applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Irosin, Sorsogon, and it was there where she found out that her real surname was actually Llaneta. Realizing that the sudden change in surname would cause untold difficulties and confusion, she then filed a petition to change her name . 4. The trial court denied the petition, and she appealed straight to the Supreme Court. Issue: Should Teresita be allowed to use the surname Ferrer despite the fact that she is an illegitimate child? Held: YES. The decision was REVERSED. Ruling: 1. Teresita was able to establish quite convincingly that the surname she has used all her life is that of Ferrer. All her records, all her associates, and all her friends have always known her to be Teresita Ferrer. Allowing such an abrupt change of name would definitely cause some serious difficulties and fill her life (quite unnecessarily) with endless affidavits and forms for her to

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fill out and submit. The respondent court relied on the doctrine that said a name change would give a false impression of family relationship. However, it is not a hard and fast rule, because it only applies when the change would, in all likelihood, cause prejudice or future mischief to the family concerned. That is not the case here. 3. Teresita has always been known as a Ferrer. The state agrees, along with its bureaucratic offices and agencies, that Teresita has carried her name well. More importantly, the Ferrer family itself has supported her petition, without any signs of objection from anyone anywhere. 4. And although there is a possibility that Serafin might disagree, hes dead, and thats that. Concept: The interests of the child are ALWAYS paramount. 449. Milagros Llerena TELMO v. Republic () 1976 Aquino *change of surname from Telmo to THelmo not allowed Facts: 1. Mrs. Milagros Telmo was a lawyer. In her attys oath, she used Telmo. Her husband was Pedro Telmo. They begot 4 kids who were baptized Telmo, but had been using Thelmo since kindergarten days. 2. When the Telmo spouses sojourned in the US, Pedro Telmo, following the American style, changed the spelling of his name to "Thelmo". 3. Mrs. Telmo was appointed justice in Zamboanga. There were administrative cases filed against her and she said that some complainants used the name "Telmo" and others used "Thelmo ". She declared that in the administrative case which resulted in the termination of her tenure as justice of the peace, she used the name "Thelmo" 4. So she filed a petition praying that her husband's surname "Telmo" be changed to "Thelmo." Her husband did not join her as a co- petitioner. But he executed an affidavit where he manifested that he interposed no objection to his wife's petition. She said that she wanted to legalize her use of the surname "Thelmo". 5. In her petition she alleged that she initiated the addition of the letter "h" to her husband's surname "Telmo" in order "to distinguish her sons from other Telmos who are the illegitimate children of the relatives of her husband" . 6. Of course SolGen opposed. He contended: 1) to allow her to change her husband's surname without granting a similar judicial authorization to her husband and sons would generate confusion since the latter "may still legally use the family name Telmo; Issue: May Milagros surname be changed from Telmo to Thelmo, i.e., is there sufficient justification to grant her petition? Held: No, husband, and not Milagros, shouldve initiated the proceedings Ruling: 1. A married woman, who uses her husband's surname and desires judicial authorization to change the spelling of his surname, her husband should initiate the proceeding. 2. In the instant case, the anomaly is that the husband did not ask for judicial authority to change the spelling of his surname . It was his wife who filed the petition. The irregularity in the petition is obvious. The lower Court sanctioned the wifes change of the spelling of her husband's surname but no similar authority was granted to the husband because he did not file a petition for that purpose. 3. It is true that the wife submitted to the court her husband's affidavit of conformity to the change in the spelling of his surname But that would not prevent him and their children from using the old spell ing. And in that event, confusion and error might arise. 4. Moreover, Milagros reasons are not substantial and cogent enough to sustain her petition. 450. Tolentino vs. CA () 10 Jun 1988 Gutierrez Jr. *divorced woman may still use her ex-husbands surname Facts: 1. Husband: Arturo Tolentino and 1st wife: Consuelo David-Tolentino (divorced on 15 Sep 1943) 2nd wife: Pilar Adorable (deceased) 3rd wife: Constancia Tolentino (married on 21 Apr 1945) 2. Constancia filed a suit against Consuelo to stop her from using the surname Tolentino. 3. On 13 Jan 1972, Consuelo filed her answer admitting she has been using and continues to use the surname Tolentino . 4. On 18 Jan 1972, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction against Consuelo from using the surname Tolentino. 5. Consuelo then filed a motion for leave to file a third party complaint against Arturo Tolentino. Court granted. 6. On 19 Apr 1972, Arturo Tolentino filed his answer and admitted that Consuelos use of the su rname was with his and his familys consent. 7. After the hearings, the trial court decided in favor of Constancia and made the injunction permanent. 8. Upon appeal, Court of Appeals reversed. Issue: Can Constancia restrain Consuelo from using the surname Tolentino? Held: No. The use of the surname Tolentino does not impinge on Constancias rights.
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Ruling: 1. Since we do not have divorce in our laws, the use of surname of a divorced wife is not provided for . The effect of a divorce is akin to the death of the spouse where the widow can continue using her deceased husbands surname . 2. Article 370 of the Civil Code states that the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husbands surname . She cannot be prevented from using it neither can she restrain others from using it. 3. Constancia failed to show that she would suffer any legal injury or deprivation of legal rights when Consuelo is allowed to continue using Tolentino. It is public knowledge that Constancia is the legal wife. 4. There is no usurpation of Constancias name since Consuelo never represented herself after the divorce as Mrs. Arturo Tolentino but simply as Mrs. Consuelo David-Tolentino. Elements of usurpation of a name include: (a) there is an actual use of anothers name by the defendant; (b) the use is unauthorized; and (c) the use of anothers name is to designate personality or identify a person. None of the elements exists in this case. 5. Constancias action has already prescribed. Under Article 1149 of the Civil Code, the period of prescription is five years from the time the right of action accrues. She should have filed it when she came to know that Consuelo was still using the surname Tolentino and not wait for 20 years. 451. CORAZON LEGAMIA y RIVERA, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT () August 28, 1984 Abad Santos *Live-in partner used husbands surname Facts: 1. Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for 19 years from November 8, 1955 to September 26, 1974, when Emilio died. During their live-in arrangement they produced a boy who was named Michael Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes. 2. From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together until the latter's death, Corazon was known as Corazon L. Reyes; she styled herself as Mrs. Reyes; and Emilio introduced her to friends as Mrs. Reyes. 3. Corazon filed a letter in behalf of Michael with the Agricultural Credit Administration for death benefits . 4. The letter was signed "Corazon L. Reyes." The voucher evidencing payment of Michael's claim in the amount of P2,648.76 was also signed "Corazon L. Reyes." 5. Felicisima Reyes who was married to Emilio filed a complaint which led to Corazon's prosecution . Issue: Whether or not Corazon is guilty of the crime under Anti-Alias Law Commonwealth Act No. 142 Held: No. Ruling: 1. It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as the wife and use the name of the man she is living with despite the fact that the man is married to another woman.. 2. In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20 years . 3. He introduced her to the public as his wife and she assumed that role and his name without any sinister purpose or personal material gain in mind. 4. She applied for benefits upon his death not for herself but for Michael who as a boy of tender years was under her guardianship. 5. Surely, the lawmakers could not have meant to criminalize what Corazon had done especially because some of them probably had their own Corazons. 165. Yasin v. The Honorable Judge Shari'a District Court 1995 Bidin, J.: *Muslim divorcee allowed to resume the use of her maiden name Facts: 4. Yasin alleged that shes a divorcee. They were granted a divorce decree March 1984. 5. She claims that the petition she filed (use of maiden name) is (not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but ) merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolutionof her marriageby divorce under the Code of Muslim Issue: May Yasin be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name? Held: Yes, its allowed under NCC Ruling: 8. Yasin does not seek to change her registered maiden name but, instead, prays that she be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name in view of the dissolution of her marriage 9. When she married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status. 10. The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil register 11. Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husband's surname during the marriage (Art. 370, Civil Code), after annulment of the marriage (Art. 371, Civil Code) and after the death of the husband (Art. 373, Civil Code) is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation (Art. 372, Civil Code). 12. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband's name by prefixing the
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word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). 13. Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory 14. Shes not even required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage as no law requires it. 15. Onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced woman to resume her maiden name and surname. Concept: Articles 370 and 371 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 370. A married woman may use: (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or (2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or (3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs." Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless: (1) The court decrees otherwise, or (2) She or the former husband is married again to another person. 417. In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Garcia () 31 Mar 2005 Sandoval-Gutierrez *adopted daughter allowed to use her mothers surname as middle name Facts: 8. Father: Honorato Catindig and Mother: Gemma Garcia had Illegitimate daughter: Stephanie Garcia 9. Honorato Catindig, petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. 10. He stated that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent and prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname. 11. The trial court granted the adoption. It freed Stephanie from all obligations to her mother and ordered that she be now known as Stephanie Catindig. 12. Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name. 13. The trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name . 14. OSG agrees that Stephanie should be permitted to use Garcia as her middle name for the following reasons: a. It is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her natural mother . b. There is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. c. It is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. Issue: Can Stephanie use Garcia, her natural mothers surname, as her middle name after the adoption? Held: Yes. There is no law which prohibits an adopted child to use his/her natura l mothers surname as middle name. Ruling: 8. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption , it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother . 9. The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status. 10. Stephanies continued use of her mothers surname as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. 11. To allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship wit h her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy. 12. The law should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration. 13. There is no law regulating the use of a middle name. The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mothers surname shall be added (Article 375(1) of the Civil Code). 14. The members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the childs mother as his middle name and approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father. Concept: Name - the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.
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Two parts: (1) the given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals; and (2) The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. 452. In Re: Petition for Change of name Julian Jin Wang () TingaMarch 30, 2005 *middle names are odd in Singapore Facts: 1. Petitioner is a minor who is being represented by his mother for the change of his name. 2. His mother wants to drop his middle name because in Singapore, middle names are not used and thus might be discriminated against while in school. 3. His mother argued that in times of globalization; it would be for the best interest of the child in order to fully adapt to a new environment. 4. She argues that convenience and to keep him from undue embarrassment is a valid reason. 5. RTC and SOLGEN denied it. Issue: Should the kid be allowed to drop his middle name? Held: No Ruling: 1. Middle names have practical and legal significance. They serve as to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he is. 2. The cases cited by the mother are not applicable because they were either when the petitioners were of age (when they are considered to be able to exercise their discretion and judgment, fully knowing the effects of their decision to change their surnames) 3. It is best that the matter of changing ones name be left to the judgment of the kid when he reaches the age of majority. 4. It was not clearly established how the dropping of the middle name would make the childs life more co nvenient in Singaporean society. 5. The continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty is not a reasonable ground to drop it from the registered complete name. Concept: Grounds for change of name 1.When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce. 2. when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation. 3. when the change will avoid confusion 4. when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage. 5. A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anyone. 6. When surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. 453. Gonzaludo vs. People () February 6, 2006 Garcia Facts: 1. Ulysses Villaflor was a member of the Bacolod City Police. 2. He married Anita Manlangit, and they stayed with Ulyssess mother. 3. He was assigned to Pagadian City; however, he would go home to Bacolod to supervise his business. 4. Anita secured a teaching job in Samar, and so she had to live in Samar. 5. He was reassigned in Bacolod and bought a small house. 6. He brought Rosemarie Gelogo as his mistress into the house. 7. Improvements were made in the house. The small house was transformed into a 2-storey structure. 8. After his death, Rosemarie offered to sell the house to Bienvenido Gonzaludo who lives just nearby. 9. Initially, Bienvenido was not interested to buy because he already had one and he did not have money. 10. However, since it was sold at a cheap price, he convinced Gregg and Melba Canlas, to whom he is related by affinity, to buy the same. 11. Rosemarie and Gregg executed a Deed of Sale. She signed as Rosemarie Villaflor, the lawful owner of the 2-storey house. 12. Anita filed a complaint charging Rosemarie, the spouses and Bienvenido with Estafa thru falsification of Public Document. 13. Rosemarie remained at large, only the spouses and Bienvenido were arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty. 14. The Canlases were acquitted, but Bienvenido was convicted. Issue: Should Bienvenido be acquitted? Held: YES
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Ruling: 1. If Rosemarie cannot be held liable for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document, with all the more reason should Bienvenido be as alleged co-conspirator. 2. There is no question that the first (made false pretenses), second (such pretenses were made prior/simultaneous with fraud) and fourth (offended party suffered damage). There was fraudulent misrepresentation when she used Villaflor as her surname, it was made prior/simultaneous with fraud, and Anitas right on the house was lost. 3. However, Rosemarie cannot he held liable for estafa. While she used the surname Villaflor, such fraud was employed upon the Canlases who were the ones who parted with their money when they bought the house. The fraud was not the efficient cause and did not induce Anita to part with her property. 167. Remo vs. DFA () March 2010 Facts: 1. Petitioner wishes to renew her passport but change her name on it from her married name to her former name (or maiden name). 2. The Sec. Foreign Affairs denied the change of name because of RA 8239, which sets clear standards as to when one is allowed to change his or her name in a passport. 3. Petitioner on the other hand cites the Civil Code provision of Article 370 and the case of Yasin vs. Honorable judge Sahri' a District Court. Issue: Should petitioner have the right to change her name for a RENEWAL of passport? Held: No Ruling: 1. RA 8239 is controlling in this area because it is acts as a special law, while the civil code is general. 2. The two laws are not in conflict however because petitioner is not compelled to utilize her married name (as stated in the civil code) when she first applies for a passport. She could have used her maiden name when she FIRST applied. 3. Once she acquires a passport however, she can no longer change the name UNLESS the ff exist: a. death of husband b. divorce c. annulment d. nullity of marriage Or simply when her marriage no longer exists. As her marriage was subsisting at the time of the petition , she does not meet any of the requirements stated under RA 8239. Yasin case is different because it involves the resumption of a maiden name in the view of a marriage that was already dissolved.
4. 5.
454. Reyes vs Alejandro () January 16, 1986 Patajo *Absentee husband with no property Facts: 6. Erlinda Reynoso the petitioner and Roberto L. Reyes were married on March 20, 1960; that sometime in April 1962 her husband left the conjugal home due to some misunderstanding over personal matters. 7. Since then petitioner has not received any news about the whereabouts of her husband; that they have not acquired any properties during their marriage and that they have no outstanding obligation in favor of anyone; that her only purpose in filing the petition is to establish the absence of her husband, invoking the provisions of Rule 107 of the New Rules of Court and Article 384 of the Civil Code. 8. On October 25, 1969 Erlinda prayed for the declaration of the absence of her husband Roberto L. Reyes alleging that her husband had been absent from their conjugal dwelling since April 1962. Issues: Is the declaration of absence of his husband necessary? Held: No. Husband has no rights, property or interest. Ruling: 5. Considering that neither the petition alleges, nor the evidence shows, that Roberto L. Reyes has any rights, interest or property in the Philippines, there is no point in judicially declaring him an absentee. The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is when he has properties which have to be taken cared of or administered by a representative appointed by the Court (Article 384, Civil Code); the spouse of the absentee is asking for separation of property (Article 191, Civil Code) or his wife is asking the Court that the administration of an classes of property in the marriage be transferred to her (Article 196, Civil Code) 6. In Jones vs Hortiguela: For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole
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purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. Concept: The reason and purpose of the provisions of the New Civil Code on absence (Arts. 381 to 396) are: (1) The interest of the person himself who has disappeared; (2) The rights of third parties against the absentee, especially those who have rights which would depend upon the death of the absentee; and (3) The general interest of society which may require that property does not remain abandoned without someone representing it and without an owner (Civil Code by Francisco, Vol. 2, pp. 930- 931, 1953 Ed.) 455. Eastern Shipping v Lucero () August 31, 1983 Escolin Josephine refuses to believe that her hubby is dead Facts: 1. Julio Lucero, Josephines husband, was Captain of M/V Eastern Minicon and was employed by its mother company Eastern Shipping Lines on a contractual basis (per trip). 2. On February 16, 1980, while it was en route to Manila, the ship sent three messages to the petitioner companys Manila office. The messages were meant to tell the company that the ship was in dire straits as it had encountered boisterous weather. The last few parts of the messages eventually called on the company for help, but it was too late as the ship was lost at sea, never to be found again. 3. The company took the necessary steps and mobilized its insurer, Lloyds of London, to confirm the ships loss. The insurance company gave its report that the ship was confirmed to be lost and the company proceeded to provide death benefits to the families left behind by the ship members. 4. Josephine didnt want to accept the death benefits (perhaps because she was hoping that the ship would stil l be found). She then filed a complaint with the National Seamen Board to claim the monthly allotment she thought she supposed to get. The company countered by saying that she is not entitled to anything anymore because she declined to accept the death benefits. 5. The Board ruled in favor of Josephine. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Boards decision, saying that the presumption applies here and that since the four year period has not yet expired, Josephine is still entitled to the monthly allotment from her husbands salary. Eastern Shipping then appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: Should the presumption apply or is the ship deemed lost (forever) at sea? Held: YES. The decision was REVERSED. Ruling: 1. The company cannot deny (as it was also shown by the facts on record) that the ship sent three distress messages to its Manila office, clearly indicating that it was in danger of being sunk by the stormy weather. The strength of the evidence shows that the ship eventually did sink and that all the crew members perished with it. 2. The presumption of death, therefore, should yield to the preponderance of evidence showing that the moment of death was clearly established. The ruling on Joaquin v Navarro is applicable here: where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule on preponderance of evidence controls. 3. Article 391 cannot be permitted to override the facts established in this case and Josephine must accept the fact that her husband really IS dead. 4. However, the court did find that Josephine is still entitled to death benefits. Concept: In cases of absence, the presumption is not the ONLY rule to follow. Its a base -to-base casis, hehehe. 456. Eduardo OLAGUER v. Emilio PURUGGANAN, Jr. and Raul LOCSIN, () 2007 Chico-Nazario *exec VP arrested during Marcos admin; his stocks transferred to another while being detained Facts: OLAGUERs version: 1. he was the owner of 60,000 shares of stock of Businessday Corporation (Businessday) with a total par value of P600,000 2. At the time he was employed with the corporation as Executive Vice-President of Businessday (and President of Businessday Information Systems and Services and of Businessday Marketing Corporation) 3. He, together with respondent Raul Locsin (Locsin) and Enrique Joaquin (Joaquin), was active in the political opposition against the Marcos dictatorship. 4. Anticipating the possibility that Olaguer would be arrested and detained by the Marcos military, Locsin, Joaquin, and Hector Holifea had an unwritten agreement that, in the event that Olaguer was arrested, they would support the his family by the continued payment of his salary.

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Olaguer also executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), appointing as his attorneys-in-fact Locsin, Joaquin and Hofilea for the purpose of selling or transferring Olaguers shares of stock with Businessday. 6. During the trial, Olaguer testified that he agreed to execute the SPA in order to cancel his shares of stock, even before they are sold, for the purpose of concealing that he was a stockholder of Businessday , in the event of a military crackdown against the opposition 7. The parties acknowledged the SPA before respondent Emilio Purugganan, Jr., who was then the Corporate Secretary of Businessday, and at the same time, a notary public 8. As expected, Olaguer was arrested (1979) by the Marcos military and detained for allegedly committing arson. During his detention, respondent Locsin ordered fellow respondent Purugganan to cancel the Olaguers shares in the books of the corporation and to transfer them to respondent Locsins name . 9. In 1986, Olaguer was finally released from detention. He then discovered that he was no longer registered as stockholder of Businessday 10. He also learned that Purugganan had already recorded the transfer of shares in favor of respondent Locsin , while petitioner was detained. When he demanded that respondents restore to him full ownership of his shares of stock, they refused to do so. 1. 2. 3. LOCSINs version: Olaguer approached him and requested him to sell, and, if necessary, buy Olaguers shares of stock in Businessday, to assure support for Olaguers family in the event that something should happen to him He denied that he made any arrangements to continue paying Olaguers salary in the event of the latters imprisonment. When Olaguer was detained, respondent Locsin tried to sell Olaguers shares, but nobody wanted to buy them . Olaguers reputation as an oppositionist resulted in the poor financial condition of Businessday and discouraged any buyers for the shares of stock. In view of Olaguers previous instructions, respondent Locsin decided to buy the shares himself. However, he had to borrow from Businessday the funds he used in purchasing the shares from Olaguer
4.
Now: Olaguer insists that there was no valid sale since respondent Locsin exceeded his authority under the SPA issued in his, Joaquin and Holifenas favor. He alleged that the authority of the afore-named agents to sell the shares of stock was limited to the following conditions: (1) in the event of the Olaguers ABSENCE and incapacity; and (2) for the limited purpose of applying the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of Olaguers subsisting obligations In other words, Olaguer seeks to impose a strict construction of the SPA by limiting the definition of the word absence to a condition wherein a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, without leaving an agent to administer his property, citing Article 381 of the Civil Code (see concept) Olaguer also puts forward that the word incapacity would be limited to mean minority, insanity, imbecility, the state of being deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction. He cites Article 38 of the Civil Code (see concept) THUS, he claims that his arrest and subsequent detention are not among the instances covered by the terms absence or incapacity, Issue: Was the sale of stocks valid despite Olaguers contentions regarding the ABSENCE and INCAPACITY conditions on the SPA? Held: Yes, its valid, they were all done with Olaguers consent Ruling: 1. Limiting the definitions of absence to that provided under Article 381 of the Civil Code and of incapacity under Article 38 of the same Code negates the effect of the power of attorney by creating absurd, if not impossible, legal situations. 2. Article 381 provides the necessarily stringent standards that would justify the appointment of a representative by a judge. Here, Olaguer himself had already authorized agents to do specific acts of administration and thus, no longer necessitated the appointment of one by the court. 3. On the other hand, defining the terms absence and incapacity by their everyday usage makes for a reasonable construction, that is, the state of not being present and the inability to act, given the context that the SPA authorizes the agents to attend stockholders meetings and vote in behalf of Olaguer, to sell the shares of stock, and other related acts . This construction covers the situation wherein Olaguer was arrested and detained. This much is admitted by Olaguer in his testimony. 4. Also, Olaguers contention that the shares may only be sold for the sole purpose of applying the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of Olaguers subsisting obligations to the company is far-fetched. > Petitioner had not submitted evidence that he was in debt with Businessday at the time he had executed the SPA. The language of the SPA clearly enumerates, as among those acts that the agents were authorized to do, the act of applying the proceeds of the sale of the shares to any obligations Olaguer might have against the Businessday group of companies. 5. So ultimately: although the sale of stocks was irregular, its nonetheless valid. Neither does this irregularity prove that the transfer was fraudulent. In his testimony, Olaguer admitted that they had intended to conceal his being a stockholder of
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Businessday. The cancellation of his name from the stock and transfer book, even before the shares were actually sold , had been done with his consent. Even the subsequent sale of the shares in favor of Locsin had been done with his consent. Concept: Art 381: When a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an agent to administer his property, the judge, at the instance of an interested party, a relative, or a friend, may appoint a person to represent him in all that may be necessary. This same rule shall be observed when under similar circumstances the power conferred by the absentee has expired. Art 38: Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person, from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements. 457. Eugenio vs Velez () 17 May 1990 J. Padilla *corpse should be in custody of family members Facts: 1. Vitaliana Vargas died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in the residence of Tomas Eugenio on 28 Aug 1988. 2. Unaware of her death, her brothers and sisters filed on 27 Sep 1988 a petition for habeas corpus. 3. The court granted petition on 28 Sep 1988 but was returned unsatisfied by Eugenios refusal to surrender the body arguing that a corpse cannot be a subject of habeas corpus proceedings. As common law husband, Eugenio claimed legal custody of her body. 4. Court issued two orders dated 29 and 30 Sep 1988 directing the delivery of the body to a funeral parlor and its autopsy. 5. Eugenio filed motion to dismiss due to lack of jurisdiction but was denied. Before resolving the motion, the court allowed the Vargases to amend their petition claiming legal custody of the body instead. 6. The siblings invoke Articles 305 and 308 of the Civil Code that as next of kin, they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister. 7. On 17 Jan 1989, the court rendered a decision that the Vargases had the rightful custody over the dead body over Eugenio who was merely a common law spouse and being legally married to another woman. 8. Eugenio filed a new petition for review with the SC on 23 Jan 1989. It was consolidated with his earlier petition. Issue: Who has custody over the corpse of Vitaliana? Held: The Vargases (siblings of the deceased). Ruling: 1. Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters under Sec. 1103 of the RAC. 2. The writ of habeas corpus as a remedy became moot and academic due to the death of the subject allegedly restrained of liberty, but the issue of custody remained. After the fact of Vitalianas death was made known to the petitioners on the habeas corpus proceedings, amendment of the petition for habeas corpus was proper to avoid multiplicity of suits. 3. Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. Tomas Eugenio has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even marrying Vitaliana. The provisions of the Civil Code, when referring to a spouse, contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. He was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime. Concept: Revised Administrative Code. Sec 1103: Persons charged with duty of burial. The immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified: (b). If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, it they be adults and within the Philippines and in possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses. 458. EMPERATRIZ LABAYO-ROWE,vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, () December 8, 1988 - GANCAYCO, J. *Mother wanted to change married to single coz no marriage happened Facts: 1. Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe, filed for the correction of entries in the civil registry 2. She asked the court to order the Local Civil Registrar of San Fernando, Pampanga to correct the entries in the birth certificates of her children Vicente L. Miclat, Jr. and Victoria Miclat especially with regard to petitioner's name which appears in both certificates as "Beatriz Labayo-Labayu and as regards her civil status and date of marriage which appears in the birth certificate of Victoria Miclat as "married" with the year appearing "1953 Bulan." 3. At the hearing, petitioner testified that her nickname is Beatriz and Emperatriz J. Labayo is her real name ; 4. that the entry in Victoria Miclat's birth certificate stating her civil status as "married" is not correct because she was never married to Vicente Miclat, the father of her child; that the date and place of marriage appearing in the said birth certificate as 1953-Bulan is not true as they were never married; that the questioned entries were reported by Vicente Miclat; and that she is

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at present married to an American by the name of William Rowe. The court also directed the civil registrar to correct the name of the mother appearing as Beatriz V. Labayu/Beatriz to Emperatriz Labayo, her civil status from "married" to "single" and the date and place of marriage from "1953-Bulan" to "No marriage." Issue: Is the lower court's order correct in allowing the changes in the civil status and the date and place of marriage of the petitioner as appearing in the birth certificate of Victoria Miclat Held: No. Ruling: CLERICAL ERRORS AND NON-CLERICAL ERRORS 1. If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of the mistake. 2. However, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved 3. the correction of petitioner Labayo's name and surname registered as "Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayo in the birth certificates of her children. The petition also seeks the change of her status from "married" to "not married" at the time of her daughter's birth, thereby changing the status of her child Victoria Miclat from "legitimate" to "illegitimate ." 4. The change of petitioner's name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo is a mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding is appropriate. 5. the change of the petitioner's status from "married" to "not married" and Victoria Miclat's filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." NOT ALLOWED WHO SHOULD BE INFORMED 6. In the case before Us, since only the Office of the Solicitor General was notified through the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, representing the Republic of the Philippines as the only respondent, the proceedings taken, which is summary in nature, is short of what is required in cases where substantial alterations are sought. 7. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been made respondents . They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as well , together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or represented. EFFECTS 8. The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired 9. Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and embarassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter 10. The fact that the notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. 40. Sermonia v. CA () June 14, 1994 Justice Bellosillo Facts: 1. Jose Sermonia was married to Virginia Nievera. 2. While this marriage was valid and subsisting, he married Ma. Lourdes Unson. This 2 nd marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar. 3. Jose was charged with bigamy before the RTC. He moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal liability for bigamy was extinguished by prescription. This was, however, denied, as well as his motion for reconsideration. 4. He challenged the orders before the CA, but his petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Issue: 1. Is the rule on constructive notice applicable in bigamy cases? Held: No 2. Did Jose conceal his bigamous marriage? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. No. This should not be applied because a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by the offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previous subsisting marriage. It is also entered into a place where the offender is not known to be still a married person. *This is not contrary to the policy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the prescriptive period from registration would amount to almost absolving the offenders for liability.

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Yes. His marriage may have been recorded in the Civil Registry, but he indicated that he was single. He could have told his first wife about the subsequent marriage so that everything would be out in the open. Obviously, he knew no priest would knowingly perform/authorize a bigamous marriage as this would subject him to punishment under the Marriage Law. Concept: The stability of marriage should be regarded as an inviolable social institution. Prescriptive Period for the crime of bigamy This should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party because its discovery is quite difficult and would take time. 459. Zapanta vs. Local Civil Registrar of Davao () VitugSeptember 26, 1994 *Wife wants to correct the name of her dead husband. Facts: 1. Petitioner (Gliceria S. Zapanta) is the widow of the late Florencio B. Zapanta. 2. After the deceased had been entombed, the petitioner looked at the certified true copy of the death cert of her late husband and discovered that the name indicated was Flaviano Castro Zapanta 3. She is now before the court seeking to correct the clerical error. 4. The fiscal dismissed the petition because it is not a MERE clerical error but a SUBSTANTIAL one. Issue: Can substantial errors and not only clerical errors be allowed to be changed? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. The court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. 2. Appropriate adversary proceeding One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application ,one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. 3. No doubt, petitions filed by petitioner in the lower court by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register could be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action (Republic vs. Valencia) 4. The court deems that the petition before it is an adversary proceeding and to allow petitioner and interested parties to have their day in court. 460. Leonor vs. CA () April 2, 1996 Panganiban *Rule 108 is for typo errors only!!! Facts: 1. Virginia A. Leonor was married to Mauricio D. Leonor, Jr. Out of the union, three children. 2. While Mauricio resided in Switzerland studying and working, Virginia stayed in the Philippines working as a nurse in Laguna. 3. Mauricio became unfaithful and lived with a certain Lynda Pond. 4. This induced Virginia to institute a civil action in Geneva, Switzerland for separation and alimony. He counter-sued for divorce. 5. The Swiss Court pronounced the divorce of the spouses but reserved the liquidation of the matrimonial partnership. It also denied alimony to petitioner. 6. In a letter to the Swiss Court, Mauricio, for the first time, raised the issue of the alleged non-existence of the marriage between him and Virginia. 7. Meanwhile, Virginia learned that the solemnizing officer in the Philippines, Justice of the Peace Mabini Katalbas, failed to send a copy of their marriage contract to the Civil Registrar of San Carlos City for registration. 8. Hence, Virginia applied for the late registration of her marriage. 9. The Civil Registrar, finding said application in order, granted the same. 10. On appeal, Mauricio asked for the cancellation of his marriage in the Philippines. Such Court granted him alimony, prompting Mauricio to elevate the matter on appeal to the Federal Court of Switzerlandaffirmed. 11. Mauricio, represented by his brother, filed a petition for the cancellation of the late registration of marriage. Given as grounds were the tardiness of the registration and the nullity of his marriage with Virginia due to the non-observance of the legal requirements for a valid marriage. Mauricios petition was filed pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 12. The trial court declared said marriage null and void for being sham and fictitious. Issue: In disposing of a special proceeding under Rule 108, did the trial court have jurisdiction to declare the marriage null and void and to order the cancellation of its entry in the local civil registry? Held: NO Ruling: 1. On its face, the Rule would appear to authorize the cancellation of any entry regarding marriages in the civil registry for any
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3.
reason by the mere filing of a verified petition for the purpose. However, it is not as simple as it looks. Doctrinally, the only errors that can be cancelled or corrected under this Rule are typographical or clerical errors, not material or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage. The summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under Art. 412 of the Civil Code, cannot be used by Mauricio to change his and Virginias civil status from married to single and of their three children from legitimate to illegitimate. Ne ither does the trial court, under said Rule, have any jurisdiction to declare their marriage null and void and as a result thereof, to order the local civil registrar to cancel the marriage entry in the civil registry. Further, the respondent trial judge gravely and seriously abused his discretion in unceremoniously expanding his very limited jurisdiction under such rule to hear evidence on such a controversial matter as nullity of a marriage under the Civil Code and/or Family Code, a process that is proper only in ordinary adversarial proceedings under the Rules.
461. Lee et al vs. CA () October 11, 2001 De Leon *Crafty father tried to make legitimate his 8 children from maid-mistress Facts: 1. This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same man but begotten of two (2) different mothers. One set, the private respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng. The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan. 2. Lee Tek Sheng, facilitated the arrival in the Philippines from China of a young girl named Tiu Chuan. She was introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to his family as their new housemaid but far from becoming their housemaid, Tiu Chuan immediately became Lee Tek Sheng's mistress. 3. Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each ( eight of them) of the petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioners by making it appear that petitioners' mother was Keh Shiok Cheng. 4. Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who gave maternal care and guidance to the petitioners. They all lived in the same compound Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents were residing in. All was well, therefore, before private respondents' discovery of the dishonesty and fraud perpetrated by their father, Lee Tek Sheng. 5. When Keh Shiok Cheng's died, Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names of all his children, including those of petitioners', be included in the obituary notice of Keh Shiok Cheng's death that was to be published in the newspapers. Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation into the matter. After investigation and verification of all pertinent records, the NBI prepared a report that pointed out, among others, the false entries in the records of birth of petitioners 6. The petitions sought is to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name of "Keh Shiok Cheng" as their mother, and by substituting the same with the name "Tiu Chuan", who is allegedly the petitioners' true birth mother. Issues: Is Rule 108 improper for impugning the legitimacy of the (Tiu Chan) children? Held: No. It may be used as long as all procedural requirement are complied with. Ruling: 3. In Republic vs. Valencia the Court affirmed the CFI of Cebu City ordering the correction in the nationality and civil status of petitioner's minor children as stated in their records of birth from "Chinese" to "Filipino", and "legitimate" to "illegitimate", respectively. Although recognizing that the changes or corrections sought to be effected are not mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, this Court, sitting en banc, held therein that even substantial errors in a civil register may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. In the said case, we also laid down the rule that a proceeding for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the civil register under Rule 108 ceases to be summary in nature and takes on the characteristics of an appropriate adversary proceeding when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are complied with. 4. The Court held that the petitions filed by the private respondents in the courts below by way of a special proceeding cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil registers with the requisite parties, notices and publications could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action . 5. It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy granted upon mere application or motion. But this is not always the case, as when the statute expressly provides. Hence, a special proceeding is not always summary. One only has to take a look at the procedure outlined in Rule 108 to see that what is contemplated therein is not a summary proceeding per se. Rule 108 requires publication of the petition three (3) times, i.e., once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec.4). The Rule also requires inclusion as parties of all persons who claim any interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction (Sec. 3). The civil registrar and any person in interest are also required to file their opposition, if any, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice (Sec. 5). Last, but not the least, although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same (Sec. 7).

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7.
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The flaw in Ty Kong Tin (the basis for basing that extending Rule 108 to substantial changes is unconstitutional ) lies in its theory that Article 412 contemplates a summary procedure, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows: "No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order." It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by the preceding provisions include not only status but also nationality. Therefore, the Ty Kong Tin pronouncement that Article 412 does not contemplate matters that may affect civil status, nationality or citizenship is erroneous. This interpretation has the effect of isolating Article 412 from the rest of the articles in Title XVI, Book I of the New Civil Code, in clear contravention of the rule of statutory construction that a statute must always be construed as a whole such that the particular meaning to be attached to any word or phrase is ascertained from the context and the nature of the subject treated. RA 9048 speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be corrected and changed without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general . The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register. This is precisely the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and other cases of its genre had said, perhaps another indication that it was not sound doctrine after all. It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congress' response to the confusion wrought by the failure to delineate as to what exactly is that so-called summary procedure for changes or corrections of a harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from that appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or corrections of a substantial kind. For we must admit that though we have constantly referred to an appropriate adversary proceeding, we have failed to categorically state just what that procedure is. Republic Act No. 9048 now embodies that summary procedure while Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary proceeding. Be that as it may, the case at bar cannot be decided on the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which has prospective application. Hence, the necessity for the preceding treatise.
Concept: Rule 108: Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry Persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are: (1)the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to: (1)issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought. Republic Act No. 9048 which was passed by Congress on February 8, 2001 substantially amended Article 412 of the New Civil Code, to wit: "SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname . No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations." 462. Barco v CA () January 20, 2004 Tinga Petition for correction of entries: Difficult. Youve been warned Facts: 1. This is a really tricked-out case involving a good number of parties and a better number of issues. Nadina Maravilla was married to Francisco Maravilla, but they eventually obtained an ECCLESIASTICAL annulment of marriage in 1970, the same year they were married. In 1978, Nadina gave birth to June Salvacion, who was registered with Francisco as her father and Maravilla as her surname. 2. Despite the civil registry entry however, Nadina claimed all along that Armando Gustilo was the father of June. When Gustilo s wife died in a naval accident in 1981, he and Nadina went to the US to get married. Nadina eventually obtained an annulment of her marriage to Francisco two years after she was married to Gustilo. 3. In 1983, Nadina filed a petition for correction of entries in Junes birth certificate. She presented evidence that Francisco could not have been the father and that she was actually sexing Gustilo before the time she was about get pregnant. Gustilo confirmed the
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petition by signing a Constancia (a document which shows that one has provided consent). The original petition was eventually amended by Nadina, impleading both Francisco and Gustilo. 4. The OSG opposed the petition claiming that only innocuous or clerical errors may be corrected under a petition for correction of entries. The RTC however believed Nadina claims that her uncle, William Veto, who helped her in preparing the questioned documents, made the mistake that caused all their problems. It then subsequently granted Nadinas petition. 5. Gustilo died some time after the decision, which led to the filing of two separate cases, in the Philippines and the US respectively. One of the cases was filed by Jose Vicente Gustilo, who claimed that he was also a biological child of Armando. He wanted to annul the judgment of the RTC correcting the entries in the civil registry. Nadina countered by questioning Jose Vicentes filiation. 6. Milagros Barco, the legal guardian of Mary Joy Gustilo (still another biological child of Armando) filed an intervention in the petition (apparently because her interests as well as Mary Joys would be affected by Nadinas correction ). Barco also claimed that she was the common-law partner of Armando before Nadina, and that she gave birth to Mary Joy as a result of that cohabitation. Her intervention supported Jose Vicentes petition somewhat in that it also claimed that the correctio ns made were illegal since they were not impleaded as concerned parties. 7. The CA dismissed the petition as well as the intervention, saying that they both failed to establish fraud. It also rejected the claim that since they were not impleaded in the petition for correction, the judgment is null. Barco appealed to the Supreme Court after that. Issue: (1) Was the petition for correction fatal because it did not implead Jose Vicente and Milagros Barco? NO. (2) Was the granting of the petition for correction proper? YES. Held: The decision was AFFIRMED. Ruling: 1. It is true that Barco is a party whose rights or interests may be affected by the change sought after by Nadinas petition fo r correction. However, the CA correctly pointed out that the failure to implead was cured by the subsequent publication of the petition. 2. A petition for correction is a petition in rem, an action against a thing and not a person. It is validated essentially through a publication, since it binds not only the parties, but also the whole world. 3. While Barco claims that only clerical errors may be corrected, subsequent rulings aside from that in Valencia tended to include substantial changes as well. One particular ruling in Lee said that Rule 108 has had a change in its effect. No longer do city or municipal registrars need to secure a court order for correcting clerical errors, which means that Rule 108 would now only apply to substantial changes in the entries. The Valencia ruling, supported by Lee, is well entrenched in our system today and has been used repeatedly by the courts. 4. The claim made by Barco that the petition has prescribed because filiation can only be impugned within one year (the correction having the effect of changing Junes civil status and filiation) was also debunked by the court. It said that the RTC has already ruled on the case (despite the action having already prescribed). And the ruling, albeit erroneous, is not void. 5. The action for annulment of judgment cannot work here when the judgment rendered by the RTC is only erroneous and not void. In the spirit of fair play, the decision should be left alone. Concept: After a long and winding twist of facts and motions and pleadings and rulings, I dare say that this is the most Pilita-Coralesy decision of the Supreme Court so far. In correction of entries, many tricks can be pulled by the court, but in the end its still the interests of the child that prevails. 463. Republic v. Petronio BENEMERITO () 2004 Vitug *changing substantial entries in sons BC needs adversarial proceedings Facts: 1. Petronio Benemerito, filed a petition asking for the correction of certain entries in the record of birth of his son, Joven Lee Benemerito (June 1990) 2. Changes sought are: (a) change of the father's name from Peter Laurente Benemerito to Petronio L. Benemerito; and (b)the date of marriage of Joven Lees parents, Edna Sicat and Petronio Benemerito appearing therein from Sept 1, 1989 to Jan 25, 1998 3. Benemerito testified that he and Edna Sicat were married on 25 January 1998. Prior to their marriage, they had been living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage and during the cohabitation, Joven Lee, was born. 4. He said that he was surprised to later discover that his name was erroneously recorded in the birth certificate of his son as Peter Laurente Benemerito instead of his correct name Petronio Laurente Benemerito, and that the date of his marriage with Edna Sicat appearing in the birth certificate of Joven Lee as 01 September 1989 instead of 25 January 1998 5. Republic asserts that the changes sought are substantial and not innocuous and thus an adversarial proceeding (hearing ata to) is essential; and that indispensable parties, including the Benemeritos wife or the grandparents of the child, should have themselves been notified or been made parties to the proceedings to shed light on the supposed discrepancies or errors found in the birth certificate of Joven Lee Benemerito
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Issue: May the substantial changes be granted without an adversarial proceeding? Held: No; changes like the ones sought by Benemerito cant be granted under summary proceedings Ruling: 1. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed 2. The corrections sought to be made by respondent in the birth certificate of Joven Lee could hardly qualify as just clerical errors. In order to effect the desired changes, it would be essential to establish that Peter Laurente Benemerito , the person named as being the father of Joven Lee, and Petronio Benemerito, herein respondent, refer to the same person. 3. The intended correction of the date of marriage of the parents of Joven would, in effect, change the status of the child, from being the legitimate son of Peter Laurente Benemerito to being instead the legitimated child of Petronio Benemerito and a certain Peter Laurente Benemerito. 4. The changes in the entry in the Certificate of Live Birth of Joven Lee, which can possibly affect successional and other rights of persons related to either or both Benemerito and his wife, as well as that of Joven Lee himself , are simply too substantial to be dealt with in summary, instead of the regular adversarial, proceedings 46. Silverio vs. Republic () 2007 Corona, J. *Silverio the becky ;) Facts 1. Rommel Jacinto Dante Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate 2. Petitioner alleged his name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male." 3. He further alleged that he is a male transsexual; underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. Ultimately, he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok. 4. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. 5. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. RTC said that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. Court also believes that no harm or injury will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. 6. OSG, filed a petition alleging that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. CA ruled in favour of OSG. 7. On appeal to SC, Silverios petition hinges on under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. Issue: Can the entries in Silverios birth ceritificate be changed and thus alter his status and capacity to legally marry a person of same sex? Held: No, simply because theres no law. Ruling : 1. A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment a. Court said that just because he acquired physical features of a female, doesnt mean hes entitled to the changes he seeks. Petitions like this are controlled by laws. b. And theres a governing law. It provides for grounds for which change of first name may be allowed- this includes: 1) name is ridiculous, 2) new name has been continuously used, or he has been publicly known by that first name, and 3) change will avoid confusion c. Silverios basis in praying for the change of his first name which was his sex reassignment is not contemplated by any of the governing laws. PLUS, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. d. As to the other law he invokes, RA 9048- same thing, it doesnt cover sex reassignment. 2. No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment a. Under RA 9048, a correction involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error . It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. b. (this might be long... ) Now, Rule 108 (in relation to other laws) provides for entries correctablethis includes acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name) c. BUT Rule 108 doesnt really cover the correction on the ground of sex reassignment. d. More crucially, these acts, events, decrees, produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person

3. So there. Silverio is my last case!!!!!
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397. Republic vs. Capote () February 2, 2007 Corona * Child wanted to change his surname to his mothers surname because need to petition to US Facts: 7. Minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. 8. [He] was born on July 9, 1982 [,] prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code and as such, his mother used the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between them ; and [Giovanni] has been known by that name since birth [as per his birth certificate registered at the Local Civil Register of San Juan, Southern Leyte]; 9. The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time [Giovanni] was born and up to the present, failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns 10. Giovanni is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he desires to have his surname changed to that of his mothers surname; 11. Giovannis mother might eventually petition [him] to join her in the United States and [his] continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the surname of his natural father, may complicate [his] status as natural child; 12. GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO to GIOVANNI NADORES Issue: Can the minor change his surname from his fathers surname to mothers surname? Held: Yes. Ruling: 7. An illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mother surname , and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. 8. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. 9. Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. 10. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. 11. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son. 12. Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in a newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition including the OSG 464. Republic vs. Jennifer Cagandahan () September 12, 2008 Quisumbing * Who would not know this one? Bajita? Anyway, Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia Facts: 1. Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. 2. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. 3. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. 4. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries . 5. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized , she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. 6. Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines -Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that "Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female." Issue: Can she be allowed to change her sex and name under the facts given? Held: Yes. Ruling: PROCEDURAL 1. The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is fatally defective because it failed to implead the local civil registrar as well as all persons who have or claim any interest therein is not without merit. 2. However, it must be stressed that private respondent furnished the local civil registrar a copy of the petition , the order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings.

3. 4.
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In which case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is substantial compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue which in this case should be dealt with utmost care in view of the delicate facts present in this case.
GENDER 5. In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. 6. "It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a `no-man's land' for those individuals who are neither truly `male' nor truly `female'." 7. The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification . 8. In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. 9. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the subject's birth certificate entry is in order . 10. Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. 11. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. 12. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps , like taking lifelong medication, to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. 13. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent's development to reveal more fully his male characteristics. NAME 14. As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.[28] 15. The trial court's grant of respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. 16. Considering the consequence that respondent's change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name. 17. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male . 343. De La Cruz vs. Gracia () July 31, 2009 Carpio- Morales * Father died left an autobiography acknowledging his child. Facts: 11. 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. 12. On September 4, 2005, Dominique died. 13. After almost two months, she gave birth to her minor child Christian Dela Cruz "Aquino" at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City. 14. Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth, using Dominiques surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar 15. She submitted the childs Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominiques father Domingo Butch Aquino. 16. During the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child in an "AUTOBIOGRAPHY" 17. THEN WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. 18. City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent ), denied Jenies application for registration of the childs name because Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1 stated that the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child (either through the back of Municipal Form No. 102 Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father) 19. Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint the denial of registration of the childs name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father under Article 176. 20. They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes an admission of paternity in a "private handwritten instrument" within the contemplation of the above-quoted provision of law. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A "PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT" WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION
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OF ARTICLE 176. Held: Yes. The Autobiography is a private handwritten instrument in the purview of Article 176 Ruling: 8. Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not expressly require that the private handwritten instrument containing the putative fathers admission of paternity must be signed by him. 9. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature. 10. That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code (related to 175) 11. In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominiques Autobiography , though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law. a. First, Dominique died about two months prior to the childs birth. b. Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. c. Third, Jenies testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominiques father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child. 12. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominiques Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts extant herein that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents house; she was pregnant when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is Dominiques. 13. It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children 14. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration Concept: the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made: 3) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and 4) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence. 465. Braza vs. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City () Carpio MoralesDecember 4, 2009 *wife wants to collaterally attack a bigamous marriage Facts: 1. Cristina Torres (Petitioner) and Pablo Braza were married. (Jan 4 1978) 2. Their children are Paolo Josef and Janelle Ann. (co petitioners) 3. Pablo died in a vehicular accident. 4. During the wake, respondent, Lucille introduced her son Patric Braza (co-respondent) 5. Petitioner saw Patricks birth cert and it said that it acknowledged PABLO (the dead guy) as the father. 6. Petitioner saw Lucilles marriage contract and it showed that Pablo and her were married on Paril 22, 19 98. 7. She is thus filing the case saying that Patrick could not have been legitimated because the marriage with Licille was bigamous thus she wants: (1) the correction of the entries in Patricks birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name Braza. (2) a directive to Patricks guardians (including respondent) to submit Patrick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation. (3) to declare the nullity of legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate thus (4) declaring the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous. Issue: Should the case prosper? Held: No, cannot attack marriage collaterally. Ruling: 1. Petitioners claim that their main cause of action is for the correction of Patricks birth records and that the rest of the prayers
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are merely incidental. 2. This is the reason of the demise of their petition. 3. The validity of marriage as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned ONLY in a direct action and not through collateral attack such as the one before the court.
- THE END -

Persons Chalc PC Finals - Atty. Legarda

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