Chauvinism and Internationalism in Science

Chauvinism and Internationalism in Science: The International Research Council, 1919-1926 Author(s): A. G.
Cock Source: Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Mar., 1983), pp. 249-288 Published by: The Royal Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/531490 . Accessed: 29/04/2013 09:23
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249
CHAUVINISM AND INTERNATIONALISM IN SCIENCE:

THE INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
I9I9-1926
By A. G. COCK
S09 3TU Department of Biology,The University, Southampton,
HE InternationalResearchCouncil, founded in I919 by representatives of the leading scientific academies of the major Allied nations, was intended to promote internationalco-operation in science, through the formation of a series of InternationalUnions, each covering a separatebranch of science. Its internationalbasiswas, however, deliberatelyrestricted: the former CentralPowers were excluded by statutefrom both the I.R.C. and its Unions, while former neutral countries were to be admitted only by a three-quarters majority vote. The I.R.C. was thus quite openly part of the general post-war policy, whose spearheadwas the Treaty of Versailles,of isolating the Central Powers, of demanding from them expressionsof penitence, and of ensuring that Germany in particular never regained her old dominance in military affairs,industry,trade or science. Opposition to the exclusion of Germanyand her former allies was soon expressed, especially in former neutral countries, and eventually, aftertwo successfulattemptsto change the statutes,the offending clause was repealed in 1926, and all the old Central Powers were unanimouslyinvited to join. (I shall henceforthreferto groups of statessimply as the Allies, the Central Powers and neutrals, 'former' being understood. I shall also often write 'Germany' when strict accuracy would demand 'the Central Powers'. This is justifiableto the extent that the exclusion imposed by the I.R.C., along with governmentalpolicies and popularfeeling, was directed primarily against Germany, with German-speakingAustria standing next in the hierarchyof villains.) It is widely believed that most scientistsare imbued, more or less strongly, with a spirit of scientific internationalism;that science itself or scientific opinion, constitutes a force working in favour of peaceful internationalcooperation. We may defer, for the moment, any examinationof the natureand content of this 'scientific internationalism';the immediate point is that the early history of the I.R.C. has been commonly regardedas a test case for its existence and effectiveness. Not surprisingly(and, up to a point, justifiably) the general verdict has been that scientific internationalismfailed the test abjectly. By 1926, political and general relations between the two groups of former combatants had become much less strained, even in some respects
250
friendly. Only three months afterthe I.R.C. amendedits statutesGermanywas admittedto the League of Nations. It could be held, therefore,that the I.R.C. was following in the wake of public opinion, ratherthan (as might have been hoped) setting an example. There is then, on the surface,much to supportthe that, in the conflictssurroundingthe astringentremarkby Schroeder-Gudehus of the transnational 'the of I.R.C., early years loyalties has been hardly weight noticeable' (I). I shall neverthelessbring forward evidence indicatingthat such an extreme and dismissiveview needs substantial modification. This investigation grew out of a project with much more modest and circumscribedaims. My original intention was simply to provide an accountof the activitiesof one outspokenopponent of the I.R.C. policy of exclusion-the geneticist and biologist William Bateson-and to set this broadly (that is, not in any comprehensiveway) in the context of similarand contrastingviews on the question expressed by other contemporary British scientists. It proved unexpectedly difficult to provide such a context. Although it is clear that a substantial body of scientistsbroadly sharedBateson'sviews, it was impossible to name names and give relevant quotations, except in the case of two of Bateson's friends, who were implicated through their correspondencewith him: the mathematician G. H. Hardy and the botanistSir David Prain. There is a fairly substantial body of studieson the early historyof the I.R.C. are concerned almost exclusively with affairsat the centre: but these (I-6), with the formal proceedings of the General Assemblies and the views of membersof the executive committee. The one exception (in the sense that it concentrateson the grassrootsratherthan the centre) is Forman'sstudy of the refusal,after 1926, of most Germanscientists,in the face of pressurefrom their own government, to countenancejoining I.R.C. Due weight is given, in these publicationsgenerally, to the widespreadopposition to exclusion by scientists in neutral countries, but the existence of any similar opposition among is barely mentioned. Nor do the affairsof individual individual Allied scientists Unions, in contrastto the I.R.C. itself, receive more than passingattention. These difficulties led to a broadening of the scope from my original aims. The evidence I shallpresentsufficesto show that the simplisticpictureof Allied scientistsunited (apartperhapsfrom a small and impotent fringe of extremists) in supportof Germanexclusion is far from the truth. Yet this paper does not pretendto be a comprehensiveand definitive accountof the controversiesover the exclusion of the Central Powers. That would require more time and resources than I can afford (7). It would necessitate, besides the study of published and unpublished sources on a wider (and international)range of individual scientiststhan I have attempted,a more thorough study of archives
25I
at the Royal Society (especially the papers of Sir Arthur Schuster, first Secretary-Generalof I.R.C.), and a study of the archives of the leading scientificacademiesof other countries,of the I.R.C. itself and of its constituent Unions-in so far as these survive (8). Apart from giving an outline of the formal history of the I.R.C. sufficient to make the rest of the narrativecomprehensible,I shallconcentrateon four main themes. (i) An account will be given of the activities of Bateson, Hardy, Prain and others which led to the Royal Society adopting a resolutionthat Britain would not join the InternationalUnion of Biological Sciences (I.U.B.S.) unless and until the I.R.C. statutes were amended to allow Germany to join. Similar events in other English-speaking countries(particularly U.S.A.) will be related in less detail, and a thwarted rebellion in the InternationalMathematical Union (I.M.U.) will be examined. (ii) An attempt will be made to assessthe importanceof dissidentopinions among Allied scientistsin bringing about the change of Statutesin 1926, in comparison with other forces acting in the same direction; opposition from from Allied governneutrals,changing public opinion and possible pressures ments. The inertial weight that reformershad to overcome, due to the heavily entrenchedI.R.C. constitution,will be emphasized. (iii) Publicly expressedopposition to the I.R.C., particularlywhen it took the form of a boycott or other disruptive action, appearsto have been concentrated mainly among biologists and mathematicians. This does not necessarilyimply that private opposition was more widespreadamong these sciences,and I shallsuggestan explanationof it on tacticalgrounds. (iv) The I.R.C. was also widely criticized for being excessively bureaucratic and for allowing too little autonomy to its daughterUnions. Such criticismsled, in 1931, to a major overhaul of the I.R.C. statutes.A new title (InternationalCouncil of Scientific Unions) was then adopted, reflectingthe new and more federalconstitution, which gave, for the firsttime, a representation to the Unions on the General Council, in addition to the nationally appointeddelegates.Logically, this was a quite separateissuefrom that concerning the exclusion of Germany, but in fact these two criticisms were often voiced together by the same persons. Possibly this associationhad some psyconvictions tended also chological basis,in that those of liberal internationalist to be antibureaucratic I but a tactical element was that devolutionists, suggest Critics whose main concern was with Germanexcluagain mainly responsible. sion would throw in the point about bureaucracyto add weight to their case, and viceversa.On the other side, those in control of the I.R.C. resistedpressure for more autonomousUnions partly, perhapsmainly, becausethey fearedthat
252
if Unions made their own membershiprules Germanywould gain entranceby the back door.
BATESON,HARDY AND PRAIN
Bateson and his two friendsserve as examplesof Britishscientificopponents of the exclusion of Germany.They are not, of course, a randomsampleof the opposition, and a larger sample would no doubt have been desirable.All the to same, the diversity of their social origins and political outlooks compensates some extent for the meagre numbers. I do not claim that these three were necessarily the most important and influential of British opponents-the ringleadersof the movement, so to speak. The opposition was almost wholly an informal and unorganizedmovement, depending on private conviction and private persuasion.Only at one point (9), and that quite late in the day, was there any suggestion of an organized public campaign.In such a context, any attempt to identify the most influential figures would be more than usually hazardousand subjective. William Bateson (I861-1926) (IO) was the 'father'and unchallengedleader of British genetics, widely respectedin other branchesof biology, and with an internationalreputation. His early embryological work led on to studies of discontinuousvariation, first descriptive,then experimental.These put him in a position to give a prompt and vigorous welcome to the rediscovery of Mendelism, and to play a leading part in its development and application. After a career at Cambridge he became in I9IOthe first director of the John InnesHorticulturalInstitutionin London. G. H. Hardy (1877-1947) was one of the leading mathematiciansof his with a disdainfor applicatime (i i). He was very much a pure mathematician, in of niche the and his tions, history biology arosecasually,through important a common interestin cricket with R. C. Punnett, Bateson'scollaborator(I2). He moved from Cambridgeto a chair at Oxford in 1919and back to a Cambridge chairin 93I. Sir David Prain (I857-I944) (I3) took degrees in Natural Science and in Medicine in Scotland, and soon afterwards joined the IndianArmy, serving as of a Medical Officer. He joined the staff the CalcuttaBotanic Gardenin 1895 and became Director in 1898. In 1905he returnedto Britainas Director of the Royal Botanic Gardens,Kew. Though his publicationsmay have nothing to match the major innovations of Bateson and Hardy, his work in taxonomic and economic botany was both extensive and highly regarded.From I909 he was Chairmanof Council of the John Innes HorticulturalInstitution;this led to a close friendshipwith Bateson. (14)
253
Bateson was the son of the In social origins the three were widely disparate: Master of a Cambridge college, Hardy of a house master at a preparatory school, while Prain'sfatherwas a PerthshiresaddlercumParishCouncil Clerk. Hardy'spolitical views set him apartfrom the other two: he was a pacifistand a political disciple of Bertrand Russell (II, I5). Bateson's political views are difficult to characterize.He came from a strongly Liberal family but in later life, while strong strandsof liberalismremained,they were combined with elements displaying conservative and even aristocratictendencies, e.g. he had a markeddistrustof democraticprinciples (16). He has recently been described as 'in many ways an archetypalconservativethinker' but this is seriouslymisleading. (17)
Prain's political attitudes are even more difficult to pin down, and his obituaristis silent on this point. My partialexaminationof his papersyielded nothing bearing directly on his general political views, or on the I.R.C. However, I was able to discuss Prain with three people at Kew who had known him well: ProfessorR. E. Holttum, Mr R. D. Meikle and Mr H. M. Burkhill (Burkhill reckoned that he last saw Prain when he (Burkhill) was aged about 8; his knowledge of him is based on what his fatherhad told him. Burkhill senior had been a long-standing colleague of Prain, and had written his obituary for the Royal Society. The memoriesof the other two are direct.) All three were in general agreementon two main points: (i) Prain was not a strongly political animal, and certainly not interestedin the day-to-day conflictsof party politics and (ii) his general outlook could be broadly categorized as liberal (with a small '1'). As it happens,this coincides with the view I had tentatively formed (admittedly more from 'reading between the lines' than from direct evidence) from the written material. The general political positions of Bateson and Prain, in so far as they were definite, seem then to have been fairly similar, and certainly a long way from that of Hardy. As a former officer in the Indian Army, Prain is unlikely to have had much sympathy with Hardy's pacifistviews. As for Bateson, Mrs H. B. Pease (then Miss Helen Wedgwood) worked at the John Innes for a short time in I917. She was then an adherentof the 'No ConscriptionFellowship', and she recalls that Bateson was quite scathingly disparagingof conscientious objectors. So far was Bateson from being a pacifist that in I9I5 he twice (on the same day) wrote to the chemist H. E. Armstrong,urging that Armstrong take up with the War Office the potential as a weapon of an arsenicalgas which had been used to eradicateprickly pear in Australia:'its deadliness. .. does not seem to me a drawback'.(Haldane'sCallinicus was then unwritten,but Bateson's defence of his attitude would no doubt have followed the same
254
general lines as Haldane used (18).) Prain and Batesoneach lost a son in action during World War I, which was hardly likely to have encouraged an unqualifiedsympathywith Germany'spost-war plight. Since all matters concerning the I.R.C. and its Unions in Britain were channelled through the Royal Society, it is important that Hardy and Prain
occupied key positions within the Society. Hardy was Secretary (I9I6-1924) and Prain Treasurer (I9I9-I928). Bateson had, much earlier, been a member of Council (I90oI-903), but by this time he was at most on the fringes of the
centresof influencein the Royal Society. He was, however, a memberof their biological committee at a crucial time (1923). Note that Hardy did not enter into public controversy until he had ceased to be Secretary.Prain may have felt inhibited by his office from taking part in public, and his role appears mainly as sympathizerand adviserto Bateson.Unlike Bateson,Prainseemsnot to have been a man who relishedpublic controversy.
THEIR OPPOSITION TO
I.R.C.
AND
I.U.B.S.
In order to set their activities into context, a brief chronology may be helpful: 1918, October. The London Conference called by the Royal Society, with delegatesfrom Britain,France,Belgium, U.S.A. and Italy. I9I9, August. InauguralGeneral Assembly of I.R.C., Brussels.The executive committee is formed by one representativeeach from the five major Allied countriesnamed above. 1922, July. 2nd GeneralAssembly of I.R.C. Sweden proposedthat the statutes be alteredso that all countriescould join. This received little supportand was not put to the vote. I923. I.U.B.S. founded: Officers had been appointed in 1919, but 1923 is the officially recognized date, and its existence before then seems to have been purely nominal.
1925, July. 3rd General Assembly of I.R.C. The Netherlands, Denmark, and
Sweden jointly proposeda resolutionsimilarto the Swedish one of 1922. This was supportedby Britain and U.S.A., and received a majority of votes cast. As, however, an amendmentto the statutesrequireda two-thirdsmajority,the resolutionwas declaredlost.
1925, December. Executive Committee of I.R.C. decides to call an
ExtraordinaryGeneralAssembly specificallyto considerthe questionof membershiprestriction.

1926, June. Extraordinary General Assembly of I.R.C. Resolutions to amend
255
to join to the leadingacademies the statutes, and to sendinvitations of all the old Central Powerswerepassed unanimously (I9). The LondonConference (to which Hardywas a delegate)was of course calledat the worstpossible time,whenan Alliedvictorywaswithinreachbut not yet quite achieved,and when, therefore, feelingsof narrownationalism in The andrevengewere likelyto be at theirpeak.The headline of the report mood and Timesaptly revealed,without intendedirony, the predominant of the London Scientists' Conference: 'Boycottof German purpose (20). for the exclusion of Germany was advanced One of the reasons commonly of personalrelationswith that allied scientistswould find a resumption did represent the majority This probably Germans opinionamong repugnant. of antifor a few afterwards: Britishscientists and years expressions by 1918-19 arenot hardto find.A few biological German publications feelingin scientific of Bateson, if to contrast with the attitude be useful, Hardy examples may only a taxonomicpaperwith the remark: 'No and Prain.Hampson(2I) prefaced
quotationsfrom Germanauthorspublishedsince August ISt 1914 are inserted. Hosteshumani generis'.Walsingham (22) applaudedHampson'ssentiments,but had his own, slightly different form of boycott to propose: no publicationsin the German language should be cited. He accused the Germans,in effect, of taxonomic imperialismover the past fifty years, in that they having practised gave preference to names of German origin over earlier foreign names. His to Bateson that 'I have bound myself to ignore everything published in
Germany after I914' (25). (Koestler comments acidly, and in a potentially misviews were applauded by Godwin-Austen (23), while Boulenger (24), boasted
leading way, on this last passage (25). That Boulenger was Belgian by birth does make his attitude more understandableif not defensible: his homeland had been invaded by Germany in I914. Similarly it is understandable that, as we shall see, it was the French and Belgian delegations which were to prove most intransigent over the admission of Germany to I.R.C.) Much more moderatein tone, but still emphaticallyagainstpersonalcontactswith German scientists was Sir Ray Lankester(26), while an equally moderate voice was raisedon the other side by D'Arcy Thompson (27). Even Bateson (28), writing to a Danish friend in 1920, was unhappy about a suggestionto hold an International Congress of Genetics in Copenhagen the following year. He feared that a truly internationalcongress (i.e. one including the Germans)held then might give widespread offence. Opinions were changing, however, and he thought a delay of even as little as six months might encounter a congenial climate. He expresseda similar view to T. H. Morgan, adding, significantly, that he thought 'no organized festivity should be arranged'at such a congress
256 (29). (In this respectBateson was too sanguine:the next GeneticsCongressdid not take place until I927--but it was held in Berlin!) Bateson was one of the Britishdelegatesto the I919 inauguralconferenceof I.R.C., but it is clear that he attendedonly aftera good deal of hesitation,even There are four letters from the physicist Sir Arthur Schuster heart-searching. of the of I.R.C.) Royal Society; soon to become Secretary-General (Secretary in June and July, urging him to attend and there seems also to have been a private meeting. In his last letter Schusterstates 'attendancewould, I think, commit you to the exclusion of Germanyfrom I.R.C.' (30). Batesonobviously seized upon the chink of uncertainty afforded by 'I think' and decided to attend. It may well be that Schuster deliberately left the door slightly ajar for Bateson. By his office he was bound to strive for a distinguished and representativeset of delegates from Britain. His own history provides strong reasonto suspectthat he would have been anxiousthat the rampantchauvinism which, even then, he must have expected to dominatethe Assembly,especially among the French and Belgian delegations, should be tempered by the preown sence of at least a few men of moderateviews, such as Bateson. Schuster's of is on the exclusion German position decidedly enigmatic. His question that 'strove for the admission of the CentralPowers' obituaristsays simply he (3I). This must surely relate to a later period. (As we shall see, there is evidence that he was active in this direction in the few monthsbefore and after the decisive Assemblyof 1926, in trying to influenceGermanscientificopinion towards actuallyjoining the I.R.C.) But if he had been a convinced dissident on the issue which was the main animusfor the foundation of the I.R.C., he and could hardly have acceptedthe post of Secretary-General. It is remarkable, in indicative of some ambivalence in his about the that I.R.C., possibly feelings is his Autobiographical Schuster silent nine about his completely years Fragments
as Secretary-General
(32).
How Schuster'sviews (and his expression of them) were affected by his own German origins is difficult to assess.He was born and brought up in a In 1869 (when he was long-established Jewish family in Frankfurt-am-Main. I8) his fatheremigratedto England, becauseof the annexationof Frankfurt by Prussia.To some extent, therefore,the family were refugees,though not from Germany, but from Prussiawhich became increasinglydominant in German affairs. Although he had long since become a naturalized British subject, Schusterwas subjectedthroughoutWorld War I to persistent even harassment, to some pillorying in the press,on account of his Germanorigins and name. As of the British Associationfor I915, pressures were exerted President-designate
257
of agitations, his resignation. Therewasa series to secure by a (unsuccessfully) to about his smallgroupof Fellowsled by H. E. Armstrong (I8), bring resigof the Royal Society(33). It saysa greatdeal as Secretary nationor dismissal to the winds of public opinion, of the for the good sense, and resistance the warone Councilof the RoyalSocietythat,besides throughout maintaining from on their other of German birth, 1916 Secretary Hardy-was secretary thepressures, theRoyalSociety,despite didnot an outright Moreover, pacifist. in the set by the French follow the precedent war,by striking Academy early all German nationals-even thoughthreeof fromits list of Foreignmembers Manifesto of German of of the notorious Academics themhadbeensignatories have would made had The harassment Schuster him, I914. surely experienced of chauvinism. On the otherhand,it is likely to at the very least,mistrustful of his own position, have made him very consciousof the vulnerability to removehim fromhis officein if, as Badash implies,the attempts especially the Royal Societyhad at one point only narrowlybeenfrustrated (33). If he would did hope,at the outset,thatthebanon German fairlysoon membership be lifted, he is likely to have kept a low profile, waiting for a substantial to presshis views openly. changein the climateof opinionbeforeventuring with this suggested The evidencethat I have examinedis entirelyconsistent is unlikelyeverto havebeenamongthehard-line tactic.At all events,Schuster opponentsof Germanentry. His defenceof I.R.C. policy, in an unsigned in tone. (34). in Nature, is notablymoderate article Batesonfound his worst fearsconfirmed.He Once arrivedat Brussels, wroteto his wife: The international Everyscrap positionis even worsethanI had supposed. to turnthe worlduparedetermined of commonsenseis gone. The French the purposes of this If I had understood sidedown, andthe restacquiesce. real and useful It has certain not have come. I should objectsin meeting science for an occasion to made view, but it is largely being exploit when I keepa quiettongueandonly haveintervened chauvinistic purposes. it couldbe donewithoutexcitinga row. (35) situainto one embarrassing His policy of a quiettonguedid leadBateson of I.U.B.S.He explained electeda Vice-President tion. Forhe wasat Brussels soonafterwards: of the BiologicalUnion as Vice-President I regretthat my nameappears at Brussels.When I acceptedI thought that I was being established I refused to be president for the Brussels a Vice-President meeting. appointed
258
I thoughtthatto of two sections, but when I understood my firstmistake, as we and withdraw then be too would 'fussy', say,andthatI had protest
betterlet things take their course. (36) His confusion does seem understandable.For although Officers and a committee were elected at Brussels,and draftstatutesdrawn up (but not ratified)a substantiveI.U.B.S. did not come into existence until four years later (37). During this period Bateson's position was quixotic: an Officer of a nonexistent organizationwith whose tenetshe disagreed. Two resolutions passed by the Committee on Biology of the Conjoint Board of Scientific Societies in 1920 were importantin crystallizingopposition shift in Britishbiological that a substantial to I.U.B.S. They also demonstrated opinion had taken place since 1918. The first resolution declared that 'the restoration of normal conditions of scientific intercourse with Austria and Germany is an indispensablepreliminary to the formation of a Biological Union'. The second resolution, reflectingthe other main strandof criticismof the I.R.C., expressedunwillingnessto commit itself to the proppsedschemefor I.U.B.S., and suggestedthat 'the restorationof co-operative internationalrelations in scientific work may for the present be better achieved through the medium of InternationalCongressesand by individuals' (38). I know of no evidence that Bateson was in any way responsiblefor the formulationof these resolutions,although they wholly coincided with his views and he does appear to have been a delegate to the C.B.S.S. from the Linnean Society (39). It is noteworthy that no similar resolutions were passedby other sectional committees of C.B.S.S.; in fact the committees favoured the formation of three Unions. other International In 1919-20 an abortive attempt was made to found a rival international biological organization,of which Germanyshould be a member. The leading spirit in this was the Dutch geneticistJ. P. Lotsy. He visited Bateson in the hope of gaining his support, but Bateson's response was discouraging. At a later stage a letter from Lotsy, expounding his proposalsand soliciting support, reachedPrain, who passedit to Bateson. Bateson thought the proposalshad no chance of success;moreover, he was scathingin his commentson Lotsy's lack of sensitivity. He knew from the 1919I.R.C. assemblythe inflexibleattitudeof Flahault.Besides, he thought men such as the Frenchbiological representative it that would so letter put people off. Ratherthan clumsily composed Lotsy's a have he would preferred simple declarationthat 'our aim as Lotsy'spolemics, men of science is to promote the growth of knowledge, and that thereforewe must admit to membershipthose likely to furtherthat aim, without regardto
259
he suspectedthat 'by the time Lotsy had got those innocent remarksinto his hideous French, it would be enough to scarify a rhinoceros anyhow!' (40). (Nevertheless, as a scientistLotsy had had Bateson'srespect:see his reviews of Lotsy's books (41).) Beneath this bantering disparagementlies the fact that Bateson was not motivated by naive pro-Germansentiments.He understood only too well the depth of feeling behind the wish to exclude Germany, and his own dignified response to the death of his eldest son had been achieved only through an intense inner conflict (42). He thoroughly deplored the activities of men such as the plant geneticist Erwin Baur, a close friend of prewar days (they had collaboratedon one project), who went about representing Germanyas an injuredinnocent (36). The reservationsin Bateson'sattitude towards Germanywere also evident in his attitudeto the famous, or notorious, 'Oxford letter'. This was signed by about sixty Oxford academics(Hardy among them) and was sent to professors in the artsand sciencesin Germanand Austrianuniversities.It offered them the hand of friendshipand co-operation. Although The Timespublishedthe letter it immediately condemned it in a leading article as 'singularlyill-advised... and reprehensiblein the extreme' (43), and nearly all the ensuing lettersto the editor were hostile to the Oxford letter. Bateson'sfeelings about the episode were mixed. While he deplored the superciliousand self-righteousattitudeof The Timesand some correspondents, he felt that the tone of the letter was too effusive, and that it was thus likely to be counterproductive.He drafted, but probably did not send (at all events it was not published)a letter in which he applaudedthe final sentenceof The Times'leading article:'Let the exchange at this time of knowledge pursue its quiet course and wait for friendshipuntil it can be honest on both sides'.But, he pointed out, such a courseof development was impossibleso long as the CentralPowers were excluded from I.R.C. (44). Bateson'sattitude to the Oxford letter recalls his policy of a 'quiet tongue' at the Brusselsconference and his attitude towards the projected Genetics Congress:he did not like chauvinism,but he preferredto outflankit, ratherthan fly provocatively in its face. In I92I The Timespublishedan anonymousarticleheadlined'The progress of science revolt against super-organisation',written in fact by (Sir) Peter ChalmersMitchell, Secretaryof the Zoological Society of London (45). This attacked the whole I.R.C. set-up vigorously, both on the grounds of bureaucracyand of Germanexclusion, although the former charge was given greater prominence. Bateson confessed soon afterwardsto Hardy that he had been 'at the bottom of this', though he was not the authorof the article (46).
or any othercollateral whatever'. But theirmorality, circumstance nationality
260
in science, Bateson In a furtherminor foray in the cause of internationalism in 1922 tendered his resignation (which was not accepted) from the Linnean Society on the ground that their library was dilatory in obtaining German defence that Germanperiodicalswere then very periodicals.To the Librarian's difficult to obtain, Bateson retorted that he experienced little difficulty in obtaining copies for his personaluse (47). In fairnessto the LinneanSociety it should be said that they relied on the 'usual channels' of the book trade, whereasBateson, both then and during the war, obtainedhis copies privately, through his Danish friendOstenfeld (48). Probably the most importantdevelopment during this period was that in 1923 the Royal Society sectional committees of Botany, Physiology and Zoology, meeting conjointly, passeda recommendationto Council which was nearly identical in wording to the first of the two C.B.S.S. resolutionsthree years earlier. Bateson'scorrespondenceimplies that a similarrecommendation had been passed in 1920 (though possibly he was referring to the C.B.S.S. resolution, which was in fact forwardedto the Royal Society), and he claimed that the 1923 recommendationwas passednem.con.(49). It may thereforebe of interestto name some of the better known membersof thesecommittees.They included, along with Bateson himself, Sir William Bayliss, V. H. Blackman, Sir Sidney Harmer, A. V. Hill, Sir Arthur Keith, Sir John Russell, A. C. Seward and A. G. Tansley (50). The recommendationwas duly adoptedby the Council of the Royal Society in November 1923 (51), thus creating a somewhat paradoxicalsituation.The Royal Society had helped to found I.R.C.; it was our representativebody upon it, and had mediated Britainjoining, as a foundermember, each of the six Unions formed to date. At the 1922Assembly Sir RichardGlazebrook,on behalfof the Royal Society, had spokenagainstthe Swedish move to admit the Central Powers. How, then, could its Council 'adopt' this recommendation?From a narrowly legalistic point of view it is true that the recommendationmerely stipulateda necessaryprecondition for joining I.U.B.S., saying nothing about other Unions, so that the Royal Society could claim that it was merely following the admirableprinciple of letting each science regulate its own affairs. But in substancethe recommendation attackedthe central principle on which the I.R.C. had been founded. One can assumeonly that 'adopt' meant less than it appearsto mean, and indicatedno more than taking note of, or rubber-stamping; or that this was an early pointer towardsthe Society's change of front at the I925 Assembly. In 1924came an opportunityfor Batesonto squareaccountswith the newly of I.U.B.S., wrote to say activated I.U.B.S. Flahault,the Secretary-General that Bateson had been unanimouslynominated as Presidentof the Section of
26I
GeneralBiology. In a dignified but vigorous reply Bateson acknowledged the honour done him but begged leave to decline the nomination. He expressed doubt as to whether such a general internationalbiological organization was yet necessary, over and above the organizations of the several branches of biology. But he would not, on that ground alone, have refusedso flatteringan
invitation:
I have a much graver objection. The Union Internationaledes Sciences Biologiques, as at presentconstituted, seems to me likely ratherto restrict than to promote internationalscientificcommunication.This consideration had, as no doubt you know, weighed so much with us in England that the Royal Society has declined to join. I enclose a copy of the resolutionwhich we lately adopted,though probablyit had alreadyreachedyou. For my own part, I deplore the introduction of the question of of learningand the arts nationalityinto scientificaffairs.The representatives a dominant in influence the might provide maintaining sanityof the world. The force they might exert is prodigious.That they should promote further division is to me lamentable. The formation of a Union from which Germanyis in effect excluded, can only increasethe mischief.There is also something unreal and grotesque in the thought of a biological union containing no German names. After all, the developmentsof cellular biology have always from the beginning been very largely German. We gain nothing by refusingto recognise facts. One of the great deprivationsof the war was the suspension of intercourse with our German colleagues. I cannot be a partyto any measuretending still furtherto alienateus. Pray do not charge me with a want of sympathy.I can understandthe feelings of resentmentwhich have led to such proposals.If in the judgement of posterity we are found at this critical time ourselves to have done nothing unworthy, it is much, and with that ambition we may be content.
(52)
Bateson was not content just to decline on his own behalf. The Danish geneticist Wilhelm Johannsen had been nominated as Vice-President of the same section: Bateson promptly wrote to tell him what he had done, and had the satisfactionof learning,through one ofJohannsen'sstudents,thatJohannsen had declined the Vice-Presidency(53). A more successfulattemptthan Lotsy's at forming a 'freelance'Union was made in the field of mechanics.Sir HaroldJeffreysrecallsattendingtwo of the first three conferencesof the InternationalUnion of Applied Mechanicsin the
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early I920S, held (he thinks) at Delft, Zurich and Cambridge.The Union had no links with I.R.C. and admitted Germansand Hungariansfrom the start (54). A contemporaryreport on the Delft Conference in 1924says that it was organized by a group of Dutch scientists,and, with over 200 attending, was highly successful (including the social festivities!). The only point, in fact, where feelings ran high, was in a purely scientificdisputebetween two groups of Germans.The Frenchwere conspicuouslyabsent,but otherwise there seems to have been a reasonablybroad spreadof internationalattendance(55). I have been unable to discoverfor how long this Union remainedactive, nor whether it did more than organize a seriesof conferences. (In any case, it seemsthat, at this period, some of the I.R.C. Unions did little more than this.) The (temporary)successof the Applied MechanicsUnion probablyowed much to
the fact that it served a field not covered by any I.R.C.-affiliated Union, and thus suffered little competition. Hardy and Church mention two more international conferences held outside the I.R.C. umbrella: a Physiological Congress in Edinburgh and a Psychological Congress at Oxford (9). Quite probably there were yet others: I have not made a systematic search. Most series of congresses had standing committees, responsible for organizing the next congress. Some of these, as with the Genetics Congresses, would simply have resumed their activities when the war was over quite independently of the I.R.C. Meanwhile, Hardy was achieving several minor victories. By making the issue one of confidence in himself as a much-valued Secretary, he had persuaded the influential London Mathematical Society to vote against support of the International Mathematical Union (46). However, on a national scale Hardy's advocacy was unavailing: Britain did join I.M.U. His other role was as President of the recently formed National Union of Scientific Workers (later the Association of Scientific Workers) (56). At the May 1924 meeting of the Executive Committee he introduced a resolution: That the organisation of scientific unions or congresses which are described as international but from which particular nations are excluded on political grounds is unworthy of the spirit of science (9, 57). This resolution was passed unanimously, together with a recommendation that it be given the greatest possible publicity. It is no surprise to find two prominent left-wingers, Lancelot Hogben and Hyman Levy, among those attending the meeting. On the other hand, Helen Gwynne Vaughan, D.B.E., N.U.S.W.'s most noted conservative, was absent (58).
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in theManchester overthe Guardian The outcomewasa long letterpublished of N.U.S.W.). After citing their namesof Hardy and Church(Secretary on grounds I.R.C.anditsunionsinextenso, resolution, theywenton to criticize a campaign of protest, familiar. N.U.S.W. was, they said,promoting already their resolutionto the principalacademiesand and had communicated scientificsocietiesof Europeand America,and to the press.They invited as to possiblefurthersteps.The letter received from scientists suggestions editorialsupportin the form of a shortleadingarticleheaded'Scienceand Spite'.(9) thatthe Hardy-Church letterprovokedonly one known It is remarkable is given no reason fromN.U.S.W. (Therecouldhavebeenothers: resignation in 1924.)The Oxfordastronomer H. for mostof the 32 recorded resignations in favourof Germany' H. Turnerresignedbecauseof 'the union campaign for Schuster's had beenone of the mostinsistent campaigners (59). As Turner this issue is the his on hardlysurprising. resignation during war, resignation on theoutcome At the endof 1924,Hardyreported to N.U.S.W. members of the publicitygiven to the resolution.It had receiveda fair amountof in the British andNature hadeachdeclined press, coverage althoughTheTimes and to print it. 'A good many' replieshad been receivedfrom academies and while someof thesewere mereformalacknowledgements there societies, were also more positiveresponses. Thus the Optical Society had passeda to the attitudeof N.U.S.W. and the Meteorological resolutionsympathetic Society was 'not opposed to the admissionof ex-enemy nations'.The Societyhadneverassociated Societyandthe LondonMathematical Geological basis(together,no themselves with the I.R.C. policy. On this ratherslender with his felt doubt, personal contacts) Hardy justified in reasserting 'an overwhelming N.U.S.W.'s claim that on this matterthey represented
majority of British men of science'. The positive response to the resolution strikes one as rather meagre although, given the pace at which scientific societiesmove, June to November was a rathershortperiod on which to judge it. Replies had also been received from a number of German Academies, expressingagreementwith and gratitudeto N.U.S.W. (60) More significant, perhaps,than responsesfrom other societies were events at the InternationalMathematicalCongress at Toronto that summer. Hardy himself was not at the Toronto congress,but it is entirely possiblethat copies of the Hardy-Churchletter had reached some American mathematicians. Hardy claimed that many American mathematiciansdiscovered for the first time at Toronto that the Germanswere excluded. This discovery, he said, gave rise to
(33)
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in a resolution a good dealof indignation culminating callingfor the removal of the ban, movedby representatives of the American Mathematical Society, and supported by the delegatesof Denmark,GreatBritain,Holland,Italy, that this list Norway, Swedenand Switzerland. (It is especiallysignificant threeof the 'bigfive'nations includes of I.R.C.,leavingFrance andBelgiumin it was pointedout from the platform relativeisolation.)Inevitably, thatthe was contrary to I.R.C.statutes. The resolution itselfwasthereupon resolution but it wasagreedthatthe attention of the I.R.C.shouldbe drawn abandoned, the platform's to holdthe to the discussion and,a moredirectthreat, proposal in was Brussels under the statutes next Congress withdrawn. existing Hardy held under predictedthat Torontowould be the last mathematical congress 'boycottrules':if the ban were not soon removedby the I.R.C.the I.M.U. into a Franco-Belgian would either collapseor degenerate rump (60). The events at is that were the of the Toronto first they importance sign of open in one of the I.R.C.'sown Unions:thereseemslittledoubtthatthe rebellion hadnot constitutional American would havebeenpassed resolution propriety To the leadership of I.R.C.thismusthaveserved asa danger-signal intervened. in store. of further troubles
THE CHANGE IN OFFICIALI.R.C. POLICY AND ITS AFTERMATH
Batesondid not live quite long enough to see the doors of the I.R.C. opened to the CentralPowers. Yet the crucialdecisionwas takenshortly beforehisdeath.Thiswasthedecision in Decemof theExecutive Committee, revisionistbandwagonrolled inevitably:witness the unanimousvotes at in 1926.The questionthere was not whether would be Brussels the statutes but which revisedto admitthe Central of several worded Powers, differently resolutions,all having that effect, would be adopted.The 1926 decision involveda changeof frontby manywho hadearlier German admisopposed the American astronomer G. sion, including'old I.R.C.hands'like Schuster, of the ExecutiveCommittee) E. Hale (4, 5) (member and the President, the mathematician EmilePicard of France. reflects the more conciliatory tone of publicopiniontowardsGermany, and of the general international that relations the developed softening during I920s, in the Kelloggpactof 1928.Justthreemonthsafterthe Brussels culminating wasadmitted of Nations,although it of 1926Germany to theLeague Assembly thatthe invitation to join I.R.C.camefirst.But the internal maybe significant Once sufficient rank-and-file scientists, politicsof I.R.C. were alsoimportant.
How did this change of front come about? In large part, no doubt, it ber I925, to call an ExtraordinaryGeneral Assembly. From then on, the
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in line with the changing climate of public opinion, had come to favour German admission, then continuance of the old policy was a source of dissension and a potential danger to the integrity of I.R.C. This point was stressed by Sir Richard Glazebrook in explaining Britain's change of stance at Brussels in
I925 (I9).
The ambiguity of attitudes among men at the centre of I.R.C. is well
seen in a very revealing letter from Hale to Schuster in 1924: As to the German question, I confess that I am still greatly puzzled regarding the best procedure. There is a growing demand in this country for the admission of Germany to all international affairs, which is naturally most insistent in the case of those who have been least in contact with the French and Belgians since the war. (61) Hale regarded the parallel issue of pressure for greater autonomy of the Unions as 'chiefly directed towards the admission of Germany', and he proudly related to Schuster his manoeuvres to prevent this pressure being expressed through official channels. At a meeting of the Division of Foreign Relations of the National Research Council an informal show of hands had shown a unanimous desire for greater autonomy, but Hale had managed to prevent a formal vote being taken. There had been an acrimonious debate on the issue (again without a vote) in the National Academy of Sciences the previous year, and he intended not to allow the question to come up in the Academy in 1924
(6i).
Yet Hale's personal view (shared by Millikan (62)) was strongly in favour of allowing the Unions to make their own rules, both on procedural matters and as to membership. I should be ready to press this point very far, even against strong opposition by Picard, because I believe the life of the International Research Council to be at stake. If we insist on the present hard and fast system many of the Unions will break away from us or will dissolve and be reconstituted independantly. We cannot afford to let Picard's iron hand wreck the whole organisation, which we have set up with so much difficulty. (61) So too on German admission, which Hale believed should be arranged as soon as possible (Millikan was much more strongly in favour). He suspected that Schuster and the Royal Society agreed with him on both issues, and suggested that they should work together, moving 'carefully and diplomatically'. The first step should be to secure the agreement of the Italian member of the Executive Committee. The second should be the elimination of the intransigent Picard as President. In the interim, his tactic was to suppress overt opposition as far as possible, until a clear victory could be assured in the
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I.R.C., ratherthan acrimoniousand damagingdisagreement(61). Whatever we may think of Hale's machiavelliantactics,his change of view did not amount to inconsistency.His prime concern throughouthad been the well-being and integrity of I.R.C. (4, 5). In the early years the admissionof Germany would have caused a major revolt among the Frenchand Belgians: Hale had thereforebeen againstit. Now the danger came from the other side, so he supportedadmission.He had from the startfavouredmore autonomy for the Unions, but had given in so as to preserveunity: now that this issue, too, threatenedto become disruptivehis advocacy becamemore forthright. It did not take very long for Hale to bring his public stanceinto line with his private views. By the time of the 1925 Assembly, at the latest, he was an open supporter of the admission of the Central Powers. Himself unable to attend the Assemblyfor reasonsof health, he arrangedfor Vernon Kellogg to lead the U.S. delegation (63). Schuster'sconversion to a similar viewpoint seems to have roughly paralleledHale's although he was slower than Hale to recognize the need for greaterautonomy of the Unions. This seems however,
from Kevles's account, to have been due not to things related to the German question, but to his fear that, with more autonomous Unions, the I.R.C. itself would degenerate into a merely ceremonial body (5). Once the decision had been taken to call an Extraordinary Assembly in 1926 precautions were taken to prevent a repetition of the fiasco of 1925. Voting on the Dutch-Danish-Swedish resolution in 1925 had fallen only a little short of a two-thirds majority of votes cast: 10 for, 6 against. But the rules required a two-thirds majority of all member nations (one vote per nation, irrespective of size). With 29 member nations, even a unanimous vote by the 16 nations present in 1925 would not have sufficed to change the statutes. Arrangements were therefore made for a postal ballot among nations not sending a delegation. The unanimous result achieved (both on the postal and personal votes) must have been gratifying to old and new opponents of exclusion alike, although fairly strong persuasive pressures, especially on people like Picard, had been necessary to bring it about. It was now the French and Belgians and their allies who had been called upon to suppress their private feelings in the interests of the unity of the I.R.C. All the same, those at the centre of the I.R.C. must have known that the resolution passed and invitations issued in 1926 were an expression of hope for the future, not something likely to bear immediate fruit. For there had been unofficial overtures early in the year, to sound out German governmental and scientific opinion, and the results of these had been distinctly gloomy. In March, 1926, C. G. Simpson of the British Meteorological Office had long
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Paris; the French scientistPainleve was presentfor part of the time. (Lorentz was an old campaigneragainst the exclusion of Germany. He had written to Schusterin that sense, in terms of studied moderation, as early as 1919. (64)) Simpson was a member of the Council of the Royal Society, but was emphatic that he attended in a private capacity, not as an official representativeof the Royal Society. As he met Lorentz at the specific suggestion of Sir Richard Glazebrook (Foreign Secretary,R.S.) and sent detailed reportson the talks to Glazebrook, Rutherford(President)and Schuster,he is perhapsbest regarded as a semi-officialenvoy. Simpson was told by Lorentz that two members of the Dutch Academy (Went and Kruyt) had had a meeting with the three Secretariesof the Berlin Academy (Planck, Rubner and another). The atmosphereat this meeting had initially been bad, but had improved. Lorentz showed him a copy of a memorandumwhich the Germanshad given to Went, which set out four conditions for Germanycoming into I.R.C., these were: (i) That a positive invitation to join be issued. (ii) That not only should the regulation banning German entry be annulled, but that it should be declaredthat the reasonsfor excluding Germany were annihilated ('vernichtet'). (The intention was apparently to avow that there never had been any valid reason for keeping Germanyout.) (iii) Germany and Austria should each be given a seat on the Executive Committee and a proper proportion of offices in the Council and the Unions. That the German language be allowed at meetings, and if there were (iv) more than one official languageGermanshouldbe one. (65) Plans were also discussedfor a 'preliminary'meeting at Paris, to try to resolve the differencesrevealed by the Dutch-Germanmeeting. This was to be attendedby representatives of the German,Frenchand BritishAcademies,and of other countries. I have found nothing among Schuster'spapersto indicate that this 'preliminary' meeting ever took place-perhaps it died in utero through intransigenceon one or both sides. Whether it took place or not, it must have been clear by the time of the Assembly that the leadersof German science were determinedto extract the maximum possible national advantage from the situation. They were preparedto enter only on conditions which could readily be construed as a German victory, rather than as an act of reconciliation, and which could thereforebe a powerful emollient to injured German pride. Furthermore, some of these conditions were bound to be
Lorentz in conversations, extendingover two days, with the Dutchphysicist
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unacceptableto at leastsome of the Western countries.To persuadethe French and Belgians to swallow sufficient of their pride to let Germany in was difficult enough: to expect them to swallow their pride whole, even to abase themselvesby apologizing, in effect, for having excluded Germanyin the first place, was to asktoo much.
In the event, the decisions taken at Brussels in 1926 satisfied only the first of the four German conditions. The relevant clause of the statutes was simply annulled, without comment as to whether it had originally been justifiable, which was a long way from meeting condition (ii). It was therefore inevitable that events after 1926 should be anti-climatic. Neither those who had been blackballed, nor those who had stayed outside in protest showed any great alacrity to join. The German Academies, in particular, vigorously rejected the invitation, against the wishes of their own government. The response in the smaller countries of the Central Powers was more favourable: Hungary joined I.R.C. in 1927 and Bulgaria in 1934 (the delay in Bulgaria was ostensibly for financial reasons). But Germany and Austria stayed outside until after World War II: Austria joined I.C.S.U. (the successor of I.R.C.) in 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1952 and the German Democratic Republic in 1961 (66). It is unlikely that German and Austrian scientists really intended to stay outside for so long. The prevalent attitude would rather have been: 'We'll show them we're not to be had just for the asking-let's wait a few years'. Once Hitler came to power in 1933 the opportunity in Germany had been lost, for the climate of opinion would then have been very unfavourable to joining any international organization of this kind. In Austria, conditions for joining should have been more favourable, for the country was dominated by political Catholicism up to 1938, and the Vatican City was a member of I.C.S.U. from 1934. Not surprisingly, however, feelings of cultural unity with Germany took precedence, especially as the Austrian Academies were affiliated to the Verband des deutschen Akademien. Even in 1926, Austria had been prepared to join if only Germany would (66). Schuster does not appear to have been especially active after 1926 in making further attempts to persuade the Germans to join. There are two probable reasons for this. First, after the initial rebuff, a year or more had to elapse before it was worth renewing the attempts, and in 1927-28 Schuster suffered a serious illness, followed by a long convalescence which kept him largely out of action for about six months. During this period Glazebrook deputized for him, and kept him informed of such developments as there were. Glazebrook had met a retired German scientist (Strecker) who thought he could do something
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Much more (it is not clear precisely what) to produce a better understanding. a from was letter Schuster's Went, view) long reporting on the promising (in state of German scientific opinion. According to Went's information, at the meeting of the Cartell [=Verband?] deutscherAkademien in 1927 there had been a majority (Berlin, Gottingen, Heidelberg, Vienna) in favour of joining I.R.C., but the opposition of the minority (Munich, Leipzig) had been so strong that the majority had not dared to pressthrough their proposal.Went also believed that the Deutsche PhysikalischeGesellschaftwanted to join the InternationalUnion of Physics, and that the corresponding chemical body wished to join the I.U. Chemistry. Having learnt that the botanist Goebel (Munich) was one of the leading opponentsof joining I.R.C., Went had had a long talk with Goebel and other leading Bavarianscientists,trying, he believed with some success,to weaken their opposition. Went believed that only a very few were strongly opposed, while the great majority of German scientists wanted to join I.R.C. (a situation,he suggested,parallelto that in Franceand Belgium up to 1926). Many Germans had enjoined him to have patience. Other moves were afoot through other Dutch scientists,but Went was not authorized to give details. Schusterwas so encouragedby Went's report that he suggested that the Royal Society ought to propose or support a move to abolish the I.R.C. rule whereby countries adheringto a particularUnion had also to belong to the I.R.C., although he did not seem very optimistic about the chancesof success(66). The picture paintedby Went is much rosierthan that which emergesfrom Forman'scareful study of German opinion (mainly among physicists) at the same period (3). The impressionthat one gains from Formanis that, apartfrom a few outstandingindividuals (e.g. Einstein, who was widely ostracizedas a result), Germanscientistspresentedan almost monolithic opposition to joining the I.R.C. PerhapsWent, or his informants,had succumbedto wishful thinking: the contrast,nevertheless,is striking. The second, more conjectural,reason why Schustershould have stayed in the backgroundis that the nationalisticleadersof Germanscience would have acknowledged that most of their counterpartsin Allied countries had, like themselves,been acting in accordancewith properand laudablepatrioticsentiments. They were men of like minds divided by the accident of nationality. Schuster, however, would have been seen as a special case. As a man of German birth who had become the chief executive of an anti-German organization, he would probably have been regarded as a traitor, even a pariah. The absentGermanycontinued to give rise to some dissensionand friction
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within the I.R.C., though to a much lesser extent than before 1926. Thus in 1928 the British National Committee of the International Astronomical Union proposed to change the I.A.U. statutes so as to allow individual German scientists to attend their meetings, without waiting for a corresponding change in the statutes of I.R.C. itself (68). From Sweden in the same year came a more ominous threat: that Sweden (and perhaps other neutrals) would probably not continue her membership beyond 1931 (when the I.R.C. statutes were due to come up for revision) unless Germany had by then adhered. Behind this threat, Glazebrook saw the possibility that Sweden was considering joining some new, German-based combination-but the threat never materialized (69). On the other side, British biologists were in no great hurry to reverse their earlier decision to stay out: Britain did not adhere to I.U.B.S. until 1929 (70). U.S.A., which had stayed out of I.U.B.S. for similar reasons (see below) was even tardier, not joining until 1935 (71). The reason for this continued abstention, now that the German question had, at least formally, been disp6sed of, is to be sought partly in inertia and partly in the old bugbear of bureaucracy: the widespread feeling that I.U.B.S. was an imposing piece of machinery of little real use to biologists. This is well brought out in a letter from Dale to Schuster in 1927, which appears to have accompanied a formal recommendation from the various biological committees of the Royal Society not to join I.U.B.S. Dale reported that he had put the case for I.U.B.S. as well as he could (and one senses that Dale himself did not find it a very convincing case), but there was, he said, a uniform scepticism as to any gain to British biologists or their sciences to be achieved by joining, apart from a possible influence on the general politics of international science. While the I.R.C. was still postponing the question of making itself truly international, biologists had taken things into their own hands and organized several international congresses in which Germans and Austrians had participated (72). The views of leading British biologists seemed, in fact, to be virtually unchanged since just before the statutes were altered, when Schuster had told the Belgian Secretary-General of I.U.B.S. that he knew of only a single British biologist (J. H. Ashworth of Edinburgh) who was favourable towards joining I.U.B.S. (73). (Schuster's and Dale's informal opinion polls appear to have been restricted to FF.R.S.) It seems rather remarkable that, only two years after Dale's letter, Britain should have joined: this was surely due less to any changes in conviction about the merits of I.U.B.S., as to a desire not to appear unco-operative in the international scene, and to evade those accusations of 'British perfidy' which Prain had predicted would result from the ambiguous nature of the original recommendation of the biological committees of the Royal Society. (Prain had
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criticized the wording of the 1923 recommendationas being too 'clever' and 'political': he would have preferreda more forthright declaration.As things stood, the recommendationdid not commit Britain to joining I.U.B.S. as soon as the Germanswere allowed in, but other countriesmight well supposethat it implied such a commitment, with the consequent declarationsagainst British perfidy if we did not.) (74).
ATTITUDES OF BIOLOGISTSIN OTHER ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES
So far, I have treated the boycott of I.U.B.S. as a purely British affair. I now wish to consider briefly similar strandsof opinion elsewhere, confining countries. myself for simplicityto English-speaking An examination of the lists of countries belonging to the eight Unions formed up to 1926 (Astronomy, Geodesy and Geophysics, Chemistry, Mathematics,Radio Science, Physics, Biological Sciences, Geography) reveals a very sporadicpattern of membership(19). The total membershipof all the Unions together is not much more than half what it would have been had each country belonged to all eight Unions. The smallercountriesoften belonged to only one or a few Unions (Monaco in fact belonged to I.R.C. but to no constituentUnion). It would clearly be unrealisticto supposethat all or most gaps in the membershiphinged on the German question, and hazardousto assume this in any individual case without supportingevidence. Neverthelessthere is a strong hint of solidarityamong the biologists of the English-speakingnations. Only one-South Africa-belonged to the I.U.B.S. at this time. The nonmembershipof U.S.A. is particularlystriking, since, like Britain, she was one of the five statesattendingthe 1918 London Conference;she had a representative on the executive committee of I.R.C., and adheredto all the other seven Unions. Australia belonged to six of them, Canada to five, while New Zealand was in a ratherdifferentposition. New Zealand was cited in I9I9 as a founding member of I.R.C., but her membershipnever became effective (i.e. she did not pay the membershipdues) during the 1920s, and consequentlyshe belonged to no Union. Enquirieshave been made to the affiliating academiesof these countriesas to the reason(s) why they did not then belong to I.U.B.S., and have yielded a variety of answers.In the case of Canadano informationis now available(74). In U.S.A. the Division of Biology and Agriculture of the National Research Council voted in May 1923 againstjoining I.U.B.S. (75). Although Schramm's brief letter gives no indication of the reason, Hale's letter to Schusteralready cited shows that the exclusion of Germany was (at the least) an important determinant in the vote. 'Here as with you, the biologists and the pure
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mathematicians seem to be the most insistent regarding the omission of Germany' (61). Australian withholding from I.U.B.S. was probably influenced by financial stringencies, and there is no definite evidence of a boycott. However, feeling was strong in Australia that Germany ought to be admitted. Not only was an Australian motion tabled at Brussels in I925 alongside the Netherlands motion, making Australia the first former Allied nation to give public and official support to the admission of Germany. Long before this, in August 1922, the Australian National Research Council had passed a similar resolution, and sent a copy of it to London (presumably to Schuster) (77). Financial stringencies were again important, probably decisive, in preventing the adherence of New Zealand to I.U.B.S.: neither the records nor personal memories suggest anything approaching a boycott (78). Thus in U.S.A. and quite probably in Australia biologists took the same line as in Britain, although the role of Australian biologists is less clear.
ATTITUDES IN OTHER SCIENCES
Clearly, biologists were not alone in including a substantial number of opponents of German exclusion. We have already met several sources implicating mathematicians: Hardy's account of events at the London Mathematical Society; the broadly based international revolt at the I.M.C. congress at Toronto, and Hale's remark to Schuster just quoted. (Hale's letter was not influenced by the Toronto congress; it was written 3 months previously.) There was, besides, a large and growing body of opinion within I.R.C. itself which worked for a change in the statutes. There was a third alternative policy for objectors: to form an independent or breakaway Union. We have seen that there was at least one unsuccessful attempt (in biology) and at least one which was temporarily successful (applied mechanics). However, such a course is tactically rather unattractive. Unless a breakaway Union can secure the support of many countries, including the most important ones, it will offer few advantages to its adherents (the form rather than the substance) and will besides cut them off from the mainstream of international cooperation in that science. If the science is one where the need for formal international co-operation is fairly slight, this may not matter much, but then the incentive to form a breakaway Union will be weak. A breakaway Union does, however, probably have a greater propaganda value than a boycott: the latter might be widely interpreted as the result of inertia, parsimony or isolationism. I shall argue that such tactical considerations were the main identifiable factor in the apparent greater readiness of biologists and mathematicians to
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Unions.An alternative wouldbe indulgein boycottsor breakaway hypothesis into biology or mathematics tendedto have a different that peopleattracted theirinternational loyalty or altered mentalitywhich somehowstrengthened is their way of expressingit. The 'mentality'hypothesis not inherently in three but it compares poorly with the 'tactical'hypothesis implausible, It less much of formulation has less ways. support; (ii) feasibility (i) primafacie to adequate with acceptable (iii) less amenability testing.It is for precision; to not because I wish minimize the these reasons,and possiblerole of
mentality, that I shall ignore the 'mentality'hypothesishenceforth.For similar
reasons, I shall ignore factors which in this context can be regarded as 'chance', e.g. the individual characteristics and geographical location of the person(s) in charge of a particular Union. Biology and pure mathematics may seem to be strange bedfellows. What they had in common was that neither, in the I920s, had any pressing need for a Union. Mathematics, dealing only in ideas, needs only international means of communication, journals and congresses, neither of which needs the backing of a Union. This applies with only slightly less force to applied mathematics. It is significant that the I.M.U., founded in 1922, was dissolved some time between I93I and I934 and was not refounded until I952 (I9, 37). Among the Unions established by 1926, Astronomy, Geodesy and Geophysics, Radio Science and Geography stand out as sciences with a clear and strong need for formal international co-operation, even in the very collection of their data. The case was perhaps less obvious and strong for Physics and Chemistry, yet the common coin of these sciences was entities and units which were exactly comparable across national boundaries: elements, atomic weights, spectra, electrical units. ... As the I.R.C. had effectively destroyed the remnants of the pre-war system, physical scientists had really very little choice but to join I.R.C. (or rather, to support joining by their nations) and, if they felt so inclined, to work from within for reform of the statutes. To have stayed outside the system, cutting themselves off from vital international sources, would for many of them have been quite crippling. It is instructive to compare the crude classification of sciences above, according to their degree of need for an international organization, with the assessment by Kevles as to the degree of activity of the eight Unions formed by the mid-1920s. Only two, he says, were flourishing (astronomy; geodesy and geophysics), while the rest (notably those for mathematics, chemistry and physics) 'amounted largely to mere paper organisations' (5). Excepting the relative inactivity of the Unions for radio sciences and geography, (which might have other causes) the general agreement is good. Where there was an
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Union was co-operation,the corresponding urgent need for international to be anemptyshell-as, active;wheretherewasno suchclearneed,it tended to be. British I.U.B.S. indeed,the leading judged biologists in the sameprecise The commoncoinageof biology wasnotinternational Particular were of the sciences. as that species usuallylocal in way physical which could be and even with stocksof laboratory distribution organisms, drift soon ensurethat would acrossnationalboundaries, transferred genetic no identical. meaurements Such stocks were sibling longerprecisely biological of interfor the establishment andunitsas then existedweretoo approximate to be a pressing need.Biologists couldthusaffordto takea national standards at very little practical cost. ForBateson was quiteright standupon principle it it not as is in thatthe functhen as was, now) claiming biology (considering channels andby tionscould be servedas well-perhaps better-by informal concommittees of international bodiessuchas the standing existingspecialist often did very muchmorethanjust organize gresses(52). Thesecommittees a threadof conthe for next congressand generallymaintain preparations in The need for a international most body biology permanent tinuity. pressing and monitora code of practicefor the had been in taxonomy,to establish and of species andhighertaxa.Thisneedhadlong beenserved, nomenclature of and the International served well, through Botany. Congresses Zoology datesfrom of Zoological Nomenclature The International Commission It at an of 1894,whenit wassetup by International Congress Zoology Leyden. side a similarpermanent is true that on the botanical body was not formed BotanicalCongress,Cambridge). This delay was until 1930 (International their own in that the Americans a of the fact code due to adopted mainly in The from the one use. international codes different general Botany,slightly in fact go back even furtherthanthe zoological of botanicalnomenclature Commission and the International ones: to I867 (Paris).(The International from but they remainas Bureaudo now receivefinancial I.U.B.S., support which to the to but answerable not I.U.B.S., bodies, Congresses independent in set them up.) It is of interestthat when, 1934,U.S.A. did at lastjoin E. D. Merrill I.U.B.S., it was largely on the initiativeof a taxonomist, Merrill York Botanical was of New Gardens): promptlyelected (Director President of I.U.B.S. (80). But the growing body of experimental biologistsneededto have little themselves with the niceties of proper concern nomenclature, beyondensuring at least)the 'same' thatthe organism they workedwith was (approximately, thatthe samespecieswas not and conversely, speciesas that used elsewhere, upon under two differentnames. And the average being experimented
275 biologist of the time could support a boycott without putting his professional interests appreciably at risk.
CONCLUSIONS
The events surrounding the early years of the I.R.C. have sometimes been regarded as a test-case for the existence and effectiveness of a spirit of internationalism among scientists. Clearly, judged by the highest standards, the scientists (or rather, the scientific establishments) of the Allied countries, and no less those of Germany, failed the test. If the scientists of neutral countries came out of the affair with much greater credit, that, it may be said, was because they faced a much lesser challenge: there was for them no conflict between scientific and national loyalties. The view expressed by SchroederGtidehus, that 'the weight of transnational loyalties' among scientists was 'hardly noticeable' is therefore superficially attractive. Nevertheless, I believe, for three main reasons, that it is seriously exaggerated and one-sided. First, a major war presents a particularly severe challenge-perhaps the most severe-to any system of international loyalties which transects the conventional duties of patriotism. Failure in this test by no means implies that scientific loyalties would have failed a less demanding test. Witness the activities (undoubtedly effective, though not immediately so) of scientists of neutral countries in the I.R.C. affair. The main motive of these can hardly have been anything else than a sense of scientific internationalism. Indeed, from a narrowly nationalistic point of view, an indefinite continuation of the immediate post-war situation would have given the neutral countries at least a marginal advantage in competitive terms, since they alone would have been in communication with their fellows in both the opposed camps. Second, the question of adherence to the I.R.C. or any of its Unions was effectively outside the control of rank-and-file scientists in any country. The system of representation through the leading scientific academy of each country meant that the power or decision lay in the hands of a rather small body of distinguished and comparatively elderly scientists. (The I.R.C. did have an alternative, for use in countries where no suitable academy existed, whereby membership was effected through the government itself. This was little used, and was hardly calculated to give a more representative result.) Academies like the Royal Society were self-selecting and self-perpetuating elites. Even had there been some more representative system of election of members of the academies, with scientists as a whole forming the electorate, it is unlikely that the collective views of those elected would have been very different. For election to the academy would still have been seen as an honour,
276
of eminentachievement in science.Thisconsideraa rewardand recognition the voting, which would have been influenced tion would have dominated of sciencepolicy andpolitics,suchas adherence to hardlyat all by questions it is unlikelythatthe the I.R.C.Indeed,given the highlydispersed electorate, views of potentialcandidates upon such questionswould have been at all known. a referendum on I.R.C.matters couldhave widely Only specifically a true reflection of the views the of scientific as a given community whole,and in the delineation even thiswouldhavefaceddifficulties of the electorate. The is well illustrated Golub's elections to the point by protest (council concerning of the?) American the ballotform were Institute of Physics.Accompanying thumbnail of the candidates. These,however,related solelyto the biographies and research of the candidates, academic achievements andnot at all to their to society.Accordingly, views on, say, the relationof the physicsprofession theelections a farcical contest(81). Golubconsidered popularity In the present there are thatopinionamong several case, pointers suggesting scientists would have been on averageless chauvinistic than rank-and-file the scientific establishments. There of course the is, point among very general in time of war, at leastin its extremer thatchauvinism forms,is characteristic at home (civilians thanof moreof the olderpopulation andperhaps brass-hats) the actualcombatant forces,who tend moreto see 'the enemy',equallywith as helplessvictimsof fate. An exampleis providedby the cause themselves, of the removal of BertrandRussellfrom his fellowshipat Trinity celebre in I917.(Russell's CollegeCambridge allegedoffencewasnot hispacifism per of pacifism, whichlandedhimin prison. se, but his persistent publicadvocacy for example,and Other less vocal pacifists amongthe Fellows Eddington, it was preFrom account, Hardy's Hardy himself-escaped unscathed.) the war older Fellows-too for and old service thus still in dominantly residence-who voted for Russell's expulsion.The youngermen, while not with Russell's were moreinclinedto tolerate much views, them,but agreeing war on were unable to vote service, (15). beingmostlyaway Morespecifically, the difficulties in 1926, Kevles,discussing facingSchuster no that the had French scientists were but influence' 'reasonable, says younger a similar view (thoughnot specifically (5). As we have seen,Went expressed of age) over the converse in Germany situation bringingin the question (66). Thereis also the instructive the of N.U.S.W., example stronglyopposedto German exclusion. Withoutdoubtthe average member of N.U.S.W. was,in the centreof powerin age andrank,considerably juniorto thosewho formed a typical the Royal Society.The N.U.S.W., however,cannotbe considered of scientists of thetime:it haddistinct whichwere sample left-wingtendencies,
277
amongits leadership (despitethe 'mandatory' preprobablyratherstronger

sence of a conservative in Gwynne-Vaughan on the Executive Committee)
than among the general membership. This, indeed could hardly have been otherwise: the very idea of joining a trade union, especially one including in its ranks technician grades as well as the more middle-class type of scientist, would in the I92os have been repugnant to most scientists of more conventional views. There was, then, a self-selecting bias among the membership of N.U.S.W., and one which might be expected to produce a concentration of views favouring internationalism. Nevertheless, N.U.S.W. membership in 1924 reached over 900: on MacLeod's estimated total (necessarily imprecise) of 20,000 scientists in Britain, this amounted to 4.5% of all British scientists-a small but not inconsiderable minority (82). The exclusion of Germany from the I.R.C. was, then, the responsibility of scientific elites, although it is problematical how much difference to events it would have made had the generality of scientists had a say in the matter. If it seems highly unlikely that this would have sufficed to prevent the initial exclusion of Germany in 1919, it seems on the other hand, very likely that it would have done something to hasten her subsequent admission. As German scientific opinion against accepting an offer to join hardened with each delay, even an advancement by a single year (as it was, only the stringent voting requirements thwarted the majority view in the I.R.C. in 1925) could have had very important and enduring consequences for international scientific relations. The view of a scientist as one wholly devoted to a dispassionate search for objective truth, coming down from his ivory tower only to give the less exalted members of the populace a demonstration of how the application of scientific principles could set the world to rights, has long since lost whatever plausibility it may once have had. If we are to look for effects of a 'spirit of scientific internationalism' in public affairs, we must therefore not expect to find scientists wholly immune from the wave of chauvinism occurring during and after a major war. Rather we must ask such questions as: was the wave, at its peak, less intense or less widespread than in other sections of the population? Did the wave subside sooner among scientists? How far did scientists eventually put their own house in order, or was it left to governmental and other external pressures? Here lies my third and most important reason for believing that scientific internationalism was not a negligible force. Without data far more extensive and precise than have been discussed here, the first two questions hardly admit of a definite answer. Certainly quotations from scientists could be found, displaying as extreme and petty a chauvinism as any found elsewhere. The amelioration of relations between Germany and the
278
Western Allies after 1918, both at governmentaland less official levels, was so gradual a process that it would be very difficult to argue that scientistsas a whole were either well in the van, or lagging behind other groups. The crux then lies in the questionof what were the causesof the (abortive)detente in the I.R.C. in 1926. Here Schroeder-Gtidehus again expressesa forthright view:
'the decisive pressures were to come from governmental quarters' (2). My own
view is almost diametrically opposite: that the pressurescame mainly from within the scientific world itself, and while other sources played their part, were at most marginal. direct governmentalpressures cites in support of her view a number of items from Schroeder-Gtidehus German diplomatic archives implying that the French, Belgian, British and to their academiesor delegationsto Swiss governmentshad issued'instructions' vote for the amendmentof the I.R.C. statutesin 1926.Diplomats are of course liable to over-estimatethe importanceof the messagesthey transmit.Whatever the British Charge d'affairesmay have told German diplomats, the British Government had no legal authority to give such instructionsto the Royal Society, and it is in the highest degree unlikely that they would have made so crass a blunder. (In time of war, and on a matter more obviously affecting national security,things might have been different.)To have attemptedto instruct the Royal Society would have been to invite a rebuff: indeed, it could even have encouragedFellows opposedto the admissionof Germany(andthere must still have been some) to stage a rebellion, ballasting their case by the claim that they were acting in defence of the much-treasured independenceof the Society from the government.Doubtlessthe Britishgovernmentof the day that the Royal Society would supportGermanadmission,and they may hoped have conveyed these hopes to the Society in some informaland less well very ham-fisted manner. (I found no evidence of such a communication among Schuster'spapers,although I was unableto make an exhaustivesearch.Besides, such a delicate matteris rathermore likely to have been conveyed by word of mouth.) In any case, the government need have had no qualmsabout which way the Royal Society would vote in I926, for they had already, in 1925, voted for Germanadmission. In the case of Switzerland,I would suppose(as an outsider)that an attempt by the government to instruct the academy was no more likely than in Britain-and just as superfluous,since Switzerlandtoo, had opposed German exclusion in 1925. The cases of France and Belgium are different. These countries had formed the core of the opposition to the revision of the I.R.C. statutes.Given the rule requiringa two-thirds majority,a change was virtually impossible without securing the support of at least one of them. In a formal
279
thatwhatever senseit couldbe argued caused France andBelgiumto pressures switchsideswerethe 'decisive' The here was PrePicard, pressures. key figure sidentof I.R.C.:if he changed,the restof the French andBelgiandelegations were likely to follow him, togetherwith countries like Czechoslovakia and betweengovernRelations Poland,which tendedto takea leadfromFrance. ment and the Academiedes Scienceswere probably closerand moreformal thanin Britain andSwitzerland, whichwouldfacilitate effective governmental is It that from the French indeed was Government pressure. possible pressure the laststrawwhich brokePicard's resistance. But the proverbial 'laststraw' has its dramaticeffect only becauseof the many earlierstraws.By conPicard wasa remarkably obstinate accounts, man,rigidin hisdevotemporary tion to international of hispatriotic scienceandto his own conception duty.Is it reallyplausible thatsucha man would have been moreinfluenced by prefrom his own government ssures thanby the combinedpersuasive effortsof scientific frommanycountries, colleagues togetherwith the likelihood(very realby 1926)that, withoutreform,the organization over whichhe had presidedsinceits inception woulddisintegrate? Hadthe French government gone so faras to threaten to cut off fundsfromthe Academie, unless Picard toed the But no-onehasadduced line, thatmightindeedhave beena decisivepressure. thatsuchthreats evidence weremade. The case, then, for an important,let alone a decisive, governmental on the eventsof 1926,remains influence It is ironicthatSchroederunproven. Gidehusherself(I, 2), alongwith Forman has demonstrated thatin a later (3), German on their the of the sustained affair, by government pressures phase to promote scientists adherence to theI.R.C.werequiteineffective. Why then, on a muchslenderer thatpoliticalpressures were basis,assume documentary in the preceding 'decisive' This is not at all to entertain that doubt phase? any the diplomaticmessageswhich she cites were in fact transmitted: the could have crept in at any one of several intrusivelyemphatic'instructed' in the either accident or intent.Indeed, transmission, by stages they soundlike aimed at reassurance. to a more Accustomed typical diplomaticmessages authoritarian and centralisttraditionof governmentthe average German or scientist maynot havefoundthe ideaof a government diplomat instructing an academyincongruous: the exampleof theirown reactions to government wasyet to come. pressures Thereis, on the otherhand,ampleand clearevidenceof the role of pressures internalto the scientific world. This is not to claimthatscientists were uninfluenced either by events or by the generalclimateof opinionaround them.Of coursethey were:scientists do not live in ivorytowers.But it wasa
280
to pressures. matterratherof influencesthan of passivesubmission Such influencesdo not imply that scientistssimply played follow-my-leader, unmoved to a scientist. the If, whilepondering by theidealssupposedly proper of a we are hit on the toe a scientifictheory, beauty by brick,the theory fromour mind,supplanted vanishes correlates of by pain,rageandthe mental least until the has We activities-at subsided. pain displacement might who wasa chauvinist if speculatively, in 1918and reasonably, sayof a scientist an internationalist internationalist tendencies by 1926,thathisnatural (natural, that is, to his occupationas a scientist,without therebyimplyingthat the were presentin every scientist)were overcomeby an attackof tendencies themselves. Thatmanyof thosewho supported butlaterreasserted chauvinism, to the cause)were moved Germanentry (especially among later adherents of the I.R.C.)thanby a moreby practical considerations (the riskof collapse not is inconsistent with thisview. real concernfor internationalist principles, no threat to For the German would have the I.R.C. had question presented to there not been a large and vocal body of scientists on opposed principle was expressed thatopposition in Allied exclusion.It is important by scientists but thereis no needhereto tryto assess therelaaswell asin neutral countries, of the two. Likewise, the fact that differentgroups of tive effectiveness scientists different tactics(workingwithinthe system, boycott,a rival adopted to the main point. is subsidiary Union), accordingto their circumstances, is not entirely an ideologicalmatter.It has an Scientificinternationalism of scientific fromthe universalist nature strand, method, ideological stemming it in which national no but find has,too, a practical strand, place; ideologies to scienceof international communication andcoarisingfromthe usefulness of an interstrand: asmembers Thereis alsoa professional scientists operation. interests. with a to each others' national duty protect guild, fromwithinthe scientific for The central community pointis thatpressures of scientificinterreform,all dependingon one or more of these strands causeof becamevery strongand were muchthe mostimportant nationalism, interthe decisionof 1926.This was, on the whole, a victoryfor scientific it because too late to flawed and muted came a nationalism, victory, although into the I.R.C.Justas scientists aim:the entryof Germany achieveits ultimate shameon the eventsof shouldlook back with some, possiblyprophylactic, to takea modest andqualified I918 and 1919,theyareentitled pridein thoseof
I926. NOTE ADDEDNOVEMBER1982
in view of recentcontroversy The question arises, naturally especially (83),
28I
whether I.C.S.U. coped with the chauvinistic aftermath of the war(s) of 1939-45 any better than I.R.C. did with that which followed I914-I918? I shall attemptonly a skeletalanswer. The index date (comparable to I919 for I.R.C.) may be taken as 1946, when I.C.S.U. entered into an agreement with U.N.E.S.C.O. and thus establishedan informal link with the United Nations. Under this agreement, I.C.S.U. received financial support from U.N.E.S.C.O., but retained its independence (6). The same five countries (U.S., Great Britain, France,Italy and Belgium) who as victor nations in I919 had founded I.R.C. in 1919 were again among the victors (at least in the conventional sense) after 1945. These countries (or, rather, their academies) were, together with the academiesof allies and friendly countries, in effective control of I.C.S.U. in 1946. The governments of all the I.R.C.-founders joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Thus, besides the chauvinistic tensions between recent warenemies (for the sake of concisenessI shallignore wars after 1945),there was an intersectingset of antagonismsarising from current political conflicts between the statesconcerned. The table below shows the dates at which academies of the principal I939-45 war-enemies of the I.R.C.-founder countries joined I.C.S.U. Alongside are the years in which the correspondingstatesjoined the United Nations. Below the horizontalline similarfigures are given for the two largest states which, after 1945, became political opponents of the I.R.C.-founder states.Both these states,of course,had been recent wartimeallies of the I.R.C.founders. Academy/State FederalRepublicof Germany GermanDemocratic Republic Austria Japan
U.S.S.R. People's Republic of China
Year ofjoining I.C.S.U. U.N. 1952(a) 1973 I96I 1973 1950(a) 1955 (1931) (b) 1956
1955 1949/1982 (c) 1946 1971
(a) There is an uncertaintyof up to two years about the exact dates when the FederalRepublic of Germanyand Austriajoined; the latestpossible yearsare given here. (b) Japan'smembershipnever formally lapsedduring the war.
282
(c) AcademiaSinica Nanking was affiliated not later than 1948; by 1952 the
SinicaPeking (P.R. China), but registrationwas changed to Academia severalyears'outstandingdues were paid in the early 195o'sby Academia SinicaTaipei(Taiwan), which thus acquiredthe registration.Reinstatement of AcademiaSinicaPeking was achieved only in 1982.
This table is based on informationsupplied by the Executive Secretaryof I.C.S.U. (84). For China and Taiwan, see also (85). The limitations of the table are serious (e.g. the omission of many smaller countries and of the entire 'Third World'), but it shows that I.C.S.U. coped with chauvinismvery much better than I.R.C. had. In the top partof the table, only one country (G.D.R.) was not affiliated to I.C.S.U. 6 years after 1946, whereas it had taken I.R.C. 7 years even to amend its statutesto make affiliation of ex-enemy stateslegally possible. If we rememberboth that affiliation to bodies like I.C.S.U. would not have a high priority in war-ravaged defeatedcountries,and that G.D.R., as a memberof the Warsaw Pact, was also a current political opponent of the I.R.C.-founder states, the achievement of I.C.S.U. must be judged impressive. All four countries, moreover, joined I.C.S.U. earlierthan U.N., by an average of I2 years. As far, then, as securing the affiliation of recent war-enemiesis an adequateguide, I.C.S.U. did very much better than the principalinternationalbody in the generalpolitical field. Science and scientistswere indeed in the vanguardin achieving reconciliation
after 1946, as they had not (or not indisputably) been after 1919.
Below the line (and including G.D.R. for these purposes), the picture is much less clear or satisfactory. But at least it can be argued, on these data, that I.C.S.U. did no worse in persuadingcitizens of states currently in political conflict to co-operatethan did other, more political bodies. Clearly many and diversefactorscontributedto this improvedperformance of I.C.S.U. as comparedwith I.R.C. I shall merely indicatethose which were, in the main, internal to I.C.S.U. itself: (i) The lack of any initial discriminatoryprinciple comparableto that propoundedby the London Conferenceof 1918. (ii) The looser-knitfederalconstitutionof I.C.S.U. It is federal along two separate dimensions (as between states and as between sciences [Unions]), and the fact that power is spread over both dimensions of the federality was probably important. (iii) Organizationally, I.C.S.U. did not have to startfrom scratch,a handicapimposed on I.R.C. by the London Conference.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am much indebted to the librariansand archivistsof the following: The
283 Royal Society, London, England; Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick, England; Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, England; American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, U.S.A.; National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., U.S.A., and especially to Dr P. K. McClure of the lastnamed, who sent copies of several letters of the greatest interest. I am grateful, too, for information provided by various correspondents, as indicated in the footnotes. The return of the Bateson Papers to this country was made possible by the generosity of the late Dr Gregory Bateson and by a travel grant from the Wellcome Foundation. A further grant from the Wellcome Foundation is now aiding completion of the cataloguing of these papers.
NOTES
(I) B. Schroeder-Giidehus, 'Challenge to Transnational Loyalties: International Scientific Organisationsafter the First World War', Science Studies,3 (1973),
93-1 i8.
und International Zusammenarbeit, (2) B. Schroeder-Giidehus,Deutsche Wissenschaft (3) P. Forman, 'Scientific internationalism and the Weimar Physicists'. Isis, 64
Science in World War I', Isis, 62 (1971), 47-60. D. (5) J. Kevles, 'The International Research Council, 1914-1928 (Geneva; Dumaret et Golay, 1966). (I973), I5I-I80.
(4) D. J. Kevles, 'Into Hostile Political Camps: the Reorganisationof International

1914-1931-a
Politics, Science and OrganisationalFailure'. (Unpublished MS based on a paper given at the conference on 'Science, Governmentand Internationalism,
study in
University of California, Berkeley, 1970.) (6) Sir H. S. Jones, 'The Early History of ICSU, 1919-1946', I.C.S.U. Review 2 (1960), I69-I87. This is a semi-official history, written by a former secretary-
generalof I.C.S.U. Published sources apart, this study has leaned heavily on the personalpapersof (7) William Bateson, now in course of transferto the University Library, Cambridge. These will be referredto as B.P.C., followed by a catalogue reference to particularitems. A microfilm of sections A to F (which includes about half the items referredto here) is available at the library of the American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia.Use has also been made, for materialon Hardy, of the A.Sc.W./N.U.S.W. archives at the Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick. Two days were spent examining Prain'svoluminous correspondenceat the Royal Botanic Gardens,Kew. This was insufficientfor an exhaustive search, and in fact yielded nothing directly relevant to the present study. More productively, several days were spent on the Schuster MSS. at the Royal Society. The time spent was again insufficient for an exhaustive search, though I believe that the more important relevant documents were discovered.
284 (8) The archives of the InternationalUnion of Biological Science previous to 1953 are no longer traceable:P. H. Bonnel, Executive Secretaryof I.U.B.S. (pers. (9) G. H. Hardy and A. G. Church, ' "International"Scientific Unions', Manchester
Guardian (3 June 1924), I2. Reprinted with the ManchesterGuardian'seditorial comment in Scientfic Worker (May-June, 1924), I8 and 23-24. The set of comm., 1976).
incomplete sets elsewhere (British Union Catalogue of Periodicals, 1958 and Supplement, 1960). The Warwick holding is not listed in the Union Catalogue, (Io) B. Bateson, William Bateson, Naturalist: His Essays and Addresses,(London: Cambridge University Press, 1928), pp. 1-160. See also: W. Coleman 'Batesonand Chromosomes: Conservative Thought in Science', Centaurus, 15 (1970), 228-314; A. G. Cock, 'William Bateson, Mendelism and Biometry'. J. Hist.
Biol. 6 (1973), 1-36. (II) E. C. Titchmarch, 'Godfrey Harold Hardy, I877-I947,' Obit. Not. Fell. R. Soc. Lond. 6 (1948), 447-46I. G. H. Hardy, A Mathematician's Apology, (London: Cambridge University Press, I940). i-io. (12) R. C. Punnett, 'Early days of Genetics', Heredity, 4 (I950), R. Soc. Lond., 4 (1945) H. Obit. Not. Fell. I. 'David Burkill, Prain, I857-I944', (13) 747-770.
at the Modern Records Centre, Warwick appearsto be the ScientificWorker only complete library backrun in existence, although there are several
as the A.Sc.W./N.U.S.W. archiveswere not then in a co-operatinglibrary.
(14) There is an extensive Bateson-Praincorrespondenceamong the separatecollec-
tion of Bateson papersat theJohn InnesInstitute,Norwich. While this mainly concerns administrativematters, it attests the developing friendshipbetween them. andTrinity(Cambridge:privately printed, 1942). Russell (15) G. H. Hardy, Bertrand (16) See especially W. Bateson, 'Biological Fact and the Structureof Society', in B. Bateson, (note 10), 334-355. D. MacKenzie, 'StatisticalTheory and Social Interests',Soc. Stud. Sci. 8, (1978) (17) 35-83. See also Coleman (note io). My reasonsfor dissentingfrom their view are too complex to be given here, and will be given in full in a paper in preparation intended for Annals of Science, on Bateson's attitude to the chromosome theory of heredity. The point is only of marginal importance here: if Bateson was a conservative,this placeshim even furtherfrom Hardy's position. (18) W. Bateson to H. E. Armstrong, 6 May 915 (2 letters). Armstrong Papers, A Defenceof ImperialCollege, London, England.J. B. S. Haldane, Callinicus:
Chemical Warfare(London: Kegan Paul, 1925). of the First, Secondand Third GeneralAssembliesof the Inter(i9) Reportsof the Proceedings General Assemblyof the InternationalResearchCouncil. Report of the Extraordinary See also national Research Council. (London: The Royal Society, I920-27).
Jones, (note 6).

(20) The Times (London, 21 October I918). (21) Sir G. Hampson, 'A Classification of the Pyralidae', Proc. Zool. Soc. Lond. (1918),
55-I3I.
285
(22) Lord Walsingham, 'German Naturalistsand Nomenclature', Nature,Lond.,I02, (5 September,1918), 4. (23) H. H. Godwin-Austen, Future Treatment of German Man of Science', Nature, (24) G. A. Boulenger to Bateson (23 April I919), B.P.C., E. 32.b.I. (25) A. Koestler, The Caseof theMidwifeToad,(London: Hutchinson, 1971), p. ISI. A major theme of the whole book is that Bateson, Boulenger and others were conspiring to persecuteKoestler'shero and fellow-Austrian P. Kammererfor his Lamarckianbeliefs. Boulenger's chauvinistic statement is introduced as evidence to support this theme without mentioning his Belgian upbringing. This makes the statementappearmore dramaticand more personally vindictive against Kammererthan it really was. A more bizarre result of Koestler's treatment is that, perhaps unintentionally, Bateson in particularis made to appeara gross chauvinistthrough 'guilt by association'. (26) E. R. Lankester, 'International Relations in Science', Nature, Lond., I04 (30
(27)
Lond., I02 (26 September, 1918), 64-65.
D. W. Thompson, 'InternationalRelations in Science', Nature, Lond., I04
October I919), I72.
(23
October 1919), 154. (28) Bateson to C. H. Ostenfeld (5 May 1920), B.P.C., F.36.r.IS. (29) Bateson to T. H. Morgan, I9 May I920. T. H. Morgan papers, American
PhilosophicalSociety, Philadelphia.
(30) Schuster to Bateson (23, 26 and 29June and 2 July 919), B.P.C., G.2.a.4, 5, 6 and
9. (3I) G. C. Simpson, 'Sir Arthur Schuster, I95I-I934', Obit.Not. Fell. R. Soc. Lond.,I (I935), 409-423. (London:Macmillan, 1923). (32) A. Schuster,Autobiographical Fragments, (33) L. Badash, 'British and American Views of the GermanMenace in World War (34).Anon. 'InternationalRelationsin Science', Nature,Lond.,104 (23 October I919), 154-155. Naturestates (personal communication, I980) that Schuster was the author. (35) B. Bateson, (note Io), p. 139. (36) Bateson to Ostenfeld (23 October I919), B.P.C., F.36, r.i2; also in B. Bateson, (note Io), I39-I40. He gave a similarexplanationto Morgan (note 29). Councilof Scientific UnionsYearbookfor 1975, (Paris, I.C.S.U., 1975), (37) International
10.
I', Notes & RecordsR. Soc. Lond., 34 (1979), 91-121.
Vol. 38 and Learned Societies (38) Yearbook of GreatBritainand Ireland, of the Scientific of the Royal Society, and consisted of delegates from the principal scientific societies. Its objects included 'promoting the co-operation of those interested in pure or applied science' and 'discussingscientific questionsin which internationalco-operation seemsadvisable'. (39) W. W. Watts (Secretary, C.B.S.S.) to the Secretary, Linnean Society (25
November 1919); Watts to Bateson (IS and 20 December 1919), B.P.C., G.2.a. I 1-13. (40) Prain to Bateson (6 January 1920); Bateson to Prain (7 January 1920), B.P.C., G.2.a.15 and I6.
(1921),
pp. I0-12. The Conjoint Board was formed in 1917 under the auspices
286 W. Bateson, 'A Text-book of Genetics', (1906) and 'Lectureson Evolution', (1908): in R. C. Punnett, Scientific Papersof WilliamBateson,Vol. 2 (New York;Johnson Reprint, 1971), 442-448. discussionof (42) See his letters written soon afterwards,especially the dispassionate the causes of World War I and of limitations to the duty of a citizen to his government in wartime, in the letter to his son Martin. In B. Bateson (note 10), I35-138. See also D. Lipset, GregoryBateson:The Legacyof a Scientist, (NewJersey: PrenticeHall, 1980), chap. VI. (43) The Times(London: I8 October 1920). (44) Bateson, draftletter to The Times,(n.d.), B.P.C., G.2.c.Io. (45) The Times (London: 8 March 1921). Attributed to 'Our Scientific Correspondent'.The Times(pers.comm., 1980) now identifiesthis as Mitchell. (46) Hardy to Bateson (30 March 1921), B.P.C., G.2.a.2o. of the LinneanSociety) (pers.comm. 1973). (47) G. Bridson (Librarian to Bateson Ostenfeld (48) (30 March 1915 to 17 February1919), B.P.C., F.36.r.4. to
(41)
II.
(49) Bateson to Ostenfeld (27 November 1920 and 7 December 1923), B.P.C., F.36.r.16and 19. There were 30 members in all. Some of them, of course, may not have been (5S) present at the crucial joint meeting. Sir A. V. Hill did not remember the subjectbeing discussedat all (pers.comm. I977). F. (51) A. Towle, AssistantSecretary of the Royal Society, to Bateson (I8 January 1924),B.P.C., G.2.a.23. (52) Ch. Flahaultto Bateson (I5 January1924);Bateson to Flahault(21January1924), B.P.C., F.46.a.I. and 2. Bateson to Hardy (20 May 1924),B.P.C., G.2.a.25. (53) Sir H. (54) Jeffreys (pers. comm. I977). Jeffreys was effectively a founder of N.U.S.W.-see below (note 56). (55) Anon. (B.L.) 'The InternationalConference on Applied Mechanics', Scientific Worker (May-June, 1924), 7-8. A.Sc. W. Archives. (56) For the general history of N.U.S.W. and A.Sc.W. see: E. K. MacLeod, 'Politics, Professionalism and the Organisation of Scientists: The Association of Scientific Workers, 1917-1942'. Ph.D. Thesis, Univ. of Sussex(I975); R. & K. MacLeod. 'The Contradictionsof Professionalism: Scientists,Trade Unionists and the FirstWorld War', Soc. Stud.Sci., 9 (1979), 1-32; Anon. (The Editor), 'The ASW-Twenty years of History'. Sci. Worker (Autumn, 1939), 68-73, A. Sc.W. Archives.None of these mentions the episode recounted here, which is marginal to their main theme of the development of trade unionism and professionalism. (57) Agenda and Minutes, N.U.S.W. Executive Committee meeting, IOMay 1924, A.Sc. W. Archives, 1/2/6/17 and 19. Conservativecandidatein the BritishParliamentary (58) Vaughan was an unsuccessful Elections of 1923, and a former Presidentof N.U.S.W. She resignedfrom the Executive in I924-but not, apparently,on this issue: E. K. MacLeod (note (59) Agenda, N.U.S.W.
56), 218 and 225. A.Sc. W. Archives, 1/2/6/32.
Executive Committee Meeting, 12 December,
1924,
287 (60) G. H. Hardy, 'The Campaign against the Boycott', Sci. Worker (November-December 1924), 59, A.Sc. W. Archives. The brief official Proc6sVerbal of the businessmeeting of I.M.U. at Toronto broadly confirmsHardy's account, though, as one might expect, it is pitched in a lower key and plays down the extent of opposition to the platform. Thus, the original U.S.A. resolution is not mentioned: it is merely. recorded that the U.S.A. (with the support of other countries) handedto the Presidenta note concerning the intervention of the I.R.C. in the admissionof countries into the Union, which the President undertook to passto the Executive Committee of I.R.C. Proc.Int. Math. Congress, Toronto,1924. Vol. I, 65-66. Hardy's name is not among the list of delegatesand membersat the congress:ibid, 30-44. (61) Hale to Schuster (2 May 1924). Archives of the National Academy of Sciences, U.S.A. The (62) physicistR. A. Millikan. He was active in National ResearchCouncil affairs, and was to deputize for Hale at the next executive committee meeting of I.R.C. (63) The zoologist Vernon Kellogg, permanent secretary of the National Research Council since 1920. He was not related to the architectof the Kellogg Pact of
1928.
(64) H. A. Lorentz to A. Schuster, I September 1919, Schuster MSS. 540, Royal Society, London. G. (65) C. Simpson to R. T. Glazebrook, 29 March 1926;Simpsonto A. R. Schuster, 20 April 1926. SchusterMSS. 543, Royal Society, London. (66) F. W. G. Baker (Executive Secretary,I.C.S.U.) (pers.comm. 1976). (67) F. A. F. C. Went to Glazebrook, I February 1928; Glazebrook to Schuster 6 February 1928; Schusterto Glazebrook, 9 February1928. SchusterMSS. 543, Royal Society, London. (68) Glazebrook to Schuster, 20 January 1928. Schuster MSS. 543, Royal Society, London. A. Gullstrand to Glazebrook, 31 January 1928; Glazebrook to Schuster, 6 (69) February1928. SchusterMSS. 543, Royal Society, London. (70) Council Minutesof the Royal Society (9 May 1929). (71) F. R. Lillie to M. J. Sirks (2 August 1935). Archives of the National Academy of Sciences, U.S.A. (72) H. H. Dale to Schuster(8July 1927). SchusterMSS. 543, Royal Society, London. (73) Schusterto M. Faure-Fremiet,13 March 1926. SchusterMSS. 543, Royal Society, London. Prain to Bateson (IoJanuary 1926),B.P.C., G.2.a.28. (74) (75) M. Nickerson, CanadianFederationof Biological Sciences (pers.comm. 1976) E. H. P. Garneau,Royal Society of Canada(pers. comm. 1977). (76)J. R. Schramm to A. L. Burrows (9 May 1923). Archives of the National Academy of Sciences,U.S.A. (77) I. Kepars,National Libraryof Australia(pers.comm. 1977). (78) C. A. Fleming, Past President, Royal Society of New Zealand (pers. comm. 1976). benefit of adherence to a (79) What is important here, of course, is the perceived
288 Union. What the realbenefit was, even to the physical sciences,of the whole I.R.C. system in the I920S is problematical. Hale conveyed a certain disillusionmentabout this. 'If we wish the I.R.C. to survive we must give it some very definite work to do and see that this work is done. Several of the American delegates at Brussels expressed the opinion that the International trary, though I do not think it can long exist if it remainscontent merely with having organised certain related Unions, and especially if its chief effect is a the I.R.C. itself, ratherthan to the Unions. M. (80) J. Sirks, Secretary of Botanical Section, I.U.B.S. to National Research U.S.A.
Council, U.S.A. (20 August 1934); Sirks to A. L. Burrows, National Research Council (2 November I935). Archives of the National Academy of Sciences, restrictive one . . .'. (note 61). These remarks, of course, applied primarily to Research Council was entirely useless .... My own opinion is quite the con-
(8 ) R. Golub, letter to the editor, Physics Today (March 1970), i (cited by Forman (note 3), I70). (82) E. K. MacLeod (note 56), 217; Anon. (note 56). (83) Nature, Lond., 299 (16 & 23 September and 28 October 1982): Editorials 'Doing
one's thing' (p. 194), 'Academiesnot international'(p. 288), Vera Rich 'Enter China' (p. 292), F. W. G. Baker (letter to Editor) 'ICSU matters'(p. 774). (84) Personalcommunicationsfrom F. W. G. Baker, Executive Secretaryof I.C.S.U., (85) Vera Rich (see note [83]).
22July 1976 and I5 November 1982.

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Chauvinism and Internationalism in Science: The International Research Council, 1919-1926 Author(s): A. G.

CHAUVINISM AND INTERNATIONALISM IN SCIENCE:

S09 3TU Department of Biology,The University, Southampton,

ExtraordinaryGeneralAssembly specificallyto considerthe questionof membershiprestriction.

or any othercollateral whatever'. But theirmorality, circumstance nationality

The ambiguity of attitudes among men at the centre of I.R.C. is well

Lorentz in conversations, extendingover two days, with the Dutchphysicist

ATTITUDES IN OTHER SCIENCES

amongits leadership (despitethe 'mandatory' preprobablyratherstronger

in view of recentcontroversy The question arises, naturally especially (83),

I am much indebted to the librariansand archivistsof the following: The

(4) D. J. Kevles, 'Into Hostile Political Camps: the Reorganisationof International

as the A.Sc.W./N.U.S.W. archiveswere not then in a co-operatinglibrary.

(14) There is an extensive Bateson-Praincorrespondenceamong the separatecollec-

Jones, (note 6).

Lond., I02 (26 September, 1918), 64-65.

D. W. Thompson, 'InternationalRelations in Science', Nature, Lond., I04

October I919), I72.

I', Notes & RecordsR. Soc. Lond., 34 (1979), 91-121.

Executive Committee Meeting, 12 December,

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