Org Safety Culture of CCFD1 - Ken Horn Capstone

CCFD1SafetyCulture 1 AssessmentoftheOrganizationSafetyCulture Of ClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1 KennethHorn PortlandStateUniversity Submittedto: MasamiNishishiba,PhD MatthewJones,PhD June8,2010
CCFD1SafetyCulture 2 Abstract TheresearchproblemwastheClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1hadtaken significantactionstoaddressthereductionoffirefighterinjuries.Thisefforthas includedthecreationofawellnessandfitnessgroupandafulltimeSafetyOfficer; however,therehasneverbeenanassessmentoftheorganizationalsafetyculture withintheClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1(CCFD1).SafetyCultureisconsidered fundamentalwithinthefirecommunityinregardstofirefightersafety.Thisconcept isreflectiveinthe16FirefighterLifeSafetyInitiatives.ThePurposeofthisstudyis toreducetheinjuryratewithintheFireDistrict.Threehypothesesweretestedto helpidentifysafetyculturerelatedconcepts.Thethreehypothesesincluded:(1)In ClackamasFire,therearedistinct,identifiablesubculturesthatarerelatedtosafety. (2)FirefightersatClackamasFiretendtovalueefficiencyandeffectivenessover safety.(3)FirefightersatClackamasFirewilltendtovalueindividualaccountability oversafety.Descriptiveresearchmethodsincludedasurveymadeavailabletoall membersofClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1.Theresultsindicatedapositive safetyculturewithinCCFD1.Theresultssuggestedthereareidentifiablesubgroups relatedtosafetywithintheorganization,firefighters,undervaryingsituationswill tendtovalueefficiencyandeffectivenessoversafetyandlastly,theresultsdidnot supportthatfirefighterswillvalueindividualaccountabilityoversafety.
CCFD1SafetyCulture 3 TABLEOFCONTENTS Abstract.2 TableofContents3 Introduction...7 BackgroundandSignificance......8 LiteratureReview..19 Method......28 Results...32 Discussion...55 Recommendations.61 ReferenceList...69 Tables Table1(ResearchKeyQuestions)....29 Table2(ResponsebyDivision)..33 Table3(ComparisonofScoresbyDivision)...34 Table4(MeanScoresbyYearsofService)..35 Table5(03YearsofServicescoresbyDimension)..35
CCFD1SafetyCulture 4 Table6(48YearsofServicescoresbyDimension).....36 Table7(915YearsofServicescoresbyDimension)...36 Table8(16+YearsofServicescoresbyDimension)....37 Table9(ComparisonofResponsestoMeanScores,NorthBattalion)...39 Table10(ComparisonofResponsestoMeanScores,SouthBattalion)....40 Table11(TotalMeanScoreofallStations).41 Table12(Station1DimensionScores)..41 Table13(Station2DimensionScores)..41 Table14(Station3DimensionScores)..42 Table15(Station4DimensionScore)42 Table16(Station5DimensionScores)..42 Table17(Station6DimensionScores)..42 Table18(Station8DimensionScores)..43 Table19(Station9DimensionScores)..43 Table20(Station10DimensionScores)...43 Table21(Station11DimensionScores)...43 Table22(Station15DimensionScores)...44
CCFD1SafetyCulture 5 Table23(Station16DimensionScores)...44 Table24(Station17DimensionScores)...44 Table25(VolunteerStations12&13DimensionScores).44 Table26(Hypotheses2Scores).49 Table27(Hypotheses3Scores).50 Table28(ResultsofOpenendedQuestions).....52 Table29(ComparisonofStudyResults)...56 Table30(H3MeanScoreComparison).60 Figures Figure1(ModelofReciprocalDeterminism).16 Figure2(MeanScoresbyStation)38 Figure3(MeanScoresbyDivision)..46 Appendixes AppendixA(SurveyQuestions)..72 AppendixB(InterviewQuestions)...75 AppendixC(RadarGraphsofMeanScorebyDivision)...76
CCFD1SafetyCulture 6 Appendix AppendixD(RadarGraphsofMeanScorebyStation).....79 AppendixE(RadarGraphsofMeanScoresbyYearsofService)...85 AppendixF(ResponsestoOpenEndedSurveyQuestions)......87 AppendixG(GraphofOpenEndedQuestions).96 AppendixH(GraphofInterviewQuestions)..97
CCFD1SafetyCulture 7 Introduction ClackamasCountyFireDistrict(CCFD)#1hasbeenmakingeffortsto
constantlyidentifyproblemsanddevelopsolutionsthroughorganizationalpolicy formationtoassuresafety.Understandingtheorganizationalcultureandemployee responsestosafetypolicychangesiscriticalforeffectiveimplementationofsuch policiesandprocedures.Itisimperativetounderstandhowsafetyisvaluedwithin theorganizationandhowindividualbehaviorinfluencestheadherencetosafety policiesandprocedures. Thepurposeofthisstudyistoidentifyanddefinetheorganizationalsafety
cultureinCCFD#1andunderstandhowitinfluencestheimplementationofsafety policiesandproceduresthroughouttheorganization.Furthermore,thestudy intendstoidentifythedegreeinwhichfirefightersvaluesafetywhileperforming theirduties.TheresponsesfromaculturalsafetysurveyadministeredtoallFire Districtemployeeswereusedtoaddressthreeresearchquestionsrelatedtosafety. Inaddition,aseriesofinterviewswithemployeesrepresentingacrosssectionofthe organizationwasconductedtoobtainadditionalqualitativeinformationtohelp interprettheresultsofthesurvey.Byexaminingbothquantitativeandqualitative data,thisstudyattemptedtoexplicatetheintricaciesoftheorganizationalculture relatedtotheimplementationofsafetypolicies,procedures,andpractices.
CCFD1SafetyCulture 8 BackgroundandSignificanceoftheStudy EachyearintheUnitedStates,approximately100firefightersdieintheline
ofdutyandthousandsmoreareinjured.Thistrendhasdeclinedsincethe1970s, yetfirefighterfatalitiesper100,000fireincidentshaveactuallybeenonthe increase.Since2005,thenumberoffirefighterfatalitieshasrisenfrom2.81to3.86 per100,000incidentsin2008,a37%increase(U.S.FireAdministration,2009).In 2008,therateofinjuriesper1000firesis25.2,upfrom23.3in1981.(Karter,Molis, 2009)Thisincreaseisdespitemanyadvancesinfirefightingsafetyequipment, trainingandearlydetection. Firefighterinjuriesanddeathshaveasignificantimpactonorganizations,
families,andthecommunity.Thepriceispaidwiththelivesofthefirefighters,their families,andthedollarsandresourcesofthetaxpayers.Theactualcostisdifficultto determinesincetherearemanyvariables,howevertheNationalInstituteof StandardsandTechnology(NIST)producedareportin2005attemptingtoputa costtofirefighterdeathsandinjuries.Dataforthis2005studywasnot comprehensiveandmanyofthesourceswereunqualified,howevertheestimates arestillconsideredcrediblebytheauthors.Theestimateswerebasedon:costs associatedwithovertime,investigations,physicalfitnessprograms,losttimefrom work,preventionrelatedcosts(NIST,2005).Accordingtothe2001data,inOregon, theaverageclaimforanonthejobinjurywas$8,389.00.Duringtheyear2009, ClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1had16casesinvolvingfirefighterinjuriesthat resultedindaysawayfromwork.Thisresultedinapproximately114shifts
CCFD1SafetyCulture 9 (24hourshifts)missedfromwork,whichalsoresultedinapproximately $114,000.00inovertime,notincludingrollups,rehabtime,investigations,and administrativetime(OSHA300recordsfromCCFD12009). InMarchof2004,theleadershipoftheAmericanFireServiceassembledin
Tampa,Floridaanddiscussedtheissueoffirefightersafety,specifically,howto preventlineofdutydeaths.Asaresultofthismeeting,the16FirefighterSafety Initiativesweredeveloped.Thegoaloftheseinitiativeswastoreducethenumberof firefighterdeathsby25%withinthefirstfiveyearsand50%within10years.These 16safetyinitiativesprovidedthefireserviceablueprintforchangeinsafetyculture andpractices.Thefirstoftheseinitiativeswasto:Defineandadvocatetheneedfor aculturalchangewithinthefireservicerelatingtosafety;incorporatingleadership, management,supervision,accountability,andpersonalresponsibility(Everyone GoesHomeInitiativeProgram,2004). SincetheintroductionoftheFirefighterSafetyInitiativesin2004,Clackamas
CountyFireDistrict#1hasimplementedseveralsafetyrelatedactionsthathavehad significant,positiveimpactsonsafetywithintheorganization.In1998,thefire districtcontractedthroughOregonHealth&ScienceUniversityforaWellness Coordinator.In2005,thedistrictbudgetedforafulltimeWellnessCoordinator.In 2005,atemporarylaborassistantwashiredandin2008,thatpositionwasmade fulltime.Lastly,in2007,afulltimesafetyofficerforthedistrictwashired.The SafetyOfficerpositionisoneofthefirstintheareaandwasconsideredasignificant commitmenttowardssafety.Despitealltheeffortstocreatesafetyrelatedpositions
CCFD1SafetyCulture 10 withintheorganizationandintroducingimprovementsinfiresafetyequipment,the injuryrateatCCFD#1sisstillcomparabletothenationalaverageof25injuriesper 1000fires.Theliteratureemphasizestheneedfororganizationstoassesstheir cultureintermsofsafetyandCCFD#1hasnotdonethis.Therearesomeanecdotes thatseemtosuggestthatthereisadisassociationbetweensafetyrelated policies/proceduresandtheactualpractice.Astheliteratureonorganizational culturesuggest,theresistancetoadoptorcloselyfollowsafetypoliciesand proceduresmaybeduetohowanorganizationanditssubgroupsvaluesafety.On thesurface,CCFD#1appearstobemovingtowardsenhancingsafety,however,at thedeeperlevel,CCFD#1mayneedtofurtherunderstandanddefineitscultureand howitrelatestosafety.Muchofthereviewedliteraturesuggeststhefireservice mustaddresstheorganizationalcultureiftheyaretobesuccessfulinimplementing newsafetyrelatedpoliciesandprocedures.IndustriessuchasNuclearPower, Chemical,andOilandGasoperateinahighriskenvironment,andtheyhavemade somesignificantimprovementsinsafetyperformancebyutilizingtheconceptof organizationalculture(Pessemier,2008).TheFireServicemustlooktothese industriesandthescienceofsafetyinordertoaddresssafetycultureandcultural changewithinourownhighriskorganization.Muchoftheresearchassociatedwith highriskindustriesshowsapositiverelationshipbetweenthesafetyperformance andthesafetycultureofanorganization. Jones(2000)suggeststhatitisourdeepconnectiontoourhistoryasa
professionthatmakessafetyculturewithinthefireservicesodifficulttochange.We havebenefitedfromtheprestigethatiscloselyrelatedtothesacrificesofourfellow
CCFD1SafetyCulture 11 firefightersandperhapsstillvalueprestigeoversafety.Itmaybeourpropensity towardsunsafeactsthatisexacerbatedbyourhistoryasrisktakers.Ifweasan organizationattempttomakechangesthatarenotcongruentwithorganizational values,itwillbemetwithsignificantresistance.Pessemier,(2008)Wiegmann, Douglas,Zhang,VonThaden,Sharma,andGibbins(2004)alsopointoutthatto changeorganizationalculture,onemustalsochangetheimageofthatorganization asviewedbyitsmembersbothinternallyandexternally. Harvey,Erdos,Bolan,Cox,andGregory(2002)suggestthattherearesub
culturesrelatedtosafetywithinanorganizationandthatthesesubculturesmay differfromtheoverallorganizationalculture.TheresultsofastudybyHarvey,etal (2002),alsosuggestthatsubgroupsorculturesrelatedtosafetycouldbeidentified withintheorganization.Wong,Desai,Madsen,Roberts,andCiavarelli(2005)state thatmanymanagersarelikelytobeawareofsafetyriskswithintheirorganization however,theyarelesslikelytounderstandtheinfluenceofthesafetycultureover individualbehaviorsanddifferencesintermsofsafetypractices. ItisreasonabletoassumethatwithinClackamasCountyFireDistrict,there
willbeseveralidentifiablesubculturesdefinedasgroupswithdifferingvaluesor perceptionsrelatedtosafety.Withinthesesubcultures,safetymaybevalued differentlythantheoverallorganization.Ifthisisthecase,thenitisimportantto identifythesesubculturesinordertodeterminemeasuresthatspecificallyaddress differentvaluesystemsinthesesubculturesandtoreducetherateofinjuries. Furthermore,howanorganizationdevelopsandimplementsitssafetypoliciesand
CCFD1SafetyCulture 12 procedureswillhaveanaffectonhowwelltheyarefollowed.Ifthisprocessis disconnectedfromsafetyvalues,thenitislikelytobeineffectiveincreatingasafe environment.Manning(2007,P.1)suggeststhedisconnectbetweensafetypolicies andpracticesoccursatfivelevels.Theselevelsinclude: 1. Culturalchangebeingviewedasathreat. 2. Unsafebehaviorsandattitudesallowedbecausetheyareviewedas tradition. 3. Safetyandmissionwithinorganizationalculturesareunbalanced. 4. Thevoicesofsafetyleadershiphavebeeneithersubconsciouslymuffledor consciouslysubdued. 5. Thelessonsfrombehavioralsafetysciencehavenotbeenembracedbyfire serviceleaders,muchlessblendedintoeverydayoperations. Iftheorganizationdoesnotattempttounderstandanddefineitsown
organizationalsafetyculture,thentheupwardtrendofincreasedinjurieswilllikely continue.Understandingorganizationalculturewillhelpprepareforexternal influencesthatmayaffecttheworkplaceculture.Forexample,thenextgeneration toentertheworkforcemayhaveahigherpropensitytowardsrisktaking(Manning, 2002).Thosewillingtotakeriskswithoutregardtopersonalsafetycould dramaticallyinfluencethesafetyclimateofanorganizationandovertime,affectthe culture.Ifthistypeofbehaviorispermittedtoseepintotheexistingsafetyculture, thefireserviceandperhapsthedistrictcanexpectasignificantriseinfirefighter
CCFD1SafetyCulture 13 deathsandinjuries.Ifthedistricthowever,managestoinstillastrongcultureof safety,theymayindeedbeabletoreachthegoalssetoutbytheEveryoneGoes HomeFireSafetyInitiatives. ClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1hasaddressedmanyoftheissuesrelated
tosafetyandtheadherenceofsafetypoliciesandprocedures.Ithasmade advancementsinsafetyrelatedequipmentandtrainingrelatedtotechnicalissues routinelyencountered.Theorganizationhasalsoaddressedsafetyfromahealth andwellnessperspective.However,ithasnotattemptedtomeasurethecurrent safetyculture,andtherefore,hasnobaselinetodeterminewhetherthechanges madehaveapositiveaffectonthesafetycultureandinjuryreduction.Itistimefor thefireservicetomoveawayfromlaggingindicatorssuchastimelostdataand injuryratesandstartusingleadingindicatorssuchasthemeasurementofthe organizationalsafetyclimate(Yule&Flin,2007).Intermsofleadership,Reuchlin (2004)recommendsthatanorganizationfocusonthemacroissueofsafety, particularlywiththelevelofleadershiprequiredtocreateandchangeculture. Lastly,(Wongetal,2005,p.60)findthatunitswiththelowestsafetyclimateratings havenearlydoublethenumberofseriousaccidentsasthosethatscoreonthehigh endofthesafetyclimate.Researchrelatedtoorganizationsafetycultureisquite broadandresearchspecificallyrelatedtothefireserviceislimited.Thefoundation ofthisresearchprojectisbasedonworkcompletedbyWilliams(2006,2007)ofthe ArundelCountyFireDepartment(ret.)andWindham(2005)withtheWoodlands FireDepartmentinWoodlands,Texas.Otherrelatedfieldsincludethenuclear powerindustry,offshoredrilling,aviation,andotherhighriskindustries.
CCFD1SafetyCulture 14 Theneedfortheunderstandingandmeasuringoforganizationalsafety
cultureisillustratedwellbytheworkofWilliams(2007).Init,hedescribesthe effortsmadebytheUniversityofMaryland,CenterforFirefighterSafetyResearch andDevelopmenttoimplementvigoroussafetystandards,policiesandpractices andyet,ariseininjuryratescontinued.Whattheliteraturesuggestsisthatthe Universitymaynothavehadanunderstandingofthesafetycultureandtherefore mayhaveimplementedtheabovesafetystandards,polices,andpracticesinaway thatwasnoteffectivelyacceptedbythemembers.Thismayhelpexplainwhytheir effortshadlittleimpactoninjuryrates. TheproblemofaninadequateunderstandingoftheSafetyCulturewithin
ClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1mayhaveanaffectonhowtheorganizationis abletomeetthethreeoperationalobjectivesestablishedbytheUnitedStatesFire Administration(U.S.FireAdministration,2009).Thoseobjectivesinclude:1) enhancingfirefightersafetyandreducingthelossoflifefromfirebyfirefighters,2) Promotewithinthefireservicecommunityacomprehensive,multihazardrisk reductionplantoreducethenumberofinjuriesanddeathstofirefightersand;3)to addresstheemergingissueasidentifiedbytheFirefighterLifeSafetySummitto reducethenumberoffirefighterdeathsbyestablishingamechanismtomeasure andactuponfiredepartmentsafetyculture. ThemissionstatementofClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1states:Tosafely
protectandpreservelifeandproperty(CCFD1,2009).Itispossiblethatthismission putsfirefightersatoddswithtwocompetingvalues,gettingthejobdoneasa
CCFD1SafetyCulture 15 firefighter,whichincludestakingrisks,butyetdoingitsafely.Thisinsightmay explainwhyinanorganizationthatispromotingsafetypracticesstillfailstomake significantstridesinpreventingaccidentsandinjuries. BygainingabetterunderstandingoftheorganizationalSafetyCulturewithin
ClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1,wewillhavetheinformationneededtomake safetyrelateddecisionsbasedonleadingIndicatorssuchasthesafetyculture withinanorganization.LeadingIndicatorshelpgiveanorganizationan understandingofhowwellsafetyrelatedpolicesmaybeacceptedwithinthe departmentandprobabilitythatthepoliceswillhaveapositiveeffectoninjury reduction.AnOrganizationsrelianceonlaggingindicatorssuchasinjuryrates meanstheyhavetowaittodetermineifthepoliciesareeffectiveinenhancingsafety relatedpracticeswithintheorganization.Anunderstandingoftheconstructofour safetycultureandhowitinfluencesourdecisionmakingprocesswillgiveusthe abilitytoimplementsafetypoliciesandproceduresthatarenotinconflictwith currentorganizationalsafetyvalues. Safetyperformancealsodependsonothervariablessuchas:psychological,
behavioral,andsituation.InFigure1,wecanuseamodelbasedonAlbertBanduras (1977)modelofReciprocalDeterminismtoillustratetherelationshipbetweenthe threefactors.
CCFD1SafetyCulture 16
Figure1
Thepsychologicalvariablesareconsideredthebasisofculture(values,
beliefs,andattitudestowardssafety).Thebehavioralvariablesarethe competenciesoftheindividualandthepatternsofactionandbehaviors.Situational variablesincludetheorganizationalstructure,processesandsystems,aswellas externalvariablessuchasthecomplexity,context,andnatureofthework performed.Tools,Equipment,andmachinesusedinthetaskshouldalsobeincluded sinceemployeesmayconsiderthemdirectlyrelatedtosafety.(PessemierW., DevelopingaSafetyCultureintheFireService,2008).Thesethreefactorsthe psychological,behavioral,andsituationalfactorsaretheindependentvariables thatinfluencethedependantvariable,whichissafetyperformance. WhatthetheoryofReciprocalDeterminismsuggestsisthatallthreefactors
haveanequalimpactonthepersonandtheirsafetyperformance.Apersoncanhave animpactontheirsafetyenvironmentbyhowtheyimplementsafetypractices;in turn,theenvironmentcanhaveanimpactontheirbehaviorrelatedtosafety
CCFD1SafetyCulture 17 practices.Lastly,thesafetyenvironmentcanhaveanimpactonsafetyrelated policiesandprocedures.Thisunderstandingcanhelpleadersoftheorganization determineifsafetypracticesarehavinganeffectonthesafetyenvironment(fewer injuries)orthelackofinjuriesishavinganegativeeffectonsafetypractices(not followingsafetyproceduresorpractices). Pessemier(2008)andotherstendtousefirefightingactivitiesasthepointof
referencewhenrelatingtoinjuries,however,whenassessingthesafetyculture,itis importanttoincludeallworkrelatedactivitiessuchasEmergencyMedicalServices, stationactivities,andtraining.Itisquitepossiblethatanorganizationcouldvalue safetydifferentlyand,dependingontheactivity,placeadifferentvalueonthat activity. Anotherrelevantconceptthatneedstobeexploredasitrelatesto
organizationalcultureistheconceptoforganizationalidentity.Organizational identityreferstohowanorganizationseesitself,anditisthoughttobeapossible determinantofhowtheemployeesrespondtochangewithintheorganization.The organizationalidentityconsistsoftheculture(internal)andtheimage(external). Thetraditions,beliefs,norms,andassumptionsthatmakeuptheculturehelp individualsgivemeaningtotheidentityoftheorganization.Theexternalimageis howtheorganizationisviewedfromthestakeholdersorconstituents(Hatch& Shultz,2002).Ahealthyorganizationalimagemeansthatthereisprobablybalance betweentheinternalandexternalconstructsandthereforetheimageofthe organizationisseenthesamewayfromtheemployeesandtheexternal
CCFD1SafetyCulture 18 stakeholders.HatchandSchultz(2002)discussdysfunctionalaspectsofidentity, whichincludeswhentheorganizationfallsintoorganizationalnarcissism.When lookingforanexplanationastowhythefireservicehasbeenreluctanttomake neededchanges,weneedtoevaluatetheorganizationalcultureandexamineifthe organizationsuffersfromnarcissisticbehavior.Narcissisticorganizationstendto focusinwardonhowtheywishtoprojecttheirimage.Theneedsofthestakeholders areignoredandtheorganizationalidentityisplacedatriskofbeinginfluenced solelyfromtheorganizationalcultureandinternalstakeholders.Inthecontextof thefireserviceorganization,iffirefightersaremoreconcernedabouttheimagethey portray,nothowiteffectstheorganizationalstakeholders,thenpositivesafety changes,andattitudesarelikelytoremainunchanged.Asmentionedbefore,thefire servicehasbenefittedfromaheroicimage,onethatisbasedonthesacrificesof others.Thefireserviceisstilloneofthefewindustriesthatexceptinjuriesand deathaspartofthejob,whereasmanyotherhighriskindustrieshaveembraced safetyasabasicconstructoftheirculture. Ithasbecomeobviousthataddressingsafetythewaywehavedoneinthe
pastisnotworkingintermsofreducinginjuryratesinthefireservice.Fireservice culturehasbeenidentifiedasamajorinfluencetosafetyandtheadherencetosafety policiesandprocedures.Alongwithunderstandingtheorganizationalsafety culture,wemustalsoaddressconceptssuchasorganizationalidentity,andsafety relatedbehaviors.Thefireservicemusttakeacuefromotherhighriskindustries andbegintotakeascientificapproachtosafetyrelatedpractices.Thisconceptis consideredaleadingindicatorapproachandhelpsdeterminethereceptivenessan
CCFD1SafetyCulture 19 organizationistosafetyrelatedchange.Thisisachangefromthepracticeofusing laggingindicatorssuchasinjuryratestatisticstodetermineifsafetypoliciesand proceduresareworking.Itistimetomovepastthefearoflosingourfireservice identityandbegintochangeourculturetoamoresafetycentricone. LiteratureReview AdetailedliteraturereviewofmaterialrelatedtoOrganizationalSafety
Culturewasconducted.TheauthorperformedakeywordsearchoftheInternet usingtheterms:Safety,SafetyCulture,SafetyBehavior,andIndustrialSafety.The majorityoftheliteraturewasobtainedthroughtheNationalFireAcademyand PortlandStateUniversityelectroniclibraries.Asubstantialamountofliteraturewas reviewedfromotherhighriskindustriesincluding:Aviation,OffShoreDrilling, Mining,andNuclearPower.Disciplineswithintheseindustriesincludedindustrial safetyandhumanbehaviorrelatedtosafety.Therewerethreeprimarysources usedasreferencestothisproject,theyinclude:theSafetyCulturewithintheAnne ArundelCountyFireDepartment(2006),theSafetyCultureinMarylandsFireand RescueServices(2007)byAlanWilliams,andDevelopingaSafetyCultureintheFire Service(2008)byWilliamPessemier. Definitionsofsafetyculture Theliteraturereviewrevealedthatthereisnocommonoraccepted definitionoforganizationalsafetyculture.However,theliteratureemphasizedthe importanceofdevelopingagoodunderstandingoftheconceptbeforemeasuringit. TheInternationalNuclearSafetyAdvisoryGroupofInternationalAtomicenergy
CCFD1SafetyCulture 20 (IAEA)forexample,definesthesafetycultureofanorganizationastheproductof individualandgroupvalues,attitudes,competencies,andpatternsofbehavior. Anothercloselyrelateddefinitionis:thesetofvalues,beliefs,traditions,norms, attitudesandsocialpracticesetouttoreduceorminimizetheexposuretoinjuries ordangerousconditions(Ahmad&Alistair,2003).Lastly,Mearn,Flin,Gordon,& Fleming(1998)definesafetycultureasentrenchedattitudesandopinionsthata groupofpeoplesharewithrespecttosafety. Whatfactorsconstituteahighqualitysafetycultureisupfordebate.Many
organizationshaveattemptedtodefinethefactorsthatmakeupanexcellentsafety culture.TheseincludetheAdvisoryCommitteeforSafetyofNuclearInstallations (ACSNI)andtheInstitutionforOccupationalSafetyandHealth(IOSH)andtheyboth implythatthesafetydependsasmuchonthegeneralorganizationalcultureasit doesspecificallytosafetypractices.Aconsiderableamountoftheresearchhasbeen focusedonoverallorganizationalcultureandthefactorsthatcontributetoit,such as:jobsatisfaction,individualresponsibility,managementresponsibility,leadership style,communication,commitment,riskawareness,andrisktaking(Cameron& Quinn,2006).Thesestudiesalsohavepertinencetotheexplorationof organizationalsafetyculture. Someliteratureiscarefultopointoutthedifferencebetweencultureand
climate.Oftenthetwoareusedinterchangeably,yettheyarebydefinition,different. Climateshouldbethoughtofasreflectingattitudes,perceptions,andbeliefs whereascultureinvolvesvalues,traditions,andnorms(Harvey,Bolem,Cox,&
CCFD1SafetyCulture 21 Gregory,2002).Anorganizationsclimatemaychangedependingoneventsor changeswithintheorganization.Forexample,duringunioncontractnegotiations theclimatemaymodifydependingonhowwelltheprocessisadvancing.A significantinjurytoamembermayalsohaveadetectableeffectontheclimateofthe organization,yetneitheroftheseeventswouldlikelyhaveanimmediateeffecton thesafetyculture.Itispossiblethatovertimeclimatewillhaveaninfluenceover culturalchange. SafetyCultureismorestablethansafetyclimateandisresistanttochange. (Cooper2001)pointsoutthatsafetyisavalueandthatvaluesareconsideredasa constantsetofcorebeliefsheldbyanindividualconcerninghows/heshould behaveoverabroadrangeofsituations(p.17).Thisisparticularlyimportantsince itisinthestationswheremanyofthesevaluesaredevelopedandpassedon.Jones (2000),suggeststhattheattitudestowardssafetymayberelatedtoourpastandthe prestigeweasfirefightersexperienceduetothesacrificesofourbothersand sisters.Thepersonathatthisisariskybusinessandthatinjuryanddeatharepart ofthejobmaybeconsideredanunderliningvalueupheldbyfirefighterstoday.The focusofthisstudyissafetyculturebasedonthemeasurementoftheattitudeand perceptionofthemembersofClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1. Subculture Importanttothestudyisthereferencetogroups,sincetheauthorexpectsto
identifysubcultureswithintheorganization.Mycontentionisthatgroupswithin theorganizationwillsharevaluesoftheoverallorganizationaswellashavetheir
CCFD1SafetyCulture 22 ownestablishedsafetyrelatedculture.Thisissupportedbyworkcompletedby Harvey(2002)thatsuggeststhatitispossibleforgroupstoholdmanydifferent valuescomparedtotheoverallorganization.Theinfluenceonthesubculturecan bederivedfrommanysources,butislikelyinfluencedbystationresponsibilities, (i.e.,specialtyrescueorfromwhatpreviousdepartment,cityordistrictthestation mergedfrom)(Harvey2002).Whatevertheinfluence,itisimportantunderstand thatsafetycultureisastableconstructnoteasilychangedoralteredinashort period. TheworksofHofstede(1994),Means(1999),andPidgeon(1991)have
shownthatsubculturesexistatthegrouplevelwithinanorganization. Furthermore,Harvey,Bolem,Cox,andGregory(2002)suggestthatcultureisthe keyfactorindistinguishingonegroupfromanother.Theysuggestthatthereare fourtypesofculturewithinanorganization.Thesemaybeimpliedas(basedon power,role,task,orperson).Subculturesthataffectsafetybehaviorareindentified inotherhighriskindustries.Forexample,Kao,Lai,andLee(2008)studiedthe safetycultureofpetrochemicalplantsinChina.Theirfindingsshowedasignificant relationshipbetweenjobpositions,workexperience,worksafetyandhealth environmentsatisfaction,andinjuryriskperception.AnotherstudybyLeeand Harrison(2000)lookedatthesafetyculturewithinnuclearpowerstationslocated intheUnitedKingdom.Theyanalyzedvariouscomponentsincluding:jobtype,age, gender,andshift.Theirresearchshowedawidevariancebetweenjobtypes.They alsofoundthat,inregardstoage,olderworkershadamoresafetyconscious attitudethanyoungerworkersdid.Itshouldbenotedthatwithinmanyofthe
CCFD1SafetyCulture 23 definitionsrelatedtosafetyculture,groupsareoftenhighlightedandtheevidence suggeststhatitmaybemoreaccuratetotalkintermsofgroupculturevs. organizationalculture.Manyhavesuggestedthatitiswithintheseidentifiedgroups thattheculturerelatedtosafetyispassedonanditistheattitudetowardsdanger, safetycompliance,andproperconductofhazardousoperationsthatmakesupthat culture(Beck,1999;Chute,1995;Clark,1999;Wong,2005).AtClackamasCounty FireDistrict#1,thecorrespondingcategoriesthatformthebasisofcultureare: rank,stationassignment,ordivision.Subcultureformedbasedonthesecategories couldexplaindifferencesinsafetyrelatedbehavioratdifferentstationsand divisionsandatdifferentrankswithinthedepartment.Therefore,itishypothesized thattheClackamasFirealsohasidentifiablesubculturethataffectssafety. H1:InClackamasFire,therearedistinct,identifiablesubculturesthatare relatedtosafety. Valueonefficiencyandeffectivenessoversafety InresearchbyOmodei,Mclennan,andReynolds(2005,)theyfoundthat
[d]espitethegeneralawarenessof,andconcernwith,theeffectsoffatigueand dehydrationinsummerfiresindifficultterrain,theprimaryfocusongettingthejob doneappearstooverrideanysuchconcerns(p10)amongthefirefighters.Thisis congruentwiththegeneralobservationthatfirefighterstendtovalueefficiencyand effectivenessoversafety.AccordingtoCooper(2001),ifsafetyisnotclearlyvalued amongthefirefighters,theywilllikelystrugglewithwhattheyvaluemore.This dichotomyisaccentuatedwhenotherbehaviorsarevaluedequally.Firefightersmay
CCFD1SafetyCulture 24 alsofindthemselvesconflictedbetweenthetwocompetinggoalsofproviding effectiveservicedeliveryinordertorescueandsavecivilianlivesandprovidingfor firefightersafety(Pessemier,2008). Therefore,itisimportanttoexaminethebehavioroffirefighters,specifically
relatedtotheadherencetosafetyprocedures.Thisstudyattemptedtoexplorewhy firefightersmakethedecisionstheydowheninterpretingandmanaginghighrisk situationsduringdailyactivities. H2:FirefightersatClackamasFirevalueefficiencyandeffectivenessover safety. Notmuchstudyhasbeendoneexaminingwhyanindividualinthe
firefightingcontext(supervisororcoworker)willchoosetoignoretheomissionof asafetyprocedurebyanothercrewmemberandyetwouldrisktheirlifetosave them.Someliteratureshowthatinahierarchicalorganization,thepositionwithina chainofcommandisthemostsalientfactorthatinfluencesanindividualsdecision (BehavioralScienceTechnology,2004).Thismayhelpexplainwhyonefirefighter (rank)wouldnotremindanotherfirefighterofgreaterrankorexperienceabouta safetyprocedureortheuseofrelatedsafetyequipment.Anotherpossibilitytobe exploredisthetheoryofindividualaccountability.Celinska(2007)suggestthat utilitarianindividualism,avaluedeeplyrootedinAmericanhistoryisassociated withlimitedresponsibilitytowardsthecollective.Thiscouldplayarolein determiningthelevelinwhichanotherfirefightermightinterveneinregardsto safety.
CCFD1SafetyCulture 25 Therefore,thethirdhypothesistestedinthisstudyaddressesthe relationshipbetweenindividualaccountabilityandsafety. H3:Firefighterswilltendtovalueindividualaccountabilityoversafety. Reportedpromisingpracticesinpromotingsafetyculture Theresultsofsimilarsafetypromotionstudieswerereviewedfortheir
recommendations.Sincenoneoftherelatedstudieslookedspecificallyatthesame researchquestions,itislikelytherecommendationsmightnotmatchdirectlywith myconclusions.However,itislikelythattherewillbesimilaritiessufficientforthis project.Intwoofthestudiesreviewed,theoverallOrganizationalSafetyCulture wasassessedandthiswasconsideredacoredimensionofthestudy.Williams (2006)concludedthefollowinginhisassessmentofthesafetycultureoftheAnne ArundelCountyFireDepartment,Maryland. 1. Theleadershipmustsendaclearmessageregardingtheimportanceof safety. 2. Clearcommunicationisneededtoinstillandenhancetrustwithinthe organization. 3. Asafetycodeofconductmustmeestablishedgivingalltherightand obligationtoreportsafetyproblemsandtocontributeideasrelatedtosafety totheirsupervisors. 4. Enhanceleadershipandfollowershipskillsinallpersonnel. 5. EnhancethemarketingofHealth/Safetydivisionofanorganization.
CCFD1SafetyCulture 26 6. Completeananalysisofknowledge,skills,andabilitiestoensurethat appropriatetrainingisbeingconductedforallpersonnel. 7. Regularfollowupandthedevelopmentofsurveystouseonaregularbasis toassesstheimpactofanyimprovementplans. Windham(2005)hadthefollowingrecommendationsafterstudyingthe
organizationalsafetycultureoftheWoodlandsFireDepartment,Woodlands,Texas: (a)exceptionsshouldbecommunicatedwithregardtosafetyandallpersonnel shouldbeheldaccountable,(b)policiesandpracticesshouldbeexamined,(c)risk managementshouldbeexaminedandallpersonnelbeheldaccountabletothe specificsoftheriskmanagementprocess,(d)thepeerfitnesstrainerprogram shouldcontinue,(e)unionofficialsshouldbeconsultedtoimplementafitness evaluationprocessand,(f)workshouldcontinuetomakeaculturalchangewithin thefiredepartment.ItisimportanttopointoutthatCCFD1currentlyhasapeer fitnesstrainerprogramandtheorganizationdoesincludetheunionwhensetting fitnessstandards.Theaboverecommendationshowever,helpvalidatetherelevance ofthecurrentprograms.Pendergast(2007)providestwelverecommendationsto improvesafetyaftercompletingasafetyculturesurveyoftheLaconiaFire Department,Laconia,NewHampshire.Thesetwelverecommendationsincluded:(a) identifyproblemsthatexist,(b)gainleadershipsupport,(c)treatsafetyasamission andestablishresourcesneeded,(d)createownershipofhealthandsafety throughoutalllevelsoftheorganization,(e)createcontrolmeasuresandestablish safetystandards,(f)measuresafetyrelatedperformance,(g)ensureallaccidents andnearmissesarethoroughlyinvestigated,(h)ensureattendanceatsafety
CCFD1SafetyCulture 27 meetings,thiscouldincludeinternalandexternalmeetings,(i)ensuresafetyaudits arecarriedout,(j)includesafetytrainingduringrecruittraining,(k)makegood safetybehavioraconditionofemployment,(l)providefeedbacktostakeholders regardingtheeffectivenessandoutcomesofsafetyinitiatives.Acommonthemeof theaboverecommendationsisoftentheneedtocommunicateeffectivelythe messageofsafety.Culturalchangeisnotaneasyendeavorandrequiresnotonlya clearsafetymessage,butalsoaconsistentandcontinualone.AstudybyCarroll (2002)ofthenuclearpowerindustryprovidesthesomeinsighttotheissueofboth communicationandinterpretationofcollecteddata.AfewexamplesofCarrolls recommendationsregardingtheenhancementofcommunicationinclude:(a)Senior managementaddressingissues,communicatingdecisions,results,andexpectations, (b)individualdepartmentsmustbeinvolvedinsafetyrelateddecisionmaking meetings,(c)resultanttaskswereassignedandtracked,and(d)communications highlightingtheworkaccomplishedisusedtoreinforceawillingnesstoraise concerns. Otherpertinentrecommendationsrelatedtochangingorganizationalsafety
cultureincludestudiesbytheBerkleyLabCommunicationsDepartment(2005)and byNASA.Specifically,NASArecognizedthattochangebehaviormeantchanging attitudestowardssafetyandthiswassomethingthatcouldnotbeaccomplished simplybycreatingrulesforeverysituation.AnassessmentforNASAbyBehavioral ScienceTechnology(2004)madethefollowingrecommendationsfororganizational change:(a)planningmeetingswithleadershiptoreaffirmagencyvalues,etc,(b) confidentialcoachingdesignedtohelpeachleaderunderstandtheirstrengthsand
CCFD1SafetyCulture 28 developmentalneeds,(c)integrateplansintoexistingactivities,(d)developteam effectivenesstrainingandadvancedsafetyleadershipassessmentcenters,and(e) implementafeedbacksystemwherekeyleadershipbehaviorspromoteopenand honestcommunicationthatpromotesdissentingopinions. Method Inordertotestthethreehypothesesthataimtoexaminethepresenceof
subculture,relationshipbetweensafetyandefficiency,andtherelationshipbetween safetyandindividualaccountability,asurveywasdeveloped.Thesurveyinstrument wasdevelopedusingquestionsfromtheSafetyClimateMeasurementToolKit (HealthandSafetyExecutiveProject)andSafetyCultureSurveyusedtoassessthe safetycultureoftheAnneArundelFireDepartment(WilliamsA.S.,2006).Contact wasmadewithMr.Williams,AnneArundelFireDepartment(Ret.)andpermission wasobtainedtousesurveyquestionshehaddeveloped.Healsoadvisedmethat manyofhissurveyquestionscamefromtwoothersourcesandprovidedmewith contactinformationforoneofthosesources.ContactwasattemptedwithWilliam Pessemierbutwasunsuccessful.TheSafetyCultureAssessmentToolKitcreatedby theHealthandSafetyExecutiveProjectwasdevelopedforpublicuseandmanyof
ResearchQuestion H1:Withintheorganization,thereexist distinct,identifiablesubcultures relatedtosafety
SurveyQuestions Thiswillbedeterminedby relationshipbetween demographicsandsurvey questions
H2:Firefighterswilltendtovalue efficiencyandeffectivenessoversafety
12,16,20,23,41,46,
Citations (Harvey,Bolem,Cox,& Gregory,2002) (WilliamsA.S.,2006) (HarveyJ.E.,2002) (Guldenmund,2000) (Wiegmann,Zhang,von Thaden,&Sharma,2004) (Wong,2005) (Yule,2007)(Pessemier B.,2007) (PessemierB.,2007) (Omodei,2005) (Cooper,SurfacingYour
Table1ResearchKeyQuestions
thequestionsweremodifiedfromthatsurveytool.Itisalsoimportanttonotethat allthequestionsusedwerevalidatedfortheiroriginalpurpose;timewasnot allottedforthevalidationinthisstudy.Thesurveyitselfconsistedof40questions usingaLikerttypescalewitharangefrom15with5beingpositiveand1beinga negativeresponse.Severalquestionswerestatedinthenegativeandwereadjusted duringtheanalysis.
SafetyCulture,2002) (Jones,2000) (PessemierB.,2007) (Cooper,SurfacingYour SafetyCulture,2002)
H3:Firefighterswilltendtovalue individualaccountabilityoversafety
9,13,14,17,19,21,27,35, 40,42,43,44,45,47,48
Keyquestionitemsthatwerepertinenttothepresentedhypothesiswere identified.ThisbreakdownshowninTable1above.Thestudywasdistributedto thepopulationviaemailusinganonlinesurveytoolSurveyMonkey,inwhichthe firedistricthasanaccount.Thefirstemailrelatedtothestudywassentouttothe studypopulationconsistingofallmembersoftheorganization.Themessage explainedthepurposeofthesurvey,theanonymityoftheresults,andwhowas performingit.Instructionsweregivenonhowtocompletethesurvey,whoshould participateinthestudy,andalinkattachedtothebodyofthemessage.Lastly,two additionalremindersweresentout. Threedimensionswereidentifiedtohelpbetterunderstandandcategorize
thesafetycultureoftheorganization.Thesethreedimensionsare:Organizational Policy,Organizationalleadership,andSafetyProcedures.ThesewerelabeledI,II,III onthesurveyform.Thepurposeofthethreedimensionsistohelpunderstandthe overallsafetycultureoftheorganization.Ifthereareidentifiedareasofsafety relatedweaknesseswithintheorganization,itisimportanttoknowwherethose weaknessesare.Furthermore,thedimensionsofLeadershipandProceduredirectly relatetoquestionusedtodefendthesecondandthirdhypothesis.Additionally,the surveyisbrokendownintothefollowingcategories:Administration,Operations, Training,FirePrevention,andVolunteers.TheOperationsgroupwasfurtherbroken downintoseventeenstations,twoofwhichwereremovedsincetheyarevolunteer stationsandnotstaffedfulltime.Thelastcategoryinthissectionisyearsofservice;
CCFD1SafetyCulture 31 thiswasusedinlieuofrankinordertoprovidegreateranonymityduringthe survey.TheVolunteergroupwasconsideredaDivisionandnotbrokendownto thestationassignmentlevel.Thestudywasorganizedinawaytohelpidentifyifany subculturesrelatedtosafetyatthestationleveloryearsofserviceexists.Though thecategoryofrankshowsupontheoriginalsurveyform,itwasremovedfromthe onlinesurveytohelpensureanonymity. Therangeofagreementinthesurveyincludedthefollowingchoices:
StronglyAgree,Agree,Neutral,Disagree,andStronglyDisagree.Questionsforthe surveywerederivedfromseveralsources,includingarelatedstudyontheAnne ArundelCountyFireDepartment(Williams,2006)andtheSafetyClimateToolkit developedbytheHealthandSafetyExecutiveoftheUnitedKingdom.Thequestions aredesignedtoassessthesafetycultureoftheorganizationbyaskingtherecipients toratesafetyrelatedvaluestatements.Attheendofthesurvey,twoopenended questionsdesignedtoelicittheresponsesonhowtheemployeefelttheyorthe organizationcouldimprovesafetywithinthedepartment. Intervieweeswereselectedusingclustersamplingtechnique.First,arandom
listingofthestationsandshiftswerecreatedusingarandomizationformulain Excel.NinefirestationsrepresentingtheOperationsdivisionandthreeother divisionswereselectedforinterviews.Thepurposeoftheinterviewswastocollect relevantqualitativeinformationnotobtainablethroughstandardsurveyquestions. Theinterviewsincludedallmembersoftheshiftandtookplaceinsmallgroup
CCFD1SafetyCulture 32 settings.Theinterviewswereconductedbytheauthor,andduetothesensitivityof issues,werenotaudiorecorded.ThequestionscanbefoundinAppendixB. Results Theresultsofsurveydatawereanalyzedusingdescriptivestatistics1suchas
mean,median,andstandarddeviation.DatawasfilteredusingtheSurveyMonkey filteringtooltoassistinaggregatingtheresults.Thiswasorganizedintothe followingvariables:OrganizationalDivisionsincluding:(a)Operations,(b) Administration(LogisticsandInformationTechnology),(c)Training(wellness), (d)FirePrevention,and(e)theVolunteergroup(Table1). Respondentsprofile TheOperationsDivisionmadeup75%oftheresponsesor119outof159
organizationalpersonnelsurveyed.Thisrepresentsapproximately79%ofthe personnelassignedtotheOperationsdivision.Therearesomesmallvariationsin thenumberassignedtooperationsduetoTemporaryDutyAssignments(TDY). 1Itisrecognizedbytheauthor,thattheresearchcouldbenefitfrommoreadvance analyticalmethodsneededtodeterminesignificanceoftheresultsandtovalidate thesurveyquestionsforreliability.
CCFD1SafetyCulture 33 Thesearegenerallyassignmentsoutsideofthenormaloperationsassignmentssuch astrainingofficers,PublicInformationOfficers,orEMSOfficerpositions. Administrationrepresented10%oftherespondentsor84%(16of19)ofthe personnelassignedtoAdministration.TheTrainingdivisionrepresented5%ofthe respondentsor89%(8/9)oftheassignedpersonnel,preventionrepresented4.4% ofrespondentsor58%(7/12)ofassignedpersonnel,andthevolunteerrankhada responserateof5.7%.Itshouldbenotedthatduringthissurvey,thevolunteer programwasinthemiddleofsubstantialchangesandthelargestvolunteerrecruit academywasnearlycompleted.Thismayhaveleadtothelimitedresponsetothe surveybythevolunteergroup.
Table2ResponsesbyDivision
Division
ResponsePercent
ResponseCount/total numberofpersonnelin thedivision 119/150 16/19 8/9 7/12 9/59
Operations Administration Training Prevention Volunteer
74.8% 10.1% 5% 4.4% 5.7%
Thefollowingscoresrepresentthedegreeofpositiveornegativeresponseto
thesurveyquestions.Ascoregreaterthan2.50representsapositiveresponseto thesafetyrelatedquestion.Ascorebelow2.50representsanegativeresponseto thesafetyrelatedquestion.Forthepurposeofthisstudy,DimensionISafetyPolicy referstoorganizationalpolicespertainingtosafetyrelatedtopractices.Policiesare
CCFD1SafetyCulture 34 generallyfoundintheformofStandardOperatingGuidelines(SOGs). OrganizationalLeadershipreferstothedecisionmakersoftheorganization;this wouldincludeCompanyOfficers,ChiefOfficers,andProgramManagers.Examplesof SafetyProcedureswouldincludetheuseofsafetyequipmentorpracticesdetailedin theFireRescueProtocols,aguidethatdescribeshowtomitigateincidents.Thetotal mean,median,andstandarddeviationscoresrepresentingallthreesurveyed dimensionsfortheDivisionsandareasfollows:Operationshadameanscoreof 3.66,medianscoreof3.49andstandarddeviationof.318.TheTrainingdivisionhad ameanscoreof3.59,medianscoreof3.62andstandarddeviationof.232.TheFire PreventionDivisionhadameanscore3.82,medianscoreof3.62andastandard deviationof.246.Administrationhadascoreof3.64,medianscoreof3.62and standarddeviationof.186.Thevolunteergrouphadameanscoreof3.92,median scoreof3.83andstandarddeviationof.354.Thevolunteerrankrepresentsthe highestcombinedmeanscorewiththelargeststandarddeviationscore.(Table3)
Table3ComparisonofscoresbyDivision(AllDimensions)
Division Operations Training Prevention Administration Volunteers
Mean 3.66 3.59 3.82 3.64 3.92
Median 3.49 3.62 3.79 3.62 3.83
StandardDeviation .318 .232 .246 .186 .354
CCFD1SafetyCulture 35 Thevolunteergrouphadthehighestcombined(OrganizationalPolicy,
OrganizationalLeadership,andSafetyProcedures)meanscoreof3.92.TheTraining divisionscoredlowestindimensionIandIIIwith3.8and3.34respectively.The OperationsDivisionscoredlowestindimensionII(Leadership)withascoreof3.49. Ifthevolunteergroupisbackedout,theFirePreventionDivisionhasthenext highestmeanscoreof3.82. Theyearsofservicegroupisdividedintothefollowingcategories:(a)zeroto
threeyears,(b)fourtoeightyears,(c)ninetofifteenyears,and(d)16yearsor more.Foreachoftheyearcategories,thecombinedDimensionsscorewas calculatedinordertocomparethesafetyattitudesoftheyearsofservicegroups. (Table3).Thetablebelowshowsthatthe48yeargrouphadthehighestsafety perception/attitudeandthe915grouphadthelowest.The915yeargroupalso hadthehigheststandarddeviation.

Table4ScoresbyYearsofService
Yearsof Service 03Years 48Years 915Years 16+years
Numberof respondents 31 29 41 58
Mean 3.63 3.70 3.51 3.68
Median 3.56 3.58 3.40 3.54
Standard Deviation .127 .262 .291 .299
Thefollowingtablesshowthebreakdownofscoresbyyearsofserviceandby dimension.Thisallowsthereadertocompareresponsesbydimensionandshows
CCFD1SafetyCulture 36 howyearsofservicechangesperceptionwithinthosedimensions.Thezeroto threeyeargrouphad31respondentsandrepresented20%ofthetotalsurveyed.

Table503YearsofServicescoresbydimension
Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII
Mean 3.56 3.78
Median 3.58 3.87 3.58
StandardDeviation .436 .347 .436
SafetyProceduresIII 3.56
The48yeargrouphad29responsesor18%,915yearshad41respondentsor 26%,andthelargestgroupwasthe16+yearswith56respondentsor36%ofthe totalgroup.

Table648YearsofService
Mean 4.00 3.58
Median 3.96 3.66 3.50
The16+yearshadthehighestDimensionI(Policy)scoreof4.02whichshowsthat thosewiththemostexperiencewithintheorganizationandthosethatarelikelyto beinleadershiproles,feelstronglythatoursafetyrelatedpoliciesareappropriate. The03yeargrouphadthelowestdimensionIscoreof3.56,howeverthisgroup alsohadthehighestscoresindimensionIIandIIIof3.78and3.56respectively.The
CCFD1SafetyCulture 37 915yeargrouphadthelowestscoresindimensionIIandIIIof3.29and3.40 respectively.

Table7915YearsofService
Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII SafetyProceduresIII
Mean 3.84 3.29 3.40
Median 3.78 3.41 3.26
The915yeargroupalsohadthelowesttotalmeanscoreof3.51.The48year grouphadthehighesttotalmeanscoreof3.70withthe16+yearsgroupscoringa 3.68.

Table816+YearsofService
Mean 4.02 3.54
Median 3.99 3.66 3.38
Thereviewedliteraturesuggeststhatthemoreyearsofserviceanemployees
hasorthegreatertheirpositioniswithintheorganizationthegreatertheir perceptionorattitudetowardssafetywithinthatorganization.Inthisstudy,a higherormorepositivescorewouldrepresenttheelevatedperception/attitudeof safety.Theresultsinthisstudyshowthatthereisnotalinearprogressionofthe scoresinstead,itshowsthatthe48yearand16+groupssharenearlythesame
CCFD1SafetyCulture 38 positivescore.Inthiscase,itisthe915yeargroupthathasthelowestcombined meanscoreaswellasthelowestscoreintheLeadershipDimension.Overall,the resultsdonotshowacleardivisionbetweenyearsofservice,howeveritdoesshow thatwithintheyeargroups,thedimensionsareperceiveddifferently.Further researchisrequiredtodeterminewhythe915yeargrouphasalesspositive combinedscore. Next,theauthoranalyzedtheresultsbasedonstationassignment,this
includedstationsonethrough17,excludingstations12,13,14.Thesefirestations arestaffedwithvolunteersandweregroupedinthevolunteercategoryonly.All careerstationswiththeexceptionofstation7wereusedforthestudy.Thiswasdue totheinadequateresponsefromthestation7.Forthepurposeofthestudy,the authormovedtheoneresponsefromstation7tostation6.Itshouldbenotedthat station7hasonlythreepeopleassignedtoitandtheworkscheduleissignificantly differentfromtherestoftheorganization.Intotal,therewere159respondentsto thesurvey.Thisrepresents80%oftheorganization.Figure7isagraph representingthetotalcombinedmeanscoresformallthreedimensionsbystation.

Figure2MeanscoresbyStations
Station17hadthehighesttotalmeanscoreof3.86withastandarddeviationof .396.Station15hadthelowesttotalmeanscoreof3.41withastandarddeviationof .391.TheSouthBattalionhadthehighesttotalmeanscoreof3.71;thisisdespitethe loweststationscorefromStation15.TheNorthBattalionhadatotalmeanscoreof 3.69.Thoughitisdifficulttodeterminethesignificance,itisnotedthattheNorth Battalionhasasignificantlyhighercallvolume.Inthiscase,callvolumewas comparedtohelpdetermineifriskexposurehadaneffectonsafety perception/attitudes.Inthiscase,itappearsthegreatertheexposuretorisk (representedascallvolume),thelowerthesafetyperception/attitudescore.This suggeststhatsubgroupsmaybeidentifiedbystationasitrelatestocallvolume, riskexposure,andrisktolerance.Table8showsacomparisonofcombinedmean safetyscoreswithcallvolumebetweenstationsintheNorthBattalionwhiletable9 showsthecomparisonintheSouthBattalion.
Table9ComparisonsofResponsestoMeanScores,NorthBattalion
Station Engine1
NumberofAlarm 2,252
MeanScore 3.59
CCFD1SafetyCulture 40 Engine2 Engine3/Rescue3 Truck4 Engine5 Engine6 Engine8

Table10ComparisonsofResponsestoMeanScores,SouthBattalion
1,800 3,194 1,586 1,693 1,011 1,358
3.77 3.64 3.64 3.70 3.77 3.67
Station Engine9 Engine10 Engine11 Truck15 Engine16 Squad17
NumberofAlarms 889 625 488 1,486 1,811 816
MeanScore 3.75 3.83 3.69 3.41 3.70 3.86
Abreakdownofthedimensionscoresshowsstation6and2(North
Battalion)withthehighestcombinedscoreof3.77.Station6alsohasthehighscore of4.31indimensionI(Policy)whileStation15hasthelowestcombinedscoreof
CCFD1SafetyCulture 41 3,41andthelowestPolicyscoreof3.81.Station17hadthehighestscorein dimensionIIandstation15hadthelowestscoreof3.03.Station10hadthehighest scoreindimensionIIIwith3.59andstations15and16hadthelowestscoresof 3.38.Thefollowingtable(Table11)showsthetotalmeanscoresofthecombined stationsforeachdimension.Thehighscoreinthepolicydimensionshowsthatthe employeesinthefirestationsperceiveOrganizationalSafetyPolicytobeatan appropriatelevel.Incomparison,theSafetyProceduredimensionhasthelowest score.Inthisstudy,thelowertheDimensionIIIscoressuggestsahigherthe toleranceforriskisacceptedbythegroup.
Table11TotalMeanScoresofallStations
Dimension DimensionIPolicy DimensionIILeadership DimensionIIISafetyProcedures
Score 4.08 3.54 3.46
Thenextseriesoftablesshowthebreakdownofscoresforeachdimensionin
eachofthecareerstations.Thepurposeofthiscomparisonistoshowhoweach stationdiffersintheirperception/attitudetowardssafetyasitrelatestothethree dimensions.Thisunderstandingofattitudesandperceptionsisimportantwhen
CCFD1SafetyCulture 42 consideringwhereandhowsafetyrelatedchangeswithintheorganizationshould beimplemented.

Table12Station1Dimensionscores
Mean 3.95 3.42 3.41
Median 3.86 3.50 3.50
Table13Station2DimensionScores

Mean 4.18 3.61 3.53
Median 4.20 3.63 3.31
Mean 3.93 3.55 3.43
Median 3.92 3.58 3.25
Mean 4.00 3.53 3.40
Median 4.00 3.64 3.68
Mean 4.06 3.64 3.56
Median 4.00 3.80 3.70
Table17Station6Dimensionscores

Mean 4.31 3.56 3.44
Median 4.33 3.67 3.50
Mean 4.07 3.45 3.49
Median 4.05 3.55 3.32
Mean 4.11 3.61
Median 4.06 3.67
StandardDeviation .323 .450
CCFD1SafetyCulture 44 SafetyProceduresIII
3.54
3.44
.617
Mean 4.21 3.69 3.59
Median 4.13 3.88 3.69

Mean 3.97 3.59 3.50
Median 4.00 3.60 3.60
Mean 3.81 3.03 3.38
Median 3.82 3.10 3.40
Dimension PolicyI
Mean 4.09
Median 4.06
StandardDeviation .348
CCFD1SafetyCulture 45 LeadershipII SafetyProceduresIII

3.63 3.38
3.75 3.40
.317 .431
Mean 4.30 3.73 3.54
Median 4.25 4.00 3.63
Table25Volunteers(stations12&13)DimensionScores
Mean 4.31 3.83 3.62
Median 4.22 4.00 3.44
FurtheranalysisofthedatacanbefoundinappendixDthroughF.Each
stationisrepresentedinaradargraphshowingthestationsscoreineachofthe threedimensions.ClearlyallofthestationsintheOperationsDivisionscorehigher inthePolicyDimension,followedbyLeadership,withthelowestscoresbeinginthe SafetyProceduralDimension.Allscoreshowever,arewellabovethe2.50mean scoreforascaleof15.ThissuggeststhatClackamasFireDistrict#1hasthe perception/attitudeofapositive,overallsafetyculture.Theaboveresultsarethe
CCFD1SafetyCulture 46 firststepinunderstandingthesafetycultureoftheorganizationandsuggestthat subgroupsmaybeidentifiedbyDivision,Battalion,andStationassignment. Next,thequestionsrelatedtothehypotheseswereanalyzed.Thefirst
hypothesisstatedthattherewouldbeidentifiablesubgroupsrelatedtosafety culture.Comparisonsofmeancombinedscorestoyearsofserviceshowsarange from3.51(915years)to3.70(48years).The915yearrangerepresentsa combinationofCompanyofficers,Firefighters,andApparatusOperatorsassignedto Operationsdivision.Thiswouldalsotendtoexcludemanyofthechiefofficersand currentadministrativestaffthatwouldtendtoberepresentedinthe16+year group.The48yeargrouprepresentsmostlyFirefightersandApparatusOperators, personnelnotusuallyconsideredinleadershippositions.Sincerankwasnot identifiedinthisstudy,itwouldbedifficulttodetermineifthedifferenceinscoresis duetoyearsofservice,experience,orpositionwithintheorganization.The literaturewouldsuggestithastodowithexperience(yearsofservice)ratherthan position,thoughsomeliteraturesuggeststheremaybeaconnectionbetween positioninanorganizationandsafetyperception.Kao,Lai,andLee(2008) AreviewofthecombinedmeanscoresbyDivisionsshowsanotable
differencebetweentheVolunteergroupandtheOperations,Training,and Administrationgroups.(Figure3)
Figure3MeanScoresbyDivision
TheTrainingDivisionhasthelowestcombined(allthreedimensions)scoreof3.59 andtheVolunteergrouphasthehighestat3.92.Apossibleexplanationforthis variancemaylieintherelationshipbetweenpersonnelwithasignificantexposure tothefireservicecultureandthoseoperatingonthefringes.Volunteersare generallymadeupofthoseeitherlookingforemploymentinthefireserviceor thosewantingtogivebacktothecommunity.Volunteerfirefightersusuallyhave employmentoutsideofthefireserviceandhavelimitedexposuretocareer employeesandtheirculture,andtheriskassociatedwithincreasedcallvolume. ManyofthefirePreventionpersonnelhavesomefirefighting(Operational) experience,buthavenothadsignificantexposuretothefirefighterandstation culture.Thisalsoseemstobecongruentwiththerelationshipbetweenslower stationswithhighercombinedmeansafetyperception/attitudescores,aconceptto beexploredfurtherinthispaper.Regardless,theredoesseemtobeanidentifiable differencebetweentheVolunteer/Preventiongroupsandtheremainingthree divisionsasidentifiedbytheirhighersafetyperception/attitudescores.Ananalysis
CCFD1SafetyCulture 48 oftheOperationalscoresshowsnotabledifferencesrelatedtocallvolume(Table9). Stationswithhighercallvolumesappeartotrendtowardslower,combinedmean surveyscoresthanstationswithlowercallvolumes.IntheNorthBattalion,Station6 sharesthehighestmeanscoreof3.77withstation2.TheSouthBattalionhassimilar resultswithitslowercallvolumeandhighercombinedmeansafety perception/attitudescore. Station15hasthesecondhighestcallvolumeintheSouthBattalion,yetit
hasasignificantlylowerscorethanstation16whichhasthehighestcallvolumein theSouthBattalion.Station16doessharethelowestscoreinDimensionIIIwith station15however.Thetypesofcallsstation15respondstoversesstation16and thatstation15isaspecialtyrescuestationcouldexplainthisdiscrepancy,but furtherresearchwouldberequiredtomakethisdetermination.Withthissaid,there stillappearstobeadirectcorrelationbetweencallvolumeandsafetyperception scores. Theresultssuggestthatsafetyperception/attitudeisrelatedtocallvolume,
whichinturnisrelatedtoincreasedriskexposureandthisexposureleadsto greatertoleranceofrisk.ThisisspecificallynotableinDimensionIII,Safety procedureswheremeanscoreareconsistentlylower.Theresultsalsoshowthat busierstationsintheNorthandSouthBattalionshavecombinedscoresconsistently lowerthanslowerstationsintherespectiveBattalions.Thisrelationshipbetween callvolumeandlowersafetyperception/attitudesupportsthatthefirsthypothesis holdstrue,thatthereareidentifiablesubgroupswithintheorganization.The
CCFD1SafetyCulture 49 researchalsosuggeststhatthesesubgroupsarerelatedtoriskexposureas demonstratedbythedifferenceinscoresbyStationandBattalion.Theresultsalso suggestthattherearesubgroupsidentifiedbyDivision.Thisissupportedbythe significantdifferencesinsafetyperceptionscoresbyDivision. Thesecondhypothesisstatesthatfirefighterswillvalueefficiencyoversafety.
ThefirststepwastoreviewthedatacomparingtheoverallOrganizationtothe OperationsgroupusingthequestionsspecifictoH2ofthestudy(Table2,Table25). Ahigher,morepositivescoreshowsthatemployeesvaluessafetymorethan efficiency,whereasalowerscoreshowstheemployeevaluesefficiencyoversafety. Inthisstudy,thequestionspertainingtothehypothesiswerecomparedtoone anotherinordertodeterminewhatwasvaluedmorepositively.TheOperations groupwascomparedtotheoverallorganizationsinceitistherewefindthe majorityoftheonline2firefightersandwherethegreatestexposuretoriskis found.Inquestion1.,weseeasignificantdifferenceinscoresbetweentheoverall organizationandtheoperationsgroup.Inquestionfourandsix,weseeasimilar scoredifferenceatalesserdegree.Eachindicatingavalueshifttowardsefficiency oversafety.
Table26Hypotheses2
Question 1.Safetyequipmenthasthepotential toadverselyaffectefficiency.
Organization Operations 3.41 2.58
2OnLinedescribescareerfirefightersregularlyassignedtofirestations throughoutthedistrict.
CCFD1SafetyCulture 50 2.Minorsafetyviolationsare acceptableiftheriskisminimal. 3.Supervisorspermitcuttingcorners togetthejobdone. 4.Gettingthejobdoneefficientlyis mostimportant. 5.Thedepartmentprovidesadequate safetyequipmentformyassigned duties. 6.SometimesIamnotgivenenough timetogetmyjobdonesafely. Meanscore Again,weseealowercombinedmeanscoreinthegroupwiththemost 3.05 3.79 3.14 4.09 2.90 3.78 3.19 4.06
3.21 3.45
3.17 3.28
exposuretorisk.Theoperationsgroupisalsothegroupmosteffectivebysafety relatedpoliciesandprocedures.Thisalongwithdataobtainedbytheinterviews suggeststhatfirefightersdooratleastsometimesdovalueefficiencyoversafety. ThisconceptisdiscussedfurtherintheDiscussionsectionofthereport. Thethirdhypothesisstatesfirefighterswillvalueindividualaccountability
oversafety.Hereagain,themorepositiveascoreis,thegreaterthevalueistowards safety,whereaslesserscoresindicatesavaluetowardsindividualaccountability. Theresultshowever,showsimilarscoresbetweentheoverallorganizationandthe Operationsgroup(Table27).Severalofthescoresareidenticalandthemajorityare withinafewhundredthsofapoint.Thescoresshowthatthereisarelativelyhigh perceptionofsafetyoverindividualaccountabilityacrosstheorganizationandthat theexposuretoriskdoesnotappeartohaveadirectimpactontheperceptionof
CCFD1SafetyCulture 51 safetyvs.individualaccountability.Thisdoesnotexplainthewitnessedreluctance tointervenewhensafetypolicesandproceduresareignored,buttheinterview resultssuggestitcouldbethattheactivityisnotperceivedasriskytherefore,there islittleneedforintervention.

Table27Hypotheses3
Question Irelyonmysupervisortokeepmesafe. Coworkersarewilingtoreportsafetyviolations, unsafebehaviors,orhazardousconditions.
Organization Operations 2.75 3.45 2.83 3.41 3.76
Peerinfluencesareeffectiveatdiscouraging 3.75 violationsofstandardoperatingproceduresorsafety rules. Iammoreresponsiblewhenitcomestofollowing safetyproceduresthanmycoworkers. Mysupervisorscloselymonitorsafetyprocedures andcorrectanydeviationsfromestablishedsafety standards. Icansafelydeterminetheproperlevelofsafety equipmentneededtoperformmyassignedduties. Coworkerswillremindmetousepropersafety equipment. Iamadequatelytrainedtosafelyconductallmy assignedduties. Iutilizemysafetyequipmentmoreoftenthanmy coworkersdo. Usingpropersafetyequipmentisprimarilythe individuals'responsibility. Iamcomfortablewithremindingmycoworkersto usesafetyequipment. IamsureitisamatteroftimebeforeIaminvolved inanaccident. 3.10 3.74
3.09 3.71
4.21 3.33 4.07 3.02 3.99 4.12 3.39
4.26 3.32 4.09 2.98 3.99 4.19 3.35
CCFD1SafetyCulture 52 Iunderstandthesafetyrulesformyjob. TheSafetyofmycoworkersismyresponsibility. MeanScore ThesurveydatacollecteddoesnotappeartosupportH3intermsof 4.14 3.97 3.65 4.18 4.09 3.66
Firefightersvaluingindividualaccountabilityoversafety.However,theinformation collectedduringtheinterviewsdoessuggesttherearesomeincidentswherethis mightholdtrue.Forexample,23%oftheintervieweesstatedtheywouldviolatea safetypolicyorprocedureinordertogetthejobdonesooner.Furthermore,18% statedtheywouldnotremindacoworkerforconcernofbeinglabeledamicro manager.14%statedtheywouldnotremindsomeoneifthesafetyequipmentwere consideredinefficientorineffective.Lastly,36%statedtheywouldfeel uncomfortableremindingamoreexperiencedfirefighteroroneofhigherrankto usesafetyequipment.Again,moststatedtheywouldfirstperformarisk/benefit analysisbeforemakingthedecisionandwouldinterveneiftheydeemedthe circumstancehighlydangerous.Furtherinvestigationintothisbehavioris warrantedsincethewillingnesstointerveneinasafetyrelatedincidentis paramountifasafetycultureistobepositivelychanged. Thenextresultstobereviewedarethetwoopenendedquestionsasshown
inTable28below.
Table28ResultsofOpenendedquestions.
CCFD1SafetyCulture 53 1.Howcouldyouimprovesafetywithintheorganization? 2.Howdoyoufeeltheorganizationcouldimprovesafety? Section Percentageofresponses Question1Question2 ImproveCommunications SafetyCultureChange ImproveSafetyProcedures IncreaseTraining ImproveSafetyPolicies ImproveSafetyEquipment IncreaseEnforcement ImproveLeadership Whenthequestionisfocusedtowardstheindividual,leadershipisidentified 12% 9% 18% 16% 7% 10% 4% 22% 19% 10% 15% 18% 16% 9% 2% 2%
astheleadingresponseforimprovingsafetywithintheorganization.Acloserlook attheresponsesshowsthatleadingbyexampleandtakingpersonalownershipby wayofSafetyproceduresisthemostsuggestedmethodtoimprovesafety.Whenthe focusofthequestionsisturnedtowardtheorganization,theshiftleansto Communicationsastheprimarymethodtoimprovesafety.Thisisgenerallyinthe formofcommunicatinglessonslearnedfrompastincidentsandnearmissincidents. ThistranscendstotheTrainingcomponentsincemanyanswersmadereferencesto bothtrainingandcommunicationandtheneedtoaddressbothsimultaneously.A changeinPolicywasanotherfrequentanswer,eitheraloneorwithother suggestions.Theauthorattemptedtodifferentiatebetweenhowfirefightersdo
CCFD1SafetyCulture 54 something(Procedure)andwhatisrequired(Policy).Forexample,apersonmight suggestchanginguniformcolortoavoidresemblingalawenforcementofficer;this wouldbeconsideredaPolicychange,whereaswearingsafetygoggleswouldbea safetyprocedure.Somesuggestionsmightbeconsideredboth,suchaschangingthe locationinwhichequipmentiscarriedonfireandrescueapparatus.Theopen endedquestionsnonotspecificallyaddresstheresearchquestionsperse;however, theydohelptobetterunderstandwhyandhowfirefightersmakesafetyrelated decisionsandwhatinfluencesthosedecisions. Interviewresults Tofurtherunderstandandinterprettheresultsofthesurvey,theauthor
interviewedDepartmentpersonnelinsmallgroupsettings.Theinterviewswere accomplishedusingfourquestionsrelatedtothesafetyculturesurveyandcanbe foundinAppendixB.Thefindingsfromtheinterviewshelpilluminate,tosome extentthewhyandhowemployeesmakesafetyrelateddecisionsandhow employeesperceivehowtheorganizationvaluessafetyvs.performance. Universally,employeesthroughouttheDivisionsfeeltheOrganizationplacesvalue onbothsafetyandperformance.Thatistosay,employeesdonotbelievethe Organizationconsidersthetwomutuallyexclusive.Whenaskedwhatconditions wouldleadtoasafetyissuegoingunreportedorunderwhatconditionswouldan individualviolateasafetyprocedureorpolicy,thefollowingtworesponseswerein themajority(23%):Risk/Benefitanalysisandperceptionofriskwereusedto defendtheomissions.Thatistosay,ifthewitnessorindividualfelttheriskwas
CCFD1SafetyCulture 55 smallenoughorthebenefitgreatenough,theviolationswilllikelyoccur.Intermsof efficiencyorgettingthejobdoneinatimelymanner,only10%oftherespondents feltthatasafetyviolationwouldbeignoredorgounreportedjusttogetthejob faster.However,whenaskedwhentheywouldviolateasafetypolicyorprocedure, 23%oftherespondentssaidtheywoulddosotogetthejobdonesooner.This appearstosupporttheconceptofindividualaccountabilityhavinganinfluenceon safetyrelateddecisionmaking,thoughtheresultsarenotsignificanttoverifythe conclusion.Lastly,whenaskedwhyanindividualwouldnotremindacoworker aboutusingapieceofsafetyequipmentoraboutasafetyprocedure,36%stated thattheexperiencelevelorrankoftheoffenderwouldbeasignificantfactor.Other responsesincludednotwantingtonagsomeoneoveraperceivedminorissueor theythoughtthepersonknewwhattheyweredoing. Summaryofresults Itisapparentfromtheresultsofthisstudythattheorganizationhasahighly
positiveperception/attitudetowardssafetyandthatnodimensionhadascore belowthe2.50midpoint.Thisisalsoverifiedbythehigherscoresinthe dimensionsrelatedtobothorganizationalpolicyandleadership.Thetheoryofsub groupsrelatedtoorganizationalsafetycultureappearstobevalidwhencomparing Divisions,Battalions,andstations.Theexposuretoriskappearstohaveasignificant impactonsafetyattitudesthroughouttheorganization.Theresultsalsosuggestthat employeeswithhigherexposurestorisk(highercallvolumes)tendhavehigher tolerancesforriskoradiminishedriskperception.This,theninfluencesthe
CCFD1SafetyCulture 56 risk/benefitanalysisusedbytheemployeestomakesafetyrelateddecisions.Next, thecombineddatasupportsthetheorythatfirefighterstendtovalueefficiencyover safety,atleastinqualifiedcircumstances.Lastly,thesurveyresultsdidnotsupport thethirdhypothesiswellenoughtodefendthatfirefightersvalueindividual accountabilityoversafety,howevertheinterviewresultsdidsuggestthiscouldbe heldtruewhenhierarchalinfluencesareinplace. Discussion TheconceptofSafetyCultureiswidelydebatedintheSafetycommunity.The
literature,thoughplentiful,isfracturedandsomewhatcontroversial.Thereislittle agreementonthedefinitionofSafetyCultureandtheconceptscontainedtherein.In addition,theconceptofSafetyCulturereferstowhattheliteraturecallsa perceptionofsafetyrelateddimensions.Anemployeesperceptiondoesnotmean anorganizationisunsafeorthatpoliciesandproceduresarenotfollowed,itisa reflectionoftheemployeesattitudetowardstheissues.Forexample,intheissue relatedtoaccountabilityoversafety,individualsmaysimplyviewtheactivityas safethereforethereisnoneedtofollowanygivenpolicyorprocedure. Alternatively,insomecasesitmaybehowtheindividualviewsthemselvesand theirexperiencelevelinregardstosafety.Withthatsaid,theliteratureisclear abouttherelationshipbetweensafetycultureandaccidentrates.Theindustries researchedforthisstudyarerelatedtothefireserviceastheyareallconsidered highriskindustriesandthatsafetyrelatederrorshavesignificantimpactsonthe organization.LiteraturespecifictotheFireServiceislimitedandwhatisfoundis
CCFD1SafetyCulture 57 eitherspecifictothewildlandfirefightingorisresearchofquestionablevalidity. Thevalidityofthisstudyisdifficulttodetermineandfurtherstatistical
analysisisneededtohelprealizethesignificanceoftheresults.However,a comparisoncanbemadewiththeresultsoftheaforementionedstudies,atleastin thesimilardimensionsandtheoverallOrganizationalSafetyCulture(Table29).

Table29ComparisonsofStudyResults.
Department/Study ClackamasFireDistrict MarylandStudy
MeanScore 3.61 3.54
StandardDeviation .35726 .5292
Inthisstudy,thethreedimensionssurveyedwereSafetyrelatedPolicy,Leadership relatedtosafety,andSafetyrelatedprocedures.Thesecloselyresemblethe dimensionsusedintheAnneArundelandMarylandStudies:(a)Management,(b) SafetySystems,and(c)risk.Neitherstudyhowever,approachedtheissueofSafety Cultureinthewaytheauthordid.Theattemptwasmadetoaskquestionsthat wouldhelpdeterminethewhyandhowfirefightersmakesafetyrelateddecisions, notsimplymeasuretheoverallsafetycultureoftheorganization.BothWilliams (2007)studyandPessemiers(2008)studyattemptedtoaddresstheissueof validityandreliabilityaswellastheOrganizationalCulture.Bothusedfocusgroups tohelpestablishvalidityaswellasstatisticalanalysis.Forethisstudy,manyofthe questionsusedinthePessemier/Williamsstudieswereused,butnotvalidatedfor thisstudy. Next,furtherdiscussionoftheresultsrelatedtothethreehypotheses
isrequired.Thefirsthypothesesstatedtherewouldbeidentifiablesubgroups
CCFD1SafetyCulture 58 relatedtosafety.Theresultssuggestthatthereareatleasttwoidentifiablegroups, whichcanbefurtherdividedintosubgroups.ThesegroupsincludeOrganizational Divisions,Battalions,andFirestations.Yearsofservicedidnotshowenough varianceinscorestowarranttheconclusionthatYearsofServicegroupsare identifiedassubgroups.Inadditiontothescoresimilarities,thevarianceinscore byYearsofServiceappeartocontradictfindingsfromWilliams(2007),Leeand Harrison(2000),andCiavarelliandCrowson(2004)whichhavefindingsthat suggestmoreexperiencedmembersofanorganizationtendtobemoresafety consciousandhaveahigherperceptionofsafetywithinanorganization.The Clackamasstudyshowsmoreofarelationshipbetweenranksthansimpleyearsof service.Thoughthestudydidnotspecificallybreakdownrank,themajorityof officersandchiefofficerswithinourorganizationhavemorethan15yearsof experienceandthe16plusyeargroupdidscoresecondtothe48yeargroup.The resultsdoshowatreadtowardshigherscoresasyearsofexperienceincrease,with theexceptionofthe915yeargroupwhichhadthelowestscore..Italsohasoneof thegreateststandarddeviationscoresof.291,secondtothe16+group. TheRiskExposureGroup(Divisions&Stations)hasthemostnotable
differencesinscores.Slowerstationshaveatendencytowardshighercombined meanscoresthenbusierstationsandtheSouthBattalion(slower)haveahigher combinedmeanscorethantheNorthBattalion(busier).TheFirePrevention DivisionandtheVolunteergrouphavethehighestmeanscoreswhileOperations, Administration,andtheTrainingDivisionhavelowercombinedmeanscores.One mightexpecttheAdministrationDivisiontohavethehighestscoresincetheyhave
CCFD1SafetyCulture 59 moreyearsofserviceandarefurtherremovedfromtherisk;however,asignificant numberofadministrativepersonneladvancedthroughtheranksandmaystillbe influencedbytheOperationalCulture.VolunteersandthePreventionStafftendto havealesserdegreeofriskexposure,whichmightexplaintheirhighercombined meanscores.Inaddition,manyVolunteershaverecentlyfinishedtherecruit academyandmaybeinfluencedbyjobrelatedsafetytraining.Theseresultsare comparablewiththestudybyWilliams(2007),wheretheVolunteergroupscored higherthantheCareergroup.Hereagain,theliteraturesupportsthis,Pessemier (2008)suggeststhatpersonnelexposedtoriskonaregularbasistendtohavea highertolerancetorisk.Severalanswersfromtheopenendedquestionsshowthat somefirefightersfeelsafetycanbeoverdoneandthatinjuriesareinevitable.This attitudemightexplainwhygroupswithgreaterexposuretorisk,tendtohavelower scores. Next,isthediscussionofthesecondhypothesis:firefighterswilltendtovalue
efficiencyoversafety.Here,againweseealowercombinedmeanscorefromthe OperationsgroupincomparisontotheoverallOrganization(Table26),specifically inthedimensionwheresafetymayhaveanimpactontherequiredtasks.For example,thereisanotablelowerscoreforthequestion:Safetyequipmenthasthe potentialtoadverselyaffectefficiency.Here,responsesfromtheopenended questionshelpexplainwhythismightoccur.Severalanswerssuggestthat firefightersfeeltheycanbetoosafe,orthatsafetycangetinthewayofgettingthe jobdoneefficiently.Thisalsomayalludetothepracticeofomittingtheuseof certainsafetyequipmentinordertoperformmoreefficiently.Theimpactor
CCFD1SafetyCulture 60 perceivedimpactthatsafetyrelatedpoliciesorprocedureshaveonrequiredtasksis ofparticularimportancewhenitcomestopolicyorprocedureimplementation.If indeed,firefightershaveabiastowardsefficiency,thenwemustmakesurewe addresstheimpactthepolicyorprocedurehasonefficiency.Evenwhenfirefighters advocateforandagreetoasafetyrelatedpolicyorprocedure,ifitnegatively influencesefficiency,itwouldnotlikelybefollowed. Theliteratureonthisdimensionofsafetycultureisminimal.However,
researchbyOmodei,Mclennan,andReynolds(2005)showthatwildland firefighterstendedtoignoretheobvioussignsoffatigueanddehydrationinorderto completeatask.Thiscandoattitudecanbefoundthroughoutthefireservice regardlessofthetypeoffirefighting.Furtherresearchisneededtohelpdetermine howfirefightersassessrisksinceitisuncleariffirefighterssimplydevelopahigher toleranceforriskoruseadifferentsetofcriteriawhencompletingrisk/benefit analysis.Regardless,itisclearthatthesafetyisperceivedbyfirefighterstohavea negativeimpactonefficiencyandmustbeconsideredwhendevelopingnewsafety proceduresofpolicieswithinanorganization. Thelasthypothesisattemptstoexploretherelationshipbetweensafetyand
accountability.Thehypothesisstates:firefighterswilltendtovalueindividual accountabilityoversafety.Admittedly,thisisprimarilybasedonobservationwith verylittleliteraturetovalidateit.Again,theNASAstudy(2004)suggeststhatin hierarchicalorganizations,positionwithinthatorganizationwillhavesomeaffect ontheperceptionofsafety.Theresultsofthisstudydonotsuggestthereisa
CCFD1SafetyCulture 61 significantdifferencebetweenrankandyearsofservicewhenitcomestosafety perception;infact,thescoresareveryclosetothatoftheoverallorganization.Since rankwasnotidentifiedinthestudy,acomparisonofmeanscoresrelatedtotheH3 questionswasmadeusingYearsofService.3

Table30H3Meanscorecomparison
16+Years 3.67
915Years 3.53
48Years 3.65
03Years 3.74
Organization 3.65
Again,theseresultsaresimilartothefindingofWilliams(2007)and
Pessemier(2008)andmaysuggestthatanyreluctanceonthepartoftheobserver tointervenemaybebasedontheperceptionofrisk.Slovic,Fischhoff,and Lichtenstein(1980)suggestthatiftheobserverhasanequalorhighertolerancefor risk,theymaybelesslikelytointervene.Inotherwords,iftheobserverhasalower riskperception,theywillhaveahigherrisktoleranceandwillseenoneedto interveneintheaction.Theirresearchalsosuggeststhattheriskperceptionis basedonacombinationofseverityandtheprobabilityofinjury.RiskToleranceand RiskPerceptioninthefireservicewillneedtobestudiedfurtherifwearetofully understandhowandwhyfirefightersmakethedecisionsrelatedtosafety.This issuewillbediscussedfurtherintherecommendationsection. Recommendations
3ThereisadirectcorrelationbetweenyearsofserviceandrankwithinCCFD1.
CCFD1SafetyCulture 62 Theresultsofthisstudyhavehelpedtoidentifyareasforimprovement
withintheorganization.Further,theresultssuggestthatadditionalresearchis neededtohelpcomprehendtheassociationbetweenRiskPerception,Risk Tolerance,andAccountabilityintermsofsafetyrelateddecisionmaking.The resultsofthestudysuggestthatthereisarelationshipbetweenriskexposureand risktoleranceandanunderstandingofthisrelationshipwillbebeneficialinfurther improvingtheorganizationalsafetyculture.Fromtheresultsofthisstudy,the authorrecommendsthatthefollowingareasbeaddressedthroughtheeffortsofthe SafetyCommitteeandsubcommitteesunderthedirectionoftheSafetyOfficer:(a) Additionalresearchinsafetybehavior,(b)Improvedrecordkeepingdetailinginjury ratesandsubsequentcostsassociatedwiththoseinjuries,(c)Sustainabilityofsafety relatedprograms,(d)WellnessandFitness,(f)andaStakeholderanalysisrelatedto safetyissue.Inadditiontothesegeneralareas,thefollowingspecifictopicsneedto beaddressed:(a)The16FireFighterLifeSafetyInitiatives,(b)Communications,(c) SafetyCultureChange,(d)SafetyProcedures,(e)Training,SafetyrelatedPolicies,(f) SafetyRelatedEquipment,(g)Enforcement,and(h)Leadership. Thefirstfourrecommendationstranscendtheorganizationandshouldnot
bethesoleresponsibilityofthedistrictSafetyCommitteeoritssubcommittees. However,theauthorbelievestheseitemsmustbeaddressedtoensure sustainabilityofthesafetyprogramandtofurtherchangeandimprovethe organizationalsafetyculture.Inaddition,theremustbeanexuscreatedbetween thegroupswiththeabovementionedareasofresponsibilitytopreventthe individualgroupsfromworkinginanuncoordinatedeffort.Forexample,theFitness
CCFD1SafetyCulture 63 &WellnesscommitteeshouldworkcloselywiththeSafetycommitteeandthe Equipmentcommitteeshouldbeinvolvedaswell.Allareinterrelatedandshould notfunctionseparatefromoneanotherinordertopreventthesiloeffectcommon inorganizations. Thefirstofthesetopicsandthefoundationofthisstudybeginswiththefirst
ofthe16FireFighterLifeInitiatives.Itisalsothestartingpointforaddressingthe remaining15initiatives.ThefirstrecommendationisthatClackamasFireDistrict #1formallyadaptthe16LifeSafetyInitiativesandthroughtheSafetyCommittee formsubcommitteestospecificallyconcentrateonalloftheLifeSafetyInitiativesin aninclusive,sustainablemethod.Secondly,Communicationsinregardstosafety mustbeenhanced.Theresultsoftheopenendedquestionsshowthatlessons learnedfromothereventsneedtobedisseminatedthroughoutthedepartment. ThereviewedliteraturerecommendsthatlessonLearnedinformationbeshared throughoutanorganizationinaformalizedmanner.AtCCFD1,thiscouldbe accomplishedthroughseveralmethodsofcurrentlyestablishedformsof communication.Thesemethodsincludedusingthedistrictintranetasamethodto distributetimelyinformationandtoaddlinkstoothersafetyrelatedsightssuchas BillyGoldfedersTheSecretList@FirefightersCloseCalls.comand www.Everyonegoeshome.comwebsite,bothdedicatedtobringingclosecall/near missstoriestotheforefront.Secondly,thisinformationshouldbeformally communicatedtocompanyofficersduringdrillsandmandatorytrainingevents. Informal,nonscheduledtrainingthroughBattalionChiefswouldalsobeaneffective methodtopassoninformationandincorporateitintothenormaloperating
CCFD1SafetyCulture 64 procedures.Lastly,regularcommunicationsfromthedistrictSafetyOfficer regardingfindingsfrominjuriesandnearmissincidentswithinthedepartment mustbecommunicatedthroughformalchannelssuchatrainingandinformal forumssuchastheHotSheetortheD1net. Thenextrecommendationpresentedspecificallyaddresseesthe
OrganizationalSafetyCultureofCCFD1.Thisstudyisthefirststepinaddressingthe 16FirefighterLifeSafetyInitiativesandstartedwithageneral,Organizational CulturalSurveyin2008,andnowthecurrentOrganizationalSafetyCulturesurvey. Understandingtheorganizationalcultureintermsofsafetyisparamountbeforeany discussionofchangecanoccur.TheresultsofthesurveysuggestthatClackamas CountyFireDistrict#1hasahighlypositiveattitudeintermsofsafetyandis comparativetothestudiesbyWilliams(2007)andPessemier(2008).Itis recommendedthatfurtherresearchbecompletedonfirefightersafetyrelated behaviorandanindepthstudyontheoverallsafetycultureoftheorganization completed.Thisissuggestedsincethefocusofthecurrentstudyattemptedtoelicit specificsafetyrelatedperceptionsandattitudesanddidnotaddressothersafety relateddimensionspertinenttofullyunderstandingtheoverallorganizational culture. AddressingSafetyProceduresisthenextproposal.Itisrecommendedthat
theSafetyCommitteeformasubcommitteetospecificallyaddresssafetyrelated procedureswithintheorganization.Awebportalshouldbecreatedtoallow suggestionsandrecommendationstobecollectedandreviewedbythecommittee
CCFD1SafetyCulture 65 throughoutthemeetingcycle.Feedbackduringthisprocessisimportandshouldbe consideredaspartoftheprocess.SinceSafetyrelatedPolicyiscloselyrelatedtothis subject,theportalshouldhaveasectionforboth.Committeemembersmaythen needtofiltersubmittedsuggestionstoandforwardthemtotheappropriatesub committeeorDivision. Trainingrelatedresponsesaccountedforoneofthehighestresponseratesof
theopenendedquestionsat18%fortheorganizationand16%fortheindividual response.Often,theseresponseswerecorrelatedwithcommunicationsintermsof lessonslearned.ItisimportanttonotethatresearchbyLehmann,Haight,and Michael(2009)suggestthatonthejobsafetytrainingmaynotbeadequateenough tochangesafetyrelatedbehaviors,especiallyinregardstoriskperceptionand tolerance.Additionalpsychologicalandbehavioraltrainingmayberequiredto changesafetyrelatedattitudeswithintheorganization.Itisalsoimportanttonote, thattheTrainingDivisionhadoneofthelowestscoresinsafetyperceptionwhen comparedtootherdivisionswithintheorganization.Furtherunderstandingofthis responseisnecessarytohelpmakeneededchangeswhenappropriate.Lastly,the waywearetrainedshouldbereviewed.Forexample,timerequirementsareoften placedontrainingcompetencies.Theliteraturesuggeststhatthiscouldpossiblyput firefightersatoddswithwhatismostimportant,timeorsafety.Iftimeisperceived tobevaluedoversafety,itcouldhaveanegativeaffectonsafety. Safetyrelatedequipmentdidnothaveasmanyresponsesastheabove
sections,howeveritstillrequiresacloserlookastohowtheorganizationcan
CCFD1SafetyCulture 66 improvetheprocessinwhichsafetyequipmentisresearchedandimplemented withinthedepartment.Theresearchandliteraturereviewsuggestsacorrelation betweensafetyandefficiencyandshouldbeconsideredwhenintroducingnew safetyequipment.Forexample,ifsafetyequipmentreducestheefficiencyofa procedure,itislesslikelytobeutilizedduringsaidprocedure,particularlyifthe actionisoflowperceivedriskandconsequence.Again,acommonmethodtocollect suggestionsrelatedtosafetyequipmentshouldbeinplace.Thedistrictintranetis againagoodavenuetocollectrecommendationsandsuggestionsrelatedtosafety equipment. Enforcementofsafetyrelatedpracticeshadthefewestresponseoftheopen
endedquestions.Itisunknownifthisisrelatedtothelackofperceivedneedto enforcesafetypolicesandpracticesorifitrelatedtotheorganizationalculture. Whatissuggestedistheemployeesofthefiredistrictbelievefurtherenforcement methodsarenotrequiredtoimprovesafetywithintheorganization.Itshouldbe notedhowever,thatoneresponsecalledforgreaterenforcementofonscene safetypractices.Lastly,enforcementtendstohaveagreaterimpactonnewer,less senioremployeesandareducedimpactonmoreexperiencedemployees. Enforcementworkswelltoinitiallyestablishthesafetybehavior,butitisthe organizationalculturethatsustainsit. SafetyrelatedtoLeadershipisthelastofthenineidentifieddiscussion
topics.Fromanorganizationalperspective,itinvokedoneofthelowestresponses yetithasoneofthegreatestimpactsontheorganizationalculture.However,
CCFD1SafetyCulture 67 employeesdidnotfeeladdressingleadershipissuesfromanorganizational perspectivewasnecessarytodirectlyimprovesafety.Additionally,theindividual perspectiveinvokedthehighestresponserateof22%oftheanswers.Fromthe responses,itwasapparentthatemployeesfeltthattakingindividualaccountability towardssafetywasthemosteffectiveapproach.Inmostcases,itwassuggestedthat leadingbyexamplewouldbemosteffectiveandthemajorityoftherespondents statedtheyneededtodoso.Itisunclearifthisspecificallyrelatestothethird hypothesisintermsofindividualaccountabilityoversafety,butitdoesshowa willingnesstoberesponsibleforthesafetyofothers. Itisrecommendedthataccountabilityforothersintheorganizationbe
instilledinallemployeesfrominitialtrainingandthroughoutsubsequenttraining sessions.Itisalsoarecommendationthatsupervisorsandcompanyofficerbeheld accountableforinjuriesthattakeplaceontheirwatch.Itisnotsuggestedthatthis bedonethroughthedisciplinaryprocess,butthroughmeasuredperformance standardsrelatedtosafetyviolationsandaccidentrates.Informationrelatedto safetywouldbesharedthroughoutthedistrictthroughthecurrentlyestablished communicationmethods. Lastly,itisrecommendedthattheFireDistrictimprovetrackingofinjuries
andtheassociatedcosts.Asmentioned,thedistricthasbeenproactiveand progressiveinitspursuitofasaferorganizationandithashadapositiveimpacton theorganization.However,withoutadequatemeasurementtools,wehavenoway ofdeterminingoureffectivenessofouractions.
CCFD1SafetyCulture 68 Insummary,Ibelievethepresentedresearchhasofferedsomeinsightofthe
overallsafetyculturewithinClackamasFireDistrict#1.Thisprojectisasignificant steptowardsdefiningandadvocatingtheneedforculturalchangewithinthe organizationrelatedtosafety.Theauthorbelievesthatamorethorough understandingofhowfirefightersvaluesafetywillallowforimprovedeffectiveness whenintroducingandimplementingnewsafetyrelatedpolicesandprocedures.It alsooffersrecommendationsforimprovingandmaintainingsafetyrelatedpractices withintheorganization. Further,theauthorencouragesadditionalresearchinorganizationsafety
culture,particularlyusingasurveythataddressnotonlytheOrganizationalCulture, butSafetyRelatedBehaviorsandSafetyManagementSystems.Inall,ClackamasFire District#1scoredpositiveinalldimensionssurveyed,OrganizationalPolicy, OrganizationalLeadership,andSafetyProceduresandtheauthorfeelsthisisa refectionofanorganizationcommittedtothesafetyofitsemployees.Thisdoesnot meanwecanneglectthefutureeffortstoimproveuponourorganization.Each injuryhasarelatedcostassociatedwithit,bothfinanciallyandemotionallyandwe cannotacceptinjuriesaspartofthecostofdoingbusiness.Firefightersareheroes, notbecauseoftheirsacrifices,butbecauseoftheircommitmenttohelpandsave othersinneed.Thepurposeofthisresearchistobetterunderstandour organizationalsafetycultureandtohelpsavethelivesofthosewhosaveothers.
WorksCited
Ahmad,R.,&Alistair,G.G.(2003).MeasuringSafetyCulturewithSPMTFieldData. JournalofConstructionResearch,4(1),2944. Bandura,A.(1977).SocialLearningTheory.NewYork:GeneralLearning. Beck,M.W.(1999).SafetyCultureaconcepttoomany.HealthandSafety Practitioner,16(1),1416. BehavioralScienceTechnology.(2004).AssessmentandPlanforOrganizational CultureChangeatNASA.Ojai.
CCFD1SafetyCulture 70 BerkeleyLabCommunicationsDept.(2005).SafetyCultureSurveyResultsareIn. RetrievedApril5,2010,fromTodayatBerkeleyLab: http://lbl.gov/today/2005/Nov/09Web/safetypage.html Cameron,K.S.,&Quinn.(2006).DiagnosingandChangingOrganizationalCulture. SanFrancisco,CA:Jossey&Bass. Carroll,J.S.(202).Safetycultureasanongoingprocess:culturesurveysas opportunitiesforinquiryandchange.MITSloanSchoolofManagement. Celinska,K.(2007).IndividualismandCollectivismInAmerica:TheCaseofGun OwnershipandAttitudesTowardsGunControl.SocialPespectives,50(2),229247. Chute,R.W.(1995).Cockpitcabincommunicationsataleoftwocultures. InternationalJournalofAviationPsychology,5,257276. Ciavarelli,A.C.(2004).Organizationalfactorsinaccidentriskmanagement.Safety acrosshighconsequenceindustriesconference. ClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1.(2009).ClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1. Retrieved200923MayfromAboutUs: http://www.clackamasfire.com/aboutus.html ClackamasFireDistrict#1.(2009).OSHA300Records. Clark,S.(1999).Perseptionsoforganizationalsafety:implicationsforthe developmentofsafetyculture.JournalofOrganizationalBehavior,20,185198. Cooper,D.(20011February).TreatingSafetyAsAValue.SafetyManagemetn, pp.1721. EveryoneGoesHomeInitiative.(2004).AbouttheEveryoneGoesHomeInitiative. RetrievedMarch2,2009,fromEveryoneGoesHomeFirefighterLifeSafety Initiative:www.everyonegoeshome.com Goldfeder,B.(2010).TheSecretList.RetrievedMay13,2010,fromFirefighterClose Calls:www.firefighterclosecalls.com Harvey,J.E.,Bolem,G.,Cox,H.,&Gregory,M.J.(2002).AnAnalysisofsafetyculture attitudesinahighlyregulatedenvironment.Work&Stress,16(1),1936. Hatch,M.J.(2002).TheDynamicsoforganizationalIdentity.HumanRelations,55, 9891018. HealthandSafetyExecutiveProject.(n.d.).SafetyClimateandMeasurementUser GuideandToolKit.RetrievedMarch26,2010,fromSafetyClimateandMeasurement UserGuideandToolKit: http://www.lut.ac.uk/department/bs/safety/document.pdf
CCFD1SafetyCulture 71 Hofstede,G.(1991).Culturesandorginizations:Softwareofthemind.Interculture cooperationanditsimportancetosurvival.London:McGrawHill. Jones,M.(2000).ReducingFirefighterDeathsandInjuries:ChnageinConcept, PolicyandPractice.PublicEntityRiskInstitute(PERI).Fairfax:PERI. Kao,C.L.(2008).SafetyCultureFactors,GroupDifferences,andRiskPerceptionin fivePetrochemicalPlants.ProcessSafetyProgress,37,145152. Karter,M.J.(2009).U.S.FirefighterInjuries2008.NationalFireProtection Association,FireAnalysisandResearchDivision.Quincy:NFPA. Lee,T.H.(2000).Assessingsafetycultureinnuclearpowerstations.SafetyScience, 34,6197. Lehmann,C.C.(2009).EffectsofSafetyTrainingonRiskTolerance:Anexamination ofMaleWorkersintheSurfaceMiningIndustry.TheAmericanSocietyofSafety Engineers,6(1),122. Manning,B.(2002).Creatingthe"New"FireServiceSafetyCulture:APrespective, Part1.RetrievedMarch2,2009,fromEveryoneGoesHomeFirefighterSafety Initiatives:http://everyonegoeshome.com Mearns,K.J.(1999).AssessingtheStateofOrganizationalSafetyCultureor Climate?CurrentPsychology,18(1),513. NIST.(2005).TheEconomicConsequencesofFirefighterInjuriesandThier Prevention.FinalReport.NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology,U.S DepartmentofCommerce.Arlington:TriDataCorperation. Omodei,M.M.(2005).IdentifyingWhyEvenWellTrainedFirefightersMakeUnsafe Decisions:AhumanFactorsInterviewProtocol.EighthInternationalWildlandFire SafetySummit,(pp.112).Missoula. Pendergast,D.(2007).Definingandassessingthefactorswithintheorganizational cultureoftheLaconiaFireDepartmentthataffectthehealthandsafetyclimateand moreenduringhealthandsafetyculture.NationalFireAcademy,Emittsburg. Pessemier,B.(2007).FinalReportforLODDProject:PhaseIII.OklahomaState UniversityInternationalFireServiceTrainingAssociationandFireProtection Publications. Pessemier,W.(2008).DevelopingaSafetyCultureintheFireService.International FireServiceJournalofLeadershipandManagement,2. Pidgeon,N.F.(1991).SafteyCultureandRiskManagementinOrganizations.Journal ofCrossCulturalPsychology,22(1),129138. Reuchlin,H.S.(2004).TheRoleofLeadershipinInstallingaCultureofSafety: LessonsfromtheLiterature.JournalofHealthcareManagment,49(1),4758.
CCFD1SafetyCulture 72 Slovic,P.F.(1980).FactsandFears:Understandingperceivedrisk.Societalrisk assessment.NewYork:Plenum. U.S.FireAdministration.(2009).HistoricalOverviewofOnDutyFirefighterFatalities 19772008.RetrievedMarch5,2010,fromU.S.FireAdministration: http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/fireservice/fatalities/statistics/history.shtm Wiegmann,D.A.,Zhang,H.,vonThaden,T.,&Sharma,G.G.(2004).SafetyCulture: AnIntergrativeReview.TheinternationalJournalofAviationPsychology,14(2), 117134. Windham,R.(2005).Abaselinemeasurementofthewoodland'sfiredepartment safetyculture.NationalFireAcademy.Emittsdburg:NationalFireAcademy. Wong,D.S.(2005).MeasuringOrganizationalSafetyandeffectivenessatNASA. EngineeringManagmentJournal,17(4),5962. Yule,S.F.(2007).Theroleofmanagementandsafetyclimateinpreventingrisk takingatwork.Int.J.RiskAssessmentandManagement,7(3),137151.
AppendixA
Whichoneofthefollowingbestdescribesyourposition?
1 Operations 2 Administration 3 Training 4 Prevention 5 Volunteer
YearsofService 03years 1
48years 2 915years 3 4 16yearsormore
Rank FireFighter 1 2 CompanyOfficer ChiefOfficer 3 Administrative 4 Strongly

Strongly Agree
1.Thedepartmentisgenuinelyconcernedaboutsafety cdefg 2.LeadershipprovidesapositiveclimatethatpromotessafeFire/EMS operations cdefg 3.Theaccidentandinjuryrateinourdepartmentiswithinindustry standards.... cdefg 4.Firefightingactivitiesaremadeassafeastheycanbe cdefg 5.Thedepartmentdoesenoughtopromotesafety cdefg 6.Leadershipconductsadequatereviewsandupdatesofsafetystandardsand operatingprocedures...cdefg 7.Thedepartmenthasawelldefinedsafetyprogramcdefg 8.Leadershipcloselymonitorsproficiencystandardstoensurefirefightersare qualifiedtofunctionsafelycdefg 9.Irelyonmysupervisortokeepmycoworkersandmesafe.................cdefg 10.OurHealth/SafetyPoliciesandProceduresareadequatetoprovideasafe workingenvironment...cdefg 11.Supervisorsencouragereportingsafetydiscrepancieswithoutfearofnegative repercussions....cdefg 12.Safetyequipmenthasthepotentialtoadverselyaffectefficiencycdefg 13.Coworkersarewillingtoreportsafetyviolations,unsafebehaviors,orhazardous conditions......cdefg 14.Peerinfluencesareeffectiveatdiscouragingviolationsofstandardoperating proceduresorsafetyrules...cdefg 15.Violationsofsafetyrulesarerare..cdefg 16.Minorsafetyviolationsareacceptableiftheriskisminimal.cdefg
Disagree
CCFD1SafetyCulture 74 17.Iammoreresponsiblewhenitcomestofollowingsafetyproceduresthanmy coworkers..cdefg 18.Mydepartmenthasareputationforsafety..cdefg 19.Mysupervisorscloselymonitorsafetyproceduresandcorrectanydeviations fromestablishedsafetystandards.cdefg 20.Supervisorspermitcuttingcornerstogetthejobdone...cdefg 21.Icansafelydeterminetheproperlevelofsafetyequipmentneededtoperform myassignedduties...cdefg 22.Ihavesometimesfelttoofatiguedtodomyjobsafely..cdefg 23.Gettingthejobdoneefficientlyisimportant....cdefg 24.Thelackofexperiencedpersonnelhasadverselyaffectedthesafetyofmy job...cdefg 25.Safetydecisionsaremadeattheproperlevels,bythemostqualifiedpeoplein theorganization.....cdefg 26.Leadershiptakesthetimetoidentifyandassessrisksassociatedwithits Fire/EMSoperations...cdefg 27.Coworkerswillremindmetousepropersafetyequipment.....cdefg 28.OperationalRiskManagementprocessesareincorporatedintothedecision makingatalllevels...cdefg 29.Mydepartmentwouldratherloseabuildingthanunnecessarilyriskmy personalsafetycdefg 30.Leadershipissuccessfulincommunicatingitssafetygoalsto personnel...cdefg 31.Leadershipcommunicatesthelessonslearnedfromaccidents,injuries,andnear missreports.cdefg
32.Mistakeshaveleadtochangesinsafetyprocedures.cdefg 33.Leadershipsetstheexampleforcompliancewithsafetystandards..cdefg 34.Mysupervisordoesnothesitatetotemporarilyrestrictindividualstoofatigued tocontinuetoworksafely.......cdefg
CCFD1SafetyCulture 75 35.Iamadequatelytrainedtosafelyconductallmyassignedduties..cdefg 36.Leadershipprovidesadequatesafetybackupstocatchpossiblehumanerrors duringhighriskoperationscdefg 37.Ilooktomysupervisortodeterminetheproperlevelofsafetyequipmenttobe used...cdefg 38.Safetyeducationandtrainingareadequateinmyorganization.cdefg 39.Iamkeptinformedofimportantsafetyinformation..cdefg 40.CoworkersshareanequalresponsibilityinmakingsureIfollowsafetypolicies andprocedures...cdefg 41.Thedepartmentprovidesadequatesafetyequipmentformyassigned duties....cdefg 42.Iutilizemysafetyequipmentmoreoftenthanmycoworkers.....cdefg 43.Usingpropersafetyequipmentisprimarilytheindividuals responsibility....cdefg 44.Iamcomfortablewithremindingmycoworkerstousesafety equipment...cdefg 45.IamsureitisamatteroftimebeforeIaminvolvedinanaccidentcdefg 46.SometimesIamnotgivenenoughtimetogetthejobdonesafelycdefg 47.Iunderstandthesafetyrulesformyjob.cdefg 48.Thesafetyofcrewmembersismyresponsibility..cdefg
AppendixB
InterviewQuestions 1. Whatwouldyousayisthemostimportantinourdepartment,safety,or performance?
CCFD1SafetyCulture 76 2. Underwhatcircumstancesorconditionswouldanunsafeactbeignoredor hiddenandgounreported?Ifitdoeshappen,why? 3. Underwhatcircumstancesorconditionswouldyouviolateasafety procedure? 4. Aretherecircumstanceswhereyouwouldnotremindacoworkertouse properprotectiveequipmentofsafetyprocedure?
AppendixC
Figure4Operations
Figure5Training
Figure6Prevention
Figure7Administrations

Figure8Volunteer
AppendixD
Figure9Station1
Figure10Station2
Figure11Station3
Figure12Station4
Figure13Station5
Figure14Station6
Figure15Station8
Figure16Station10
Figure17Station11
Figure18Station15
Figure19Station16
Figure20Station17
AppendixE
CCFD1SafetyCulture 86 YearsofService
Figure21
Figure22
Figure23915YearsofService
Figure2416+YearsofService
AppendixF
SafetyCultureSurvey2010 Howdoyoufeeltheorganizationcouldimprovesafety? ResponseCount64answeredquestion64skippedquestion95 ResponseText 1.communication 2.Lesspunitiveandmorecommittedtojustdoingtherightthings.Thisisanissue ofdepartmentcultureandnotjustsafety. 3.Furtherimbedsafetyinourorganizationalculture.Eachdrillshouldbeginwitha safetymessage. 4.Manyofourinjuriesarebackrelated.Wecanlookatbetterwaysofmoving people,deadweight.Training,equipment?Howdotheymovepts.inthehospital? 5.Bycontinuingtofosteraculturethatissafetyoriented. 6.Embedsafetycomponentsintoalltrainingandenforcesafetypoliciesthatarein place 7.Provide2setsofturnoutstoeveryone.Providethelatestequipmentandsafety geartooperationalpeople.Equipmentwouldbeabudgetpriorityandnot secondarytoinformationgathering. 8.Morelinepersonnelinput 9.Sharingthenearmissesdistrictwidewouldbegood.Idon'thearofmanythough Iknowtheyhappenmoreoften. 10.Fullyaddressthedieselexhaustproblem,addressproblemswitholder apparatus(seatbelts,emergencylighting),Continuethetrainingthatwecurrently haveandalwaysseekopportunitiestoimprove. 11.Specificallyaddresssafetyofinteriorfirefighting.Forinstance,newpeopleare beingtaughtnewtechniquesoffightingfireintheCFBTburnprop(whicharegood techniques)butsomecomeawaythinkingthatishowwearegoingtofightfire insteadofrealizingthatisatooltofightfireifyouareunfortunateenoughtofind yourselfinthattypeofhazardousatmosphere.Ibelieveweneedtodoabetterjob ofemphasizingcontrollingthefireenvironmentpriortoenteringastructure.Just oneexample. 12.Increasetrainingand/orresponsibilityforthosewhoperformhighrisklow
CCFD1SafetyCulture 89 frequencymissions(i.e.:rope,water,etc...).Limitthoseallowedintheworkingarea (akahotzones)ofsuchevents. 13.Notgooverboardwithsafety,itwillpushpeopleaway 14.Continuetolearnfrommistakesmadehereandinfireorganizationsaroundthe world. 15.Currentlydoingagoodjob.DistrictSafetyOfficerisabenefittoCFD#1.Share nearmissreportsconfidentially. 16.Ihavenocomplaintswiththesafetyconcernsinmydivision,welookaftereach otherandremindeachotherwhensafetyconcernsarenoticed 17.Bettercommunication 18.Ibelieveweneedtohavesometypeofsecuritycamerasorwindowtosee peoplewhoarecominginLogistics. 19.Askpeopletosubmitnewsafetyrulesforajobwhentheyfeelit'sneeded.then getbacktothemhowit'sgoing. 20.Doingagoodjobnow 21.Regardingthelastquestion,Ithinkwemitigatehazardswell,butinjuryismore orlessinevitable. 22.Newer,better,lighterequipment.TakingtheEMSequipmentoutofthecabs. 23.Sendingmoreresourcestoemergencies.Wearesometimesmoreconcerned withaneventthatmighthappenthantheeventthatiscurrentlyhappening.We needtospendconsiderablemoretimeinhandsontraining,workingtogetherand gettingoutintoourfirstdueareas. 24.continueonthepathofimprovingsafety 25.Nothaveuslooklikecopsinthecolorandappearanceofoureverydayuniform. Thisputsmeandmycrewinimmediatedangerwhendealingwithalteredmedical patients,andwedon'thaveaweapontoprotectourselves 26.Makeitateameffort. 27.IfeelthatkeepingourEMSkitsintheinsideofourApparatusisahealthhazard duetoallofthehousesthatwegointo.Ialsothinkthatkeepingthekitsinside contributestoshoulderinjuriesandstressonourshouldersingeneralbecauseof havingtoliftalargekitdownasyouareturningorsteppingoffastep.Itseemslike
CCFD1SafetyCulture 90 itwouldn'tbeveryhardtomovethekitstotheoutside. 28.Handsontraining(evenbriefinhousetraining)oneverynewpieceof equipmentforfireandEMS. 29.Keeptraining.AndlearnfromotherDept.mistakes,andourown. 30.Ithinkwe'redoinganadequatejob. 31.Bettercommunicationbetweenallranks. 32.Haveleadersleadbyexample.Greateronsceneenforcement. 33.Morestaffingalwaysaswellassparesetsofturnoutgear.Thereisnopossible waytoproperlycleangearwhichiscontaminatedduringashiftitmustbedone after.Atstationsthatrunnightcallsregularlypersonnelaretiredduetolongwork daysontopofrunningalarms. 34.HiringafulltimeDSO/ISOwasagreatstepintherightdirectionfortwo reasons:1)DSO/ISOrespondstoincidentsandhissolejobistoactinthatcapacity. 2)Hispositionsendsastrongandpowerfulmessagetoallemployeesthatsafetyis animportantvirtueatCCFD1.BudgeforpagerpayforbackuponcallISO'sto respondwhenCaptainPhillipsisoffduty(likeonweekends.) 35.Incorporatemorecommonsensepractices 36.Investmoremoneytogetequipmentthatwouldimprovesafety,suchasinmask crewcommunicationdevices,Arizonatruckbelts,andequipmentthatwouldaidin ourliftingofheavypt's 37.Continuetoresearchthenewestandlatestsafetyreports/findings. 38.Train,train,train.Firegroundhandsondrillswithanemphasisonpropersafety procedureswillimprovespeedefficiencyandoverallperformance.Additionallyit willreenforcesafetyprocedures,makingthemsecondnature. 39.Letsopenlydiscussandlearnfromeachothersmistakes/accidents.wecan shareexperienceswithoutmakingsomeonelookbad,usestoriesasawaytolearn frombadsituations.Nearmissstoriescouldchangebehaviorfortherestofus. Someoneinjuredornearmisscouldchangethewaywethinkandactoncalls.lets startanearmisstabontheD1netthatcouldkeepstorieswith"howtomakeit betterexplanations.Justathought...onthisnetsite,wecouldkeepothernearmiss storiesfromacrossthecountry.Letsorganizeaweblocationforallsafety messages/storiesforcrewstogotoandlearnfrom 40.Continuetobeattheforefrontofequipment/technologyadvancesandcontinue totrainandeducatesafepractices.
CCFD1SafetyCulture 91 41.Morehandsonfiregroundtraininginlieuofsomegeneralbusinesspractices.At timeswearemoreconcernedaboutmakingwidgetsthanreallyimprovingour efficacyandexperiencethatwillresultinourimprovedsafety. 42.Anonymousnearmissreportingandreview. 43.Whatdoesourdepartmentsafetyofficerdoallday?REALLY! 44.CommunicateandsharewhatshappeninginandaroundourDept.Learnfrom others 45.Moreofateamorientedapproachtosafety. 46.Obtainmoreinputfromlinepersonnelwhoareinvolvedinthehigherrisk activitiesandmorelikelytobeinjuredbyunsafeacts. 47.Iamnotanemergencyserviceemployee;Iworkintheofficeandamnotsure. 48.ImplementCrewResourceManagement(CRM)atalllevels. 49.Fourpersoncompanies. 50.Ifeelthatthedistrictiscurrentlyperusingnewwaystoimproveonthesafety programandIamconfidentthattheyhavemybestinterestinmind. 51.Ithinktheyaredoingagreatjobatit. 52.Ifeelwearedoingwell@it 53.DefinetheroleofthesafetyofficerwithintheDistrict...issendingoutfood recallsreallynecessary?Itseemsdistractingmorethenhelpful.Onsignificant incidentshavetheofficercompletingthereport,puttogetherabriefsummaryof lessonslearned/safetypoints.Havingtoputtogetheraquickemailreleasetothe organizationwillpromptmoremeaningfuldedebriefsattheincidentscene. HavetheSOputtogethergoalsfortheyearandalsopublishatyearsendwhere peoplearegettinghurt,typeofinjuriesandtimelossstats.Thiswouldaidin identifyingtotheorgwherewehavesafetyholesinourservicedelivery.Be cautiouswith"pushingdownwork"totheCompanylevel.Itdistractsfromtraining andfitnessbyovercommittingthecompanies.DoasurveyusingRMStoseehow muchtimecrewsactuallyparticipateinphysicaltrainingandsetperformancegoals. HavetheSOpresentattheannualCompanyOfficerstraining.Makeasafety discussionanintentionalpartofeverytrainingsessionincorporateitintothe lessonplanandobjectives. 54.Fourpersoncompanies.
CCFD1SafetyCulture 92 55.Putafourthoneveryrig. 56.Upgradeourresponsesystemtoambulanceonlycalls,somanyBScallswearus down.Backofftheuniformgarbage.Feelslikethatisthemostimportantthingis howwearedressedvs.howweperform.Leavepeoplestationedinthesamestation foraslongaspossible.Movingmeansnewhazardstofind,insteadofalready knowingthem. 57.Byspecificallyusingtheinputfromemployeesthatwearthegearanduseitto determinewhetherornotweasanorganizationshouldbuyit.OurSCBA'sSUCKare piecesofCRAPandarenotwhatthecommitteewantedtobuy.Butwearestuck wearingthesereallypatheticairpacksforyearsnow. 58.SometimesbeingtoomuchofasafetySusiegetsinthewayofsafelydoingyour job.Beingtoosafecansometimesbeunsafe.Learn,teachandlisten. 59.SometimesbeingtoomuchofasafetySusiegetsinthewayofsafelydoingyour job.Beingtoosafecansometimesbeunsafe.Learn,teachandlisten. 60.SometimesbeingtoomuchofasafetySusiegetsinthewayofsafelydoingyour job.Beingtoosafecansometimesbeunsafe.Learn,teachandlisten. 61.SometimesbeingtoomuchofasafetySusiegetsinthewayofsafelydoingyour job.Beingtoosafecansometimesbeunsafe.Learn,teachandlisten. 62.Continuedlearningfromothers'incidents.Notgetoverzealous,butcontinueto reassessprocedures. 63.Morefocusonsafety,lessfocusontimecriteriaduringpracticaltraining.Time limitscreateasenseofurgencyanddistractionduringpracticalevaluations, potentiallyimpairingsafety. 64.Communicateonregularbasis.Offerremindersonpolicyandreasoningbehind changes.
CCFD1SafetyCulture 93 SafetyCultureSurvey2010 Howcouldyouimprovesafetywithintheorganization? ResponseText ResponseCount61answeredquestion61skippedquestion98 1.Communications 2.Leadbyexample,takepersonalownershipinthesafetyofallemployees. 3.Continuetokeepmyeyesopenfordangeroussituationsandposs.hazards. Educatedthenewguysonsafetyissuesandwhatihaveseeninthepast. 4.BycontinuingtakingtheleadinperformingdaytodaytasksutilizingproperPPE inallsituationsandencouragingcoworkerstodothesame. 5.Enforceexistingruleswithsubordinates.Leadbyexample 6.Encourageotherstowearpropergear. 7.Followtheruleinplaceandusethesafetyequipmentwehavewhenit's necessary,andbeingabletotalktotheofficerinchargewheni'mdon'tfeelsafe doingsomething. 8.Bysettingtheexample 9.Payingmoreattentiontothelocationofmycoworkersonscene. 10.Communicationwithcoworkers,safetychecks 11.Continuetostresstheimportanceofsafetyandleadbyexample. 12.ProvidefeedbackupthechainofcommandifIseesomethingthatishazardous. 13.IcouldalwaysimproveonslowingdownandlookingbeforeIleap.Consider consequencesmorecautiously.Wheremysafetyglassesmore,especiallyonEMS calls.Thereisalwaysroomforimprovement. 14.Keeptrainingandenforcingexistingsafetyguidelines. 15.Leadingbyexample.Alwaysthinkingofsafetyfirst.Evenifitdelaysyouractions slightly.Allowotherstodothesame.Itisacultureshift. 16.PromotesafepracticespersonallyandasaSupervisorleadbyexample. Encouragecrewtoperformsafetasks.Training.
CCFD1SafetyCulture 94 17.BemoremindfulofsafetyproceduresandPPEuse 18.Geteveryonemoreinvolvedwiththeprocess. 19.Alwaysusesafetyequipmentprovided 21.Trainingandthensomemoretrainingfollowedupwithsomemoretraining. 20.MakingsurethatmycoworkersandIarewearingthecorrectPPEforeach situation. 22.Thereisalwayssomethingthatcanbeusedorgainedfromreviewingsafety issues,continuethis 23.Haveourdressattireincluderedpoloshirtswithlargewhitelettersontheback. 24.Makeitmygoalandresponsibility 25.Overall,Ithinksafetyisverygoodhereatthedistrict.Ibelievethereisavery goodbalancethatleadstotheFFbeingabletoperformandgiveagoodserviceto thepublic.Ibelievethatweareaggressiveenoughtobeveryeffective,butonthe samehand,wearesafeenoughthateveryonegoeshome. 26.Watchmybackandthebacksofothersonthejob. 27.TRAINING 28.Workonmymaster'sdegreeandaskeveryonetoparticipateinasillysurvey aboutsafetyintheworkplace. 30.Improvethesafetyculture 29.Doabetterjobofcommunicatingmyexperienceswithothers,topreventsimilar accidents. 31.Bewellrestedasmuchaspossible,goodnutritionandexerciseandutilizeall safetyequipment. 32.Byprojectingandpracticingsolidandpositivesafetypractices.Byleadinga safetyexampleandtheproperpositiveattitude.Byfollowingallsafetyandrisk assessmentpoliciesandprocedures. 33.Betheexample(positive) 34.Icouldusemyprovidedsafetyequipmentonamoreconsistentbasis.
CCFD1SafetyCulture 95 35.Continuetoresearchthenewestandlatestsafetyreports/findings. 36.Whenitcomestosafetyinthefireservicecommonsenseandproperlyapplied peerpressurecanhaveasignificantimpact. 37.Youareassafeasyourteamthatisworkingaroundyou.Ihavewitnessedunsafe actsbyAMRcrewsthathavethepotentialofcausingaccidents,injuriesor exposures.Examples:NotwearingproperPPE,Questionablesafedriving,improper lifting.Addressingthesecouldimprovesafetyintheworkplace. 38.MoveallEMSgearoutofthecabsoftheengines,intogroundlevel compartments.Doasurveymonkeyonthistopic.Youwillfindthatnoonelikesgear inthecabsoftherigs.ThenewPierceengines,thecomp't'saretoohightobelifting gearoutanddown.HeavyEMSequipmentshouldbekeptinacomp'tat"reachable" levelslikeE23.Thereasontheyhavebeenmovedtothecabsinthefirstplaceisthe medicationsandfluidswillgetcoldoutside.Heatedcompartments?Isthisreallya concern?Werun70%+ofourcallsareEMScallswherewehavetoliftthisgearin andoutofthecab.Notgood.Thisisamajorbattleandneedstobeaddressedifwe arebuyingandbuildingnewrigs.Pleasehelpwiththis!!!Wewouldlovetoseea change...movenonessentialitemsintothecabs,EMSgearouttoaccessible,waist levelheight. 39.Bemorecomfortableremindingcoworkerstousesafetyequipment. 40.Continuetofollowsafetyproceduresandpoliciesandtocontinuetrainingless experiencedpersonnelsotheyfullyunderstandtheinherentdangersofour responsibilities. 42.Notsureifthiswouldbedifferentthanabove. 41.Performtaskssafelyasindividuals.Promotegoodsafetytechniquestoco workers. 43.Moreinformationandprogramsatthecrewlevelenforcingincidentsafety practices. 44.Sharemoreinfo,learnwhatworksandwhatdoesn'twork! 45.Vehicleisstoppedandmaxibrakeissetbeforepeoplegetonorexitthefire vehicle. 46.SetthetoneforutilizingproperPPEandsafetyequipmentroutinely. 47.Iamnotanemergencyserviceemployee;Iworkintheofficeandamnotsure. 48.EducatemembersonCRM
CCFD1SafetyCulture 96 49.FinetuningthingssuchasdecreasingtheneedtoreachupwardforheavyEMS kits.Ifkitscouldbeloweredabit...thatwouldbenice. 50.Bynotcuttingcornersandhelpingtomakesureeveryoneelsedoesthingssafely 51.Promotewearingallsafetyequipmentonallcalls. 52.Trainmore.Belesshurrieduponarrivingonscenetomaintainahighlevelof situationalawareness.Participateinsafetyspecifictrainingonanannualbasis. 53.Alwayswearmysafetyequipment,andencouragethesamefromothers. 54.Pushformoretraining,voiceopinionwithpeers,doitrightthefirsttime,andif somethingisdumb,voiceit. 55.Wecouldthrowawayallofourairpacksandbuynewonesthataretestedand wantedbyourcrewsnotsomeonethatfliesadesk. 56.Goodtraining,andunderstandingacrossallareasoftheorganization,keeping upwithnewidea'sthatmakesense,improvedSOG's,TEAMWORK,review,good equipmentnotlowbudget.AGOODDISPATCHSYSTEM. 57.Goodtraining,andunderstandingacrossallareasoftheorganization,keeping upwithnewidea'sthatmakesense,improvedSOG's,TEAMWORK,review,good equipmentnotlowbudget.AGOODDISPATCHSYSTEM. 58.Goodtraining,andunderstandingacrossallareasoftheorganization,keeping upwithnewidea'sthatmakesense,improvedSOG's,TEAMWORK,review,good equipmentnotlowbudget.AGOODDISPATCHSYSTEM. 59.Goodtraining,andunderstandingacrossallareasoftheorganization,keeping upwithnewidea'sthatmakesense,improvedSOG's,TEAMWORK,review,good equipmentnotlowbudget.AGOODDISPATCHSYSTEM. 60.Takeresponsibilityforyourownsafetyandthesafetyofothers. 61.MaintainmypartinensuringIamalwaysproperlypreparedandequippedto performmyjobsafely. AppendixG
CCFD1SafetyCulture 97 OpenEndedQuestionResults
Graph1OpenEndedQuestion1
Graph2OpenEndedQuestion2
AppendixH
CCFD1SafetyCulture 98 InterviewQuestions
Graph3InterviewQuestion1



Org Safety Culture of CCFD1 - Ken Horn Capstone

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Descrição original:

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Org Safety Culture of CCFD1 - Ken Horn Capstone

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

CCFD1SafetyCulture 1 AssessmentoftheOrganizationSafetyCulture Of ClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1 KennethHorn PortlandStateUniversity Submittedto: MasamiNishishiba,PhD MatthewJones,PhD June8,2010

CCFD1SafetyCulture 6 Appendix AppendixD(RadarGraphsofMeanScorebyStation).....79 AppendixE(RadarGraphsofMeanScoresbyYearsofService)...85 AppendixF(ResponsestoOpenEndedSurveyQuestions)......87 AppendixG(GraphofOpenEndedQuestions).96 AppendixH(GraphofInterviewQuestions)..97

CCFD1SafetyCulture 7 Introduction ClackamasCountyFireDistrict(CCFD)#1hasbeenmakingeffortsto

CCFD1SafetyCulture 8 BackgroundandSignificanceoftheStudy EachyearintheUnitedStates,approximately100firefightersdieintheline

CCFD1SafetyCulture 9 (24hourshifts)missedfromwork,whichalsoresultedinapproximately $114,000.00inovertime,notincludingrollups,rehabtime,investigations,and administrativetime(OSHA300recordsfromCCFD12009). InMarchof2004,theleadershipoftheAmericanFireServiceassembledin

CCFD1SafetyCulture 13 deathsandinjuries.Ifthedistricthowever,managestoinstillastrongcultureof safety,theymayindeedbeabletoreachthegoalssetoutbytheEveryoneGoes HomeFireSafetyInitiatives. ClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1hasaddressedmanyoftheissuesrelated

CCFD1SafetyCulture 15 firefighter,whichincludestakingrisks,butyetdoingitsafely.Thisinsightmay explainwhyinanorganizationthatispromotingsafetypracticesstillfailstomake significantstridesinpreventingaccidentsandinjuries. BygainingabetterunderstandingoftheorganizationalSafetyCulturewithin

behavioral,andsituation.InFigure1,wecanuseamodelbasedonAlbertBanduras (1977)modelofReciprocalDeterminismtoillustratetherelationshipbetweenthe threefactors.

haveanequalimpactonthepersonandtheirsafetyperformance.Apersoncanhave animpactontheirsafetyenvironmentbyhowtheyimplementsafetypractices;in turn,theenvironmentcanhaveanimpactontheirbehaviorrelatedtosafety

climate.Oftenthetwoareusedinterchangeably,yettheyarebydefinition,different. Climateshouldbethoughtofasreflectingattitudes,perceptions,andbeliefs whereascultureinvolvesvalues,traditions,andnorms(Harvey,Bolem,Cox,&

CCFD1SafetyCulture 24 alsofindthemselvesconflictedbetweenthetwocompetinggoalsofproviding effectiveservicedeliveryinordertorescueandsavecivilianlivesandprovidingfor firefightersafety(Pessemier,2008). Therefore,itisimportanttoexaminethebehavioroffirefighters,specifically

ResearchQuestion H1:Withintheorganization,thereexist distinct,identifiablesubcultures relatedtosafety

SurveyQuestions Thiswillbedeterminedby relationshipbetween demographicsandsurvey questions

CCFD1SafetyCulture 32 settings.Theinterviewswereconductedbytheauthor,andduetothesensitivityof issues,werenotaudiorecorded.ThequestionscanbefoundinAppendixB. Results Theresultsofsurveydatawereanalyzedusingdescriptivestatistics1suchas

ResponseCount/total numberofpersonnelin thedivision 119/150 16/19 8/9 7/12 9/59

Operations Administration Training Prevention Volunteer

74.8% 10.1% 5% 4.4% 5.7%

thesurveyquestions.Ascoregreaterthan2.50representsapositiveresponseto thesafetyrelatedquestion.Ascorebelow2.50representsanegativeresponseto thesafetyrelatedquestion.Forthepurposeofthisstudy,DimensionISafetyPolicy referstoorganizationalpolicespertainingtosafetyrelatedtopractices.Policiesare

Division Operations Training Prevention Administration Volunteers

Mean 3.66 3.59 3.82 3.64 3.92

Median 3.49 3.62 3.79 3.62 3.83

StandardDeviation .318 .232 .246 .186 .354

Yearsof Service 03Years 48Years 915Years 16+years

Mean 3.63 3.70 3.51 3.68

Median 3.56 3.58 3.40 3.54

Standard Deviation .127 .262 .291 .299

CCFD1SafetyCulture 36 howyearsofservicechangesperceptionwithinthosedimensions.Thezeroto threeyeargrouphad31respondentsandrepresented20%ofthetotalsurveyed.

Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII

Mean 3.56 3.78

Median 3.58 3.87 3.58

StandardDeviation .436 .347 .436

The48yeargrouphad29responsesor18%,915yearshad41respondentsor 26%,andthelargestgroupwasthe16+yearswith56respondentsor36%ofthe totalgroup.

Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII

Mean 4.00 3.58

Median 3.96 3.66 3.50

StandardDeviation .198 .379 .472

CCFD1SafetyCulture 37 915yeargrouphadthelowestscoresindimensionIIandIIIof3.29and3.40 respectively.

Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII SafetyProceduresIII

Mean 3.84 3.29 3.40

Median 3.78 3.41 3.26

StandardDeviation .219 .318 .452

The915yeargroupalsohadthelowesttotalmeanscoreof3.51.The48year grouphadthehighesttotalmeanscoreof3.70withthe16+yearsgroupscoringa 3.68.

Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII

Mean 4.02 3.54

Median 3.99 3.66 3.38

StandardDeviation .233 .337 .591

CCFD1SafetyCulture 40 Engine2 Engine3/Rescue3 Truck4 Engine5 Engine6 Engine8

1,800 3,194 1,586 1,693 1,011 1,358

3.77 3.64 3.64 3.70 3.77 3.67

Station Engine9 Engine10 Engine11 Truck15 Engine16 Squad17

NumberofAlarms 889 625 488 1,486 1,811 816

MeanScore 3.75 3.83 3.69 3.41 3.70 3.86

Dimension DimensionIPolicy DimensionIILeadership DimensionIIISafetyProcedures

Score 4.08 3.54 3.46

eachofthecareerstations.Thepurposeofthiscomparisonistoshowhoweach stationdiffersintheirperception/attitudetowardssafetyasitrelatestothethree dimensions.Thisunderstandingofattitudesandperceptionsisimportantwhen

CCFD1SafetyCulture 42 consideringwhereandhowsafetyrelatedchangeswithintheorganizationshould beimplemented.

Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII SafetyProceduresIII

Mean 3.95 3.42 3.41

Median 3.86 3.50 3.50

StandardDeviation .245 .312 .590

Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII SafetyProceduresIII

Mean 4.18 3.61 3.53

Median 4.20 3.63 3.31