C.a.J. Coady - The Morality of Terrorism

Royal Institute of Philosophy
The Morality of Terrorism Author(s): C. A. J. Coady Reviewed work(s): Source: Philosophy, Vol. 60, No. 231 (Jan., 1985), pp. 47-69 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3750562 . Accessed: 30/11/2012 15:46
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The Morality ofTerrorism

C. A. J. COADY
Throwinga bomb is bad, Droppinga bomb is good; Terror,no need to add, Depends on who'swearing thehood.1 There is a strong tendencyin the scholarlyand sub-scholarly literature on terrorism to treat it as something like an ideology. There is an equally strongtendency to treatit as alwaysimmoral. Both tendenciesgo hand in hand with a considerabledegree of about the meaningof the term'terrorism'. I shall tryto unclarity and I shall arguethatthe first is the dispel this unclarity tendency productof confusion and thatonce thisis understood, we can see, in the lightof a more definite analysisof terrorism, that the second raisesissues of inconsistency, and even hypocrisy. tendency Finally, I shall make some tentative about what categoriesof suggestions targetmay be morallylegitimate objects of revolutionary violence, and I shall discusssome linesof objectionto myoverallapproach. The tendencyto thinkof terrorism as an ideologyis no doubt by superficial verbalresemblances-somanyexpressions encouraged of belief-but ending in '-ism' are words forideologiesor systems indicates thatthe'-ism'endinghererefers reflection to no morethan natureof a methodor a tactic.Let us start, the relatively systematic unlikeso much of the literature on terrorism, withsome statements from terroriststhemselves,or at any rate, those who would be regarded as terrorists: commonly (1) Carlos Marighela,the Brazilianrevolutionary, who had such a of urban guerillawarfarein stronginfluenceon the development South America, devotes only two paragraphsto what he calls in his Handbookof Urban Guerrilla 'terrorism' Warfare publishedin is rather restrictive. 1969, the year of his death. His definition 'By 'I meantheuse ofbomb attacks',2 he writes, terrorism', but although narrowthe definition picks out a centralterrorist technique and
Roger Woddis, 'Ethics for Everyman', fromThe New Oxford Book of LightVerse,chosenand editedby KingsleyAmis (OxfordUniversity Press, 1978), 292. 2 Carlos Marighela, Handbook of Urban Guerilla Warfare, collectedin For the Liberationof Brazil by Carlos Marighela,trans. John Butt and Sheed (Harmondsworth: Rosemary Penguin,1971), 89. Philosophy 60 1985 47
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makes it clear that it is a means to politicalobjectives.Elsewhere, whendiscussing othertechniques such as kidnapping or execution of informers (which would probablybe called 'terrorist' by others, certainly by newspapers)Marighela makesit clearthatsuch acts are to subservethe wider politicalobjectivesof the revolution. It is a of his and othersuch writings weakness thattheydo notalwaysshow will actuallypromote thatthe variousparamilitary techniques these it is clearthatMarighela widerobjectives, but thatis another matter; forinstance, believesthattheywill. Talkingof executions, he says: forsuch people as American 'We should use the deathpenalty spies, in the government agentsof the dictatorship, torturers, fascists who have committed crimes against patriotsor tried to capturethem, It is apparent from thisquotationthatthe killing police informers'.3 of these categoriesof person is viewed by Marighelaas a kind of to be justifiedin whatever judicial punishment way such punishmentsare justified, in timesof war. especially theorist and spokesman for South Amer(2) Anotherimportant ican revolutionary movements,Regis Debray, wrote of what he in his book Revolution in theRevolution? called 'cityterrorism' as follows: cannotassume any decisiverole and it Of course cityterrorism entailscertaindangersof a politicalorder.But if it is subordinate in the countryside, to the fundamental the struggle it struggle, has, from the militarypoint of view, a strategicvalue; it thousandsof enemysoldiers,it ties up most of the immobilizes in unrewarding repressive mechanism tasksof protection . . . the government must,since it is the government, protect everywhere the interests of property don't have to owners; the guemilleros protect anything anywhere4 We can see from theseextracts thatfarfrom beingan ideology, or or what many people would long-range goal of action, terrorism, is treated as a techniquein the serviceof such a regardas terrorism, forterror is a formof violenceand goal. This is hardlysurprising a means. It mustofcoursebe concededthatjust violenceis primarily as thereare those who treatviolencegenerally as almostan end in itselfso thereare those who do the same forterrorism. A parallel withorthodox warfare is here,as elsewhere, If we read instructive. in GreatBritain some of the responses to theoutbreak ofWorldWar I thereis present a sortoflustforviolencewhichtreats it almostas a self-sufficient connectedwith end, certainly something intimately
Regis Debray, Revolutionin the Revolution?trans. Bobbye Ortiz (London: Monthly ReviewPress, 1967), 75.
4
3Ibid. 87.
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The Morality of Terrorism
the Englishpoet or virtue.Consider,forinstance, personalgrowth Julian Grenfellwhose much anthologizedpoem 'Into Battle' expressed so well the intoxication with war that so many of his seem to have had. Grenfell,a sensitiveand intelligent generation from the front man, wroteto his mother saying'. . . I adore war. It the objectlessness is like a big picnicwithout of a picnic. I've never been so well or so happy.'5 Grenfellwas awarded the DSO for in out into no-man'sland and almostinto enemytrenches crawling orderto snipe at Germans. It was his own idea and he killedthree in his game book; they he made two entries Germans. Afterwards, come afteran entryforOctober 1914 of '105 partridges' and read: 'November16th: 1 Pomeranian;-November17th:2 Pomeranians'.6 In GeorgesSorel'sReflections on Violence thereis a similar euphoria about working class violencethoughthereis a theoretical framework within which violence functionsas a means to political ends.7 Somethingof the sort is true also of Franz Fanon's eulogies to violencein The Wretched anti-colonial of theEarth wherekillingis and even ennobling praisedforits liberating effects upon the killer (although the case historiesprovidedsit uneasilywith the thesis maintained).8Similarly,with some terrorist operationsit may be that the terroritselfhas assumed the status of an end so that has becomea sortof ideology, terrorism the wreaking of havoc itself a value thatneeds littleor no justifying purposebeyondit. thenthatthereare warriors who treatwar as Let us acknowledge and terrorists who treatterror as self-justifying self-justifying but let Such aberrations us ignore them as aberrational. need theirown discussionbut shall not findit here. It maybe possibleto arguethat war or terror as meansinevitably thosewho beginby treating finish as this is an line of moralcriticism them ends; up treating important but it containsthe implicitconcessionthat the activities can seem as means,and sincethisis how theyare usuallydefended, justifiable be examined. thisis how theyshould,in the first instance, This is precisely the way discussions of the morality of war often of policyby proceed. Clausewitz'sdictum,'War is the continuation other means', is announced and then a debate ensues as to the
5 Quotedin NicholasMosley,JulianGrenfell: His Lifeand theTimes of His Death (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,1976), 239. 6 Ibid. 243. 7 Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, trans.T. E. Hulme (London: George Allen & Unwin,1925). 8 Franz Fanon, The Wretched of theEarth trans.ConstanceFarrington (Harmondsworth: Penguin,1967). For the praiseof violencesee especially pp. 73-74, forthe case histories see Chapter5 and especially case 3 on pp. 210-212. 49
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thosepolicyobjectives.As reflection efficiency of war in promoting on themorality ofwarhas developedin thepastand also increasingly in recent years,thisstark utilitarian formula has been perceived to be inadequate.It has seemedclearto manythatsome meansthatwould be effective in producingthe desiredpolicyobjectivesare morally inadmissibleor at least dubious-for instance,introducing deadly the defeat poison into the enemy'scivilianwatersupplyto facilitate of his troops.Many believe,in myviewrightly, thatthe obliteration even if one's cause bombingof enemycitiesis equallyreprehensible is right and it can be shown that the bombing hastens one's achievement of victory and reducesone's owncasualties.All ofthisis discussedin just war theory under relatedto questionstraditionally the category of thejus in belloand debatein the area has been given a certainamountof renewedcurrency by severalrecentbooks. But is not myconcernhere. The crucialpointis merely the terminology ends (believedto thatwhen violenceis viewedas a meansto certain be) of importance thenthereare broadlythreewaysof assessingits One is to rejectit on the groundthatthe use of violence morality. of good ends is never (or at any rate,severeviolence)in the pursuit 1 A second is to assess the morally licit; this is the pacifist position. in contributing to the violence solely in terms of its efficiency of the good ends; this is the utilitarian A achievement response.11 in termsof its efficiency, thirdis to assess the violence,partly but in terms of the sort of violence it is, most more significantly whether it is directed at morally but particularly appropriate targets also whetherit is barbaricor grotesqueor disproportionate. (This last featuremay fit into a purelyutilitarian framework depending
9 Cf. Michael Walzer,just and Unjust Wars (London: Allen Lane, 1978); BarriePaskinsand Michael Dockrill,The Ethicsof War (London: Duckworth, 1979); James Turner Johnson,Ideology,Reason and the Limitation ofWar (Princeton University Press, 1975). 10Here I simplify forpurposesof exposition. somewhat What I sketch is a pacifist but somepacifists wouldaccepttheuse ofsevere certainly position but rejectwhat theysee as the police violence withina legal framework violenceof war. For a good discussionof some of basicallyunconstrained see Jenny the issuesto do withpacifism Teichman,'Pacifism', Philosophical 4 (January Investigations 1982). 11This is again shorthand In a fuller but I thinkreasonableshorthand. thatutilitarianism whichlooks to justify discussionwe should distinguish of narrowly violenceby its promotion military goals and thatwhichtakesa wider view of the goods in question. There is also the question of rule utilitarianism. If rule-utilitarianism can be shownto be a genuinealternaas a formof utilitarianism tive to act-utilitarianism then perhaps some versionof it would blurthe line betweenthe secondand thirdresponses.
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upon how it and theframework are described.)This third responseI shall call the internal viewpoint sinceit does nottreat themorality of the violenceexternally solelyin termsof its consequences.It will of course be sensitive to consequences but not as the sole moral part of this consideration. We should note that it is a significant outlook to be concernedthat non-combatants be afforded a moral fromdirectmilitary immunity attack.In what follows,the pacifist position, important thoughit is, willbe gently set aside because I am in comparisons betweenthosewho justify interested violenceby the in pursuitof its goals and thosewho justify State (notablywarfare) violenceby non-Stategroups in pursuitof theirgoals. It is in the contextof such justificatory endeavourthat the moral problemof should be placed. terrorism Beforeproceeding further to turn alongtheselinesit is appropriate If terrorism to definitional matters. is a methodthereis still briefly the earlierreferences the question,whatmethod?It is clearfrom to 'terrorism' can be used viewsthattheterm Marighela's (or just'terror') more or less narrowly and it is unlikely thatthe termin 'ordinary' definitesense since it has political parlance has any particularly arisen and continues to be employed in contexts of a highly even hysterical nature.The semantic confusion emotional,partisan, such contexts seems about distributed between generated by equally of and terrorism but it is to discern in supporters opponents possible the welter of accusation,complaintand expositionan outline on concernsand anxieties whichthe different converge.I shall attempt to bring this outline into focus by defining the concept in terms of seems whichcapturemuch what to exercise people in their worries and which allow me to continuemy exploration about terrorism of and otherformsof politicalviolence. I analogies betweenwarfare thinkthatit also does justiceto the historical evolution of the term whichis, forinstance, in Laquer and Lineberry.12 well summarized The definition used by Jan Schreiberin his book, The Ultimate and World Order will be my starting Weapon: Terrorists point. as 'a politicalact, ordinarily Schreiberdefinesterrorism committed by an organizedCroup, involvingdeath or the threatof death to on the right non-combatants'.1 Although path,thisneedsamending in certain obvious directions; as it stands, it is misleadingly unspecificabout the kind of causal nexus indicatedby the word 'involving'.It should at least be made clear that the politicalact
WalterLaquer, Terrorism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977); R. C. Lineberry, The Struggle AgainstTerrorism (Wilson,1977). 13 JanSchreiber, The Ultimate Weapon:Teroristsand World Order(New York: Morrow,1978), 20.
'2
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intentionallyproduced the death or threat of death to noncombatants,otherwise loud applause at a political rally which distracted a passing (civilian) motorist causinghim to crash into a pole and die would count as an act of terrorism. As I use the term 'intentional' it is possible forthereto be foreseen consequencesof one's acts that are not intentional; for instance,the designerof a freeway may have good statistical reasonto expectthatsome people will be killed in consequence of its being built but he does not intentionally bringabout theirdeaths. There are those who dislike this usage but even they will distinguish somehow (and it is not to do it) betweenwhat is directly alwaysan easy matter intentional and whatis, if'intentional', nonethe less onlyincidentally so and no of thiskindseem partof the agent'spurposein acting.Distinctions required in familiardebates about the morality of warfarewhere thereseems to be a vital distinction betweena directattackupon and an attackwhichis aimed at combatants non-combatants but is civiliancasualties.If such a knownto be likelyto have incidental is relevant to warfare distinction it is also presumably to pertinent otheruses of politicalviolenceand I take it to be in the spiritof Schreiber'sdiscussionto treat the 'involving'as of the (directly) kind. intentional to Schreiber'sdefinition is to widen it a The othermodification littlesince a terrorist act can be aimed at othersevereinjuriesthan of torture would surely do thetrick and death. Tortureor the threat so would lesser but still severe injury.By the same token,certain would probablycount, for types of severe attacksupon property of civil aeroplanes most people, as terrorist-e.g. the destruction even withoutany danger to human life. As amended then, the of a terrorist act would go as follows:'A politicalact, definition committedby an organizedgroup, which involvesthe ordinarily of non-combatants or othersevereharming or the intentional killing severedamageto the property of threat'4 of the same or intentional of the same'. The term'terrorism' or the threat can non-combatants in terrorist as the tacticor policyof engaging acts. thenbe defined need to be noted: Certainconsequencesof thisdefinition to some features of terrorist (1) There is no explicitreference forinsthave regardedas important, which commentators activity it typically aims to produce,such as ance, the sortof widereffects fromthe an over-reaction publicizinga forgotten cause, provoking
14 The definition treats threatsas essentiallyintentional so that the specification 'intentional threat' would be pleonastic.If the readerbelieves thattherecan be unintentional thenhe shouldread therelevant threats part of the definition as referring to intentional threats.
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some groupwho mayor may not be the group enemy,intimidating but I do underdirectattackand so on. These features are important not propose to treatsuch specificpoliticalobjectivesas part of the The more general reference definition. to 'a politicalact' is here uses to the political advantageously vague because it does notrestrict tactic may be turnedand it rightly which the terrorist allows for to determine whatvariousgroupsuse terrorempirical investigation ism for. It mighthoweverbe claimedthatthereis one verygeneral effect of terror tacticsthatdeservesto be written intothe definition, namely,the effect of fear. The distinctive point of terrorism as a tactic,it will be said, is to terrorize, to spreadfearand so destabilize social relations.This claim containsan insight into the sociology of terrorism but I do notthink it shouldbe made a matter ofdefinition. (Here I side with Paskins and Dockrill againstMartinHughes.)15 In the first My reasonsare threefold. place, stressupon this effect tendsto precludeanyseriousconcern withthemoreintrinsic issue of the typeof methodsused (as it may be) to generate the fear.This tendencyis clearly at work in Hughes' treatment of the topic. the fear effect seems to some withall uses Secondly degreeassociated of politicalviolence,includingopen warfare wherecivilianpopulationsare involvedthoughnot directly attacked.Thirdly,intimate as the fear effectmay be, it does nevertheless seem possible that terrorist attacks should give rise, not to the spread of fear and but to defianceand a strengthening of resolve. It demoralization, would be a defective definition whichwas forced to treat such attacks as thereby non-terrorist even though theyhad deliberately encompassed, let us say, the deathsof children.This last pointhas a further forthe definition in termsof fearbecause if we seek to implication meet the counter-example in the definition by referring to an to spreadfearrather intention thanto actualproduction of it thenwe face the different thatwe are prejudgproblem,alreadymentioned, intothe specific ing an empiricalinvestigation motives of thosewho choose to attacknon-combatants. I do not, of course,denythatthe tactic of deliberate attacks upon non-combatants is commonly perceivedas being aimed at the creationof the sort of fear that producespanic and demoralization and, moreover, it can be admitted thatthe perception is often correct. The tacticis, after all, called 'terrorism'. to make no Yet, for the reasonsgiven, I would prefer
Cf. B. Paskins and M. Dockrill, op. cit. 90, and Martin Hughes, 'Terrorismand National Security',Philosophy 57 (January1982), 5. My agreement withPaskinsand Dockrillis onlypartial, however, sincethey want to restrict theapplication oftheterm 'terrorism' to contexts ofevasivewarfare and so refuse to applyit to fullscale warsbetween states. 53
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reference to such motivation in the definition. The philosophy of in whichthe referent languagehas made us familiar withsituations or extension whichdoes not of a termmay be fixedby a predicate the natureof the reality determine so indicated and which,iftrueat all of it, is so contingently. It seems to me thatsomething similar holds of the link betweenterrorism and the motivation of creating fear. Those readers who agree with me that the attack upon non-combatants is the crucial definitional featurebut are more impressedby the fear-creation motivethan I am could amend the definition to includea subsidiary reference to the commonpresence of such motivation.The phrase 'and commonlyinvolvingthe intentionto create or maintainwidespread fear' could then be insertedafterthe phrase'an organizedgroup.' Such a guardedand secondary reference to the feareffect would not materially affect the course of our discussion.I shall further discuss some of the issues raisedby the relations betweenfearand terrorism at the end of this paper. is not a tacticrestricted terrorism to revolutionar(2) As defined, ies or othernon-governmental groups.Doubtlessmanypeoplewould be surprised at the idea that governments and authorizedgovernmental instrumentalities do or can use terrorist methods fortheir is usuallythe product of naivety politicalpurposesbut such surprise or prejudice. Certainly if we see terrorism as a particular kind of of politicalviolence(and thisseems a centralstrandin employment all the varied and oftenconfuseduses of the expression)then we should surely be impressedby analogies and identitiesbetween methodsused ratherthan dissimilarities betweenthe powers and we run the risk of standingsof the agentsusing them. Otherwise the way some people treatthe term treatingthe term 'terrorism' as a stateinto whichonlyotherscan lapse; the parallel 'obstinacy', of purpose'. state in their own case being describedas 'strength There is, of course, no need to deny that the use of terrorby non-Stategroups ratherthan by the State raises special theoretical issues and I shall have something to say about thislater. (3) Following SchreiberI have used the term 'non-combatant' wheresome may thinkthe term'innocent'more appropriate. Each I prefer termhas its advantagesand disadvantages; the expression in exposition at thispointforreasonsofconvenience 'non-combatant' since the term'innocent'may be even more likelyto mislead. In and contemporary discussions of the morality traditional of warfare the categoryof 'the innocent'usually collapses into that of 'noncombatant' into a largely partlyin orderto avoid being sidetracked fruitless debate about mentalstatesto whichattributions of guiltor innocenceare to be attached.But moreof thislater. 54
violence (4) I have made no use of the notionof indiscriminate in definitions I have or discussions of terrorism. whichoftenfigures There is a sense in avoided this because I think thatit is confusing. which I agree with the idea that terrorism involvesindiscriminate between violence,namely,the sense in whichit failsto discriminate combatantand non-combatant targets.This is all that Paskinsand On theotherhand, Dockrillmean by 'indiscriminate', forinstance.16 to conveythe idea thatterrorism is manywriters use 'indiscriminate' in thatthe terrorist quite irrational weaponis used in an undiscrimiThis need notbe true natingway, as it were,wildlyand pointlessly. or theirproperty and thereis at all of attacksupon non-combatants and selection usuallya good deal of thought goingintothe terrorist techniqueemployed. violence'does, however, raise another (5) Talk of,'indiscriminate of the issue. Some readerswho agree with me on the importance distinction and its relevance to the definicombatant/non-combatant to defineterrorism tion of terrorism, more may none the less prefer of thej'usin bello. (I am indebted to Michael widelyas any violation In otherwords, to thispossibility.) Stockerfordrawing myattention any use of politicalviolencewhichstandsundermoralcondemnation because of the type of violenceused ratherthan its relationto the I suspect politicalgoals of the users would thencount as terrorist. warrant forthiswiderusage but, on the thatthereis some linguistic we do morejusticeto the concerns usuallyarticulated whole, I think if we operatewiththe narrower I definition by the term'terrorist' but not have proposed.If a revolutionary groupadoptedtheimmoral uncommon militarypolicy of taking no prisoners('yielding no afterinterrogation, then quarter') or even of killingtheirprisoners it deserves moral condemnation the behaviour does seem to although from a direct treatment attack different the somewhat upon require in both cases goes uninvolved.This is so even if the condemnation In any case, employing the wider considerations. beyondutilitarian will of terrorism not affect the broad purposesof my concept greatly discussion. is a means or Let me returnnow to the idea that terrorism technique for the pursuitof politicalends and should be judged morallyin that light. I had begun to explorean analogybetween about the techniquesof violenceused by Statesto moraljudgments wage war and thoseused by non-State groups,such as revolutionary in pursuitof theirobjectives. In this connectionI organizations, and internal betweentheutilitarian a contrast to sketched approaches
16
Ibid. 89. 55
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I want now to discuss certaininteresting such judgments.17 consequences of thiscontrast as it appliesto the problem of terrorism and in particular I wantto drawattention to theway thatpeople tendto apply one outlook (the utilitarian) when discussingState violence (especiallythatof theirown State) and another(the internal) when discussing the violenceof non-State actorssuch as revolutionaries. In discussions ofthe morality it willoften ofwarfare be possibleto come to the same conclusionsabout a given actionor policyfrom either a utilitarian or internalperspective.That this is so stems partlyfromcertaintheoretical features of utilitarianism whichneed not concernus now but at a certainconcrete level the pointis clear enough. Certaincivilianmassacres,forinstance,stand condemned not only because they constitutethe deliberatekilling of nonbut also becausetheycould havebeen seen at thetimeto combatants be inefficient meansto thepurported goal-terms such as 'pointless', and 'wanton' are 'counter-productive' germaneto such cases. None of warfare the less, the history plainlyshowsus cases wherethe two moral perspectivesyield quite different results. The Allied area of German in cities World War II and the US nuclear bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki are just two outstanding attacks upon examples where the whole enterprisewas to slaughter nonand hence was plainlyimmoral combatants on the internal perspective and yet was 'justified'in utilitarian terms.(I put 'justified' in of hindsight, quotationmarksbecause, with the benefit it may be doubted whetherthese justifications were successfulin theirown terms.Especiallyin the case of the bombing of the Germancities,it seems that the apparentlydesired effectof weakeningGerman civilianmorale and so bringing the war to an earlierend was not achieved. None the less, it is fair to say that some plausibility attachedto such calculationsat the time.) It is clear then thatwe have here a profoundclash of the highestpracticalsignificance betweenthese two approachesto moral judgment.It is a difficult taskto adjudicatebetweenthem,a taskwhichI shall and important not here attempt. My more modest goal is to point out some of terrorism consequencesofthe clash forthediscussion but beforeI proceedto do so I should liketo makejust fourcomments. First,it
The contrast is the familiar one drawnby such writers as G. E. M. Anscombe,'War and Murder'in War and Morality, RichardWasserstrom (ed.) (Belmont: Wadsworth,1970); Thomas Nagel 'War and Massacre', 2 (1972); Michael Walzer,Justand Unjust Philosophy and Public Affairs Wars,and Jeffrie G. Murphy, 'The Killingof the Innocent', TheMonist57 (1973). By calling it 'familiar'I do not mean to say or implythat it is uncontentious. 56
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to some not to declaremy own adherence would be less than frank positionabout position.Second, the internal versionof the internal quite of war or of politicalviolenceseemsderivedfrom the morality or non-utilitarian of an anti-utilitarian generalmoral considerations moralstructures naturewhichare deeplyembeddedin the inherited of what may still be called (though with some embarrassment) that Westerncivilization.Third, however,it should be remarked wayto resolveclashes are possibleabout the right different positions strands in our moral between the utilitarianand non-utilitarian It is possible to hold that in the case of war, and every thinking. shouldalwaysyield calculations utilitarian othercase forthatmatter, constraints.Some writershave recentlyurged to non-utilitarian the utilitarian howeverthat in certainveryextremecircumstances calculations should prevail while others again say that in such therecan be no rubricfor choice. I have views about extremities notethem.Fourth,it is worth but shallheremerely thesedifferences to the morality of political attitude also thatthe internal remarking of legal, moral violence is not only embodiedin the long tradition but thatgoes by thetitleof 'just wartheory' thinking and theological has also been embodied,at least to some degree,in the outlooksof cultural backgrounds. professionalsoldiers with widely different bombingof Germanpopulastrategic Hence it was thatthe British at thetimeas immoral was condemned (because it was a tioncentres not onlyby such peace activists directattackupon non-combatants) officers.1 but by seniorBritish as Vera Brittain betweenthe utilitarian and internal I have stressedthe contrast of it seems to me that the violence because to morality approaches to are the charge of of terrorism subject many condemnations on if because insist one applying they inconsistency, not hypocrisy, in of violence war (either kind of moralityto the State's use kindaltogether and another or civilor anti-insurgency) international agent(e.g. therevolutionary). to the use of violenceby thenon-State is adoptedwhichmorally standard For one's own State a utilitarian so thatsuch acts ofnon-combatants the intentional killing legitimates as the bombingof Dresden are deemed to be of State terrorism19
In Michael Walzer's words: 'At the heightof the blitz manyBritish shouldbe aimed onlyat thattheirown air attacks stillfeltstrongly officers civilian and thatpositive efforts shouldbe madeto minimize targets military casualties. They did not want to imitate Hitler, but to differentiate fromhim.' Justand UnjustWais, 257. themselves 19 It is interesting that Neville Chamberlainin 1940 denouncedsuch See J. F. C. Fuller,The as 'mereterrorism'. bombing proposals 'blackguardly' ConductofWar, 1789-1961(London: EyreMethuen,1972), 280. 57
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morallysanctionedby the good ends they supposedlyserve. The same people, however, make the move to higherground when and judge considering the activities of the rebelor the revolutionary his killing of non-combatants by the internal standard.In the case of is thateven ifhis cause is just and his the revolutionary, the thought revolutionlegitimate, his methodsare morallywrong because of whattheyare or involve.In thecase ofthe Stateor itsinstrumentalities this thought is quietly abandoned and replaced by those utilitarian considerations whichare deniedto the revolutionaries. Consistency may be achievedin eitherof two ways: by adopting the utilitarian response responseto bothkindsof case or the internal to both kinds of case. I would myselfurge the second type of as immoral consistency and object to the techniqueof terrorism Does thisamountto wherever and whenever it is used or proposed.20 This is a the moral rejectionof both war and armed revolution? both serious issue precisely because modern war and modern which revolution have becomeso committed to tacticsand strategies In war,the bombingof civilianpopulations is the most are terrorist. strikingexample but there are other techniques such as the of crops, the destruction defoliation of forests, the destruction of of villages, the slaughter of villagers and forced resettlement or involve terrorism.In populations which either are terrorist revolutionary warfare the recourse to such weaponsas letter bombs, and bombs in public places, hijackingof civilian transportation to killpassengers, randomkillings or maimings and so on are threats and inevitable then familiar.If such proceduresare reallyintrinsic wars and revolutionsstand under moral condemnation;this is perhaps the real challengeof modernpacifism.I am not myself so let us now suppose persuaded (quite or yet) of the inevitability recourse(or with that wars and revolutions can be waged without as it were,accidental onlymarginal, recourse)to terrorism. This suppositionitselfpresupposesthatwe can in both contexts and non-combatants. betweencombatants Some make a distinction to the distinction claim writerswho concede moral significance statesit can no longerbe none the less thatin modernindustrialized warfare is drawn. These writers argue that,in modernconditions,
in which ofinternalism It seemspossibleto espousea less absoluteform but have, an internalist perspective some actionscan be seen as wrongfrom ofnot becauseoftheawful consequences regrettably, tobe done,at leastpartly Williamsseemsto hold such a view (see 'A Critiqueof doingthem.Bernard in Utilitanranism: For and Againstby J. J. C. Smartand Utilitarianism', Press,1973), Ch. 5, and especially Bernard Williams(CambridgeUniversity p. 117) and Michael Walzer (op. cit.) has condonedsome of the terrorist bombing ofWorldWar II in thisway. 58
20
ofarmies notjusta matter armies butofnations against against nations and spiritually and so unified aretheseentities economically thatthere is no real difference of role or function betweenany one citizenand another;hence fromthe moralpointof view thereis no discernible difference between shootinga soldier who is shootingat you and gunning downa defenceless childwhois a member ofthesamenation as thesoldier.The conclusion is perhaps absurdorobsceneto sufficiently theargument discredit and theargument has beeneffectively criticized inanycase bya number I cannot ofrecent writers.21 fully expound their critiqueshere but let me just stressthe basic insightbehind the prohibition on killing or attacking non-combatants. This is that we can in killing someone(leavingaside thedifficult onlybe justified case of if theyare actuallyengagedin prosecuting capital punishment) an attack upon us or othersor engagedin some similar projectinvolving theinfliction ofgrossinjustice. Theythenbecomelegitimate targets for ouressentially willbe thosenotactually defensive violence.Now there a gun who willstillbe implicated in a chainofagency firing underthe theattack' or somevery similar description 'prosecuting at description whomit willbe right to direct violence,e.g. a manbringing bulletsto thegunman.Hence, thetarget areacan be reasonably enlarged beyond themanwiththegunbutitis justabsurdto enlarge itto includewhole nationsor even veryconsiderable ofthem.This enlargement sections cannot be made to worksimplyby showingthatthereare various causalconnections sustaining between certain andthose whoare groups theobviouscombatants. Soldierscould notfight without foodbutthis does notmakecombatants ofthefarmers whosupply them with foodas ofsustaining their partofthebusiness fellow The farmer's countrymen. activities are essentially directedtowardsnourishing the soldierqua man notqua soldierand he is nota combatant even ifin his hearthe supportsthe war (just as the soldieris a combatant even if he is a who hateswhathe is doing). Similarly forthemedicoswho conscript tryto heal and repairthe men who are soldiersand forthe mothers without thosemenwhoaresoldiers whosecontribution wouldnothave been born.More generally in anynationat warthere willbe countless of citizenswho are not engagedin prosecuting numbers the harmful activities which constitute the just grievance whichentitles another to takeup arms. Most of the population of children, country women and the aged fall into this category, as do mostof the artisans and professional who are notdirectly people and workers in such involved war-related industries as theproduction ofarmaments. Ofcourse, there
See especially John C. Ford, SJ, 'The Moralityof Obliteration Bombing',collectedin Wasserstrom, op. cit., and the articles of Anscombe cited. and Murphypreviously 59
21
C. A. J. Coady
may be soldierswho are pacifist conscripts determined not to shoot whenthebattlebeginsjust as theremaybe elderly civilian ladieswho are dedicatedpoliticalagentstaking some veryactivepartin thewar campaignbut here,as elsewhere in the discussion ofpublicmorality, the idea of reasonableexpectation is important and, priorto specific information to thecontrary, it is reasonable to viewsoldiers withguns as engagedin prosecuting the attack and elderly civilian ladiesas not. Muchmorecouldbe said aboutthisand I am notdenying that there are greyareasbut mostofit has already been wellsaid byothers so I shall oftheviability ofthedistinction leavethedefence herefor I want topass on to another aspectof it. of theattempt of Stateviolenceto One ofthe ironies by supporters distinction underminethe combatant/non-combatant is that some violence have learned fromthem and supportersof revolutionary it is impossiequally speciouslyarguethatin revolutionary struggle ble to distinguishcombatantsand non-combatants amongst the 'enemy'. Here the supposedlyunifiedenemyis oftena class rather than a nation but in eithercase the notionof 'collectiveguilt' or thosewho say collective combatant status'is verydubious,although is useless in war should be moresympathetic thatthe distinction to the revolutionaries' theoretical positionthantheyare. None the less thereare interesting and rathertricky questionsraised by transferringthe notionsof combatant and non-combatant from the context war to the area of conflict withinthe State. of formalinternational Beforelookingmore fullyat this howeverthereis one point that should be briefly addressed. It maybe urgedagainstmuchof whatI have said thatit assumes, thata revolution in itsparallels warand revolution, between especially thatis highly debatable justified. It is thisassumption can be morally inbringing justified can never be morally for itmaybe said thatcitizens violenceto bear againsttheirrulers.In replyI wouldurgethatifit is thenit is hardto resist justifiable possibleforsomewarsto be morally to the case of revolution. of the justificatory the extension patterns such wrongs seem to have committed some regimes Certainly against or againstsub-groups within thosepopulations theirown populations Nazi Germany violent redress. at leastaprimafacie case for as to create to presentsuch cases; moreover, and Uganda, under Amin, seemn in countries to Nazi occupation forces resistance armedunderground surrender seem to like France whose leaders signeda formal treaty bringus close to the revolutionary patternand this was generally violence ofbymanypeoplewhoareopposedto revolutionary approved in othercontexts.It maybe said thata moralcase forrevolution can exist against a dictatorship but never against a democracy.As a I am sensitive convinceddemocrat, to the forceof thisrejoinder but 60
The first is thatmany findits forcebluntedby two considerations. havedemocratic societies non-democratic trappings. basically political classedas a democracy because for instance, is frequently SouthAfrica, ofitspopulation buttherestricted forms for a section ithas democratic of any argument it fromthe protection franchise surelydisqualifies against revolutionbased upon politicallyrelevant propertiesof democracies.The second is that, ever since Tocqueville, political tyranny theorists have been awareof the problems posed by majority thatdemocratic and by thedeep and seriousinjustices overminorities in Northern Irelandis can countenance-thesituation legalmachinery today goes activity notirrelevant here.In anyeventmostrevolutionary which makesmall on incountries, likemany ofthosein SouthAmerica, ofbeingdemocratic. pretence of thejust revolution needs moredevelopment The generaltheory should be but I wantto pressthe issue about how such revolutions conducted and in particularwho are the combatantsand noncombatants. Let me begin with the point that revolutionaries broadly themselves do not always have trouble distinguishing though,of course, there between combatantsand non-combatants are greyareas. To takean exampleused by MichaelWalzer,the play by Albert Camus, entitledThe Just Assassins, is based upon an actual episode in Russia early this centuryin which a group of decided to assassinatea Tsarist official, revolutionaries the Grand in thesuppression involved of radical Duke Sergei,a man personally hid a bomb underhis coat The man chosento do thekilling activitv. and approached the victim'scarriagebut when he got close he on his lap so he realizedthatthe Grand Duke had twosmallchildren and Camus has one of his comradessay, in abandonedthe attempt there's a right the decision,'Even in destruction, wayand a accepting wrongway-and thereare limits'.22 if one reads Guevara'sBolivian Diary, one is struck by Similarly, are discriminated evento thepointwhere the care withwhichtargets soldiersand agentsare givena political lecture capturedGovernment not havingthe facilities to imprison and thenreleased(the guerrillas 23 Again in Regis Debray's Revolution in the Revolution? captives). is incidental to terrorism and mostly the onlyreference critical;in so far as it is approved of, it is doubtfulwhetherall that he calls For instancehe approves would qualifyon my definition. terrorism in that 'it immobilizes of the role of city terrorism thousandsof
Walzer,op. cit. 199. Che Guevara, Bolivian Diary, trans. Carlos P. Hansen and Andrew Sinclair (London: JonathanCape/Lorrimer, 1968). For a few such incidentssee pp. 67, 77 and 92.
22 23
61
C. A. J. Coady
enemy soldiers, it ties up most of the repressivemechanismin bridges,electricgenerunrewarding tasks of protection: factories, oil pipe-lines-these can keep ators, public buildings, highways, ofthearmy'.24Certainly, he does not busy as muchas three-quarters seem to have in mind any sort of killingbut rathersabotage of property and may property whichmayor maynotbe non-combatant or may not involve the risk of civilian deaths. The Cypriot General George Grivas,showedhis sensitivity to the revolutionary, in his memoirswhen he wroteof the EOKA campaign, distinction likethebomber,at random.We shotonlyBritish 'We did not strike, who would have killedus if theycould have firedfirst, servicemen or intelligence . Whether and civilianswho were traitors agents for our Grivas trulydescribed EOKA practiceis less important of thepossibility and desirabildiscussionthanhis acknowledgement violenceat morally revolutionary legitimate targets. ityof directing In a just revolutionthen who are the combatantsfrom a revolutionary's point of view? To begin with thereare those who the injusticesagainstwhich directly employviolence to perpetrate is aimed: the armyor elementsof it, the police or the revolution involvedin elementsof it,26the secret police, foreigners directly forces in prosecutingthe injustices, assisting the governmental the 'oppression' and the politicianswho are directing informers, seems to extendthe provisions of complainedof. This last category but not,I think, dramatically. whatWalzercalls 'thewar convention' If the politicians can be shownto be in a chain of agencydirecting behaviourwhich justifiesthe revolution then they the tyrannical Let us supposethe IRA's revolutionary seem to be legitimate targets. in NorthernIreland to be justified.Its use of bombs on activity and a case of railwaysand in pubs would clearlybe illegitimate failto discriminate since such attacksnecessarily between terrorism combatants and non-combatants.Similarly with the killing of and the otherson his boat since not only were they Mountbatten innocent but so surely was Mountbatten.A visitingscholar in criminologyrecentlyat Melbourne Universitytried to include as a legitimate out the amountof targetby pointing Mountbatten 'Irish land' thathe owned but thisseemsto be a clearcase in which
24
25
Quoted in Robert Taber, The War of the Flea (London: Paladin, 1972), 106. 26 The importance by the exampleof hereis illustrated of discrimination who assassinatedLord Moyne in Cairo in 1944 the Jewishrevolutionaries but refusedto kill an Egyptianpolicemanwhomtheydid not regardas an thisrefusal led to their in Palestine eventhough imperialism agentof British capture.See Walzer,op. cit. 199. 62
op. cit.75. Debray,
connectionwith a chain of agencyhas been estaban insufficient of a case forthe thereis at least the beginning lished. By contrast, Ireland, spokesmanon Northern assassinationof the Conservative but at least addressed to Airey Neave-not, I think, sufficient case is considerations whichhave some relevance.A moreclear-cut of the American Public Safety provided by the kidnap-killing in Uruguayin 1970. Mitrione had been sent Adviser,Dan Mitrione, of the Tupamarosinsurgento Uruguayto assistin the suppression evidencethathe had an important role in cy. There is considerable It the torture prisoners. campaignwaged againstUruguay'spolitical would be absurd to regardhis positionas that of an uninvolved in the diplomat though this was how he was initiallyportrayed media at the timeof his death.27 Western of revolutionary of thiskindbetweentargets Distinctions violence forthe revolutionaries from the pointof view are not onlyimportant concernedwith of how they should behave but also for observers theirbehaviour.The factis ofcoursethatmostobservers, describing the Press,describeanyrevolutionary as a terrorist and and especially use of violenceas terrorism, including virtually any revolutionary of soldiers.At leastthisis so throughout even the killing mostof the violence directed Western media with respect to revolutionary in what is oftencalled 'the Free against establishedgovernments in Afghanistan, on the otherhand, are World'. The revolutionaries to as terrorist in the Western Press thoughI seldom if ever referred doubt thattheirtacticsdisplaymoreconcernformoralscruplethan those employedin Belfastor El Salvador. The assumption underhabitis of coursethatrevolutions againstus and lyingthislinguistic whereasrevolutions our allies are unjustified againstour ideological The same assumption, withsuitably justified. enemiesare invariably forthe indexicalelements, adjustedreferents of guidesthe reporting the Soviet bloc Press. the naivety or cynicism of thisassumption Whatever it does raise if since we assume that theoretical issues some given interesting is unjustified then we would seem to have revolutionary campaign betweenthe targets some reason to make light of any distinction is unjustified all ifa revolution selectedby the rebels.After thenany in is whether its name unjustified of combatantsor killingdone There is a pointof connection here withjust war non-combatants. it similar since would seemthatwe can makea precisely point theory just war an war. Let us revert to the about unjustified terminology which morally mentionedearlierand referto those considerations
For a sober assessmentof allegations about Mitrione's role see A. J. Langguth, Hidden Terrors (New York: Pantheon Books,1978),especially pp. 250-254. 63
27
C. A. J. Coady
the resort to arms in the first justify place as thejus ad bellumand whichplace moralconstraints thoseconsiderations upon how thewar is waged as theJusin bello. Terrorism is morally condemned under thejus in bello and it is sometimes held thatthejus in bello andjus ad bellum are independent.Michael Walzer has, for instance, claimedthatthe'two sortsofjudgments are logically independent. It is perfectly possible fora just war to be fought unjustly and foran in strict I have accordance withthe rules.'28 unjustwar to be fought kind of independence elsewhere29 and shall argued againstthe first now merelyreaffirm that it is imperilled by the thought thatwhat is a certaincourseof actionthenatureof thejus ad bellumjustifies which is partiallyspecifiedby the means which are proposed or involvedand which in turnfall under the judgmentof thejus in bello. I want ratherto focus here on the second kind of independin accordance ence, the idea that an unjustified war can be fought is in withthe moralrulesofjus in bello. There a sense whichthisis but thereis also a clearlypossibleboth fora war or fora revolution sense in which, as I have alreadysaid, all the killingdone by the so thatthethought warriors whosecause is unjustis itself unjustified can easily arise that the victimsin uniform are as much sinned againstas any civilianskilledin defianceof theJusin bello and the war conventions associatedwithit. Is thisthought correct? Almostbut not quite. There is substantial in it but it tendsto obscuresomething truth that important, namely, in whateverthe objective facts about a given State's justification going to war its soldieryare likelyto believe that theyhave good moral reason for trying to wound or kill enemysoldierswhereas, even subjectively, vis-a-vis the theywill not be in the same position has quite wide scope s civilianpopulation.This consideration enemy in one's national forit rangesfrom matters to do withtrust leadersto back whenyou are shotat. quite specificissues to do withshooting All of theseinvolveimportant withwhich questionsof responsibility I cannotnow deal but, takenin conjunction withthefactthatit may matter to determine oftenbe a verydifficult side in which,ifeither, in fighting, a war is justified thatin the case theymakeit intelligible at least, we should continueto insistupon some moral of warfare, betweenkilling combatants and non-combatants even differentiation should by those who are wagingan unjustwar. Such an insistence in the be at theexpenseofthegenuineinsight contained nothowever idea that the killingof combatantsin an unjust war is morally
cit. 21. C. A. J. Coady, 'The Leaders and the Led', Inquiry23 (September 1980), 286.
28 Walzer,op.
29
64
Of course,forour purposes,we have had to simplify problematic. a greatdeal and ignoremanyinteresting complexities and difficulties posed by actual war situationswhere it may be that a war is on both sides or may appear to be justified unjustified on both or maybeginas unjustand becomejust and so on. Whatis the lessonofthisdigression forour discussion ofterrorism and revolutionary violence?Surelythis,thatwe should continueto make a distinctionbetween two broad types of revolutionary at whatwouldbe legitimate violence,thatwhichis directed if targets the revolutionwere justifiedand that which is directedat noncombatants. We shouldreserve theterm'terrorism' onlyforthelatter condemned. Violenceof the former and it can be unequivocally kind of the overalllegitimacy standsor fallsmorally by the judgment of Does thisopen the way to condoning the revolutionary activity. far too manyacts of politicalviolencewhichunderstandably cause such widespreadshock and distress?It all depends. If you thinkthat an easy moral violent revolutionary struggleis readilyjustifiable, fortheconsequences and have a option,thenyou shouldbe prepared of what you are supporting. realisticappreciation If, on the other hand, you think that violent revolutionis sometimes,but only seldom, justifiable then the killings you condone will be far more condemnthe killing of Aldo Moro restricted. (You can vehemently without regardingit as terrorist.)My own view is that violent revolution,like war, is only rarelyjustifiablethough one's sympathiesmay oftenbe morewiththe rebelsbecause of theirgenuine and unlikely-to-be-remedied grievances. Two finalclarificatory turns points. My discussionof terrorism upon viewingit as a tacticbut it may be urgedthatthe means/end to the realities. model upon which I relyis not alwaysappropriate terrorism and, forthatmatter, Sometimes revolutionary governmennotto achievesome definite end noras an is employed tal terrorism, end-in-itself but as a piece of powerful an aberrational symbolism, Paskinsand Dockrillin theirbook seem to take act of self-assertion. violence: thisview of bothwar and revolutionary It is ... oftendifficult to answerthe question whether war is usefulor not. To look at the Allied bombingcampaignas though it werea priori obviousthatit was engagedin as meansthought to be usefulin the pursuit of some well-defined goal is, we argued,a very dubious proceeding.Many otherexplanations of the campaign are possible. The same is true of terrorism. One is apt to thinkof the terrorist a ruthless as, howeversympathetic, figure prepared to use indiscriminate violence in pursuit of a welldefined goal. But thereappearsto us to be good theoretical reason
3
65
C. A. J. Coady
Often,stateswage warbecause they to doubt all such stereotypes. with the terrorsimilarly believe that they have no alternative; or one has no alternative, ist.... To wage war because one thinks because one believesthatwar is the onlyway to show thatone is in earnestis not necessarily to do something whichone assumesis or justifiable, as meansto some end.30 understandable, thereis no doubt AlthoughI thinkthatsome of this is confused The first a real motivation. thingto note thatthe passage identifies about it howeveris that, althoughit providesus with a salutary may warningagainst too crude a construalof the goals terrorism themeans/end model. Indeed, thetalkof serve,it does notinvalidate in terms ofcertain needsto be construed goals 'havingno alternative' and purposesin orderto have sensemade ofit sincethereare usually with certain other 'alternatives'which are however inconsistent willpromote values or ends whichit is believedthatwaror terrorism odds of the or embody. Finland's war againstthe overwhelming Soviet Union had alternatives but none of them promoted or exhibited the values the Finns saw themselves emphatically defendto be too internal ing by theirhopelesswar. If such ends are thought forthe usual means/end or constitutive modelthenI do not need to in warforits quarrelwiththeobjector.The Finnswerenotengaging abouttheir (on own sake but to showtheirearnestness independence with the parallel one possible account of theirmotives). Similarly case of revolutionary violence,especiallyterrorism. We can underand threatened standhow a community maybecomeso downtrodden in theiridentity and conditionsof life as to believe that the only what dignity they way of asserting reallyemphaticand appropriate I do not thinkthatin its possess is to commitan act of terrorism. pure formthis is the typicalcase but it is a possible case, and in the morecommoncases. relatedto it mayfigure ingredients between Finally, let me return,as promised,to the connection thatterrorism terrorism and fear. Earlier,I rejectedthe suggestion in terms ofthe creation or spread shouldbe defined whollyor partly of fearbut thereis no doubt thatone of the reasonswhypeople are is that theyfindsuch activities activities so disturbedby terrorist of social realitieswith which their lives are deeply undermining enmeshed and which provide a backgroundof normalcyagainst whichtheycan go about theirordinary living.(No doubtthisis less when their'ordinary' lives are alreadydominated by fear important of this paper there is no and oppression.) From the perspective reasonto denyany of this. Indeed myaccountof terrorism goes far towardsexplaining whythisshouldbe so sincethe methodof terror
30
Paskinsand Dockrill,op. cit. 94.
66
is to attack those who have reason to think of themselvesas ofcovert thatanyform warfare, It is also true,however, uninvolved. will lead to the breakingdown of no matterhow discriminating, Any as terrorism. conditionsthoughnot so dramatically normalcy warfare (to use the jargon)will make familiar formof low-intensity it will intotargets; soldiersand politicians such as policemen, figures innocent people who are, in reality, of apparently lead to the killing politicaladvisers;it will resultin secretpolice or foreign informers, some mistakenor accidental killingor injuringof genuine nonof suspicion. Here we combatantsand itselfcreate an atmosphere and betweenterrorism have anotherpotentsource of the confusion violence but confusionit remains, other forms of revolutionary seeks to gain his ends by forthe terrorist howeverunderstandable, targets. thosewho are not morally legitimate attacking deliberately warfare and terrorism ofclandestine This collapseofthecategories paperin by MartinHughes'recent has been givenrenewedcurrency as 'a war in which a Hughes simplydefinesterrorism Philosophy. secret army spreads fear' and he claims that secret armies 'must threateneverybodybut their active supporters-and surely both lurking enemies and ambiguous, suspicious friends are quite warfare not Hughes seems to thinkthat clandestine frightening'.31 createsthesortoffeardiscussedabove but inevitably onlycommonly and so thereis no involvesa policyof attacksupon non-combatants in termsof such a policy. of terrorism definition need fora distinct warswhichmakelittleor no Guerrilla In thishe is surelymistaken. tactics are not only possible but seem to have use of terrorist the factsare oftenhard to establish, occurredthough,notoriously, commentaries and embodythe sorts of the because reports partly 'clean' revolution One such appears I to am confusions trying dispel. Batista, another insurrection (perhaps against to have been Castro's was the EOKA campaignagainstthe Britishin more contentious) and Cyprus. Hughes argues that it is too much to ask of resisters because 'great forces that they attackonly military revolutionaries to such attacks.But, in the first place, this armies are impregnable of regularforcesfromattackby the immunity greatlyexaggerates resistance groups,as both Cuba and Ireland demonstrate, irregular is not thefactthatorthodox victory military it ignores and, secondly, the usual aim of guerrillaattacksupon the enemy'sarmed forces effects. to producepolitical are intended primarily since such attacks victoryin the Tet In Vietnam, the Americanswon the military forthe Vietcong victory but it none the less was a political offensive at of Vietnam.Moreover, Hughes'argument and decidedthe destiny
31
Hughes, op. cit. 5. 67
C. A. J. Coady
fora just targets this point skatesover the factthatthe legitimate revolution can go beyondmen in uniform withguns. some concrete evidenceforhis viewthatcovert Hughes does offer but activesupporters as the enemyand it wars musttreateveryone consists in the 'famous fate' of Mrs Lindsay. This, he says, it is forrevolutionaries to sap 'illustrates powerfully how necessary civilianopponents. It seemshardto imagine how thecourageoftheir they could use any but very severe threatsfor this purpose.'32 citesMrs Lindsay'scase and speaksof her Curiously, Hughes merely 'convictions and courage'without givingany details. The facts are that she was an elderly woman who supplied to the British forcesin January in information 1921, whichresulted an ambushand killing two IRA men and capturing theirsurprising ten others,fiveof whomwere laterexecuted.She was subsequently kidnappedand shot by the IRA who gave as theirreason'the stern necessity to protectour forces'.These details (providedby Townshend on whom Hughes relies33) show thatMrs Lindsay'sfatewas not that of a mere 'civilian opponent' in the sense of one who but rather thatof an disagreedwiththe IRA's aims and programme one who could plausibly be viewedas taking an activepart informer, in the war. The IRA maywell have been wrong to killher,theymay forshe mayhave have even been wrongto view her as an informer actedto save British thatshe was condemning liveswithout realizing Irishmenbut, whateverwe decide about that, her fate does not mustmaketargets of everyone thethesisthatsecretwarfare illustrate that low-intensity warfaremust be, in my but active supporters, before shortly sense, terrorist. Indeed, Townshendis able to report, discussing Mrs Lindsay's death, that the IRA 'did not show of the desperateterrorism which oftenmarksguerrilla symptoms in decline. It continued to wage urbanand ruralwar on movements to indiscriminate the same lineswithout attacks.'34 roughly resorting forthe storyof Mrs Lindsay is Townshend's source, incidentally, This makesvery H. C. Wylly's History oftheManchester Regiment. interesting reading.WyllydescribesMrs Lindsayas 'a braveloyalist woman' who gave 'a greatexampleof courageand devotionto the Afterher disappearance, Empire'.35 Lloyd George, duringnegotiato be made amongst therebels tionswithde Valera,caused inquiries as to her fate. Accordingto the rebel Parliament'sMinisterof
32
Ibid. 18.
33 Charles Townshend, The British Campaign in Ireland 1919-1921 (OxfordUniversity Press, 1975), 153.
34
35
Groom, 1925),210.
68
Regiment, H. C. Wylly, History oftheManchester II (London: Forster
Ibid. 152.
Defence she had been executedonly afterthe Britishcommander, General Strickland, ignoreda letterfromher pointing out thatshe would be killedifthe British wentahead withtheexecution of fiveof the capturedIrishmen.Five days after theywere killedso was she. Wyllymakesno mention of the fateof herbutler-chauffeur, Joseph Clarke, who was kidnappedwith her but the absence of comment stronglyimplies that his captors regarded Clarke as basically a non-combatant and releasedhim. I have throughout had to adopt manysimplifications and approximations.One such is the implication thatall revolutionary war is of a piece in style,tactic and strategy; anotheris that all sub-State politicalviolenceof an organized kindis revolutionary whereplainly it is not; another that'secretwar' makesunambiguous sense; another that revolutionary war is always conducted within the national confinesof the State which is the principaltargetbut, of course, there is trans-national revolutionary activityand trans-national terrorism. roomfordisputeabout the criteria Finallythereis clearly for distinguishing combatantand non-combatant both in war and, in revolutionary even moreawkwardly, I am notparticularcontexts. ofthe words'combatant' ly enamoured and 'non-combatant'; in some ways, it mightbe clearerto speak of legitimate and non-legitimate but whichever targets usage appeals thereare stillproblems of detail and principlein spellingout the notionof a chain of agency,which seems to be centralto the distinction. This is an important and taskwhichI mustleave to another difficult occasion. In the present context, I will be happy enough if it can be agreed that the existsand has the role I attribute distinction to it and thatclearcases can be describedon either side of the divide. University ofMelbourne
69

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op. cit.75. Debray,

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