Kant's Early Theory of Genius (1770-1779): Part I

Tonelli, Giorgio.
Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 4, Number 2, April 1966, pp. 109-132 (Article)
Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

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Kant's Early Theory of Genius (1770-1779): Part I

GIORGIO TONELLI
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE THEORY OF GENIUS in K a n t ' s philosophy was realized comparatively early in the history of K a n t ] o r s c h u n g , and several works have been devoted to this subject? B u t nobody has, until now, tried to reconstruct the development of K a n t ' s ideas on genius utilizing the materials contained in his N a c h l a s s , published by Adickes. 2 This is what I shall attempt in the present paper, limiting the study to the period from 1770 to 1779, coinciding with Kant's preliminary works for the elaboration of the C r i t i q u e o] P u r e R e a s o n . First I shall t r y to establish K a n t ' s opinions on genius in the aforesaid span of time, second, to trace the sources of such opinions in K a n t ' s cultural background. w Before 1770 K a n t rarely uses the term genius. The corresponding notion has not yet a clearly defined place in his theories about "empirical psychology" (or "anthropology") and "aesthetics." I n 1764 he writes about "the Italian genius" as compared with the spiritual endowment of other nations (II, 244). "Genius" here generally corresponds to the English and French notion "g~nie du peuple." s The word "genius" appears in the same year in some other contexts, with the generical meaning of a "power of the mind." * In 1768 K a n t uses, in a letter to Herder, the word "genius," apparently identified with the expression "fertile spirit." ~ K a n t actually is warning Herder 1 See especially: K. Hoffman, Die Umbildung der Kantischen Lehre vom Genie in Schellings System des transscendentalen Idealismus (Bern: 1907, Berner Studien zur Philos. u. ihrer Geschiehte, LIII); R. Schlapp, Kants Lehre vom Genie und die Entstehung der "Kritik der Urteilskraft" (G6ttingen: 1901); O. SchSnd6rffer, "Kant's Definition vom Genie," Altpreussische Monatsschrift, 1893, xxx; O. Wichmann, "Kant's Begriff vom Genie und seine Bedeutung~" Deutsche Akademische Rundschau, Jhg. II, 12 Sem., Folge N. 2; 7, 15 Jan. 1925. Schlapp's work, utilizing Kant's Kolleghefte (or notes taken from his lectures), is peculiarly important. In Kants Gesammelte Schriften, published by the Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften. This is the edition we refer to in our quotations. We give only the number of the volume and the page for the printed works of Kant, and the number of the volume and that of the Reflexion for the Nachlass. We refer to the last issue of the Preussische Akademie Ausgabe edition. We intend to utilize Kant's Nachlass following the same criteria as in: G. Tonelli, Kant, dall'estetica metafisica all'estetica psicoempirica. Studi sulla genesi del criticismo (1754-1771) e sulle sue fonti (Torino: 1955), Memorie della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, Serie 35 Tomo 3, Parte III. See pp. 7-10, 192, 253-255. 3See Tonelli, op. cir., p. 115. 4 "Der h6chste Schwung, den das menschliche Genie nahm, um zu dem Erhabenen aufzusteigen, bestand in Abenteuern" (II, 255). 5We shall translate with "spirit" the peculiar sense of the German Geist as Kant (as we shall see later) employs it here. Otherwise Geist may mean in German (among other things) : 9, soul , , (= Seele) both as man , s soul ~nd as spiritual creature, , , ghost , , (= Gespenst), , * chemical spirit", "wit" (= Witz), or "anthropological characteristic of a time or of a nation," this last

[io9]

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against a youthful, mystical exaggeration of this genial fertility, to whose

motion the calmness of the philosopher's contemplative life is to be preferred. Criticism 6 makes genius more cautious. 7 Most probably from this period, come two Reflections s bearing on our subject. Genius is referred to art (Kunst) and literature (sch6ne Wissenscha]ten), and opposed to learning (Erlernung) and imitation (Nachahmung) in literature. Genius is related to the judging intellect (Verstand zu urtheilen), especially as intellect is common sense (gesunder Verstand), but not vulgar common sense (gemeiner Verstand) to which spirit (called here esprit) is opposed.
Common sense does not apply to genius only, but also to the imitative process; not only to literature, but to every kind of science. I n this early stage of his psychological ideas, K a n t seems to a p p l y the concept of genius to aesthetic activities only. C o m m o n sense is clearly not the same as genius, but rather a power ruling it through criticism. w After 1770 K a n t gives a terrific development to his theory of genius, as attested by the quantity of material, both in the Nachlass and KollegheIte, devoted to it. I t is often difficult to date more precisely the Re)~exionen concerned, inside the decade from 1770 to 1780. Only a rough distinction m a y be made in the majority of cases between materials anterior and posterior to -----1776. We shall try therefore to distinguish, when expedient, only between a version probably anterior and a version probably posterior to this date. One of the most striking features of the whole period is the rise of the term "spirit" as an equivalent or near-equivalent of genius. Sometimes t h e y are simply identified2 B u t more often a certain distinction is made between them (although, in general, what is referred to the one m a y be referred to the other). Before --1776, spirit seems to be a more general notion than genius, comprehending besides genius, taste and right reason (gesunde Vernun]t, a notion related to "common sense") (XV, N. 738). Elsewhere, spirit is "talent in general," lO whereas genius is the originality sense being the nearest to what we call "spirit." (See Grimm's Deutsches WSrterbuch, art. "Geist.") In Kant's time, Geist could not be used as an equivalent of "mind," called then Gemiit, and olfly in later German idealism Geist. Gemi~t was the soul, not in a metaphysical sense, but as a complex of psychological powers. 6 The mental power enabling one to criticize is, in the same period, defined by Kant as "common sense" (gesunder Verstand). Criticism may refer both to reason (in logic) and to taste (in art); taste is a form of common sense (see Tonelli, op. cir., pp. 136--137,140). Here criticism is referred by Kant. to Herder's poetry; it depends therefore on taste. "Wofern die Critik nicht das Nachtheilige an sich h~tte das Genie furchtsam zu machen ." "Bey der friihen Auswiekelung Jhrer Talent sehe ich rait mehrerem Vergniigen auf den Zeitpunkt hinaus wo der fruchtbare Geist nicht mehr so sehr getrieben durch die warme Bewegung des jugendlichen Geftihls diejeninge Ruhe erwirbt welche sanft aber empfindungsroll ist und gleichsam das beschauliche Lehen des Philosophen ist, gerade das Gengetheil yon demjenigen wovon Mystiker tr~iumen" (X, 73-74, Letter N. 40, 9 May, 1768). 8 XVI, N. 1573, and 1582. They are most probably dated between 1760 and 1768, but they could also be later, up to 1775. See, for the year 1772, Schtapp, op. cir., pp. 62-6~ (Genie = Originatgr Between 1770 and 1780: XV, N. 819 (where Geist is correlated to Genie and not to Talent). After 1775: XVI, N. 1894 and XV, N. 933 ("Man kan auch das Wort Geist allein statt genie brauchen"). Sometimes the identification is more or less implicit, as the characters referred to one of them are, in another place, referred to the other. For instance, XV, N. 782, N. 932, N. 943, and N. 949. 10The same m XV, N. 933.

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(dis Eigenthiimliche) of talent in general (XV, :N. 761). T a l e n t leads to imitation, not as a copying to the letter, but as an imitation of the spirit of a model; this is not y e t genius, but the best w a y to reach it (der Leit]aden vor dis genie) (XV, N. 778).11 T h a t spirit is not y e t genius, although necessary for it, is repeated also in a Kolleghe]t from the y e a r 1775-177612; but, here, spirit is "a p a r ticular quality (eine besondere Eigenscha]t) of talent." 13 F r o m the period after +-1775, XV, N. 926 attests t h a t spirit is an a n i m a t i n g talent, whereas genius is the originality of spirit. I n XV, N. 930, genius is defined as an original spirit. More frequently, genius is considered as something wider t h a n spirit, as in the (perhaps earlier) XV, N. 812, where genius is a more general power comprehending spirit, sensibility (Empfindung), Judgment, ~4 and taste, a constellation which we m e e t v e r y frequently in the texts under consideration. The same recurs in XV, N. 874, and a p p a r e n t l y in X V I , N. 1847 too. XV, N. 977 presents a peculiar situation which we shall discuss later: but spirit seems to be subordinated to genius as the vivifying element of its subordinate powers, which are in this case "wit" and " p h a n t a s y , " being p a r t s of "imagination." 15
w We have seen how spirit seems to be something intermediate between t a l e n t and genius. TM I t will now be a p p r o p r i a t e to a t t e m p t a clarification of the notion of talent (Talent). Actually, K a n t mentions three different kinds of mental production: (1) copying, requiring diligence; (2) free imitation, requiring talent; and (3) true originality, requiring genius. I n a Kolleghe]t of 1775-1776, the first kind of mental production is called " n a t u r a l disposition" (Naturell), and is to be easily instructed or receptive to precepts. T a l e n t is an " e n d o w m e n t " (Gemi~tsgabe), a capability to produce (hervorbringen) something new following apprehended rules, and m u s t be educated. Genius does not require m u c h education, 17 because it is a creative (schSp]erisch) talent, i.e., producing independently from instructions or rules, is, 19 This distinc11 Following a Kollegheft from 1775-1776, it is impossible to transform a talent into a genius by education, but it is possible by education to awaken genius, if it is already present. Philosophy, the science of genius, cannot be taught, one can only be taught how to philosophize (Schlapp, op. cir., pp. 125-126). See also w167 10 ft. 12Schlapp, op. cir., p. 127. 13Ibid., p. 126. 14We translate with Judgment (with a J) the German Urteilskraft: literally "power of judging," as distinguished from Urteil, judgment. 15We shall translate Einbildungskraft with "imagination," Phantasie with "fancy," and Dichtungsverm5gen with "phantasy." 1~An attempt toward an explanation of such waverings in terminology and classification as seen in w shall be made in w167 connecting them with an actual plurality of senses of the word "spirit." 1~This is meant in the sense that genius in its peculiarity does not want any instruction, and does not follow any rule, but, as we shall see later, genius, presupposing both diligence and talent, indirectly requires education and rules, but only as a preparation for its use. is Schlapp, op. cit., pp. 123-124. . . 19 Frequently, however, this trichotomy is presented by Kant in a simplified way, 1.e., as a dichotomy, distinguishing either (a) diligence from (b) talent and genius, or (a) dil!gence and talent from (b) genius. So that sometimes the distinction between talent and genius, or between diligence and talent, practically disappears. See, for some examples, footnotes (22) and (24).

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l i o n b e t w e e n diligence a n d t a l e n t is clarified b y a c o r r e s p o n d i n g d i s t i n c t i o n bet w e e n c o p y i n g a n d i m i t a t i n g . I n X V , N . 920 ( a f t e r 1776), " c o p y i n g " ( N a v h t u n ) , w i t h its subspecies of " a p i n g , " 20 signifies " m a k i n g t h e s a m e " (Gleichtun) ; on t h e c o n t r a r y , in " i m i t a t i o n " ( N a c h a h m e n ) , o n l y t h e w a y of d o i n g t h e t h i n g (Manier) is t h e same, b u t the c o n t e n t m u s t be a n o r i g i n a l i n v e n t i o n (Oriqinalit~it in der Erfindung).21 T h i s k i n d of i m i t a t i o n , m a k e s precise X V , N. 778 (before 1776), p r o v i d e d t h a t it is t h a t which does n o t follow t h e l e t t e r (as in copieren a n d nach5]]en), b u t the spirit, a n d is t h e best p r e p a r a t i o n for t r u e g e n i a l p r o d u c tion. 22 G e n i u s w a n t s i n s t r u c t i o n , 23 as diligence (Fleiss) a n d t a l e n t do, b u t it goes bey o n d t h e m (XV, N. 899; a f t e r 1776) .24 D i l i g e n c e (Naturell, Fleiss) seems to be sufficient w h e n s o m e t h i n g m u s t a n d c a n be done m e r e l y b y following some p r e d i s p o s e d r u l e ; b u t , if e i t h e r t h e r u l e s c a n n o t precede the p r o d u c t i o n , 25 or t h e y are n o t sufficient to d e t e r m i n e the p r o d u c t , 2~ 20 Called Nachdffen, or imitation of the Manier, i.e., of the way of doing something (Manier), without being able to imitate also the content (Inhalt) of the thing and without any original new content. 21 On the relationship between Manier and idea in genius, see w 22 Once at least, in 1775-1776, Kant contradicts his distinction between diligence and talent, shortly after having stressed it (see Schlapp, op. cir.,pp. 128-129). On this occasion talent is called mechanical. In XV, N. 922 also, talent is called mechanical, but united to Fleiss. Apparently, this is not the free talent mentioned shortly before. "Mechanism" seems to be better referred to diligence, and free talent (as opposed to Mechanismus des talents) seems to be somewhat assimilated to genius. See also w 23 See also w 24 It must be remarked that sometimes the distinction between taleI}t (as spirit) and genius disappears, at least as both are opposed to diligence: see XV, N. 812 (1769-1778), and XV, N. 975 (1775-1778). 25Kant seems to mean by this that such rules cannot be, in the present case, deductively established, but that they are established empirically, abstracting them from their actual use, i.e., the rule may be recognized only after one has (as it were, instinctively) acted in accordance with it. Of course rules abstracted in this way are not unchangeable, but they depend upon successful acting, which establishes empirically some never completely defined and nondeducible (non a priori) rules of action (or of thinking). We are led to this interpretation by the connection, which we shall meet later (see footnote 29) between talent and Geschieklichkeit; now the rules of Geschicklichkeit (or "ability") shall have, in the critical period, at least, the aforesaid characteristics, in their well*known classifications as hypothetical imperatives. It must also be remarked that, if this interpretation holds, talent may be referred also to the rules of taste, which have, in this period and before, the same characteristics as we attributed to the "hypothetical imperatives" (see Tonelli, op. cir., especially pp. 166-167 and 215-216). This interpretation could be supported by XV, N. 923 (1776-1778) : "Das Talent kan nicht yon der Leilung und dem Zwange der Regeln befreyet werden ausser in denienigen Stricken, wo die Regel empirisch ist, und unter der Bedingung, dass das Talent selbst Produkte gebe, die zur Regel dienen." This coincides with Kant's theory of Taste. However, XV, N. 923 could also be accounted for as a case in which talent is identified with genius, the structure of which is, in this, analogous to talent. 2s This is the case, if between what is disposed by rule and the actual product there is a gap, which must be filled by something which we could call "instinctive action," but without transgressing certain rules. This may refer to a situation, where a part of the object is produced following demonstrated rules, but another part following those kind of rules which cannot precede the exertion (see footnote 25). But possibly it refers to some imperceptible nuances which never can be brought into a rule: in this sense perhaps spirit (as distinguished from genius, that is, as implicitly attributed to talent) is called once by K a n t das Unbeschreibliche [a kind of je ne sais quoi] (Schlapp, op. cir., p. 127). This could refer to "play" as an element of art, as in XV, N. 922, in which case "die Regeln nicht die Ausribung m6glich machen"; the "play" element is referred to genius too. But it is also possible that here, as in some other laces, talent be equated to genius, and that what cannot be determined by rule is meant to e a new idea.

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talent is needed. Actually, talent always must be led b y rules, but t h e y only make its action harmonious, 27 they do not produce anything (XV, N. 922, between 1775 and 1778). Talent produces something new, unknown before; but this is not y e t the originality of true genius: following XV, iN. 969 (1776-1778), talent brings the mind only to contrivances (Einfdlle or particular devices), but genius brings it to (new) ideas (i.e., to new general principles, as we shall see later). w Diligence, talent, and genius are not to be considered as peculiar faculties; but as different ways of setting one's faculties to work. 2s All of them imply the exertion of several elementary powers; of course, talent requires some more powers than diligence, and genius some more t h a n talent. F r o m XV, N. 933 and N. 934 (1776-1778, or perhaps earlier) it is clear t h a t "talent" is only a general word covering what actually is a g a m u t of different talents. I t is, however, not clear whether we must identify a "peculiar talent" with an elementary mental power, in so far as it is "spontaneous," or with a peculiar blend of several mental powers which are directed to some more special achievement within the range of talent in general (see also XV, N. 938, 1772177S). Following XV, N. 819 (1769-1778), the most characteristic elementary power at work in talent should be Judgment, i.e., the power of distinguishing what is adapted, and what is not, to a given idea. ~9 J u d g m e n t and talent are not genius because, as we shall see later, t h e y presuppose a given idea and only find a way (or device) for applying it, whereas genius creates a n e w idea. s~ Further, in talent another element is at work (which is not, in turn, a peculiar faculty), and this is spirit. Spirit, as we saw in w is an intermediate element between talent and genius, but it is sometimes, at least as "vivifying but not original," peculiarly attributed to talent. ~7I.e., they make it harmonize with the general conditions rendering any action of that kind possible and effective, but they do not determine the peculiar content of the action. 2, XV, N. 949 (1776-1778) : Genius is not a peculiar power (Kraft), but a principle of unification of all powers. The same is elsewhere said of splint (XV, N. 933, et al.). das Unterseheldungsverm6gen des Schickliehen, d i desjenigen, was der Idee, welche gegeben ist, nicht widerstreitet" (loc. cit.). This means that Judgment is a capacity for relating a peculiar case to a general principle, which has been previously determined. We know from other researches which we shall publish in another place, that Judgment is, in this period of Kant's evolution, the faculty bridging the gap between a universal p.rinciple, demonstrated a priori, and a peculiar case, in order to see whether or not this case is comprehended under that rule, but the universal rule itself does not contain the further particular rule needed to determine whether the universal rule applies to the case in question or not. Now, a more particular rule cannot be deduced in any way, but is every time substituted by a practical exertion of the power called "Judgment." In such cases, Judgment is closely related to common sense (a relation which is explicit, for instance, in XV, N. 819) and to taste, which is sometimes called "sensible Judgment." (See, for the development of the same questions before 1770, Tonelli, op. cit., pp. 22-23, 140-143, 157, 161-163, 177 ft.) Thus, the connection or analogy between Judgment and talent (as "ability") is somewhat clarified (see footnotes 25 and 26). The "idea" referred to shall be classified later as an empirical ideal (see w and footnote 52). 30Of course, Judgment, as we shall see later, is an ingredient of genius as well as of talent, but the originality of genius is in spirit, not in Judgment.
, 9 " o .

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A more general notion, corresponding to the sum of all cognitive powers, is that of "intelligence" (Kop]), as exposed in a Kolleghe]t from the year 1775--1776) 1 W h a t is important for intelligence is not so much strength (GrSsse) of every single power, but their just proportion, ae K a n t gives as an example the proportion between wit and intellect, and between m e m o r y and Judgment. aa Also, diligence, talent, and genius seem to be three peculiar kinds of intelligence, or three different and progressively important stages of grouping and proportioning one's powers: in fact, K a n t exposes his ideas on diligence, talent, and genius immediately thereafter. 84, 35 The most important character of the powers (constituting genius) is their proportion, K a n t writes elsewhere (XV, N. 841, 1776-78. See also w w We shall now proceed to inquire about the notion of spirit, s~ this peculiar element being sometimes referred to talent, sometimes to genius; and this shall lead us to a better understanding of the notion of "genius." We must keep in mind t h a t w h a t is said about spirit m a y sometimes be referred to talent, sometimes to genius proper, and sometimes it m a y be an ambiguous character referred to a position in which talent and genius are not clearly differentiated. We know 37 that spirit is sometimes considered as " a peculiar quality of talent"; as such, it is "a principle of vivification" (der Grund der Belebung). Vivification is defined as "to give a sudden new impulse" (au] einmal einen neuen Trleb zu geben).Ss But, in most cases, spirit is considered as one of the four elem e n t a r y powers composing genius (i.e., sensibility, Judgment, spirit, and taste).~9 As such, spirit also is chiefly the source of vivification of life. Actually, both sensibility and spirit are sources of movement, of occupation (Bewegung, Beschii]tigung), but sensibility achieves such aims through sensations, spirit through kritfte ist. Das Ergentumliche des Kopfes kommt auf die Proportion der Gemiitskr~fte an," Schlapp, op. c~t., p. 118. a2 "Kopf 1st die Summe aller Erkenntisskr~fte, so wie das Herz die Summe aller Begehrungs31

ibid. a6Ibid., p. 120. :: Ibid., pp. 133 sgg. r~opJ is mentioned in connection with talent in XV, N. 933. 86Kant uses, of course, the term Geist before 1770, but in senses which generally are rather

distant from "spirit." In an Essay of 1754, Kant mentions some people "die einen allgemeinen Weltgeist, ein unfiihlbares, aber ~berall wirksames Prineipium als das geheime Triebwerk der Natur annehmen" (I, 203). In this sense Weltgeist means Weltseele, or platonic idea informing the world. In the same essay Kant supports a different Weltgeist theory (I, 211-212) : that is not a soul of the world, but "eine subtile, iiberall wirksame Materie, die bei den Bildungen der Natur das active Principium ausmacht . . . . " But the same elementary substance is considered, one year later (in the Allgemeine Naturgeschichte), as a purely mechanical principle of the universe. The notion of Weltgeist as Wellseele, in German romantic idealism, shall be combined with the cultural concept of esprit du si~clc and evolve into the hegelian notion of Weltgeist, or Mind of the World, a metaphysical-cultural entity. We shall meet something analogous in Kant, in w Later, in 1755, Kant tries to defend Epicurus, whose philosophical attempt, in spite of its negative results, "der Scharfsinnigkeit eines grossen Geistes gem~ss war" (I, 226). In the present case Kant is rather near to his later notion of spirit. But, in general, Geist means either soul, as in I, 322, 359, 360, or mind, as in I, 321. In 1763 God receives the attributes of a Geist or immaterial being (II, 87-88). Finally, in the Traiime eines Geistersehers of 1776, "Geist" is employed passim both as "soul" and as "ghost." 87Sehlapp, op. cit., p. 126. 6s Ibid., p. 127. 69 See w

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concepts, and both are peculiar (Eigenti~mlich, which means both particular or not-universal and productive, or, in the case of spirit, original). Such views are exposed in XV, N. 779 (1773-1777), and partially supported by XVI, N. 1844 and N. 1847 (1776--1778). In XV, N. 812 (1769-1778), spirit is called "interior life." Following XV, N. 817 (1769-1778) spirit moves and vivifies the mind: this means that "it puts the mind's powers in a free play." 40 Spirit is the secret source of life (XV, N. 831, 1773-1778), and it awakens the mental powers (XVI, N. 1880, 1776-1778). Now, this vivification happens through ideas 41 (XV, N. 942, 1772-1778). Such ideas must not necessarily be known, they m a y only be conjectural (vermuthet). But a spirit is original only when these ideas vivify through their novelty and originality (durch das Neue und eigenthi~mliche), as we find in XV, N. 943 (1776-1778). Original spirit is a principle of vivification enabling us to do such things as cannot be performed either through diligence or through imitation (XV, N. 932, 1776-1778). Spirit vivifies sensibility through an idea; but this idea must first of all vivify the intellect (XV, N. 933, 1772-1778). Spirit is an interior principle of vivification of thoughts, or of all talents; it begins a new course of t h i n k ing (eine neue Reihe der Gedanken) ; it is original, spontaneous vivification, not derived from anything (XV, N. 934, 1772-1778). In the last contexts, spirit is equated with genius, as, in the same vivifying function, in XVI, N. 1894 (17751778) ; genius is an interior principium vitale of knowledge, insists XVI, N. 1900 (1776-1779). w Attempting now to draw some conclusions about the function of spirit, we m a y suggest t h a t there is a more general sense of spirit, following which spirit is defined as the vivification of mind (intellect plus sensibility) through an idea (concept a priori, universal rule). Spirit is then used in two more restricted senses. In a first sense, as pertaining to talent (and as talent is distinguished from genius), it vivifies some object through a previously given idea; in this sense it is vivifying and it m a y be, up to a certain point, new, as talent is a power productive of something new (or of a new device) but following apprehended rules (see w167and 4). B u t spirit is not, in this sense, original. This first more restricted sense of spirit is, in an explicit form, only poorly represented in the material under consideration, and its more particular physiognomy is only inferred, in our need for clarification, from other elements as examined in w1674, and 7. In a second restricted sense, much more widely represented, spirit, as a not 40This free play, as a unification, must not be confused with the play of wit, explains XV, N. 819 (1759-1778). This may perhaps be connected with XV, N. 943 (1775-1778): "Es kan uns etwas zur Belebung Anlass geben, ohne ein belebend principium zu seyn z. E. blosse Bilder, welche die Imagination in Zug bringen." But this may be a third, purely sensible kind of play (whereas wit has to do with concepts too) : "Empfindungen bewegen, ideen beleben aus einem principio, weil sie einen allgemeinen Grund der th~tigheit bey sich fiihren" (XV, N. 945, 1775-1778); "Geist (genie): Belebung durch I d e e . . . Belebung durch associirte Empfindung ist anderes als durch ein allgemein Principium der association vieler Empfindungen" (XVI, N. 1894, 1775-1778). 41 In this phase Kant frequently identifies ideas and concepts a priori.

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only spontaneous but also original spirit, is a synonym of genius, or an element of it. Such an original spirit is a creator of new ideas. Yet, in the pertinent contexts, spirit as an element of genius is more generally restricted to its vivifying function, whereas the properly creative element is more frequently called genius (as a constellation of powers), and not spirit. Only in a few Reflexionen is spirit completely identified with genius. w In fact, "genius consists in originality of idea in the production of an object" (XV, N. 812, 1769-1778) ; "it must contain a creative force" (XV, N. 921a, 17751778) ; "originality of spirit is genius. Talent vivifying the mind is spirit" (XV, N. 926, 1776--1778) ; genius gives birth to something as a woman gives birth to a child (XV, N. 936, 1772-1778); genius is a power for original production (XV, N. 1821, 1769-1775), and it creates architectonically (XV, N. 1847, 1776-1778) ; now, architectonic intelligence is a creative spirit (XV, N. 1815, 1770-1777). As we saw in w genius is generally defined as a peculiar or original spirit, not as spirit in general. Only in few places spirit is identified with genius, but still as a peculiar (eigenti~mlich) spirit. On this occasion, Kant calls spirit "a new word" (XV, N. 932, 1776-1778). As a synonym of genius, spirit must be used without an article ("Man sagt nicht: der Geist, sondern: Geist schlechtin") and without attributes, because a more restricted kind of spirit is not genius, or a general vivification of all talents, but only a particular talent (besonder, which is not the same as eige~ti~mlich or peculiar. Peculiar means original. See XV, N. 933 and N. 934, 1772-1778).42 Such views seem to support our explanatory thesis, which in turn accounts for the waverings in terminology and classification of genius, spirit, and talent, as seen in w Another distinction shall be mentioned: that between spirit and wit. Wit is related to spirit, but spirit is something more, something unfathomable (das Unbeschreibliche), which in turn is not yet genius (1775-1776).43 Following XV, N. 819 (1769-1778), spirit and wit are different things, the first vivifies, the second plays. 44 The same view is supported by XV, N. 943, 1775-1778. 45 Spirit is called by the French gdnie, because the word "spirit" (esprit) means ]or them "wit" (XV, N. 944, 1776-1778). For a better understanding of this point it would be necessary to inquire about the function of wit. Extensive research on this subieet that will be published elsewhere yielded a general conclusion, which may be summarized as follows. In this phase of Kant's thought, wit is an intermediate power between sensibility and intellect, whose function is to discover similarities in both sensible representations and concepts, through a process called comparison (Vergleichung). Now, as for its concept-unifying function, in which it is analogous to spirit, it differs from spirit, because wit brings about the foresaid unification by comparing given particular notions .and reaching a more general concept abstracted from 4~The same in XV, 938. The reason for this position shall be given in w 43Schlapp, op. cir., p. 127. 44See footnote 40. ,6 "Ein bon mot kann witz oder Geist haben. Der Geist ist ernsthaft, aber der Witz spasst."

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their common traits (proceeding from the parts to the whole). Such general concepts are only as valid as their more particular components are, and they may be, if these are empirical concepts, empirical or inductive universals. Spirit does not abstract, from a given material, something already implicit in it, but brings to it something new, which, in original spirit, is a new idea or universal concept a priori, proceeding from the whole to the parts. We must turn now to the consideration of the connection between idea and original spirit (or genius). w Genius is often connected with the notion of idea (See Xu N. 765, N. 765, N. 812, N. 934, N. 941, XVI, N. 1849). Not only genius has to do with idea, but Judgment too. 46 As XV, N. 841 (1776-1778) states, spirit concerns the greatness (Gr~sse, viel Idee), Judgment the regularity (Regelm~issigkeit) of an idea. More precisely, as we find in Xu N. 817 (1769-1778), Judgment establishes a connection between a representation of a particular thing and an idea, so that the figure (Gestalt) of that thing does not contrast with its idea; whereas spirit puts the mind into motion, and reaches an idea. From what we already know, we must understand this distinction as follows: Judgment relates a thing to an already given idea, spirit creates originally a new idea (but not everything new is an idea: it may only be a device. See XV, N. 969, 1776-1778). Genius is not conditioned by idea only: there may be a genius in the execution (Aus~bung), which does not renew the content (or idea), but the way of performing it (Manier) : this is a virtuoso (XV, N. 812, 1769-1778).4~ An idea (called also Einsicht) produced by genius must be easily perceivable (]asslich), and must be easy to communicate and to make understood (verst6ndlich gemacht); otherwise genius is fanatical (schw~irmt), as XV, N. 899 (17761778) relates. Fanaticism, following XV, N. 921 (1775-1778), extends its idea beyond any possible experience. A true genius must subject the connection between its product and the leading idea to the proof of intellect and reason, with the exception of the artists, whose purpose is only to divert (XV, N. 921a, 17751778). Now, what is the function of an idea in mind? This is a very broad question, which cannot be answered in connection with genius only. We know from Xu N. 921a, that, in poetry at least, an idea unifies the play of sentiments and images. More generally, XV, N. 932 (1776-1778) states that what vivifies in spirit is a certain universal conceived by the mind before any particular, and informing its products. Following XV, N. 945 (1776-1778), an idea is the unity of concept as a principle for determining a multiplicity in the intuition corresponding to this concept, so that every part is related to every other part, as in an animal body; it is not a composition or association of multiplicity, but a production of it through an idea, so that in any part the whole is present. In XV, N. 933 we find that a great idea (vieI Idee) is a unity under several rules; it must be a system, not an 46As we shall see later (w the idea to which Judgment refers is not necessarily the same as an idea of genius (spiritual ideal) : it may also be aa empirical ideal. 47On the relationship between Manier and originality in Talent, see w

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aggregate. An idea is expressed though a sensible multiplicity which is v e r y unified; but every single product (or expression) of t h a t idea moves (or vivifies) only in its connection with such an idea, which goes, in its productivity, far bey o n d any particular product. 4s An idea must first vivify intellect and t h e n sensibility. Philosophy is a true home for ideas; ideas are capital in art too. T h e y are not to be found in mathematics, except when a new method is introduced (XV, :N. 943, 1776-1778). XV, N. 918 (1776-1778) makes a distinction between empirical and spiritual ideas, and XVI, N. 2835 (1776-1777) contains a long examination of the function of idea, in which genius is mentioned. B o t h texts can be explained only in a wider context. w I t is impossible to take into consideration in this place all materials pertinent to the notion of "idea" in Kant's Nachlass and Kolleghe]te. We can only summarize in a simplified way some general results of an examination of the foresaid materials (implying also XV, N. 918 and XVI, N. 2835), which will be published elsewhere. God, principle of all things, thinks an intelligible world (mundus archetypus) whose elements are called ideas. This archetypal world is a condition of the possibility of the existing phenomenal world (mundus echtypus). Empirical objects, elements of this phenomenal world, originate as a limitation of their archetypal counterparts. In the human mind two kinds of ideas are to be found: (1) those t h a t cannot be intuited or perceived in concreto (called comparative a r c h e t y p a ) , which are the correspondents to the archetypal ideas of God, (2) those t h a t can be intuited in concreto (called frequently ideals instead of ideas), which are a depauperated version of at least some of the archetypa. Ideas in general are a principle of unity and ordinance of the empirical multiplicity, but as a totality preceding its parts, and generating them through a limitation. This precedence is not (or is not necessarily) temporal, but m e t a p h y s ical: i.e., it is impossible to justify the peculiar structure of the parts without referring them to each other and to the whole; their whole is a t o t a l i t y or a system, and not an aggregate or a whole composed by the simple conjunction of metaphysically self-sufficient parts. Ideals are either (1) empirical, divided into (a) sensible, (b) intellectual; or (2) spiritual, divided also into (a) sensible, (b) intellectual. Empirical ideals are universal principles underlying every empirical object, as a completion of the synthesis of the unlimited sensible world or its transcen48 It seems to be clear enough, from this passage, that "vivification," generally considered as a character of creative genius (i.e., of a great artist or scientist), is also transmitted to everybody who is in the position to contemplate or understand its products or creations. The observer is led, by the peculiar structure of this product, beyond the product's particularity, to a universal idea. Only a perception of genius vivifies sympathetically one's interior, states XV, N. 943; and this happens by going back to the idea (underlying a single product); it is not necessary to know the idea; it is sufficient to suppose (vermuten) one. This reference of a single genial product to a much greater idea makes plain why Kant considers spirit as something giving "much to think about" (viel zu denken), as in XV, N. 958, 1776-1778.

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dental u n i t y (they seem to be the principal gnoseotogieal elements underlying the structure of a n y object). Spiritual ideals are, on the contrary, a creation a u t o n o m o u s f r o m the empirical world, representing an example o] perfection which cannot be found in it, relating an object to its essential end (to w h a t it should be). T h e y enable us to judge objects in this respect, and to produce objects (representations, actions, things) more conforming to such spiritual ideals. 49 Ideals in general m a y be (1) speculative, (2) aesthetic, (3) pragmatic. Now, ideas ~~ pertinent to genius or to original spirit seem to be one and the same thing with spiritual ideals9 I n fact such ideas m u s t be new and original (XV, N. 812 and IN. 943). This implies t h a t some other ideas are not; these could be spiritual ideals which were already known before, but t h e y m i g h t also be empirical ideals. B u t it is v e r y likely t h a t some products of genius are not spiritual ideals, but ideas which are possible only in abstracto: actually genius is often related to philosophy (as we shall see l a t e r ) ; and sometimes m e t a p h y s i c a l concepts and moral ideas are said to be pure, i.e., not realizable in concreto: see X V I I I , IN. 4983, 1776-1778. Ethics has no exemplar but examples ( X V I , N. 1869, 1776As we shall see later, genial ideas m a y be either speculative (philosophical, bearing on m a t h e m a t i c a l method, etc.), or aesthetic (pertaining to b e a u t y ) . w We m u s t now refer again to a context wider t h a n this article, in order to explain another feature of genial creation. A spiritual ideal (i.e., an original idea which m a y be intuited in concreto) constitutes, as an i m a g i n a r y representation in concreto, a prototype (Urbild); an object realizing as exactly as possible such a prototype is an exemplar (Muster, Sinnbild). Rules are not ideas: and a concrete realization of a rule is an example E x e m p l a r s cannot be, properly speaking, imitated; being unique realizations of an idea, which determines completely their content, t h e y cannot be employed to produce something "in the same w a y b u t with a new content" (as the definition of imitation runs, see w ; but exemplars can be copied through diligenceY 49 Sensible empirical ideals seem to be identifiable with the general laws of sensibility and aesthetic rules (of taste), which do not imply any concept. Intellectual empirical ideas are probably the transcendental concepts a priori. Sensible spiritual ideas are apparently the same as aesthetic ideas in genial fine art (which is a simple play of sentiments and images ruled by an idea), i.e., the aesthetically perfect representation of the species to which the object pertains (see w as in XV, N. 921a. Intellectual spiritual ideals, then, should be meant as original philosophical or scientific ideas, as we shall discuss in w167and 19. The place of technical and ethical ideas, in respect to this partition, is not clear. See also w167 19, and footnotes 98 and 99. 50 Only in XV N 932 and in Schlapp, op eit, pp 165-166 is the term ideal used in connection w~th genres, instead of ~dea. Anyway, Kant frequently calls idea what corresponds in fact to his definition of ideal. ~1 "Die Ktinste des Fleisses erkennen ein Muster und bedtirfen es," XV, N. 812, 1769-1778. Talent (imitation), on the contrary, is free from an exemplar: see XV, 922 (i.e., it follows rules determining the way of doing something, but not the exact content of this thing, which is new, if not genially original--see w

(Beispiel) .

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On the contrary, examples seem to be, as instances of a r u l e (or of the " w a y of producing a thing"), leaders of imitation (and therefore pertinent to talent).52 I t is clear t h a t products of genius, in so far as t h e y are the realization i n c o n c r e t o of an original idea, are one and the same thing as exemplars: genius i s an exemplar for rules. 5a, 54 But, as we shall see soon, genius does not f o l l o w a previous exemplar. Now, i n b e a u t y , both exemplar and example are principles of criticism and judgment: the exemplar, being the m o s t excellent realization of a certain idea, serves as a t e r m of comparison for the degree of excellence in realization of another (new) idea, the example, as a t e r m of comparison for estimating adherence of the new product to the (old) general aesthetic rule. Being referred to b e a u t y , both exemplar and example are referred to taste; m o r e exactly the exemplar conCerns Judgment, the example concerns taste. I n connection with genius, XV, N. 812 (1769-1778) states t h a t genial a r t is creative, i.e., it does not reproduce an exemplar as diligence does, but it proceeds from an idea. However, in a broader sense (referring not only to artistic products of genius, but to science too) it is said that, if a product of genius cannot determine a new genial product, it is useful in "developing or awakening genius." 55 E x a m p l e s also are not sufficient, of course, in determining a genial product in the wider sense; but, as talent (or imitation) leads to genius (w the same is said of examples. 56 w I n connection with this point, it will be useful to t a k e into consideration the relationship of genius with r u l e s . T h e t e r m "rule" is not used b y K a n t , in this phase, in a thoroughly consistent way. Generally, however, a distinction can be m a d e between a rule and a law. A rule is more frequently an empirical universal obtained b y comparison (see w whereas a law is always a true universal deduced a p r i o r i (an idea).5~ I m i t a t i v e talent is led b y rules, and it m a y , with their help, d i s c o v e r m a n y things, but not a new method. 5s, 59 I m i t a t i v e talent, however, is not just a slavish following of rules; it is something more. T h e pure following of rules is called 6~Talent thus does not follow an exemplar or an original idea; actually we know that talent does not concern original ideas or spiritual ideals. This does not prevent talent from conforming itself to an empirical ideal (see w In fact, as we saw in w Judgment, in talent, relates a product to a given (i.e., not original) idea. See footnote 29. 6a Sehlapp, op. cir., p. 128. . . . . 6~Here rules are related to an exemplar. Actually, m some contexts, the dzstmctmn between ideas (laws) and rules is not kept, and rules seem to be connected with universals a priori. This probably derives from the fact that sometimes, in this period, the judgment of taste is considered a priori. In XV, N. 759 (1772) it is said that "die Natur im genie Stoff und Beyspiel zu Regeln giebt." Here example means more precisely "exemplar." In XVI, N. 1821, genius is called "Ursprung der Regel." 55 "Das Genie wird entwickelt durch Vorlegung von producten desselben": XV, N. 922, 1775-1778. ~ "Aueh Beyspiele naehzuahmen fat der Leitfaden vor das genie. Aber nieht den Buehstaben und das PersShnliche, sondern den Geist derselben" XV, N. 778, 1772-1773. b7See footnote 54. 58Schlapp, op. cir., pp. 125-126. ~gThis zs clearly the spontaneous but not genial talent, as we saw in w

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mechanism (which seems to be better related to diligence, s~ as stated in XV, N. 924, 1776-177861 and in Schlapp62). As talent (which is often a spontaneous or partially original medium between diligence and genius) as a mechanism is sometimes equated to diligence, and as a free talent to genius, it is difficult to say to what kind of t a l e n t XV, N. 923 (1776-1778) refers, which states t h a t talent must follow the rules, with exception of empirical rules, s~ in which case talent gives to itself rules through its products. Both "spontaneous talent" and talent-genius (as in the following case) could be meant. Actually in XV, N. 922, where mechanical talent (equated here to diligence) is opposed to free talent (equated here to genius), talent is said to be founded on mechanical rules; but rules are not enough to produce an object, and genius is needed: talent (as genius) must also be free from rules. Genius must be aware (inne werden) of rules, but not learn (lernen) them, and it must be free to conform itself to them. Freedom of talent must not be a lack of rule, but a spontaneous accord with rules which have not been imposed in advance. The same theme, now more clearly related to genius, recurs in XV, N. 778 (1772-1773), where it is said t h a t new discoveries never are a break with the past and that genius must imitate "the great Masters" before it can become original; the law of continuity is employed in support of this thesis. Genius may, states XV, N. 672 (1772-1773), depart from rules which limit spirit, but not from what is customary and casual; otherwise it might become irregular (Ragellos). The more original side of genius is exclusively stressed in other places: genius is superior to rules and gives laws (XV, N. 812, 1778-1779)64; genius is the origin of rules (XVI, N. 1821, 1769-1776)65; genius creates without imitation, without teaching, without rule, but it must not be purely irregular (1775-1776)~6; genius is not restricted by rules, but it is an exemplar for them; either it follows spontaneously previous rules, or it must invent some new ones27, 68
w The relationship between genius and rules is a source for another development of our question: the problem of ]anaticism (Schw5rmerei). Taste and Judgment must limit genius: otherwise genius approaches madness (XV, N. 812, 1769-1778). If an idea is not clear and easy to grasp (]asslich), imagination is fanatic, and its product is a pure delusion (XV, N. 899, 177680See w and footnote 22. Sometimes restricted talent is equated with copying. See Schlapp, op. cir., p. 128. 6~In XV, N. 929, Muster or exemplar seems to be related to imitation (instead of example), but it is to be kept in mind that free imitation is very near to genius and sometimes equated to it. 6~Schlapp, op. cir., p. 129. 68Nonempirical rules seem here to be the same as laws. 64Such laws seem to be the same as original ideas: in XVIII, N. 4983, ideas (giving exemplars) are opposed to rules (giving examples). 66 In this early Refiexion there seems to be no distinction between rules and laws. 66Schlapp, op. cir., p. 62 and pp. 123-124. 67Ibid., pp. 128-129. 68See footnote 54.

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1778). A genius not respectful for continuity in the development of ideas, and not undergoing a stage of imitation of the M a s t e r s of the past, creates only fancies (XV, N. 778, 1772-1773). An enthusiastic genius (begeistertes Genie),S~ a m o n g other unpleasant qualities, is against right reason (gesunde Vernun]t), and its pretended creations vanish, as soon as the veil of m y s t i c a l words in which t h e y are enshrouded is torn a w a y (XV, N. 936, 1772-1778). F a n a t i c i s m is bent towards religion, and it melts piecemeal scraps of reason and learning into a secret language (XV, N. 897, 1776-1778). T o be a fanatic m e a n s to substitute miscellaneous intuitions for an orderly reflectionT~ a fanatic is incomprehensible, lacks evidence (Deutlichkeit), and he neither entertains concepts (as a scientific genius does), nor images (Bilder; as a genial artist does), but passions (Gemiithsbewegungen) ; he m a y have sensibility and spirit, even some taste, but no J u d g m e n t ; he likes mysticism (XV, N. 771, 1772-1775). Elsewhere we meet a more differentiated t y p o l o g y of fanaticism: a fanatic genius exaggerates his ideas: as examples, K a n t gives Rousseau, Plato, St. Pierre, Lavater. F a n a t i c i s m proceeds from the single-minded exaggeration of a central idea (Hauptidee), extended beyond the field of possible experience. F a n a t i c s m a y be v e r y intelligent (gute K6p]e), and one m a y really learn from them. T h e enthusiastic genius (das enthusiastische Genie) exaggerates actions conforming to an idea in itself true, or his practical application of such an idea (XV, N. 921, 1775-1778). B u t there seems to be also a noble kind of enthusiasm, following from an ideal. 71 But, besides fanaticism and enthusiasm, there is a third kind of unorderliness, called whim (Phantasterei), which is only a m e a n cheating. Whimsical style is a kind of secret or alchemistic language, a mixture of chemistry and theosophy, a context of e m p t y and meaningless words aiming only at the purposeful deception of the public (XV, N. 921a, 1775-1778). K a n t seems to refer to Paracelsus and p r o b a b l y Boehme, but his real t a r g e t m u s t h a v e been a m u c h nearer one, viz., Swedenborg and H a m a n n . 7e Thus, the formerly examined indiscriminate indictment of fanaticism seems to have been a t t e n u a t e d in respect to some personalities whom K a n t wished not to or dared not disavow, and only accentuated in respect to some inexcusable " b l a c k sheep." w We have seen t h a t in genius several mental powers are at work (see w I n the last article we saw t h a t J u d g m e n t and taste are essential to orderly genius. T h e most distinctive powers composing genius are four: sensibility (Empfind" 69 But, once at least, Begeisterung seems to be a positive quality of genius: see XV, N. 812. In XV, N. 951, we also find a distinction between Begeisterung and Schwgrmerei. o ~ Reflection ~ is for Kant, in this period, a term describing the function of Judgment, as opposed to "comparison" of wit. Reflection proceeds from the whole to the parts, as spirit does; only reflection does not create a (new) idea, but it judges about the connection between an object and the (given) idea of it. Judgment reflects, spirit vivifies, wit compares. n Schlapp, op. cir., p. 142. ~ Adickes suggests Herder (XV, N. 921a, note, p. 408), but there is no evidence in Kant of such an extreme contempt for Herder. Kant reprimanded Herder's exaggerations, but had a certain consideration for him, and he is more likely to be classified among the "good fanatics" of XV, N. 921. For a not very complimentary remark of Kant about Herder's genius, see XV, N. 912.

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u n g ) , J u d g m e n t ( U r t h e i l s k r a ] t ) , spirit ( G e i s t ) ,73 and t a s t e ( G e s c h m a c k ) . A c t u a l l y m a n y m o r e p o w e r s c o ~ p i r e i n the g e n i a l c r e a t i o n , b u t those a b o v e are the m o s t characteristic of genius (XV, N. 874, 1776-1778).74 As K a n t deals with the problems of genius in sections of his n o t e b o o k s a n d of his lectures which are specially d e v o t e d to the p s y c h o - e m p i r i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n of b e a u t y , sometimes the four e l e m e n t a r y powers are exclusively referred to the general headings " t h e o r y of taste," "fine art," or " b e a u t y , " 75 w i t h o u t m e n t i o n i n g genius. But, as the discussion expands v e r y f r e q u e n t l y b e y o n d the boundaries of aesthetics, a n d e m braces, in a wider t h e o r y of original creation, all of the p r o d u c t s of genius in science and technical art, it will be m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e to relate t h e m to genius, as K a n t often does when he refers t h e m to knowledge in general. TM W e a l r e a d y k n o w how spirit w o r k s (w167 As for sensibility, J u d g m e n t , and taste, an i n q u i r y a b o u t their structures goes far b e y o n d the limits of this paper. W e will therefore only s u m m a r i z e our results in t h a t field (the d o c u m e n t a t i o n shall be given in a n o t h e r w o r k ) , and relate t h e m to genius and to each o t h e r in this peculiar constellation. T h e four elements a p p e a r v e r y often t o g e t h e r in the mentioned form, whether explicitly referred to genius, or not. 77 T h e i r constellation is first m e t in 1771, 7s b u t sometimes it undergoes m i n o r variations. TM Because of their origin in the s t u d y of the t h e o r y of b e a u t y , our four elements are sometimes absorbed in the aesthetic side of knowledge, s~ and, as such, t h e y are once called "subjective f o u n d a t i o n s of p l e a s u r e " (XV, N. 873, 1776-1778), and, a t a n o t h e r time, t h e y are related to aesthetic k n o w l e d g e (aiming t o w a r d

" 73 As we already know, sensibility,.. . Judgment, and taste are elementary powers, but spirit is a more general element vivifying all powers (see w As such it is often identified with genius itself, or with the sum of the other powers plus their vivification. It must, however, be remarked that sensibility is a different kind of vivification (see w Actually, Geist vivifies through concepts, not through sensations. Sensibility is a kind of receptive, passive vivification, whereas spirit is spontaneous. Sensibility seems to be equated with NatureU, Fleiss (see XV, N. 934). But concepts seem to be vivifying only as connected with sensations or as seen in concrete (see w ~4XV, N. 960 (1776-1778): "[ch suche nicht die physische Ursache des genies, i.e. Einbitdungskraft-Geditehtnis, denn diese stehen nieht in unserer Gewalt, sondern die leitende Kr~fte, welche den Natiirlichen richtung geben, also blos das formale principium." See: Schlapp, op. cir., p. 59 (1771); XV, N. 779 (1772-1777), N. 916 (1775-1778) and N. 958 (1775-1778); XVI, N. 1815 (1771-1775), N. 1825 (1772-1775), and 1857 (1776-1778). ~8 See SchlauD. om cir., ~). 75 (1772) where genius is not mentioned, but the four powers seem to be referred ~t~)'know!edge in general. The,same in XVI, N. 1834 (1,7,72-1.778), where "Aesthetic" means not only pertinent to beauty but, more generally, pertinent to the sensible or intuitive perfection of knowledge," and. in XVI, N. 1815 (1771-1775). The four powers are referred to knowledge in general, and, at the same time, to genius, in XV, N. 738 (1769-1775), where the places of spirit and genius are exchanged, in XV, N. 771 (1772-1775), N. 812 (17691778), N. 817 (1769-1778), and in XVI, N. 1894. ~7See Schlapp, pp. 59, 75; XV, N. 752, 779, 806, 812, 817, 858, 873, 874, 916, 958, 977; XVI, N. 1834, 1844, 1845, 1846, 1847. 7s Schlapp, op. cir. p. 59. 79 In XV, 738 (1769-1775), spirit takes the place of genius as a more general element, and comprehends (1) genius, (2) taste, (3) right reason [an equivalent of Judgment]. Sensibility is not mentioned here, as in XV, N. 812 (1769-1778). In XV, N. 817 (1769-1778), genius comprehends (1) spirit, (2) Judgment, (3) sensibility, and is connected to, but on the same footing with, taste. In XV, N. 815, an "architectonic intelligence" (architechtonische kopf,, i.e., genius--see w167 and 7 for architectonic related to genius) comprehends (1) spirit, (2) expermnce [= sensibility], (3) reason [ = Judgment], (4) taste. XVI, N. 1902 (1778-1779) contains a still more irregular constellation. 80 Aesthetic perfection of knowledge is not only referred to fine art but, more generally, to the sensible distinctness or evidence of knowledge in general. See Tonelli, op. cir., pp. 167185, 221, 304.

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truth) and are termed "subjective" as opposed to the objectivity of intellect and intuition (Anschauung; XVI, N. 1834, 1772-1778). sl Referring to them probably as a whole, or in their proportion, XV, N. 874 (1776-1778) says t h a t they cannot be taught. w We shall now proceed to expose the results of our research on the four elements. The structure of three of t h e m (sensibility, Judgment, and taste), cannot be defined within the context of theory of genius only. T h e y are the object of very long discussions by Kant, which we shall not relate, taking here into consideration only what their structure is when they are referred to as members of the four-power constellation. Sensibility concerns the sensible content, vivifies the senses, gives much to feeling, excites and moves (Reiz und Ri~hrung), corresponds to the peculiarity of the sensible content (of a representation, or of a product), and it is productive (brings something new into the sensible field). Judgment concerns the intellectual ]orm o] the ]oresaid sensations, i.e., it unifies, orders or harmonizes them, limiting their p l a y within themselves and in connection with the idea or concept of the corresponding object, in so far as the universality of this concept is concerned; t h a t is, it refers representation to its essential end; but it does not produce anything, it only limits genius. Spirit concerns the intellectual content, i.e., it vivifies the intellect, gives much to think about, concerns (as we know from w167 the originality of ideas, viz., the subjectivity of intellectual laws or the peculiarity of concepts, and it is productive, s2 Taste concerns the sensible/orm o] the ]vresaid ideas, i.e., it limits and orders them through sensibility, rendering sensibly universal (-- evident) those subjective notions (Privatdenken), through the proportion, symmetry, and h a r m o n y of their sensible form; it limits genius, and does not produce anything. Now, how do our four powers practically work together? Only XV, N. 817 allows us a glimpse into the actual process; unfortunately, the structure of the four powers is on this occasion somewhat anomalous, s~ Anyway, the process runs as follows: " . . . Judgment determines the idea of what a thing ought to be. The figure, in which such a thing appears, must not contrast with the idea. Thus, Judgment bounds and limits the play of sensibility, but it gives a true u n i t y to it and reinforces in this way the impression. The mind is interested b y emotions, it is put into motion and action by spirit, goes through the multiplicity, reaches an idea, comes back again, and proportions t h a t multiplicity in its (the multiplicity's) choice and relationships, both in connection with that idea and with itself 81Of course we know that a nonfanatic genius produces not only works of art, but valuable knowledge too, especially in respect to the method of obtaining knowledge. But we are not able to say, at the present time, whether such genial elements in valuable knowledge are generally considered by Kant as subjective.Although it is sure that at least some uses of Judgment, outside genius, are considered by Kant objective, about 1779, even taste, generally considered as subjective, seems to become, at least in some respect, objective. In XV, N. 976 (1776-1778), Judgment is identified with analysis, spirit with synthesis. s~ See footnote 79.

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(i.e., referring to the relationship of the elements of the multiplicity to each other). The last is taste, which is nothing but a judgment of the measure of the impressions, as far as this measure has the use of moving in a proportioned w a y the whole receptivity of the soul, i.e., without infringing it with inconsistencies . . . . ,, 84 Before we attempt an inferential clarification of this process, we shall introduce a survey of the different fields in which it takes place, i.e., of the different kinds of genial creation. w K a n t establishes a distinction between products of art and products of genius. Art consists in giving a certain disposition to things (XV, hi. 331, 17731778), and this requires an exemplar which one must reproduce through diligence, conforming to given rules; it is, properly speaking, oaly a work (XV, hi. 812, 1769-1778) ; it is like a methodically and regularly disposed garden (XV, l~l. 754, 1772). Some arts are only this, as crafts (Handwerke) which cannot be connected with spirit (geistesleer). B u t other arts m a y be connected with spirit (geistesfiihig) although actually they are not always (XV, hi. 958 and N. 974, 1776-1778). Genius, as opposed to nongenial art, is invention (dichten, XV, hi. 331) ; it is talent and spirit, freedom (XV, N. 812) ; it is like a wood produced by free and fertile nature (XV, N. 754). In one place two kinds of genius are distinguished: of ideas or invention, and of execution or manner (virtuosi, XV, N. 812). But, in another, genius and virtuosity seem to be different things (XV, N. 927). Genius is directed toward (1) arts of genius, (2) sciences of genius (XV, hi. 812). 85 Genius is termed "a power for producing originally perfection in knowledge," and this perfection m a y be either aesthetic (consisting in novelty, facility, liveliness, breadth), or logical (consisting in truth, universality, p u r i t y - XVI, N. 1821, 1769-1775).8s Art of genius is a pure play of sentiments and images, unified through an idea as in poetry or in fictional literature (XV, hi. 921a, 1775-1778). Arts of genius m a y be music, painting, architecture, gardening, but especially p o e t r y (XV, hi. 812). Rhetoric seems to be pertinent to genius, but it is more subjected to rules than poetry (XV, N. 922, 1775-1778). As an example of poetic genius, Milton is mentioned (XV, N. 778, 1772-1773). s~ "Die Urtheilskraft bestimmt die Idee, was eigentlich eine Sache seyn soll. Die Gestalt, wie sie erscheint, muss der Idee nicht wiederstreiten. Die Urtheilskraft bindet also und schr~inkt das Spiel der Sinntichkeit ein, aber sie giebt ihm wahre ]~inheit und verstiirkt dadurch den Eindruck. Das Germfith wird dureh rfihrungen interessiert, durch Geist in Bewegung und action versetzt, l~uft das Mannigfaltige durch, geht bis zur Idee, yon da wieder zuriik und oroportioniert es in seiner Wahl und Verh~ltnissen nach derselben und unter einander. Das Letztere ist Geschmak, welches nichts anderes ist als das Urtheil fiber das Maas der Eindrficke, in so fern es dazu dient, die gantze Empfindsamkeit der Seele proportionirt zu riihren, d.i. ihr durch keine wiedersprfiche irgendwo abbruch zu thun." 8~See also Schlapp, op. cir., p. 62. 86Aesthetic ~enius is not exclusively oloerative in fine arts and poetry, and logical genius not exclusively~n science. As it appears from other contexts, there is a kind of genial beauty which refers to an intellectually defined idea (wesentliche SchOnheit), although beauty is more generally a simple play to which the idea gives unity, but in which it has no intelIectual function. And genial science is not only philosophy, which cannot be demonstrated in concreto or aesthetically, but also cosmology (which probably may be at least partially endowed with sensible evidence), or a new mathematical method (which certainly may be proved intuitively).

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w Genius, as related to science, aims at an augmentation of knowledge, of intellect and reason (XV, N. 921a). In all sciences, especially of reason, it is necessary, first of all, to invent architecturally the general idea, or the whole; and this is a task for genius. Examples of such leading ideas are "humanity," "republic," "the best world," "justice" (XVI, N. 2835, 1769-1777). This ability to invent which one cannot be taught consists in the m e t h o d of a science, s7 In mathematics there are no ideas, except the invention of a new mathematical method (XV, N. 943, 1772-1778, and N. 812); mathematics is the field of concepts made intuitive, not of ideas; it does not proceed from whole to parts, but from universal to particular (XV, N. 943). Mathematics may be taught, ss Cosmology seems to be directed by genius, as its inventions seem to be something more than imitation, although imitation is a necessary step to reach them. Kant mentions in this connection Newton and Kepler (XV, N. 778). As we already know, some minor inventions in the fields of natural science are not the fruit of genius, but of talent only (XV, N. 969). Philosophy is the science of genius par excellence: everything in it is pertinent to an idea (XVI, N. 2835). It cannot be taught. 89 It is impossible to teach philosophy, only to philosophize2 ~ Nevertheless, philosophical ideas are not vivifying; only ideas in nature and art are (XV, N. 943). In order to understand this point, we must remember that metaphysical and ethical ideas are possible only in abstracto, i.e., they are spiritual ideas but not spiritual ideals91; therefore, they cannot be connected with sensibility; they lack vivification both as it is found in sensibility (emotion) and as in taste (evidence) ; and, as spirit seems to be vivifying only as a general vivification of all talents, ideas cannot vivify. As it appears, philosophy, "the true land of ideas," seems to be emphatically sponsored as a science of m e t h o d . It must be remarked that Kant uses the terms "invention" and "discovery" as equivalents in connection with genial ideas. w We must, then, try to figure out how the process described in w works in at least two different realms: genial art (of beauty) and genial science. In genial art (of beauty), apparently the process is started by the passive vivification of sensibility, i.e., by excitement (or grace, R e i z ) and emotion ( R i i h r u n g ) , notions closely related to those of life and vividness, which in turn correspond to the clearness of a representation, or to the multiplicity of its characters, and to a more elementary order in such characters, which makes them easier to grasp (]asslich) ~ in a quite subjective or private way. So, a certain representation (of a real or imaginary object) is endowed with a peculiarly stimulating physiognomy, catching the attention and putting the mind into motion. The next step consists in relating the sensible content of this representation to 87Schlapp, op. cir., p. 125. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid., p. 62. ,o Ibid., p. 125. '~ See w and Schlapp, op. cir., p. 172. ,2 Cf. ToneUi, op. cir., pp. 169-170, 180-182 and 216.

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a c o n c e p t o r to a u n i v e r s a l i n t e l l e c t u a l ]orm. T h i s is d o n e b y J u d g m e n t , w h i c h r e f e r s t h e f o r e s a i d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o a n i d e a , t o i t s e s s e n t i a l end, to w h a t t h e t h i n g o u g h t t o be. T h i s p r a c t i c a l l y h a p p e n s (1) b y e s t a b l i s h i n g w h a t k i n d of t h i n g t h e f o r e s a i d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is i n t e n d e d t o m e a n , t h a t is, b y r e l a t i n g t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to t h e a l r e a d y g i v e n idea o / a species of objects93; (2) b y m a k i n g such a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n c o n f o r m t o t h e i d e a l of t h e t h i n g i t s h o u l d r e p r e s e n t , r u l i n g o u t a n y superfluous c h a r a c t e r s c o n t r a s t i n g w i t h t h e e x e m p l a r 2 4 T h e t h i r d s t e p consists in w o r k i n g o u t a n e w p a r t i c u l a r i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n t e n t for t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , o r in p r o d u c i n g a n e w idea. A l l a e s t h e t i c i d e a s , i n c l u d i n g t h o s e o p e r a t i n g in J u d g m e n t , w e r e once p r o d u c e d b y genius, a s w e r e t h e e x e m p l a r s t a t u e s of t h e g r e a t a n c i e n t s c u l p t o r s , w h i c h l a t e r b e c a m e t e r m s of J u d g m e n t . 95 B u t o r i g i n a l i t y of spirit, or genius, consists in r e a c h i n g a n e w i d e a , b e y o n d t h e f o r m e r e x e m p l a r s . W e can i m a g i n e t h a t t h i s h a p p e n s , in f i g u r a t i v e a r t , e i t h e r b y a f u r t h e r s p e c i f i c a t i o n of t h e e x e m p l a r (e.g., b y e s t a b l i s h i n g n o t o n l y w h a t a m a l e b o d y m u s t l o o k l i k e in g e n e r a l , b u t w h a t i t m u s t l o o k l i k e u n d e r s p e c i a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s ) , or b y c o m b i n i n g s e v e r a l f o r m e r i d e a l s i n t o a n e w s u p e r i o r w h o I e ( w h i c h m a y i n c l u d e a t t h e s a m e t i m e a f u r t h e r s p e c i f i c a t i o n of t h e i d e a l - e l e m e n t s , as t h e n e w w h o l e m a y be c o n s i d e r e d a s p e c i a l c i r c u m s t a n c e i n t o w h i c h t h e y e n t e r ) .96 w T h e f o u r t h a n d l a s t step r e s p o n d s to t h e n e e d of c o m m u n i c a t i n g such a n e w i d e a l . I d e a l s a r e s u b j e c t i v e or p r i v a t e i n t e l l e c t u a l c r e a t i o n s , a n d as such ~6 Cf. x v , N. 819. XVIII, N. 5533 (1775-1779) : "Wir haben eine empirische idee der SehSnheit eines Menschen und eines Pferdes; sonst wiirden wir nicht sagen kSnnen, was jedem fehlt." Schlapp, op. cit., pp. 165-166: "Die grSsste SchSnheit des KSrpers setzen wir in eine in uns liegende Idee, des Mittel zwischen Festigkeit und Magerheit. Eine solehe Proportion haben 'die Alton' bei den Statuen des Baehus und Apolls beobachtet . . . Es client dieses Ideal dennoeh zur Beurteilung. Ein jeder Mensch yon Genie hat ein so]ches Ideal . . . . " Ibid., pp. 201-202: "Eine Idee muss bei jeder Sache zugrunde liegen. Wir kSnnen eine Sache nicht eher fiir schSn halten,.als bis wir wissen, was es ffir eine Sache sei, und was da schSn sein soll. Denn eine Sache kann m verschiedenen Verhaltnissen schSn und such nicht schSn sein. So kann man z. E. nicht urteilen ob ein gemaltes Gesicht schSn sei, wenn man noeh nicht weisst, ob es eine Manns--oder Weibesperson sein soll . . . . Ich muss also wissen, wozu die Sache bestimmt ist, ehe ich urteile. Man muss allemal die Idee der Sache zum voraus setzen." This idea is "yon vielen Dingen zusammengenommen abgeleitet und gleichsam das Mittlere yon allen Excessen und Defecten vieler specierum. Das Muster der SchSnheit liegt also in dem Mittleren der Species." But this idea is a creature of intellect, it has not been abstracted from experience (see XV, N. 961, 1776-1778). 94 This is, of course, not the only function of Judgment; but the only one specifically aesthetic. The aesthetic four-step process in general may or must be supplemented by other nonspecifically aesthetic functions. For instance, wit is often related to some aspects of beauty. ,6 See footnote 86. 96 It is not strictly necessary to think of the operation of spirit as posterior to the operation of Judgment. Kant might also mean that, at least on some occasions, first spirit creates a new idea, then Judgment conforms sensible vividness to it. Of course, even if things are imagined to occur in the order (1) sensibility, (2) Judgment following a given idea, (3) creation of a new idea, a new idea requires a further adaptation of the sensible material to it, and this must be referred not only to sensible form (given, as we shall see, by taste), but also to sensible content. Now, it is not always clear whether the last operation is performed by a new intervention of Judgment, or by taste itself (which seems to be chiefly referred to sensible form). Anyway, Kant generally enumerates the four powers in the order: (1) sensibility, (2) Judgment, (3) spirit, (4) taste. Judging from XV, N. 817 (see w it is probably taste which conforms senmbility to a new idea in every respect. Before 1770, K a n t excluded Reiz and Ri~hrung from the judgment of taste (Tonelli, op. cit., pp. 180-181), but in the phase 1770-1780 there are waverings on this point.

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t h e y c a n n o t be m a d e universal (or u n i v e r s a l l y acceptable) in a p u r e l y intellect u a l (or in abstracto) form. T h e y m a y become universal (or become given ideas, exemplars) o n l y in a sensible way. :Now, t a s t e has the f u n c t i o n of giving the idea a corresponding universal sensible form. I n order to u n d e r s t a n d this point, we m u s t m a k e clear w h a t the function of t a s t e in general is. T a s t e chiefly refers to the universal f o r m of sensibility, t h a t is, to sensible distinctness or evidence, realized in s y m m e t r y , proportion, a n d h a r m o n y either of a sensible r e p r e s e n t a tion or of an existing object. Such f o r m a l c h a r a c t e r s of a sensible t h i n g m a k e it possible for this t h i n g to be intuited b y e v e r y b o d y in a c o g e n t l y u n i f o r m w a y (sensible u n i v e r s a l i t y of Anschauung), a n d are s h a r p l y differentiated f r o m t h e sensible c o n t e n t of the t h i n g (i.e., Reiz and Ri~hrung), which is experienced b y different m e n in a subjective or n o n u n i f o r m w a y 2 7 Now, this concretization of an intellectually subjective idea in a sensibly u n i versal f o r m 9s seems to be sufficient to render it a universal ideal or idea in concreto (see w or an exemplar (see w As an example of the whole f o u r - s t e p process, as r e l a t e d to painting, we m a y refer to X V , N. 916 (1775-1778), where, a f t e r m a n y hesitations, K a n t a t t r i b u t e s to sensibility the element of expression (Ausdruck), to J u d g m e n t drawing (Zeichhung), to spirit composition (Composition), a n d to t a s t e color ( Colorit). A c t u ally, color is generally considered b y K a n t to be a p u r e l y sensible element (Reiz): in fact, in other places, s y m m e t r y , balance, h a r m o n y , b u t n o t color, are referred to taste. 1~176 97 See Tonelli, op. cir., pp. 165-166, 170-172, 183, 221,246, 250-251,262-263, 294-298. 98 The universality of taste is (with some exceptions) considered by Kant to be subjective too; but it is a universal subjectivity, whereas the subjectivity toni court of both sensibility and spirit is only personal or private. ~ XV, N. 625 (not. ,, after 1769) may probably be interpreted" as an early formulation of the four,step process. Bey allem, was nach Geschmak Gebilligt werden soll, muss einiges seyn, was die Unterscheidung des Manigfaltigen erleichtert (absteehung); einiges, was die Begreiflichkeit befordert (Verh~ltnisse, proportionen); einiges, was die Zusemmennehmung mSglich macht (Einheit) ;und endlich: was die Unterseheidung von allem MSglichen befordert (praeeision)." The first point seems to correspond to sensibility; the second to taste; the third point represents a unifying function, which could be related to both Judgment and wit (see XV, N. 464, 1770-1778, where wit is equated to Geist); the fourth refers to an element which is analogous.,, to Baumgarten's. acumen (Scharfsmn~ke~t)" ' " or "habltus" diversitates rerum observandl (Metaphys~ca, Halle: 1757, w Now, m Baumgarten, acumen is opposed to ingenium (Witz, wit; ibid., w167 and we find, in Kant, Judgment as scharfsinnig, opposed to wit (XV, N. 472, 1769-1772, and XV, N. 464; but in XV, N. 473, 1770-1778, both wit and Judgment are called Scharfsinn). But this Praecision is also analogous to the later function of Geist which elaborates through a wider unification or synthesis a more precise idea of a species. Thus, we may reach the conclusion that the third and fourth points represent the functions of intellectual unification and distinction; both share the posterior functions of Judgment (which is at the same time unification under an idea, and distinction from what does not refer to that idea) and spirit (which is further elaboration of the unifying idea, and, by this the source of a better distinction), and seem to correspond roughly to ingenium and acumen. We clearly are in N. 625 at a stage of Kant's evolution, where the notion of ingenium (= Witz) is still considered, as in earlier German philosophy (see w167 an inventive power (not yet differentiated from spirit: see XV, N. 464, and N. 472, where Witz brings to Erfindungen or Ein$~lle). Later (with the development of the theory of invention not through comparison, but through spiritual creation), Judgment, as a unifying acumen, and spirit, as a specifying and creative ingenium, are substituted for the former functions of Praecision and Einheit, which appear now as superficial simplifications of a much richer and complicated process. See also Tonelli, op. cir., pp. 295-296. 100 See XV, N. 752, and K.H.L. Politz, "Kants Vorlesungen fiber die Metaphysik. Zum

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w T h i n g s are more complicated if we t r y to m a k e o u t the w a y the four-step process t a k e s place in genial sciences. T h i s is the case chiefly because K a n t gives v e r y few indications on this point, which p r o b a b l y was n o t quite clear in his mind. F i r s t of all, genial scientific ideas are of t w o k i n d s (1) such as m a y n o t be intuited in concreto, (2) such as m a y be, i.e., spiritual ideals (see w In order to u n d e r s t a n d w h a t genial scientific ideas are, let us t e n t a t i v e l y set up a r u d i m e n t a r y i n v e n t o r y of intellectual elements i n v o l v e d (in K a n t ' s opinion) in science. (I) Empirical concept of objects, i.e., the intellectual c o u n t e r p a r t s of aesthetic ideals or of spiritual sensible ideals; t h e y are neither ideals, n o r ideas in general, o n l y empirically a b s t r a c t e d universals. T M ( I I ) M a t h e m a t i c a l concepts (see w ( I I I ) Empirical intellectual ideals, which seem to correspond to t h e categories of the Critique o] Pure Reason. 1~ (IV) Spiritual (genial) intellectual ideals. (V) Genial abstracted ideas. Now, o n l y elements (IV) and (V) are genial ideas. E x a m p l e s of element (V) h a v e been seen in w as philosophical ideas: the p e r f e c t republic, the best world, are n o t to be m e t in experience a n d n o t to be exemplarized t h r o u g h experience. 1~ T h e y are n o t vivifying, t h e y h a v e no connection with sensibility. Therefore, the four-step process seems here to b r e a k down, as sensibility a n d t a s t e at least are eliminated. A n d K a n t does n o t give a n y indication, in t h e context we are examining, of the w a y t h e y are b r o u g h t about. Thus, if the four-step process has to t a k e place in genial sciences too, we o n l y Druck befSrdert yon dem Herausgeber der Kantischen Vorlesungen fiber die Philosopmscne . . . . . neligionm'ehr-"~ Erf-rtu :1 821 ,t1775-1780), pp. 176-177. See also XVI, N. 1857: "Der Abriss gehort vor die Urtheilskr~ft (Zeichnung), die Robe ausarbeitung vor das geme und die Ver feinerung vor den Gerschmak." 101 Following XVI, N. 2835 (1769-1777, more probably 1773-1777), there are ideas corresponding to such empirical concepts (only as far as such empirical concepts are true, of course), but chiefly in mente dei only: "Gott ist das inhaerirende subiect aller ideen als ens realissimum und auch die erste Ursach alles ZufAlligen . . . . Die Eintheilung der Arten ist bey uns nur nominal und entspringt ans der Vergleichung; aber real ist sic, wenn die idee uns bekannt ware. Z. E. Von einem Pferde und dann, was daran naeh verschiedenheit der UmstAnde AbgeAndert wird." For the structure of the Vergleichung (comparison)process, see w Now, Kant probably holds that human scientific ideas, corresponding to God's ideas of the single species, may be derived from the genial scientific idea of a science, but this is not quite clear (although one should conjecture so, for instance from XVIII, N. 5551b). At least until a science has not been built up following its genial idea, the human mind orders reality through a less exact correspondence to the divine ideas, i.e., the empirical concept of a species. Nevertheless, there are (as far as they have been created genially) human nonscientific correspondents to the divine ideas of the single species of existing objects, and such are the aesthetic spiritual ideals102or exemplars, whose, intellectual, nongenial counterparts are the empirical" " concepts. They are called emp~rlcal not because they are abstracted from experience, as empirical concepts of species, but because they are actually and universally present in the empirical world, as its texture;and because they have not been created by the human mind, but they have been reached through Zergleiderung of reality (which is a quite different process from abstraction, see Tonelli, op. cit., pp. 242, 255-256 and 281, about the irresoluble concepts), or as in the Critique of Pure Reason, through a transcendental deduction. An empirical 1deal in general is "das allen Anschauungen allgemein zum Grunde liegende, woraus durch einschrAnkungen einiger theile alle Gestalten bestimmt werden" (XV, N. 918). Sensible empirical ideas must then correspond to the pure forms of sensibility, intellectual empirical ideals to what is soon going to be called a category. (See also w and footnote 49.) ~08See XVI, N. 2835, and also Schlapp, op. cit., p. 172: "Daher sind das nur leere Worte, was uns yon der Glfickseligkeit der andern Welt gesagt wird, wozu uns das eoncretum fehlt. Eine solche Glfickseligkeit ist zwar ein allgemeiner Begriff [= abstract idea], aber kein Ideal."

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may apply it to sciences constructed with element (IV). Now, the only nonphilosophical ideas referred to by Kant in connection with genius (as seen in w are (a) a new mathematical method, (b) new cosmological ideas. As for (a), the case is not quite clear either, because mathematics has a peculiar structure, excluding sensibility as mere Empfindung at least, and working with concepts which have been constructed, i.e., neither empirically abstracted nor derived from ideas of species. As for (b), it is not to be taken for granted that Kant generally did not consider cosmology as a part of philosophy. But this may be safely inferred in this case from the fact that K a n t could not equate general cosmological ideas with philosophical ideas, as defined in this context, because the first one corresponds, evidently, to characters of the concrete, existing world, whereas the second ones are only abstract representations of nonsensible (nonsensibly real) things. T M w The four-step process of genial invention could then be applied to cosmology (or to physics in general) in the following way: (a) sensibility provides us with representations of existing objects, which are further elaborated in a nongenial way by intellect, in empirical (abstractive) concept formation, and connects them following the pattern of empirical ideals; (b) such representations are corrected by Judgment conforming to the previous general spiritual ideal of the science; (c) spirit elaborates a new idea of science; (d) taste provides this new idea with sensible evidence. Thus, a cosmological genial idea may be communicated and taught the same as a mathematical method, after it has been invented or as one may be taught to copy slavishly an aesthetic exemplar; this is not clearly said by Kant, but we cannot assume he held a different opinion on this point; as a matter of fact, he only says that it is impossible to teach how to reach new ideas and methods in mathematics and science, not that it is impossible to teach how to follow or to apply the already known. 1~ Now, the possibility of teaching already invented spiritual ideals of science may be understood only if we refer to the action of taste, rendering such subjective ideals sensibly universal, or communicable, or universally acceptable, analogous to the sensible universalization of aesthetic spiritual ideals, as seen in w176 This explains also why Kant considers philosophy in a different way: in philosophy not only is it impossible to teach how to discover or invent new ideas, but apparently philosophy itsel], as it is, cannot be taught (see w This is clearly explained by the fact that philosophical ideas are not ideals, i.e., that they cannot be seen in concreto or sensibly universalized by taste. It is only possible to teach how to philosophize, but Kant here does not 104Cosmologicalspiritual ideals are of course different from empirical ideals. These underlie every possible intellectual connection of representations, whereas Newton's theory is a very peculiar way of ordering physical objects, which cannot be reached either by analysis or by deduction, but which must be invented. lo5With exception of new particular devices, which are however not a matter of genius, but of talent: see w 106Somethin$ very near to taste may be admitted in mathematics too, because, if mathematics excludes the matter of sensibility, it does not exclude the form of sensibility. Kant spoke previously of the "beauty of theorems," etc. (See Tonelli, op. cir., pp. 33, 284-286, 294.)

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provide us with more precise information about this very special kind of instruction. Another "vivifying" science related to genius, is anthropology (Menschenkenntniss), which is mentioned in XV, N. 944, but Kant does not develop this theme in the present context.

Rome, Italy.

(TO BE CONCLUDED)

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