A Reply to William Lane Craigs Metaethical Argument (aka Craigs Moral Argument).

1. ntro!uction. ". #$%ecti&ity. ".1. #$%ecti&e statements or %u!gments' an! o$%ecti&e matters. ".". #$%ecti&e moral &alues an! !uties. ".(. #$%ecti&ity an! min!)!epen!ence. #$%ecti&e pain an! o$%ecti&e *ear. ".+. #$%ecti&ity an! necessity. (. A tra!itional &ie, on moral &alues an! moral !uties+. .aturalism' moral &alues an! !uties' pain an! *ear. /. Morality an! !eterminism. 0. Color' e1o$iology an! genetic engineering. 2. 3eauty' e1o$iology' an! .ean!erthals. 4. Craig on $eauty an! e&olution. More e1traterrestrials' an! more .ean!erthals. 5. Morality' e&olution' an! e&olutionary counter*actuals. 16. Morality an! e1o$iology . 11. Morality an! e1o$iology 1". Morality an! e1o$iology . 7ome o$%ections. . Moral 8,in 9arth.

1(. #ntological *oun!ation or groun!ing. 1(.1. Craig:s *oun!ational con!itions. 1(.". Craig:s theistic *oun!ational account' an! Craig:s *irst premise. 1(.".1. ;uplicate min!s. 1(.".". n*ormati&e i!enti*ication accounts an! conceptual pro$lems. 1(.".".1. <oo!ness ,ithout <o!. 1(.".".". Water ,ithout ="#1(.".(. Circularity. 1(.(. 7houl! ,e e1pect that o$%ecti&e moral &alues an!>or !uties ha&e an ontological *oun!ation' in the sense o* in*ormati&e i!enti*ication1(.+. =eat an! Craigs *oun!ational con!itions. 1(./. Water an! Craigs *oun!ational con!itions. 1(.0. 7ick $ir!s an! Craigs *oun!ational con!itions.

1(.2. <reen stu** an! Craigs *oun!ational con!itions. 1(.4. #$%ecti&e kin!ness an! Craigs *oun!ational con!itions. 1(.5. #$%ecti&e cruelty an! Craigs *oun!ational con!itions. 1(.16. #$%ecti&e greatness. 1(.11. ?alue! properties1(.1". .ormati&ity. 1(.1( .on)theism' ontological *oun!ations' an! $ur!en. 1+. 9&olution an! sel*)sacri*ice' an! generally human $eha&ior. 1/. Moral o$ligations' legal o$ligations an! comman!s. 10. @ru!ential reasons &s. moral reasons12. Accounta$ility. 14. Conclusions. 1. ntro!uction. In this article, I will raise a number of objections to his Craigs metaethical argument (aka Moral Argument), arguing that hes failed to establish or ro!ide good reasons to think that the first remise is true" #he formal argument is$ %&$ If 'od does not e(ist, then objecti!e moral !alues and duties do not e(it" %)$ *bjecti!e moral !alues and duties do e(ist" C$ 'od e(ists" Additionall+, I will briefl+ address other arguments he makes usuall+ in the same conte(t as the metaethical argument, like an argument from moral accountabilit+" ,efore I go on, Id like to oint out that I do not claim originalit+" In fact, I took most of the ideas in this article from a number of different, often multi le, sources" -./ ". #$%ecti&ity. In his defense of a metaethical argument, Craig sa+s that a something is objecti!e if it does not de end on an+ones o inions, and its subjecti!e if it does" -r&/ 0o, that raises some 1uestions, like$ a. 2hat kind of 3something counts4 Are we talking about objecti!e judgments, or statements4 5acts4 0omething else4

Craig doesnt sa+, but in his defense of the metaethical argument, Craig talks about objecti!e !alues and duties, as well as objecti!e truth -r&/, and im licitl+ about objecti!e statements and6or ro ositions when he talks about what holds true-r)/ inde endentl+ of what eo le belie!e" In a different article 7 not defending the metaethical argument but clearl+ referring to it 8, Craig also talks about objecti!e facts" -r9/ -&/ $. 2hat kind of :de endence: is rele!ant4 In the rest of this section, I will anal+;e the matter of objecti!it+ in the conte(t of Craig:s metaethical argument" ". #$%ecti&e statements or %u!gments' an! o$%ecti&e matters. <ets consider some e(am les of statements or judgments-)/$ 0&$ All combustible materials contain hlogiston" 0)$ 0anta Claus e(ists, and flies in a sleigh" 09$ =ichard >awkins belie!es that ?ahweh e(ists" @sing the word 3objecti!e and other words in those statements in an ordinar+ sense, its clear to me that there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether 0& is true, there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether 0) is true, and there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether 09 is true" #he+re all false" In that ordinar+ sense of 3objecti!e, I would also sa+ that whether combustible materials contain hlogiston is an objecti!e matter, so is the matter(s) of whether 0anta Claus e(ists and flies in a sleigh, and so is the matter of whether =ichard >awkins belie!es that ?ahweh e(ists" As for Craigs use of 3objecti!e, whether all combustible materials contain hlogiston, whether 0anta Claus e(ists, etc", are matters that do not de end on an+ones o inion, so those matters and the corres onding statements seems to meet Craigs re1uirement for objecti!it+ as well" 2hat about 094 Is 09 objecti!e, in the sense of the term 3objecti!e used in Craigs metaethical argument4 In a sense, whether 09 is true de ends on one of >awkins beliefs 7 namel+, whether he belie!es that ?ahweh e(ists" Aowe!er, that is not the rele!ant kind of de endence when it comes to ascertaining whether a statement, a matter, etc", is objecti!e, in the sense in which Craig uses the word 3objecti!e in the conte(t of the metaethical argument" If that were the rele!ant kind of de endence, its clear that moral judgments would often not be objecti!e in the sense of 3objecti!e used in Craigs metaethical argument, since 7 for instance 7 we can set u scenarios in which, sa+, whether ,ob has a moral obligation to refrain from utting some of

the white substance in the sugar bowl that is on the table 7and which is in fact sugar 7 in his fathers coffee does de end on facts such as whether, sa+, ,ob believes that the substance in 1uestion is poison" ,ut there is no reason to think that Craig meant to count that kind of de endence against objecti!it+, and there seems to be no other sense in which 09 would de end on an+ones beliefs" 0o, it seems that in the cases of 0&, 0) and 09, objecti!it+ in the ordinar+ sense of the term outlined abo!e and objecti!it+ in the sense of the term used b+ Craig in his metaethical argument go together" 0till, one ma+ ask whether Craig 7 at least, when it comes to the objecti!it+ of statements 7 is actuall+ using the word 3objecti!e in the same sense as the ordinar+ sense outlined abo!e, or 0&, 0) and 09 are just cases in which the referent of the term 3objecti!e in the ordinar+ sense outlined abo!e and the referent of the term 3objecti!e in the sense of the term used b+ Craig in his metaethical argument, ha en to o!erla " A number of his statements strongl+ su ort the h+ othesis that the meaning is the same or a ro(imatel+ close to that, at least when it comes to the objecti!it+ of statements, matters, etc", des ite some obscurit+ in Craigs formulation, since 7 for instance$ a. In his defense of the metaethical argument-r&/, Craig makes a classification of matters between objecti!e ones and matters of ersonal taste or o inion" *bjecti!e matters would be those that do not de endent on eo les o inion, whereas those that do de end on that would be subjecti!e, and those would be matters of taste, or o inion" $. Craig also uses such e(am les of non8objecti!it+ (i"e", matters of taste or o inion) in the conte(t of his argument against ga+ relations-r9/, where he also makes some of the main metaethical claims he makes in the conte(t of his metaethical argument" In that conte(t, hes using the term 3objecti!e in the usual sense 7 he does not tr+ to define it in that conte(t, but rather a eals to the intuiti!e gras of the term" In that conte(t, he also o there would be two categories$ 1. Matters of fact, or objecti!e matters" ". Matters of o inion, matters of taste, or subjecti!e matters" #here might be debatable subtleties about, sa+, whether there are some differences between the meanings of 3its a subjecti!e matter, 3its a matter of taste, 3its a matter of o inion, 3there is no objecti!e fact of the matter, 3there is a fact of the matter, etc", but for now, we ma+ establish the following e1ui!alences, which seem to be in line with common usage of the terms, and also seem to match Craigs usage$ oses matters of fact to matters of taste, or matters of o inion" #hose considerations also allow us to infer how Craig classification works for matters" In that case,

91A A matter M is objecti!e if and onl+ if M is a matter of fact if and onl+ if M is not a matter of o inion" 9"A A statement or judgment 0 is objecti!e if and onl+ if there is a fact of the matter as to whether 0 is true if and onl+ if there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether 0 is true" %erha s, someone might disagree with the e1ui!alence between 3there is a fact of the matter as to whether 0 is true and 3there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether 0 is true" I will address the issue in this conte(t later" ".". #$%ecti&e moral &alues an! !uties. 2hile the meaning of 3objecti!e in the case of statements, judgments, matters, etc", a ears clear enough, the terms 3objecti!e !alues and 3objecti!e duties in Craigs metaethical argument are more obscure" 2hen addressing the matter, Craig makes a distinction between what he calls 3moral !alues and 3moral duties, and associates the first with good and bad, and the second with right and wrong" -r&/ I artiall+ agree with Craigs distinction, though not com letel+" #he degree of agreement is not entirel+ clear" 5or e(am le$ 1. I do not see an+ difference between sa+ing 3,ob beha!ed immorall+ and 3,ob beha!e in a morall+ bad wa+" More generall+, I do not see an+ differences in the meaning of 3morall+ bad when a lied to actions, and 3morall+ wrong" *n the other hand, 3morall+ bad is also redicated of agents, and as such its a character trait, whereas 3morall+ wrong is redicated of actions onl+" Craigs e( lanation of the distinction he makes is not sufficientl+ detailed for me to tell whether he would disagree with an+ of m+ assessments in oint &" ". *ne ma+ talk about doing something that is 3a necessar+ e!il, and in that case, a erson ma+ be bringing about something bad 7 or e!il 8, but in order to re!ent something worse 7 for instance 8, and without beha!ing in a morall+ bad6morall+ e!il wa+" Craigs e( lanation of the distinction he makes is not sufficientl+ detailed for me to tell whether he would disagree with an+ of m+ assessments in oint )" (. Also, in that conte(t, I do not think that 3a necessar+ e!il, or 3something bad, means morally e!il, or morally bad" And it seems robable to me, gi!en his words, that Craig would disagree with m+ assessment on that matter" +. I would make a distinction between bad things, situations, e!en beha!iors, agents, etc", and morally bad beha!ior, agents, etc" 5or instance, a child d+ing of cancer is a bad situation, but I dont know there is an+thing morally bad about it, as long as no moral agents are in!ol!ed in

causing it" Also, the beha!ior of some agent ma+ be a bad thing without being morall+ wrong, or morall+ bad" 5or instance, a crocodile drowning a child in order to eat him is a bad thing" ,ut the crocodiles beha!ior is not morally bad, as far as I can tell" Its not morall+ an+thing" Craig:s e( lanation of the distinction he makes is not sufficientl+ detailed for me to tell whether he would disagree with an+ of m+ assessments in oint B" /. As for goodness, I would agree of course that there is a difference between morall+ good actions and morall+ obligator+ actions" 5or instance, some actions in!ol!ing self8sacrifice are lausibl+ morall+ good but not obligator+, but su ererogator+" It seems clear that Craig acce ts that distinction too" 0till, here we ma+ stick to Craigs distinction for the sake of the argument, since whether hes right about that articular oint makes no rele!ant difference in the conte(t of the objections to his metaethical argument Im going to raise" Aowe!er, in an+ case, his e( lanation of the distinction between good6bad and right6wrong does not elucidate what Craig means when he claims that objecti!e moral !alues and duties do exist, though he ro!ides some information that we ma+ use to anal+;e his claim" *n that note, we can tell the following$ 1" In asserting the second remise, Craig is sa+ing that there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether, sa+, the Aolocaust was immoral" And the same goes for other moral matters" "" Its clear also that the second remise does not onl+ entail that there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether, sa+, the Aolocaust was immoral 7 and the same for other matters about right or wrong or -morall+/ good or bad, etc"8, but also at least that some judgments like 3A has a moral obligation to C, 3? is morall+ good, etc", are true", for some actual beha!ior or agent ?, and some actual agent A" 2e can tell that )" is true for the following reasons$ ".a. If the second remise onl+ entailed that there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether beha!iors are right or wrong, etc", then that would be com atible with a moral error theor+" As a arallel, the statement 3All combustible materials contains hlogiston is objecti!e, but false" ". $. #he reason for the actualit+ re1uirement is that without it, then also a moral error theor+ would seem to be com atible with the second remise" 5or instance, let:s sa+ theor+ #& holds that$" ".$.1. #here is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether the Aolocaust and other beha!iors are morall+ wrong, whether some agent has a moral obligation, etc"

Aowe!er, no actual agent has an+ moral obligations, or is morall+ good or morall+ bad, etc" ".$.". 0tatements like 3All immoral beha!iors are immoral, 3If a erson has a moral obligation not to lie, then that erson has a moral obligation not to lie, 3All moral obligations are moral obligations, 3All entities who ha!e at least one moral obligation ha!e at least one moral obligation, etc", are all true, and furthermore necessaril+ true" ".$.(. It:s meta h+sicall+ ossible that there is some agent that has a moral obligation, but actuall+, no agent has an+ moral obligations, and gi!en the wa+ the world actuall+ ha ens to be, there will ne!er be an+ agent who will ha!e an+ moral obligations and6or will be morall+ good or bad, etc" 0o, #& is a moral error theor+" ,ut it seems clear that Craig intended to rule out all such theories in his second remise, and thats also clear gi!en the arguments he gi!es in su of it" 0o, based on the abo!e, we can tell that the second remise of Craigs metaethical argument at least im lies the two following two conditions$ #M?;1A 0tatements 7 or judgments, or whate!er one calls them 7 of the form 3D is immoral, 3? is morall+ good, 3A has a moral obligation to C, etc", are objecti!e, in the ordinar+ sense of the term 3objecti!e mentioned abo!e" 5or instance, if someone claims that ga+ se( is immoral among humans 7 as Craig does -r9/8, then there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether that claim is true, and so on" #M?;"A 0ome statements of the form 3A has a moral obligation to C are true, and some statements of the form 3? is morall+ good are true, and so on, where ? is an actual beha!ior of a erson, or a erson, A is an actual agent, etc" #he two issues are !er+ different ones, as the hlogiston and 0anta Claus e(am les 7 for instance 7 illustrate" 5or e(am le, 0& and 0) are objecti!e statements, but all statements of the form 3D contains hlogiston are false" 0imilarl+, someone might maintain that *ME>& is true, but *ME>) is false 7 and so, that a moral error theor+ obtains, etc" Also, for instance, to sa+ that no statement of the form 3D contains hlogiston is true for an+ actual D is !er+ different from sa+ing that, at least for some D, whether D contains hlogiston is a matter of taste, or a matter of o inion, or that there is no objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether D contains hlogiston, etc" ort

I will address that distinction in the conte(t of Craigs claims in greater detail later" 5or the moment, gi!en the anal+sis so far, and des ite some obscurit+ in his argument, we can tell that at least %) entails *ME>& and *ME>)" 0till, some 1uestions remain, like$ a. >oes %) mean the same as the conjunction of *ME>& and *ME>)4 $. If not, are %) and the conjunction in 1uestion at least necessaril+ e1ui!alent conditions4 'i!en how Craig argues, it seems to me that a" is lausibl+ true 7 and hence, so is b" Aowe!er, in an+ case, Craigs arguments in su in su ort of %) are essentiall+ an a eal to human intuitions ort the remise, and so ort of *ME>& and *ME>) and nothing be+ond that, so if %) im lied something not implied

b+ the conjunction of *ME>& and *ME>), Craig would ha!e failed to su

his theistic case would fail on account of that, inde endentl+ of other considerations" Moreo!er, there seems to be no good reason to grant an+thing be+ond those conditions" 'i!en that, and since %) entails the conjunction *ME>& and *ME>), we ma+ consider the conditions necessaril+ e1ui!alent" In other words, we ma+ assume in this conte(t that b" is true 7 which seems to be the case, an+wa+, gi!en man+ of Craigs words" @nder that understanding, lets acce t Craigs second remise" ".(. #$%ecti&ity an! min!)!epen!ence. #$%ecti&e pain an! o$%ecti&e *ear. As a arallel to the claim that objecti!e moral !alues and duties do e(ist, lets consider the claim that objecti!e ain does e(ist" As in the case of *ME>& and *ME>), the claim that objecti!e ain e(ists means the same as or is at least e1ui!alent to the conjunction of the following two conditions$ #@1A 0tatements 7 or judgments, or whate!er one calls them 7 of the form 3D is in ain are objecti!e, in the ordinar+ sense of the term 3objecti!e mentioned abo!e" 5or instance, if someone claims that ,ob is in ain 7 ,ob is a s ecific agent 8, then there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether that claim is true, and so on" #o use Craigs own distinction, whether ,ob is in ain is not a matter of o inion, but a matter of fact" #@"A 0ome statements of the form 3A is in ain are true, where A is an actual agent" Fow, the claim that objecti!e ain e(ists, so understood, is true" 5or e(am le, just as the matter of whether there is a cat on a s ecific mat o!er there is a matter of fact, not a matter of o inion, so is whether the cat that is on the mat 7 lets sa+ there is one, named :,ob: 7 is in ain" Also, there are some actual agents that are in ain"

0imilarl+, we ma+ consider objecti!e fear, and it:s clear that objecti!e fear does e(ist" 5or e(am le, if Alice is a s ecific erson, whether Alice afraid of the actual cat that is on the mat, or whether she fears tarantulas, are matters of fact, not matters of o inion" Moreo!er, it:s clear that some actual agents do fear some things" 0o, objecti!e fear does e(ist" Fow, there is a sense of :mind8de endent: in which fear, ain, etc", are mind8de endent states. Aowe!er, the meaning of 3objecti!e (and 3subjecti!e) used b+ Craig in the conte(t of his metaethical argument is not related to that matter" #hat said, there are two oints that I would like to address here$ 1. It might be argued that its not ossible for ,ob to e( erience ain without belie!ing that he is e( eriencing ain" >oes that mean that whether ,ob is in ain de ends on ,ob:s beliefs, and so it:s not an objecti!e matter4 <ea!ing aside the issue of whether 3de ends would be the correct term here, and e!en if its true that its not ossible for ,ob to e( erience ain without belie!ing that he is e( eriencing ain, that is still not a roblem for objecti!it+ in this conte(t" #he matter of whether ,ob is in ain is not a matter of o inion" Its a matter of fact, and that is the classification that Craig uses, and the measure of objecti!it+ as he uses the words in the conte(t of the metaethical argument" ". 0omeone might suggest that e!en if there is a fact of the matter as to whether the cat that is on the mat is in ain, there is no objective fact of the matter, because objecti!it+ re1uires mind8 inde endence" As I see it, there is no semantic difference in collo1uial s eech between the meanings of the statements :there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether the cat is in ain:, and :there is a fact of the matter as to whether the cat is in ain:, etc", so I will use the e( ressions interchangeabl+ unless otherwise s ecified" Aowe!er, e!en if I:m mistaken about that, the oint would remain that whether ,ob 7 i"e", the cat in 1uestion 7 is in ain is a matter of fact, not a matter of o inion, and that is the classification that Craig uses, and the measure of objecti!it+ as he uses the words in the conte(t of the metaethical argument" -9/ 0o, if it turned out that there is a difference in collo1uial s eech between the meaning of the statement :there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether the cat is in ain:, and the meaning of the statement :there is a fact of the matter as to whether the cat is in ain:, etc", then Craig would be using :objecti!e: in a different wa+, but in an+ case, b+ his usage of the words, it would remain the case that objecti!e ain e(ists, objecti!e fear e(ists, and so on"

0o, in short, it seems that objecti!it+ in the conte(t of Craig:s metaethical argument is not about mind8 inde endence and mind8de endence 7 at least not unless there is a sense of the mind8 inde endence6mind8de endence classification that matches the matter of fact6matter of o inion classification" ".+. #$%ecti&ity an! necessity. 2hile this section is not re1uired in the conte(t of Craigs metaethical argument,7 this section can be seen as a long side note 8, I think the matter of necessit+ might be im ortant in the conte(t of some ontological metaethical arguments for theism, if some oints are raised, so I will address it" 2hile objecti!e fear and objecti!e ain do e(ist, its clear that there are ossible scenarios in which the+ do not" It:s true that possibly, no agent experiences pain or fear. Fow, let 2& be a scenario in which there is ne!er an+ entit+ that e( eriences an+ ain"-B/ If 2& were actual, then objecti!e ain would not e(ist" Aowe!er, there would still be a fact of the matter as to whether a s ecific entit+ G that e(ists in 2& is in ain" Moreo!er, the matter of whether an entit+ in 2& is in ain would not be a matter of o inion" =ather, the fact of the matter would be that no entit+ in 2& is in ain" Fow, lets consider objecti!e moral !alues and duties" It seems that on Craigs ontolog+, the claim that objecti!e moral !alues do e(ist would be necessaril+ true 7 since Craigs ontolog+ osits that 'od is necessar+ 8, but the claim that objecti!e moral duties do e(ist would be contingentl+ true, since lausibl+ 'od could refrain from creating an+ entities to whom he would issue an+ commands, so *ME>) would not be true with regard to moral obligations, and since the second remise affirms that both objecti!e moral !alues and objective moral duties e(ist, it seems that the second remise is, on Craig:s ontolog+, contingentl+ true" 0ince I see no good reason to belie!e that a necessar+ agent e(ists, or that necessaril+, there are agents, or that necessaril+ there are entities that are morall+ good, or morall+ bad, or ha!e moral obligations, etc", I would reject both a claim that objecti!e moral !alues necessaril+ e(ist, and a claim that objecti!e moral duties necessaril+ e(ist" *f course, to be clear, if 2) -B/is a scenario in which objecti!e moral !alues and6or duties do not e(ist, it does not follow from that that whether some agent (sa+, a shark) that e(ists in 2) has a moral obligation, or is morall+ good, etc", are matters of o inion, or that statements like 3Its immoral for an+ adult human to torture infants for fun, or 3If an adult man were to torture infants for fun, he would be acting immorall+, would not be true in 2)" ,ut the contingenc+ of the claims that objecti!e moral !alues and6or duties e(ist is not roblematic"

0o, in short, u on reflection, I see no roblem in granting the second remise from a non8theistic ers ecti!e, but I would refrain from granting that its necessaril+ true 7 in an+ case, Craigs own osition seems committed to the contingenc+ of the second remise, for the reasons gi!en abo!e" (. 8he *irst premise. #he first remise of Craigs metaethical argument is that if 'od does not e(ist, then objecti!e moral !alues and duties do not e(ist" 5or now, I will not address the issue of what Craig means b+ 'od, and focus on the conse1uent" 0o, in order to defend the first remise, Craig more or less e( licitl+ assumes a scenario in which 'od does not e(ist, and makes some arguments-H/ in su objecti!e moral !alues and duties do not e(ist" -J/ Aowe!er, there some !er+ different wa+s in which someone might argue that, in a certain scenario, objecti!e moral !alues and duties do not e(ist" 5or instance, someone might otentiall+, and under the assumption that God does not exist$ a. Argue for the conclusion that *ME>& is false" -K/ $. Argue for the conclusion that *ME>) is false" c. 0omehow argue for the conclusion that the conjunction of *ME>& and *ME>) is false, without making a s ecific argument for the falsit+ of one of them in articular" 5or instance, if *ME>& is false, then there is no objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether, sa+, the Aolocaust was morall+ wrong 7 or erha s there is in that case, but not in man+ othersL I will lea!e those issues aside to sim lif+" *n the other hand, if *ME>) is false, it seems that there is an objecti!e fact of the matter 7 namel+, its not the case that the Aolocaust was morall+ wrong" 0o, one ma+ wonder what Craig is arguing for" In his defense of the metaethical argument-r&/, he first asks 7 rhetoricall+ 7 whether without 'od, moral issues are akin to matters of taste, like whether chocolate tastes better than !anilla" #hat suggests that hes tr+ing to sa+ that without 'od *ME>& would be false, and there would be no objecti!e fact of the matter as to, sa+, whether the Aolocaust was immoral 7 or other moral judgments 8, and also that it would be a matter of taste, etc" *n the other hand, in the same conte(t, Craig claims that without 'od, the terms 3good and 3e!il would ha!e no reference oint" ,ut that actuall+ suggest an error theor+, at least for 3good and 3e!il, since taste judgments lausibl+ do ha!e referent oints e!en if s eaker8de endent, and its im robable that he would argue that without 'od, an error theor+ holds for good and e!il, but instead right and wrong are matters of taste" ort of the claim that in such a scenario-I/,

0o, what is Craig arguing for4 In another ost -r9/, Craig sa+s that without 'od, those who claim that right and wrong, and good and e!il, are matters of taste, would be absolutel+ correct, that the matter becomes one that de ends on culture, and so on" #hat clearl+ indicates that hes claiming that without 'od, *ME>& is false" ?et, in the same document, he claims that without 'od, e!er+thing is ermitted" ,ut that seems to be a claim that 3,eha!ior C is ermissible is true for all C, which would also im l+ that 3A has a moral obligation to D is false, for all A, D, and so on, rather than 3its ermissible to me, but not to +ou, etc" 0o, Craig a ears to be jum ing between claiming that without 'od, a moral error theor+ obtains, and that without 'od, some sort of s eaker8relati!ism or subjecti!ism-M/ is true" Ais arguments do not seem to be of much hel figuring out what hes tr+ing to establish, either" Ae goes on to make a number of claims, but were not closer to establishing what it is that hes tr+ing to show would ha en without 'od" 0till, lets take a look at what a theist would robabl+ need to establish if he claimed without 'od, *ME>& is false, and what he would need to establish if he claimed that without 'od, *ME>) is false" 2ith regard to *ME>&, it seems that at the !er+ least, in order to establish that without 'od, *ME>& is false, a theist would ha!e to show that without 'od, at least one of the following conditions obtains$ i. >ifferent com etent s eakers of moral language mean different things when the+ make moral statements, e!en if the+re using all terms correctl+" ii. Moral statements are statements about the s eaker (e"g", like 3D is immoral means 3I do not like D)" iii. #he standards each human being is using when assessing moral wrongness, goodness, etc", !ar+ from erson to erson-&./ in ideal conditions" -&&/ #hose conditions o!erla to some e(tent, but thats not a roblem" 0o, regarding condition iii, that is not the same as establishing that there is moral disagreement 7 which is clear 8, or that different eo le sometimes ha!e different theories about what the ro er standards are 7 which is clear as well" =ather, a theist would ha!e to establish that, when different -actual or otential/ human beings use their own sense of right and wrong without making an+ errors, the+ come u to different moral assessments sometimes 7 or ma+be a sufficient number of times, but lets lea!e that aside to sim lif+" -&./ 5or instance, as an analog+ to this, it ma+ be that ,ob uses his gustator+ taste and sa+s that the chocolate cake tastes better the a le ie, whereas Alice uses hers and sa+s the a le ie tastes better,

and neither of them is making an error in the use of their sense of gustator+ taste, which are the standards the+ use for assessing tastiness" 0o, under ideal conditions, the difference ersists" In order to establish that without 'od, *ME>& is false, it seems to me a theist !er+ robabl+ would ha!e to establish that without 'od, the facult+ or faculties com etent s eakers of moral language use to make judgments of right and wrong or good and e!il-&)/, are such that the+ di!erge in a sense similar to what the gustator+ taste e(am le shows, or erha s that i. or ii. obtain, for the following reason$ If the human sense of right and wrong and6or good and e!il con!erge under ideal conditions -M/, !er+ robabl+ there would be an objecti!e fact of the matter in the sense of 3objecti!e rele!ant in this conte(t, at least if eo le mean the same b+ the terms" 5or instance, if there is con!ergence under ideal conditions, and Alice sa+s that the Aolocaust was immoral, whereas ,ob sa+s that the Aolocaust was not immoral, it seems at least one of them is making 7 deliberatel+ or not 7 a false claim, since in ideal conditions, the+ would both con!erge to one assessment 7 in this case, that it was immoral" It seems, in articular, that whether the Aolocaust was immoral lausibl+ would not be a matter of o inion, or of taste" #he same would a judgments" %erha s, a theist might sa+ the+ do not need iii", because the 3human beings condition is allegedl+ too restricti!e, and that there would be no objecti!e moral !alues and duties if there are some other, non8 human agents (sa+, aliens from another lanet), with something akin to a sense of right and wrong or good and e!il, but associated with different beha!iors, states, etc", from the ones the human sense or senses are associated with" Aowe!er, that would ha!e to be argued for, and that would seem to re1uire arguing some moral semantics, since the theist in 1uestion would ha!e to show 7 for instance 7 that the aliens utterances count as moral claims 7 rather than onl+ something akin to them 7 and that are rele!ant to assessing whether there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether some beha!ior is immoral, e!en though in other cases 7 e"g", color 7 whate!er the aliens do or sa+ does not count when it comes to objecti!it+" I will take a look at alien e(am les in greater detail later, since Craig uses them, e!en though he does not e( lain what hes tr+ing to establish with that e(am le 7 i"e", is he tr+ing to establish *ME>&, or *ME>)4 And how4 5or now, I will oint out that Craig claims hes not doing moral semantics, but moral ontolog+ -rB/-rH/, +et establishing i.' ii.' iii", or e!en the alien !ariant, would seem to re1uire arguing about the meaning of moral terms 7 i"e", it would recisel+ re1uire arguing moral semantics" <ets now take a look at another o tion$ a theist might claim that without 'od, *ME>) is false" l+ to other moral

In order to establish that, he would ha!e to show that without 'od, all statements like 3D is immoral, or all statements like 3D is morall+ good, etc", are untrue" Aow might he argue in su ort of one of those conclusions4 *ne wa+ would be for him to consider man+ h+ othetical scenarios without 'od, and argue that in all of them the claim 3D is immoral would be untrue" Clearl+, that is a very heavy burden" Indeed, if we use our sense of right and wrong intuiti!el+, it seems clear that an adult human torturing children for fun is beha!ing immorall+, e!en if we sti ulate in the scenario that 'od does not e(ist" In fact, whether 'od e(ists is intuiti!el+ orthogonal" 'ranted, a theist might sa+ that the+ ha!e different intuitions" ,ut wh+ should we ut aside our intuitions and acce t his4 An alternati!e a roach would be for the theist to, sa+, tr+ to show that the meaning of the term 3immoral is such that the claim 3D is immoral, where D is an actual beha!ior, entails the e(istence of certain entit+ that would not e(ist without 'od" A sim le e(am le would be if, sa+, 3D is immoral meant 3'od forbids D, but thats not the case, so the theist would ha!e to defend another h+ othesis, if he were to take this route" In an+ case, it seems that the theist would ha!e to do some moral semantics if he tried that course of action" Also, of course, in order to establish such claims about the meaning of 3immoral, the theist would still need to a eal to his intuiti!e gras of the terms, and so to his sense of right and wrong" ,ut wh+ should we follow his sense of right and wrong, instead of ours4 In the s ecific case of Craig, he sa+s that in his metaethical argument, hes not doing moral semantics, but moral ontolog+ -rB/-rH/" Is there another route4 In an+ case, its hard to see also how a theist might go about establishing results about moral ontolog+ without doing at least some moral semantics" #hat said, I will consider Craigs s ecific claims and arguments in su (. A tra!itional &ie, on moral &alues an! moral !utiesAccording to Craig-r)/, moral !alues were traditionall+ considered anchored on 'od, and moral duties were considered to come from 'ods commandments" In that conte(t, 'od is understood to be the 30u reme 'ood" Also, Craig maintains that by definition, 'od is the greatest concei!able being ('C,)" -rH/-rHb/ Fow, while 3moral duties is a term in Gnglish, the conce t of moral duties e(ists in other languages as well" As for 3moral !alues, the e( ression is somewhat obscure, but in an+ case, the conce ts of ort of %&, granting that objecti!e moral !alues and duties do e(ist, under the understanding e( lained abo!e"

morall+ good and morall+ bad e(ist in other languages as well, and so does the conce ts of justice 7 which Craig refers to as a moral !alue" 0o, once we take that into consideration, its clear that Craigs claim is not true as a general claim about humans, or human ci!ili;ation, etc", but is limited to some cultures" 5or instance, in China, eo le do not traditionall+ belie!e that their obligations ha!e to do with the commands of 'od" In fact, the+ traditionall+ do not belie!e in 'od, in the sense in which Craig is using the word 3'od" #hat wa+ is not articularl+ recise (e"g", the word :greatest: is not so clear in that conte(t), but it:s clear enough to tell that 'od is not the creator of some Chinese folk religions, like %angu or 0hangdi, and isnt an+thing osited b+ ,uddhism, either, or b+ an+ religion common in China" Also, in Na an, there is no traditional belief in the e(istence of 'od, or on an+ anchoring, etc", of goodness or of moral obligations in an+ones nature and6or commands, or in an+ other agents for that matter" #here are different religious beliefs, like 0hinto or ,uddhism, that influenced each other and had more or less acce tance in their !arious forms at different times, but in an+ case, the+ did not osit a 'od8based moral ontolog+, or an+ di!ine commands, and so on" In fact, historicall+, there are lent+ of cultures without belief in 'od, and without a belief that moral obligations were the commands of certain entities, e!en if most eo le in those cultures traditionall+ belie!e or belie!ed in different entities that are sometimes called in Gnglish 3gods, but which do no metaethical work" 0imilar oints a l+ to moral goodness" 0o, its not the case that traditionall+, among humans, moral goodness was considered to be anchored in 'od or in an+ other entit+ for that matter, and the same goes for moral duties" Instead, beliefs on the subject a ear to !ar+ widel+ from culture to culture, and sometimes within cultures" -&9/ +. .aturalism' moral &alues an! !uties' pain an! *ear. Craig claims that the most o ular !iew among atheists is Faturalism, which Craig describes as the !iew that science and science alone determines what e(ists" 2hat e(ists is what our best scientific theories of the world re1uire" If something is not re1uired b+ our best scientific theories of the world, then it does not e(ist"-r)/ Fow, Craig does not sa+ there whether its our current best scientific theories, some future theor+ that will lausibl+ be de!elo ed" If its our current theories, then its !er+ ob!ious that Faturalism so defined is false, since there are man+ matters of e(istence of objects that remain unsettled in resent8da+ h+sics 7 for instance 8, and there almost certainl+ are articles we do not know about +et, etc"

,ut moreo!er, e!en if one includes future theories, it seems clear that neither human scientists nor an+ ost8human beings -&B/will disco!er all of the things that e(ist on all of the lanets in the entire uni!erse, and in articular, that if there are alien lifeforms elsewhere in the uni!erse, chances are some 7 e!en most 7 of them will ne!er be disco!ered b+ human or ost8human beings" 0till, perhaps, in his definition of :3Faturalism, Craig meant that Faturalism is the !iew that what kinds of entities e(ist is somehow determined b+ science alone, or something along those lines" #hat would raise 1uestions about how 3kinds and 3entities are understood in his conte(t, so more recision on Craigs art would be needed, but in an+ case, at the very least, Faturalism so defined is robabl+ unjustified, since there seems to be no good reason to think that human beings e!en or ost8human beings will e!er ha!e the kind of e istemic access that it robabl+ would re1uire, under an+ reasonable understanding of Craigs definition" In an+ e!ent, Craigs claim that Faturalism so defined is the most o ular !iew among atheists seems to be also unjustified" ,ut roblems for Faturalism so defined aside, lets assess Craigs claim that on Faturalism, there are no objecti!e moral !alues$ In su ort of that claim, he gi!es the e(am le that one cannot find moral !alues in a test tube" Its a strange e(am le" 0cience is not done onl+ in test tubes" In an+ case, if one cant find moral !alues in a test tube, then it seems that similarl+, one cant find fear or ain in a test tube" 2hat would be the difference4 If Faturalism 7 as defined b+ Craig 7 is committed to the claims that objecti!e ain does not e(ist and6or that objecti!e fear does not e(ist, and so on, then we can easil+ tell that Faturalism so defined is false, inde endentl+ of the re!ious considerations about alien lanets or articles, and inde endentl+ of metaethical considerations as well" ,ut erha s, someone might claim that on that kind of Faturalism, objecti!e ain does e(ist, since our best theories about, sa+, pain, seem to re1uire that there is objecti!e ain, e!en if we cant find ain in a test tube" 0imilarl+, it might be claimed that since our best theories about, sa+, fear, re1uire that there is objecti!e fear, there is objecti!e fear on naturalism so defined" Aowe!er, in that case, one ma+ also oint out that our best theories in s+cholog+ seem to re1uire that objecti!e moral duties do e(ist" 5or e(am le, based on our best theories in s+cholog+ and e( eriments, we can tell that objecti!e antisocial ersonalit+ disorder does e(ist, and such disorder is characteri;ed as """ a er!asi!e attern of disregard for, and !iolation of, the rights of others that begins in childhood or earl+ adolescence and continues into adulthood-&H/

#hat seems to re1uire that others ha!e rights that can be !iolated in the first lace" Also, its not the case that those rights in the definition are legal rights" 0urel+, eo le ma+ well meet the criteria for ha!ing antisocial ersonalit+ disorder e!en if the+ li!e in, sa+, a failed state, or generall+ a lawless land" Alternati!el+, a brutal ruler with antisocial ersonalit+ disorder ma+ res ect the law 7 onl+ he makes the laws that he likes" ,ut if there are rights, lausibl+ necessaril+ there are duties" Moreo!er, Craig ro!ides no good reason to think that our best scientific theories will not re1uire objecti!e moral !alues as well" 5or instance, stud+ing the conditions in which children are more likel+ to become good persons is a erfectl+ !alid scientific research goal -&I/, as long as we ha!e a reasonabl+ good e istemic access to moral truth 7 which Craig acce ts" 'ranted, a theist might claim that if theism is not true, that would not be a !alid research goal" ,ut the burden would be on him" #he oint here is that Craig ro!ides no good reason to think that in the future, scientists will either be theists or reject such research rojects" 0o, if we include s+cholog+ and6or neuro s+cholog+, in the definition of 3Faturalism, then Craig has failed to establish that on Faturalism so defined, %) is false" *n the other hand, if we e(clude s+cholog+, neuro s+cholog+, etc" from the definition, then Faturalism as defined b+ Craig is committed to the non8e(istence of objecti!e ain, leasure, anger, fear, etc"L in that case, it:s !er+ ob!ious that Faturalism so defined is false, e!en if we don:t consider metaethical 1uestions" ,ut in an+ case, a non8theist need not worr+ about that" 0he ma+ sim l+ not adhere to Faturalism as defined b+ Craig 7 I don:t adhere to it, for instance 8, and oint out that 7 for instance 7 she still sees no good reason to belie!e that 'od e(ists 7 I don:t, for e(am le" /. Morality an! !eterminism. In another article, Craig also maintains -r&./ that without freedom, our choices are not morall+ significant, and that there is no freedom if determinism is true" I would sa+ that if we cannot make choices of our own free will, then lausibl+ we cannot beha!e immorall+, and we cannot ha!e moral obligations" ,ut Craig does not seem to ro!ide an+ good reason to sus ect that if determinism is true, we cannot make choices of our own free will, or an+thing like that" G!en granting for the sake of the argument that the libertarian conce tion of free will is coherent, that does not entail that the libertarian account is true" In fact, unless the regular conce t of making choices of ones own accord or ones own free will 7 which is what lausibl+ is needed for moralit+, freedom8wise 7 has ontological commitments

incom atible with determinism 7 or with causal determinism, if someone makes that difference and claims the roblem is onl+ with causal determinism 8, it seems there is no difficult+ in this conte(t" ,ut Craig does not show that there are such ontological commitments in the regular conce t of free will" =ather, he claims that we would be like u be making our choices freel+" In articular, causation at a lower le!el does not seem to den+ causation at a higher le!el" 5or instance, e!en if there is a causal e( lanation in terms of articles of the e!ent consisting in a lioness killing a wildebeest, that does not entail or suggest that she did not kill the wildebeest, or e!en that she did not kill the wildebeest because she was hungr+" If a theist claims otherwise, the burden would be on them" *f course, this is b+ no means a com rehensi!e anal+sis of com atibilist accounts of freedom" ,ut there is no need for that here" Craig claims, in the conte(t of one of his defenses of the claim that moralit+ needs theistic metaethical foundations, that freedom re1uires non8determinism 7 and a s ecific kind of non8determinism 8, but has not shown that that is the case" 0. Color' e1o$iology an! genetic engineering. As art of his defense of the metaethical argument, Craig also considers some h+ othetical scenarios in which aliens e!ol!ed differentl+,-r&&/ and claims that those h+ othetical scenarios su that without 'od, there are no objecti!e moral !alues and duties" I will address the s ecific case of objecti!e moral !alues and duties later, but first, I will consider other cases, as a means of introducing arallels" 0o, lets consider the h+ othesis that objecti!e color does e(ist, which 7 mirroring the anal+sis in the case of objecti!e moral !alues and duties 7 means the same as the conjunction of the following two conditions, or is at least e1ui!alent to the conjunction of the following two conditions$ #C1A 0tatements 7 or judgments, or whate!er one calls them 7 of the form 3D is green, 3? is red, etc", are objecti!e, in the ordinar+ sense of the term 3objecti!e mentioned abo!e" 5or instance, if someone claims that the cucumber on the table is green 7 ointing at a s ecific table 8, then there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether that claim is true, and so on" #o use Craigs own distinction, whether the cucumber on the table is green is not a matter of o inion, or a matter of taste" #C"A 0ome statements of the form 3D is green, or 3? is red, etc"", are true, where D, ?, etc", are actual objects" ort his claim ets, etc", controlled b+ the strings of sensor+ in ut and h+sical constitution, but does not ro!ide a definition of 3 h+sical, or e( lain wh+ we would not

Incidentall+, it seems Craig agrees that objecti!e color does e(ist"-r&&b/ Fow, we alread+ know that, e!en here on Garth, different animals ha!e different !isual s+stems that react to different arts of the GM s ectrum" 5or instance, there are birds that can see light that is either infrared or ultra!iolet" Fow, lets consider the following scenario$ #here is a s ecies of intelligent social alien (sa+, s eciesO&) that e!ol!ed on another lanet, and the+ ha!e also a different !isual s+stem, which is stimulated b+ light in a wa+ that is considerabl+ different from the wa+ in which our human !isual s+stem is stimulated" 0 eciesO& has a language shared b+ their entire s ecies, and words that the+ use in a wa+ similar to the wa+ we use color words in our human languages" <ets call that s eciesO&8color language" -&J/ If the+ came to Garth, humans with a normal !isual s+stem, and under normal conditions, would see all of them as almost entirel+ red 7 and basicall+ the same tone of red" Aowe!er, the+ do not see themsel!es in that manner" Instead, the+ classif+ themsel!es into si( different categories, s eciesO&8color wise, which is in accordance to their erce tion, and the+ also ercei!e each of the indi!iduals in each of the categories to ha!e large arts of its bod+ of one s eciesO&8color, other arts of another s eciesO&8 color, and so on" *n the other hand, if the+ were to !isit Garth, the+ would see no difference between the wa+ 3go and 3sto traffic lights look, since the+re not different s eciesO&8color" *f course, if aliens like that do e(ist, its clear what those aliens do or belie!e has nothing to do with, sa+, whether ,ob ran a red traffic light, or the light was green" In fact, whether a traffic light was green or red is a matter of fact, and it does not de end on an+ones o inion, whether human or alien from another lanet" Fow, if some of those aliens came to Garth and the+ were to claim, in English, that traffic lights for 3sto and 3go are the same color, the+ would be making a false statement" And if some humans were to claim, in their language, that all indi!iduals of s eciesO& are the same s eciesO&8color, those humans would be making a false claim as well, regardless of what the+ belie!e" *n the other hand, humans would be correct in claiming, in Gnglish, that all indi!iduals of s eciesO& that the+ encountered are almost entirel+ red, and essentiall+ all the same tone of red" #he crucial oint is that such aliens might make objecti!e species# !color statements 7 the descri tion of the scenario su orts that the+ do, so lets sa+ the+ do 8, whereas humans make objecti!e color statements" #he objecti!it+ of color statements, or the objecti!it+ of s eciesO&8color statements, in the

sense of 3objecti!e in the conte(t of the metaethical argument, is not affected, threatened or otherwise debunked b+ the e(istence of such different s ecies" Moreo!er, objecti!e color does e(ist, and in the scenario, so does objecti!e s eciesO&8color" 2hile s eciesO&, with those articular traits, is a h+ othetical one, it seems that for all we know, there ma+ well be elsewhere in the uni!erse a s ecies of intelligent, social aliens with a !isual s+stem !er+ different from the human !isual s+stem, color8like language, true objecti!e color8like statements, and so on" Fow, there might be some hiloso hical sense of 3objecti!e in which, erha s, such scenarios ro!ide e!idence against the e(istence of objecti!e color" I will not take a stance on that, but rather oint out that that would not be rele!ant in this conte(t, because thats not the sense of 3objecti!e were talking about" An alternati!e scenario would be one in!ol!ing human genetic engineering" 5or instance, using com uters and other technologies, we can set u a camera or set of cameras that take !ideo footage but change the wa+ it looks to us, color8wise" 2e can use cameras sensiti!e to light in a s ectrum of around, sa+, from BB.nm to JH.nm instead of the !isible s ectrum from 9M.nm to J..nm, and then set it u so that on a com uter screen, the cameras s ectrum is translated into our !isible s ectrum assigning color according to some rules of our choosing, so that the images on screen look to us differentl+ from the wa+ the+ would look to us if we were to look at the objects directl+ under some usual da+light conditions, and instead the+ look like the wa+ some entities similar to us but with a different !isual s+stem that res onds to a s ectrum from BB.nm to JH.nm might see them"-&K/ In this case, we would see things like that due to a combination of the cameras, the com uter, etc", and our e+es 7 which we would use to look at the com uter screen 8, without an+ genetic engineering, but in a distant future, using genetic engineering, erha s someone might modif+ a grou of humans to see things in that wa+" -&M/ <ets sa+ that those geneticall+ modified humans (sa+, 'M8humansO&) li!ed together in a countr+ (or in a s aceshi , etc"), and de!elo ed words similar to our color words, but that would be useful to eo le with their !isual s+stem" In that scenario, the+ could make objecti!el+ true 'M8humanO&8color statements, etc", as we can make objecti!el+ true color statements" 0o, objecti!e color does e(ist-)./, and in that scenario, so does objecti!e 'M8humanO&8color" At this oint, someone might erha s wonder whether 'M8humansO&, or s eciesO&, etc", are nomologicall+ ossible" I would sa+ that at least, we do not know that the+re not, nor would we be justified, gi!en what we know about biolog+ at this oint, to claim that the+ are not" Moreo!er, in the

case of aliens with different !isual s+stems 7 not s eciesO&, but any other s ecies that ma+ be used for a similar argument 8, we are not e!en justified in sa+ing that the+ are not actual. In other words, we do not ha!e grounds for claiming that there are no intelligent and social alien s ecies with language and with different !isual s+stems like the ones suggested abo!e in the entire uni!erse" 2. 3eauty' e1o$iology' an! .ean!erthals. In his re l+ to an objection to the metaethical argument, Craig claims that the e!idence su beaut+ is objecti!e" -r&)/ In a different conte(t, he claims that there are objecti!e aesthetic judgments-r&9/, and clearl+ indicates that he also belie!es that some statements of the form 3D is beautiful are true" 0o, lets consider the h+ othesis that objecti!e beaut+ does e(ist, which means the same as the conjunction of the following two conditions, or is at least e1ui!alent to it" #31A 0tatements 7 or judgments, or whate!er one calls them 7 of the form 3D is beautiful are objecti!e, in the ordinar+ sense of the term 3objecti!e mentioned abo!e" 5or instance, if someone claims that a s ecific landsca e is beautiful, then there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether that claim is true, and so on" #o use Craigs own distinction, whether that landsca e is beautiful is a matter of fact, not a matter of o inion" #3"A 0ome statements of the form 3D is beautiful, are true, where D is an actual object" *ne detail here is that one might wonder whether abstract objects would count in *,)" Aowe!er, addressing that issue would be unnecessar+ for the ur oses of the arguments at hand, so I will e(clude them just to sim lif+" #hat aside, ersonall+, I think that *,) is true, and that lausibl+ in most cases we encounter, there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether an object is beautiful" Aowe!er, I think there are cases in which that is not so, and the ro ortion of cases in our e( erience might not be small enough for me to acce t *,&, e!en if one acce ts a usual degree of tolerance" 0o, I would take no stance on whether *,& is true" Aowe!er, there is no need to get into that in this conte(t, so lets grant that the conjunction of *,& and *,) is true" 0o, objecti!e beaut+ does e(ist" <ets consider the following scenario$ *n another lanet, there e!ol!ed intelligent, social aliens 7 sa+, s eciesO) 8, which are at least as ugl+ as an+ of the animals on those lists" Also, the+ e!ol!ed in dark, humid ca!e en!ironments, which the+ find articularl+ a ealing" #he+ find o en s aces 7 like sa!annahs if the+ saw one 8, orts that

articularl+ una ealing" 0uch aliens ha!e language that is akin to our language about beaut+ in the wa+ the+ use it, etc", but associated with !er+ different things" -)&/ After reflection on the scenario, it seems intuiti!el+ clear to me that whether some aliens e!ol!ed differentl+ 7 s eciesO) or something like that-))/ 8, has no bearing on whether the truth8!alue of aesthetic judgments de ends on what eo le belie!e, or on whether such judgments are true" Intuiti!el+, what aliens do or ercei!e does nothing to undermine our sense of beaut+, or our judgments of beaut+, or the belief that objecti!e beaut+ does e(ist, etc" 2e would still make objecti!el+ true judgments of beaut+, and the aliens would make objecti!el+ true judgments of s eciesO)8beaut+, etc" 'ranted, someone might insist that if such aliens e(isted, then there would be no objecti!e beaut+" ,ut if someone made such a claim, he would ha!e the burden of backing it u " Moreo!er, if thats the osition of someone who also maintains that objecti!e beaut+ does e(ist, then he"s committed to a claim about exobiology ranging across the whole universe, namel+ the claim that aliens like s eciesO) do not e(ist" -))/ ,ut wh+ should an+one belie!e that the+ ha!e such knowledge about e(obiolog+4 And wh+ should we belie!e that he does4 <ets lea!e e(obiolog+ aside for now, and turn to cloning" 2hat if someone managed to clone #eanderthals4 Its difficult, but with sufficient technolog+, it might just be doable" 'ranted, it ma+ be immoral, but that does not mean its nomologicall+ im ossible, or e!en that it wont ha en" 0o, lets sa+ that someone clones some Feanderthals" It seems clear that Feanderthals are uglier, com ared to modern humans, and all other things e1ual" 5or instance, +oung, health+ Feanderthals are uglier than +oung, health+, modern humans, etc" In fact, all Feanderthals are 1uite ugl+, e!en though some Feanderthals are uglier than other Feanderthals" *n the other hand, on a!erage, modern humans are Feanderthal8uglier than Feanderthals" In other words, Feanderthals are more Feanderthal8beautiful than modern humans are, all other things e1ual 7 thats almost certain" In addition, there might be differences between beaut+ and Feanderthal8beaut+ when it comes to, sa+, landsca es" I take no stance on that articular issue, but in an+ case, none of that would seem to be a roblem for objecti!e beaut+" 4. Craigs take on $eauty an! e&olution. More e1traterrestrials' an! more .ean!erthals. In an objection to the metaethical argument, the e(am le of beaut+ was used in an attem t to undermine the second remise, or at least the reliabilit+ of our sense of right and wrong, etc"

In his re l+, Craig makes a number of claims and im lication about beaut+ and e!olution -r&)/, including the im lication that if our sense of beaut+ comes from e!olution without 'od, then that undermines either our belief that objecti!e beaut+ e(ists, or at least the reliabilit+ of our a reciation of it" As the e(am les gi!en in the re!ious section illustrate, there seems to be no good reason to belie!e so" *n the other hand, the scenarios gi!en in the re!ious section would seem to be a serious challenge to $raig"s stance on beaut+" 5or instance, it seems that Craigs !iews entail that if something like s eciesO) does e(ist, either there is no objecti!e beaut+, or at the !er+ least one of the two s ecies 7 i"e", s eciesO) or humans 7 has a massi!el+ unreliable sense of beaut+, and there would a ear to be no good reason to trust the human one" ?et, Craigs osition is that objecti!e beaut+ does e(ist, and that the human sense of beaut+ is at least generall+ reliable" ,ut that seems to commit $raig to a wide!ranging claim about exobiology, namely that nothing like species#% evolved anywhere in the universe. -))/ I su ose someone might suggest that if 'od e(ists, there is no undermining e!en if such aliens do e(ist, and our sense of beaut+ is still generall+ reliable" ,ut that would not work, because as long as Craig rejects the distinction between beaut+ judgments and s eciesO)8beaut+ judgments, then either they would ha!e a massi!el+ unreliable sense of beaut+ 7 rather than a generall+ reliable sense of s eciesO)8beaut+ 8, or we would ha!e a massi!el+ unreliable sense of beaut+" ,ut that would seem to take awa+ an+ good reason to think we got the right sense of beaut+ e!en assuming 'od e(isted 7 wh+ think 'od referred us, rather than the aliens he also created4 In an+ case, it seems that one wa+ or another, Craigs osition commits him to a uni!erse8wide e(obiolog+ claim on the matter$ either a claim that nothing like s eciesO) e(ists in the whole uni!erse, or that if the+ do, the+ ha!e a massi!el+ unreliable sense" ,ut moreo!er, Craig claims that it would be somehow anomalous, gi!en an e!olutionar+ account of our sense of beaut+ 7 without 'od 7 that we would a reciate beaut+ in other s ecies, not just humans, or in humans of the same se(, etc" ,ut his claims are on e!olution mistaken, for a number of reasons, such as the following ones$ 1. In the case of humans of the same se(, there ma+ well ha!e been an ad!antage 7 i"e", on balance, in the ancestral en!ironment, it was conduci!e to re roducti!e success 7 to being able to make assessments of beaut+ of indi!iduals of the same se(, gi!en that otential mates of the o osite8se( were able make them" #hat would allow both men and women to com are themsel!es with otential com etitors, redict beha!ior of otential mates, etc"

Aowe!er, that factor is surel+ not the whole stor+, e!en if it ma+ ha!e la+ed some role" #here are more general considerations about e!olution that Craig is missing, like the following oint$ ". Ada tations that were on balance conduci!e to re roducti!e success in the ancestral en!ironment often had side effects that were not rele!ant to fitness and sometimes, or side effects that, on their own, would ha!e been detrimental in terms of fitness, but resulted from the same gene mutations that conferred ad!antages that offset those disad!antages in that en!ironment, etc" Also, in some cases, there ma+ be some traits that would be on balance slightl+ detrimental to re roducti!e success toda+, but were not so in the ast, etc" As e(am les of some of the traits in some of the re!ious categories, we find some artificial sweeteners sweet but there was no ad!antage to that" Its a conse1uence of ada tations to other things" Also, there was no ad!antage in finding lethal antifree;e tast+, though there was no disad!antage in an en!ironment with no antifree;e, etc" #he same goes for other animals" 5or instance, man+ animals find ethanol !er+ a ealing, and so on" I dont know all of the causes we a reciate beaut+ in other animals" It ma+ ha!e something to do with our abilit+ to ercei!e good health, and erha s a number of other traits, but thats s eculati!e" Aowe!er, in an+ case, the oint here is that Craigs objection is not warranted" More recisel+, his claims are based on a misunderstanding of resent8da+ e!olutionar+ biolog+, which result in mistaken redictions about what would result from an e!olutionar+ rocess that occurs b+ the mechanisms osited b+ modern science and nothing else" *n that note$ (. Craigs objection is a bold claim or im lication about human biolog+ and e!olution" Gssentiall+, hes im l+ing that the e!olutionar+ rocess, onl+ b+ the mechanisms osited b+ science 7 or !er+ similar ones 7 would not result in the mental traits that we obser!e in humans" *n that note, he clearl+ im lies that if our a raisal of beaut+ in the o him as a fashion model" #here are se!eral objections one ma+ raise to that claim, but I will focus on just one, which is in an+ case decisi!e$ Craig bases his assessment on the false assum tion that non8theistic e!olution would result in se(ual attraction being e1ual gi!en e1ual otential to be fertile" ,ut that isnt how natural selection works" 0urel+, it:s not just the number of otential offs ring that counts, but man+ other factors, such as that otential offs ring:s chances in turn to re roduce, which de end osite se( were the result of natural selection, a +oung woman with a big nose and a hareli would look as beautiful to

also on a number of different factors, including their abilit+ to attract mates with genes that would gi!e them a good chance of re roducti!e success, and so on" 0o, there are man+ causes for the o!erall, on8a!erage attracti!eness of some traits, such as the fact that the+ ma+ be cues to good health, etc", or se(ual selection, and a long etc" Craig seems to be very confused about natural selection, and generall+ about the mechanisms of e!olution ro osed b+ resent8da+ science" In an+ case, and with res ect to se(ual attraction, we ma+, of course, also take a look at the issue of otential or actual !ariations from s ecies to s ecies" 2e ma+ consider the case of, sa+, warthogs" #he+re ugl+" ?et, the+ do not seem to be articularl+ attracted to much more beautiful animals, but rather, to other ugl+ warthogs" #he same seems to go for all other ugl+ animals" *f course, thats not remotel+ sur rising gi!en e!olution b+ the mechanisms acce ted b+ resent8da+ science, or !er+ similar ones" #hat aside, we ma+ consider another e(am le that oses a serious challenge to Craigs !iews on beaut+ and e!olution$ Feanderthals" 2hat if someone were to bring them back, b+ means of cloning4 #hen, one ma+ consider the statement$ =.A Adult, health+ modern humans are more beautiful than adult, health+ Feanderthals" 0ince objecti!e beaut+ does e(ist 7 as Craig maintains, and as I concede for the sake of the argument 8, there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether AF is true" 0ince 7 as Craig im licitl+ indicates 7 our sense of beaut+ is generall+ reliable, chances are that our sense of beaut+ is correct and that AF is true" ,ut lets sa+ that we ask Feanderthals" Assuming no distinction between beaut+ and Feanderthal8 beaut+ 7 a distinction that Craigs osition seems incom atible with 8, the+re almost certainl+ going to make the wrong assessment, namel+ that AF is false" ,ut wh+ should one think that Feanderthals had such a defecti!e sense of beaut+4 Aow do we know we didnt get the defecti!e sense in the first lace4 %erha s, someone might claim that Feanderthals would not be able to learn a sufficientl+ so histicated language and would not understand the 1uestion" ,ut that would be a claim about Feanderthal biolog+ that would be in need of defending" Moreo!er, its hard to see how that would e!en matter" Also, someone might suggest that there are -or were, de ending on the case/ beautiful modern humans, and beautiful Feanderthals, but not com arable, beaut+8wise" ,ut the roblems is that our sense of beaut+ tells us that Feanderthals were com arable with modern humans, and the+ were uglier, e!en assuming in both cases +oung and health+ indi!iduals" In light of the re!ious considerations, we can tell that Craig:s stances on beaut+, e!olution, and the relations between them are all mistaken"

5. Morality' e&olution' an! e&olutionary counter*actuals. In su ort of the first remise, Craig argues against what he derogatoril+ calls 3herd moralit+ 8 humans ne!er li!ed in herds, and neither did their a e ancestors, but ne!er mind that 8, and makes a number of claims$ -r&&/ In articular, he claims that if moral !alues are just the roduct of biological and social e!olution, those reall+ arent moral !alues, but sim l+ conditions under which the human s ecies will flourish" <ea!ing aside derogator+ words like 3just, 3sim l+ and se!eral others he uses in that conte(t, like 3herd moralit+, etc", one ma+ re l+ that$ 1.a. #he word 3social seems to indicate something other than biological e!olution, and might suggest that the !iew hes arguing against su orts some form of cultural relati!ism" #hat does not ha!e to be the case, since a non8theist ma+ well hold that the sense or right and wrong and good and e!il-&)/ is the roduct of biological e!olution, e!en if it needs some en!ironment to de!elo 7 like all of our traits do 8, and e!en if the ancestral en!ironment that led to their e!olution included rominentl+ a social en!ironment" 1.$" #he sense of right and wrong and of good and e!il-&)/ would not be on such e!olutionar+ accounts conditions in which the human s ecies will flourish, but rather, the result of an ada tation or combination of ada tations that were on balance conduci!e to re roducti!e success in the ancestral en!ironment" 2hile, on those accounts, humans will de!elo a certain language 7 like moral language 7 due to some features of human biolog+ 7 and, erha s, some aliens would de!elo a different language 8, e!olution onl+ la+s a role in the etiology of those features, and so onl+ indirectl+ in the de!elo ment of the language" ,ut none of the abo!e tells us that our judgments like 3the Aolocaust was immoral would not be objecti!e judgments, or that all judgments like 3D is immoral, for an actual D, would be false, on such a non8theistic e!olutionar+ !iew" 1.c. It is true that some accounts of this kind might also osit that there:s alwa+s be a moral obligation to beha!e in a wa+ conduci!e to human flourishing" #hose accounts would be mistaken, as we can tell b+ means of setting u a number of scenarios in thought e( eriments in which it:s clearl+ not morall+ obligator+ to beha!e in a wa+ conduci!e to human flourishing, and e!en scenarios in which it:s morall+ obligator+ to beha!e in wa+s not conduci!e to human flourishing at all" Aowe!er, it is not the case that, in general, according to these kinds of e!olutionar+ accounts 7 which actuall+ use e!olution as a source of our mental faculties, but not as a means of setting u

moral obligations, which de end on mental faculties, howe!er we got to ha!e them 8, there would alwa+s be a moral obligation to beha!e in a wa+ conduci!e to human flourishing" 1.!. Craig claims that a socio ath who rejects what he calls the 3herd moralit+, would not be doing an+thing morall+ wrong on that !iew" ,ut for that matter, someone might sa+ that if our 3herd color e!ol!ed, then there would be nothing red about 3sto traffic lights on a similar non8 theistic e!olutionar+ !iew, or that on such a !iew, there would be nothing ugl+ about warthogs if our :herd beaut+: e!ol!ed" @ on reflection, I see no good reason to belie!e either Craigs claim about the socio ath, or the arallel claims about color or ugliness, or that the mistaken accounts that osit that there is alwa+s a moral obligation to act in a wa+ conduci!e to human flourishing ha!e any roblem with moral objectivity. =ather, the roblem with such accounts is that that they make a false universal first!order ethical claim" 5or that matter, theories in!ol!ing ethical and metaethical claims that osit that there is alwa+s a moral obligation to belie!e that Nesus is lord and sa!ior, at least for adult humans who ha!e read the 'os el and some others, also make a false uni!ersal first8order ethical claim, but do not ha!e an+ roblem with objecti!it+" Also, in addition to the abo!e, Craig maintains that if we could rewind e!olution, then a different entit+ with a considerabl+ different set of moral !alues and duties might ha!e resulted instead of humans, and if so, neither their !alues nor ours would be right" Aowe!er, Craig does not do an+thing to establish his claims" 5or instance$ ".a" #hose entities would ha!e had to resol!e roblems similar to the ones our ancestors faced, so ma+be there would not be such !ariation after all, if the initial conditions are the same" B"(C ".$" Craig has not e( lained wh+, assuming that there might be such differences if we could rewind e!olution, that would ro!ide an+ e!idence in su objecti!e moral !alues and duties do not e(ist" 5or e(am le, we ma+ consider the same argument about rewinding e!olution in the case of color !ision" ,ut as the rele!antl+ similar e(am le of s eciesO& illustrates, that would ro!ide no e!idence against the e(istence of objecti!e color without 'od" Craig ro!ides no argument in this conte(t in su ort of the claim that it would make a difference in the case of moralit+L rather, he seems to assume that the e(am le of rewinding e!olution hel s his case" 16. Morality an! e1o$iology . Craig also considers some e(am les of aliens from the Andromeda gala(+ who come to Garth and attack, either ra ing and killing humans, or eating humans" -)B/ Fow, Craig has not shown that e!olution would not be con!ergent in the case of moralit+, at least for social entities" ,ut we ma+ grant that there is such difference" ort of the claim that without 'od,

0o, lets sa+ for the sake of the argument that the aliens in 1uestion 7 sa+, s eciesO9 7 e!ol!ed !er+ differentl+, but the+ do ha!e a sense more or less similar to our sense of right and wrong, and to our sense of good and bad-&)/L those faculties are similar to ours in the wa+ using them normall+ feels to them, in the role that the+ la+ in discussions about what to do in their societ+, etc", but associated with different beha!iors and6or situations, entities, etc" In articular, their sense of s eciesO98right and s eciesO98wrong does not associate an+ negati!e e!aluation with their actions of in!ading the Garth and eating humans" 0o, lets sa+ that the+ in!ade the Garth and eat humans" -)H/ 0 eaking of those scenarios, Craig claims$ CraigA I think this e(traterrestrial illustration is a !er+ owerful illustration that, in the absence of 'od, human moralit+ isnt objecti!e" It has no more claim to be objecti!e than some e(traterrestrial alien moralit+" ,efore I address those claims, and on a terminological note, in the cases of color, and beaut+, I used the terms color 8 rather than human color 8 as o human beaut+ 8 as o osed to s eciesO&8color, and beaut+ 8 rather than osed to s eciesO98moralit+-&J/, osed to s eciesO)8beaut+, res ecti!el+" 0imilarl+, I will here use moralit+

8 rather than human moralit+, which Craig uses8, as o res ecti!el+" ,ut thats merel+ terminolog+"

0o, in the e(cer t 1uoted abo!e, Craig makes at least two claims" 1. A claim that the e(traterrestrial e(am les show that, without 'od, objecti!e moral !alues and duties do not e(ist" ". A claim that without 'od, human moralit+ has no more claim to be objecti!e than some e(traterrestrial moralit+ 7 with the terminolog+ I introduce abo!e, that would be moralit+ and s eciesO98moralit+ in the e(am le in 1uestion, res ecti!el+" 2hat to make of those claims4 In the case of claim &", Craig does not e( lain whether that alien e(am le is su *ME>& is not true without 'od, or that *ME>) is not true" ,ut in an+ e!ent, Craig seems to ro!ide no reason to sus ect that objecti!e moral !alues and duties would not e(ist, in the sense of &objective" used by $raig in his metaethical argument, just because of the alien e(am le" #o be clear, Im not claiming that there is no technical sense of 3objecti!e used in hiloso h+, in which the alien e(am le would not show that moralit+ would not be objecti!e" ,ut the rele!ant oint here is that the alien e(am les do not show that without 'od, sa+, whether the Aolocaust was morall+ wrong osed to show that

has an+thing to do with what an+one 7 human or alien 7 belie!es and so, in the sense of &objective" relevant to $raig"s metaethical argument. If someone claimed otherwise, the+ would ha!e to argue that oint" ,ut its not illustrated b+ the e(am le, as Craig resents it" As for claim )", assuming sufficient similarit+ between our moral sense and s eciesO98moral sense in terms of how the+ feel it, work, etc" 8 e(ce t that associated with different beha!iors, situations, etc" 8, then claim )" seems to be lausibl+ true, just as s eciesO&8color and s eciesO)8beaut+ are also objecti!e" ,ut that does nothing to establish the first remise" 'ranted, someone might claim that the case of moralit+ is rele!antl+ different from the case of color and6or from the case of beaut+, etc", but that would ha!e to be argued for" In articular, someone might claim that the difference is that judgments of beaut+, and also moral judgments, are e!aluati!e judgments, but color judgments are not" Aowe!er, in that case, the+ would ha!e to e( lain in what sense and6or how there is an e!aluati!e com onent that is relevant to the matter of objectivity, in the sense in which $raig uses the word &objective"" #he burden would be on the claimant" Also, someone might claim 7 for instance 7 that the meaning of moral terms is such that moral judgments ha!e ontological commitments incom atible with the e(istence of something like s eciesO98 moralit+, and so that if such s ecies, or a rele!antl+ similar one, e(isted, then all judgments of the form 3D is immoral, 3D is morall+ good, etc", would be objecti!e but all false, or some other !ariant" Aowe!er, that would be a matter of moral semantics that would ha!e to be argued for as well" As it stands, u on reflection, I see no good reason to think that that is so" *n that note, lets consider the following scenario$ Millions of +ears into the future, humans or ost8human beings-&B/ make contact with intelligent social aliens" Aumans or ost8humans are more ad!anced, so e!en though the aliens turn out to be hostile, the+ can be handled" Fow, after stud+ing the aliens, - ost/8humans figure out that the aliens do not ha!e a sense of right and wrong and good or bad but something more or less similar to them in the wa+ outlined earlier" I doubt that millions of +ears into the future, - ost/8human beings would belie!e that 'od e(ists, but regardless of what the+ belie!e on that matter, it seems intuiti!el+ clear that the+ would not and should not consider their findings about the aliens e!idence su not immoral" orting the conclusion that the Aolocaust was

In fact, the immoralit+ of the Aolocaust and e(obiolog+ seem to be orthogonal matters, regardless of theistic belief" At least, u on reflection, I do not see an+ good reason to belie!e otherwise, and Craig does not seem to ro!ide an+" All that aside, and as an alternati!e objection, a theist might raise the issue of genetic engineering" 2hat if someone made geneticall+ modified humans, sa+ 'M8humansO9, with a slightl+ different sense or senses, instead of a sense of right and wrong, or good or e!il4 #he+ wouldnt be something com letel+ alien like s eciesO9, but something !er+ similar to humans, but not 1uite the same" A roblem I see with that scenario is that such modifications might result in conflicts between different arts of the mind, unless erha s the changes are massi!e" ,ut lea!ing that aside, I will address the matter of entities that are !er+ similar to humans but not 1uite the same in the section dedicated to Moral #win Garth scenarios" #he genetic engineering cases, assuming the+re nomologicall+ ossible, would be handled in the same fashion" 11. Morality an! e1o$iology . 7ome o$%ections. ort his In the re!ious section, I argued that Craigs argument from e(traterrestrials fails to su

conclusion" In this section, I will consider some objections, and offer some re lies, but before I go on, and to be clear, I do not claim that Craig would raise the same objections or similar ones" #$%ection 11.1A If something like species#' existed, invaded Earth and ate humans, they would clearly be acting immorally. Even science fiction examples illustrate that aliens that attack like that are behaving immorally. In other words, they ought to refrain from eating humans. (ut the previous analysis indicates that, without God, they would not be acting immorally, contradicting our moral intuitions. ReplyA 1" #he re!ious anal+sis is not committed to the 1uestion of whether s eciesO9 aliens who in!ade the Garth and attack humans would be acting immorall+" Its com atible with at least the following two !iews$ 1.a. #he aliens are acting immorall+, but the+ do not ha!e a sense that allows them to know that" #he+ are not acting s eciesO98immorall+, though" 1.$. #he aliens are not be acting immorall+" In fact, nothing that the+ do is immoral" 0ome of the things the+ do might be s eciesO98immoral, but in!ading Garth and eating humans are not among them"

I do not think that &"a" is the right !iew, though, but other non8theists might not ha!e an+ !iews on the matter, and that does not seem to be a roblem either wa+" *f course, e!en if &"b" is the ro er inter retation 7 which I find lausibl+ correct 8, that does not mean that the situation consisting in aliens of s eciesO9 eating humans is not a bad situation" In the sense in which, sa+, the situations consisting in crocodiles eating +oung children or +oung children slowl+ d+ing of cancer are bad situations 7 though not morall+ bad, as far as I can tell, if no moral agent is res onsible 8, we ma+ ro erl+ sa+ the e!ent or situation consisting of s eciesO9 aliens eating humans is a bad situation or e!ent" *n the other hand, in the scenario, lausibl+ the e!ent or situation consisting in aliens of s eciesO9 eating humans is not a s eciesO98bad situation of e!ent 7 assuming the+ ha!e something akin to that good6bad distinction but associated with different situations, etc" 8, and erha s eating humans is e!en a s eciesO98good situation or e!ent, though that would not im l+ that eating humans is s eciesO98morall+8obligator+" ". #he claim that its clear that those aliens would be acting immorall+ is im lausible" In fact, while the re!ious anal+sis is not committed to the 1uestion of whether s eciesO9 aliens who in!ade the Garth and eat humans would be acting immorall+, after reflection, it seems lausible that the+ wouldn"t be acting immorall+" -)I/ #he+ do not ha!e a sense of right and wrong that would tell them its immoral, e!en under ideal conditions" #he+ do not seem to ha!e the right kind of mind to beha!e immorall+, as far as I can tell" As for science fiction aliens, the+re often made in the writers image, so to s eak" In other words, e!en though those fictional agents -fictionall+/ e!ol!ed on different lanets, where the+ e!ol!ed is not the issue, but rather, what kind of mind they have" 5or that matter, man+ of those fictional aliens feel se(ual attraction towards humans, because writers usuall+ make them with human8like minds, e!en though in case of contact we should e( ect aliens not to be 7 normall+, at least 7 se(uall+ attracted towards humans" *n the other hand, someone ma+ ha!e come u with some fictional ad!anced aliens that do not ha!e moral obligations 7 some fictions ma+ not be s ecific enough to determine that" #his is not to sa+ that real aliens would ne!er ha!e moral obligations" If the uni!erse is sufficientl+ big, there might be aliens that e!ol!ed with minds like ours, including a sense of right and wrong and good or e!il 7 rather than the s eciesO9 analogue, or an+thing like it" (. #hat aside, according to Craig, 'od e(ists and a creatures moral obligations are 'ods commands" If so, then if s eciesO9 e!ol!ed on some lanet 7 guided b+ 'od, erha s 8, then it seems that those aliens would not ha!e a moral obligation not to eat humans, since the+ do not

ha!e a sense of right and wrong that tells them not to eat humans, and then lausibl+ 'od would ha!e not commanded them not to eat humans" 0o, it seems that e!en on Craigs theor+, if those aliens e(isted, in an+ case the+ would not ha!e a moral obligation not to eat humans" ,ut then, wh+ would it be a roblem for non8theists if, on non8theism, those aliens lausibl+ would not ha!e a moral obligation not to eat humans4 'ranted, a theist might claim that such aliens or rele!antl+ similar ones are meta h+sicall+ im ossible, but that in articular entails that those aliens, or an+ rele!antl+ similar aliens, do not e(ist an+where in the uni!erse, which a wide8ranging claim about e(obiolog+, encom assing the entire uni!erse" 2h+ should we belie!e that a theist has such knowledge of e(obiolog+4 #$%ection 11."A )n that kind of evolutionary account, who is to say that it"s not morally obligatory for individuals of species#' or a relevantly similar species to invade the Earth and eat humans because they like the way humans taste* ReplyA 2e can tell b+ our sense of right and wrong that that would not be a moral obligation for them, or for an+one" #hat would not be morality, and we can tell because were the ones with the sense of right and wrong, not aliens of s eciesO9" #hose aliens ha!e a sense of species#'!right and species#'!wrong, but thats a different thing, like s eciesO&8color !ision is not color !ision, and a sense of s eciesO)8beaut+ is not a sense of beaut+" #hat aside, its not at all clear to me that natural selection in our uni!erse would fa!or something as different from our moral sense as what is ro osed here 7 though almost certainl+ it would if the uni!erse has infinitel+ man+ lanets" Im just granting that for the sake of the argument" ,ut e!en if the+ did ha!e a species#'!moral! obligation to in!ade the Garth and eat humans, that is not a moral obligation to do so" 5or e(am le, lets consider the following scenario as an analog+$ <ets sa+ 7 which is !er+ lausible 7 that humans ha!e a s ecies8wide !er+ similar erce tion of colors 7 i"e", no in!erted color s ectrum, etc" <ets also sti ulate that there is an intelligent social alien s ecies, s eciesOB, which has a s ecies8wide erce tion of s eciesOB8color-&B/, and that in articular, the+ normall+ ercei!e objects that emit light in wa!elengths between 9).nm and 9J.nm in a wa+ !er+ similar to the wa+ in which humans normall+ ercei!e objects that emit light in wa!elengths between H).nm and HJ.nm, in other words, like we ercei!e objects that emit green light" 0omething similar goes for reflecti!e ro erties 7 i"e", objects that reflect some wa!elengths under such8and8such conditions, instead of objects that emits them"

<et *B be an object that emits light in wa!elengths between 99Hnm and 9B)nm, and no other wa!elengths" In that scenario, *B emits s eciesOB8green light, but it does not emit green light" 0 eciesOB8green is not green at all" And similarl+, ha!ing a s eciesO98moral8obligation is not the same as ha!ing a moral obligation, just as, sa+, being s eciesOB8green is not the same as being green #$%ection 11.( )n that kind of evolutionary account, let"s say that some species#' aliens have a species#'! moral!obligation to invade the Earth and eat humans. Should they do it* ReplyA Its not the case that the+ morally should do it" Aowe!er, it ma+ well be that the+ rationally should attack and eat humans 7 it de ends on the case" It might be that the+ ha!e reasons to in!ade the Garth and eat humans, but ha!e no reasons not to 7 e!en if it is immoral of them to attack (which seems im lausible to me for the reasons I!e been e( laining, but lets sa+ so), moralit+ does not gi!e them an+ reasons" Also, there might be some term in their language 7 lets call it 3s eciesO98should 7 that is not a s+non+m of an+ term that we use, but which la+s a function in their language somewhat similar to the function of the moral should among us, and ma+be it is the case that the+ species#'!should in!ade, etc" Aowe!er, just as 3s eciesOB8green does not mean the same as 3green, and 3s eciesO)8beautiful does not mean the same as 3beautiful, also 3s eciesO98should does not mean the same as 3should, in the moral sense of 3should, nor does it mean the same as an+ term in Gnglish or in an+ other human language" ,ut to be clear, when I sa+ 3s eciesO98should, I:m not sa+ing that the meaning of the term has a built8in reference to the s ecies" =ather, Im using 3s eciesO9: merel+ to indicate that its a term used b+ aliens of that articular s ecies, and which has no s+non+ms in Gnglish or other human languages" Also, as I ointed out earlier, Im assuming at this articular oint and onl+ for the sake of the argument that there might be that kind of huge di!ergence between different s ecies, e!en if the+re all intelligent social s ecies that e!ol!ed without an+ designer" 2hether that is actuall+ the case is an e(obiolog+ 1uestion whose answer I dont know, so Im taking no stance" If a theist is taking a stance, he should defend his e(obiolog+ claim" #$%ection 11.+. +here can be no such thing as &species#'!should". If there were a term &should" in the alien language that plays a function in their language somewhat similar to the function of &should" in

the moral sense of &should" among humans, then it actually means the same. +he same for other terms. ReplyA 'oing b+ m+ intuiti!e gras of the terms, it seems !er+ im lausible to me that the meaning of our moral terms is like that" Aowe!er, assuming for the sake of the argument that the terms would mean the same as this rejoinder holds 7 which I reject 8, and also assuming for the sake of the argument that there is or there might be such huge !ariations between s ecies 7 a matter on which I take no stance 8, and further assuming for the sake of the argument that s eciesO9 actuall+ e!ol!ed, then there would seem to be two distinct ossibilities$ a. 0 eciesO9 aliens lausibl+ would ha!e a sense of right and wrong generall+ reliable as a means of ascertaining the moral obligations of indi!iduals of their species, whereas we humans ha!e a sense of right and wrong generall+ reliable as a means of ascertaining the moral obligations of humans" #his might result in moral obligations to eat us, etc", which would be counterintuiti!e" $. A moral error theor+ is true" ,ut I ha!e no good reason to belie!e our moral terms are like that at all" *n the other hand, a theist raising objections &&"9 and &&"B would seem to be committed to a osition that entails the disjunction of the following o tions$ c. Aliens like that do not e(ist" !. Aliens like that are ha!e a !astl+ unreliable sense of right and wrong" e" Aliens like that ha!e a moral obligation to eat us if the+ find us in a situation like the one outlined abo!e, or similar obligations" Aowe!er, c. is a statement about e(obiolog+ ranging across the whole uni!erse, and there is no e!idence for thatL e. is !er+ counterintuiti!e, and !. seems unjustified 7 wh+ would their moral sense be the flawed one4 8, and also has the following roblem if the theist su the+ ha!e such a !astl+ unreliable sense of right and wrong4 As I mentioned, I see no good reason to think that our moral language is like that" *n the contrar+, I think its definitel+ not like that at all, and the aliens in 1uestion would be talking about something else" #$%ection 11./A (eings with a human level of intelligence or superior but with no moral obligations are metaphysically impossible, with the possible exception of God, who does not have any moral orts >i!ine Command #heor+$ If the moral obligations of those aliens are 'ods commands, how does 'od gi!e them commands if

obligations because an entity"s moral obligations are God"s commands, and God is not giving binding commands to himself. ReplyA 1. <ea!ing aside the odd e(ce tion for 'od and the odd theistic metaethics, the scenario in!ol!ing s eciesO9 seems to me lausibl+ a case in which some beings with a human le!el of intelligence or su erior would not ha!e moral obligations, though I need not take a stance here" A claim that either the+re meta h+sicall+ im ossible or that the+ would ha!e moral obligations seems to lace a burden on the claimant" ". <ets consider the following scenario$ *n a different lanet, another alien s ecies 7 sa+, s eciesOH 7 e!ol!ed" #hose aliens are !er+ ad!anced, and e!entuall+, b+ means of a combination genetic engineering and artificial intelligence, some reckless indi!iduals of that s ecies make an ultra8intelligent c+borg, e!en far more intelligent than s eciesOH aliens" As it turns out, the c+borg 7 which is not a social being, does not care about an+ other being, and does not e!en ha!e an+thing akin to the sense of right and wrong 7 wi es out s eciesOH for its own benefit, and in accordance to its !alues" It then goes on to use the resources of that lanetar+ s+stem, and starts working towards becoming more owerful, e!en if that will lead it to attack and destro+ other intelligent beings in other lanetar+ s+stems in the future" In that scenario, it seems e!en more intuiti!e to me that the c+borg does not ha!e an+ moral obligations" %lausibl+, nothing the c+borg does is morall+ wrong, or obligator+, or raiseworth+, or morall+ an+thing" #his does not mean that the c+borg does not ha!e reasons for acting, or that its not the case that it should rationall+ do D 7 for some D" ,ut its not the case that the c+borg morally ought to do D or not to do D, for an+ D" #hat would be m+ assessment, but I do not need to claim that in this conte(t" Instead, its enough to oint out that a claim that either such a c+borg is im ossible or it would ha!e moral obligations would seem to lace a burden on the claimant" All that said, as far as I can tell a non8theist need not take a stance on whether such aliens, or the c+borg, would ha!e moral obligations" If the c+borg did ha!e moral obligations, it seems lausible that it often rationall+ ought to do what it morall+ ought not to do 7 and in an+ case, it would not care 8, but as before, this does not seem to be a roblem" #he roblem seems to be for those claiming otherwise" #$%ection 11.0A

If our sense of right and wrong comes from evolution without God, then there are no moral obligations. ,ow could a mindless process impose a moral obligation* ReplyA #hat is a different kind of 1uestion, not directl+ related to the art of Craigs argument I addressed abo!e, but that aside$ 1. #he e!olutionar+ rocess would not be imposing an+thing e(ce t in a figurati!e sense" Moral agents are agents with some kind of mind, howe!er the+ came to e(ist, whether b+ e!olution or b+ some other means" In other words" as long as the e!olutionar+ rocesses or an+ other rocess results in minds of the right kind, those entities might be morall+ good, bad, beha!e immorall+ 7 and hence, ha!e moral obligations, etc" -)J/ In fact, this is intuiti!el+ clear, and it illustrates another roblem with Craigs metaethical argument, namel+ that it has a conclusion that flies on the face of moral intuitions" 5or instance, we ma+ set u a scenario in which 'od does not e(ist, and Nack kills children just for entertainment" Intuiti!el+, its clear that in that scenario, Nack would be acting immorall+" #he resence of 'od is orthogonal to it" I will get back to this oint later" "" 2hile a theist might claim that the e!olutionar+ rocess would not result in minds, or in the right kind of mind, thats a claim that he would ha!e to argue for" #$%ection 11.2A +here cannot be such thing as species#'!morality. +here is only morality. If species like species#' evolved on different planets, then at most one intelligent social species would have the true morality, and all of the rest would be morally confused by a vastly flawed sense of right and wrong, and of good and evil. (ut then, what would be the reason for believing that our faculties are the reliable ones, rather than the faculties of some aliens* ReplyA As in re!ious cases, whoe!er made such a claim would ha!e to argue for it" As it stands, after reflection, I see no good reason to belie!e so" In fact, it seems highl+ counterintuiti!e, as the contact e(am le indicates" Moreo!er, also as before, someone who maintains that we do ha!e a reasonabl+ reliable moral sense +et raises objection &&"J, is committed to a claim that there are no aliens rele!antl+ similar to s eciesO9 in the whole uni!erse" 1". Morality an! e1o$iology . Moral 8,in 9arth. ort %&" I argued in re!ious sections that Craig does not establish that his alien e(am les su

Aowe!er, there are other arguments a theist might make, also in!ol!ing entities with something similar to a moral sense in some wa+s, but not 1uite the same" *n that note, I think an interesting case to consider would be some of the Moral #win Garth e(am les, and in articular the scenarios resented b+ Aorgan and #immons in a ers like Few 2a!e Moral =ealism Meets Moral #win Garth-r&B/, or Anal+tical 5unctionalism Meets Moral #win Garth" -r1// G!en though Aorgan and #immons use the e(am les in a !er+ different conte(t, the scenarios raise the issue of aliens with different faculties, so I think the+ are lausibl+ rele!ant in the conte(t of Craigs metaethical argument for theism" I will focus on the e(am les in the second a er" -r1// 0o, the authors e( lain that some of the differences in the mature folk moralit+ of humans and #win Garthers res ecti!el+, result from some s ecies8wide s+chological differences between Garthers (i"e", humans) and #win Garthers" -r1// #he reference to a mature folk moralit+ is made in the conte(t of their re l+ to anal+tical moral functionalism 7 which a non8theist need not endorseL ersonall+, I dont 8, but essentiall+ the rele!ant oint here is that some human moral judgments would differ from some moral or moral8like judgments of #win Garthers, as a result of their different s ecies8wide s+chological makeu , and e!en u on careful reflection" 2hen resenting these scenarios, Aorgan and #immons consider two h+ otheses, which essentiall+ can be ut as follows$ 1. #win8Garth8moral terms cannot be ro erl+ translated into moral terms" #heir meaning is different" #win Garthers and humans would be talking ast each other if the+ did not reali;e that" #he judgments made b+ #win Garthers are #win8Garther8moral judgments, which are moral!like judgments, but not actuall+ moral judgments" ". #here is no difference in meaning, and translation between #win Garth moral terms and human moral terms is a ro riate" #win Garthers make moral judgments, and disagreements between Garthers and #win Garthers are genuine moral disagreements" Aorgan and #immons claim that b+ far the more natural and lausible mode of descri tion, when one considers the Moral #win Garth scenario, is the second" -r&H/ In defense of that claim, the authors sa+ that reflection does not result in hermeneutical ressure to inter ret the terms 3good and 3right used b+ #win Garthers as non8translatable b+ their Garth counter arts in Gnglish" I ha!e to sa+ that m+ intuitions are that the b+ far more natural and lausible mode of descri tion, when one considers the Moral #win Garth scenario, is the first, and that the differences here are not in belief or theor+, but in fact in meaning"

Also, the authors suggest, as an e(am le in su

ort of their claim 7 as alwa+s, when arguing against

anal+tic moral functionalism -r&H/ 7 that e!en after recogni;ing the difference in their res ecti!e mature folk moralities, members of each grou (i"e", humans and #win Garthers) would consider that debating with the other grou in a wa+ akin to the wa+ humans debate moral issues with each other would be a ro riate, rather than sill+" ,ut if the differences were in meaning rather than in theor+ or belief, the members of those grou s would encounter such debate rather sill+, according to the authors" In order to anal+;e this claim, we neednt assume Anal+tical Moral 5unctionalism, but onl+ that there is a mature folk moralit+ and a mature folk #win8Garther8moralit+, which differ as a result of s ecies8 wide s+chological differences between humans and #win Garthers" Gssentiall+, what this means is that the human sense of right and wrong, and good or e!il, and the #win Garther mental faculties that resemble them, are similar but not the same, and are actuall+ associated with different classes of beha!iors, so the difference in some cases would ersist e!en under ideal reflection" #hen, when it comes to cases in which its known that the reason #win Garthers who s eak #win Garth Gnglish acce t -or reject/ a judgment in #win Gnglish but humans reject -or acce t, res ecti!el+/ an orthogra hicall+ identical judgment in Gnglish does stem from some s ecies8wide s+chological differences between the human moral sense and the #win Garther similar counter art, it would strike me as very sill+ to debate, unless there is a good reason, as in the following scenario$ Alice is human, and ,ob is human, whereas #om is a #win Garther" It might be that, under some circumstances, #om does not ha!e a #win8Garther8moral8obligation not to beat ,ob, and he actuall+ has some moti!ation to beat ,ob" Aowe!er, it might also be that in those circumstances, its either morall+ obligator+ or at least morall+ raiseworth+ for Alice to tr+ to rotect ,ob from #om e!en at the e( ense of confusing #om, and she reckons the onl+ wa+ she has a shot at rotecting ,ob is b+ ersuading #om that it would be #win8Garth8immoral for him to beat ,ob 7 e!en though it would not be so, and Alice knows it or at least sus ects so 8, and she ro erl+ reckons #om robabl+ can be confounded b+ means of some cle!er #win8Garther8moral8like seudo8argumentation" 0o, in a situation like that, it seems to me it would not be sill+ for Alice to engage in such a debate, though it would be e(tremel+ sill+ for #om 7 unless, erha s, #om also has some reason to engage Alice, attem ting to confuse her. Aowe!er, if the intent is not to confuse ones interlocutor 7 which ma+ be in some cases morall+ justified for humans, or #win8Garther8morall+8justified for #win Garthers 8, as I said I would find such debate !er+ sill+, gi!en that its known that u on ideal reflection, ones interlocutor will not agree with

a judgment in their language that is orthogra hicall+ identical to the judgment one makes in ones language" *f course, if the human moral sense and the #win Garthers #win8Garther8moral sense are e(tremel+ similar, and the !ast majorit+ of cases of di!ergence in orthogra hicall+ identical judgments result from errors committed b+ one or more of the humans or the #win Garthers in!ol!ed, rather than from s ecies8wide s+chological differences, then unless there are good reasons to think that a articular di!ergence results from s ecies8wide s+chological differences, it ma+ well make sense to debate, at least at first" ,ut thats not the issue" 0o, while different eo le will assess the matter b+ their own intuitions, of course, in m+ intuiti!e assessment, the most lausible answer to the #win Garth scenario b+ far is$ Ans,er A1A A1.i." #win Garthers are talking about #win8Garther8right and #win8Garther8wrong, etc", rather than about right and wrong" A1.ii. #win Garthers ha!e no moral obligations, though the+ ha!e #win8Garther8moral8 obligations" Another answer to the #win Garth scenario might be$ Ans,er A"A A".i. #win Garthers ha!e moral obligations" A".ii" #win Garthers ha!e a sense of right and wrong generall+ reliable as a means of assessing whats right or wrong for a #win Garther 7 which is s+chologicall+ different from a human being 7 to do, whereas humans ha!e a sense of right and wrong generall+ reliable as a means of assessing whats right or wrong for a human being to do" A".iii. 2hile there is a arent disagreement on the moralit+ of beha!ior in superficially similar scenarios that do not factor in the s ecies8based differences in the s+chologies of the indi!iduals in!ol!ed in those scenarios, there is no disagreement u on reflection on what the moral obligations of indi!iduals of each s ecies are" In fact, u on reflection, a human should generall+ rel+ on the normal sense of right and wrong of #win Garthers in order to assess the moral obligations of #win Garthers, and !ice !ersa, unless the+ ha!e other means, like sufficientl+ owerful com uters that can do the job as well" Answer A& holds that &" is true, but its different from the wa+ in which Aorgan and #immons seem to anal+;e that ossibilit+, in the sense that (b+ A&"ii") humans would u on reflection con!erge 7 if the+ make no mistakes 7 to the assessment that #win Garthers do not ha!e an+ moral obligations, though the+ ha!e a usuall+ considerabl+ close analogue"

Answer A) is that the meaning of the terms is the same, but denies that there is disagreement in the mature folk moralities, so this is im licitl+ den+ing the scenario that Aorgan and #immons ro ose, b+ sa+ing that the folk moralities would not be different because they would factor in the species!based differences in the psychological makeup of the agents, and that will +ield different !erdicts about what an agent morall+ ought to do" Aowe!er, I think A) is !ulnerable to a number of otential difficulties, like$ a. 0omeone might suggest that there are situations in which the death of some humans is a worse result than the death of the same number of #win Garthers because of some s ecies8s ecific traits of human s+cholog+ 7 all other things e1ual" If so, then if a human is in a osition to sa!e onl+ one grou of humans or one grou of #win Garthers, erha s she has a moral obligation to sa!e the humans, bringing about the better result 7 i"e", the grou of humans sur!i!e" ,ut would the #win Garthers ha!e a moral obligation to bring about the worse result, namel+ that the #win Garthers sur!i!e4 *r should the+ sa!e the humans4 #here are otential answers to this$ *ne o tion 7 the best b+ far I think 7 is that if ) is true, the sur!i!al of the grou of humans is neither better nor worse than the sur!i!al of the grou of #win Garthers just because of their s ecies" Another otential answer 7 but I think much weaker assuming % 7 would be to se arate human8good and #win8Garth8good (e!en if not right and wrong), and sa+ that #win Garthers would ha!e a moral obligation in that case to bring about the worse result, but not the #win8 Garth8worse result" $. 2hat if its not #win Garthers but far more different aliens, like s eciesO94 In the earlier e(am le of s eciesO9, its not sti ulated that the+ ha!e a s eciesO98moral8obligation to in!ade the Garth and eat humans" ,ut erha s, the condition of a s eciesO98moral8obligation to do so might be added, whereas its not at all lausible that a moral obligation to attack the Garth and eat humans, might be added" 0o, its intuiti!el+ clear that in the case of s eciesO9, the+re talking about different things, and s eciesO98moralit+ is not the same as moralit+" It might be argued that that suggests that the similarities between humans and #win Garthers in the #win Garth scenario gi!e a mistaken im ression 7 to some humans, at least 7 that the meaning of the orthogra hicall+ identical terms is the same, e!en if its not" A otential re l+ in defense of A) here would be that #win Garthers ma+ be sufficientl+ similar to humans to ha!e moral obligations, etc", e!en though the+ ha!e somewhat different moral obligations sometimes e!en in su erficiall+ identical situations 7 i"e", situations that a ear identical without factoring in some distinct features of human and #win Garther s+cholog+ 8, but

on the other hand, s eciesO9 aliens are too different from humans, and do not ha!e moral obligations, but s eciesO98moral obligations, etc" An alternati!e re l+ in defense of A) might be that it a lies to s eciesO9 as well, and that erha s the+ do ha!e moral obligations like in!ade the Garth and eat us 7 e!en if the+re not at an+ risk 8, or things like thatL but that seems e!en more im lausible" c. *n a different note, it might be stipulated that correct #win Garth moralit+ assessments do not take into consideration the s+chological differences between humans and #win Garther" A otential re l+ here is that unless #win Garther mature folk moralit+ con!erges to taking into account the s+chological differences between humans and #win Garthers, then its not moralit+, but #win8Garth8moralit+, and we would be in the case of answer A&"-)K/ Intuiti!el+, as I said, I find A& a lot more lausible" 0till, in an+ case, neither answer seems to ro!ide an+thing that could su argument" 1(. #ntological *oun!ation or groun!ing. According to Craig, moral !alues are grounded in 'ods character, and moral duties are also ontologicall+ grounded in 'od because 'ods commands constitute our duties" 2ithout 'od 7 Craig maintains 7 there would be no such foundation or grounding" In this section, I will assess the matter, and raise some objections" 1(.1. Craigs *oun!ational con!itions. In different documents, Craig makes a number of statements that we ma+ use to a roach his conce t of ontological foundation, and also infer some of the conditions he claims or im lies are re1uired for an ontological foundation of moral !alues and duties" *n that note, we ha!e the following ieces of information$ a. Craig rejects Pagans 3ideal obser!er ro osal-r&J/ on different grounds, one of which is that that non8realities cannot be the ontological foundations of actual things" 0o, in articular, this rules out ideal obser!ers and the like as foundations of objecti!e moral !alues and duties" $. In a different ost e( laining art of his metaethical argument, Craig claims that some 1ualities are good because the+re found in 'ods nature" -r&K/ c. Craig rejects abstracts objects as a foundation of moralit+, or generall+ it seems as foundations of an+ concrete things, gi!en his take on abstracta"-r&M/ !. In one of his books-r)./, Craig sa+s that the kind of grounding (i"e", foundation) he:s talking about is what Mark Mur h+ calls informati!e identification -r)&/, and Craig ro oses an ort a metaethical theistic

informati!e identification of moral !alues with 'ods character 7 or at least some as ects of it 8, and moral duties with 'ods commands" As illustrations of what kind of foundational account an informati!e identification is, Mur h+ gi!es the e(am les of the identification of water with A)*, and of heat with molecular motion" e. In his debate with 0am Aarris-rH/, Craig makes it clear that when he:s asking about the foundation about objecti!e moral !alues and duties, one of the things he:s asking is what makes those actions good and e!il, right or wrong" *. 5urthermore, Craig goes on to ro!ide an e(am le$ he sa+s that moral !alues are determined b+ the aradigm of 'ods character in a manner akin to the wa+ in which in the ast, a meter was defined in terms of a aradigmatic meter bar"-r&M/-r)./-)M/ 2e ha!e enough information to list at least some of the conditions Craig re1uires as an ontological foundation of objecti!e moral !alues and duties" 0o, gi!en the re!ious oints, it seems that according to Craig, if D is an ontological foundation of objecti!e moral !alues (*5*ME), then the following conditions 7 which ma+ o!erla 7 obtain$ #D#M?1$ D is not an abstract object" #D#M?"$ D is actual and not some sort of ideal obser!er" #D#M?($ #o be morall+ good is non8tri!iall+ but informati!el+ identified with D, or at least with some states or as ects of D, in a wa+ akin to the wa+ in which water is identified with A)*, or heat is identified with molecular motion in :informati!e identification: accounts of water and heat, res ecti!el+" #D#M?+A #hings ( eo le, beha!ior, etc") are morall+ good to the e(tent to which the+ are so because the+ stand in certain relation to D, or at least to some as ect or state of D, etc" In other words, that is what makes them morall+ good" #D#M?/A Bsome,hat tentati&eE Craig is not clear on thisC D (or at least some as ect, or state of D, etc") ro!ides a aradigm, a measure based on which moral goodness is determined, in such a wa+ that nothing would be morall+ good if D did not e(ist" Also, this aradigm is in some wa+ akin to the aradigmatic meter bar in the ast" #here might be more re1uirements in Craigs !iew, but at least those a ear to be at least some of the re1uirements for an ontological foundation of objecti!e moral !alues, although in the case of condition H 7 i"e", *5*MEH 8, and while it seems robable based on Craig:s statements and argumentation that that is one of the conditions he demands, the e!idence is less strong than it is in the case of the other conditions" ,ut Craig does not s ecif+ which conditions he maintains an ontological foundation meets or must meet, we:re onl+ able to infer his conditions from claims and arguments he makes in different

works, debates, etc", and the e!idence a ears to be insufficient to full+ settle the matter" 0o, gi!en that condition H seems to robabl+ be one of his conditions, I will kee it, but also consider the alternati!e inter retation that he does not re1uire H as a condition" #hat aside, Craig makes corres onding demands in the case of an ontological foundation of objecti!e moral duties, so there seem to be conditions *5*M>&8H as well, corres onding to *5*ME&8H, and which I will not list for the sake of bre!it+" 0o, some ke+ 1uestions are$ 1. 0hould we e( ect that objecti!e moral !alues ha!e an ontological foundation, in the sense of informati!e identification4-9./ 1:A 0hould we e( ect that objecti!e moral duties ha!e an ontological foundation, in the sense of informati!e identification4 -9./ ". Assuming that the answer to &" is affirmati!e, should we e( ect that the ontological foundation of moral !alues meets conditions *5*ME&8H4 (or &8B, in case Craig does not re1uire condition H) ":. Assuming that the answer to &:" is affirmati!e, should we e( ect that the ontological foundation of moral duties meets conditions *5*M>&8H 7 which are conditions corres onding to *5*ME&8H4 (or &8B, in case Craig does not re1uire condition H) (.a. Assuming that the answer to &" is affirmati!e, is there generall+ a burden on non8theists to resent a theor+ of an ontological foundation of moral !alues, in the sense of informati!e identification4 (a:. Assuming that the answer to &:" is affirmati!e, is there generall+ a burden on non8theists to resent a theor+ of an ontological foundation of moral duties, in the sense of informati!e identification4 I will address these 1uestions below, beginning in section &9"9, but first, I will raise some objections to Craig:s own foundational account, in the following subsection" *n a terminological note, from now on, when I s eak of an ontological foundation, I:m talking about a foundation in the sense of informati!e identification-9./, unless otherwise s ecified, since that is the sense of foundation that Craig is talking about" 1(.". Craigs theistic *oun!ational account' an! Craig:s *irst premise. In this subsection, I will first raise an objection to Craig:s first remise, and I will argue that we ha!e good grounds not just to reject it as unsu orted, but to conclude it:s actuall+ false"

After that, I will raise an objection Craig:s foundational account 7 and rele!antl+ similar metaethical theories 8, based on a more general h+ othesis about ontological accounts in terms of informati!e identification, which I find lausible" <ater, I will raise another objection to Craig:s foundational account, based on a circularit+ issue" ,ut I go on, I:d like to oint out that the rest of the arguments in this essa+ are inde endent of an+ of the arguments in this subsection, and are also sufficient to ro erl+ reject Craig:s metaethical argument 7 one of m+ goals is to ro!ide mutuall+ inde endent grounds to reject Craig:s metaethical argument, each of them sufficient" 1(.".1. ;uplicate min!s. <et:s consider the following scenarios$ 7cenario 7(A >ickO9 is a human serial killer who enjo+s killing his !ictims in a articularl+ slow and ainful manner" Ae does all of that for fun, and he has do;ens of !ictims" 'od e(ists" -9&/ 7cenario 7+A >ickOB is an agent whose mind is like >ickO9:s mind is in 09 in the sense that >ickOB ercei!es, remembers, desires, feels, generall+ subjecti!el+ e( eriences, belie!es, intends and chooses in 0B, just the same as >ickO9 ercei!es, remembers, desires, feels, generall+ subjecti!el+ e( eriences, belie!es, intends, and chooses in scenario 09"-9)/ #hat includes, in articular, making the same free choices, and for the same reasons" 5or e(am le, if >ickO9 in 09 freel+ chooses to torture a little girl for fun, cut her limbs off and watch her bleed to death, >ickOB makes the same choice in scenario 0B" And the+ both feel the same amount of leasure in doing so" Aowe!er, >ickOB has no victims" Ae ne!er inflicted an+ ain or an+ suffering on an+one" Ae believes he has do;ens of !ictims, he has experienced the same as >ickO9 has e( erienced, but he has no !ictims" Instead, in scenario 0B there is a !er+ owerful creature 7 sa+ NokerOB 8, who tra ed >ickOB 7 who was still lanning to attack his first intended !ictim 7 in a sort of holodeck or similar en!ironment, in which >ickOB e( eriences what looks to him like interacting with eo le, torturing them, etc", but those aren:t real eo le$ the+:re just constructs of NokerOB:s mind and6or a de!ice made b+ NokerOB, which do not e( erience an+ suffering, ain, etc" In 0B, 'od e(ists" 7cenario 7/.

>ickOH is an agent whose mind is like >ickO9:s mind is in 09 in the sense described abo!e, who has !ictims who suffer the same as >ickO9:s !ictims in 09 7 their minds are also e(act du licates of those of >ickO9:s !ictims 8, etc" 'od does not e(ist" 7cenario 70. >ickOI is an agent whose mind is like >ickO9:s mind is in 09, in the sense described abo!e" Aowe!er, >ickOI has no victims" Ae ne!er inflicted ain or an+ suffering on an+one" Ae believes he has do;ens of !ictims, he has experienced the same as >ickO9 has e( erienced, but he has no !ictims" Instead, in scenario 0I there is a !er+ owerful entit+ 7 sa+ NokerOI 8, who tra ed >ickOI 7 who was still lanning to attack his first intended !ictim 7 in a sort of holodeck or similar en!ironment, in which >ickOI e( eriences what looks to him like interacting with eo le, torturing them, etc", but those aren:t real eo le$ the+:re just constructs of NokerOI:s mind and6or a de!ice made b+ NokerOI, which do not e( erience an+ suffering, ain, etc" In 0I, 'od does not e(ist" If we make now intuiti!e assessments of the res ecti!e >icks and their beha!ior, it:s clear that$ a. In 09, >ickO9 is a morall+ bad erson" $. In 0B, >ickOB is a morall+ bad erson, and e(actl+ as morall+ bad as >ickO9 is in 09" c. In 0H, >ickOH is a morall+ bad erson, and e(actl+ as morall+ bad as >ickO9 is in 09" !. In 0I, >ickOI is a morall+ bad erson, and e(actl+ as morall+ bad as >ickO9 is in 09" e. In 09, >ickO9 is beha!ing immorall+ when he:s torturing and6or killing his !ictims for fun" *. In 0B, >ickOB is beha!ing immorall+ when he e( eriences as if he:s torturing and6or killing !ictims for fun" 5urthermore, he:s is beha!ing e(actl+ as immorall+ as >ickO9 is beha!ing in 09, in the corres onding cases" g. In 0H, >ickOH is beha!ing immorall+ when he:s torturing and6or killing his !ictims for fun" 5urthermore, he:s beha!ing e(actl+ as immorall+ as >ickO9 is beha!ing in 09, in the corres onding cases" h. In 0I, >ickOI is beha!ing immorall+ when he e( eriences as if he:s torturing and6or killing !ictims for fun" 5urthermore, hes beha!ing e(actl+ as immorall+ as >ickO9 is beha!ing in the corres onding cases" More generall+, we are able to establish b+ reflection on our intuiti!e gras of the rele!ant moral conce ts-99/ and b+ means of assessing scenarios like 0980I and others, that whene!er two agents in different scenarios are such that their minds are alike in the sense described abo!e, then one of them is morall+ good or bad if and onl+ if the other one is 7 and to the same e(tent 8L one of them beha!es

immorall+ if and onl+ if the other one does and to the same e(tent, etc", and generall+ the+ ha!e the same moral ro erties regardless of an+ other factors, and in articular regardless of whether certain other agents 7 be it 'od or e!en !ictims in the case of immoral beha!ior 7 e(ist in the scenarios in 1uestion" ,ased on that, it seems clear that it:s extremely counterintuitive the claim that if 'od did not e(ist, then objecti!e moral !alues and duties would not e(ist" In other words, the first remise of Craigs metaethical argument flies on the fact of our intuitions, and indeed our gras of moral conce ts" Fow, in a re l+ to an objection raised b+ 0winburne, Craig claims that on his account, 'od e(ists necessaril+, so scenarios in which 'od does not e(ist are im ossible, and that would allegedl+ block 0winburnes objection" -r))/ 2ithout taking a stance on whether Craigs re l+ works against 0winburnes objection, we ma+ ask here$ 2ould that re l+, or a similar one, work against the objection to the first remise that I:m raising here, which is somewhat similar but not in terms of ossible worlds4 It seems clear that it would not, since what were assessing is whether if 'od did not e(ist, objecti!e moral !alues and duties would e(ist, and in order to assess that matter, we need to assess scenarios in which 'od does not e(ist, regardless of whether such scenarios are ossible" In fact, $raig himself gi!es arguments in su ort of the first remise of his metaethical argument that are based on h+ othetical scenarios in which 'od does not e(ist, and makes some assessments in those scenarios, claiming that in those cases, objecti!e moral !alues and duties would not e(ist" Aowe!er, in addition to not gi!ing an+ good reasons in su ort of such claims 7 which is what I argue in much of this essa+ 8, Craig fails to include in his assessment of the h+ othetical scenarios in which 'od does not e(ist the fact that his conclusion that in those cases, objecti!e moral !alues and duties would not e(ist, flies on the face of our intuitions" 5or instance, in su ort of the second remise, Craig uses the ort e(am le of the Aolocaust, a ealing to moral intuitions and6or our gras of moral conce ts to su

the claim that the Aolocaust was immoral and would ha!e been immoral e!en if all humans belie!ed otherwise" #here is no roblem with that, but what Craig does not oint out is the fact that the same intuitions and6or gras of the conce ts also su ort the conclusion that the Aolocaust was immoral, and would ha!e been immoral even if humans were the only persons that actually exist. 0cenarios like 0980I, and the assessments I made abo!e, also make use of some scenarios in which 'od does not e(ist, and those assessments strongl+ su ort the conclusion that its not the case that if 'od did not e(ist, objecti!e moral !alues and duties would not e(ist" At this oint, someone might object to that assessment and claim that e!en though our moral intuitions constitute some e!idence in fa!or of the !iew that in some scenarios in which 'od does not e(ist,

objecti!e moral !alues and duties do e(ist, u on reflection and when also factoring in the argumentation ro!ided b+ Craig as e!idence, the o!erall e!idence su not e(ist, objecti!e moral !alues and duties would not e(ist" Aowe!er, thats not e!en remotely lausible" %urel+ for e(am le, our assessment that, sa+, a erson who tortures children for leasure e!er+ single da+ is a morall+ e!il erson is extremely intuiti!el+ lausible" *n the other hand, some of the im licit or e( licit h+ otheses on which Craig bases his arguments in su ort of the first remise of the metaethical argument are remarkabl+ weak" Again, urel+ for e(am le, e!en before considering an+ of the arguments that I will gi!e below, Craig:s assum tion that objecti!e moral !alues and duties ha!e or at least lausibl+ ha!e an ontological foundation that meets conditions &8H 7 or e!en &8B, in case Craig does not assume condition H 7 is not nearl+ as lausible as our assessment about the moral e!ilness of the sadistic torturer in 1uestion" Aence, the considerations made abo!e do constitute !er+ strong e!idence against the first remise of Craig:s metaethical argument, that is, !er+ strong e!idence that the remise in 1uestion is false" -99/ <et us now turn to the other issue$ >o scenarios like 0980I and6or considerations similar to those made abo!e, also work against Craigs theistic foundational account, and not merel+ his first remise4 It seems to me that the+ lausibl+ do, for the reasons I will e( lain below" 1(.".". n*ormati&e i!enti*ication accounts an! conceptual pro$lems. <et:s sti ulate that$ 1. *(D, ?) is a h+ othesis that D is identified with ?, for some D and ?" In other words, *(D, ?) is a foundational account of D in terms of ?, in the sense of informati!e identification" ". 0(D, ?, r) is a h+ othetical scenario, defined b+ some conditions C(0(D, ?, r)), and which are not contradictor+" In other words, the conjunction of the conditions that define the scenario does not entail a contradiction" -r is an inde( number/ (. G(D, r) is a known, actuall+ true h+ othesis asserting that some concrete articular G in the actual world is (or was) D, or has (or had) D if D is a ro ert+" #his condition is not scenario8 de endent" It:s about something in the actual world, not actual from the ers ecti!e of some h+ othetical scenario" 5or e(am le, gi!en that we know that %ol %ot was a morall+ e!il erson, we ma+ ick G(moral e!ilness, &) to be :%ol %ot was morall+ e!il:, or e1ui!alentl+ :%ol %ot had the ro ert+ moral e!ilness:" Another e(am le$ 'i!en that I know that the li1uid that is in the bottle on m+ desk is water, I ma+ ick G(water, K) to be :#he li1uid in the bottle on m+ desk is water:-9B/" And since we know orts the claim that in those scenarios, objecti!e moral !alues and duties do not e(ist, and generall+ the contention that if 'od did

that the li1uid that fills the %acific *cean is water, we ma+ ick G(water, JB) to be :#he li1uid that fills the %acific *cean is water": -9B/ 2e sa+ that condition .(#(F' G)) obtains if the following conditions obtain for some r$ a(F' G' r). 5rom C(0(D, ?, r))QG(D, r), using the conce t of D, it follows that there is6was some concrete articular C in 0(D, ?, r) such that C is6was6has6had D in 0(D, ?, r) but it:s not the case that C is (or was6has6had) ? in 0(D, ?, r)" $(F' G' r). 5rom C(0(D, ?, r))QG(D, r), using the conce t of D, no contradiction follows" c(F' G' r). 5rom C(0(D, ?, r))QG(D, r), without using the conce t of D, it does not follow that there is6was some concrete articular C in 0(D, ?, r) such that C is6was6has6had D in 0(D, ?, r) but it:s not the case that C is6was6has6had ? in 0(D, ?, r)" !(F' G' r). 5rom C(0(D, ?, r))QG(D, r), e!en using the conce t of D, it does not follow that there is6was some concrete articular C in the actual world such that C is6was6has6had D in the actual world, but it:s not the case that C is6was6has6had ? in the actual world" @nder those definitions, the general h+ othesis in 1uestion is as follows$ C1A If F(*(D, ?)) obtains, then *(D, ?) is not a true foundational account of D in terms of ?, in the sense of informati!e identification" I think C& is lausible because if F(*(D, ?)) obtains, identif+ing D with ? would seem to be in conflict with our understanding of the conce t of D" In other cases of ontological accounts in the sense of informati!e identification, like the h+ othesis that water is A)*, or the h+ othesis that heat is molecular motion, conce tual anal+sis is insufficient to establish the identities in 1uestion 7 we also need em irical findings 8, but on the other hand, the h+ otheses in 1uestion do not seem to conflict with our gras of the rele!ant conce t" ,elow, I will show that if C& is true, Craig:s foundational account is false" ,ut before that, let:s assess an objection$ #$%ection 1(.".".1 i. $ is implausible because it includes scenarios -./, 0, r1 that are metaphysically impossible. ii. 2 hypothesis $% just like $% but restricted to metaphysically possible scenarios is true. iii. 2ny scenario in which God does not exist is metaphysically impossible if God exists. ReplyA %oint iii" is usuall+ acce ted in m+ e( erience, but I do not see wh+ it should be, under a 'C, conce tion of 'od" At least, that would ha!e to be argued for, and a mere claim that necessar+ e(istence is a great8making ro ert+ would not seem ersuasi!e in m+ !iew" Also, defining the term :'od: in modal terms (instead of concei!abilit+ terms, in order to a!oid the issue of whether

concei!abilit+ is coe(tensi!e with meta h+sical ossibilit+) in a wa+ such that oint iii" is guaranteed, ma+ well gi!e rise to coherence difficulties 7 a art from an+ coherence issues with conce t of the 'C, itself, some of which I will briefl+ comment on later" 0till, let:s grant iii" for the sake of the argument, and let:s sa+ that the 'C, is such that if 'od actuall+ e(ists, 'od e(ists necessaril+" #hen, oint i" still seems !er+ im lausible, since the conflict between the allegedl+ informati!e identification between D and ? and our gras of the rele!ant conce ts seems to remain, regardless of whether 0(D, ?, r) is ossible" Moreo!er, there seems to be no good reason wh+ the -assumed/ necessit+ of 'od if 'od e(ists should immuni;e theistic h+ otheses of informati!e identification from challenges based on our gras of the rele!ant conce ts, while any other account of informati!e identification that does not osit an allegedl+ necessar+ being would be subject to such challenges" *n that note, and for that matter, someone might sa+ that to be kind is to resemble 'od" 0hould we acce t that there is no wa+ of challenging such an account on the basis on our gras of the conce t of kindness and some h+ othetical scenarios just because 'od -we assume/ is necessar+ if he e(ists4 #hat seems very im lausible" 'enerall+, it seems !er+ lausible to me that we ma+ ro erl+ challenge an+ account of informati!e identification on the basis of our gras of the rele!ant conce ts" C& is an attem t to ca ture somewhat more recisel+ at least one of the wa+s in which we ma+ raise some of those challenges based on our gras of the rele!ant conce ts" Fow, C& seems lausible as far as I can tell, but e!en if C& were to be rejected for some reason, I would still intuiti!el+ reckon that h+ otheses of informati!e identification ma+ ro erl+ be challenged on the basis of the rele!ant conce ts e!en if not on the basis of C&" 0till, gi!en that C& a ears lausible and I see no good reason to reject it, I will make an argument against Craig:s foundational account of moral goodness based on C&" 1(.".".1. <oo!ness ,ithout <o!. 0o, let:s argue against Craig:s ontological account based on C&" Craig holds that moral !alues are grounded in 'od:s nature, and 'od is the aradigm of goodness" -rB/ Ae also identifies moral obligations with 'od:s commands" 0o, on his account, it seems that to be morall+ good is to resemble 'od in some wa+, and to be morall+ obligator+ is to be commanded b+ 'od" In other words, moral goodness would be identified with some uns ecified resemblance to 'od, and moral duties with 'od:s commands"

<et:s assume at least for now that the conce t of resemblance to 'od is not contradictor+ 7 else, Craig:s ontological account fails just because of that" <et:s also assume that in a gi!en scenario, nothing resembles 'od in the rele!ant sense unless 'od e(ists, since that seems to be Craig:s osition 7 else, it seems that resemblance to 'od would not re1uire the e(istence of 'od, and the account would be com atible with non8theism lus the truth of ordinar+ moral assessments, like the assessment that it:s immoral for a erson to kill eo le for fun" <et D& be moral goodness, and let ?& be resemblance to 'od (in some sense of resemblanceL it works for an+ sense)" <et G(D&, &) be R'iorgio %erlasca beha!ed in a morall+ good wa+ when he made some choices to sa!e eo le from the Fa;isR-r)9/ In case someone objects to this articular e(am le for whate!er reason, an+ known actual e(am le of morall+ good beha!ior b+ a human being will do" <et:s consider *(D&, ?&), and define scenario 0(D&, ?& &) b+ conditions C(0(D&, ?&, &)), which are as follows$ C(0(D&, ?&, &))8&$ 'od does not e(ist" C(0(D&, ?&, &))8)$ #here was entit+ 'iorgioO& in 0(D&, ?&, &) such that the mind of 'iorgioO& was like the mind of 'iorgio %erlasca in the actual world in the sense that 'iorgioO& belie!ed, remembered, ercei!ed, desired, felt, generall+ subjecti!el+ e( erienced, intended, chose, etc", in 0(D&, ?&, &), the same as 'iorgio %erlasca belie!ed, remembered, ercei!ed, desired, felt, generall+ subjecti!el+ e( erienced, intended, chose, etc", in the real world" #hat includes in articular making the same free choices in the corres onding cases, and for the same reasons" -9)/ Fow, from C(0(D&, ?&, &)) (i"e", the conjunction of the conditions), lus G(D&, &), and our conce t of moral goodness, no contradiction seems to follow, but it follows that 'iorgioO& beha!ed in a morall+ good wa+ in 0(D&, ?&, &) when he made some choices to sa!e eo le from the Fa;is" In articular, it follows that 'iorgioO& had at least some moral goodness in 0(D&, ?&, &), but had no resemblance to 'od in 0(D&, ?&, &), since 'od does not e(ist in 0(D&, ?&, &)" *n the other hand, we are not able to reach that conclusion onl+ from C(0(D&, ?&, &)) lus G(D&, &), but without using the conce t of moral goodness" For are we able to conclude, from C(0(D&, ?&, &)) lus G(D&, &), e!en using the conce t of moral goodness, that there is some agent in the actual world that had some moral goodness but has no resemblance to 'od" 'ranted, someone might sa+ that there might be some hidden entailments somewhere, but there is no good reason to assume so" 0o, it seems that F(*(D&, ?&)) obtains, and so if C& obtains 7 which seems lausible 8, then Craig:s foundational account is false"

1(.".".". Water ,ithout ="#In this subsection, I will address a otential objection to the objection to Craig:s metaethical account that I raise abo!e based on a arallel with the account of water and A)*" 0o, let D) be water, and ?) be A)*, and let:s tr+ to construct some 0(D), ?), )) based on which we would conclude that F(*(D), ?))) obtains, and so if C& obtains, then the account of water in terms of A)* is false" <et G(D), )) be R#he li1uid that fills the Atlantic *cean is water"R, which is true oil s ills notwithstanding-9B/" #he choice of the Atlantic *cean, of course, is of no im ortance, as long as the claim meets the re1uirement of oint 9" abo!e" 0o, how might someone go about arguing that F(*(D), ?))) obtains4 Mirroring the construction I made abo!e, someone might tr+ the to define C(0(D), ?), ))) as the conjunction of the following conditions$ C(0(D), ?), )))8&$ *(+gen does not e(ist" C(0(D), ?), )))8)$ #here is a li1uid <) such that <) has in 0(D), ?), )) the same h+sical ro erties as the li1uid that fills the Atlantic *cean 7 or, if needed, the same h+sical ro erties as a s ecific sam le from that the li1uid in the Atlantic *cean that is water" Aowe!er$ i. If being com osed of A)* 7 i"e", two h+drogen atoms and one o(+gen atom 7 is a h+sical ro ert+, and the definition of C(0(D), ?), )))8) is to be understood as using the actual world as a means to choose the ro erties of <) in 0(D), ?), )), then from the conditions C(D), ?), )) it follows that o(+gen does e(ist in 0(D), ?), )) and also that it:s not the case that o(+gen e(ists in 0(D), ?), ))" 0o, 0(D), ?), )) is contradictor+, and so it ma+ not be used to su ?)))" ii. If being com osed of A)* 7 i"e", two h+drogen atoms and one o(+gen atom 7 is a h+sical ro ert+, and the definition of C(0(D), ?), )))8) is not to be understood as in i. abo!e, then it:s unclear how to construe it" #here are different otential !ariants" ,ut moreo!er, in an+ case, if 0(D), ?), )) is not contradictor+, then it remains the case that from C(0(D), ?), ))), it follows that <) is not com osed of A)* in 0(D), ?), )) 7 since o(+gen does not e(ist in the scenario 8, and since the h+sical ro erties of <) in 0(D), ?), )) are the same as the h+sical ro erties of the rele!ant li1uid in the actual world, the li1uid in 1uestion is not com osed of A)*" 5rom that and G(D), )), it follows that the li1uid that fills the Atlantic *cean, in the actual world, is water but is not A)*" ,ut then, F(*(D), ?))) is not su (D), ?), )) does not obtain" orted b+ 0(D), ?), )), because condition d" ort F(*(D),

iii. If being com osed of A)* is not a h+sical ro ert+, then an+one raising this objection would need to s ecif+ what the+ mean b+ : h+sical ro ert+:, or otherwise define the ro erties the+ want to assign to <), so that the matter ma+ be assessed" %ersonall+, I:!e not found a !ariant that worksL i"e", I:!e not found an+ wa+ of showing that F(*(D), ?))) obtains, b+ defining the rele!ant ro erties in an+ wa+" 'ranted, someone might tr+ to define different scenarios, or erha s tr+ to show that C& entails that some other generall+ acce ted informati!e identification 7 i"e", other than :water is A)*: 8 would be false, but that would ha!e to be defended" 'ranted, also, it:s not an eas+ matter, but so far, I:!e not been able to figure out an+ wa+ of showing that C& would ro!e too much if true, and it remains lausible for the reasons I ga!e abo!e that C& is in fact true" 1(.".(. Circularity. As I mentioned earlier, Craig holds that moral !alues are grounded in 'od:s nature, and 'od is the aradigm of goodness" -rB/ 0o, on his account, it seems that to be morall+ good is to resemble 'od in some wa+" Also, Craig defines the term :'od: as Rthe greatest concei!able beingR" -rH/-rHb/-r)B/ #hat definition seems to assume a shared conce t of greatness that ma+ be used to define the term :'od:" #hat seems doubtful to me" %urel+ for e(am le, I would be inclined to sa+ that Alice is a greater erson than ,ob if and onl+ if Alice is morall+ better than ,ob" In other words, at least when it comes to greatness as a person, that seems to be about moral goodness as I would use the words" If ,ob and Alice are e1uall+ morall+ good, I wouldn:t sa+ that Alice is a greater erson than ,ob just because she is, sa+, more owerful or knowledgeable than ,ob, all other things e1ual" I might in those cases sa+ that Alice has greater ower or knowledge, but not that she:s a greater erson" Fow, if there is a shared conce t of greatness and if greatness de ends, when it comes to ersonal beings, onl+ on moral goodness 7 and ma(imal greatness is thus e1ui!alent to moral erfection 8, then there might be for all we know lent+ of ossible ersonal beings who are ma(imall+ great" Moreo!er, in that case, greatness does not entail ro erties like being articularl+ owerful" ?et, Craig and man+ other theist hiloso hers a ear to understand greatness !er+ differentl+, talking about se!eral great8making ro erties, e!en if sometimes Craig considers it difficult to figure out some of those" -r)B/ 2hile it:s true that, as Craig oints out-r)B/, the mere fact that eo le disagree on which ro erties are great8making does not im l+ that there is no fact of the matter, this s ecific e(am le would seem to show more than mere disagreement about whether a certain ro ert+ is great8making,

but seems to re!eal different conce ts, since he:s clearly not onl+ talking about moral goodness, and I would onl+ be talking about that as I gras the conce t" 'ranted, someone might sa+ that ontological greatness, e!en when a lied to humans, is not the same as being a greater erson" ,ut I do not seem to ha!e a conce t of ontological greatnessL I understand the idea of being a greater erson, or the idea of being greater with res ect to some other ro ert+ other than ersonhood 7 like knowledge or ower 8, but that:s it" If there is no such shared conce t of greatness, it seems that Craig:s conce t of 'od ought to be rejected, and then the same goes for his foundational metaethical account" 'ranted, someone might sa+ that I ha!e failed to gras the conce t, or raise some other objection" I remain ske tical about the conce t of a :greatest concei!able being:, but let:s let that ass, and let:s assume for the sake of the argument that there is such shared conce t of greatness, and that it:s not limited to moral goodness" #hen, there seems to be the following roblem with his foundational account$ a. In his debate with 0am Aarris, Craig claims that it follows from the !er+ conce t of 'od as the greatest concei!able being that 'od is morall+ good -rHb/, and that someone who understands the conce t of 'od reali;es that asking wh+ 'od is good is like asking wh+ bachelors are unmarried" #hus, according to this, the e( ression :'od is morall+ good: is analytical, and the anal+ticit+ in 1uestion is a arentl+ trans arent" $. Additionall+, Craig claims that to be -morall+/ good is a great8making ro ert+ [r25]-rHb/, and uncontro!ersiall+ so"[r26] c. 5urthermore, when addressing a : erfect island: objection to the ontological argument [r26], he gi!es an account of what the idea of the most erfect island would be 7 which he rejects, of course 8, and that would be an island that e(ists in e!er+ meta h+sicall+ 7 or broadl+ logicall+ 7 ossible world and has all of the ro erties that are great8making with res ect to islands" It seems that the idea of 'od is, according to Craig, that of a being that has all of the great8 making ro erties to a ma(imal degree and in e!er+ meta h+sicall+ ossible world" 'i!en that conce tion, it seems that Craig:s foundational account of moral goodness, in the sense of informati!e identification-9./, is as follows$ <1A #o be morall+ good is to resemble, in some rele!ant wa+, a being who e(ists in e!er+ meta h+sicall+ ossible world and who has all of the great8making ro erties to a ma(imall+ ossible degree in e!er+ ossible world" -9H/ ,ut there seems to a !icious circularit+ roblem" 5or e(am le, let:s sa+ that someone ro oses an ontological account in the sense of informati!e identification as follows$

31$ #o be an unmarried man is to resemble, in some rele!ant wa+, the uni1ue bachelor who e(ists at e!er+ ossible world" #hat would not be an informative identification" In addition to other ob!ious roblems with ,&, there seems to be a !icious circularit+ roblem, since ,& is trans arentl+ anal+ticall+ e1ui!alent to$ 31:A #o be an unmarried man is to resemble, in some rele!ant wa+, the uni1ue unmarried man who e(ists at e!er+ ossible world" #he !icious circularit+ roblem that I:m focusing on is inde endent from other roblems with the account, like the non8e(istence of such necessar+ bachelor" 5or e(am le, the following two accounts also would be !iciousl+ circular, as a proposed informative identification. 3"A #o be an unmarried man is to be a bachelor" 3":A #o be an unmarried man is to be an unmarried man" Feither ,) nor ,): ro!ides an+ kind of informati!e identification, at least not to someone who understands the meaning of the words in the sentences 7 though at least the+ ha!e the ad!antage of being true, unlike ,& and ,&:" Fow, going b+ Craig:s claims, <1 seems to be transparently analytically e3uivalent to$ <"$ #o be morall+ good is to resemble in some rele!ant wa+ a being who e(ists in e!er+ meta h+sicall+ ossible world and who is morall+ good to a ma(imal degree in e!er+ ossible world, and who also has all of the other great8making ro erties to a ma(imall+ ossible degree in e!er+ ossible world" -9H/ 0o, in addition to other roblems, Craig:s foundational account seems to suffer from a !icious circularit+ roblem" #hat said, I will from now on lea!e aside the arguments gi!en in this subsection, and will continue to raise objections to Craig:s metaethical argument, based on other, inde endent grounds" 1(.(. 7houl! ,e e1pect that o$%ecti&e moral &alues an!>or !uties ha&e an ontological *oun!ation' in the sense o* in*ormati&e i!enti*ication- -9./ Craig claims that e( lanations 7 and, resumabl+, ontological foundations 7 ha!e to sto somewhere -r&K/, so it:s clear that his own claims entail that some things are objecti!e and ha!e no ontological foundation in terms of informati!e identification 7 because the e( lanations sto somewhere" 0o, wh+ should we e( ect an ontological foundation in the sense of informati!e identification in the case of, sa+, moral goodness4 0hould we e( ect an ontological foundation of, sa+, ain4 Aow about, sa+, ha iness4 %leasure4 5ear4 Pindness4 Cruelt+4 =ules of !ulture ecking order4 =ules of wolf ecking order4 In an+ e!ent, Craig does not ro!ide an+ good reason to sus ect that such foundation is re1uired in the articular case of objecti!e moral !alues and6or duties"

Is it that su er!enient ro erties or states need an ontological foundation, erha s4 2h+4 ,ut if that is, and following the e(am les of water and heat, it seems that, sa+, moral goodness would lausibl+ be identified with the mental states on which it su er!enes, so for e(am le, moral obligations would su er!ene on a list of states of mind (including knowledge, intentions, etc")" In an+ case, Craig has not met the burden of e( laining wh+ we should think that there is such a foundation" 0till, e!en assuming for the sake of the argument that there is an ontological foundation of objecti!e moral !alues and there is an ontological foundation of objecti!e moral duties, the 1uestions of whether we should e( ect that such foundations meet conditions *5*ME&8H and *5*M>&8H 7 or e!en conditions &8B, just in case Craig does not re1uire condition H 8 (i"e", 1uestions ) and ):), remain" Craig has not gi!en us an+ good reasons to think so" ,ut let:s consider some other e(am le, and assess whether the accounts in 1uestion 7 or rather, the foundations the+ osit 7 meet Craig:s conditions, or whether we should e( ect that the foundations in other cases meet those conditions" -9I/ 1(.+. =eat an! Craigs *oun!ational con!itions. <et:s consider the account of heat in terms of molecular motion" Aeat is identified with molecular motion, but molecular motion does not meet all of Craig:s condition *5*ME&8H"-9I/ In articular, the fact is that there is no aradigm of heat, so molecular motion does not meet condition H" 0omeone might suggest that some ast cases of molecular motion are the aradigmatic object, but that seems absurdl+ im lausible" Aow would a ast state of molecular motion be a aradigm of molecular motion4 Moreo!er, that:s clearl+ not what the account of heat in terms of molecular motion actuall+ holds" %erha s, someone might suggest that ha!ing a aradigmatic e(am le of a molecule would suffice, but that does not work, either" Aow would a molecule be a aradigm of molecular motion* Moreo!er, there does not seem to e(ist a aradigmatic e(am le of molecules, either 7 not that that would seem to suffice" 2ould a water molecule be a aradigmatic e(am le4 *r ma+be a methane molecule4 It seems extremely lausible that neither of them would be" #r+ing to go into subatomic articles, etc", would not be of hel , either, and for similar reasons" In short, molecular motion does not meet condition H" ,ut then, wh+ should we e( ect that the ontological foundation of objecti!e moral !alues and6or objecti!e moral duties meet condition H, if there is such a foundation4 #he burden would be on the defender of condition H"

%erha s, someone might insist that heat is identified with actual molecular motion, resent or ast, or erha s future too de ending on the theor+ of time" Aowe!er, that too does not gi!e us a paradigm of heat, so condition H still would not obtain" 0o, in an+ case, molecular motion does not meet condition H" 0till, perhaps Craig does not demand condition H" In an+ case, condition H is not met, so lets lea!e condition H aside, and lets focus on the other conditions" >oes molecular motion meet all of the other conditions4 If it does not, then we ma+ ask$ wh+ should we e( ect that an ontological foundation of objecti!e moral !alues meet such conditions, if there is such a foundation4 ,ut if molecular motion does meet conditions &8B, then in articular the account of heat in terms of molecular motion is identif+ing actual cases of heat with actual cases of molecular motion 7 not with some abstract ideal molecular motion 7 and a arentl+ also heat in -some/ counterfactual scenarios with molecular motion in those counterfactual scenarios" Aowe!er, in that case, and mirroring the case of heat and molecular motion, erha s actual cases of moral goodness and obligations ma+ be ro erl+ identified with some actual mental states or traits, including erha s cases of actual intent, choices, etc", describable b+ non8moral conce ts, and similarl+ for counterfactuals" More recisel+, moral goodness would be identified with the ro ert+ of ha!ing such8and8such mental states, traits, and to ha!e a moral obligation would be to ha!e such8and8such states, etc" #hat account would seem not to re1uire 'od, and Craig ro!ides no good reason to rule this out" At this oint, someone might ask things like$ :,ut how would moral goodness just attach itself to some actual mental states or traits, etc"4:, suggesting that there is a roblem with that suggested account" ,ut for that matter, one ma+ similarl+ ask$ :,ut how would heat just attach itself to molecular motion4:" #he roblem with that kind of 1uestions is that, on the heat account, heat just is molecular motion" And in the suggestion in the moral case, to be morall+ good just is to ha!e some actual mental states6 ro erties 7 including intent, choices, etc" In brief$ a. Molecular motion does not meet condition H, which Craig robabl+ demands 7 though that:s not entirel+ clear, as I mentioned earlier" $. If molecular motion fails to meet one or more of the other conditions, then wh+ would an ontological foundation of objecti!e moral !alues, if there is one, meet all of those conditions4 A similar 1uestion ma+ be asked with regard to objecti!e moral duties" Craig ro!ides no good reason to think it:s re1uired in either case"

c. If molecular motion meets conditions &8B, then in articular the account of heat in terms of molecular motion is identif+ing actual cases of heat with actual cases of molecular motion, not with some abstract ideal molecular motion, and also heat in -some/ counterfactual scenarios with molecular motion in those counterfactual scenarios" ,ut in that case, mirroring the case of heat and molecular motion, erha s actual objecti!e moral goodness is identified with some actual mental states, traits, etc" 8 and a similar result holds for moral obligations, and for counterfactuals" At this oint, a defender of Craig:s argument might sa+ that those accounts do not work, because -allegedl+/ some ro erties are valued and others are not, and then, moral goodness, as a !alued ro ert+, is not the same as an+ ro ert+ that can be entirel+ described b+ non8moral conce ts, which is not !alued" A somewhat similar objection might be raised in the case of moral obligations" I will address the matters later" 1(./. Water an! Craigs *oun!ational con!itions. <et:s now turn to the account of water in terms of A)*" 2ater is identified with A)*, but A)* does not meet all of Craig:s condition *5*ME&8H"-9I/ At least, A)* does not meet condition H, since there is no concrete aradigm of A)*, no aradigmatic molecule" Fow, someone might suggest that water molecules are all interchangeable because somehow the+ ha!e some identical intrinsic ro erties 7 or something like that 8, so an+ of them will do as a aradigm" Aowe!er, e!en lea!ing aside isoto es, the roblem of defining :intrinsic: and other issues, that does not seem to work, either, since$ . A aradigm a arentl+ has to determine what water is" ,ut a li1uid is not water in !irtue of being like some s ecific, actual molecule" . #he account of water in terms of A)* does not depend on whether all molecules of water have identical intrinsic properties. In fact, the account would not fail if, in the future, we were to find out that, sa+, subatomic articles ha!e some differences 7 and then, so do A)* molecules 8, which are not detectable b+ the e( eriments carried out so far but re1uire far more ad!anced technolog+ and resources" 0o, e!en assuming for the sake of the argument that condition H would somehow be met if there are intrinsicall+ identical articles, the oint is that we would ha!e a satisfactor+ account of water in terms of informati!e identification even if the particles were not intrinsically identical, and condition 4 were not met. 0o, in short, lausibl+ condition H is not met in the case of A)*, either, but moreo!er, the account seems to work regardless of whether it:s met"

0ince condition H is lausibl+ not met in the case of A)*, wh+ should we e( ect that the ontological foundation or foundations of objecti!e moral !alues and6or duties meet condition H4 Moreo!er, if the account of water in terms of A)* would be satisfactor+ regardless of whether condition H is met, wh+ should a ro osed account of objecti!e moral !alues and duties in terms of informati!e identification that does not meet condition H be rejected just because of it4 #he burden would be on the defender of condition H" Also if someone suggested an ideal molecule of water, or some %latonic form, that would be in conflict with either condition ) and6or condition &L moreo!er, if that were acce table in the case of water, wh+ not in the moral case4 In an+ case, the fact is that A)* does not meet condition H" 0till, perhaps Craig does not demand condition H" =egardless, condition H is not met, so let:s lea!e condition H aside, and let:s focus on the other conditions" >oes A)* motion meet all of the other conditions4 If it does not, then we ma+ ask$ wh+ should we e( ect that an ontological foundation of objecti!e moral !alues meet such conditions, if there is such a foundation4 ,ut if A)* does meet conditions &8B, then in articular the account of water in terms of A)* is identif+ing actual water with actual ,%) and a arentl+ also water in -some/ counterfactual scenarios with A)* in those counterfactual scenarios, in which cases the conditions &8B should be understood relati!e to those scenarios" Aowe!er, in that case, and mirroring the case of water and A)*, erha s actual cases of moral goodness and obligations ma+ be ro erl+ identified with some actual mental states or traits, including erha s cases of actual intent, choices, etc", describable b+ non8moral conce ts, and similarl+ for counterfactuals" More recisel+, moral goodness would be identified with the ro ert+ of ha!ing such8 and8such mental states, traits, and to ha!e a moral obligation would be to ha!e such8and8such states, etc" #hat account would seem not to re1uire 'od, and Craig ro!ides no good reason to rule this out" At this oint, someone might ask things like$ :,ut how would moral goodness just attach itself to some actual mental states or traits, etc"4:, suggesting that there is a roblem with that suggested account" ,ut for that matter, one ma+ similarl+ ask$ :,ut how would water just attach itself to A)*4:" #he roblem with that kind of 1uestions is that, on the water account, water just is A)*" And in the suggestion in the moral case, to be morall+ good just is to ha!e some actual mental states6 ro erties 7 including intent, choices, etc" In brief$

a. A)* does not meet condition H, which Craig robabl+ demands 7 though that:s not entirel+ clear, as I mentioned earlier" $. If A)* fails to meet one or more of the other conditions, then wh+ would an ontological foundation of objecti!e moral !alues, if there is one, meet all of those conditions4 A similar 1uestion ma+ be asked with regard to objecti!e moral duties" Craig ro!ides no good reason to think it:s re1uired in either case" c. f A)* meets conditions &8B, then in articular the account of water in terms of A)* is identif+ing actual water with actual ,%), and also water in -some/ counterfactual scenarios with A)* in those counterfactual scenarios" ,ut in that case, mirroring the case of water and A)* erha s actual objecti!e moral goodness is identified with some actual mental states, traits, etc" 8 and a similar result holds for moral obligations, and for counterfactuals" At this oint, a defender of Craig:s argument might sa+ that those accounts do not work, because -allegedl+/ some ro erties are valued and others are not, and then, moral goodness, as a !alued ro ert+, is not the same as an+ ro ert+ that can be entirel+ described b+ non8moral conce ts, which is not !alued" A somewhat similar objection might be raised in the case of moral obligations" I will address the matter later" 1(.0. 7ick $ir!s an! Craigs *oun!ational con!itions. <ets consider the h+ othesis that objecti!e bird illness does e(ist, and which means or is at least e1ui!alent to the following conditions" #3 1A 0tatements 7 or judgments, or whate!er one calls them 7 of the form 3D is ill, where D is a bird, are objecti!e, in the ordinar+ sense of the term 3objecti!e mentioned abo!e" 5or instance, if someone claims that ,ob the bird is ill 7 ,ob is a s ecific bird 8, then there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether that claim is true, and so on" #o use Craigs own distinction, whether ,ob is ill is matter of fact, not a matter of o inion" #3 "A 0ome statements of the form 3D is ill, are true, where D is an actual bird" 0o, objecti!e bird illness does e(ist" 0o, we ma+ ask about the ontological foundation of bird illness" ,ut erha s, someone might sa+ that illness is just the absence of health, and as such it doesn:t re1uire an ontological foundation" ,ut then, we ma+ ask about the ontological foundation of bird health" It seems that it does not meet condition H, one wa+ or another" #here seems to be no aradigmatic case of an ill or a health+ bird, for instance"

'ranted, someone might claim that ro er function re1uires 'od, or something like that, and then claim that the ontological foundation of bird health is also 'od, or 'od:s choices, or something along those lines" ,ut that would ha!e to be argued for" -9J/2ithout that, there is no good reason to belie!e that if objecti!e bird illness or health has an ontological foundation, the foundation meets condition H, and it seems im lausible" ,ut if the ontological foundation in 1uestion 7 assuming there is one 7 fails to meet condition H, what about the other conditions4 As in the case of water and heat, we ma+ consider two cases$ 1. If the ontological foundation of bird illness or health 7 whate!er it might be, assuming there is one 7 fails to meet one or more of the conditions &8B, wh+ would a foundation of objecti!e moral !alues or duties 7 if there is one 7 to meet all of them4 ". If the ontological foundation of bird illness or health 7 whate!er it might be, assuming there is one 7 meets conditions &8B but not condition H, it seems that the foundation is lausibl+ actual states or e!ents -or h+ othetical ones in counterfactual scenarios/, and then a arallel for moral goodness and moral duties seems to be a!ailable, as described in the cases of water and heat" 1(.2. <reen stu** an! Craigs *oun!ational con!itions. As we saw earlier, objecti!e color does e(istL here, to sim lif+, let:s consider objecti!e green onl+" #he h+ othesis that objecti!e green 7 or greenness, if one refers 7 does e(ist, means the same as the conjunction of the following two conditions, or is at least e1ui!alent to it" #<1A 0tatements 7 or judgments, or whate!er one calls them 7 of the form 3D is green, are objecti!e, in the ordinar+ sense of the term 3objecti!e mentioned abo!e" 5or instance, if someone claims that the cucumber on the table is green, then there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether that claim is true, and so on" #o use Craigs own distinction, whether the cucumber on the table is green is not a matter of o inion, or a matter of taste" It:s a matter of fact" #<"A 0ome statements of the form 3D is green are true, where D is an actual object" 0o, objecti!e green e(ists" ,ut is there an ontological foundation of objecti!e green, matching Craig:s conditions4 -9I/ It seems lausible that there is not, for the following reasons$ a. 0ince objecti!e green e(isted long before there were an+ humans, an+ ontological foundation that is some actual humans, or some as ect or state of some actual humans, would not match condition )" $. Ideal things and6or abstract objects are not an o tion, due to conditions & and )" c. 0 ecific, actual hotons in the ast, or resent, !er+ lausibl+ would not meet condition H"

!. 0 ecific, actual objects with certain reflecti!e ro erties in the ast or resent would lausibl+ not meet condition H, either" In articular, on an account in terms of wa!elengths, light, etc" 8 which is more or less common, I think 8, the ontological foundation of objecti!e green would not meet condition H" As for the other conditions, it seems to meet them as long as the account identifies actual instances of green with actual instances of some reflecti!e6emitting ro erties, etc", and makes similar identifications in -some/ counterfactual scenarios" Aowe!er, in that case, a similar account ma+ be offered in the cases of objecti!e moral goodness and objecti!e moral duties, as e( lained in the anal+sis of the cases of water and heat, and Craig has ro!ided no good reason to block that account" At this oint, a defender of Craig:s argument might sa+ that those accounts do not work, because -allegedl+/ some ro erties are valued and others are not, and then, moral goodness, as a !alued ro ert+, is not the same as an+ ro ert+ that can be entirel+ described b+ non8moral conce ts, which is not !alued" 0imilarl+, he might sa+ that obligations are either !alued or normati!e, whereas ro erties describable b+ non8moral conce ts entirel+, are not" I will address the matter later" 1(.4. #$%ecti&e kin!ness an! Craigs *oun!ational con!itions. <et:s consider the h+ othesis that objecti!e kindness does e(ist, which means the same or is at least e1ui!alent to the following two conditions$ #H1A 0tatements 7 or judgments, or whate!er one calls them 7 of the form 3A is kind, are objecti!e, in the ordinar+ sense of the term 3objecti!e mentioned abo!e" 5or instance, if someone claims that Alice is a kind erson 7 Alice is a s ecific erson 8, then there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether that claim is true, and so on" #o use Craigs own distinction, whether Alice is a kind erson is not a matter of o inion, or a matter of taste" #H"A 0ome statements of the form 3A is kind:, or :A is a kind erson:, or :A is a kind agent:, or :A is beha!ing in a kind manner:, or :A beha!ed in a kind manner:, where A is an actual agent, or generall+ statements asserting that some actual entit+ A or some actual beha!ior , is kind, are true" #hen, since some humans are kind ersons, we can tell that objecti!e kindness does e(ist" 'ranted, someone might suggest that no human is a kind erson" ,ut that seems absurd" @nder a usual understanding of the conce t of kindness, some humans are ob!iousl+ kind eo le, e!en if clearl+ not ma(imall+ kind" Moreo!er, it:s enough that sometimes some humans are kind to other humans sometimes in order for objecti!e kindness to e(ist" 0o, we can tell, based on our obser!ation of human beha!ior that objecti!e kindness does e(ist" 2e ma+ then consider 1uestions such as$

a. >oes objecti!e kindness ha!e an ontological foundation, in the rele!ant sense, so that there is a ro er ontological account of kindness in terms of informati!e identification4 $. If the answer to a" is affirmati!e, does the ontological foundation of objecti!e kindness meet all of Craig:s conditions4 ,efore assessing those 1uestions, let:s oint out 7 just in case, considering some otential objections 7 that kindness is akin to moral goodness in the sense that it su er!enes on mental ro erties of an agent described b+ conce ts other than the conce t of kindness" 5or e(am le, let:s sa+ that A&9 is an agent that ercei!es, remembers, desires, feels, generall+ subjecti!el+ e( eriences, belie!es, intends and chooses in scenario 0&9 the same as A&B ercei!es, remembers, desires, feels, generall+ subjecti!el+ e( eriences, belie!es, intends and chooses in scenario 0&B" #hat includes their making the same free choices in the res ecti!e cases, and for the same reasons" #hen, its clear that A&9 is a kind erson if and onl+ if A&B is a kind erson" Moreo!er, the two are kind to the same degree 7 or unkind to the same degree, if the+ ha en to be unkind ersons" In other words, if their minds are a match in all of that, then the+re also a match with res ect to kindness" <ets now address 1uestions a" and b"$ a. >oes objecti!e kindness ha!e an ontological foundation, in the rele!ant sense, so that there is a ro er ontological account of kindness in terms of informati!e identification4 I dont know" I wonder$ 2h+ would objecti!e kindness ha!e such an ontological foundation4 And if objecti!e kindness does not ha!e an ontological foundation, wh+ would objecti!e moral goodness ha!e one4 ,ut lets assume for now that objecti!e kindness does ha!e an ontological foundation in the rele!ant sense, and lets turn to the second 1uestion" $. If the answer to a" is affirmati!e, does the ontological foundation of objecti!e kindness meet all of Craig:s conditions4 Again, I do not see wh+ it would" In articular, lets consider the fifth condition 7 though, granted, it:s not certain that Craig re1uires it" #hat condition, in the case of moral goodness, is the following condition$ #D#M?/A D (or at least some as ect, or state of D, etc") ro!ides a aradigm, a measure based on which moral goodness is determined, in such a wa+ that nothing would be morall+ good if D did not e(ist" Also, this aradigm is in some wa+ akin to the aradigmatic meter bar in the ast" In the case of kindness, the condition would be$

#D#H/A D (or at least some as ect, or state of D, etc") ro!ides a aradigm, a measure based on which kindness is determined, in such a wa+ that nothing would be kind if D did not e(ist" Also, this aradigm is in some wa+ akin to the aradigmatic meter bar in the ast" ,ut what might such be a aradigm of kindness4 At this oint, someone might claim that the ontological foundation of objecti!e kindness is 'od, that to be kind is to resemble 'od in some wa+, and that that ontological foundation meets all of condition H" ,ut wh+ should we belie!e or e!en sus ect that4 Aow man+ ontological foundations is 'od su to be4 0hould we also belie!e that if 'od did not e(ist, objecti!e kindness would not e(ist4 All of that would ha!e to be defended b+ the claimant" Alternati!el+, someone might claim that there is some rele!ant difference between objecti!e kindness and objecti!e moral goodness, so that the former lausibl+ has no ontological foundation or no ontological foundation that meets Craig:s conditions, but the latter lausibl+ does" ,ut that would ha!e to be argued for" Fow, Craig:s metaethical argument is an ontological metaethical argument, not a semantic one, and Craig does not seem to ress o en 1uestion arguments, at least not in that conte(t and to the best of m+ knowledge" ,ut erha s, someone might suggest something along those lines, claiming that there is a difference between moral goodness and kindness that is rele!ant when it comes to whether there are ontological foundations, or ontological foundations of a certain kind, and which is based on semanticall+ o en !s" closed 1uestions" Aowe!er, it:s not clear that there is such difference" 5or e(am le, the 1uestion :I know that >ick inflicts e(cruciating ain on children e!er+ da+, urel+ for leasure, but is he a morall+ good erson4: a ears no more o en to me than the 1uestion :I know that >ick inflicts e(cruciating ain on children e!er+ da+, urel+ for leasure, but is he a kind erson4: 'ranted, someone might claim 7 sa+ 7 that onl+ the first 1uestion is o en, or that both 1uestions abo!e are o en, but that that is onl+ a articular case when it comes to kindness, whereas other, rele!ant 1uestions about kindness are closed, but rele!ant 1uestions remain o en in the case of moral goodness" ,ut the burden would be on the claimant" As it is, it seems that the ontological foundation of objecti!e kindness, if there is one, does not meet condition H" 5erhaps, Craig does not demand that a foundation meets condition H" ,ut in an+ case, let:s consider the other four conditions$ 1. If objecti!e kindness has no ontological foundation, wh+ would objecti!e moral goodness ha!e one4 osed

)" If objecti!e kindness has an ontological foundation that fails to meet one or more of the conditions &8B, wh+ would objecti!e moral goodness ha!e one that does4 9" If objecti!e kindness has an ontological foundation that meets conditions &8B, since it does not meet condition H, lausibl+ it would be some combination of mental states or traits describable b+ conce ts other than the conce t of kindness, or moral conce ts" ,ut then, as in the case of water and heat, a similar account ma+ be offered in the case of moral !alue, and of moral dut+" 1(.5. #$%ecti&e cruelty an! Craigs *oun!ational con!itions. <et:s assess the h+ othesis that objective cruelty exists, which means or is at least e1ui!alent to the following two conditions$ #CR1A 0tatements 7 or judgments, or whate!er one calls them 7 of the form 3A is cruel, are objecti!e, in the ordinar+ sense of the term 3objecti!e mentioned abo!e" 5or instance, if someone claims that >ick is a cruel erson 7 >ick is a s ecific agent 8, then there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether that claim is true, and so on" #o use Craigs own distinction, whether >ick is cruel is not a matter of o inion, or a matter of taste" #CR"A 0ome statements of the form 3A is cruel:, or :A is a cruel:, or :A is a cruel agent:, or :A is beha!ing in a cruel manner:, are true, where A is an actual thing" Fow, it seems ob!iousl+ true that objecti!e cruelt+ does e(ist" ,efore we go on, and in order to reclude some otential objections, let:s establish first that cruelt+ is not an absence of kindness, or an absence of lo!e, or both, or a similar absence" #o see that, let:s consider the following scenario$ 7cenario 71"A In the Andromeda gala(+, ad!anced aliens made an enormousl+ intelligent c+borg, Cantarl+, belie!ing it would hel them de!elo new technologies more 1uickl+" ,ut the+ made a serious mistake during the design rocess" As a result, the+ ended u with a being who cares about no one:s interests but its own, and who is also willing to use an+ resources it finds to its ad!antage and with no regard for an+ other agent" Cantarl+ destro+ed its creators b+ the most efficient method it found, and took o!er their lanet" After that, it went to other lanets, and then to other lanetar+ s+stems, consuming resources and killing trillions of com le( li!ing organisms, just to use the resources for its goals, which are basicall+ controlling more s ace without ri!als, sur!i!ing for as long as it can without an+ suffering, and a number of means8to8ends goals" Fow, Cantarl+ has no kindness whatsoe!er" It also has no lo!e, or similar feelings" It does care about itself, but for no other agent" #he li!es or suffering of others isn:t e!en a consideration for Cantarl+"

*n the other hand, Cantarl+ is not interested in causing an+one an+ suffering for the sake of it, either" Cantarl+ sim l+ does not care at all about the suffering of others, one wa+ or another, and so it causes a lot of suffering, but alwa+s goes for the most efficient method of e(termination, and it:s usuall+ !er+ fast, com ared with most other alternati!es" *n a different gala(+, !er+ distant and !er+ similar to the Andromeda gala(+, there is another c+borg, Cindur, who is as intelligent as Cantarl+, and e1uall+ ad!anced scientificall+ and technologicall+" <ike Cantarl+, Cindur is com letel+ de!oid of kindness, lo!e, and an+ similar traits" It !alues itself just as Cantarl+ !alues itself, but that is all" Also, like Cantarl+ in the Andromeda gala(+, Cindur tra!els through the gala(+ where it resides, destro+ing other beings and consuming resources, in similar numbers and amounts as Cantarl+, res ecti!el+" Aowe!er, there is a the following difference between the two$ in most cases, when it finds ci!ili;ations, Cindur does not choose a fast method of e(termination" Instead, it kee s a good number of indi!iduals ali!e for the ur oses of torturing them for leasure, and it now has a collection of billions of intelligent, social and usuall+ kind beingsL those beings are tortured b+ Cindur for their entire li!es, onl+ for the ur ose of entertainment, and with no ho e of esca e" In scenario 0&), Cindur is more cruel than Cantarl+, e!en though the+ both e1uall+ lack all lo!e, kindness, and an+ similar ro ert+" Also, similarl+, in scenario 0&), Cindurs beha!ior is o!erall more cruel than Cantarl+s beha!ior, e!en though both Cindurs and Cantarl+s beha!iors are com letel+ de!oid of an+ lo!e or kindness" Aence, cruelt+ is not just the absence of one of those ro erties, or an+ similar one, since in that case Cindur and Cantarl+ would be e3ually cruel, and so would be their beha!iors" Fow, lets oint out 7 just in case 7 that cruelt+ su er!enes on mental ro erties described b+ conce ts other than the conce t of cruelt+" 5or e(am le, lets sa+ that A&H is an agent that ercei!es, remembers, desires, feels, generall+ subjecti!el+ e( eriences, belie!es, intends and chooses in scenario 0&H the same as A&I ercei!es, remembers, desires, feels, generall+ subjecti!el+ e( eriences, belie!es, intends and chooses in scenario 0&I" #hat includes their making the same free choices in the res ecti!e cases, and for the same reasons" #hen, its clear that A&H is a cruel erson if and onl+ if A&I is a cruel erson" Moreo!er, the two are cruel to the same degree, if the+ are cruel" In other words, if their minds are a match in all of that, then the+re also a match with res ect to cruelt+" <ets now ask$

a. >oes objecti!e cruelt+ ha!e an ontological foundation, in the rele!ant sense, so that there is a ro er ontological account of cruelt+ in terms of informati!e identification4 I dont know" I wonder$ 2h+ would objecti!e cruelt+ ha!e such an ontological foundation4 And if objecti!e cruelt+ does not ha!e an ontological foundation, wh+ would objecti!e moral goodness ha!e one4 ,ut lets assume for now that objecti!e cruelt+ does ha!e an ontological foundation in the rele!ant sense, and let:s turn to another 1uestion$ $. If the answer to a" is affirmati!e, does the ontological foundation of objecti!e cruelt+ meet all of Craigs conditions4 It seems clear that that is not the case" In articular, the fifth condition is robabl+ not met 7 though, granted, it:s not certain that Craig re1uires it" #hat condition, in the case of moral goodness, is the following condition$ #D#M?/A D (or at least some as ect, or state of D, etc") ro!ides a aradigm, a measure based on which moral goodness is determined, in such a wa+ that nothing would be morall+ good if D did not e(ist" Also, this aradigm is in some wa+ akin to the aradigmatic meter bar in the ast" In the case of kindness, the condition would be$ #D#CR/A D (or at least some as ect, or state of D, etc") ro!ides a aradigm, a measure based on which cruelt+ is determined, in such a wa+ that nothing would be cruel if D did not e(ist" Also, this aradigm is in some wa+ akin to the aradigmatic meter bar in the ast" ,ut what might be a aradigm of cruelt+4 At this oint, someone might claim that the ontological foundation of objecti!e cruelt+ is 'od, that to be kind is to be dissimilar to 'od in some wa+, and that that ontological foundation meets condition H" ,ut wh+ should we belie!e or e!en sus ect that4 Aow man+ ontological foundations is 'od su to be4 Incidentall+, it seems that the 'od o tion is not a!ailable to Craig in the case of cruelt+, for the following reason$ in his defense of his metaethical argument, Craig maintains that if 'od did not e(ist, ra e would be cruel but not morall+ wrong" -r)J/ 5or all of the reasons I:m gi!ing, I do not think Craig has ro!ided an+ good reasons to e!en suspect that ra e would not be morall+ wrong if 'od did not e(ist, but that aside, the fact that Craig sa+s that if 'od did not e(ist, ra e would still be cruel, indicates that Craig does not belie!e that the ontological foundation of objective cruelty is based on 'od" %erha s, someone sa+ argue that there is a difference between objecti!e moral goodness and objecti!e cruelt+ that is rele!ant in this conte(t, and so that onl+ objecti!e moral goodness has an ontological foundation meeting all of Craig:s conditions, including condition H" ,ut the burden would be on the osed

erson making that claim" =egarding the issue of o en !s" closed 1uestions, the case of cruelt+ is handled in a manner similar to the case of objecti!e kindness" 5erhaps, though, Craig does not re1uire condition H" ,ut in an+ case, if objecti!e cruelt+ has an ontological foundation, it does not meet condition H, so let:s consider the other conditions" Aere too, the matter is handled as in the case of objecti!e kindness" 1(.16. #$%ecti&e greatness. I alread+ raised an objection to Craigs foundational account based on the idea of greatness" ,ut in this art of the essa+, Im lea!ing aside for the sake of the argument an+thing in subsection &9"), in order to gi!e mutuall+ inde endent arguments against Craigs metaethical argument, so I will address the matter again, this time asking for an ontological foundation of objecti!e greatness" <et:s assess the h+ othesis that objective greatness exists, which means or is at least e1ui!alent to the following two conditions$ #<R1A 0tatements 7 or judgments, or whate!er one calls them 7 of the form 3A is great, are objecti!e, in the ordinar+ sense of the term 3objecti!e mentioned abo!e" 5or instance, if someone claims that Alice is a great erson 7 Alice is a s ecific agent 8, then there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether that claim is true, and so on" #o use Craigs own distinction, whether Alice is great is not a matter of o inion, or a matter of taste" #<R"A 0ome statements of the form 3A is great:, are true, where A is an actual thing" >oes objecti!e greatness e(ist4 Craig is committed to an affirmati!e answer, since his conce tion of 'od is the 'C, conce tion 7 i"e", Craig defines the term :'od: in that fashion 7 so 'od is b+ definition the greatest concei!able being 8, and claims 'od e(ists" -rH/-rHb/-r)H/ I alread+ raised some objections to that definition, but Im lea!ing that aside here as well" 0o, we ma+ ask someone defending Craigs arguments$ what is the ontological foundation of objecti!e greatness, in the sense of informati!e identification4 -9./ Fow, someone might suggest that 'od is the ontological foundation of objecti!e greatness, and that to be great is to resemble 'od" Aowe!er, the term :'od: is defined as :#he greatest concei!able being:, so a h+ othesis that to be great is to resemble 'od means the same as a h+ othesis that to be great is to resemble the greatest conceivable being. 0urel+, that would no an informative identification" In fact, such an account would be !iciousl+ circular" *f course, to sa+ that to be the greatest concei!able being is to ha!e all great8making ro erties to a ma(imal degree or something along those lines would not resol!e the roblem$ the circularit+ would remain, and would be just as !icious"

'ranted, someone might sa+ that the ball has to sto somewhere, and there is no informati!e identification account of greatness" ,ut if there is no such account in the case of greatness on Craig:s !iews, then wh+ should we acce t his claim that there is such account in the case of moral goodness4 1(.11. ?alue! propertiesGarlier, I suggested a otential account of moral goodness in terms of mental states and6or traits 7 including, erha s, decision, intentions, etc" 8 describable in non8moral conce ts, mirroring the cases of water6,%) and heat6molecular motion, and also suggested one otential objection in terms of !alue" #o be clear, Im merel+ considering this otential alternati!e, but Im not suggesting Craig would raise this articular objection" 0o, according to this otential objection, the ro erties in 1uestion cannot be identical because one of them 7 moral goodness 7 is -in some sense/ a !alued ro ert+, whereas the ro erties of ha!ing some mental traits, states, etc", describable b+ means of non8moral conce ts, are not !alued ro erties" ,ut here, we ma+ ask some 1uestions, like$ Is there a difference between !alued and non8!alued ro erties4 If so, what is for a ro ert+ to be !alued4 More recisel+, in what sense is moral goodness 7 allegedl+ 7 a !alued ro ert+4 2e ma+ consider two alternati!es$ 1. If to sa+ that a ro ert+ is !alued is to merel+ sa+ that its a ro ert+ icked b+ the conce t of moral goodness, or moral badness, or generall+ some moral conce t, etc", then as long as ro erties such as greenness or heat are icked b+ non8color or non8heat conce ts res ecti!el+ 7 like some conce ts in!ol!ing wa!elengths, etc", or the conce t of molecular motion 8, there is no good reason to think that the same cant a l+ to moral ro erties" ". If to sa+ that a ro ert+ is !alued is to sa+ that its !alued b+ some agent or another 7 sa+, normal humans 8, that also does not constitute a roblem for a ro osed identification between moral goodness and the ro erties of ha!ing some mental traits, states, etc", describable b+ means of non8moral conce ts" 0o, lets sa+ that its neither &" nor )" #hen, the 1uestion remains$ in which sense of 3!alued might an objector claim that the ro ert+ of moral goodness is a !alued ro ert+4 #he burden to e( lain himself would be on the erson raising this objection" 2ithout such clarification, it:s not clear how to make sense of it" 5or instance, :to !alue: is a !erb" Agents !alue" #here are ro erties that are !alued b+ some agents, and for e(am le in the case of normal humans, usuall+ or alwa+s kindness and moral goodness are ositi!el+ !alued b+ such agents, whereas cruelt+ and moral

badness are negati!el+ !alued b+ such agents" #hats com rehensible" ,ut gi!en that the objection is not about what agents !alue, and not about alternati!e &" abo!e, either, then what is it about4 #hat aside, I will consider some otential re lies, which might de end on how the erson raising the objection I:m considering in this subsection e( lains the claim of a !alued ro ert+" 5or instance, we ma+ consider o tions$ Is kindness a ositi!el+ !alued ro ert+, and cruelt+ a negati!el+ !alued one4 And what about illness or healthiness4 Cowardice and bra!er+4 Aren:t those !alued ro erties4 0o, let:s consider kindness and cruelt+" Craig himself sa+s that ra e would still be cruel if 'od did not e(ist, e!en if he claims it would not be morall+ wrong -r)J/" %erha s, other theists might claim otherwise, but of course that would ha!e to be argued for" 2ithout that, there is no good reason to sus ect that if 'od did not e(ist, there would be no kind eo le and no cruel eo le" 0o, let:s first let:s first assume that cruelt+ -kindness/ is a !alued ro ert+ 7 whate!er that means" #hen, if cruelt+ -kindness/ has no ontological foundation, then there are !alued ro erties with no ontological foundation" If cruelt+ -kindness/ has an ontological foundation in terms of informati!e identification, then either cruelt+ is informati!el+ identified with a non8!alued ro ert+, or it:s informati!el+ identified with a !alued ro ert+" If it:s informati!el+ identified with a !alued ro ert+, we re eat the rocess" In the end, the alternati!es are infinite regress of informati!e identifications of !alued ro erties not grounded in 'od, a !alued ro ert+ with no ontological foundation, or a !alued ro ert+ that is informati!el+ identified with a non8!alued ro ert+" If there is a !alued ro ert+ identified with a non8!alued ro ert+, that blocks the objection I:m considering in this subsection" *n the other hand, if there is infinite regress of informati!e identification of !alued ro erties not grounded in 'od, or a !alued ro ert+ with no ontological foundation, we ma+ suggest the same might be the case for moral ro erties" Gither wa+, the metaethical argument seems to remain blocked" 0o, what if cruelt+ and kindness are not !alued ro erties4 2e ma+ run a similar argument with ro erties like bra!er+ or cowardice, healthiness or illness" ,ut what if none of them are !alued4 0omeone might e!en claim that cruelt+, kindness, etc", are !alued ro erties because 'od e(ists, but the+ wouldn:t be !alued ro erties if he did not, e!en if the+ were instantiated" 0o, as before, the ke+ 1uestion here is$ what does it mean for a ro ert+ to be !alued, in the sense of this objection4

#he burden to e( lain what the+ mean b+ :!alued ro ert+: would be on the erson making that claim, and as I ointed out earlier, it seems difficult to make sense of a claim of that sort without such clarification" 0till, another otential re l+ to this objection 7 as before, de ending on how the objector construes the term 7 is based on scenarios in!ol!ing alien minds, like scenario &), or an earlier c+borg scenario, or similar scenarios" As I mentioned earlier, normal humans, such agents -at least usuall+/ ositi!el+ !alue kindness and moral goodness, and negati!el+ !alue cruelt+ and moral badness" ,ut some of the aliens in those h+ othetical scenarios do not !alue kindness ositi!el+ e!er, and do not !alue cruelt+ negati!el+ either, e(ce t, erha s, to the e(tent that someone might be cruel towards them. ,ut e!en then, what the+ ma+ actuall+ !alue negati!el+ in that case is not the cruelt+ itself 7 which de ends on the mind of the agent being cruel onl+, regardless of results 8, but rather the ain the+ might e( erience as a result" Moreo!er, some of those aliens lace no !alue whatsoe!er in moral goodness, or moral badness" 'ranted, those aliens are h+ othetical" ,ut the+:re not contradictor+, and furthermore, in cases this makes a difference, the+ seem to be meta h+sicall+ ossible" In fact, for all we know, some aliens rele!antl+ similar to those might e!en be actual" 2e don:t reall+ know one wa+ or another" #he oint I:m tr+ing to make is that the ositi!e or negati!e e!aluation of the ro erties seems to be on the mind of the agents making the e!aluation" Glse, should those agents consider also that the+ are !alued ro erties based on what they !alue, and ask for the ontological grounding of those ro erties4 5or e(am le, let:s consider the following scenario$ 7cenario 14A #here is a lanet where some intelligent, social aliens e!ol!ed, sa+ s eciesO&K" #he+ ha!e a common language for their entire s ecies, and art of their language resembles moral language and is based on something that resembles human moral intuitions" Aowe!er, there is no erfect match" G!en under no error, their sense of s eciesO&K8moral8goodness and the human sense of moral goodness di!erge in some cases" #he+ also ha!e language similar to language of obligations, and more or less similar intuitions" 0hould s eciesO&K hiloso hers conclude that there is a necessar+ being who is the ontological foundation of species# 7!moral!goodness, which would be something other than moral goodness, so that the being in 3uestion is not God, but species# 7!God* 'ranted, a defender of Craig:s metaethical argument ma+ sim l+ sa+ that aliens like that are meta h+sicall+ im ossible, but in articular that in!ol!es a claim about e(obiolog+ encom assing the

entire uni!erse" 2h+ should we belie!e such a claim4 It seems humans do not ha!e at this oint the knowledge to make such a claim in a justified manner" Alternati!el+, he might sa+ that either the+ or us would be mistaken about moral goodness, rather than there being something like s eciesO&K8goodness" ,ut that is a roblem as well" 5urthermore, there might aliens that are far more different and that ha!e nothing articularl+ similar to a sense of moral goodness, e!en though the+ too would !alue some things, and ha!e some language associated with some of those e!aluations" 0hould we conclude that those aliens would be massi!el+ in error, or that we would be4 If there are man+ different s ecies with airwise different e!aluations, etc", should we conclude that nearl+ all of those aliens are in error4 #hat too would seem to be an unjustified claim about e(obiolog+" Moreo!er, what if our successors in a distant future where to contact aliens like that4 Intuiti!el+, it seems clear to me that the humans or ost8humans-&B/ in 1uestion should not doubt that Aitler was a morall+ bad erson regardless of how some e(traterrestrials !alue things and6or because of the kind of language the+ use when making those e!aluations" For should the+ conclude that those aliens are massi!el+ mistaken when making claims in their own alien language" M+ oint here is that, in addition to being hard to make sense of, the :!alued ro erties: objection ma+ well re!eal a commitment on the art of the defender of the metaethical argument to a number of unjustified claims, or at least claims he ought to defend" #he burden to e( lain and defend his stance would be on him" 1(.1". .ormati&ity. In addition to objection based on &alue, a defender of Craig:s metaethical argument might raise an objection based on moral obligations and normati!it+, and contend that the ro ert+ of being morall+ obligator+ is a normati!e ro ert+ 7 in some sense of 3normati!e: 8, and -allegedl+/ normati!e ro erties cannot be identical to non8normati!e ro erties" As in case of the &alue objection, here too one ma+ ask for clarification about the rele!ant sense of 3normati!e, ask wh+ being commanded b+ 'od is normati!e in the rele!ant sense, and so on" 5or instance, lets sa+ for the sake of the argument and for now that 7 as the objection contends 8, the ro ert+ of being morall+ obligator+ is a normati!e ro ert+ in some sense" 0o, here one ma+ ask$ is the ro ert+ of being commanded b+ 'od also normati!e4 If its not, then Craigs account identifies a normati!e ro ert+ with a non8normati!e one" If it is, then why is that the case4 In other words, wh+ do 'ods commands ha!e the ro ert+ of being normati!e in the rele!ant sense" And what is that sense, an+wa+4

In his debate with 0am Aarris, Craig contrasts commands gi!en b+ a random stranger, and commands gi!en b+ a com etent authorit+" -rH/ 0o, someone might suggest that 'od:s commands are normati!e because the+ were issued b+ a com etent authorit+" ,ut wh+ is 'od a competent authorit+4 0omeone might suggest that the ro ert+ of being normati!e in the rele!ant sense is the ro ert+ of being commanded b+ a com etent authorit+" ,ut then, wh+ should we acce t that the ro ert+ of being morall+ obligator+ has the ro ert+ of being normati!e, if the ro ert+ of being normati!e is the ro ert+ of being commanded b+ a com etent authorit+4 %erha s, a defender of the metaethical argument might just sa+ that e( lanations ha!e to sto somewhere, or something along those lines" ,ut the oint here is that the erson raising a 3normati!e objection ought to e( lain what he means b+ 3normati!e in that conte(t, and generall+ argue in su of the objection" In addition to the abo!e, here one one ma+ also construct scenarios in!ol!ing aliens, and$ a. Ask whether those aliens should conclude that their s eciesO&K8moral obligations are constituted b+ the commands of a being other than 'od" $. %oint out that its intuiti!el+ clear that if, in the distant future, humans were to find aliens who make e!aluations and normati!e judgments !er+ different from those made b+ humans, ha!e language associated to their e!aluations and normati!e judgments, etc", those future humans shouldnt just because of that sus ect that Aitler did not ha!e a moral obligation not to commit the Aolocaust 7 he had that obligation regardless of what ha ens with aliens on other lanets" For should those humans belie!e that those aliens would be massi!el+ mistaken when the+ make those judgments in their own alien language" c. 'enerall+ raise a number of issues similar to those raised in the re!ious subsection, In order to assess the matter in greater detail, further clarification on the art of the objector would be re1uired" ,ut the re!ious considerations indicate that the 3normati!it+ objection does not a ear romising for someone defending Craigs metaethical argument" 0till, erha s a defender of the argument might suggest that somehow moralit+ is rationall+ binding, in the sense that for an+ moral agent, its alwa+s irrational to beha!e immorall+, and that somehow that is a roblem for non8theists" Aowe!er, whether its irrational to beha!e in a certain wa+ seems to de end on the !alue structure of the agents in 1uestion" If it is the case that its alwa+s irrational for humans to beha!e immorall+, that would seem to be a matter of human s+cholog+" ,ut e!en in the limited case of humans or !er+ similar beings, it a ears !er+ implausible that its alwa+s irrational to beha!e immorall+" ort

#o see this, lets consider the following scenarios, one in!ol!ing a non8modified human and one in!ol!ing a geneticall+ modified human" 7cenario 15A <ets sa+ that Nose h is a brutal dictator" Ae engaged in mass murder, torture, theft, etc", all for ersonal gain" Aes also a s+cho ath, and couldnt care less about moralit+" =egardless of whether sometimes Nose h beha!ed irrationall+ in the rocess of getting to where he is, a 1uestion here is what would be rational for him to do now that he is in that osition, and in articular, whether he rationall+ should continue to su ress the e( ression of ideas that robabl+ would be a threat to the continuation of his regime, e!en b+ means of torture, murder, etc" It seems to me that if he rationall+ reckons that the moment he loses his gri on ower, some eo le seeking retribution will kill him 7 and we ma+ further sti ulate that he does 8, then gi!en what he !alues, he rationall+ ought to continue su ressing the e( ression of ideas in that manner, e!en though he morall+ ought not to do so" At the !er+ least, it would not be irrational on his art to continue to do that, e!en though it would clearl+ be immoral" 7cenario "6A <ets sa+ that in a distant future, a small grou of eo le are !ictorious after a global war using all sorts of wea ons of mass destruction, like nuclear bombs, biological wea ons, !er+ ad!anced killer robots, etc" #he+ take control of the lanet, and the few other sur!i!ors ha!e little technolog+ left" <ater, in an internal struggle, one of the !ictors, Nack, uses robots to carr+ out a successful cou against the others, and kills them all" 0o, Nack controls the world" Nack sends his robots to search and destro+ an+ iece of ad!anced technolog+ left in the hands of an+one else or abandoned, and to kill an+one with knowledge of science and6or technolog+" 5i!e centuries later, Nack 7 who does not get old, due to genetic engineering 7 rules the world uno osed, and all other eo le do not know about the war, ha!e no knowledge of histor+ be+ond a cou le of generations, and know nothing about modern science" Nack 7 who is a s+cho ath and does not care about right or wrong 7 forces eo le to worshi him, and goes around doing as he leases to othersL gi!en his arm+ of robots and his ad!anced technolog+ in general, there is no ho e of resistance" In that scenario, its ob!ious that Nack beha!es immorall+ b+ kee ing an+one else under his thumb" ,ut there seems to be nothing irrational about that beha!ior on his art" 0o, the suggestion that for an+ moral agent, its alwa+s irrational o beha!e immorall+ seems !er+ im lausible, intuiti!el+"

All that aside, there are further roblems for the defender of Craigs metaethical argumentL on that note, in the ne(t subsection I will consider the issue of whether non8theists ha!e an+ significant burden on this articular issue" 1(.1(. .on)theism' ontological *oun!ations' an! $ur!en. <et:s address now 1uestions 9a, and 9a:, assuming for the sake of the argument and that the answers to & and &: are both affirmati!e, and e!en that the answers to ) and ): are also affirmati!e 7 e!en though Craig has ro!ided no good reason whatsoe!er to think so" It seems im lausible that she would ha!e such a burden, as the following arallels illustrate$ . <et:s take a look at one of the e(am les of an informati!e identification gi!en b+ Mur h+$ heat is molecular motion" -9K/ #hrough the !ast majorit+ of human histor+, that account was not a!ailable" ?et, that did not lace an+ burden on someone rejecting re!ious theories of heat to ro!ide an account of her own" In fact, a erson rejecting re!ious theories of heat could ha!e ro erl+ said that she did not know what heat was, and that a lot more research was needed in order to then de!elo a foundational account" In articular, if someone had osited that heat was 'od:s causing certain sensation of eo le, and had challenged others to come u with an alternati!e foundational account, that would not ha!e resulted in an+ burden on the eo le being challenged in that fashion, and the lack of an alternati!e account would not ha!e ro!ided an+ non8negligible e!idence in su e!en if a refutation of the theistic account had not been a!ailable" . <et:s take a look at another e(am le of an informati!e identification, gi!en b+ Mur h+$ water is A)*" -9M/ #hrough the !ast majorit+ of human histor+, that account was not a!ailable" ?et, that did not lace an+ burden on someone rejecting re!ious theories of water to ro!ide an account of her own" In fact, a erson rejecting re!ious theories of water could ha!e ro erl+ said that she did not know what heat was, and that a lot more research was needed in order to then de!elo a hiloso hical account" . <et:s consider an e(am le Craig himself gi!es in the conte(t of his debate with 0am Aarris -rH/$ light and darkness" As Craig oints out in that debate, humans knew how to use the word :light: (or s+non+ms, one might add) before the+ knew the nature of light, and the+ could also tell the difference between light and darkness long before the+ knew the h+sics of light" ,ut that:s not what matters in the conte(t of this section" =ather, in this conte(t we ma+ add that for most of ort of theism,

the histor+ of humanit+, the ontological foundation of light, in terms of informati!e identification, was not known" It was onl+ disco!ered after a lot of scientific rogress" %oints similar to I", II, and III can be made for a number other cases of informati!e identification accounts, lausibl+ for most of them" ,ut if, in all those cases, there was no burden, wh+ should there be such a burden on a non8theist in the case of objecti!e moral !alues and duties, which is lausibl+ far more com licated than the cases of water or heat4 After all, non8theism is not a hiloso hical stance that claims to ha!e an account of objecti!e moral !alues and duties in the sense of informati!e identification, or to be ca able of e( laining it in those terms, or for that matter in an+ other sense" 'ranted, some not8theists might make one of such claims, erha s b+ adhering to a general hiloso hical stance that makes one of those claims" ,ut that does not create a general burden on other non8theists, but onl+ on those making such claims" 0o, gi!en the re!ious oints, the answers to 9"a and 9"a: are lausibl+ both negati!e, at least for non8 theists in general 7 e!en hiloso hers 8, or e!en non8theists familiar with Craig:s argument, or e!en non8theists familiar with other theistic metaethical arguments" 0ome non8theists might ha!e a burden because of other claims the+ make, and which go be+ond their rejection or theism, but that:s another matter" Moreo!er, in all of those cases (i"e", water, heat, color, light, etc"), it took a !er+ long time a lot of scientific rogress was re1uired before a correct or a ro(imatel+ correct hiloso hical foundational account was de!elo ed" 'i!en all of that, if someone claims that unless a lausible foundational account com atible with non8 theism is gi!en, we should based on that and the second remise of Craig:s argument reckon that 'od e(ists, the+ ought to argue in su ort of that claim" 1+. 9&olution an! sel*)sacri*ice' an! generally human $eha&ior. A theist might object to a non8theistic e!olutionar+ accounts on the ground of acts of heroism, sometimes resulting in the death of the erson making the sacrifice" More generall+, a theist might claim that an e!olutionar+ rocess without 'od would not lead to entities with the s+chological make u of humans" #his kind of objection is not a metaethical challenge, though, but its a challenge to an+ scientific understanding of human e!olution that does not in!ol!e 'od or an+ other creator, but instead in!ol!es the rocesses osited b+ resent8da+ science, with erha s some minor adjustments"

An e(am le of this kind of objection is Craigs challenge to a biological account of our sense of beaut+" I addressed that articular e(am le earlier, but a general account of the e!olution of human traits is a !er+ com licated scientific 1uestion, and surel+ be+ond the sco e of this article" 0o, I will just oint out that if a theist claimed that the e!olutionar+ rocess without 'od would not result in the kind of being that we humans are, the burden is on him to make his case" As it stands, the e!idence for e!olution b+ the means osited b+ resent8da+ science is !er+ solid, so one should e( ect onl+ minor adjustments in the future, rather than a massi!e change like the introduction of a designer guiding e!olution" #hat said, a non8theist ma+ also argue that if 'od e(isted, we would not obser!e what we obser!e toda+" 2hile it would be be+ond the sco e of this article to make an+ such arguments, we ma+ mention 7 urel+ for e(am le 7 that she ma+ make an argument from suffering and6or from moral e!il, or an argument from the e(istence of moral agents with flawed senses of right and wrong, etc" 1/. Moral o$ligations' legal o$ligations an! comman!s. In his debate with 0am Aarris-rH/, Craig claims that moral obligations and rohibitions result from commands issued b+ a com etent authorit+" A so" #hen, Craig goes on to claim that on atheism, since there is no authorit+ to gi!e moral commands or im ose moral rohibitions, then there are no moral obligations" Aowe!er, his assertions about moral obligations are not backed b+ an+ arguments he makes, nor b+ his e(am le of the olice officer" In articular, the case of the olice officer is ob!iousl+ one of legal obligation, not a moral obligation" 'ranted, in man+ cases 7 but not all 8, a erson did not ha!e a moral obligation to ull o!er before the olice officer ga!e the order, but she does ha!e such an obligation after that" Aowe!er, the fact that in some cases moral obligations result from commands does not e!en suggest that all moral obligations are like that" %urel+ for e(am le, let:s consider the following scenario$ Alice works as a lifeguard, but is on !acation abroad" 0he:s taking a walk b+ a lake, enjo+ing the !iew, when she sees that a child is on a small raft alone, and then falls to the lake, and is seriousl+ arentl+ as a arallel, he oints out that if a olice officers tells one to ull o!er, one is legally

obligated to do so, whereas if a random stranger tells one to ull o!er, one is not legally obligated to do

struggling, clearl+ in immediate danger of drowning" #he child is about &. meters from the shore, and ). meters from Alice:s osition" #he waters are erfectl+ calm, and Alice correctl+ reckons she can jum into the lake, swim towards him, etc", and she has a reasonabl+ good shot at getting there in time and sa!ing his life, with no non8negligible risks to herself" 0he sees no other eo le around" In that situation, Alice did not ha!e an+ moral obligation to jum into the lake until she saw what ha ened, but then she did" 'ranted, we ma+ sa+ that Alice alread+ had the general moral obligation to jum into a lake if a situation like that in!ol!ing the child were to ha en" ,ut the same a lies to the case of the olice officer 7 i"e", one usuall+ has a moral obligation to obe+ commands b+ olice officers in such conte(ts" Also, arguabl+ Alice would ha!e had no moral obligation to jum if 7 sa+ 7 she hadn:t witnessed what ha ened to ,ob, without an+ fault on her art" ,ut also similarl+, if a erson does not see the olice officer:s indication, without an+ fault on her art, then she has no moral obligation to ull o!er, either" In case Alice or the other erson are at fault, the matter is more debatable, but in an+ case, there is no difference that is rele!ant to the matter at hand, namel+ regarding how moral obligations arise" 0o, it seems that to the e(tent to which a moral obligation to ull o!er resulted from the olice officer:s command, a moral obligation also resulted from the child:s falling into the water" #here are of course, lent+ of other e(am les of moral obligations that one ma+ consider, but based on our e( eriences, as well as h+ othetical scenarios, there a ears to be no indication whatsoe!er of an+ general connection between moral obligation and commands, let alone e!idence that commands are a re1uirement for moral obligation" Craig does not seem to gi!e an+ e!idence in su ort of the idea that moral obligations re1uire a

commander" If he:s tr+ing to a eal to some intuitions, I will sa+ it:s extremely counterintuitive that moral obligations would re1uire an authorit+" 5or e(am le, we ma+ set u the following scenario$ 'od does not e(ist, and ,ob is the onl+ human left ali!e" #here is a cat on the mat" #hen, there is no commander, authorit+ or command, but intuiti!el+, it:s clear that ,ob would be acting immorall+ if he were to our gasoline o!er the cat and set her on fire just for fun" ,ut that entails that in the scenario, ,ob has a moral obligation not to beha!e in that manner"

Moreo!er, instead of a cat, we ma+ consider, sa+, a child, Mar+ 7 who also isn:t a moral commander, and in an+ case is aslee and has issued no commands 8, setting u the scenario so that ,ob and Mar+ are the onl+ humans left ali!e, and 'od does not e(ist" In that case, it:s also clear that ,ob has a moral obligation not to set Mar+ on fire for fun" 0o, Craig:s claim goes against strong moral intuitions -99/, and there seems to be no good reason to belie!e it:s true" In another defense of his metaethical argument-rM/, and also in his debate with =ichard #a+lor-r)K/, Craig 1uotes #a+lor-r)M/, a arentl+ as a means of su and commands" -r)M/ In some of those 1uotes, #a+lor sa+s that 1uestions about right and wrong were ne!er answered outside religion, and also that the conce t of moral obligation is unintelligible without 'od" -r)M/ Aowe!er, #a+lor:s claims that 1uestions about moral right and wrong ha!e ne!er been answered outside religionR is false unless one construes the word :religion: in a wa+ so broad that it encom asses hiloso hies like 7 urel+ for e(am le 7 Confucianism" Moreo!er, regardless of how one construes the word :religion:, as I ointed out earlier, historicall+, there are6were lent+ of cultures that ha!e no conce t of 'od, and e!en if the+ ha!e6had beliefs in some su erhuman entities, the+ do6did not hold that moral obligations come from their commands" ?et, those eo le eo le did not seem to ha!e an+ trouble understanding the conce t of moral obligation, and the+ surel+ did not understand themsel!es to be making claims about the commands of an+ entit+, let alone of 'od" Also, as before, we seem to ha!e no difficult+ understanding the claim that in the scenarios I constructed earlier in this section, ,ob has moral obligations" For do we seem to ha!e an+ articular difficult+ understanding the use of moral terms in, sa+, =ichard 0winburne:s claim that R'od has a moral obligation to make himself knownR"-r9./ #o be clear, Craig is not making a semantic argument" ,ut the oint is that regardless of what Craig is tr+ing to achie!e b+ 1uoting #a+lor, the claims in 1uestion are at best unfounded, and gi!en the re!ious considerations, we can tell also false" 10. @ru!ential reasons &s. moral reasons2hile not strictl+ art of the metaethical argument, in the conte(t of his defense of that argument, and on the issue of rudential reasons, Craig challenges atheists as follows$ -r)/ CraigA orting his contention about moral obligations

%rudence and moralit+ are often at odds, and the 1uestion for the atheist would be$ wh+ act morall+ rather than out of self8interest4 2h+ not just act out of rudence4 #here are a number of re lies a!ailable to the atheist, but for instance$ 1. %lausibl+, a human being is a kind of being one of whose goals is to be a good or a better erson 7 as a result of e!olution, erha s 8, so it would alwa+s be fa!orable to some of a human:s interests not to beha!e immorall+, at least under a broad conce tion of interest, and with the otential e(ce tion of a !er+ small ercentage of athological cases" Fow, Craig is using :self8interest: in a wa+ that e(cludes a erson:s interest in doing what:s right, sim l+ because it:s the right thing to do, and6or in order to be a good erson" #hat usage is common 7 in fact, robabl+ the most common 8, so thats not a roblem, but we ought to kee in mind what:s meant b+ :self8interestL des ite the wording, it:s not the onl+ interest eo le normall+ ha!e" ". Its not clear that moralit+ and rudence would be often at odds" G!en if we e(clude b+ sti ulation all moral considerations from 3 rudence, humans tend to be less ha lead to guilt" #hat said, that would still treat not beha!ing immorall+ as a means to an end, which is worse than tr+ing to be good because its good, doing the right thing because its right, etc" (. <ets sa+ that there is a case in which, sa+, a s+cho athic dictator is ondering whether to beha!e immorall+ to get what he wants" 0omeone might ask$ 2h+ shouldnt he act immorall+4 In the moral sense of 3should, tautologicall+ he shouldnt act immorall+" ,ut some of his interests would surel+ be ser!ed b+ acting immorall+" 2ould it be irrational on his art to beha!e immorall+4 It:s a matter of human s+cholog+, it seems to me" 5erhaps, human minds are such that their dee est !alues, e!en if obscured due to errors and irrationalit+, are alwa+s in line with moralit+, and so it:s irrational e!en for that dictator, all things considered, to beha!e immorall+" ,ut ma+be that is not always so" Ma+be not all humans are like that, and the dictator is one of !er+ few abnormal humans who sometimes might act immorall+ without acting irrationall+" 2hile I need not take a stance here, I would sa+ that after reflecting on some h+ othetical scenarios, it seems lausible that its ossibl+ rational for some humans to beha!e immorall+" 5or e(am le, lets consider the following scenario$ + if the+ feel guilt+, so thats a non8moral reason not to beha!e immorall+, since immoral beha!ior tends to

In a distant, d+sto ian future, Nack, a psychopathic human 7 and so, a erson 8, has become the ruler of the lanet" Ae uses robots to rule o!er e!er+one else, and no one else has access to ad!anced technolog+" Fo other human has the ower to be an+ threat to him, and he enjo+s 7 among other things 7 hunting humans for fun, and there are no threats from e(traterrestrials or an+ other non8human beings" In that scenario, Nack ob!iousl+ has a moral obligation not to hunt humans for fun, he beha!es immorall+ when he hunts humans for fun, and e1ui!alentl+ he ought to not hunt humans for fun in the moral sense of 3ought" Aowe!er, intuiti!el+ it seems to me that Nack does not beha!e irrationall+ if he hunts humans for fun, or e1ui!alentl+ it is not the case that Nack ought to not hunt humans for fun, in the sense of 3ought of ractical rationalit+" Moreo!er, in some other scenarios in which, sa+, a s+cho athic dictator ro erl+ reckons that he would be at much greater risk of being ousted, tried and robabl+ e!entuall+ e(ecuted if he sto s o ressing eo le, murdering eaceful dissidents, etc", then it seems lausible that he rationall+ ought to continue engaging in such beha!iors, e!en though clearl+ he morall+ ought not to continue engaging in such beha!iors 7 whether he beha!ed irrationall+ on his wa+ to becoming such a dictator is another matter" At an+ rate, the matter of rudence and moralit+ does not ro!ide an+ good reason to think that the first remise of Craigs metaethical argument is true, either, or generall+ to belie!e that 'od e(ists" 12. Accounta$ility Craig raises the ossibilit+ that someone can get awa+ with e!il, and uses that as what he calls a owerful ractical argument-r&./ for theism" #his is not art of the metaethical argument, since Craig does not claim that it su orts the remises, as far as I know" Aowe!er, he makes this argument in the conte(t of a defense of the claim that moralit+ needs theistic metaethical foundations, so I will address it" 0o, Craig maintains that if there is no 'od, there is no moral accountabilit+, and that gi!en death with no afterlife, it reall+ does not matter how we li!e" -r&./ Aowe!er, e!en without an+ kind of afterlife, our choices affect our future, and the future of othersL the+ can cause ha iness, suffering, etc", to us and6or to other eo le, and of course that kind of thing normall+ matters to us and to many others. *ur choices might not matter to some aliens from another lanet, or to some creator, but that does not change the fact that the+ matter to man+ eo le"

As for accountabilit+, there is in man+ cases moral accountabilit+ e!en if 'od does not e(ist, like the case of bank robbers going to rison" 0o, there does not need for an afterlife in order for justice to be done in man+ cases" #here isn:t always accountabilit+, but there is in man+ cases" 'ranted, sometimes there is not, and thats that" ,ut the fact that there is not alwa+s accountabilit+ without 'od does not ro!ide e!idence of the e(istence of 'od" Fow, its true that Craig does not attem t to use the ractical argument alone" Instead, he ro oses to use ractical arguments to back u or moti!ate the acce tance of what he belie!es are sound theoretical arguments" Aowe!er, that would still be e istemicall+ im ro er, since a erson would still be assigning greater robabilit+ to theism due to considerations that are not e!idence for theism" #hat aside, Craig maintains that lack of belief in 'od weakens moral moti!ation" G!en if that were true, it would ro!ide no e!idence for the e(istence of 'od, and so it would still be e istemicall+ im ro er to assign a higher robabilit+ to the h+ othesis that 'od e(ists than one would otherwise assign on the basis of a concern that ones moral moti!ation would be weakened if one assigned a lower robabilit+ to that h+ othesis" 0o, the argument fails" ,ut there is another roblem, namel+ the fact that des ite Craigs e( licit recognition that there is no reason to think that atheists can lead what we normall+ characteri;e as good and decent li!es, Craigs moti!ational argument im licitl+ holds that, at least generall+, not belie!ing in 'od will tend to make a ersons moral character morall+ worse" Aowe!er, Craig has not gi!en an+ good grounds to belie!e that" #he claim of a weakening of a moral moti!ation has not been established at all" ,ut additionall+, and for e(am le, those who ado t theistic beliefs usuall+ do not just ado t some sort of uns ecified theism, but some !ersion of Christianit+ or Islam, with all the baggage of false beliefs 7 including false moral beliefs 8, attached to them" Fow, false moral beliefs 7 regardless of their source, religious or not 7 tend to lead eo le to beha!e immorall+ belie!ing that the+:re doing the right thing" As an e(am le that illustrates the case of false moral beliefs that result from religion and that lead to beha!iors that are usuall+-B./ immoral 7 like, sa+, ublicl+ accusing eo le who are not doing an+thing wrong of beha!ing immorall+ 8, one ma+ oint to Craigs false moral claims against ga+ relations -r9/, or the claim usuall+ made b+ man+ Christians that its immoral not to belie!e that 'od e(ists and6or to belie!e that he does not e(ist 7 a claim that would be false e!en if 'od e(isted" -B&/ 'ranted, not all Christians acce t those articular false moral beliefs 7 i"e", in the cases of ga+ relations and unbelief 8, but the oint is that usually, theism leads to religions with man+ false moral beliefs, and man+ of the eo le who belie!e in them romote those beliefs, if not ublicl+ b+ means of telling their

children that those beliefs are true, etc" 'i!en their religious source, changing those moral beliefs through reason ma+ be e!en more difficult than it would otherwise be" 'ranted, it might be argued that erha s not8theists are on a!erage more inclined to ado t other false ideologies, and that the+ too would ha!e false moral beliefs as a result, etc", so the issues would then be 1uestions like which ideologies are on a!erage worse, etc" ,ut the oint is that Craig has not ro!ided an+ good reasons to sus ect that not belie!ing that 'od e(ists, on a!erage, leads a erson to be morall+ worse than she would otherwise be" 14. Conclusions. Craigs argumentation fails to ro!ide an+ good reasons to think that the first remise of his main metaethical argument is true" Moreo!er, some of the re!ious considerations lead us to the conclusion that it:s false, as long as we take it to mean the same as the conditional if God didn8t exist, objective moral values and duties would not exist, which is what Craig meant and so what is rele!ant in this conte(t" -B)/-rM/ 8 though that result is not needed to ro erl+ reject Craig:s metaethical argument" *ther metaethical or ethical arguments for the e(istence of 'od that Craig makes in the same conte(t of one of the defenses of his main metaethical argument-r&./, also fail to establish the intended conclusion, or e!en to ro!ide an+ su .otesA -./ A oster at www"freeratio"org who osts under the nickname 3,ombO). is one of the sources of some of the ke+ ideas I use in the arguments abo!e, but I do not claim that he would agree with e!er+thing I sa+ abo!e, since the article is a combination of ideas from different sources lus m+ own additions" Another source are some of Glie;er ?udkowsk+s osts at www"lesswrong"com, though I do not claim that he would agree with the !iews I e( ress in this article, either" -&/ Glsewhere, Craig also talks about objecti!e truth -rI/-rJ/, objecti!el+ true claims -rK/, etc" In those cases, he does not tr+ to define or e( lain 3objecti!e, so it seems robable that hes using the work 3objecti!e in an ordinar+ sense of the term" 0ome of the claims he makes seem to confirm that, though there is no need to go an+ further into that here" -)/ I:m not making a distinction between statements and judgments" #erminolog+ !aries, but it seems that the e(am les I gi!e would 1ualif+ as statements and judgments in Craig:s terminolog+" -9/ ort for it"

Incidentall+, Craig also claims that objecti!it+ is a re1uirement for disagreement and error-r&/, and surel+ there can be disagreement about whether, sa+, the cat in 1uestion is in ain, some eo le might erroneousl+ belie!e that the cat is not in ain, etc" #he same goes for fear" 0till, this articular claim is neither re1uired nor decisi!e when it comes to understanding what Craig means b+ :objecti!e:, and further, it seems the claim is not entirel+ correct" 5or e(am le, in the case of errors, let:s consider the following scenario$ Alice tastes a cake, finds it +umm+, and comes to belie!e that the cake is +umm+" ,ut as it turns out, the art that she tasted was a small ortion with a com osition different from that of the rest of the cake" <ater, when she:s eating another ortion, she sa+s to herself :this isn:t +umm+ at all$ it tastes funn+:, and reali;es that she was mistaken in her belief that the cake was +umm+" ,ut Mar+ sa+s that she tasted se!eral ortions and found them +umm+, so Alice gi!es Mar+ the rest of the ortion she found non8+umm+, and Mar+ finds it +umm+ too" In that scenario, lausibl+ whether the cake 7 or one of its ortions 7 is +umm+ is a matter of taste, not a matter of fact" ?et, Alice was in error" #hat said, while Craig:s claim on this oint seems to be e(aggerated, the claims, arguments, attitude, etc", and generall+ beha!ior of the arties in!ol!ed in actual moral disagreements usuall+ show that the+ do understand themsel!es to be talking about a matter of fact, not about a matter of o inion, in the cases in which the+:re being sincere 7 which is also often the case" #hat does not mean that the+ belie!e that there is always a fact of the matter, e!en in e!er+ concei!able h+ othetical scenario, about whether a erson -morall+/ ought to beha!e in such8and8such wa+, etc" Man+ eo le belie!e so 7 erha s e!en most eo le 7 but that is not re1uired to make sense of the kind of beha!ior dis la+ed in s ecific cases of disagreement b+ eo le who are being sincere" 5or e(am le, a belief that in all or at least nearly all cases that we might actually encounter there is a fact of the matter as to whether a erson should do such8and8such thing would do, though there is no need to argue that oint here" *n the other hand, I see no e!idence that the sincere beha!iors of eo le in usual cases of moral disagreement indicate that the+ im licitl+ belie!e in the mind8inde endence of moral duties and6or !alues, at least if :mind inde endence: is understood in such a wa+ that it would entail an+thing beyond what:s entailed b+ there being a fact of the matter on the issue the+:re dis uting" -B/ #he scenario ma+ be understood as a ossible world, if one acce ts talk of ossible worlds" Glse, one ma+ consider the matter in terms one refers, like scenarios, etc"

#hat aside, and just in case the definition is not clear, Id like to clarif+ that in condition *%), an agent is actual with res ect to the world or scenario under consideration 7 i"e", thats how the condition of actualit+ should be understood" #he same goes for similar conditions in the case of moralit+, beaut+, color, etc" -H/ Im talking about arguments in the sense of 3arguing a case here, not formal arguments" -I/ Craig also belie!es that a scenario in which 'od does not e(ist is meta h+sicall+ im ossible" Aowe!er, since arguing from meta h+sicall+ im ossible h+ othetical scenarios 7 or scenarios that one sus ects and6or belie!es are meta h+sicall+ im ossible 7 is not in general im ro er, that does not seem to ro!ide a good ground for challenging Craigs metaethical argument" -J/ It might be argued that, in this conte(t, the ro er wa+ to argue is that in such a scenario, the+ would not e(ist, rather than do not e(ist" Im going b+ Craigs most common formulation of the second remise, and I actuall+ dont think that this articular issue is a roblem for his argument" As I see it, whether use 3would or 3do in that conte(t is a matter of writing st+le 7 as long as ones clear about what one is talking aboutL I maintain that Craig is often obscure, but I dont think that that articular issue is one of the factors that make his metaethical argument obscure" 0o, I will not raise an+ objections to the use of 3do not, etc" In an+ case, Craig also used the subjuncti!e formulation in his debate with 0te hen <aw" -K/ An alternati!e would be to argue that, sometimes there is no objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether some beha!ior is immoral, and sometimes there is" 2ould that mean that there are objecti!e moral duties, or that there arent4 I will not address such !ariants, to sim lif+, but a dee er, more com rehensi!e anal+sis of certain metaethical issues would re1uire just that" -M/ Im using the term 3subjecti!ism in the sense of 3subjecti!e that Craig seems to be using, namel+ that its a matter of taste, etc"L de ending on terminolog+, it seems to me such !iews might be classified as s eaker8relati!ism as well" -&./ If slight !ariations would onl+ result in non8objecti!it+ in !er+ s ecific cases, 3almost alwa+s objecti!e ma+ be ro erl+ called 3objecti!e, and in an+ case, lack of objecti!it+ is e(tremel+ rare cases ma+ not

be so roblematic, so arguabl+ the theist would ha!e to show that there would significant !ariations without 'od, where 3significant is sometimes difficult to e!aluate, but it ma+ lausibl+ be e!aluated intuiti!el+ in most cases" 5or instance, if there is some !er+ slight !ariation in the color erce tion of eo le with normal color !ision and as a result, on some !er+ rare occasions, there is no objecti!e fact of the matter as to, sa+, whether an object is ure green or bluish green, that would not entail that objecti!e color does not e(ist, if we allow for some tolerance 7 just as we normall+ would sa+ that an object is blue e!en if &6&...... of its surface is not blue, we ma+ sa+ that color is objecti!e e!en if there is no objecti!e fact of the matter in &6&...... of cases we encounter" 0till, a full anal+sis of this matter would e(ceed the sco e of this article, so I will lea!e that aside" -&&/ ,+ 3ideal conditions I mean conditions in which the erson has all the information about non8moral matters needed use her faculties and make a moral assessment of a gi!en situation, and in which she is being rational and her faculties are not failing" -&)/ Im not taking a stance here on whether there is a sense of right and wrong and of good and bad6e!il, or a sense of right and wrong plus a sense of good and bad6e!il, or some other combination of faculties" In fact, I ma+ sometimes talk about a sense of right and wrong, etc", to sim lif+ the arguments, but essentiall+ the same arguments, objections, etc", are com atible with the !iew that our facult+ to tell right from wrong, etc", is actuall+ the combined result of two or more mental s+stems, etc", which ma+ e!en be the result of more general cogniti!e ca abilities" #hose are com licated issues of moral s+cholog+ on which Im taking no stance here" -&9/ 0ome of those religions that do not ha!e an+ belief in the e(istence of 'od in!ol!e man+ false moral beliefs 7 of course, belie!ers usuall+ disagree 8" 5or that matter, so does Christianit+ 7 of course, Christians usuall+ disagree 8, and other religions that do hold that 'od e(ists" ,ut in an+ case, the 1uestion here is not whether eo le in those cultures had or ha!e man+ false first8 order moral beliefs resulting from their religions, but whether in general humans traditionall+ had metaethical beliefs according to which moral duties were in one wa+ or another based on the commands of 'od, goodness based on the nature of 'od, etc" #hat is certainl+ not the case" In fact, e!en in the @nited 0tates, or in Guro e, >i!ine Command #heor+ is traditionall+ rejected b+ man+ Christians, so it:s 1uite debatable whether Craig:s claim about how moral obligations ha!e been traditionall+ understood is true e!en there" ,ut e!en granting it:s true in

the @nited 0tates and6or Guro e, it:s certainl+ not true about human beings or human cultures in general" -&B/ ,+ 3 ost8human, I mean an+ descendants of humans that ha!e significantl+ changed, whether !ia the usual mechanisms b+ which our ancestors e!ol!ed into us, or b+ means of genetic engineering and6or integration of machines into their bodies" I:m making no claim here that there will be such beings, or that there will not, or about whether the actions leading to them will be immoral, if the+ were to ha en" -&H/ htt s$66en"wiki edia"org6wiki6%s+cho ath -&I/ 0omeone might ask$ Aow would scientists measure that a erson is !iolating other eo les rights, or that a erson is morall+ good, etc"4 ,ut for that matter, someone might ask how scientists would measure that a erson is ill, or that an object is, sa+, green" 'ranted, in the case of green objects, someone might tr+ to measure wa!elengths, etc", and in the case of illnesses, there are lists of illnesses, s+m toms, etc" Aowe!er, neither detecting illness nor detecting green 7 or greenness, if one refers 7 was be+ond the ca abilities of scientists before the+ had such lists, and e!en the lists themsel!es were de!elo ed b+ means including using human color !ision and a human intuiti!e understanding of illnesses in the first lace" #he same goes for man+ other cases" -&J/ 2hen I s eak of 3s eciesO&8color, 3s eciesO&8color language, etc", I use that terminolog+ to distinguish the !isual s+stem and the language associated with it from their human counter arts, but I do not mean to suggest that thats the onl+ s ecies in the uni!erse that has that !isual s+stem, or words associated with those s ecific wa!elengths" In fact, if the uni!erse if large enough e!en if finite, there ma+ well be erha s man+ s ecies with !er+ similar or e!en almost identical !isual s+stems, including man+ with a !isual s+stem like the human one, and similar language as well" 0imilarl+, m+ use of 3s eciesO)8beaut+ and 3s eciesO98moralit+ is meant to distinguish those s ecies from humans in the matters rele!ant to the arguments under consideration" I do not mean to im l+ that their faculties, or their language, would be uni1ue in the uni!erse" #he same goes, of course, for

humans and moralit+" *ther intelligent social s ecies might ha!e moralit+ as well, e!en if not all of them did 7 a matter on which Im not taking a stance here" -&K/ *f course, some other entities with a !isual range from BB.nm to JH.nm might see things !er+ differentl+" #he e(am le is just one ossibilit+" -&M/ #hat raises moral issues de ending on how its done, but thats not the matter at hand" -)./ Actuall+, there seems to be some slight di!ergence in the wa+ eo le with normal color !ision see some colors, which suggests that, in rare cases, there is no objecti!e fact of the matter on color issues 7 e"g", there might not be an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether some object is ure green or bluish green, in some rare cases" Aowe!er, nearl+ alwa+s there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to what color an object is 7 i"e", in nearl+ all cases we encounter, that is so" 0o, it seems to me that, s eaking collo1uiall+, it would be true that color is objecti!e, since there seems to be some tolerance (e"g", we ro erl+ sa+ that a cars door is green, or made of metal, e!en if its not &..S so , but MM"MMMMS so)" 0till, this oint is not crucial to the argumentation" 2e ma+ reformulate the h+ othesis so that if color statements are nearly always objecti!e in the rele!ant sense and some statements like 3D is green, etc", are true, objecti!e color e(ists" Alternati!el+, and to sim lif+, we ma+ assume that its not the case that there is a !er+ small degree of di!ergence between the color !ision of eo le with normal color !ision, and as a conse1uence in the wa+ eo le use color terms" 2hile that robabl+ wouldnt be true, the oint would remain that the objecti!it+ of color would not be affected b+ the resence of such aliens, etc"L in fact, for that matter, we ma+ consider different s ecies of aliens with different !isual s+stems in our scenarios, sti ulating that there is no di!ergence at all within each of the alien s ecies in terms of color8like erce tion, and the oints would be the same, etc" -)&/ Its com atible with the scenario 7 so, one might s lit it into sub8scenarios if one needs more e(am les, but I think thats not re1uired here 7 that in addition to the difference in what the+ find a ealing, etc", their !isual re resentation of their en!ironment, if the+ ha!e one, is considerabl+ different from ours, and its also com atible that its not so different" ,ut there is no need for such details for the ur ose of the oint Im tr+ing to make"

-))/ In this conte(t, when I sa+ something like s eciesO), etc", I mean something similar in a sense that would be rele!ant in the conte(t of these argument" 5or instance, that the+ e!ol!ed in dark ca!es is not rele!ant, as long as there are great differences between what the+ find a ealing which is associated with their judgments of s eciesO)8beaut+, and what humans find a ealing and is associated with judgments of beaut+" -)9/ Assuming non8determinism" *f course, on determinism, the result would ha!e been the same no matter how man+ times one rewinds it, as long as the initial conditions are the same, though it would change in general with slightl+ different initial conditions" It:s not clear whether Craig is assuming non8determinism, or the 3might is e istemic and there is no such assum tion" ,ut this is not crucial, so we ma+ lea!e that aside" In fact, we ma+ e!en assume non8 determinism for the sake of the argument 7 non8determinism is Craig:s osition, regardless of whether he:s im licitl+ assuming it in this articular conte(t" -)B/ #he Andromeda gala(+ is erha s too far awa+ e!en for ad!anced aliens 7 Im not entirel+ sure, though8, so ersonall+ I would refer to set u the aliens to e!ol!e on another lanet in the Milk+ 2a+, but clearl+ gala(+ of origin is irrele!ant to the metaethical argument" Also, ra e is e(tremel+ im robable in that scenario (2h+ would the+ want to ra e humans in the first lace4), and eating humans is also 1uite im robable (wh+ not a more efficient wa+ of getting food, e!en if humans ha ened to be edible to them4), but lets sa+ for the sake of the argument 7 and to ick one of Craigs e(am les 7 that the+ want to eat humans, and lets further sa+ that the+ want to eat humans because the+ like the wa+ humans taste 7 or for an+ other reason suitable for the ur oses of the argument 7 and so the+ in!ade the Garth and do so" -)H/ I make no claim as to whether there are aliens similar to that, or e!en whether the+ are nomologicall+ ossible" Im just assuming for the sake of the argument that such aliens e!ol!ed" -)I/ 'ranted, someone might re l+ that the+ ha!e different intuitions" ,ut if that is the case, then what we a clash of intuitions, but that does not gi!e me good reasons to acce t their claim" *ther eo le will of course make their own assessments" In an+ case, if a theist claims that this would be roblematic for non8theism, he would ha!e the burden of showing wh+ or how"

-)J/ *n that note, we ma+ ro erl+ and truthfull+ sa+, in h+ othetical scenarios in!ol!ing aliens written as moral agents 7 not as s eciesO98moral agents 8, that some of them beha!ed immorall+ in those scenarios, etc"" Also, we ma+ ro erl+ make moral assessments in the case of the beings osited b+ different religions, as long as the religions in 1uestion state or entail that such beings are moral agents 7 e"g", a wa+ of entailing it would be to claim that an entit+ does morall+ raiseworth+ actions, or is morall+ good, etc" -)K/ #here are a number of issues that might be raised at this oint, but addressing them would be be+ond the sco e of this essa+" -)M/ #here is a difference here, namel+ the fact the term 3meter, was once defined in terms of the meter bar, whereas moral terms are not defined in terms of the term :'od:, let alone in terms of an actual erson" 5urthermore, e!en if the judgment :'od is morall+ good: is, on Craig:s understanding of the term :'od:, anal+tical, also the term :'od: is not defined in terms of an+ actual erson" ,ut I:ll lea!e that aside, at least for now" -9./ More recisel+, the informati!e identification would be the central art of an account of objecti!e moral !alues6duties, and the ontological foundation would be the thing that moral !alues6duties would be identified with, or -some of/ whose states6as ects6etc" moral !alues6duties would be identified with" ,ut I don:t think this slight notational abuse is a roblem, so I will talk about :ontological foundation in the sense of informati!e identification: and erha s similar e( ressions, kee ing this in mind" -9&/ M+ osition is that a serial killer would not e(ist in a scenario in which 'od e(isted, and neither would a being who intends to be a serial killer, etc" ,ut I:m lea!ing aside that for the sake of the argument, since I:m raising a challenge to Craig:s theistic metaethical account that does not re1uire an argument from e!il against theism" -9)/ 0ome of the mental states or e!ents on the list o!erla , gi!en the general Rgenerall+ subjecti!el+ e( eriencesR, or Rgenerall+ subjecti!el+ e( eriencedR, but I refer to list some s ecific ones, in order to be more s ecific" -99/

'ranted, someone might sa+ that their gras of the conce ts and6or intuitions sa+ otherwise" ,ut that kind of claim might alwa+s be raised" I in!ite readers to make their own assessments" -9B/ 2hile the li1uid in 1uestion is not pure water, the claim that it:s water is true, using the words in a usual, collo1uial sense (which includes some tolerance), and while icking a more recise e( ression would be doable if needed, it would seem to be needlessl+ long in this conte(t" -9H/ 0omeone might argue that the :greatest concei!able being: definition re1uires ha!ing a combination of great8making ro erties that achie!es a ma(imal degree of greatness in e!er+ ossible world, but erha s does not re1uire ha!ing all great8making ro erties to a ma(imal degree in case that that is not ossible for some reason" In that case, one ma+ suitabl+ modif+ the definition gi!en that ma(imal moral goodness is re1uired an+wa+, and the circularit+ objection remains" -9I/ 5or the sake of bre!it+, I will just talk about whether a foundation meets Craig:s conditions, meaning the rele!antl+ corres onding conditions" 5or instance, in the case of heat, the condition corres onding to condition H 7 in case Craig re1uires condition *M*MEH for moral goodness 7 would be a aradigmatic object or aradigmatic case of molecular motion which determines heat in a wa+ similar to which, according to Craig, there is a aradigm that determines goodness" -9J/ C& might be used to argue against an+ theistic accounts of ro er function, but I:m lea!ing all of the arguments in subsection &9") aside in other subsections, for the sake of the argument, because I aim to gi!e inde endent and sufficient reasons for rejecting Craig:s argument" -9K/ Molecules are in turn identifiable with some interactions between atoms and6or configurations of atoms, which in turn are identifiable with some interactions between subatomic articles and6or configurations of subatomic articles, and for all we know, the subatomic articles we know of might not be the bottom" In fact, there might not e!en be a bottom 7 what if it:s turtles all the wa+ down4 ,ut let:s lea!e all of that aside, to sim lif+, and since I don:t need to focus on that issue" -9M/ In the case of A)*, that:s a descri tion of a molecule at the le!el of atoms, but an identification with interactions of and6or configurations of subatomic articles is a!ailable" Moreo!er, for all we know, the

subatomic articles we know of might not be the bottom" In fact, there might not e!en be a bottom 7 what if it:s turtles all the wa+ down4 ,ut let:s lea!e all of that aside, to sim lif+, and since I don:t need to focus on that issue" -B./ I sa+ usuall+ because one can easil+ construct scenarios in which thats not immoralL for e(am le, there are scenarios in which someone claims that ga+ se( is alwa+s immoral because someone else is making a serious and sufficientl+ significant threat if she does not make that claim, and she:s not doing an+thing immoral b+ making that claim 7 she:s just under a serious threat" ,ut that:s not Craig:s situation, who in addition has had decades to assess his moral beliefs, +et continues to romote the false moral beliefs that non8belief in 'od is alwa+s immoral, that ga+ se( is alwa+s immoral, etc" 8 :alwa+s: at least for mentall+ com etent human adults, that is" -B&/ *f course, Christians usuall+ disagree with m+ moral assessment on that and man+ other matters in!ol!ing Christian8based moral beliefs" *n a related note, a link to that a moral case against Christianit+ can be found here" -B)/ If we take the first remise as a material conditional, in order to show it:s false we would ha!e to show that 'od does not e(ist, which is be+ond the sco e of this essa+" ,ut Craig did not intend it as a material conditional" =ather, Craig intended the first remise to mean RIf 'od did not e(ist, then objecti!e moral !alues and duties would not e(istR" In fact, that is the formulation he chose in his debate with 0te hen <aw"-rM/ Moreo!er, Craig sa+s that he thinks that the first remise is a true counter ossible, and that it means that if 'od did not e(ist, then objecti!e moral !alues and duties would not e(ist" -rMb/ Re*erences>sourcesA -r&/ htt $66www"reasonablefaith"org6defenders8)8 odcast6transcri t6sB8&M -r)/ htt $66www"reasonablefaith"org6defenders8)8 odcast6transcri t6sB8). -r9/ htt $66www"reasonablefaith"org6a8christian8 ers ecti!e8on8homose(ualit+ -rB/ htt $66www"reasonablefaith"org6the8 lausibilit+8of8grounding8moral8!alues8in8god

htt $66www"reasonablefaith"org6does8theistic8ethics8deri!e8an8ought8from8an8is -rH/ htt $66www"reasonablefaith"org6is8the8foundation8of8moralit+8natural8or8su ernatural8the8craig8harris -rHb/ htt $66www"reasonablefaith"org6defining8god -rI/ htt $66www"reasonablefaith"org6do8we8li!e8in8a8 ost8modern8societ+ -rJ/ htt $66www"reasonablefaith"org6are8there8objecti!e8truths8about8god -rK/ htt $66www"reasonablefaith"org6the8re!olution8in8anglo8american8 hiloso h+ -rM/ htt $66www"reasonablefaith"org6does8god8e(ist8the8craig8law8debate -rMb/ htt $66www"reasonablefaith"org6formulating8the8moral8argument -r&./ htt $66www"reasonablefaith"org6the8indis ensabilit+8of8theological8meta8ethical8foundations8for8 moralit+ htt $66www"leaderu"com6offices6billcraig6docs6meta8eth"html -r&&/ htt $66www"reasonablefaith"org6defenders8)8 odcast6transcri t6sB8)& -r&&b/ htt $66www"rfmedia"org6=5TaudioT!ideo6>efenderT odcast6)..B.K.&MoralArgument%art9"m 9 -r&)/ htt $66www"reasonablefaith"org6our8gras 8of8objecti!e8moral8!alues -r&9/ htt $66www"reasonablefaith"org6hawkings8curious8objections8to8di!ine8creation -r&B/ htt $66 hil a ers"org6rec6A*=F2M Aorgan and #immons, Few 2a!e Moral =ealism Meets Moral #win GarthL Nournal of %hiloso hical =esearch &I$BBJ8BIH (&MM&) -r&H/ htt $66 hil a ers"org6rec6A*=AM5

Aorgan and #immons, Anal+tical 5unctionalism Meets Moral #win Garth, in Minds, Gthics, and Conditionals$ #hemes from the %hiloso h+ of 5rank Nackson, edited b+ Ian =a!enscroft" *(ford @ni!ersit+ %ress ()..M)" <ink$ htt $66thorgan"facult+"ari;ona"edu6sites6thorgan"facult+"ari;ona"edu6files6Anal+ticalS).Moral S).5unctionalismS).MeetsS).MoralS).#winS).Garth" df -r&I/ htt s$66en"wiki edia"org6wiki6EisibleTs ectrum -r&J/ htt $66www"reasonablefaith"org6contem orar+8moral8arguments -r&K/ htt $66www"reasonablefaith"org6moral8argument8for8god -r&M/ htt $66www"reasonablefaith"org6classif+ing8immaterial8objects -r)./ 2illiam <ane Craig, #he Most 'ruesome of 'uests, in Is 'oodness 2ithout 'od Gnough$ A >ebate on 5aith, 0ecularism, and Gthics, edited b+ =obert" 'arcia and Fathan Ping" -r)&/ Mark Mur h+, #heism, Atheism, and the G( lanation of Moral Ealue, in Is 'oodness 2ithout 'od Gnough$ A >ebate on 5aith, 0ecularism, and Gthics, edited b+ =obert" 'arcia and Fathan Ping" -r))/ htt $66www"reasonablefaith"org6can8god8ground8necessar+8moral8truths -r)9/ htt s$66en"wiki edia"org6wiki6'iorgioT%erlasca -r)B/ htt $66www"reasonablefaith"org6 erfect8being8theolog+ -r)H/ htt $66www"reasonablefaith"org6defenders8)8 odcast6transcri t6sB8)9 -r)I/ htt $66www"reasonablefaith"org6defenders8)8 odcast6transcri t6sB8)B -r)J/ htt $66www"reasonablefaith"org6the8euth+ hro8dilemma8once8more -r)K/

htt $66www"leaderu"com6offices6billcraig6docs6craig8ta+lor."html htt $66www"leaderu"com6offices6billcraig6docs6craig8ta+lor)"html -r)M/ =ichard #a+lor, RGthics, 5aith, and =easonR" %rentice8Aall, Gnglewood Cliffs, FN$ &MKH" -r9./ 0winburne, =ichard R#he G(istence of 'odR, 0econd Gdition" Clarendon %ress *(ford" %age &9."