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DOCUMENT A/1884

30 November 2004

FIFTIETH SESSION
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Unmanned combat air vehicles and military aeronautics of the future

REPORT
submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee by Mr Braga, Rapporteur (Portugal, Socialist Group)

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION THE INTERPARLIAMENTARY EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE ASSEMBLY 43, avenue du Prsident-Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 Tel. 01.53.67.22.00 Fax: 01.53.67.22.01 E-mail: info@assembly.weu.int Internet: http://assembly.weu.int

Document A/1884

30 November 2004

Unmanned combat air vehicles and military aeronautics of the future REPORT1 submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee2 by Mr Braga, Rapporteur (Portugal, Socialist Group)

TABLE OF CONTENTS RECOMMENDATION 754 on unmanned combat air vehicles and military aeronautics of the future EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM submitted by Mr Braga, Rapporteur (Portugal, Socialist Group) I. II. III. APPENDIX I European programmes and European participation in international UCAV projects APPENDIX II American UCAV Programmes Introduction UCAVs, UAVs and other military robots UCAVs and the future of defence aeronautics

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Adopted unanimously by the Committee on 9 November 2004. Members of the Committee: Mr OHara (Chairman); MM Mauro, Braga (Vice-Chairmen); Mrs Aburto Baselga, MM Anacoreta Correia, Atkinson, Azzolini, Bindig, Van den Brande, Danieli, Duivesteijn, Etherington, Mrs Fernndez-Capel Baos (Alternate: Puche Rodrguez), MM Haupert, Hfer, Mrs Katseli, MM Kucheida, Le Grand, Le Guen, Letzgus, Meale, Meimarakis (Alternate: Dendias), Mrs Melandri, Mr Monfils, Mrs Quesada Bravo (Alternate: Cortajarena Iturrioz), MM Reymann, Siebert, van Winsen. Affiliate members: Mrs Brestensk, MM Ersi, Gawlowski, Juozaitiene, Komorowski, Lepikson, Rockenbauer, Mrs Senyszyn, MM Strazdins, Titz, Vnucec, N Associate members: MM Aikgz, Ates, avusoglu, Mrs Hldversdottir, Mr Konradsen, N Affiliate associate members: Mr Ciocarlie, Mrs Rebreanu, N, N N.B.: The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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RECOMMENDATION 7541 on unmanned combat air vehicles and military aeronautics of the future The Assembly, (i) Recalling that the aerospace sector with its specific technical constraints and requirements is a driving force for progress and innovation; (ii) Noting that the technological challenge posed by UCAVs (Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles) is mobilising increasing resources in the United States, Europe and other states with advanced defence industries; (iii) Considering that the emphasis placed on future military UAV (Unmanned Aerial Air Vehicle) and UCAV programmes in terms of investments and research, technology, development and evaluation (RTD&E) will inevitably have an impact on the civilian component of that industry; (iv) Considering that tactical UAVs have always been and continue to be regularly deployed by the armed forces of European countries for operations in Europe (Kosovo war) and elsewhere (Afghanistan, Africa, Iraq) and that their transportability and ease of use, as well as their modular structure and cost-effectiveness have made them indispensable and unavoidable; (v) Recalling that UAVs have up until now been used for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance missions; (vi) Noting that the advent of UCAVs opens a new chapter in the history of military and civilian aeronautics, because more than remotely controlled machines, they are genuine multi-mission, multirole combat aircraft that are autonomous and capable of adapting to their specific environment; (vii) Considering that the UCAV concept constitutes a new weapons system whose introduction will significantly change military doctrines and the rules of engagement for military forces, and that the use of this technology is perceived as a means for rationalising air forces by limiting human intervention and the corresponding constraints; (viii) Noting that there are a number of different European UCAV projects or ongoing programmes, such as the Neuron programme led by France with the participation of Belgium, Greece, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland; (ix) Considering furthermore that the use of UAVs is a logical development arising out of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and technological progress, particularly in the fields of information technology and miniaturisation; (x) Noting that only those countries that have a well-developed aeronautics industry and technological/IT base will be able to play any decisive role in the area of strategic UAVs and UCAVs; (xi) Stressing the need to avoid a dispersal of European efforts in this area as has often been the case in the past for other weapons systems; (xii) Stressing that these questions are relevant for a crucial aspect of the ESDP: the European defence industrial and technological base (EDITB) and European research, technology, development and evaluation (RTD&E) capabilities; (xiii) Noting that the industrial effort that is under way also requires staunch political support and an overall vision of the integration of these new weapons systems and that the ECAP (European Capability Action Plan) project groups and the European Defence Agency (EDA) are responsible for that integration; (xiv) Underlining the importance of continuing the ETAP programme (European Technology Acquisition Programme) for future combat aircraft, among which the UCAV demonstrators are one of the most promising elements;
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Adopted by the Assembly on 30 November 2004 at the 8th sitting.

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(xv) Recalling furthermore that interoperability is essential for UAV/UCAV systems and that at Euro-Atlantic level, NATO bears the responsibility for defining a common language among the allies and for designing the architecture of a common operating system; (xvi) Considering, finally, that unless there is a common effort which also requires a readiness on the part of the United States to cooperate with Europe on all types of unmanned vehicle projects American and European forces will no longer be able in the medium term to conduct joint operations in low-to-medium intensity conflicts, RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL INVITE THE WEU COUNTRIES 1. To actively support European efforts to design and develop UAV and UCAV technology demonstrators by increasing their political, financial, technological and industrial participation; 2. To take account in this regard of the following factors: the concept of unmanned remote-controlled or autonomous vehicles applied to air-based, land-based or naval weapons systems will have repercussions for defence doctrines and the operational engagement of forces; it is necessary to have an overall vision of the integration of these new weapons systems designed to augment and/or supplant existing manned systems; European countries must avoid a fragmented approach, competition among themselves and a duplication of efforts, for these are costly and ineffective in the long term; some degree of specialisation and interdependence must be accepted in order to avoid these programmes becoming bogged down in conflicting requirements; Europeans must develop their own networks that can be adapted in modular fashion to European or transatlantic coalitions in keeping with the effective multilateralism advocated by the European Security Strategy of December 2003; maintaining an optimum level of transatlantic interoperability is essential and the responsibility for finding a common operating system among the United States and its allies lies first and foremost with NATO; it is up to the European military bodies and the European Defence Agency (EDA) to develop a common, interoperable and interchangeable European standard which could provide a reference for interaction between European and American systems.

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM submitted by Mr Braga, Rapporteur (Portugal, Socialist Group) I. Introduction

1. Unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned combat aerial vehicles2 represent a major development in the area of both military and civilian aeronautics. Their use for observation and combat has become familiar to the public through the media reports on the Kosovo conflict (March-May 1999) and the military operations in Afghanistan (since 2001) and Iraq (March-April 2003). Their combat applications are of particular interest in that they presage a revolution in defence aeronautics: the use of machines to replace people for military combat operations. 2. What makes it possible to strive for that objective is the development of information and communication technologies and the exponential growth of computing power in particular. The air forces of the future will continue to need the skills and know-how of their flight crews, but these will become part of a broader and highly automated integrated system in which they will work side by side (until they are supplanted) with extremely sophisticated and increasingly powerful and autonomous machines. This will have repercussions not only for the aerospace sector, but also for the land and naval components of defence. 3. The use of unmanned flying machines for military purposes is not a recent development. Indeed, centuries of technological innovation and efforts lie between the first kites, balloons and flying bombs to be used for observation and warfare and the automatic aircraft we know today. However it was the conflicts engendered by the cold war (the Korean and Vietnam wars, for example) that wrought the most significant changes in their use and technical design, and the process was amplified by the information technology revolution of the nineteen eighties and nineties. 4. Since the last decade of the 20th century (the 1991 Gulf war), UAVs have become such a permanent feature of the modern battlefield that they are now indispensable for military operations and even compete with traditional human platforms. Complementarity, increasingly, is giving way to competition, encouraged by industry and some political and military decision-makers, although not without some degree of wariness and reluctance on the part of the latter, particularly in the air forces. 5. Although the technical performance of a Predator or Global Hawk (United States) or a Piver, Crecerelle or Sperwer (France), to mention but a few, does not yet enjoy the same prestige as that of manned aircraft, the steady progress in terms of the scope of action and sophistication of these unmanned aircraft is gradually enabling them to close the gap. Indeed a new frontier has already been crossed in the area of military aeronautics: both in the United States and Europe conventional manned aircraft are no longer the sole reference for defence aeronautic programmes and their replacement by autonomous robot vehicles has become a genuine option despite the current conceptual and technical problems. 6. The aerospace sector with its specific technical constraints and requirements in all areas from materials through to information systems is a driving force for progress and innovation. The emphasis placed on future military UAV and UCAV programmes in terms of investments and RTD&E (research, technology, development and evaluation) will inevitably have an impact on the civilian component of the industry. By the same token, progress in the fields of computerisation, automation and systems autonomy will eventually have a spin-off for ground and naval equipment. As the human factor is gradually replaced and integrated in increasingly complex information-processing systems (Network Enabled Capability3), the whole concept of defence at both national and European level will need to be revisited.
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Respectively, UAVs and UCAVs. Network Enabled Capability is the NATO terminology (N [NATO] NEC). NEC (the principle of which Network Centric Warfare, NCW lies at the heart of the reform of the US armed forces being undertaken by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld) can be summed up thus: Linking sensors, decision-makers and weapon systems so that information can be translated into synchronized and overwhelming military effect at optimum

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II. UCAVs, UAVs and other military robots 7. During the 1991 Gulf war the United States used a single UAV, the navys Pioneer4 system. During the Kosovo war, UAVs were deployed both before and during the hostilities for observation but also electronic warfare by Germany5, the United States, France and the United Kingdom. In 2001, a Predator-type UAV equipped with Hellfire air-to-surface missiles was used against Taliban and al-Qaida armed groups; it was the first operational UCAV to be tested in combat. In the 2003 Iraq war the United States deployed more than a dozen UAV systems for a range of missions. Both in the United States and Europe (European NATO members and EU member states) automated aircraft are playing an increasing role in the conduct of military operations, from peacekeeping missions through to offensive warfare. 8. The particular features of UAVs and UCAVs in particular their relatively low cost and the absence of a human crew make them very attractive to defence staffs and political decision-makers. France lost five of the thirteen UAVs it deployed during the Kosovo conflict in 1999, but the impact in operational and political terms was slight as compared with that which would have resulted from a similar (or even smaller) loss rate for manned aircraft. Up until now UAVs have been used essentially for observation missions and electronic warfare, but they also have an offensive potential of which it is difficult to measure the full consequences. Indeed the technological challenge posed by UCAVs is mobilising increasing resources in the United States, Europe and other states with advanced defence aeronautical industries. 9. In parallel, the unmanned vehicle concept is no longer reserved exclusively for aircraft. Land vehicles and naval and space-based military platforms have directly benefited from advances in the aeronautics sector coupled with the growing integration of information systems (network centric systems). This opens up new prospects for all defence industries, particularly in the land forces and naval sectors, where progress is slower than in the civilian and military aerospace industries 1. Airborne robots: concepts and use 10. UAVs and UCAVs show similarities but also major differences in terms of technology and capabilities. The UCAVs currently being developed are derived from UAVs, but represent a whole new generation of aircraft that are playing an increasingly important role in the air forces. As regards size and characteristics (payload, autonomy, range, for example), UAVs designed for observation or electronic warfare are generally easily transportable and do not require a heavy support and launch infrastructure, while the current UCAVs look more like fighter or bomber aircraft and are sufficiently large to require proper take-off and landing areas and autonomous capabilities for reacting to their environment. (a) UAVs for observation and electronic warfare 11. The NATO Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Panel describes the UAV as a powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. Ballistic or semi-ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are not
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tempo. (...) It emphasises provision of data to a wide community of users in a data pull rather than data push environment, the provision of a high bandwidth Web-based intranet and the use of Web Services technology. (Source: NATO C3 Technical Architecture; Volume 2, Chapter 5 NATO Network Enabled C3 Architecture Concepts; December 2003, www.nato.int). 4 Pioneer is a tactical observation UAV originally designed in Israel (Israel Aircraft Industries) and produced in the United States in partnership with AAI Corporation (United States). 5 On 24 March 1999, at the beginning of NATOs air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Germanys 100th UAV battery was the only European UAV unit 6 UAVs form a highly diversified group in terms of technical characteristics and the concepts for their use. They also have major applications in the civilian sector, for example homeland security (e.g. border surveillance, police surveillance operations, fire prevention). Those aspects could be addressed in a follow-up report by the Technological and Aerospace Committee.

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considered unmanned aerial vehicles7. UAVs are generally divided into three categories: micro UAVs (very small size and very light payload), tactical UAVS and, most important of all, strategic high endurance UAVs. The latter are further sub-divided into medium altitude long endurance (MALE) and high altitude long endurance (HALE) UAVs. The wingspan of aircraft in this category is close to that of a normal aircraft and they can carry loads of more than 100 kg, reach altitudes of more than 8 000 metres and remain airborne for more than a day. 12. Most European armed forces have tactical UAVs which they regularly deploy for operations in Europe (Kosovo war) or elsewhere (Afghanistan, Africa, Iraq). Their transportability (small weight and size), manoeuvrability, modular structure (enabling them to be adapted to mission requirements) and cost-effectiveness (a tactical UAV costs about 1.5 million euros, a miniature UAV less than 5 000 euros) have made them indispensable for missions. Their drawbacks are their limited autonomy (a few hours), low speed and the fact that they fly at low altitudes (less than 1 000 metres). 13. Up until now UAVs have been used for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance tasks (ISTAR). All UAVs currently in service or programmed for the next few years have been allocated to such missions, although there are now also hybrid categories with both defensive and offensive capabilities designed for electronic warfare and/or air-to-surface or air-to-air attacks. The American Predator armed with Hellfire missiles and Frances Crcerelle equipped with a system for jamming enemy communications are two examples of that development. 14. The increasingly intensive use of UAVs and the gradual expansion of their scope of application have prompted research into new so-called MCMM (Multi-Charges/Multi-Mission) versions. These will have enhanced capabilities (technical characteristics), use more sophisticated ISTAR technologies and will probably be able to switch missions mid-flight (like the militarys so-called multi-role aircraft), including for the purpose of taking offensive action (electronic warfare or ground attack). Interoperability with other similar systems at national and European level an essential characteristic of the European forces is a key requisite here too. (b) Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles 15. The advent of UCAVs opens a new chapter in the history of military and civilian aeronautics. More than just machines that are remotely controlled by an operator through a console and data links, these are genuine multi-mission, multi-role combat aircraft that are autonomous and capable of adapting to their specific environment. This is a new area in which information technology is crucial, much more so than aerodynamic design or operational capabilities. The active commitment of governments and industries to this project is not just a passing fashion, but rather a logical development prompted in large part by the difficulties encountered in the implementation of conventional combat aircraft programmes. 16. The more intensive use of tactical and strategic UAVs for observation or electronic warfare has demonstrated the advantages of using these systems rather than planes and helicopters for the same missions: they are much cheaper, easily replaceable and offer a high-quality performance thanks to the growing sophistication of sensors and other on-board equipment. The addition of weapons systems has transformed UAVs into UCAVs, at least of the first generation. The United States Predator system equipped with Hellfire air-to-surface or Stinger surface-to-air missiles is one famous example8. 17. But the UCAV concept entails more than merely adapting UAVs to more complex missions. It is a new weapons system whose introduction will profoundly affect military doctrines and rules of engagement. The attraction of UCAVs is for the moment more a matter of perception than of real capabilities (not yet tested). The use of this technology is perceived as a means for the cost-effective rationalisation of the air forces, by gradually removing the human factor and the corresponding costs and constraints. An air force composed essentially of UAVs and UCAVs will require a smaller
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Comments of the 3rd meeting of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Panel (11-12 March 2004); www.nato.int. 8 The first recognised engagement between a Predator equipped with Stinger missiles and an Iraqi Mig-25 fighter aircraft took place in December 2002, over Iraq. The UAV was able to fire two missiles at the aircraft before being shot down by the Iraqi pilot; source CNN, 30 December 2002, www.cnn.com

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number of conventional aircraft and pilots (except those required for very specific missions) and have lower fleet management and maintenance costs. 18. The initial cost of a UCAV programme is high, albeit lower than that of a manned aircraft programme, for the UCAV is not a small-scale model but will need, if it is to conduct the same missions and offer the same capabilities, the same characteristics as the aircraft it is replacing. In other words, a Predator carrying sophisticated guided munitions is not the equivalent of an F-15 or F-16, wheareas an X-45 (Boeing), X-47 (Northtrop Grumman) or a Neuron (Dassault), are already perceived as complementary to, and future successors of, the F-16 and F-35/JSF, F-18A and Rafale aircraft. In terms of design and materials there is currently no obstacle to such a development. The major challenge is to transform these robots into autonomous entities equipped with artificial intelligence. 2. Land- and sea-based platforms 19. These days in air forces, armies (especially mechanised divisions) and navies, an increasing number of operational functions are managed automatically. Sensors, radar, communications, data processing and even large C4ISR9 electronic platforms (such as radar aircraft and satellites) operate in a network environment in which there are ever increasing exchanges of data, leaving very little to the initiative of the technicians or systems operators. The two-man crews of American B-2 Spirit strategic stealth bombers, for example, spend most of the mission resting10. Piloting, navigation and targeting require practically no human intervention apart from pressing switches: The pilot can choose to activate the appropriate selection of flight and mission equipment for take-off mode, go-to-war mode and landing mode by using a simple three-way switch11. 20. The present enthusiasm for UAVs and UCAVs reflects the growing integration between weapons systems and their operators. This enhances efficiency and preserves or increases the tactical and strategic advantage vis--vis potential enemies, but at the same time reduces the human role in the system. The B2 bomber, for example if we disregard the logistic and technical constraints linked with its utilisation can fire up to 80 guided munitions at as many targets anywhere in the world during a single sortie from the United States, Guam (Pacific Ocean) or the Island of Diego Garcia (Indian Ocean) with a single aircraft and two crew members12. Studies are under way on applying a similar concept to land and naval forces with the same objective of reducing or eliminating the constraints linked with the human presence (which costs a sizeable part of defence budgets). (a) Land forces: from Goliath to Terminator 21. Micro-UAVs and tactical UAVs are used essentially for land forces security missions in order to reduce the fog of war and for the acquisition, for example, of artillery targets. In addition, unmanned ground vehicles are increasingly being used for demining and ISTAR-type missions. Like their airborne counterparts, these UGVs are developing fast in both number and quality, and various models are already available, ranging from miniature vehicles (e.g. for special forces) to transport or armoured vehicles with defence capabilities. Furthermore, with the soldier of the future projects humans are becoming increasingly integrated in information systems. 22. Goliath was a robot tank designed by Germany during World War II. It was a small (500 kg) tracked vehicle equipped with an explosive charge (up to 100 Kg of TNT) and non-recoverable. It was remote-controlled through a cable and used for demining and the destruction of small fortifications. The Borgwald IV was a more sophisticated full-scale (4.5 tonnes) radio-guided vehicle capable of carrying loads of up to 500 kg. Unlike Goliath, it was reusable. At the end of the war it was equipped with a camera for navigation and target-acquisition purposes. Tests were carried out with a view to adding weaponry to give it a combat capability. The last in that line of precursor unmanned land
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. The longest mission for a B2 so far was more than 40 hours. 11 B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber, www.airforce-technology.com 12 The B-52 flying fortress also has that capability with a five-man crew but over longer distances (16 000 km as opposed to 11 600km for the B-2) and with a larger and more diversified weapons payload capability. According to the Pentagon this aircraft which entered service in 1955 will still be used in 2045 and beyond; www.militaryfactory.com
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vehicles was the NSU Springer, which was designed to replace Goliath and Borgwald IV and to combine mobility, survivability, destructive capability and fire power. 23. Current projects are designed to give UAVs greater autonomy and make them less dependent on human operators. The underlying idea is for these reconnaissance, identification, target-acquisition, demining, transport or assault vehicles to function using data pre-programmed at the start of the mission so that once they are deployed they can perform their tasks autonomously. Demo III is an experimental reconnaissance robot designed by the US Army on the basis of the following principle: The soldier plans a mission for the robot through the operator control unit (computer). (...) If the vehicle runs into trouble, it can send a message back that it needs help. The soldier can then turn on the cameras (mounted on the vehicle), take a look around, execute a plan, and the robot will resume its mission13. Syrano (robotised target acquisition and neutralisation system) is being developed by the French armed forces. To protect itself against attack it operates in stealth and silent mode. It detects intruders within its surveillance zone and can trigger the firing of incapacitating munitions. It can also locate fire from heavy weaponry and be used as an abandoned sensor to retransmit relevant information to the command post14. The PRIMUS (Programme of Intelligent Mobile Unmanned Systems) standard vehicle is equipped with a drive-by-wire system and can be deployed autonomous, tele-operated or tele-guided, based on technologies used by modern flight control systems. The combination of specific local navigation capabilities and the way-point based global navigation makes it possible to maneuver through unknown cross country terrain with up to 25 km/h, and drive autonomously on paved/-unpaved roads or simple natural contours with a velocity of up to 50 km/h. Missions for the robot vehicle are planned and transmitted by just one operator at the Command & Control Station (CCS). The robot vehicle is equipped with dual use function for unmanned and manned tasks so that a person can drive the Wiesel as standard tracked vehicle 15. The UK company QinetiQ has extensive experience in the field of demining UGVs working with a remote camera. These were successfully deployed by the British forces in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Recent work has focused on enhanced navigational autonomy and the relevant division of this company has already devised a system that undertakes simple programmable operations. Using this technology, on-board sensors scan the terrain to produce an obstacle map providing information on the size, orientation, shape and range of obstacles. Using this data, the vehicles navigation system starts to look at ways of negotiating the route in an intelligent and efficient manner, and provides control data to tell the vehicle the speed and path that should be followed. This then allows the vehicle to navigate safely and quickly across unstructured, unmapped, rugged terrain 16. 24. The armies of autonomous robots popularised by the Terminator film series are not for the near future, but defence research is being conducted on the soldier of the future concept, in which soldiers equipped with the latest information and communications technologies are closely integrated in increasingly complex network systems. The Future Force Warrior (United States) and FELIN (France) programmes are forerunners of that development: The FFW is by definition network centric. This concept, which is due to be deployed as of 2010, involves a lightweight, overwhelmingly lethal, fully integrated individual combat system, including weapon, head-to-toe individual protection, netted communications, soldier worn power sources, and enhanced human performance. It is based on five essential elements: lethality vision (weapons and fire control

Reconnaissance scouts of the future; American Forces News Service, 17 May 2004; http://usmilitary.about.com 14 Thales, Journe de larme blinde ; Saumur, 23-25 mars 2004 ; www.thales-communications.com 15 EADS, Unmanned Ground Vehicles, PRIMUS ; www.eads.net. 16 Robot Warriors; Armed Forces International; www.copybook.com.

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software/hardware), survivability vision (protective combat ensemble, ballistic, chemical/biological protection, electro-textile power, integrated laser eye protection), sensors & communications (C4ISR), power vision (power source/system) and mobility, sustainability and human performance vision (cognitive and physical fightability, on-board physiological/medical sensor suite with enhanced prompt casualty care) 17. The aim of the FELIN programme (FELIN stands for soldier with integrated equipment and links) developed by the French company SAGEM for the French armaments procurement authority, DGA, is to equip two thirds of the land forces by the end of 2008. It will be the first future soldier system to become operational within the armed forces of an EU member state18. The UKs FIST TD 200019 programme (Future Integrated Soldier Technology Technology demonstrator) aims to transform the conventional infantry section into a genuine weapons system, just like an aircraft or warship. The British foot-soldier of the 21st century will act as a mobile platform, carrying a variety of electrical devices (for example, thermal imagers, head-up displays, GPS, radios, and computers). The project has been under way since the end of the 1990s and aims to attain Full Operating Capability which means equipping 35 000 soldiers in 2015. To resolve the problem of power supply which is crucial for the proper functioning of these systems, the UK has entered into a bilateral Information Exchange Agreement with the US in the areas of fuel cell design and performance, battery design and technology, novel power sources and power management systems. This collaboration has helped identify fuel cell technology as a means of addressing future battlefield power requirements. These fuel cells are capable of producing over eight times more power than current state of-the-art lithium batteries and have a potential life of up to five years20.

(b) Naval forces: UUVs and USVs 25. UAVs and UCAVs are also very important for the naval forces as auxiliary equipment and force multipliers. UAVs are used essentially to support coastal operations (observation) but their role in the marine environment is evolving in the same way as for the land and air forces. Their ISTAR capability can be used for anti-submarine warfare or anti-air/anti-missile/anti-torpedo defence. However, their integration in this operational environment poses technical problems which have not yet been fully resolved, in particular as regards their on-board stowage, launch and recovery. These are very important questions, given that naval air forces will in the future be equipped with large UCAVs. 26. Northrop Grummans X-47 UCAV programme is designed to give the US Navy an enhanced strike capability in addition to or as a replacement for its manned aircraft. The X-47 is designed for carrier-based take-off and landing, but that capability has not yet been tested in operational conditions. However, in February 2003 a prototype successfully took off and landed without human intervention (apart from the software) at the navy pilot training facilities of the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division at China Lake in the United States. In 2004 the X-47 successfully performed manoeuvres designed to test its integration in the flight control system of an aircraft carrier. 27. The US Navy and the naval forces of other countries are exploring two other unmanned vehicle concepts: the UUV or AUV (Unmanned Underwater Vehicle/Autonomous Underwater Vehicle) and the USV (Unmanned Surface Vessel). The first is the subject of various national and cooperative programmes (at the Undersea Research Centre of SACLANT, NATO, for example). These are not unmanned submarines, but rather smaller craft which can be used, according to the US Navys 2001
Future Force Warrior; US Army Soldier Systems Center (SSC); www.natick.army.mil. La DGA notifie SAGEM le march de ralisation des systmes FELIN pour larme de terre; French Ministry of Defence, Defence Information and Communications Department, 4 March 2004; www.defense.gouv.fr. 19 Future Integrated Soldier Technology (FIST), Defence Procurement Agency (UK); www.mod.uk. 20 Ibid.
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master plan for UUVs21, for maritime reconnaissance, undersea search and survey, communications and navigation aid/relay and submarine track and trail missions. 28. As with UAVs and UCAVs, the major problems here are autonomy in operational terms and as regards energy supplies, and the ability of a single vessel to carry out different types of mission. With technology as it stands at present, the optimum solution would be to have UUVs weighing an average of some 10 tonnes instead of the current two tonnes for the largest vessels22. In Europe the Norwegian company Kongsberg Simrad SA has developed the HUGIN 3000 for the oil industry, but this vessel which has up to 61 hours autonomy also has defence applications. The Swedish company Kokums plans to build a large-size UUV demonstrator for the Swedish navy. India has a similar project under way23. 29. Unmanned surface vehicles have now almost become a reality, although for the moment projects are confined essentially to coastal surveillance operations. Israel (Rafael Industries) has launched Protector for port and harbour security missions, anti-terror and force protection in coastal areas and inland waters, surveillance and reconnaissance missions. This small vessel (9-11 metres) is autonomous and multi-mission and equipped with a stabilised naval machine gun system. It can reach speeds of up to 40 knots (45 km/h). The United States for its part is developing the Spartan advanced concept technical demonstration programme24; with one demonstration model being used by the Enterprise carrier group25. The Spartan Scout (7-11 metres, 1.5-2.5 tonnes payload and a speed of 2850 knots or 50-90 km/h) is remote-controlled and can conduct intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, anti-terrorist and anti-submarine warfare missions. In the future it could be armed with systems for attacking other vessels or land-based targets. III. UCAVs and the future of defence aeronautics 30. The UCAV, UAV, UGV, UUV/AUV and USV concepts have one point in common: they all aim to reduce the human component or at least the role of the systems operator in defence systems. The greater their autonomy, the less they depend on a controller, with obvious advantages in terms of costs and of reducing the vulnerability of the networks of which they are part. Forces protection is also enhanced by the deployment of these capabilities. 31. UAVS and UGVs play an important role for the security of the European and American forces in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq, since they make it possible to reduce the number of manned flight and human patrols and hence the number of potential targets for enemy forces. Moreover the continual upgrading of these vehicles in terms of their number, performance and endurance is demoralising and dissuasive for the enemy, who becomes visible before getting close to a target. Technology on its own does not guarantee peace, but used intelligently it offers major tactical and material advantages which in the long term help ensure an acceptable level of security and stability in the field.

This document is being revised to take account of the latest developments in the field of naval strategy. (Source: National Defense Magazine, May 2004; www.nationaldefensemagazine.org). 22 Navy adjusts course for underwater robots; National Defense Magazine, May 2004; www.nationaldefensemagazine.org. 23 India working on underwater surveillance vehicle; The Times of India, 21 August 2003; http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com. 24 France (through a DGA contract placed with Thales for the anti-submarine warfare module de of Spartan) and Singapore are also involved in this project. (Source: France to develop ASW module for Spartan Scout; Janes Navy International, 15 July 2004; www.jni.janes.com.). 25 France to develop ASW module for Spartan Scout; Janes Navy International, 15 July 2004; www.jni.janes.com.). 25 The next Kitty Hawk ACTD program sped Spartan Scout tests; Defense News, 17 November 2003. In the same article the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group of the US Navy is quoted as predicting that between 2030 and 2050 a 20-ship strike group may have some 200 unmanned surface vehicles; www.defensenews.com.

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32. UCAVs are of particular interest in that they herald a new trend: the emergence of technological warfare, in which machines rather than men confront each other on the battlefield. The best and most sophisticated systems regardless of the political aspects almost always win, as demonstrated in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Asymetrical conflicts are those in which different technological levels are pitched against each other. When UCAVs reach the same level of sophistication as manned fighter aircraft, they will constitute a major deterrent: the psychological effect of sending human troops against large numbers of such machines, particularly when heavy losses are incurred, will be considerable. 33. UCAVs are also important in industrial and technological terms. Their size and aerodynamic characteristics, as well as their autonomy and ability to adapt to a changing environment, may enable them eventually to supplant existing manned aircraft. Hence they represent a promising market for aeronautical companies, with considerable spin-off for the civilian sector, particularly in view of the fact that a single manned aircraft (or its civilian equivalent, a transport aircraft for example) can be replaced for the same cost by several UCAVs26. 34. UAVs have already supplanted helicopters for certain intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance and electronic warfare missions. Technological warfare implies a constant stream of real-time information on the full range of battlefield parameters. This can be supplied by modern UAVs albeit still not without certain difficulties, but increasingly effectively including for internal security missions such as coastal surveillance and the monitoring of air and land borders. 35. What makes this sector attractive for aerospace companies is not so much the actual construction of UCAVs as their spin-off for research, technology, development and evaluation (RTD&E). This is an area with large budgets and major long-term gains (derived commercial applications and new technologies), whereas conventional programmes are confronted with a number of problems (duration, costs, export barriers). Moreover, the UAV and UCAV sector is one in which European defence aeronautics companies are almost all on an equal footing as regards competition or transatlantic partnerships in the area of investments (300 million euros27 for the French company Dassaults Neuron project, 175.5 million dollars for the development of American UCAVs in 200428) and technologies. In the long term the main challenge will be to guarantee interoperability among these robot warriors and between men and machines, as well as more generally between EuroAtlantic defence systems and the ESDP. 1. European and American programmes 36. While almost all developed countries are capable of designing and producing UAVs, UCAV technology calls for an advanced aeronautics industry. This explains why the majority of declared UCAV projects currently in the study or development phase are to be found in France, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. Alone or in the framework of collaborative projects, those countries are paying increasing attention for defence purposes to the concept of unmanned vehicles and autonomy (in the sense of artificial intelligence) and have embarked on the path towards technological warfare. The costs of those programmes, while less than those of manned aircraft, are rising from year to year. Technological limitations are still an obstacle to the more widespread use of these vehicles within the armed forces, but the information they provide is vital to network centric operations. Other countries such as India, Israel and Russia also have the technological know-how and potential needed to invest in this field of military aviation. (a) European UCAV projects 37. In Europe (EU and/or NATO member countries) at least five countries have UCAV programmes: France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom. However, they have not all reached the same stage of development and France through the Dassault group (in cooperation with EADS) is the only one to have launched a UCAV concept demonstration programme, known as
By way of comparison, the initial cost of an X-45 UCAV (Boeing) is estimated at 40 million dollars, as opposed to over 100 million dollars for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter or 200 million for the F-22 Raptor. 27 To start the programme: this is not a renewable budget. 28 US defence budget for 2004; US Department of Defense, www.defenselink.mil.
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Neuron. Originally a national project, this programme is now endeavouring to group together all European efforts in this area. That strategy is beginning to bear fruit; if successful, it could serve as a model and catalyst for other high-tech programmes that are too costly for a single country on its own. Neuron 38. Neuron, which the French Government has supported with a 300 million euro investment (shared between Dassault Aviation and EADS), is not yet the European UCAV, but a demonstrator of the validity of the UCAV concept. Greece (Hellenic Aerospace Industries) and Sweden (SAAB) have signed agreements for participation in this programme, which is led by Dassault in partnership with EADS. Belgium (Sabca), Spain (Casa/EADS); Italy (Alenia and Finmeccanica) and Switzerland (Ruag) have also expressed an interest in becoming involved. Russia could also eventually indirectly participate through an agreement signed on 6 October 2003 by the French company SNECMA and the Russian company Rosoboronexport on the possibilities of collaborating on propulsion systems for a new generation of combat aircraft and unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV)29. 39. The French procurement office (DGA), the order-giver for this demonstrator, describes its purpose as being to demonstrate Europes capacity to build and fly a discreet unmanned platform remote-controlled from a ground station and capable of delivering a guided weapon stored in its hold. The combat vehicle is not an end in itself, but should also serve to study new concepts for the operational deployment of the personnel and airborne combat systems resulting from the removal of the pilot. The results of the programme should be useful for new manned combat aircraft or the midlife renovation of Rafale. The first tests and flights are scheduled for 2008-2009. 40. Neuron, which can weigh up to 8 tonnes, is diamond-shaped platform equipped with stealth technology and capable of carrying 250 kg of guided munitions. It is derived from the AVE (Aronef Validation Exprimental) programme launched at the end of the last decade in two versions: D for the stealth version and C for the control version (also known as Petit Duc). Together with the French company SAGEM the prime contractor for several tactical observation UAVs including the new multi-sensor UAV Sperwer purchased by Canada30, Denmark, France, Greece, the Netherlands and Sweden Dassault is developing a stealthy tactical UAV for observation and combat called SlowFast (but also known as Moyen Duc). This UAV designed for observation and ground attack missions should be operational as of 2007-2008. Replica, SHARC, Sky-X and Taifun 41. Replica is a UCAV programme designed by the British company BAe Systems. The UK has not yet expressed any preferences (for a national, American or European system) regarding UCAVs, which is understandable in view of the fact that its armed forces are to be equipped over the next few years with the new Eurofighter (EADS; Royal Air Force) and F-35/Joint Strike Fighter (Lockheed Martin/BAe; Royal Navy) aircraft. Nevertheless BAe wishes to play an active role31 as regards European UAVs a field in which there is not yet any common reference or standard. The BAe teams have already conducted preliminary research on a stealth capability for this aircraft, and a demonstrator is under study32. 42. The Swedish firm SAAB, which is also involved in the Neuron demonstrator, is working in parallel on a UCAV project designed to complete the fleet of Gripen JAS-39 aircraft currently flown by the Swedish air force. SHARC (Swedish Highly Advanced Research Configuration) is a stealthy UCAV that is autonomous in terms of navigation and mission execution. A quarter-size model has been flying since 2002. Designed for integration in the future network centric national defence
SNECMA Moteurs, press release of 7 October 2003; www.snecma-moteurs.com. Sperwer UAVs were deployed and used within the Canadian contingent of the UN force ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan. 31 On 12 July 2004, Mike Turner, Director of BAe Systems, stated that continental Europe is getting its act together on UAVs and UCAVs (...). We [BAe] are working with the Defence Procurement Agency [United Kingdom] on programs (...); its really important as a nation we get onboard. (Source: Defense News, 2 August 2004; www.defensenews.com ). BAe is also involved in the United States X-45 UCAV programme (Boeing). 32 Brits may fly solo on new UCAV program; Aviation International News, July 2004; www.ainonline.com.
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system33 , SHARC must have the capacity to conduct SEAD missions (suppression of enemy air defences) and offer beyond-visual-range missile coverage34. On 25 August 2004, After taking off without pilot assistance, the SHARC performed a totally autonomous mission before landing on its own, aided by differential GPS and a radar height finder35. 43. SAABs know-how in this field is also represented by its FILUR (Flying Innovative LowObservable Unmanned Research Vehicle) demonstrator project36. The results of this programme help improve the low-observability performance of SHARC, with which it is being conducted in parallel. The combined experience obtained from these two demonstrators provides valuable input for the Neuron European programme. 44. Sky-X is a UCAV demonstrator developed by the Italian company Alenia on its own initiative (i.e. not on order from the state). This is a multi-mission UCAV: Cameras, radar systems, infra-red or other kind of sensors and weaponry may be hosted in identical modules to be installed in the bay. An open hardware and software architecture will allow the operation of many different payloads depending on which module is actually installed37. The demonstrator, scheduled to conduct its first flights in 2005, weighs one tonne at take-off (with the payload) and measures almost six by six metres. If the project enters the development phase, the final model will be at least twice that size. Sky-X should have stealth capabilities and a high degree of autonomy (artificial intelligence). Alenia has already invested more than 35 million euros in this project38. 45. Taifun is a UAV/UCAV demonstrator designed for the German armed forces by the defence electronics division of the German company Rheinmetall. This autonomous UCAV can stay aloft for about four hours and has a range of 200 km. It is not a robot aircraft like the previous projects, but a tactical UCAV to be used by land forces for ground attacks and controlled by a ground station. Its relatively slow speed gives it an advantage for target acquisition and identification. Particular features are its onboard optronics and quasi-real time transmission capabilities. The first test flight was conducted in December 2002. The Taifun system is completed by KZO39, a tactical UAV for electronic warfare and observation. (b) UCAV programmes in the United States 46. The United States experimental UCAV demonstrator programmes (designated with an X) differ from their European counterparts not only in terms of resources and technologies, but also as regards their characteristics and stated purpose. They are, par excellence, the technological warfare vehicles of the future, alongside the B-2 Spirit bomber and F-22 Raptor fighter aircraft. These two advanced demonstrators developed by Boeing (X-45) and Northrup Grumman (X-47) are managed by a division of DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) called J-UCAS (Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems), whose task is to rationalise American research in this field and which brings together representatives of the US Air Force and Navy40. 47. According to the DARPA specifications, UCAVs must be able to operate independently or as an integral part of manned aircraft operations and will incorporate the next generation of stealth

Developed by a consortium of the companies SAAB and Ericsson in partnership, inter alia, with IBM and Boeing. 34 UCAV update; Janes International Defense Review, August 2004; http://idr.janes.com. 35 SAAB press release, 2 September 2004; www.saab.se. 36 FILUR a flying low signature demonstrator; SAAB, press release, 13 November 2003 ; www.saab.se. 37 Alenia Aeronautica; www.alenia-aeronautica.it. 38 Alenia is also negotiating with the Dassault group to participe in the Neuron demonstrator. (Source: Italys SKY-X demonstrator explores artificial intelligence; Defense News, 2 August 2004 ; www.defensenews.com). 39 KZO: Kleinfluggert zur Zielortung, small aircraft for target aquisition. 40 The J-UCAS budget requested for 2005 is 710 millions de dollars. For 2004-2009, the total sum allocated to UCAV and UAV programmes of all kinds is estimated at more than 12 billion dollars, of which at least 4 billion for UCAVs. (Source: Fiscal 2005 Department of Defense Budget release, 2 February 2004, www.defenselink.mil ; Department of Defense, Office of Management and Budget (Whitehouse), 23 August 2003, www.whitehouse.gov).

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technologies41.The specifications also call for complete interoperability with other UCAV and UAV systems, as well as with manned systems, and it must be possible for a single operator to manage several vehicles at once42. The UCAVs must be able to exchange information among themselves and adapt automatically (autonomy) to any changes in their environment (automated dynamic mission replanning) 43. 48. All these requirements are grouped together under the title common operating system. A 26 941 808 dollar contract was signed on 28 September 2004 with the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory of Laurel, which will play the role of integrator/broker 44. The initial contract is estimated at 300 aircraft (Air Force and Navy) at an estimated cost of 40 million dollars each45. The final choice of systems will be made in 2010. X-45 (Boeing, US Air Force) 49. The United States launched its UCAV programme at the end of the 1990s. The first phase started in 1998 and in 1999 DARPA signed a contract with Boeing for the development of an Advanced Technology Demonstrator (ATD). A 131 million dollar budget (21 million dollars of which provided by Boeing) was allocated to this 42-month programme, which produced two vehicles. The first X-45A test flights took place in May (first demonstrator) and November 2002 (second demonstrator). In 2003 the programme entered a more advanced phase designed to test interoperability with manned systems and to meet changes in operational requirements. Once the X-45A had demonstrated the feasibility of the concept, studies were launched on a more complete vehicle, the X-45B. Finally this was replaced by a more sophisticated system better suited to real-life conditions, the X-45C demonstrator, due for delivery in 2006. 50. The X-45 was initially designed for SEAD missions (suppression of enemy air defences) as of the first day of operations. The programme has since evolved and acquired airborne attack46 (multiple targets), electronic warfare and air combat capabilities for the purpose of airspace surveillance and enforcement of no-fly zones. The X-45A has a wingspan of ten metres and a length of eight metres and a payload capacity of 1.5 tonnes. The X-45 has a 15 metre wingspan and a length of more than 11 metres, and can carry a payload of two tonnes in two munitions bays. Additional fuel tanks can be added to increase its range (2 400 km, three times that of the X-45A). 51. The performance levels of this new system, the assembly of which commenced in June 2004, represent a big step forward for UCAVs. The X-45C must be able to perform airborne electronic attack, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, suppression of enemy air defence and combat missions47. Another requirement is an air refuelling capability (which will considerably increase its flight autonomy and endurance) which is due to be demonstrated in 2007. On 12 October 2004

Ibid. In June and August 2004 the first tests of this capability were successfully carried out with the two existing X45A controlled by a single operator. (Source: Boeing X-45A Unmanned Aircraft Taxi Together; Ready for Multi-Vehicle Flight, 7 June 2004 and Boeing X-45A Aircraft Fly Together for First Time Demonstrate Unmanned Coordinated Flight Successfully, 2 August 2004 ; www.boeing.com). 43 The system will automatically create new mission routes in response to changes in its external environment. When a new (simulated) threat radar system is observed by the system, the mission control system will create a new flight path to avoid detection. X-45A J-UCAS begins Block 2 flight demonstrations; Darpa News release, 14 November 2003; www.darpa.mil. 44 DARPA awards funding for Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems Common Operating System integrator/broker; DARPA news release, 28 September 2004; www.darpa.mil. 45 Boeing wins contract for unmanned aircraft; Los Angeles Times (United States), 13 October 2004; www.latimes.com. 46 In April 2004, the X-45A for the first time dropped a guided 250-pound bomb on a fixed target from more than 10 000 metres altitude at a speed of 0.67 Mach (1 Mach = speed of sound = 331.5 metres per second); JUCAS X-45A destroys target; DARPA News Release, 19 April 2004 ; www.darpa.mil. 46 X-45C; Boeing, www.boeing.com 47 X-45C; Boeing, www.boeing.com.
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DARPA signed a 766.7 million contract with Boeing for the further development of the X-45C. Three models are to be built and tested by 201048. X-47 (Northrop Grumman, US Navy) 52. The United States UCAV programme was designed from the outset to equip both the air force and navy. The naval version must be compatible with carrier transport and operations, which entails major constraints in terms of size, weight and engine systems, and initial DARPA/Navy requirements concerning missions, range and endurance must be complied with. In 2000 Northrup Grummans 49 naval UCAV programme was launched at DARPAs request. The X-47A (Pegasus) demonstrator, funded by the company itself, carried out its first flights in 2001-2002. This vehicle forms the basis of the current programme for the construction of three X-47 demonstrators, for which a development contract worth more than a billion dollars over a five-year period was signed in August 2004. 53. The X-47B is a more powerful version of the A, an 8.5 by 8.5 metres aircraft designed essentially to validate the naval UCAV concept. The X-47B, of similar dimensions, is to have a range of 2 770 km and a payload capacity of about 2.5 tonnes. It must be able to stay on a target for at least two hours, at a distance of at least 1 850 km. According to the DARPA specifications, the X-47B must meet the following criteria in terms of technology and missions: integrated sensors, communication, navigation equipment and low observability features, along with a common operating system to meet mission capability objectives established by the US Air Force and US Navy. The targeted missions encompass suppression of enemy air defenses, penetrating surveillance in denied enemy airspace, and precision strike all from both land and aircraft carrier bases50. The demonstrator must also have electrtonic warfare capabilities and be equipped with a synthetic aperture radar (SAR)51. 54. The X-47B must also meet the specific requirements of naval aviation. Those specifications, used for the design and development of the X-45A (Pegasus), were set out as follows: technologies, processes and system attributes (TPSA) relevant to operations on and around an aircraft carrier. These TPSAs include development of a robust air vehicle; shipboard integration; deck operations; carrier air space operations; command, control and communications suitable for a carrier environment; humansystems interface suitable for a carrier environment and reliable, repeatable catapult takeoff and arrested landing performance. Some of those elements were already successfully tested in February 2003 (autonomous take-off and landing of the X-47A on an airstrip designed to simulate the landing deck of an aircraft carrier) and in February 2004 tests were carried out on its integration in the air control system of the Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier, using a Beechcraft King Air specially configured to simulate the X-47. Catapult-launch and arrested landing tests are scheduled to take place (on land) in 2007. UCAR (Unmanned Combat Armed Rotorcraft, US Army) 55. In 2002 DARPA launched a programme to develop the UCAR52 concept. This is an autonomous unmanned helicopter for the army. DARPAs specifications stipulate that this aircraft must be able to carry out reconnaissance and attack missions, have high survivability, be autonomous (capacity to respond to the environment and interact with other manned or unmanned systems) and be equipped with command and control as well as targeting and firing systems. In addition UCAR is equipped with a day and night and all-weather capability. This aircraft, characterised by the absence of a tail rotor (which is conducive to low radar and acoustic observability), will also be equipped with a ladar

DARPA awards funding for X-45C Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems; Darpa News Release, 12 October 2004; www.darpa.mil 49 Northrup Grumman, which is better known for the B2 Spirit strategic bomber, also developed the high altitude long endurance UAV Global Hawk. 50 DARPA awards funding to Northrop Grumman; Darpa News Release, 17 August 2004; www.darpa.mil. 51 The data from this onboard radar are processed by computer to create two-dimensional images of the object being measured. The SAR has two major drawbacks: the geometric distortion of the objects measured (distance parameters, relief data reception times) and so-called speckle noise, which is linked with phase and magnitude parameters and is characteristic of oceanographic imaging. 52 UCAR goals and objectives; DARPA, www.darpa.mil.

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(obstacle avoidance) capability and a laser radar for the detection of nearby land-based or flying objects) 56. Four companies were selected by DARPA to tender for phase I of the project (development of the concept and initial design of the system): Boeing (McDonnell Douglas), Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Sikorsky Aircraft. In July 2003, DARPA announced its decision to award phase II contracts to Lockheed Martin (9 430 000 dollars) and Northrop Grumman 8 700 000 dollars)53. Phase II, which is currently under way, covers the design and development of the concept demonstrator. At the end of this phase in 2004-2005, a single company will be chosen to develop at least two UCAR demonstrators, due to enter into service in 2012. 57. Since the Pentagon abandoned its RAH-66 Comanche54 attack helicopter programme for the army in February 2004, the UCAR programme has become crucial. In the absence of new manned programmes and given the ageing of present equipment (AH-64 Apache and AH-1 Cobra helicopters), this programme is already emerging as their full successor, rather than as an experimental add-on. Should the demonstrator prove to be a failure or the programme become bogged down, the US Army will suffer from a shortage of attack helicopters in 2015-20. Unlike the UCAVs, which will become operational at the same time as the F-22 Raptor and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, UCAR will be the only new helicopter to come into service over the next decade. 2. Prospects and repercussions for the ESDP 58. The more extensive use of unmanned aerial, land and naval vehicles in recent military operations not only has consequences for military concepts and doctrine, but also has a political and economic impact in that these systems represent a new sector of activity for the defence industries and will play in operations involving recourse to force. For the European member states of the EU and/or NATO, this conjunction of defence and technology is speeding up the reform of the armed forces, but at the same time it gives rise to major practical and conceptual challenges which not all countries are in a position to meet. The term digital gap used to describe the separation between those within society who have access to communications and information technologies and know how to use them, and those who dont could also be applied to countries: some are well into the era of network centric warfare, others have only just entered it and others still remain on the fringes. (a) The ESDP and the wars of the future 59. The use of UAVs is a logical development arising out of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and technological progress, particularly in the fields of information technology and miniaturisation. However, in this area as in many other sectors of modern society, there are designers/developers, and there are users. All European armed forces are able to use micro UAVs or tactical observation UAVs within their units, but few have the real capacity to manage tactical and strategic UAVs and UCAVs within a network centric system. This will create problems of interoperability among the forces of the different countries, unless there is a move towards greater specialisation of EU and NATO military capabilities. 60. The multinational nature of operations helps prevent the digital gap from damaging the coherence and cohesion of the national forces made available to the EU and NATO. As regards tactical and strategic UAVs (ISTAR) and UCAVs, it is obvious that only those countries that have a well-developed aeronautics industry and technological/IT base will be able to play any decisive role. These are precisely the countries that form the core of OCCAR (Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation), the Framework Agreement on the restructuring of the European armaments industry and ETAP (European Technology Acquisition Programme55. These major states are able to bring
DARPA, Army select unmanned combat armed rotorcraft Phase II contractors; Darpa News release, 24 July 2003; www.darpa.mil. 54 The Comanche helicopter programme dated from the cold war era (i.e. more than 20 years old) and cost more than seven billion dollars up to 2004. 55 For details of these cooperation programmes see previous reports of the WEU Assemblys Technological and Aerospace Committee: The European Defence Agency reply to the annual report of the Council, Rapporteur Mr Braga; Assembly Document 1856, 3 June 2004, and The development of armaments policy in Europe
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together at European level most of the efforts (and budgets) needed to ensure that European forces are technologically equipped for the wars of the future. 61. Alongside these are countries like the Czech Republic, Greece, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland and Turkey which have specialised in certain niche areas of network centric applications or technologies such as sonar and radar, which are necessary for the development and effective use of UAVs and UCAVs or other military robots. Furthermore, the micro and ultra-light UAV sector is accessible in budgetary and technical terms to the majority of European countries. However, it is important in this area to avoid the fragmentation, duplication and competition among the different European countries which proved in the long term to be so costly and ineffective (including for exports) in the field of manned aircraft, land vehicles and naval platforms. 62. These questions are relevant for a major aspect of the ESDP: the European defence industrial and technological base (EDITB) and European research, technology, development and evaluation (RTD&E) capabilities. Already there is a proliferation of industrial UAV and UCAV programmes both at national level and in cooperation (funded by companies pending requests from governments). While the aims they share are laudable, their effect is to keep technological exchanges within a closed circuit (either at national level or restricted to the participants in a programme), which in turn leads to the development of different, non-interoperable and non-interchangeable standards. On top of this there is the problem of transatlantic competition. The broader European cooperation is in this area, the smaller the risk of developing incompatible national or transatlantic programmes. But, if we are to avoid these programmes becoming bogged down in the conflicting or complementary requirements of participants, we must rationalise and be prepared to accept some degree of specialisation and interdependence. 63. In the field of UCAVs, the Neuron programme aims to define a standard that is also applicable to non-participants. Although considerable sums have been invested, the knock-on effect of that programme will remain limited as long as neither Germany nor the United Kingdom are participants. The Dassault-EADS agreement56 on Neuron and MALE/HALE UAVs is a necessary step in order to organise a consistent and harmonised approach to requirements in this field. Indeed, it puts into practice the idea of specialisation, similar to that which exists for Sperwer, the tactical observation UAV produced by the French company SAGEM. However, that industrial effort also calls for staunch political support and an overall vision of the integration of these new weapons systems designed to augment or supplant existing manned systems. This is the responsibility of the ECAP (European Capability Action Plan) project groups, as well as of the European Defence Agency (EDA), which was recently created within the intergovernmental pillar of the EU (2004). 64. The new technologies and their defence applications in the field of UAVs or network centric operations offer opportunities to all countries, but it is important to regroup and coordinate efforts as far upstream as possible in order to avoid difficulties arising from the growing digital gap among different forces. The Neuron and Sperwer projects offer some encouraging possibilities in that respect, but these are not enough. If European forces are equipped over the next ten years with adequate tactical and strategic UAV (MALE and HALE ) and UCAV capabilities, this will be a major step forward for European defence capabilities. But unless those aircraft are interchangeable and interoperable among the different national forces, and unless each network centric system is connected to a common European/Euro-Atlantic network, the capabilities available to Europe for conducting technological warfare alongside the United States will not be sufficient to lend it any real political weight in coalitions of the willing.

reply to the annual report of the Council, Rapporteur Mr Agramunt Font de Mora; Assembly Document 1840, 3 December 2003; www.assemblee-ueo.org. 56 This agreement, announced at the Eurosatory exhibition (France) on 21 June 2004, awards the prime contractorship for the UCAV to Dassault, and for the European MALE UAV to EADS. Their partners (such as Thales, SAAB, the Greek company HAI, SAGEM) are also involved in these proejcts, with obvious advantages in terms of costs, standards and interoperability, each company having established expertise at European and international level.

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(b) Europe and the United States: Skynet or global village? 65. Will American and European UCAVs be compatible? It is difficult to answer that question, but if the systems are neither interchangeable nor interoperable (at central and/or tactical command level) there will inevitably be a technological rift between the NATO allies. Network centric operations and UAV, UCAV, UGV, USV and UUV capabilities are now perceived by the United States to represent the future. They are force-multiplying factors designed to win wars and act as a deterrent. During the early days of the Kosovo conflict, the US military authorities noted that the Serb troops remained within the field of vision of observation UAVs, without taking any particular precautions (the UAVs did not have an attack capability). However, once they had established a link between the presence of UAVs in a given area and the (very rapid) airborne interventions against their forces, they began to take shelter and to withdraw very rapidly at the mere sight of a UAV. 66. DARPA experts are envisaging a mix of manned and unmanned attack aircraft on the same mission and interacting within the same operational airspace both preprogrammed artificial intelligence and remote command and control come into play with this concept. The remote command and control will have the ability to be switched from a ground-based [Command and Control] unit issuing instructions to the UCAV, to the pilot(s) in the manned aircraft issuing commands. (...) These UCAV concepts will involve air-to-ground as well as air-to-air capabilities. The manned aircraft will be far more survivable since their primary function would be to stand off and supervise a swarmed attack by the UCAVs and in the case of an air-to-air battles the UCAVs could also offer interference as well as engage the enemy aircraft outright57. The United States 2001 defence budget law stipulated that it shall be a goal of the Armed Forces to achieve the fielding of unmanned, remotely controlled technology, such that by 2010, one-third of the aircraft in the operational deep-strike force are unmanned58. 67. A similar concept is being studied for the land and naval forces. However, above and beyond the current and future characteristics and performance levels of these systems, it is the setting-up of a new (American) C4ISR architecture that constitutes the biggest challenge. That architecture will be universal, in that it will gradually link up all United States defence systems (both tactical and strategic land, naval, air and space systems). This makes it the network of networks, which by analogy with the Terminator film series59, we could call Skynet, an increasingly automated, autonomous and intelligent system designed to establish American military power and supremacy in all areas. In 2003, with less than 300 000 troops, the United States defeated the Iraqi forces and occupied a country of more than 20 million inhabitants with American losses of just over 200 soldiers and a month of fighting. This is an imperfect example, but it presages the technological wars of the future. 68. This all-out technological focus of US strategic development has come in for criticism even from within the American political and military establishment60, but the current Administration remains determined to turn its armed forces (and individual soldiers) into the technological force of the 21st century. However, that policy has direct consequences for transatlantic relations and the interoperability of US and European systems. Europeans are confronted with a strategic dilemma: either they decide eventually to become integrated in the American system (thus ensuring enhanced interoperability), or they focus on the development of their own networks, giving them a modular structure that can be adapted to European or transatlantic coalitions. Such co-existence of different
Source : UCAV The next generation air-superiority fighter?; Major William K. Lewis, School of Advanced Airpower studies; Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, June 2002; www.au.af.mil. 58 Source: UCAV The next generation air-superiority fighter?; Major William K. Lewis, School of Advanced Airpower studies; Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, June 2002; www.au.af.mil. 59 In these films, Skynet is the network that controls the United States defence system. As its articifical intelligence evolves and it becomes increasingly autonomous, it triggers a preventive war against the human race to prevent humans from disconnecting it. Armies of UAV/UCAVs and terrestrial robots (Terminator) relentlessly pursue survivors. 60 CRS [Congressional Research Service] warns that Network Centric Warfare might rely too much on unproven technology; Aviation Week (United States), 10 June 2004; www.aviationnow.com ; Doomed to Fail : Americas Blind Faith in Military Technology; Lieutenant Colonel John A. Gentry (US Army, reserve); Parameters (US Army War College Quarterly), winter 2002-03; http://carlisle-www.army.mil.
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networks can be likened to the global village concept61 and is more attuned to the European concept of effective multilateralism referred to in the European Security Strategy of December 2003. The global village concept is founded on the notion of interdependence, while the Skynet concept entails almost total integration in a single network. 69. Interoperability is essential for UAV and UCAV systems and military robots. However, there are major issues of frequencies (communications), airspace management, command and control to be resolved. Moreover there are different utilisation concepts, a constant mix of more or less automated systems and systems with a bigger human component, different data processing protocols and data flows to be managed and processed. At Euro-Atlantic level, NATO bears the responsibility for defining a common language among the allies, as well as a common operating system (like that defined by DARPA in the United States, for example)62. Logically, the EU military bodies and the European Defence Agency should work towards a common European standard to guarantee interoperability and interchangeability, which would also provide a reference for interaction and links between European and American systems. 70. Unless there is such a common effort which in turn requires a readiness on the part of the United States to cooperate with Europe on all types of unmanned vehicle projects American and European forces will no longer be able, by around 2015, to conduct joint operations in low-to-medium intensity conflicts involving technological warfare. Once they have achieved their target of 30% unmanned air attack capabilities, the United States air forces (US Air Force and naval aviation), will dispose of relatively large numbers of low-cost combat vehicles that are easier to engage and will be integrated in the United States global network. This will leave little room for European manned aircraft incapable of controlling or communicating with the UAVs all around them. If that scenario is extended to include land and naval robots (underwater or surface vessels), then we end up with a Mars versus Venus division of tasks63 in which Mars (the United States) makes and wins wars, while Venus (Europe) manages peace in the field (on behalf of the United States). At the end of the day the success or failure of the European UAV/UCAV and land/naval robot projects, as well as of the efforts to develop an autonomous European network centric capability, will determine whether Europe is to be a genuine ally or a mere auxiliary.

The global village concept was invented by the Canadian intellectual Herbert Marshall McLuhan (1911-1980), an English teacher who wrote about the influence in contemporary civilisations of the media and technologies The new electronic interdependence recreates the world in the image of a global village (The Gutenberg Galaxy: A Voyage Between Two Worlds, 1960); http://mcluhan.ca. 62 The common operating system is designed to accommodate a number of other configurations which might be necessary to conduct similar missions in the future, as platform requirements evolve. Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems, J-UCAS Overview (DARPA); www.darpa.mil 63 To quote the American intellectual Robert Kagan in Power and Weakness; Policy Review, summer 2002; www.policyreview.org.

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APPENDIX I European programmes and European participation in international UCAV projects NEURON 1. NEURON is a UCAV technology demonstrator programme launched by the French authorities in 2003 under the direction of the DGA (Dlgation Gnrale LArmement, the French procurement authority) with Dassault Aviation as the prime contractor. Its main aim is to help prepare a future European programme for an operational combat system for the 2020 timeframe. The demonstrator will be a large-size stealthy platform carrying weapons in the bay. Formal notification of the contract will be given to industry at the end of 2004. Development and construction of the prototype is scheduled for 2006-2008. The first tests in an operational situation will take place in 20091. 2. France has made the deliberate choice of opening the NEURON programme to cooperation with its European partners. Greece and Sweden are already involved through Hellenic Aerospace Industry (HAI) and SAAB Aerospace, and the latter has already given the programme the benefit of its experience with the SHARC and FILUR technology demonstrators2. EADS (European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company) is also a partner in this project through its Spanish component, CASA. More European countries and companies are expected to join the programme between now and 2008. 3. The final technical characteristics of the demonstrator have not so far been made public. We know, however, that NEURON will be a subsonic aircraft close to the size of a combat aircraft and with a minimum weight of 5 to 8 tonnes. The demonstrator must be able to operate in an airspace environment containing other aircraft and of carrying out ground attack missions using the guided airto-surface missiles in its weapons bay.

(Artists impression Dassault-Aviation)

1 2

http://www.dassault-aviation.com See below.

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SHARC 4. SHARC (Swedish Highly Advanced Research Configuration) is a technology demonstrator developed by SAAB Aerospace in cooperation with the Swedish Ministry of Defence. After a fiveyear study SHARC made its maiden flight on 11 February 2002. Despite its small size this turbo-jet aircraft is equipped for the in-flight transmission of images over long distances. Its automatic pilot gives it total flight autonomy. The programme provides useful experience for the FILUR and NEURON programmes. Engine: AMT Olympus3 Wingspan: 2.10 metres Weight: 50 kg Maximum speed: 320 km/h4

(Photo SAAB Aerospace) FILUR 5. The FILUR (Flying Innovative Low Observable Unmanned Research) programme continues the research undertaken within the SHARC programme and uses the same onboard electronics. The programme, which is also being conducted by SAAB Aerospace in cooperation with the Swedish Ministry of Defence, deals essentially with the further development of stealth capabilities. Its aim is to demonstrate the feasibility of a UCAV with a weak radar signature, as well as to study concepts for the use of UCAVs for SEAD (suppression of enemy air defences) missions. The FILUR demonstrator has similar characteristics to those of SHARC. Its first flight is scheduled for 2005. Engine: AMT Olympus Wingspan: 2.40 metres Weight: 55 kg5

(Artists impression SAAB Aerospace)

3 4

A Dutch-produced turbine engine costing about 4 500 euros will equip the small-scale models. http://www.saabaerospace.com 5 http://www.saabaerospace.com

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SKY-X 6. The SKY-X UCAV research and technology demonstrator project is being conducted by the Italian firm Alenia. With its modular structure and open IT architecture this will be a multi-function aircraft: it can be equipped with the relevant modules (cameras, infrared sensors, radar) to serve as a conventional reconnaissance and surveillance UAV, but for combat missions these sensors can be replaced with armaments modules carrying an offensive air-to-surface payload consisting of two guided SDB bombs6. The SKY-X prototype will have limited autonomy to begin with and will therefore be remote-controlled by a land-based pilot. Its first flight is scheduled for 20057. Length: 6 metres Wingspan: 5.74 metres Empty weight: 550 kg Payload: 300 kg Maximum take-off weight: 1 000 kg Cruising speed: Mach 0.60 Maximum speed: Mach 0.74 Maximum altitude: 33 000 feet

(Photo Alenia)

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Bomb being developed in the United States. http://www.alenia-aeronautica.it

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Taifun 7. Taifun a tactical combat UAV developed by the German company Rheinmetall Defence Electronics will enter into service for the German armed forces in 2005. Its first test-flights took place in December 2002. It belongs to the Brevel family of UAVs, the first model of which has been flying since 1995. This is a small remote-controlled aircraft for use by land forces. It can transmit the data and images it gathers in quasi real time. Its low speed and manoeuvrability make it a good instrument for identifying and designating targets. For offensive action it uses light hollow-charged warheads. Length: 2.08 metres Wingspan: 2.26 metres Maximum take-off weight: 160 kg Military payload: 25 kg Maximum altitude: 4 000 metres (13 120 feet) Maximum speed: 250 km/h Range: 200 km8 Autonomy: 4 hours

(Artists impression Rheinmetall)

(Image www.airforce-technology.com.)

http://www.Rheinmetall.com , http://www.airforce-technology.com and http://www.vectorsite.com

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SCAFE/ETAP 8. The SCAFE (Future European Air Combat System) study programme is an integral part of the European Technology Acquisition Programme (ETAP). The study was launched in 2001 to review the prospects for air combat systems around the 2020 timeframe. It brings together six European nations: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The programme studies the prospects for UCAVs as part of the effort to define the types of platforms and technologies that should be given priority for the future. It embraces the research activities of a number of European companies (including EADS) as well as the NEURON, SHARC, FILUR and SKY-X programmes, which provide input for the ETAP activities.

(Artists impression of a UCAV that could be envisaged in the ETAP framework (EADS)) FOAS 9. FOAS (Future Offensive Air System) is a forward-looking programme launched by the British air forces with a view to developing a deep air-strike capability to replace the Tornado Gr. 4 aircraft around the 2017 timeframe. The system could incorporate UCAVs, cruise missiles and a C4 (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence) system9. BAe Systems was prime contractor for a study of the system architecture10. A British UCAV developed within the FOAS framework would benefit from stealth expertise acquired through the Replica project. A combat aircraft unit was built on the basis of these technologies for research purposes.

(Artists impression of a UCAV that could be envisaged in the FOAS framework (BAe Systems))

10

http://www.mods.uk http://www.baesystems.com

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APPENDIX II American UCAV Programmes 1. The United States was a pioneer in the area of UAVs1. The US armed forces were among the first to use these unmanned aircraft for reconnaissance and observation tasks. Given their advantages and operational results, the next step was to consider weaponising these aircraft in order to conduct delicate combat operations without exposing human pilots to risks. Thus, since 2001, USAF (United States Air Force) has been using a version of its Predator reconnaissance UAV equipped with air-tosurface missiles, making it the worlds first operational UCAV. 2. Even before that experience with the weaponised Predator UAV, the US armed forces were already giving thought to designing an unmanned aircraft with comparable capabilities and performance levels to those of manned combat aircraft. At the end of the 1990s the US Government launched a major UCAV study and development programme, the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) demonstration programme, under the auspices of DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency). The programme has so far given rise to two series of technology demonstrators: Boeings X-45 and Northrop Grummans X-47. Predator 3. The RQ-1 Predator is a high-endurance medium-altitude remote-controlled reconnaissance UAV developed by the US firm General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc. It is equipped with video and infrared cameras and an observation radar. It has been used by the US since 1995 and was transformed into a UCAV when the MQ1-B version appeared in 2001. In this configuration, the observation sensors are replaced with infrared and laser designators and two AGM-114 Hellfire2 missiles mounted on the wings. 4. The weaponised Predator has been used in operational situations several times and distinguished itself in particular during the US operation against the Taliban and Al-Qaida in Afghanistan and during the Iraq war. On 4 November 2002, the CIA used an armed Predator to destroy a vehicle transporting six presumed high-ranking al-Qaida operatives along a road in Yemen. Length: 8.23 metres Wingspan: 14.84 metres Height: 2.10 metres Empty weight: 512 kg Payload: 204 kg Maximum take-off weight: 1 020 kg Engine: Rotax 914 4-cylinder 101 HP. Cruising speed: 135 km/h Maximum speed: 217 km/h Maximum altitude: 7 260 metres (25 000 feet) Autonomy: 24 hours patrol in an area located 740 km (400 nautical miles) from the control station3.

1 2

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. The AGM-114 is a light laser-guided air-to-surface missile designed essentially for use against armoured vehicles. It is the main weapon on the AH64 Apache combat helicopter. 3 Sources: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc. :http://www.uav.com and US Air Force: http://www.af.mil

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(Observation Predator. Photo General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc.)

(Armed Predator prior to take-off. Photo General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc.)

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(Armed Predator in flight. Photo General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc.) 5. A new Predator has been under development since 2000 for the US Air Force. This MQ-9A Predator B is much larger and heavier and performs better than its predecessor. The conventional 100 HP engine has been replaced by a powerful turbo-prop engine. The Predator B applies the MCMM (multicharges/multisensor/multimission) concept: with its large range of sensors it offers both observation and ground attack capabilities. Indeed, it is capable of conducting both types of mission during the same flight. The range of air-to-surface munitions used by the Predator B is constantly being extended and during tests in 2004 one of the prototypes successfully dropped 227 kg (500lb) laser-guided bombs4. The ability to use other weapons, including JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munitions) and GPS (Global Positioning System)-guided bombs is also to be developed. Length: 10.97 metres Wingspan: 20.12 metres Internal payload: 363 kg External payload: 1 361 kg Maximum take-off weight: 4 536 kg Engine: Honeywell turbopropTPE 331-10T. Speed: 407 km/h Maximum altitude: 14 520 metres (50 000 feet) Flight autonomy: over 30 hours5

4 5

Predator B drops Paveway II, Janes Defence Weekly, 18 August 2004. Sources: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc. :http://www.uav.com and US Air Force: http://www.af.mil

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(Predator B in flight. Photo General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc.)

(Predator B on the ground. Photo General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc.)

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X-45 6. X-45 is the UCAV technology demonstrator developed by Boeing for the J-UCAS programme. The first version, X-45 A, made its maiden flight in May 2002. This low-observability aircraft developed on the basis of stealth technologies is designed for combat operations and carries offensive weapons in an internal weapons bay. It is guided from a ground station but has a considerable capacity for autonomous action. Since it follows a pre-programmed navigation system and conducts a mission planned by ground-based operators, it is not necessary to have ongoing human intervention. Direct intervention by the ground-based operators is only necessary for the purpose of identifying and designating targets and giving the authorisation to fire. Moreover, in theory a single ground-based pilot can control up to four X-45s at the same time. Possible operational missions for this UCAV include electronic warfare, suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD), surveillance, intelligencegathering, reconnaissance and deep strikes. 7. The X-45 A demonstrated the aptitude of UCAVs to be integrated in a network-centric system and their ability to respond to the presence of other aircraft in their environment. On 17 May 2004, for example, an X-45 A and a manned T-33 training aircraft exchanged data in flight. The possibility of using several unmanned aircraft simultaneously was demonstrated on 2 August 2004, when two X-45 As controlled by a single ground-based operator flew in formation6. This first version of the Boeing UCAV also demonstrated its offensive capabilities on 18 April 2004, with the precision-drop of a GPS-guided bomb from its weapons bay. Length: 8.75 metres Wingspan: 11.15 metres Empty weight: 3 628 kg Maximum take-off weight: 6 350 kg Payload: 680 kg Engine: Honeywell F124-GA-100 Operational ceiling: 11 550 metres (35 000 feet) Cruising speed: Mach 0.75

(The two X-45 A aircraft on the ground. Photo Boeing.)

http://www.boeing.com

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(X-45 A at take-off. Photo Boeing.)

(1st release of a GPS-guided bomb from the weapons bay of an X-45 A. Photo Boeing.)

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8. A new version of the X-45 much closer to the final operational configuration is in the process of being developed. This X-45 C7 will be larger and much stealthier thanks in particular to its new arrowhead wing design. Its avionics are more sophisticated and it can carry a full range of sensors for reconnaissance and target designation. The X-45 C also boasts an air refuelling capability that brings its performance levels close to those of a conventional manned fighter plane. It can also carry a bigger weapons payload, with the possibility of dropping up to eight 113 kg SDBs (Small Diameter Bomb). It can also use the full range of GPS-guided JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munitions). The first X-45 C is currently in the assembly phase and its maiden flight is scheduled for mid-20068. The first UCAVs are expected to become operational around 2010. Around 2015, the US aviation may be confronted with a temporary shortfall of bomber capabilities following the possible decommissioning of the B1-B and in particular B52 bombers. In order to plug the gap Boeing is envisaging offering a complete range of aircraft. Given the very encouraging results of its UCAV programme, the US company has placed the X-45 D a model largely inspired by the X-45-C but even bigger9 at the centre of this range, for the purpose of conducting very long- distance strikes. Length: 11.90 metres Wingspan : 14,94 metres Maximum take-off weight: 16 570 kg Payload: 2 040 kg Engine: General Electric F404 turbojet. Cruising speed: Mach 0.80 Operational ceiling: 13 200 metres (40 000 feet) Range: 2 407 km (1 300 nautical miles)

(Full-scale model of the X-45 C presented at the Farnborough Air Show 2004. Photo Boeing.)

7 8

Former X-45 B re-baptised following the DARPA decision to modify certain characteristics of the UCAV. http://www.boeing.com 9 Janes Defence Weekly, Boeing offers US interim strike capability options, 25 August 2003.

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(Two X-45 C dropping JDAM bombs. Artists impression DARPA)

(Remote ground-based control station for the X-45 C. Artists impression: DARPA)

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X-47 Pegasus 9. The X-47 is the UCAV proposed by the company Northrop Grumman for DARPAs J-UCAS programme. Its aim is to demonstrate the operational possibilities of a UCAV in a carrier-based environment. The requirements for such a UCAV are robustness, excellent communications with other aircraft and all other components of the network-centric system and above all the ability to land in accordance with very precise arrested landing parameters. At the same time it must be capable of the same kinds of missions as the Boeing X-45: reconnaissance, suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD), electronic warfare and deep strikes. It is therefore also a low-observability aircraft based on stealth technology with a high level of autonomy. 10. The first demonstrator, the X-47 A, made its maiden flight on 23 February 2003. This is a small-scale UCAV. Much lighter than its Boeing counterpart, the X45-A, it is made of composite material and carries its payload in an internal weapons bay. This first Pegasus has already enabled the first steps to be taken towards the use of unmanned aerial vehicles within the naval air forces. During the landing phase it is able to enter into contact with a landing deck at a pre-designated point, which is essential for carrier-based operations. It has also demonstrated its manoeuvrability and good lowaltitude and low-speed performance, a prerequisite for carrier-based operations. Length: 9.21 metres Wingspan : 9.17 metres Empty weight : 1 742 kg Maximum take-off weight: 2 500 kg Payload: 454 kg Engine: Pratt & Withney JT15D-5C turbojet Flight endurance: about 1 hour

(The first X-47 A leaving the workshop on 3 July 2001. Photo DARPA)

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(Rear view of the X-47 A. Photo DARPA)

(X-47 A during its maiden flight on 23 February 2003. Photo DARPA)

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11. On the basis of the experience acquired with the first Pegasus demonstrator, Northrop Grumann and DARPA have drawn up a concept for an operational UCAV for the US Navy, the X-47 B. The unmanned aircraft concept presented on 15 April 2003 is considerably more advanced than the first Pegasus. It maintains the arrowhead shape for stealth, but the design of the fuselage and wings is entirely new. The wing-tips can be folded back to take up less space on the deck or in the hangar of an aircraft carrier. In terms of size and weight the X-47 B, like the X-45 C, is similar to a conventional multi-role combat aircraft such as the F/A-18 Hornet , Rafale or Eurofighter Typhoon. Its offensive capabilities should be similar to those of its Boeing counterpart, in other words, the ability to deploy more than two tonnes of munitions at a distance of more than 2 400 kilometres from its starting point. On 19 August 2004, DARPA granted Northrop Grumann a contract for more than a billion dollars over five years for the further development of the X-47 B. Three prototypes will be built. Flight tests are scheduled to start in 2007. Length: 11.70 metres Wingspan: 18.90 metres Maximum take-off weight: 19 050 kg Payload: 2 040 kg Engine: Pratt & Withney F100 turbojet Operational ceiling: 13 200 metres (40 000 feet) Range: 2 407 km (1 300 nautical miles)

(X-47 B flying over an aircraft carrier. Artists view: DARPA)

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(X-47 B flying over a coastal area. Artists view: DARPA)

(Bomb drops from two X-47Bs. Artists view: DARPA)

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(Carrier landing by an X-47 B in front of F/A 18 Hornet aircraft. Photomontage DARPA)

(An X-47 B alongside an F/A 18 and E2-C Hawkeye on a carrier deck. Photomontage DARPA)

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