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Jose 'Pepito' Timoner vs. People of the Philippines and The Honorable Court of Appeals, IV Division (G.R. No.

L-62050, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 830) FACTS: Petitioner is the mayor of the town of Daet in Camarines Norte. He ordered the demolition of the stalls in Maharlika Highway, even showing himself up in those stalls during the demolition, after these establishments had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer, Dra. Alegre, for non-compliance with certain health and sanitation requirements. Among the structures thus barricaded were the barbershop of Pascual Dayaon, the complaining witness and the store belonging to one Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos. Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte against Lourdes PiaRebustillos and others for judicial abatement of their stalls. The complaint alleged that these stalls constituted public nuisances as well as nuisances per se. Dayaon was never able to reopen his barbershop business. ISSUE: Petitioner contends that the sealing off of complainant Dayaon's barbershop was done in abatement of a public nuisance and, therefore, under lawful authority. HELD: We find merit in this contention. Unquestionably, the barbershop in question did constitute a public nuisance as defined under Article Nos. 694 and 695 of the Civil Code, to wit: ART. 694. else which: A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything

(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) Annoys or offends the senses; or (3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property. ART. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing definition. The barbershop occupied a portion of the sidewalk of the poblacion's main thoroughfare and had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer. In fact, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, in its decision in Civil Case No. 2257, declared said barbershop as a nuisance per-se. Thus: Under the facts of the case, as well as the law in point, there is no semblance of any legality or right that exists in favor of the defendants to build a stall and conduct their business in a sidewalk, especially in a highway where it does not only constitute a menace to the health of the general public passing through the street and also of the unsanitary condition that is bred therein as well as the unsightly and ugly structures in the said place. Moreover, even if it is claimed and pretended that there was a license, permit or toleration of the defendants' makeshift store and living quarters for a number of years does not lend legality to an act which is a nuisance per se. Such nuisance affects the community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons and the general public which posed a danger to the people in general passing and using that place, for in addition, this is an annoyance to the public by the invasion of its rights the fact that it is in a public place and annoying to all who come within its sphere.

ESTATE OF GREGORIA FRANCISCO v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 95279, 25 July 1991, 199 SCRA 595 Melencio-Herrera, J. FACTS: Basilan Municipal Mayor Benjamin Valencia summarily ordered the demolition of an antiquated and dilapidated quonset warehouse situated in Port Area, Strong Boulevard, Isabela, Basilan, outside the zone for warehouses. The legal possessor of the quonset sought the prohibition of the Order but was denied by the RTC. The CA originally overturned the RTC but subsequently reversed itself. In question in this case is the validity of such order by the Municipal Mayor, which was in effect an abatement of nuisance, without prior judicial authority. ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Mayor could summarily and extra-judicially order the demolition of petitioner's quonset building. HELD: NO Ordinance No. 147 relied upon by Respondents should not be interpreted as authorizing the summary removal of a nonconforming building by the municipal government. For if it does, it must be struck down for being in contravention of the requirements of due process, as originally held by the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the enforcement and administration of the provisions of the Ordinance resides with the Zoning Administrator. It is said official who may call upon the City Fiscal to institute the necessary legal proceedings to enforce the provisions of the Ordinance. And any person aggrieved by the decision of the Zoning Administrator regarding the enforcement of the Ordinance may appeal to the Board of Zoning Appeals. Violation of a municipal ordinance neither empowers the Municipal Mayor to avail of extra-judicial remedies. On the contrary, the Local Government Code imposes upon him the duty "to cause to be instituted judicial proceedings in connection with the violation of ordinances" (Local Government Code, Sec. 141 [2] [t]). Respondents cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings, which applies only to a nuisance per se or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it cannot be said to be injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention. The provincial governor, district engineer or district health officer is not authorized to destroy private property consisting of dams and fishponds summarily and without any judicial proceedings whatever under the pretense that such private property constitutes a nuisance. A dam or a fishery constructed in navigable rivers is not a nuisance per se. A dam or fishpond may be a nuisance per accidens where it endangers or impairs the health or depreciates property by causing water to become stagnant. (Monteverde v. Generoso, supra). While the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a nuisance (Local Government Code, Sec. 149 [ee]), it can not declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. The nuisance can only be so adjudged by judicial determination. [Municipal councils] do not have the power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se nor can they authorize the extra

TATEL VS. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC [207 SCRA 157; G.R. No. 40243; 11 Mar 1992] Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Facts: Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by themunicipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioners warehouse. A committee was then appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within thewarehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. According to respondent municipal officials, petitioners warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional.

Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioners warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning Article 694 of the Civil (2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of and 1952 of the Municipalityof Code Virac is

unconstitutional

void.

Held: The storage

of abaca

and

copra

in

petitioners warehouse is

nuisance

under

the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a valid municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade, 5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of government. The lower court did not err in its decision.

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner, vs. JAC LINER, INC., respondent. G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005 Facts: The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides, inter alia, that: all buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and are hereby directed to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers; and (b) all temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this ordinance. It also provides that all jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall use the grand central terminal of the city. JAC Liner, Inc. assailed the city ordinance as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and Issue: Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of police power, i.e. lawful subject Held: The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus present. This leaves for determination the issue of whether the means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. What should have been done was to determine exactly where the problem lies and then to stop it right there. The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen to be effective. and lawful means. a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies.

Tamin vs CA FACTS:
Petitioner municipality represented by its mayor Real filed in the RTC a complaint for the ejectment of respondents. It is alleged that the municipality owns a parcel of residential land located in Zamboanga del Sur and the said parcel of land was reserved for public plaza under PD 365 and that during the mayor, the municipality leased the area to the defendants subject to the condition that they should vacate the place in case it is needed for public purposes and the defendants paid the rentals religiously until 1967. They refused to vacate the said land despite the efforts of the government since money is allocated for the construction of a municipal gymnasium within the public plaza and such construction could not continue because of the presence of the buildings constructed by the defendants.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the municipality has a cause of action for the abatement of public nuisance under Article 694 of the Civil Code.

Held:
Yes based on the definition of a nuisance provided for in the CC which states that Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property or anything else which: hinders or impairs the use of the property. Article 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be equal.

Article 699 provides for the following remedies against public nuisance:

1. A prosecution under the penal code or any local ordinance 2. civil action 3. abatement without judicial proceedings In the present case, the municipality chose to file a civil action for the recovery of possession of the parcel of land occupied by the PR. Under the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan has to first pass an ordinance before summarily abate a public nuisance.

Considering the facts in the complaint is true then the writ of possession and writ of demolition would have been justified. A writ of demolition would have been sufficient to eject the private respondent.

Gancayco vs. Quezon City & MMDA, G.R. No. 177807, Oct. 11, 2011 Digest
Gancayco vs. Quezon City & MMDA, G.R. No. 177807, Oct. 11, 2011

Facts: The MMDA then sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated the National Building Code of the Philippines in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. He did not comply with the notice. Thelma then proceeded to demolish the party wall of the ground floor structure. The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, regulating the use of property in a business zone. Justice Gancayco filed a Petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs decision and ruled that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to promote the general welfare of its constituents pursuant to its police powers. Issue: Did MMDA Resolution No. 02-28, validly empower the MMDA to demolish Justice Gancaycos property? Ruling: No. the Supreme Court held that the power to enforce the provisions of the Building Code was lodged in the Department of Public Works and Highways, not in MMDA. Since there was no evidence that the MMDA had been delegated by the DPWH to implement the Building Code, it necessarily had no authority to carry out the demolition. Additionally, the penalty prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904 itself does not include the demolition of illegally constructed buildings in case of violations. Instead, it merely prescribes a punishment of a fine or by imprisonment, or both, at the discretion of the court. The ordinance itself clearly states that it is the regular courts that will determine whether there was a violation of the ordinance.

CITY OF MANILA vs Hon. LAGUIO


FACTS: Manila Ordinance No. 7738, prohibiting the establishment or operation of businesses providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities in the Ermita-Malate area, to include motels and inns, was enacted by herein petitioners contending that the said ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power of the State in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community. Respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) assailed the ordinance as an invalid exercise of police power on the grounds that the Local Government Code grants the City Council only with the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, but not to prohibit them. ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 7783 of the City of Manila is a valid exercise of police power. HELD: Petition denied. The assailed ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond the regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is an exercise of police power that is violative of the private property rights of individuals. There is a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of owning, operating and patronizing those motels and property in terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end. Police power legislation of such character deserves the full endorsement of we reiterate our support for it. But inspite of itsthe judiciary virtuous aims, the enactment of the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees not even under the guiseof due process and equal protection of laws of police power.

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