SELECTED CASES IN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW I (under Prof. Atty. Ticman) Articles 3-6 EDUARDO P. DIEGO vs.

JUDGE SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO Facts: 1. This is an Administrative complaint against Judge Castillo for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a criminal case and/or rendering judgment in gross ignorance of the law: a. Accused Lucena Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr. (both Filipinos). 13 years after, a Divorce Decree was obtained by the latter in Texas, allegedly dissolving, cancelling and annulling the said marriage. b. 9 years after Lucena contracted again marriage with Jorges brother Manuel Diego. 2. With regard to such incidents, Jorge filed a complaint against Lucena for bigamy. Judge Castillo dismissed the same. 3. The main basis for the acquittal was good faith on the part of the accused. Respondent Judge gave credence to the defense of the accused that she acted without any malicious intent. Accused Lucena, he said, had sufficient grounds to believe that her previous marriage to Jorge had been validly dissolved by the divorce decree and that she was legally free to contract the second marriage with Manuel. Hence this, respondent Judge said, amounted to a mistake of fact. 4. He further stressed that knowledge of the law should not be exacted strictly from the accused since she is a lay person, and that ineptitude should not be confused with criminal intent. Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge should be held administratively liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law. Held: Respondent Judge had been less than circumspect in his study of the law and jurisprudence applicable to the bigamy case. With respect to the contention that the accused acted in good faith in contracting the second marriage, believing that she had been validly divorced from her first husband, it is sufficient to say that everyone is presumed to

know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof. Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment: For conviction to lie, it must be proved that the judgment is unjust and that the judge knows that it is unjust. It must be shown that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and that the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. Malice or bad faith on the part of the judge in rendering an unjust decision must still be proved and failure on the part of the complainant to prove the same warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint. There is, therefore, no basis for the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. Gross Ignorance of the Law: The error must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in evident bad faith. It is only in this latter instance, when the judge acts fraudulently or with gross ignorance, that administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of this Court. The error committed by respondent Judge being gross and patent, the same constitutes ignorance of the law of a nature sufficient to warrant disciplinary action. WHEREFORE, Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. UNITED STATES vs. AH CHONG Facts: 1. Defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building. 2. On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. 3. The defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that

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moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. 4. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings. 5. The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide. At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.

WHEREFORE , the judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged. MELBA QUINTO PACHECO vs. DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER

Facts: 1. Eleven-year-old Edison Garcia and his playmate Wilson Quinto saw respondents Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of a drainage culvert. Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with them inside the drainage culvert. Wilson assented. 2. Pacheco, along with respondent Andres and Wilson, entered the drainage system. After a while, respondent Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of the drainage system and left without saying a word. Respondent Andres also came out, went back inside, and emerged again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already dead. 3. Respondent Andres laid the boys lifeless body down in the grassy area then went to the house of petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilsons mother, and informed her that her son had died. Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage culvert while respondent Andres followed her. 4. No criminal complaint was filed against respondents for Wilsons death. Not until NBI made investigations which later filed a criminal complaint for Homicide against Andres and Pacheco. 5. Respondents filed a demurrer to evidence which the RTC granted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. CA affirmed the same saying, The acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on a finding that the accused did not commit the criminal acts complained of.

Issue: Whether Ah Chong can be held criminally responsible despite his defense of mistake of facts. Held: We hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. Ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged cancels the presumption of intent, and works an acquittal. The defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.

Issue: Whether or not respondents are criminally liable. Held: No.

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A person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. "Natural" refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events, while "logical" means that there is a rational connection between

the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage. The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately, or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. There must be a relation of "cause and effect," the cause being the felonious act of the offender, the effect being the resultant injuries and/or death of the victim. The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when: (a) there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or (b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim. The stones could have caused the victim to slip and hit his head on the pavement. Since there was water on the culvert, the portion soaked with water must be very slippery, aside from the fact that the culvert is round. If the victim hit his head and lost consciousness, he will naturally take in some amount of water and drown. It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious crimes for no reason at all. However, the absence of any ill-motive to kill the deceased is relevant and admissible in evidence to prove that no violence was perpetrated on the person of the deceased. In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill the deceased before or after the latter was invited to join them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner testified that respondent Andres used to go to their house and play with her son before the latters death. PEOPLE vs. RAFAEL & SIMEON MARCO and DULCISIMO BELTRAN Facts: 1. There was a fiesta being celebrated, but it was raining. Constancio Sabelbero was approached by Simeon Marco who asked him if he was the one who boxed the latter's brother the previous year. Constancio denied. Then Simeon asked if he had cigarettes and when he said he had none, Simeon said, "I have cigarettes; here is my cigarette", as he pulled out a one-foot long hunting knife. Frightened, Constancio ran away and Simeon chased him. As Constancio was passing by the place were appellant Rafael Marco, the father of Simeon, was standing, Rafael struck

Constancio with a round cane, hitting him on the left ear and left shoulder. 2. Vicente, the father of Constancio, happened to be standing in the crowd and heard shout of "Fight! Fight!" He saw Simeon about to stab Constancio, so he grabbed the hand of Simeon that was holding the knife. 3. At this juncture, Rafael Marco approached Vicente armed with a cane and a hunting knife. Sensing danger, Vicente shouted to his son Constancio, who had been hit by Rafael, and his other son Bienvenido, who appeared on the scene, to run away because the Marcos were armed. Constancio was able to run away. So also Vicente. Bienvenido who was being chased by Rafael was stabbed by the latter, and when he parried the blow, he was wounded on the left hand. After being stabbed by Rafael, Bienvenido still tried to run farther, but unluckily, his foot got caught in a vine on the ground and he fell, whereupon, out of nowhere, Dulcisimo Beltran, who was accused with herein appellant and who did not appeal his conviction, arrived and stabbed Bienvenido near his anus. Beltran was followed by Simeon, who stabbed Bienvenido on the left breast and the upper part of the left arm. Afterwards, Rafael, Simeon and Beltran ran away. Bienvenido stood up slowly and walked zigzagly towards the store of Pinda and when he arrived in front of the store, he fell to the ground and later died. 4. The RTC found respondents guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength. Issue: Whether or not the in the Phase of the incident that led to the death of Bienvenido appellant, Rafael Marco, may be held liable for murder, as found by the RTC. Held: No. From the foregoing, this Honorable Court will that the stabbing of the decedent by the three accused was not simultaneous. Rather, it was successive, with appellant inflicting the first blow. And, Beltran and Simeon were nowhere around yet. It was only after the decedent fell down that the latter two came and successively stabbed him. The manner in which the incident occurred indicates that there was no pre-conceived plan among the three accused to kill the decedent. It strongly suggests, on the other hand, that Beltran and Simeon participated suddenly, unexpectedly and without any previous agreement.

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Appellant cannot be held liable for the death of decedent under the Revised Penal Code. Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred: 1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The stabbing of the decedent by the appellant which caused a slight wound on the former's hand was intentionally made; hence, felony. However, the ensuing death of the decedent was not the direct, natural and logical consequence of the wound inflicted by the appellant. There was an active intervening cause, which was no other than the sudden and appearance and participation of Simeon Marco and Beltran. And there is authority that if the consequences produced have resulted from a distinct act or fact absolutely from the criminal case the offender is not responsible for such consequence. We are constrained to hold that he had no homicidal intent. He can be held criminally responsible only for the wound on the back of the left hand of the deceased. Hence, if at all, appellant is only guilty of Slight Physical Injuries, but not Murder. PEOPLE vs. PABLITO DOMASIAN AND DR. SAMSON TAN Facts: 1. A boy was detained for only about three hours and was released even before his parents received the ransom note. But it spawned a protracted trial spanning all of 8 years and led to the conviction of the two accused. 2. The victim was Enrico Paulo Agra, who was 8 years old at the time of the incident. The accused were Pablito Domasian and Samson Tan, the latter then a resident physician in the hospital owned by Enrico's parents. 3. While Enrico was walking with a classmate, he was approached by a man who requested his assistance in getting his father's signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed to help and rode with the man in a tricycle. Enrico became apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking him to the hospital, the man flagged a minibus and forced him inside. 4. Having suspicions, Grate, the tricycle driver, immediately reported the matter to two barangay tanods when his passengers alighted who later pursued the same. Somehow, the man managed to escape, leaving Enrico behind. Enrico was on his way home in a passenger jeep when he met his parents, who were riding in the hospital ambulance and already looking for him.

5.

In the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agra received an envelope containing a ransom note, demanding P1M. The test showed that the ransom note had been written by Dr. Samson Tan.

6. A crime of Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention was subsequently filed. RTC found the accused guilty as charged. 7. Upon appeal, the accused maintains that in any case, the crime alleged is not kidnapping with serious illegal detention as no detention in an enclosure was involved. If at all, it should be denominated and punished only as grave coercion.

Issue: Whether both accused are criminally liable for the crime charged. Held: Yes. The crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention may consist not only in placing a person in an enclosure but also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. Although the victim was not confined in an enclosure, he was deprived of his liberty when Domasian restrained him from going home. Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any manner deprive him of his liberty: Par 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a public officer. Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred: 1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already been committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime because there was no inherent improbability of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective means. The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
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SULPICIO INTOD vs. CA and PEOPLE Facts: 1. Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig, Salvador Mandaya met with a Aniceto Dumalagan. The latter told the group that he wanted a certain Bernardina Palangpangan killed because of a land dispute between them. 2. All armed with firearms, the group arrived at Palangpangan's house. Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. The group fired at said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire. 3. At trial, RTC convicted Intod of attempted murder. CA affirmed the same. 4. Petitioner seeks modification of the said Decision. Issue: Whether Intod is criminally liable. Held: Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred: 2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies. Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act an impossible crime. The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end. The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4. WHEREFORE, We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime. Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor. ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y NATIVIDAD vs. PEOPLE & CA Facts: 1. Petitioner effectively concedes having performed the felonious acts imputed against him, but instead insists that as a result, he should be adjudged guilty of frustrated theft only, not the felony in its consummated stage of which he was convicted. 2. On 19 May 1994, at around 4:30 p.m., petitioner and Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago, a security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an identification card with the mark Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU), hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of the well-known Tide brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged with more cartons

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of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space. 3. Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. All these acts were eyed by Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area. When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered. The filched items seized from the duo were four (4) cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and three (3) additional cases of detergent, the goods with an aggregate value of P12,090.00. 4. Both were charged with theft. RTC found them guilty of Consummated Theft finding credible the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and establishing the convictions on the positive identification of the accused as perpetrators of the crime. 5. Before the CA, petitioner argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen (citing Dio and Flores cases). CA rejected this contention and affirmed petitioners conviction.

(5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Certain cases to ponder: a. Adiao case - a customs inspector abstracted a leather belt from the baggage of a foreign national and secreted the item in his desk at the Custom House. At no time was the accused able to get the merchandise out of the Custom House, and it appears that he was under observation during the entire transaction. RTC said it is only Frustrated Theft. SC concluded it is Consummated Theft. b. Sobrevilla case - the accused, while in the midst of a crowd in a public market, was already able to abstract a pocketbook from the trousers of the victim when the latter, perceiving the theft, caught hold of the accuseds shirt -front, at the same time shouting for a policeman; after a struggle, he recovered his pocket-book and let go of the defendant, who was afterwards caught by a policeman. RTC said it is only Frustrated Theft. SC concluded it is Consummated Theft. c. Dio case - a driver employed by the United States Army, had driven his truck into the port area of the South Harbor, to unload a truckload of materials to waiting U.S. Army personnel. After he had finished unloading, accused drove away his truck from the Port, but as he was approaching a checkpoint of the Military Police, he was stopped by an M.P. who inspected the truck and found therein three boxes of army rifles. RTC said it is Consummated Theft. CA held that it is only Frustrated Theft.

Issue: Whether under the given facts, the theft should be deemed as consummated or merely frustrated. Held: The accused should be convicted of Consummated Rape. Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latters consent. Its elements are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and

d. Flores case - a checker employed by the Luzon Stevedoring Company, issued a delivery receipt for one empty sea van to the truck driver who had loaded the purportedly empty sea van onto his truck at the terminal of the stevedoring company. The truck driver proceeded to show the delivery receipt to the guard on duty at the gate of the terminal. However, the guards insisted on inspecting the van, and discovered that the empty sea van had actually contained other merchandise as well. RTC convicted Flores of Consummated Theft. CA however, held that it was only Frustrated Rape.
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Synthesis of the Dio and Flores rulings is in order. The determinative characteristic as to whether the crime of theft was produced is the ability of the actor to freely dispose of the articles stolen, even if it were only momentary. Neither Dio nor Flores can convince us otherwise.

For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the frustrated stage, the question is again, when is the crime of theft produced? Theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. It is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. Chief Justice Aquino: in theft or robbery the crime is consummated afte r the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated. We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was completed in this case. With intent to gain, he acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for a considerable period of time that he was able to drop these off at a spot in the parking lot, and long enough to load these onto a taxicab. Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. Unlawful Taking is most material in this respect. Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of ones personal property, is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all. We can only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated. WHEREFORE, petition Denied. RODOLFO C. VELASCO vs. PEOPLE Facts: 1. Complainant Frederick Maramba was cleaning and washing his owner type jeep in front of his house when a motorized tricycle stopped near him. Accused Rodolfo Velasco dashed out of the tricycle, approached the complainant and fired at him several times with a .45 caliber pistol. The accused missed with his first shot but the second one hit the complainant at the upper arm, causing him to stumble on the ground. The

complainant stood up and ran, while the accused continued firing at him but missed. 2. The shooting incident was reported to the police which later apprehended the accused. At the City Jail where the accused was subsequently brought, the private complainant Frederick Maramba identified and pointed to the accused as the one who fired at him, hitting him on the upper left arm. This was also corroborated by Armando Maramba, the driver of the tricycle in which the accused rode. 3. RTC found the accused guilty of Attempted Murder. CA affirmed the same in toto. Issue: Whether accused is guilty of Attempted Murder. Held: Yes. Petitioners asseveration that it is unthinkable for him to shoot private complainant because he has no motive to harm, much less kill the latter, he being a total stranger, deserves scant consideration. It must be stressed that motive is a state of (ones) mind which others cannot discern. It is not an element of the crime, and as such does not have to be proved. In fact, lack of motive for committing a crime does not preclude conviction. It is judicial knowledge that persons have been killed or assaulted for no reason at all. Even in the absence of a known motive, the time-honored rule is that motive is not essential to convict when there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit. Motive assumes significance only where there is no showing of who the perpetrator of the crime was. In the case at bar, since petitioner has been positively identified as the assailant, the lack of motive is no longer of consequence. Petitioner claims that as a navy man who is trained to kill enemies of the state, a "protector of the people," he could not have acted in the manner which the prosecution pointed out. He said it is against human experience to attempt to kill a person in the presence of a witness and in broad daylight, and that it is preposterous that after firing seven shots at close range, he failed to fatally hit the private complainant. We are not convinced. What he is saying is that the bungled killing cannot be the handiwork of an experienced soldier like him. Such an argument does not hold water. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous, or even present, good moral character and exemplary conduct. The fact that petitioner was a navy man -- a protector of the people -- does not mean that he is innocent of the crime charged or that he is incapable of doing it.

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Finally, petitioner submits that if ever he committed a crime, he merely committed attempted homicide. Still We are not convinced. The lower court was correct in appreciating treachery in the commission of the crime due to petitioners swift and unexpected attack. Having commenced the criminal act by overt acts but failing to perform all acts of execution as to produce the felony by reason of some cause other than his own desistance, petitioner committed an attempted felony. Petitioner already commenced his attack with a manifest intent to kill by shooting private complainant seven times, but failed to perform all the acts of execution by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, poor aim and the swiftness of the latter. The settled rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would have brought about death. RENATO BALEROS, JR. vs. PEOPLE Facts: 1. At about 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13 December, accused Baleros forcefully covering the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commenced the commission of rape by lying on top of her with the intention to have carnal knowledge with her but was unable to perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, said acts being committed against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice. 2. An information was filed accusing Baleros of Attempted Rape which RTC found him guilty of. Upon appeal however, the CA reversed said decision finding him guilty only of Light Coercion. 3. But, still he contends his conviction of Light Coercion. Issue: What crime is Baleros guilty of. Held: The indicting Information for attempted rape against the petitioner in the instant case contains averments constituting and thus justifying his

conviction for unjust vexation, a form of light coercion, under Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner argues, however, that the Information, as quoted above, does not allege that the complained act of covering the face of the victim (Malou) with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical caused her annoyance, irritation, torment, distress and disturbance. We wish to stress that malice, compulsion or restraint need not be alleged in an Information for unjust vexation. Unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that the term is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person. The paramount question [in a prosecution for unjust vexation] is whether the offender's act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress, or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed. That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed, by the acts of the petitioner. Petition Denied. ESMERALDO, ISMAEL and EDGARDO RIVERA vs. PEOPLE Facts: 1. At noon of May 2, 1998, Ruben went to a nearby store to buy food. Edgardo mocked him for being jobless and dependent on his wife for support. Ruben resented the rebuke and hurled invectives at Edgardo. A heated exchange of words ensued. 2. At about 7:30 p.m. the next day, a Sunday, Ruben went to the store to buy food and to look for his wife. His three-year-old daughter was with him. Momentarily, Esmeraldo and his two brothers, Ismael and Edgardo, emerged from their house and ganged up on Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows and he fell to the ground. In that helpless position, Edgardo hit Ruben three times with a hollow block on the parietal area. Esmeraldo and Ismael continued mauling Ruben. People who saw the incident shouted: " Awatin sila! Awatin sila!" Ruben felt dizzy but managed to stand up. Ismael threw a stone at him, hitting him at the back. When policemen on board a mobile car arrived, Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to their house.

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3. Ruben was brought to the hospital and survived with wounds as a result of the attack. 4. RTC found all the accused guilty of Frustrated Murder. CA, however, modified the same to Attempted Murder. Issue: Whether the accused are guilty of Attempted murder instead of Frustrated murder. Held: They are guilty of Attempted Murder. An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their consummated, frustrated or attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed. In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the intent of petitioners to kill Ruben. That the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have produced his death does not negate petitioners criminal liability fo r attempted murder. Even if Edgardo did not hit the victim squarely on the head, petitioners are still criminally liable for attempted murder. There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows: 1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts; 2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony; 3. The offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;

4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance. The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely: 1. That there be external acts; 2. Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed. ADELMO PEREZ Y AGUSTIN vs. CA and PEOPLE Facts: 1. On or about April 14, 1988, accused Adelmo Perez (uncle of victim) without the permission of anyone, entered the room of Julita Tria and once inside, embraced and kissed her on the neck, held and mashed her breast and compelled her to lie down, and thereafter kissed her lips and neck and with the intent of having carnal knowledge with her, touched her sex organ and tried to remove her panties thereby commencing the commission of the crime of Rape directly by overt acts but said accused did not accomplish his purpose, that is, to have a carnal knowledge with her, it was not because of his spontaneous and voluntary desistance but because the said Julita Tria succeeding in resisting his criminal attempt and also due to the timely arrival of her mother to the damage and prejudice of the said Julita Tria y Balagao. 2. An information for attempted rape was filed which RTC found Adelmo guilty of. This was later affirmed by CA. Issue: Was the crime committed by the petitioner attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. Held: Only Acts of Lasciviousness. No woman would ordinarily complain to the police and concoct a story that an uncle attempted to rape her, or subject herself to medical examination of her private parts, unless righteous indignation compelled her. Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony.8 Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina

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of the victim but for some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however slight, is not completed. There is no showing in this case that petitioners sexual organ had even touched complainants vagina nor any part of her body. Petitioners acts of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissing her, mashing her breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her sexual organ, while admittedly obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any showing that petitioner actually commenced to force his penis into the complainants sexual organ. Rather, these acts constitute acts of lasciviousness. The elements of said crime are: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done: (a) by using force and intimidation or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex. All these elements are present and have been sufficiently established in this case. Petitioner clearly committed lewd acts against the complainant. Moreover, petitioner employed force when he committed these acts on the complainant. In fact, as found by the trial court, there were bruises on complainants neck and navel which belie petitioners claim that the complainant consented to these acts. Although the information filed against petitioner was for attempted rape, he can be convicted of acts of lasciviousness because the crime of acts of lasciviousness is included in rape. PEOPLE vs. HENRY ALMAZAN Facts: 1. On 28 September 1996, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Vicente Madriaga and a certain Allan played chess in front of the former's house. Spectators were Vicente's son Noli and a neighbor named Angel Soliva. While the game was underway, Henry Almazan unexpectedly arrived and brandished a .38 caliber revolver in front of the group. Almazan's fighting cocks had just been stolen and he suspected Angel, one of the spectators, to be the culprit. Thus he said, "manos-manos na lang tayo," aimed his gun at Angel and pulled the trigger. It did not fire. He tried again, but again it failed.

2. At this juncture, Vicente Madriaga stood up and tried to calm down Henry, but the latter refused to be pacified. Angel ran away and Henry aimed his gun instead at Noli. Noli cried for mercy, for his life and that of his daughter, but to no avail. Henry shot Noli at the left side of his stomach sending him immediately to the ground. His daughter, unscathed, held on to Noli, crying. Henry then turned on Noel and shot him on the left thigh. Noel managed to walk lamely but only to eventually fall to the ground. Thereafter, Vicente Madriaga called on his neighbors who brought Noli and Noel to the hospital. Noli however died before reaching the hospital, while Noel survived his injuries. 3. Trial ensued for Murder and Frustrated murder which RTC found Henry guilty of respectively. Henry testified that the gunshot wound obtained by Noel was a product of self-defense on the formers part. This the RTC found as devoid of merit. Issue: Whether accused is guilty of Frustrated murder insofar as the victim Noel is concerned. Held: The accused-appellant should be held liable for Attempted murder, not frustrated murder. For the charge of frustrated murder to flourish, the victim should sustain a fatal wound that could have caused his death were it not for timely medical assistance. This is not the case before us. The court a quo anchored its ruling on the statement of Dr. Ticman on cross-examination that the wound of Noel could catch infection or lead to his death if not timely and properly treated. However, in his direct testimony, Dr. Ticman declared that the wound was a mere minor injury for which Noel, after undergoing treatment, was immediately advised to go home.15 He even referred to the wound as a slight physical injury that would heal within a week16and for which the victim was in no danger of dying. Clear as the statement is, coupled with the fact that Noel was indeed immediately advised to go home as he was not in any danger of death, we have no reason to doubt the meaning and implications of Dr. Ticman's statement. His statement that Noel could catch infection was based on pure speculation rather than on the actual nature of the wound which was a mere minor injury, hence, not fatal.

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According to jurisprudence, if the victim was wounded with an injury that was not fatal, and could not cause his death, the crime would only be attempted.18 The observation that the conviction should be for slight physical injuries only is likewise improper as the accused-appellant was motivated by the same impetus and intent, i.e., to exact vengeance and even kill, if necessary, when he shot Noel Madriaga. Wherefore, the accused is guilty of Murder (Nolis death) and of Attempted Murder (Noels injury). PEOPLE vs. AGAPITO LISTERIO y PRADO and SAMSON DELA TORRE y ESQUELA Facts: 1. At around 5:00 p.m. of August 14, 1991, Marlon Araque y Daniel and his brother Jeonito Araque y Daniel were in Alabang, Muntinlupa to collect a sum of money from a certain Tino. Having failed to collect anything from Tino, Marlon and Jeonito then turned back. On their way back while they were passing Tramo near Tinos place, a group composed of Agapito Listerio, Samson dela Torre, George dela Torre, Marlon dela Torre and Bonifacio Bancaya blocked their path and attacked them with lead pipes and bladed weapons. 2. All the accused herein, who were armed with bladed weapons, stabbed Jeonito from behind. Jeonito sustained three (3) stab wounds on the upper right portion of his back, another on the lower right portion and the third on the middle portion of the left side of his back causing him to fall down. Marlon was hit on the head by Samson dela Torre and Bonifacio Bancaya with lead pipes and momentarily lost consciousness. When he regained his senses three (3) minutes later, he saw that Jeonito was already dead. Their assailants then fled after the incident. Marlon Araque who sustained injuries in the arm and back, was thereafter brought to a hospital for treatment and survived the attack. 3. RTC found the accused guilty of Murder and Attempted Homicide, although the information for the latter offense was that of Frustrated Homicide, on the basis that none of the wounds sustained by Marlon were fatal. Issue: Whether the lower court was correct in making accused guilty of Attempted Homicide. Held. It must be Frustrated Homicide.

The reasoning of the lower court on this point is flawed because it is not the gravity of the wounds inflicted which determines whether a felony is attempted or frustrated but whether or not the subjective phase in the commission of an offense has been passed. By subjective phase is meant [t]hat portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with the prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. From that time forward, the phase is objective. It may also be said to be that period occupied by the acts of the offender over which he has control that period between the point where he begins and the point where he voluntarily desists. If between these two points the offender is stopped by reason of any cause outside of his own voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and it is an attempt. If he is not so stopped but continues until he performs the last act, it is frustrated. The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the commission of crime and the moment when all the acts have been performed which should result in the consummated crime; while in the former there is such intervention and the offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance. To put it another way, in case of an attempt the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense. He is interrupted and compelled to desist by the intervention of outside causes before the subjective phase is passed. On the other hand, in case of frustrated crimes, the subjective phase is completely passed. Subjectively the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he was passing through the subjective phase. The crime, however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender. He did all that was necessary to commit the crime. If the crime did not result as a consequence it was due to something beyond his control. PEOPLE vs. PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y BELLO Facts: 1. On 25 April 1996, at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from the second floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her two (2) children. At the ground floor she met Primo Campuhan who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to
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be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor. Primo was a helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants were down to his knees. 2. According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina. Horrified, she cursed the accused, "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their compound, to chase the accused. Seconds later, Primo was apprehended. 3. Physical examination of the victim yielded negative results. Still RTC found him guilty of statutory rape. Issue: Whether Campuhan is guilty of Statutory rape, as the act indeed was consummated. Held: No. He must only be held guilty of Attempted Rape. We have said often enough that in concluding that carnal knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary; the mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. But the act of touching should be understood here as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labias of the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. Quotes for consummated rape: 1. Touching of the female organ. 2. Introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum. 3. Bombardment of the drawbridge. 4. Shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency. 5. Strafing of the citadel of passion.

A review of the records clearly discloses that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge its onus of proving that Primo's penis was able to penetrate Crysthel's vagina however slight. Thus we cannot conclude without any taint of serious doubt that inter-genital contact was at all achieved. To hold otherwise would be to resolve the doubt in favor of the prosecution but to run roughshod over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent. Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape and only of attempted rape are present in the instant case, hence, the accused should be punished only for it. PEOPLE vs. Jesus DELA CRUZ, Demerold AYADO & Abecidueo AJEDO jr Facts: 1. Antonia Natura and her husband, Felipe Natura, went to the house of Councilman Francisco Ponseja. On their way home, they met the three accused, Jesus dela Cruz, Demerold Ayado and Abecidueo Ajedo, who were standing by the road. Upon meeting them, accused dela Cruz said, "Good evening (Tatang) father," Felipe Natura answered, "Good evening my son (Barok)". 2. Then, de la Cruz said to Felipe, "you, after the election, as if you hate me already." Felipe answered, "No my son, you forget that already." At this juncture, accused Ayado tapped the shoulder of Felipe, while de la Cruz at that same moment shouted, "Vulva of your mother" and suddenly boxed Felipe. Ayado, jointed by Ajedo, likewise, boxed Felipe. While the three accused were boxing and mauling Felipe, Antonia pleaded for the three accused to stop but the three accused did not listen to her. 3. She then looked for someone to help them. After the lapse of several minutes, when Antonia noticed that everything was quiet, she returned to the place where her husband was, but the three accused were no longer there. She embraced her husband and noticed blood on his face and body. She ran again to look for help. Felipe was brought to the hospital, yet died the next morning. 4. An information for Murder was charged against herein accused which the RTC found them guilty of.

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5.

Defense of accused: (a) Bias on part of Antonia as the lone witness. (b) Self-Defense.

She then recognized appellant who was a frequent visitor of another boarder. 3. She pleaded with him to release her, but he ordered her to go upstairs with him. With the Batangas knife still poked to her neck, they entered complainant's room. 4. With one hand holding the knife, appellant undressed himself. He then ordered complainant to take off her clothes. Scared, she took off her Tshirt. Then he pulled off her bra, pants and panty. 5. He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. She followed his order as he continued to poke the knife to her. At said position, however, appellant could not fully penetrate her. Only a portion of his penis entered her as she kept on moving.

Issue: Whether the accused are guilty of the crime as charged. Held: Yes. Antonia Natura's relation to the victim does not necessarily disqualify her on the grounds of bias and undue interest. The testimony of a lone eyewitness, if positive, reasonable and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction especially if the testimony bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and had been delivered spontaneously, naturally and in a straightforward manner. In the case at bar, the trial court found the testimony of Antonia Natura convincing and trustworthy enough to warrant a conviction. We find no reason to disturb such finding as there is no showing that exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of findings of facts of trial courts exists. This Court cannot likewise accept the plea of self-defense of accusedappellant Jesus dela Cruz. In a long line of cases, it has been held that where the accused admits to the killing of the victim but invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself. As the burden of proof is shifted to him, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. In the instant case, the unlawful aggression came not from the victim but from the accused-appellants. The version of Dela Cruz is simply incredible. If We were to subscribe to it, then the victim would have sustained only one (1) injury the stab wound. The autopsy report belies this. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. PEOPLE vs. CEILITO ORITA alias "Lito" Facts: 1. Complainant Cristina S. Abayan was a 19-year old freshman student at the St. Joseph's College at Borongan, Eastern Samar. Appellant was a Philippine Constabulary (PC) soldier. 2. In the early morning of March 20, 1983, complainant arrived at her boarding house after a party. While knocking at the door of her boarding house, all of a sudden, somebody held her and poked a knife to her neck.

6. Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to mount him. In this position, only a small part again of his penis was inserted into her vagina. At this stage, appellant had both his hands flat on the floor. Complainant thought of escaping which she was able to do and got help from policemen after running away from the accused not minding her state of being fully naked. When the policemen who were inside the building opened the door, they found complainant naked sitting on the stairs crying. 7. The accused was charged with Rape. RTC found him guilty of Frustrated Rape. The trial court was of the belief that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the victim and thus convicted the accused of frustrated rape only. The CA however modified this to Consummated Rape.

Issue: What was Orita be convicted of, Frustrated or Consummated Rape. Held: It must be Consummated Rape. Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man in having sexual bodily connections with a woman. Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In a long line of cases, We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any

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penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed. Of course, We are aware of our earlier pronouncement in the case of People v. Eria where We found the offender guilty of frustrated rape there being no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party. However, it appears that this is a "stray" decision inasmuch as it has not been reiterated in Our subsequent decisions.

Article 8 PEOPLE vs. ANTONIO & GEORGE COMADRE, & DANILO LOZANO Facts: 1. 7:00 in the evening of August 6, 1995, Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday,3 Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were having a drinking spree on the terrace of the house of Roberts father. 2. Robert and the others noticed appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano walking. The three stopped in front of the house. While his companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed an object which fell on the roof of the terrace. Appellants immediately fled by scaling the fence of a nearby school. 3. The object, which turned out to be a hand grenade, exploded ripping a hole in the roof of the house. Robert, Jimmy, Gerry, Rey and Lorenzo were hit by shrapnel and slumped unconscious. Robert Agbanlog died before reaching the hospital. 4. The 3 accused denied participation by citing their individual alibis. 5. Charge: Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder

6. RTC gave credence to the prosecutions evidence and convicted appellants of the Complex Crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder. Conspiracy was also found to have occurred. It held that the mere presence of George and Danilo provided encouragement and a sense of security to Antonio, thus proving the existence of conspiracy. Issue: Whether or not there was indeed conspiracy. Held: Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Settled is the rule that to establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required.
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A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. Mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a conspirator for conspiracy transcends companionship.

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No. The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have any participation in the commission of the crime and must therefore be set free. Their mere presence at the scene of the crime as well as their close relationship with Antonio are insufficient to establish conspiracy considering that they performed no positive act in furtherance of the crime. Time and again we have been guided by the principle that it would be better to set free ten men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit. There being no conspiracy, only Antonio Comadre must answer for the crime. Complex Crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder against Antonio. George an Danilo are acquitted for lack of evidence to establish conspiracy, hence ordered immediately released. PEOPLE vs. NORBERTO jr, EDILBERTO & ELPIDIO MANERO, SEVERINO LINES, RUDY LINES, EFREN PLEAGO, ROGER BEDAO, RODRIGO ESPIA, ARSENIO VILLAMOR, JR., JOHN DOE and PETER DOE [SEVERINO LINES, RUDY LINES, EFREN PLEAGO and ROGER BENDAO Facts: 1. 11 April 1985, around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the Manero brothers, along with Rodrigo Espia, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleago and Roger Bedao, were inside the eatery of one Reynaldo Diocades conferring with Arsenio Villamor, Jr., private secretary to the Municipal Mayor of Tulunan, Cotabato. Plans to liquidate a number of suspected communist sympathizers were discussed. Death Note: "NPA v. NPA, starring Fr. Peter Geremias (Italian priest), Rufino Robles Bantil (Catholic lay leader), Domingo Gomez (lay leader), Fred Gapate, Rene alias Tabagac and Villaning (all messengers)." The conspirators agreed to Edilberto Manero's proposal that should they fail to kill Fr. Peter Geremias, another Italian priest would be killed in his stead. This was later posted in a wooden placard outside the eatery. 2. Bantil confronted them why his name was included in the placards. Edilberto brushed aside the query; asked "Bantil" if he had any qualms about it, and without any provocation, he drew his revolver and fired at the forehead of "Bantil" but was able to parry the gun (right finger and lower right of ear were hit). 3. Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his motorcycle. He entered the house of Gomez. While inside, Norberto, Jr., and his co-accused Pleago towed the motorcycle outside to the center of the highway. Norberto, Jr., opened the gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire and

burned the motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the felons raved and rejoiced. 4. Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. But the latter simply stepped backwards and executed a thumbs-down signal. At this point, Edilberto asked the priest: What is it you want, Father? Do you want me, Father, to break your head?" Thereafter, in a flash, Edilberto fired at the head of the priest. As Fr. Favali dropped to the ground, his hands clasped against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted Edilberto if that was the only way he knew to kill a priest. Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped over the prostrate body three (3) times, kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually shattered the head of Fr. Favali, causing his brain to scatter on the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted the brain to the terrified onlookers, his brothers danced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight of their comradesin-arms who now took guarded positions to isolate the victim from possible assistance. 5. Charge: Murder, Attempted Murder and Arson. These the RTC found accused guilty of.

Issue: Whether or not there was conspiracy. Held: Yes. There was direct proof to link them to the conspiracy. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and decide to commit it. It is not essential that all the accused commit together each and every act constitutive of the offense. It is enough that an accused participates in an act or deed where there is singularity of purpose, and unity in its execution is present. The findings of the court a quo unmistakably show that there was indeed a community of design as evidenced by the concerted acts of all the accused. It is clear that appellants were not merely innocent bystanders but were in fact vital cogs in perpetrating the savage murder of Fr. Favali and the attempted murder of Rufino Robles by the Manero brothers and their militiamen. For sure, appellants all assumed a fighting stance to discourage if not prevent any attempt to provide assistance to the fallen priest. They surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez to stop Robles and the other occupants from leaving so that the wounded Robles may die of hemorrhage. Undoubtedly, these were overt acts to ensure success of the commission of the crimes and in furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy. The appellants acted in concert in the murder of Fr. Favali and in the attempted murder of Rufino Robles. While accused-appellants may not

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have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their collective action showed a common intent to commit the criminal acts. PEOPLE vs. FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA Facts: 1. The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. 2. Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book with his friend Henry. The accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him. 3. Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the process of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him. 4. Charge: Murder. RTC rendered a decision finding both accused guilty on the crime of murder but crediting in favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong. Issue: Whether or not conspiracy is present. Held: There is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against the deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed by him. The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay. Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris

wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. We agree with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to kill the deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his act was merely a part of their funmaking that evening. There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

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Article 11 PEOPLE vs. MARIVIC GENOSA Facts: 1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983. In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily. But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights would become violent. 2. Ben became cruel to her and was a habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her, and sometimes he would pin her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her. 3. November 15, 1995: Ben and his friend Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading home. When they arrived at the house of Ben, he found out that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him. 4. Upon returning home with her cousin Ecel Arano, Marivic (who was then 8 months pregnant) found Ben in his usual behavior when drunk. This time however, he was angry because of the thought of always being followed by Marivic, who was on her part only worried that he might be overly drunk and that it might end up again on a battering incident. Then it happened indeed. This time, however, Marivic was able to overcome the aggression after a flurry of threat upon her life and that of her unborn child. Ben, unfortunately died in the course of the struggle between Marivic. Two days later, the body of Ben was found in the same house they rented, this time it was already deserted by Marivic and her children. 5. Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a novel theory -- the battered woman syndrome (BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-defense. Under the proven facts, however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration because there was no unlawful aggression--no immediate and unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him. Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete. Issue: Whether appellant acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus Held: The appeal is partly meritorious. In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense--she must have actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life. Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the following requisites and effect of selfdefense: Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal liability: 1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur; First. Unlawful aggression; Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack--or an imminent danger thereof--on the life or safety of a person. In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety. Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their childrens bedroom -- and based on past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted graver harm - then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have

6. Charge: Parricide 7. RTC, finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, it gave credence to the prosecution evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping.

8. Hence, this Automatic Review.

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ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life would amount to sentencing her to murder by installment. Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendants use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated. Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor, preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at the time. The attempt on her life was likewise on that of her fetus. [79] His abusive and violent acts, an aggression which was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her unborn child, naturally produced passion and obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a separate room, her emotional and mental state continued. According to her, she felt her blood pressure rise; she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were about to die. In a fit of indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon and used it to shoot him. We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense. In the absence of such aggression, there can be no selfdefense--complete or incomplete--on the part of the victim. Thus, Marivics killing of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances. Wherefore: RTC affirmed, convicting Marivic of Parricide. Mitigating Circumstance due to a psychological paralysis because of cumulative provocation upon her that diminished her will power. Extenuating Circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation, which overwhelmed her and put her in the said emotional and mental state. Notes: Battery an act of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or her child resulting to the physical and psychological or emotional stress. Battered Woman Syndrome a scientifically defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms found in women loving in battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse.

Battered woman: a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. The BWS is characterized by the so-called cycle of violence, which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase (TENSION); (2) the acute battering incident (VIOLENCE); and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase (FORGIVENESS). PEOPLE vs. CA and ELADIO C. TANGAN Facts: 1. December 1, 1984 (11:30 p.m.) Navy Captain Eladio C. Tangan was driving alone on Roxas Boulevard. He had just come from Buendia Avenue on an intelligence operation. At the same time, Generoso Miranda, a 29-year old optometrist, was driving his car in the same direction along Roxas Boulevard with his uncle, Manuel Miranda. 2. Generoso was moving ahead of Tangan. Suddenly, firecrackers were thrown in Generosos way, causing him to swerve to the right and cut Tangans path. Tangan blew his horn several times. Generoso slowed down to let Tangan pass. Tangan accelerated and overtook Generoso, but when he got in front, Tangan reduced speed. Generoso tried four or five times to overtake on the right lane but Tangan kept blocking his lane. 3. As he approached Airport Road, Tangan slowed down to make a Uturn. Generoso passed him, pulled over and got out of the car with his uncle. Tangan also stopped his car and got out. 4. As the Mirandas got near Tangans car, Generoso loudly retorted, Putang ina mo, bakit mo ginigitgit ang sasakyan ko? Generoso and Tangan then exchanged expletives. Tangan pointed his hand to Generoso and the latter slapped it, saying, Huwag mo akong dinuduro! Sino ka ba, ano ba ang pinagmamalaki mo? Tangan countered, Ikaw, ano ang gusto mo? With this, Tangan went to his car and got his .38 caliber handgun on the front seat. 5. Contention of Prosecution: Tangan pointed such gun at Generoso and fired the same in at the latters stomach in short range. Contention of Defense: There was a grapple for possession of the gun and during the struggle both lost possession of the same which caused the gun to fall in the ground that immediately exploded hitting Generoso therefor.
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6. Charge: Homicide with use of Unlicensed Firearm and Illegal Possession of Firearms. 7. RTC acquitted Tangan of illegal possession of firearm, but convicted him of homicide. The privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete selfdefense and the ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party and of passion and obfuscation were appreciated in his favor.

PEOPLE vs. JACINTO NARVAEZ, FERNANDO CUTON, and EFREN NARVAEZ Facts: 1. Prior to the fatal night of June 24, 1992, appellant Fernando Cuton and the victim Wilfredo Mantillas had a fist fight. In the course thereof, Virgilio Pejoro heard Cuton utter the words Hindi kita titigilan. 2. At around 9:00 p.m. of June 24, 1992, Arnel Mendoza, on his way home dropped by the shanty of Domingo Anarna , in order to see and convince the victim Mantillas who was then staying thereat, to sleep in the house of his (Mendozas) cousin at Sitio Bodega. Mendoza was then fearing for the safety of Mantillas, who however refused and insisted on staying behind. 3. After staying in the said shanty for about half an hour, Mendoza left. While he was about seventy (70) meters away, he heard several gunshots. Mendoza looked back and saw five (5) men. He was able to identify appellants Jacinto Narvaez, Fernando Cuton and Efren Narvaez, and their co-accused Justiniano Pillena, but was unable to identify the other malefactor. 4. Afraid that he might be seen and harmed by the above-mentioned malefactors, Mendoza moved farther, approximately one hundred fifty meters away from the shanty. After the said assailants had left, some three (3) minutes from their arrival, he went back to the shanty and saw the bloodied body of Mantillas at the door of the hut, sprawled on the ground. 5. Charge: Murder

8. CA affirmed the RTC decision. Issue: Whether Tangan acted in incomplete self-defense. Held: No. The element of unlawful aggression in self-defense must not come from the person defending himself but from the victim. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient. Likewise, the exchange of insulting words and invectives between Tangan and Generoso Miranda, no matter how objectionable, could not be considered as unlawful aggression, except when coupled with physical assault. There being no lawful aggression on the part of either antagonists, the claim of incomplete selfdefense falls. The third requisite of lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself is not supported by evidence. By repeatedly blocking the path of the Mirandas for almost five times, Tangan was in effect the one who provoked the former. The repeated blowing of horns, done by Generoso, may be irritating to an impatient driver but it certainly could not be considered as creating so powerful an inducement as to incite provocation for the other party to act violently. The word sufficient means adequate to excite a person to commit a wrong and must accordingly be proportionate to its gravity. Moreover, Generosos act of asking for an explanation from Tangan was not sufficient provocation for him to claim that he was provoked to kill or injure Generoso. Wherefore, CA and RTC are affirmed (Homicide)

6. RTC accorded full faith and credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Mendoza and disregarded appellants defense of alibi, finding all the accused guilty of the crime charged. Issue: Whether the accused are guilty of Murder. Held:No. If the distance and darkness prevented Mendoza from seeing what the assailants carried, then the same distance and darkness also prevented Mendoza from recognizing the faces of the assailants. Mendozas testimony in court is incredible as well as
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inconsistent on a very material matter with his sworn statement to the police. In sum, Mendozas identification of the appellants as the assailants of the victim Wilfredo Mantillas is improbable due to the factual situation described by Mendoza himself. The mind cannot rest easy if a case is resolved against the accused based on evidence replete with glaring inconsistencies, missing links and loose ends that refuse to tie up. For only when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt can we be morally certain that only those responsible are held answerable. When the prosecution fails to present such proof, the charge must be dismissed. The participation of appellants in the killing of the victim Wilfredo Mantillas not having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, we hold that the appellants should be absolved. Wherefore, the said appellants are ACQUITTED on the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt. PEOPLE vs. CUNIGUNDA BOHOLST-CABALLERO Facts: 1. Cunigunda Boholst and Francisco Caballero, both at the age of twenty, were married on June 7, 1956. Later they were blessed with a daughter. Their marriage, however, was not a happy one. It was marked by frequent quarrels caused by her husband's "gambling, drinking, and serenading", and there were times when Francisco maltreated and beat Cunigunda. 2. In the evening of January 2, 1958, she went out carolling with her friend, Crispina Barabad. They divided the proceeds thereafter then later decided to go home. But before she could leave the vicinity of the house of Crispina, she met her husband Francisco, who upon seeing her, held her by the collar of her dress and asked her: "Where have you been prostituting? You are a son of a bitch."; she replied: "What is your business. Anyway you have already left us. You have nothing to do with us" 3. Upon hearing these words Francisco retorted: "What do you mean by saying I have nothing to do with you. I will kill you all, I will kill you all" 4. Francisco then held her by the hair, slapped her face until her nose bled, and pushed her towards the ground, to keep herself from falling she held on to his waist and as she did so her right hand grasped the knife tucked

inside the belt line on the left side of his body. Because her husband continued to push her down she fell on her back to the ground. Her husband then knelt over her, held her neck, and choked her saying. "Now is the time I can do whatever I want. I will kill you" 5. Because she had "no other recourse" as she was being choked she pulled out the knife of her husband and thrust it at him hitting the left side of his body near the "belt line" just above his left thigh. When she finally released herself from the hold of her husband she ran home and on the way she threw the knife.

6. In the morning of January 3, she went to town, surrendered to the police, and presented the torn and blood-stained dress worn by her on the night of the incident. 7. Charge: Parricide

8. RTC found Cunigunda guilty of the crime as charged. Now she prays that she be acquitted based on her plea of self defense. Issue: Did appellant stab her husband in the legitimate defense of her person? Held: Yes. Quod quisque ob tutelam sui fecerit, jure suo ficisse existimetur! An examination of the record discloses that the trial judge overlooked and did not give due importance to one piece of evidence which more than the testimony of any witness eloquently confirms the narration of appellant on how she happened to stab her husband on that unfortunate night. We refer to the location of the wound inflicted on the victim. Thus, with her husband kneeling over her as she lay on her back on the ground and his hand choking her neck, appellant, as she said, had no other recourse but to pull out the knife inserted at the left side of her husband's belt and plunge it at his body hitting the left back portion just below the waist, described by the attending physician, Dr. Cesar Samson, as the left lumbar region. The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity from where the knife was drawn is a strong indication of the truth of appellant's testimony, for as she lay on the ground with her husband bent over her it was quite natural for her right hand to get hold of the knife tucked in the left side of the man's belt and thrust it at that section of the body nearest to her hand at the moment.

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In the case of appellant Cunigunda Caballero, We find the location of the fatal wound as a valuable circumstance which confirms the plea of self-defense. PEOPLE vs. LUIS B. TORING DIOSDADO BERDON and CARMELO B. BERDIN Facts: 1. In the evening of May 25, 1980, a benefit dance was held at sitio Naga, Babag II, Lapu-lapu City for the last canvassing of votes for the candidates for princesses who would reign at the sitio fiesta. As one of the candidates was the daughter of Samuel Augusto (son of a barangay captain), he and the members of his family attended the affair. 2. Also present were members of the kwaknit gang, a group which was noted for their bird-like way of dancing and their propensity for drunkenness and provoking trouble. Its president, called the "alas" king, was Luis Toring. The group was then outside the dancing area which was ringed by benches. 3. At around 10:45 p.m., Samuel's daughter was proclaimed the winner in the contest. Beer and softdrinks having been served the parents of the candidates by the officers of the Naga Chapel Association which took charge of the affair, Samuel was tipsy when, after his daughter's proclamation, he stepped out of the dancing area to answer the call of nature. 4. At that moment, barangay tanod Felix Berdin saw Luis Toring, Carmelo Berdin and Diosdado Berdon proceed to a dark area while whispering to each other. Diosdado Berdon handed a knife to Luis Toring, who then approached Samuel from behind, held Samuel's left hand with his left hand, and with his right hand, stabbed with the knife the right side of Samuel's abdomen. Upon seeing Felix running towards them, Luis Toring pulled out the knife and, together with Carmelo Berdin and Diosdado Berdon, ran towards the dark. Felix tried to chase the three but he was not able to catch them. He returned to where Samuel had slumped and helped others in taking Samuel to the hospital. He died on arrival due to massive hemorrhage secondary to the stab wound on the abdomen. 5. Contention of Defense: Samuel thrust a butt of his shotgun on the chin of a certain Joel Escobia (Torings cousin). Reacting to what he saw, Toring got his kitchen knife which was tucked in his waist, approached Samuel from the latter's right side and stabbed him once as he did not intend to kill Samuel. He alleged that it was done in defense of a stranger.

6. Charge: Murder 7. RTC convicted Toring of the crime as charged, saying that Toring was the "aggressor acting in retaliation or revenge by reason of a running feud or long-standing grudge" between the kwaknit gang and the group of Samuel, who, being the son of the barangay captain, was a "power to be reckoned with.

Issue: Whether there was a valid defense of stranger. Held: No. The presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and the lack of proof of provocation on the part of Toring notwithstanding, full credence cannot be given, to Toring's claim of defense of a relative. Toring himself admitted in court as well as in his sworn statement that in 1979, he was shot with a .22 caliber revolver by Edgar Augusto, Samuel's brother. It cannot be said, therefore, that in attacking Samuel, Toring was impelled by pure compassion or beneficence or the lawful desire to avenge the immediate wrong inflicted on his cousin. Rather, he was motivated by revenge, resentment or evil motive because of a "running feud" between the Augusto and the Toring brothers. As the defense itself claims, after the incident subject of the instant case occurred, Toring's brother, Arsenio, was shot on the leg by Edgar Augusto. Indeed, vendetta appears to have driven both camps to commit unlawful acts against each other. Hence, under the circumstances, to justify Toring's act of assaulting Samuel Augusto would give free rein to lawlessness. VICKY C. TY vs. PEOPLE Facts: 1. Tys mother Chua Lao So Un was confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital (hospital) from 30 October 1990 until 4 June 1992. Ty signed the Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment in the Contract of Admission dated 30 October 1990. Tys sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at the hospital. The total hospital bills of the two patients amounted to P1,075,592.95. 2. On 5 June 1992, Ty executed a promissory note wherein she assumed payment of the obligation in installments. To assure payment of the obligation, she drew several postdated checks against Metrobank payable to the hospital. The seven (7) checks, each covering the amount ofP30,000.00, were all deposited on their due dates. But they
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were all dishonored by the drawee bank and returned unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency of funds, with the Account Closed advice. Soon thereafter, the complainant hospital sent demand letters to Ty by registered mail. As the demand letters were not heeded, complainant filed the seven (7) Informations subject of the instant case. 3. Contention of Defense: For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury. She averred that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release for her mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly treated and would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid. The debasing treatment, she pointed out, so affected her mothers mental, psychological and physical health that the latter contemplated suicide if she would not be discharged from the hospital. Fearing the worst for her mother, and to comply with the demands of the hospital, Ty was compelled to sign a promissory note, open an account with Metrobank and issue the checks to effect her mothers immediate discharge. 4. Charge: 7 Counts of Violation of BP22. 5. RTC found Ty guilty as charged. CA rejected Tys defenses and affirmed RTC decision.

State Necessity defense..(1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than the one done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it. In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable. Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Tys own failure to pay her mothers hospital bills. EDUARDO L. BAXINELA vs. PEOPLE Facts: 1. Version of Defense: Baxinela proceeded to the Superstar Disco Pub in response to the information given by Manuba that there was an armed drunken man accosting several people inside the pub. Once they arrived, they saw Lajo with a handgun visibly tucked behind his waist. When Baxinela introduced himself as a policeman and asked why he had a handgun, Lajo suddenly drew on him prompting Baxinela to pull out his gun and fire upon Lajo, critically wounding him. Thereafter, the defense claims that Regimen ordered the security guards to bring Lajo to the hospital while they proceed to the police station to report the incident. 2. Version of Prosecution: Baxinela was already in the pub drinking with Regimen and Legarda for more than a couple of hours prior to the shooting incident. After witnessing an altercation between Lajo and another customer, Baxinela decided to confront Lajo on why he had a gun with him. Baxinela approached Lajo from behind and held the latter on the left shoulder with one hand while holding on to his .45 caliber service firearm with the other. As Lajo was turning around, to see who was confronting him, Baxinela shot him. Baxinela then got Lajos wallet and fled the scene with Regimen. 3. Charge: Homicide 4. RTC and CA accepted the prosecutions version. Both courts convicted Baxinela of Homicide. 5. Claiming self-defense and fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a right or office, the accused presents this appeal.
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Issue: Whether the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption from criminal liability. Held: No. Uncontrollable Fear defense..(1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed. In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to issue the checks a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be discharged for fear that her mothers health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law. In other words, the fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the hospitals threats or demands.

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ROWENO POMOY vs. PEOPLE Issue: Whether there was valid self-defense and fulfillment of a duty or exercise of a right or office. Held: No. The requisites for self-defense are: 1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; 2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused; and 3) employment of reasonable means to prevent and repel and aggression. Evidence shows that there was no imminent threat that necessitated shooting Lajo at that moment. Just before Baxinela shot Lajo, the former was safely behind the victim and holding his arm. It was Lajo who was at a disadvantage. In fact, it was Baxinela who was the aggressor when he grabbed Lajos shoulder and started questioning him. And when Lajo was shot, it appears that he was just turning around to face Baxinela and, quite possibly, reaching for his wallet. None of these acts could conceivably be deemed as unlawful aggression on the part of Lajo. The requisites for fulfillment of a duty are: 1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office. While the first condition is present, the second is clearly lacking. Baxinelas duty was to investigate the reason why Lajo had a gun tucked behind his waist in a public place. This was what Baxinela was doing when he confronted Lajo at the entrance, but perhaps through anxiety, edginess or the desire to take no chances, Baxinela exceeded his duty by firing upon Lajo who was not at all resisting. The shooting of Lajo cannot be considered due performance of a duty if at that time Lajo posed no serious threat or harm to Baxinela or to the civilians in the pub. The Court commiserates with our policemen who regularly thrust their lives in zones of danger in order to maintain peace and order and acknowledges the apprehensions faced by their families whenever they go on duty. But the use of unnecessary force or wanton violence is not justified when the fulfillment of their duty as law enforcers can be effected otherwise. A "shoot first, think later" attitude can never be countenanced in a civilized society. Wherefore, conviction of Homicide affirmed. Facts: 1. On January 4, 1990, some policemen arrived at the Concepcion College to arrest a certain Tomas Balboa (master teacher), allegedly in connection with a robbery. Balboa was taken to the Headquarters of the already defunct 321st Philippine Constabulary Company at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo and was detained in the jail thereat. 2. Later that day, petitioner, who is a police sergeant, went near the door of the jail where Balboa was detained and directed the latter to come out, purportedly for tactical interrogation at the investigation room. At that time, petitioner had a gun, a .45 caliber automatic pistol, tucked in a holster which was hanging by the side of his belt. The gun was fully embedded in its holster, with only the handle of the gun protruding from the holster. While traversing the hallway, Balboa suddenly approached Pomoy and grabbed his gun. Struggle and grappling ensued which later caused the gun to fire twice killing Balboa. 3. Charge: Homicide 4. RTC found Pomoy guilty of the crime as charged. 5. CA discredited petitioners claim of accident: (a) Petitioner had been in control when the shots were fired; (b) The gun had been locked, it was petitioner who released the safety lock and deliberately fired the fatal shots; (c) the location of the wounds did not support that there was grappling. OSG observed that the fact that the victim was shot 2 times on different and distant parts of the body means that there was intent to cause the victims death.

Issue: Whether the shooting of Tomas Balboa was the result of an accident. Whether petitioner was able to prove self-defense. Held: Yes. Presence of All the Elements of Accident: 1) the accused was at the time performing a lawful act with due care; 2) the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and 3) on the part of the accused, there was no fault or no intent to cause the injury. Petitioner Not in Control of the Gun When It Fired - The deceased persistently attempted to wrest the weapon from him, while he resolutely tried to thwart those attempts. That the hands of both petitioner and the victim were all over the weapon.

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Release of the Guns Safety Lock and Firing of the Gun Both Accidental - In the course of the scuffle, the safety lock could have been accidentally released and the shots accidentally fired. That there was not just one but two shots fired does not necessarily and conclusively negate the claim that the shooting was accidental, as the same circumstance can easily be attributed to the mechanism of the .45 caliber service gun. Unlike a revolver, a semi-automatic pistol, as sufficiently described by petitioner, is prone to accidental firing when possession thereof becomes the object of a struggle. Alleged Grappling Not Negated by Frontal Location of Wounds - In the factual context of the present case, however, the location of the wounds becomes inconsequential. Where, as in this case, both the victim and the accused were grappling for possession of a gun, the direction of its nozzle may continuously change in the process, such that the trajectory of the bullet when the weapon fires becomes unpredictable and erratic. Self-Defense (alternative defense): Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of accident, in which there is no intent to kill. On the other hand, self-defense necessarily contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in order to defend oneself from imminent danger. Apparently, the fatal shots in the instant case did not occur out of any conscious or premeditated effort to overpower, maim or kill the victim for the purpose of self-defense against any aggression; rather, they appeared to be the spontaneous and accidental result of both parties attempts to possess the firearm. JOHN ANGCACO vs. PEOPLE Facts: 1. Petitioner John Angcaco and his co-accused were members of the Integrated National Police of Taytay, Palawan. They were serving a warrant of arrest Restituto Bergante, who was wanted in connection with a robbery case. 2. At around 4 o'clock in the morning of September 25, 1980, Noe Bergante and his brother Noel Bergante and his cousin Freddie Ganancial were awakened by the sound of gunfire while they were asleep. Noel went to the kitchen and, from there, saw Protacio Edep fire his carbine, as he shouted, "Kapitan, you come down, this is [a] peace officer." He was apparently referring to Restituto. Noel answered that his father was not in the house, having gone to Puerto Princesa. Edep then ordered the men in the house to come out. Noel accordingly went to the gate and later called Noe to also come out of the house. Noe and his cousin, Freddie Ganancial, did as bidden.

3. Once they were outside the house, Noe and Freddie were flanked by petitioner Angcaco on the right side and accused Ramon Decosto on the left side. Decosto pointed an armalite at the two and warned them not to run. Noe and Freddie joined Noel Bergante. Protacio Edep approached Freddie saying, "You are tough," and pushed him. Then, shots rang out from the armalite and short firearm of Decosto and Edep, as a result of which Freddie Ganancial turned around and dropped to the ground face down. 4. Contention of Defense: All of them denied liability except petitioner (Angcaco) who admitted that he shot Freddie Ganancial, claiming that he acted in defense of Edep, whom Freddie was about to strike with a bolo. 5. Charge: Murder

Issue: Whether petitioner be exonerated due to his act of defending a stranger or his fulfillment of a duty. Held: No. Defense of Stranger: 1) unlawful aggression; 2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and 3) the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. Petitioner's own testimony suffers improbabilities on material points. from inconsistencies and

First, there was no reason for the victim, Freddie Ganancial, to attack Sgt. Edep. Second, when cross-examined about the bolo, petitioner said he could not remember who took it away. However, at a later hearing, petitioner stated that it was he who picked up the bolo and turned it over to Edep, his superior officer. But how could he not remember who took the bolo if he was the one who did so? Once again, petitioner was prevaricating. Third, petitioner said that he merely intended to fire a warning shot when he saw Ganancial. This claim is belied by the fact that the victim sustained three gunshot wounds on the chest and abdomen. It is apparent that petitioner intended to kill the victim and not merely to warn him.
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Fulfillment of a lawful duty: 1) that the offender acted in the lawful exercise of a right or a duty; and 2) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such right or office. In this case, the mission of petitioner and his colleagues was to effect the arrest of Restituto Bergante. But, it was not shown here that the killing of Ganancial was in furtherance of such duty. No evidence was presented by the defense to prove that Ganancial attempted to prevent petitioner and his fellow officers from arresting Restituto Bergante. There was in fact no clear evidence as to how Freddie Ganancial was shot. Indeed, as already stated, any attempt by the victim to arrest the wanted person was pointless as Restituto Bergante was not in his house. As regards the second requisite, there can be no question that the killing of Freddie Ganancial was not a necessary consequence of the arrest to be made on Restituto Bergante. LUIS A. TABUENA and ADOLFO M. PERALTA vs. SB and PEOPLE Facts: 1. President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the president's office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), to which Tabuena replied, "Yes, sir, I will do it." About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated January 8, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as MARCOS Memorandum) reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction. 2. In obedience to President Marcos' verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Dabao and Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of three (3) withdrawals. 3. The disbursement of the P55 Million was, as described by Tabuena (General Manager) and Peralta (Acting Finance Services Manager) themselves, "out of the ordinary" and "not based on the normal procedure". Not only were there no vouchers prepared to support the disbursement, the P55 Million was paid in cold cash. Also, no PNCC receipt for the P55 Million was presented. Defense witness Francis Monera, then Senior Assistant Vice President and Corporate Comptroller of PNCC, even affirmed in court that there were no payments made to PNCC by MIAA for the months of January to June of 1986. 4. The position of the prosecution was that there were no outstanding obligations in favor of PNCC at the time of the disbursement of the P55 Million. On the other hand, the defense of Tabuena and Peralta, in short,

was that they acted in good faith. Tabuena claimed that he was merely complying with the MARCOS Memorandum which ordered him to forward immediately to the Office of the President P55 Million in cash as partial payment of MIAA's obligations to PNCC, and that he (Tabuena) was of the belief that MIAA indeed had liabilities to PNCC. Peralta for his part shared the same belief and so he heeded the request of Tabuena, his superior, for him (Peralta) to help in the release of P5 Million. 5. Charge: Intentional Malversation.

6. SB convicted petitioners of Malversation by Negligence. Issue: Whether the accused be held not liable for Malversation due to their obedience in good faith to a lawful order of a superior. Held: Yes. The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent. Criminal intent in embezzlement is not based on technical mistakes as to the legal effect of a transaction honestly entered into, and there can be no embezzlement if the mind of the person doing the act is innocent or if there is no wrongful purpose. The accused may thus always introduce evidence to show he acted in good faith and that he had no intention to convert. And this, to our mind, Tabuena and Peralta had meritoriously shown. In so far as Tabuena is concerned, with the due presentation in evidence of the MARCOS Memorandum we are swayed to give credit to his claim of having caused the disbursement of the P55 Million solely by reason of such memorandum. From this premise flows the following reasons and/or considerations that would buttress his innocence of the crime of malversation. First. Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with the presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is something easier said than done. And as a recipient of such kind of a directive coming from the highest official of the land no less, good faith should be read on Tabuena's compliance, without hesitation nor any question, with the MARCOS Memorandum. Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of " Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose ." 16

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The subordinate-superior relationship between Tabuena and Marcos is clear. And so too, is the lawfulness of the order contained in the MARCOS Memorandum, as it has for its purpose partial payment of the liability of one government agency (MIAA) to another (PNCC). Thus, even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and the subordinate is not aware of its illegality, the subordinate is not liable, for then there would only be a mistake of fact committed in good faith. Second. There is no denying that the disbursement, which Tabuena admitted as "out of the ordinary", did not comply with certain auditing rules and regulations such as those pointed out by the Sandiganbayan. But this deviation was inevitable under the circumstances Tabuena was in. He did not have the luxury of time to observe all auditing procedures of disbursement considering the fact that the MARCOS Memorandum enjoined his "immediate compliance" with the directive that he forward to the President's Office the P55 Million in cash. Be that as it may, Tabuena surely cannot escape responsibility for such omission. But since he was acting in good faith, his liability should only be administrative or civil in nature, and not criminal. Third. The Sandiganbayan made the finding that Tabuena had already converted and misappropriated the P55 Million when he delivered the same to Mrs. Gimenez and not to the PNCC, We do not agree. It must be stressed that the MARCOS Memorandum directed Tabuena "to pay immediately the Philippine National Construction Corporation, thru this office the sum of FIFTY FIVE MILLION. . .", and that was what Tabuena precisely did when he delivered the money to Mrs. Gimenez. Such delivery, no doubt, is in effect delivery to the Office of the President inasmuch as Mrs. Gimenez was Marcos' secretary then. Furthermore, Tabuena had reasonable ground to believe that the President was entitled to receive the P55 Million since he was certainly aware that Marcos, as Chief Executive, exercised supervision and control over government agencies. And the good faith of Tabuena in having delivered the money to the President's office (thru Mrs. Gimenez), in strict compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum, was not at all affected even if it later turned out that PNCC never received the money. Fourth. Even assuming that the real and sole purpose behind the MARCOS Memorandum was to siphon-out public money for the personal benefit of those then in power, still, no criminal liability can be imputed to Tabuena. There is no showing that Tabuena had anything to do whatsoever with the execution of the MARCOS Memorandum. Nor is there proof that he profited

from the felonious scheme. In short, no conspiracy was established between Tabuena and the real embezzler/s of the P5 Million. This is not a sheer case of blind and misguided obedience, but obedience in good faith of a duly executed order. Indeed, compliance to a patently lawful order is rectitude far better than contumacious disobedience. In the case at bench, the order emanated from the Office of the President and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without question. Obedientia est legis essentia. We are well aware of the fear entertained by some that this decision may set a dangerous precedent in that those guilty of enriching themselves at the expense of the public would be able to escape criminal liability by the mere expedient of invoking "good faith". It must never be forgotten, however, that we render justice on a case to case basis, always in consideration of the evidence that is presented. Thus, where the evidence warrants an acquittal, as in this case, we are mandated not only by the dictates of law but likewise of conscience to grant the same. On the other hand, it does not follow that all those similarly accused will necessarily be acquitted upon reliance on this case as a precedent. For the decision in this case to be a precedent, the peculiar circumstances and the evidence that led to the petitioner's acquittal must also be present in subsequent cases. Furthermore, as between a mere apprehension of a "dangerous precedent" and an actual violation of constitutionally enshrined rights, it is definitely the latter that merits our immediate attention. For the most dangerous precedent arises when we allow ourselves to be carried away by such fears so that it becomes lawful to sacrifice the rights of an accused to calm the fearful. In our eagerness to bring to justice the malefactors of the Marcos regime, we must not succumb to the temptation to commit the greatest injustice of visiting the sins of the wrongdoers upon an innocent.

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Article 12 PEOPLE vs. EDWARD R. FELICIANO, ANITA G. LAURORA, EDITHA C. MAGLALANG, MAY G. ESTRELLA, and ROMELITO G. RUELO Facts: 1. February 22, 2006 PO2 Monte, received a telephone call from a concerned citizen, who reported that an illegal drug trade was being operated by a certain "Janggo". Such information validated the lettercomplaint the police had earlier received implicating a similar person called "Janggo" in drug-related activities. 2. Police Inspector Ronald Pamor, organized a buy-bust operation. PO2 Monte was designated as poseur-buyer and, for that purpose, he was given two PhP 100 bills where he put his initials "BVM." After coordinating with the PDEA, the buy-bust team and the confidential informant went to the target area on board a passenger-type jeepney. 3. After parking their vehicle about 50 meters away from the house of "Janggo," PO2 Monte and the informant proceeded towards it, followed by other members of the team. The informant introduced PO2 Monte to "Janggo" as a regular buyer of shabu. While PO2 Monte was talking to "Janggo," he noticed two women and a man seated inside the house. "Janggo" then asked the woman standing near the doorway if she had any shabu. The woman then pulled a plastic sachet from her right pocket which she handed to "Janggo," who, in turn, handed it to PO2 Monte. 4. Upon receiving and examining the plastic sachet, PO2 Monte took off his baseball cap, the pre-arranged signal to signify the consummation of the sale. Monte identified himself as a police officer and grabbed the left arm of "Janggo." "Janggo" was identified as accused-appellant Feliciano, while the woman standing near the doorway as accused-appellant Laurora. The other persons apprehended inside the house were likewise identified as the other accused Ruelo, Maglalang, and the now deceased May Estrella. 5. Charge: Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Held:Yes. Buy-Bust Operation Was Legitimate and Valid. Defendants argue that the police officers had no basis to show any urgency upon which to justify a warrantless arrest. We disagree. It is settled that a buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment that is resorted to for trapping and capturing criminals. It is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken. There is a fine distinction between entrapping a criminal versus instigating him to commit the crime, to wit: ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION: While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the decoy solicitation of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him, free from the influence or instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was formed independently of such agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities, and, being authorised by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a spotter, detective, or hired informer; but there are cases holding the contrary. Clearly, in this case, the buy-bust operation was proper. All the essential elements of the crime of illegal sale of drugs have been established, i.e.,

Issue: Whether or not the admission of the seized dangerous drug as evidence was proper despite the allegation that it was a result of an unlawful arrest.

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6. RTC rendered accused guilty as charged. CA affirmed the same.

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(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place . The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish these elements beyond moral certainty. Accused-appellants sold the shabu for PhP 200 to PO2 Monte posing as buyer; the said drug was seized and identified as a prohibited drug and subsequently presented in evidence; there was actual exchange of the marked money and contraband; and finally, accusedappellant Feliciano was fully aware that he was selling and delivering a prohibited drug. Moreover, no proof was adduced to support the claim that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized drugs were compromised. Thus, this Court finds no reason to overturn the finding of the trial court that the same drugs seized from accused-appellants were the same ones presented during trial. As it were, the chain of custody of the illicit drugs seized from accusedappellants remains unbroken. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. Edward R. Feliciano and Anita G. Laurora guilty of the crimes charged is AFFIRMED IN TOTO. PEOPLE vs. RAFAEL STA. MARIA y INDON Facts: 1. November 27, 2002, at around 10:00 oclock in the morning, P/Chief Insp. Noli Pacheco received an intelligence report about the illegal drug activities in Sitio Gulod, Barangay Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan of a certain Fael, who later turned out to be appellant Rafael Sta. Maria. 2. Pacheco formed a Surveillance Team which reported to the former that a confidential asset found by the team had already negotiated a drug deal for the purchase of P200 worth of shabu from appellant at the latters house. 3. The surveillance team then prepared for a buy-bust operation, with PO3 Enrique Rullan as team leader, and PO1 Rhoel Ventura, who was provided with two (2) marked P100-bills, as poseur-buyer.

4. At the appointed time and place, Ventura and the confidential informant proceeded to appellants house and knocked at the door. Appellant opened the door and the confidential informant introduced to him Ventura as a prospective buyer. Ventura later handed the two (2) marked P100-bills to appellant who, in turn, gave him a plastic sachet of shabu. Thereupon, Ventura sparked his cigarette lighter, which was the pre-arranged signal to the other members of the buybust team that the sale was consummated. 5. Appellant was arrested and the two marked P100-bills recovered from him. Also arrested on that occasion was one Zedric dela Cruz who was allegedly sniffing shabu inside appellants house and from whom drug paraphernalia were recovered. Upon laboratory examination of the item bought from appellant, the same yielded positive for methylampetamine hydrochloride or shabu weighing 0.041 gram.

6. Charge: Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. 7. RTC rendered accused guilty as charged. CA affirmed the same.

Issue: Whether or not the arrest of appellant was done through instigation. Held: No. In his Brief, appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting him because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. He maintains that instigation, not entrapment, preceded his arrest. To appellant, the informant, by pretending that he was in need of shabu, instigated or induced him to violate the anti-dangerous drugs law. We are not persuaded. In entrapment, the entrapper resorts to ways and means to trap and capture a lawbreaker while executing his criminal plan. In instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be-defendant into committing the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal.
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In entrapment, the means originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime come from him. In instigation, the law enforcer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.

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The legal effects of entrapment do not exempt the criminal from liability. Instigation does. As here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by the police merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. The police received an intelligence report that appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs. They duly acted on it by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with appellant. There was no showing that the informant induced appellant to sell illegal drugs to him. Appellant would next argue that the evidence against him was obtained in violation of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 because the buy-bust operation was made without any involvement of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). The argument is specious. SEC. 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal Drugs into the PDEA and Transitory Provisions . The foregoing provision is silent as to the consequences of failure on the part of the law enforcers to transfer drug-related cases to the PDEA, in the same way that the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165 is also silent on the matter. To recapitulate, the challenged buy-bust operation, albeit made without the participation of PDEA, did not violate appellants constitutional right to be protected from illegal arrest. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 which even remotely indicate the intention of the legislature to make an arrest made without the participation of the PDEA illegal and evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible. Moreover, the law did not deprive the PNP of the power to make arrests. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the appealed decision of the CA, affirmatorary of that of the trial court, is AFFIRMED.

Article 13 PEOPLE vs. CA and ELADIO C. TANGAN Facts: 1. December 1, 1984 (11:30 p.m.) Navy Captain Eladio C. Tangan was driving alone on Roxas Boulevard. He had just come from Buendia Avenue on an intelligence operation. At the same time, Generoso Miranda, a 29-year old optometrist, was driving his car in the same direction along Roxas Boulevard with his uncle, Manuel Miranda. 2. Generoso was moving ahead of Tangan. Suddenly, firecrackers were thrown in Generosos way, causing him to swerve to the right and cut Tangans path. Tangan blew his horn several times. Generoso slowed down to let Tangan pass. Tangan accelerated and overtook Generoso, but when he got in front, Tangan reduced speed. Generoso tried four or five times to overtake on the right lane but Tangan kept blocking his lane. 3. As he approached Airport Road, Tangan slowed down to make a Uturn. Generoso passed him, pulled over and got out of the car with his uncle. Tangan also stopped his car and got out. 4. As the Mirandas got near Tangans car, Generoso loudly retorted, Putang ina mo, bakit mo ginigitgit ang sasakyan ko? Generoso and Tangan then exchanged expletives. Tangan pointed his hand to Generoso and the latter slapped it, saying, Huwag mo akong dinuduro! Sino ka ba, ano ba ang pinagmamalaki mo? Tangan countered, Ikaw, ano ang gusto mo? With this, Tangan went to his car and got his .38 caliber handgun on the front seat. 5. Contention of Prosecution: Tangan pointed such gun at Generoso and fired the same in at the latters stomach in short range. Contention of Defense: There was a grapple for possession of the gun and during the struggle both lost possession of the same which caused the gun to fall in the ground that immediately exploded hitting Generoso therefor.

6. Charge: Homicide with use of Unlicensed Firearm and Illegal Possession of Firearms.
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7.

RTC acquitted Tangan of illegal possession of firearm, but convicted him of homicide. The privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense and the ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party and of passion and obfuscation were appreciated in his favor.

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8. CA affirmed the RTC decision. Issue: Whether Tangan acted in incomplete self-defense. Held: No. The element of unlawful aggression in self-defense must not come from the person defending himself but from the victim. Incomplete self-defense is not considered as a justifying act, but merely a mitigating circumstance; hence, the burden of proving the crime charged in the information is not shifted to the accused.[23] In order that it may be successfully appreciated, however, it is necessary that a majority of the requirements of self-defense be present, particularly the requisite of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.[24] Unlawful aggression by itself or in combination with either of the other two requisite suffices to establish incomplete self-defense. Absent the unlawful aggression, there can never be self-defense, complete or incomplete,[25] because if there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of defense will have no basis.[26] A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient. Likewise, the exchange of insulting words and invectives between Tangan and Generoso Miranda, no matter how objectionable, could not be considered as unlawful aggression, except when coupled with physical assault. There being no lawful aggression on the part of either antagonists, the claim of incomplete selfdefense falls. Wherefore, CA and RTC are affirmed (Homicide) ROSARIO T. DE VERA vs. GEREN A. DE VERA Facts: 1. Petitioner Rosario T. de Vera accused her spouse Geren A. de Vera (Geren) and Josephine F. Juliano (Josephine) of Bigamy. It was alleged that the accused Geren A. De Vera being previously united in lawful marriage with Rosario Carvajal Tobias-De Vera, and without said marriage having been legally dissolved, contract a second marriage with accused Josephine Juliano y Francisco, who likewise has previous knowledge that accused Geren A. De Veras previous marriage with Rosario T. De Vera is still valid and subsisting. 2. Geren pleaded "Guilty." However, he prayed that he be allowed to withdraw his plea in the meantime in order to prove the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The motion was opposed by

petitioner on the ground that not all the elements of the mitigating circumstance of "voluntary surrender" were present. She added that "voluntary surrender" was raised only as an afterthought, as Geren had earlier invoked a "voluntary plea of guilty" without raising the former. This she did by citing cases Cagas, Taraya and Barcino. 3. RTC found accused guilty if bigamy and appreciated 2 mitigating circumstances (plea of guilty and voluntary surrender), and no aggravating circumstance. Issue: Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated. Held: Yes. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present: 1) the offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latters agent; 3) the surrender was voluntary. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture. In Cagas, after the stabbing incident, a police officer caught up with him. The accused did then and there surrender, it was because he was left with no choice. In Taraya, when the accused learned of a warrant for his arrest, he thereafter surrendered and confessed that he killed the victim. Still, the Court refused to appreciate the mitigating circumstance in his favor. Lastly, in Barcino, Jr., the accused surrendered to the authorities after more than one year from the incident in order to disclaim responsibility for the killing of the victim. The Court refused to m itigate the accuseds liability because there was no acknowledgment of the commission of the crime or the intention to save the government the trouble and expense in his search and capture; and there was a pending warrant for his arrest. In this case, the Information was filed with the RTC on February 24, 2005. On March 1, 2005, the court found probable cause for the accused to stand trial for the crime of bigamy and for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In the afternoon of the same day, Geren surrendered to the court and acknowledged his culpability. Hence, there was no more need for the court
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to issue the warrant of arrest. Thus, the trial court was correct in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of "voluntary surrender." We would like to point out that the mere filing of an information and/or the issuance of a warrant of arrest will not automatically make the surrender "involuntary." In People v. Oco, the Court appreciated the mitigating circumstance because immediately upon learning that a warrant for his arrest was issued, and without the same having been served on him, the accused surrendered to the police. Thus, it is clear that notwithstanding the pendency of a warrant for his arrest, the accused may still be entitled to the mitigating circumstance in case he surrenders, depending on the actual facts surrounding the very act of giving himself up. PEOPLE vs. EDGAR DAWATON Facts: 1. 20 September 1998 Esmeraldo Cortez was entertaining visitors in his house. His brother-in-law Edgar Dawaton and kumpadre Leonides Lavares dropped by at about 12:00 o'clock noon followed by Domingo Reyes. They started drinking soon after. At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and after having consumed four (4) bottles of gin, they went to the house of Amado Dawaton, Edgar's uncle. They stayed at the balcony of the house and continued drinking. Amado Dawaton was not in. 2. Already drunk, Leonides decided to sleep on a papag or wooden bench. At about 3:30 in the afternoon, twenty (20) minutes after Leonides had gone to sleep, Edgar stood up and left for his house. When he returned he brought with him a stainless knife with a blade 2 to 3 inches long. Without a word, he approached Leonides who was sleeping and stabbed him near the base of his neck. Awakened and surprised, Leonides got up and blurted: "Bakit Pare, bakit?" Instead of answering, Edgar again stabbed Leonides on the upper part of his neck, spilling blood on Leonides' arm. 3. Leonides attempted to flee but Edgar who was much bigger grabbed the collar of his shirt and thus effectively prevented him from running away. Edgar then repeatedly stabbed Leonides who, despite Edgar's firm hold on him, was still able to move about twenty (20) meters away from the house of Amado Dawaton before he fell to the ground. 4. Domingo and Esmeraldo were positioned a few meters away from where Leonides was sleeping when he was initially assaulted by Edgar. They 5.

were shocked by what happened but other than pleading for Edgar to stop they were unable to help Leonides. An Information for murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation was filed against Edgar Dawaton. When first arraigned he pleaded not guilty, but during the pre-trial, he offered to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide but was rejected by the prosecution, hence, the case proceeded to trial.

6. RTC convicted Edgar Dawaton of murder qualified by treachery (as charged) and sentenced him to death. Issue: Whether or not his plea of guilty to lesser offense may be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance. Held: No. The accused argues that trial court erred in imposing the death penalty despite the attendance of mitigating and alternative circumstances in his favor. While the accused offered to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide, he was charged with murder for which he had already entered a plea of not guilty. We have ruled that an offer to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense cannot be considered as an attenuating circumstance under the provisions of Art. 13 of The Revised Penal Code because to be voluntary the plea of guilty must be to the offense charged. Nor can the accused avail of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender as he himself admitted that he was arrested at his uncle's residence. Resorting to sophistry, the accused argues that he was not arrested but "fetched" as he voluntarily went with the policemen when they came for him. This attempt at semantics is futile and absurd. That he did not try to escape or resist arrest after he was taken into custody by the authorities did not amount to voluntary surrender. A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily included in his search and capture. Murder, qualified by treachery.

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EXUPERANCIO CANTA vs. PEOPLE Facts: 1. Narciso Gabriel acquired from his half-sister Erlinda Monter a cow, subject of the case, upon its birth. At 5 oclock in the afternoon of March 13, 1986, Agapay (one of the caretakers) took the cow to graze in the mountain about 40 meters from his hut. However, when he came back for it at past 9 oclock the following morning, Agapay found the cow gone. He found hoof prints which led to the house of Filomeno Vallejos. He was told that petitioner Exuperancio Canta had taken the animal. 2. Upon instructions of the owner, the caretakers moved to recover the animal from petitioners wife but they were informed that petitioner had delivered the cow to his father, Florentino Canta (barangay captain). They met petitioner who told them that if Narciso was the owner, he should claim the cow himself. Nevertheless, petitioner accompanied the two to his fathers house. As petitioners father was not in the house, petitioner told Gardenio and Maria he would call them the next day so that they could talk the matter over with his father. 3. However, petitioner never called them. Hence, Narciso Gabriel reported the matter to the police. Petitioner admitted taking the cow but claimed that it was his and that it was lost on December 3, 1985. He presented two certificates of ownership to support his claim. Issue: Whether or not Canta may be afforded with a mitigating circumstance with respect to certain attendant circumstances of his case. Held: The accused-appellant should be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender. The circumstance of voluntary surrender has the following elements: 1) the offender has not actually been arrested; 2) the offender surrenders to a person in authority or to the latters agent; 3) the surrender is voluntary. In the present case, petitioner Exuperancio Canta had not actually been arrested. In fact, no complaint had yet been filed against him when he surrendered the cow to the authorities. It has been repeatedly held that for surrender to be voluntary, there must be an intent to submit oneself unconditionally to the authorities, showing an intention to save the authorities the trouble and expense that his search and capture would require.

In petitioners case, he voluntarily took the cow to the municipal hall of Padre Burgos to place it unconditionally in the custody of the authorities and thus saved them the trouble of having to recover the cow from him. This circumstance can be considered analogous to voluntary surrender and should be considered in favor of petitioner.

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Article 14 People vs. Escote (Jun Mantika) and Acuyan (Vic Arroyo) Facts: 1. September 28, 1996 at past midnight, Rodolfo Cacatian, the regular driver of Five Star Bus and Romulo Digap (conductor) drove from its terminal at Pasay to Bolinao, Pangasinan. The lights of the bus were on even as some of the passengers slept. When the bus was travelling along the highway in Plaridel, Bulacan, Escote and Acuyan suddenly stood up, whipped out their handguns and announced a holdup. 2. They accosted the passengers and divested them of their money and valuables. They took the identification card of the police officer as well as his service gun and told him: "Pasensya ka na Pare, papatayin ka namin, baril mo rin and papatay sa iyo ." The police officer pleaded for mercy: "Pare maawa ka sa akin. May pamilya ako ." However, Victor and Juan ignored the plea of the police officer and shot him on the mouth, right ear, chest and right side of his body. Manio, Jr. sustained six entrance wounds. 3. Rodolfo heard one of the felons saying: "Ganyan lang ang pumatay ng tao. Parang pumapatay ng manok." The other said: "Ayos na naman tayo pare. Malaki-laki ito." Escote and Acuyan ordered Rodolfo to stop the bus along the overpass in Mexico, Pampanga where they alighted from the bus. The robbery was over in 25 minutes. 4. Barely a month thereafter, Escote was accosted over another violation. 5. Charge: Robbery with Homicide.

Thus, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said crime is classified as a crime against property and a single and indivisible crime. Treachery is not a qualifying circumstance because the word "homicide" is used in its broadest and most generic sense. Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide. Neither does it constitute a crime specially punishable by law nor is it included by the law in defining the crime of robbery with homicide and prescribing the penalty therefor. Treachery is likewise not inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide. Hence, treachery should be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide for the imposition of the proper penalty for the crime. In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide, the law looks at the constituent crime of homicide which is a crime against persons and not at the constituent crime of robbery which is a crime against property. Treachery is applied to the constituent crime of "homicide" and not to the constituent crime of "robbery" of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a crime against property or as a special complex and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Treachery merely increases the penalty for the crime conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code absent any generic mitigating circumstance. People vs. Inocencio Gonzalez Facts: 1. Many unfortunate tragedies would not have happened if the improvident use of a firearm did not exacerbate a simple altercation over traffic. This is one of them. On a day intended to pay homage to the dead, a pregnant woman was shot to death in the course of her husbands altercation with the accused-appellant and his son along the Garden of Remembrance within the Loyola Memorial Park in Marikina. The trial court found the accused guilty of the complex

6. RTC: Escote and Acuyan were found guilty as charged; Treachery was appreciated. Issue: Whether or not treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in a crime of robbery with homicide. Held: Yes. But it cannot be appreciated in this case because the same was not alleged in the Information. Treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in the felony of robbery with homicide, a special complex crime ( un delito especial complejo) and at the same time a single and indivisible offense (uno solo indivisible).

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crime of murder and two counts of frustrated murder and accordingly sentenced him to death. 2. October 31, 1998, both the families of the private complainant Noel Andres and that of the accused-appellant Gonzalez were on their way to the exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. Gonzalez was driving a white Isuzu Esteem with his grandson and 3 housemaids, while the private complainant was driving a maroon Toyota FX with his pregnant wife Feliber Andres, his two year old son, Kenneth, his nephew Kevin and his sister-in-law, Francar Valdez. 3. Later, their two vehicles almost collided. Noel was able to timely step on the brakes. The appellant continued driving along his way while Noel drove behind the appellants vehicle for some time and cut him off when he found the opportunity to do so. Noel then got out of his vehicle and knocked on the appellants car window. 4. Invectives were then occurred between the parties, which later involved the son of Gonzalez. Later on, a gun was shot at the car of Noel by Gonzales which caused the death of the formers wife and injuries to his son and nephew. 5. Charge: Complex Crime of Murder, Double Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder. 6. RTC: Guilty as charged; Treachery was appreciated as a qualifying circumstance. Hence, death was imposed as the penalty. Issue: Whether or not treachery was attendant in the crime committed. Held: No. The determining factor on whether or not the commission of a crime is attended by treachery is not the resulting crime committed but the mode of attack employed in its execution. Treachery is never presumed. It is required that the manner of attack must be shown to have been attended by treachery as conclusively as the crime itself. We affirm the recommendation of the Solicitor-General that the shooting was not attended by treachery and accordingly the crime committed for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide and not murder. The encounter between Noel Andres and the appellant was a chance encounter. They were total strangers before their vehicles almost collided at an intersection inside the memorial park. Unfortunately, heated exchange of remarks that followed the near collision was fanned by a short temper, which

in the case of the appellant, was augmented by the improvident use of a firearm. The fact that the appellant fired his gun from behind the victim does not by itself amount to treachery. There is no evidence on record that the appellant deliberately positioned himself behind the victim to gain advantage over him when he fired the shot. The totality of the evidence on record fails to support a conclusion that Gonzalez deliberately employed the mode of attack to gain undue advantage over the intended nor the actual victim. Without any decisive evidence to the contrary, treachery cannot be considered; thus the crime committed is homicide. People vs. Alberto Antonio, SPO4 Nieto & SPO1 Cartalla Facts: 1. November 2, 1996, what should have been an amiable game of cards between two erstwhile friends turned into a deadly confrontation resulting in the fatal shooting of one by the hand of the other. The victim, Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles, a former professional basketball player, succumbed instantaneously to a single gunshot wound right between the eyes, inflicted with deadly precision by the bullet of a .9mm caliber Beretta pistol. Alberto Ambet S. Antonio, a one -time chairman of the Games and Amusement Board (GAB) was ruled to be the perpetrator. 2. Antonio and Tuadles decided to play pusoy dos, a game for two (2) players only. They continued playing until morning. When it came time to tally their scores and collect the winnings from the loser, an argument arose. 3. The prosecution alleged and sought to prove that in the course of an argument, without warning or cause, Antonio pulled his gun from behind his back and shot Tuadles at very close range, thus employing treacherous means to accomplish the nefarious deed. The pivotal evidence presented by the prosecution was the testimony of one Jose Jimmy T. Bobis, a security guard who testified as to how the shooting of Tuadles occurred. While Tuadles lay bloodied and still, no one remembered to call an ambulance or check if he was still alive. 4. Charge: Murder; the 2 policemen impleaded as accessories. 5. RTC: All three were found guilty as charged; Treachery was present.

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Issue: Whether or not RTC correctly held that there was treachery. Held: No. There is no basis for the trial courts conclusion that accused Antonio consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself. [ It ruled that treachery qualified the killing to murder. The trial court did not explain the basis for the qualification except for a terse citation that there was a sudden attack and the victim had no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder. There must be a conscious and deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for a specific purpose. All the evidence shows that the incident was an impulse killing. It was a spur of the moment crime. It is not enough that the means, methods, or form of execution of the offense was without danger to the offender arising from the defense or retaliation that might be made by the offended party. It is further required, for treachery to be appreciable, that such means, method or form was deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offender. Such deliberate or conscious choice was held non-existent where the attack was the product of an impulse of the moment. Conscious deliberation or conscious adoption of the mode of attack has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. There would be no treachery when the victim was placed on guard, such as when a heated argument preceded the attack, or when the victim was standing face to face with his assailants and the initial assault could not have been unforseen. Thus, treachery could not be appreciated where the vict im was forewarned and could have anticipated the aggression of the accused. Since the sudden shooting of Tuadles was preceded by a heated verbal altercation between Tuadles and appellant Antonio, as admitted by both prosecution and defense, then it cannot be concluded that the shooting was committed with treachery. People vs. Claudio Teehankee Jr. Facts: 1. July 12, 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino invited Roland Chapman, Maureen Hultman and other friends for a party at his house in Forbes Park, Makati. The party started at about 8:30 p.m. and ended at past midnight.

2. After a while, Maureen requested Leino to take her home at Campanilla Street, Dasmarias Village, Makati. Chapman tagged along. When they entered the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop along Mahogany Street. 3. Leino and Maureen started walking on the sidewalk along Street. When they reached the corner of Caballero and Streets, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind stopped on the middle of the road. Mahogany Mahogany driven by them and

4. Two (2) meters away and directly in front of them stood accused. 18 For a moment, accused turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what was happening and saw accused return to his car and drive away. 5. Charge: 3 Separate Informations: Murder for Roland John Chapman (chest), Murder for Maureen Navarro Hultman (head), Frustrated Murder for Jussi Olavi Leino (head, yet survived) 6. RTC: Guilty as charged. There was treachery in all killings. Issue: Whether or not RTC judged correctly in appreciating treachery in all of them. Held: No. Chapman killing, there was no treachery. The other two shooting, there was treachery. Even then, there is no evidence on record to prove that appellant consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself. It appears to us that appellant acted on the spur of the moment. Their meeting was by chance. They were strangers to each other. The time between the initial encounter and the shooting was short and unbroken. The shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and impetuous impulse on the part of appellant rather than a deliberate act of will. As to the wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing of Maureen Hultman, we hold that treachery clearly attended the commission of the crimes. While seated, unarmed and begging for mercy, the two were gunned down by appellant. Clearly, appellant purposely placed his two victims in a
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completely defenseless position before shooting them. There was an appreciable lapse of time between the killing of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman a period which appellant used to prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the execution of the crime without risk to himself. Treachery was thus correctly appreciated by the trial court against appellant insofar as the killing of Hultman and the wounding of Leino are concerned.

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