Robert David SteeleJ 9/11 Personal Privacy

Parables (Tied to NEW CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE, pages 47-49)

1949 1st Hoover Comm. Adversarial relationship between CIA, State, and the
55 years military. TODAY: still there, State moribund and in
ago disagreement with CIA, DoD starting its own clandestine
service, side-lining CIA
1955 2"° Hoover Comm. Counterintelligence and linguistic training deficiencies,
49 years CIA replaces State in procurement of foreign publications.
ago TODAY: FBI and CIA both incompetent at
Counterintelligence, both incompetent at languages, CIA
and State both have abdicated true attention to Open Source
Intelligence (OSINT)
1961 Taylor Commission Failure in communication, coordination, and overall
43 years planning; no single authority short of the President capable
ago of coordinating the actions of CIA, State, Defense, and
USIA. TODAY: No change.
1971 Schlesinger Report Rise in size and cost with apparent inability to achieve a
33 years commensurate improvement in scope and overall quality;
ago unproductively duplicative collection systems and a failure
in forward planning to coordinate the allocation of
resources. TODAY: No change. Worse, pouring gasoline
on fire by giving more money to the same people that have
screwed it up for last decade.
1976 Church Committee DCI should have program authority and monies for national
28 years intelligence, need second DDCI for community
ago management, State must improve overt collection of
economic and political data, clandestine operations should
be separated from analysis. TODAY: No change except
that DDCI for community management failed and
specifically refused to create OSINT program line within
the national foreign intelligence program as recommended
1992 Boren-McCurdy National Security Act of 1992 (not adopted, defense and
12 years key Senators opposed), need DNI, two DDNIs, consolidate
ago DIA and INK analysts with CIA. TODAY: new
management positions ineffective for lack of financial,
personnel, and organizational authority; DIA and INR both
intellectually dead in the water, CIA struggling for lack of
sufficient open sources, sufficient clandestine, sufficient
technical, sufficient processing, and sufficient outreach to
mature multi-cultural analysts.
1996 Aspin-Brown & IC21 Role of Intelligence: Too ad hoc, lacks coherence, self-
8 years Common Issue Areas serving, should support diplomacy not just soft power.
ago TODAY: No significant change. Intelligence is not
impacting strategy, policy, acquisition, nor operations in a
substantive way.
Policy/Requirements Process: State and Defense
dominate, intelligence base declining, loss of focus on
future, system-driven. TODAY: State side-lined, CIA
ignored, DoD makes it up as it goes along.
Global Crime/Law Enforcement: Need more

Posted to www.oss.net 27 April 2004.

Robert David SteelJ 9/11 Personal Privacy

coordination of operations overseas, more sharing of

information, more training. TODAY: No significant
change—CIA and NSA still deleting US citizen names
qualified for inclusion in messages to FBI.
Organization & Communications: Need to increase DCI
authority, HPSCI authorized three ADDCIs for collection,
production, administration. TODAY: DCI continues to ,
lack authority, President ignored Scowcroft & Jeremiah v
recommendation to consolidate three national agencies out
of DoD and into a single national program.
CIA Itself: Needs better management at all levels, must V
move Centers to DCI level, improve quality of personnel.
TODAY: CIA ignored DCI's call for a "war on terror",
with significant exceptions on analytic side most CIA
managers are "old school" bureaucrats with mind-sets so
atrophied as to make them incapable of innovative thinking,
CIA still hires young people, average age 29, and is unable
to absorb nor attract world-class mid-career hires.
Budget Structure & Process: Substantial realignment
needed to break-down stovepipes, DCI does not have staff, ,
tools, or procedures for doing budget management.
TODAY: No significant change. DC! not only does not
manage the national agencies within DoD, the DCI does not
have a full grip on the minutia and shortfalls in clandestine,
technical, and open collection, across processing, and in
analytic breadth and depth.
Intelligence Analysts: Must improve. TODAY: CIA
University is making a difference, but analytic tradecraft
applied to 2% of the relevant information is not serious.
"Right-Size" and Rebuild: Consolidate senior executive
service, liberal force reduction, rationalize programs across
national, defense, tactical. TODAY: Getting worse. Until
a DCI learns to promise that reform will be job and revenue
neutral on a state by state basis, key Senators will continue
7
to block intelligence reform. Worse, by adding 7,000
bodies and over $10 billion a year to a bad system with
poor managers, the 1C has been made more cumbersome
and less effective.
Military Intelligence: DoD needs a single staff focal
point. TODAY: Undersecretary is getting a good grip, but
in isolation from both professional advice and DCI. DoD is
bypassing CIA, reinventing rather than fixing the wheels.
Technical Collection: Endorses NIMA (now NGA), need
Technical Collection Agency and Technical Development
Office. TODAY: NRO has so much money it cannot
execute its own budget, and no significant money has been
put into processing—we still process less than 10% of what
we collect, and we still ignore the 90% or so of relevant
information that is not secret, not online, and not in
English.
Clandestine Service: Need to merge DoD and CIA Human

Posted to www.oss.net 27 April 2004.

Robert David Steelej 9/11 Personal Privacy

Intelligence, create a separate entity from CIA reporting to

the DCI. TODAY: Still manned by yuppies, still too
reliant on foreign liaison, still language incompetent, still
not doing serious non-official cover (mid-career hires, not
just recycled retirees, male spouses, and elderly students).
International Cooperation: Must devise burden sharing
arrangements in space operations, may need to buy more
open source imagery. TODAY: Still doing bilateral rather
than regional multi-lateral burden sharing, but spending
billions on foreign liaison chickenfeed instead of creating
innovative ways of sharing the burden of global data
capture, translation and processing of 29+ languages,
special clandestine tiger teams leveraging middle-aged
indigenous case officers, etcetera.
Cost of Intelligence: Cost reductions are possible, need
better process to find, DoD controls 86-96% of national
intelligence budget, DCI has no authority. TODAY: No
substantive change. As in the 1971 report, it can be safely
said that we have dramatically increased the cost of
intelligence without a commensurate increase in the value
of what it provides to our national security, isolated
successes not-with-standing.
Accountability & Oversight: Must extend tenure of
oversight committee members—no attention to holding
policymakers accountable for ignoring intelligence, nor
intelligence managers accountable for being incapable.
TODAY: No one has been fired for failing America in the
decade leading to 9-11 when multiple opportunities existing
for blocking the attacks; the White House continues to
resist both 9-11 inquiries and calls for intelligence reform.

Posted to www.oss.net 27 April 2004.