BHART .

RHARI THE SCHOLAR*

by
HAJIME N A K A M U R A

Tokyo

I. BHARTRHARI~STHEORY CONCERNING THE SACRED BOOKS

Bhart.rhari declared himself to be a grammarian, and contemporary scholars of India looked upon him as one. But the study of grammar originated in the interpretation of the Vedas; orthodox Brahmanic scholars had included grammar in the six aflgas which were supplementary to the Vedas, and from ancient times it had held an important and revered place. Bhart.rhari was also held in high esteem as a Vedhnta philosopher and since this philosophy was founded on various orthodox Brahmanic sacred books, the Upani.sad in particular, it clearly follows that Bhartrhari, in addition to being a grammarian and a Vedanta philosopher, was also a believer in those sacred books. The question arises as to whether he really believed in the authority of those sacred books. The historical fact that grammar originally developed out of the Vedfiflgas, prejudiced his thinking, so that he was obliged to declare that the grammar which he taught was based on the Vedas and that he himself was a follower of the Vedic/ore. Thus in his writings he referred frequently to the Vedas. He recognized the authority of the four Vedas1 and the existence of various Vedic schools based on the same ritualismfl he asserted too that though the Vedas were of one entity, so to speak, they were taught by many saints

* This article is an English translation of a part of the writer's work in Japanese: Kotoba no Keijijogaku ("Metaphysics of language") (Tokyo, 1956), pp. 141-181. This book constitutes the fourth volume of his History o f Early Vedanta Philosophy. x Atharva.nam A~girasa.rn samnam rgyajur ca [ yasminn uccavaca varna# p rthak sthitaparigrahah.//(Vakyap. I, 21). But in some cases the term trayiis found: ibid., I, 134; III, 3, 70. 2 bhedanam (~akhdnam) bahumargatva.m karma.ny ekatra eangata / ~abdana.m yata~aktitva.m tasya gakhasu dr@ate /] (Vakyap. I, 6). The words in brackets are supplemented by the commentator.

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in various ways and this gave rise to the opinion that there were several versions of the Vedas? This illustrates clearly the general attitude towards the Vedas in Bhart.rhari's day. The Vedas are the sacred scriptures of orthodox Brahmanism and are known as the ~ruti. Brahmanic scholars hold that the Vedas are not the work of man but revelations from time immemorial acquired by various r.sis through mystic inspiration and were handed down by them from generation to generation. In order to differentiate between the Vedas and the compositions of the later sages, the latter were called sm.rti and were supposed to be based on the ~ruti, i.e. the Vedas. Both gruti and sm.rti were handed down, from father to son, in an unbroken chain, through ages, and the Indians in general accorded to both authority and veneration. Bhart.rhari accepted this view of the orthodox Brahmins: "It is said that the words of the gruti, though their author and their origin is unknown to us, go on forever without interruption; so does the sm.rti though it was composed by scholars4. ''5 And again: "The words of the gruti were composed a long, long time ago. ''6 At the Mah~pralaya (the destruction of the whole world, especially at the end of a kalpa) the world, dissolving into the Brahman, reverts to nothing and is reborn as a new world again. This process of annihilation and rebirth continues in an eternal cycle while the Vedas remain unchanged; they are unaffected by the process of birth, duration and annihilation of the world. Thus they are without beginning and without end. (In this respect the thought of Bhart.rhari is precisely the same as that contained in the Brahma-satras, 7 which was also shared by the Mim~.msh school.) On the other hand, however, the sm.rti, though of human conception and origin, was handed down from ancient times in an unbroken sequence. And here Bhart.rhari makes a point of emphasizing the fact that the composition of the sm.rti writings are multifarious: some are clear as to their aim and purpose (for instance the writings on
8 pr@tyupayo 'nukarag ca tasya ( = brahma.nah) redo mahar.sibhi.h ] eko 'py anekavartmeva samamnata.h prthak prthak ]/(V~kyap. I, 5). 4 In some cases the words gruti and sm.rti are used in combination. (Vakyap. I, 135). anadim apy avicchinn~.m grutim ahur akart.rkam / ~i~t.air nibadhyamana tuna vyavacchidyate sm.rtiO//(Vhkyap. I, 146). The text has avacchinnam and the present writer changed it to the above reading according to the commentary of Pro3. yar~ja. According to the information by Prof. de Jong, Charudeva Shastri's edition (Lahore, 1934) gives the reading: avyavaehinnarp, which must be right. e gdstram atidare vyavasttiitam, ibid., I/I, 14, 74, p. 487. Refer to the author's work: "The Philosophy of the Brahrnas~tras" (in Japanese) (Tokyo, 1951), pp. 412 ft.

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medicine); some are vague and difficult to follow (as for example the writings on what foods should and should not be eaten). But all the sm.rti writings were propounded by the Vedic scholars (Vedavid) following the special characteristics (lihga) of the Vedas. ''s Bhart.rhari calls the' gruti as well as the sm.rti: ~astra 9 or agama. 1~ Frequently however the term gastra refers to the Vedas in a broad sense, 11 and the term agama stands for the sm.rti 12 and in particular the books which give the basic rules on grammar, la The intrinsic meaning of the term agama suggests something which has b e e n handed down from ancient times ;14 therefore~ it can stand for books such as those of the Vaige.sika school as well as the gastra. But in the Vakyapadiya the term agama refers to the books of the pure orthodox Brahmanic schools and can therefore include the ~ruti and the sm.rti. As we have already stated, the former was of non-human creation and the latter compiled by human effort; but the latter found its source and origins in the former. In the concept of the transmigration of the world it is believed that the gruti perishes only to grow like seeds (bija) out of the Vedas again. 16 "It is our fixed belief that the agama was produced out of some source or other. When all the agama have perished, the three Vedas will remain like seeds to give new birth to the agama. ''17 As we can clearly see from the above quotation, Bhart.rhari regarded the Vedas as the absolute source of all knowledge. He studied them diligently and was well versed in them. He was also familiar with the subtle differences which existed between the various Vedic schools, is His work clearly reflects his veneration for the Vedas. His views on the gruti and the sm.rti are much similar to those of the
s sm.rtayo bahur@a~ ca d.rs.t.adr.staprayo]anaO / tam evakritya lifzgebhyo vedavidbhiO

praka~itah./[ (Vfikyap.I, 7). 9 Pu.nyarfijarefers to the sm.rti as sm.rtigdstra (ad V~tkyap.I, 43). 1~ grutismrtilaks.a.nagama(Pun.yaraja ad I, 41). u Vfikyap. I, 43; I, 137. But in a certain case he refers to the grammar of Pa.nini
as gastra (III, 13, 23, p. 441).
1~ sarvapravades, v ~gamav~ky~n~.m sm.rtiv~ky~n~.m pra.netrparigrahetta paurus, eyatvam upagamyate - (Pun.yar~ja ad V~tkyap. I, 134).

13 Cf. V~kyap. II, 484 f. 1~ v.rddhebhya dgamalj, III, 7, 2 (p. 294); pftrvebhya agamab, III, 14, 20 (p. 456). 15 Vfikyap. III, 11, 9. See also the commentary of Hel~trSja (p. 399).
1~ tfmi (Vedavftkyani) parvagames.u vicchinne~u anyes.u pra.nett's.u agamantar(musa.mdhfme bijavad avatis.t.hante / (Ptm..yarfija ad V~kyap. I, 134). 1~ na j(ttv akart.rkar~ ka~cid ~gama .mpratipadyate / bljar~ sarvgtgamapaye trayy evftdau vyavasthit~//(V~tkyap. I, 134).

~ In his commentary on the Mahfibhfi.sya he refers to and quotes from Taittiriy~t.h, Vfijasaneyinah., A~valSyana- and Apastamba (-~rauta) -s5tra, Bahv.rca-(~rauta)-sfitrabh~.sya, Nirukta, Pr~tti~fikhya and ~ik.sa (Kielhorn in Indian Antiquary, 1883, p. 227).

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Mima.rosa school. It is not possible to go deeply into this matter in this article, but short reference must be made to it as it has given rise to many questions. To modern scholars it may seem illogical that Bhart.rhari held the Vedas in such profound veneration; but when we realize the circumstances which led to the establishment of grammar as a branch of studies in ancient India, Bhart.rhari's attitude can be easily understood. In the beginning grammar, like the study of phonetics (dik.s~7),prosody (chandas) and etymology (nirukta), was only an auxiliary science or one of the Vedaflgas. It was taken for granted that the scholars who applied themselves to these studies were convinced of the absolute sanctity of the Vedas. Accordingly, up to a much later period, all grammarians adhered unconditionally to the Vedas. Since he grew up in such an atmosphere of tradition, the sanctity of the Vedas was an accepted and undisputed fact which he believed had been handed down through the ages. The important place accorded to their sanctity in his writings arises from the fact that, as a grammarian, he was loyal to historical traditions and beliefs. Bhart.rhari does not make an effort to explain clearly and in detail why the Vedas were regarded as holy. To him, a faithful Brahmin of the orthodox school, their holiness was without question; in other words he took it for granted. This does not mean, however, that he did not give the matter his thought and consideration, for he was, after all, a philosopher. Traces of his speculations, though they may be few, can be found in his writings. To him the Vedas were "the convenient road (expediency) leading to the Brahman", or "the imitation19 of the Brahman". These phrases which were used in the Vedanta philosophy express his veneration of the Vedas. But when we analyze them we see that the only absolute principle which he accepted was the Brahman existing behind the Vedas, although these were traditionally considered to have a holiness of their own. His idea suggested, consequently, that the authority of the Vedas is dependent on the Brahman. According to Bhart.rhari the Brahman is high and the Vedas low. In other words, although Bhart.rhari was an orthodox Brahmin scholar who professed profound veneration for the Vedas, in actual fact he transcended this generally accepted belief. In terms of his own doctrines, parts of the Vedas, which deal with various rituals, lose their significance, ~~ and the
19 praptyupayo 'nukarag ca tasya (brahma.nah) veda.h . . . (V~kyap. I, 5). Cf. Tattvasa.mgrahapafijika ad v. 128. - var.napadakrame.navasthito Vedas tadadhigamopayas tasya praticchandakanyayenfivasthita.h / 20 F o r further details o f his views on the Vedas see Vfikyap. I, 8-10; 24; II, 240;

392 f. etc.

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Vedanta (Upani.sad), which deals with the Brahman, is the only adequate one. Therefore we can say that Bhartrhari's doctrines were based on the Vedanta philosophy although on the surface he appears to be an ordinary Brahmin scholar professing the same Vedic ideas as all other scholars of his time.
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BHARTRHARI'S SCHOLARSHIP AS A GRAMMARIAN

As there is a tendency in the Vedic ideas of Bhart.rhari to evaluate the Vedas from a Ved~mta standpoint rather than from the usual Brahmin one, his attitude as a grammarian must differ from that of the other grammarians of his time. Before discussing this point, it may be well to examine his conception of grammar. This branch of study was, in ancient India, one of the six ahgas, called vydkara~a; the ahgas were second in importance to the ~ruti. Therefore grammar-books giving the rudiments of grammar were a part of the sm.rti. It is said that the various grammar-books written by ancient scholars were based o n the ~ruti and the sm.rti, a point acknowledged by Bhartrhari: ~1 "Therefore the excellent scholars began to teach the significance of words according to the Vedas which were not created by man, and, according to the sm.rti, which laid down the rules (on the usage of words). ''z2 We are inclined to believe that the grammarians of those days, despite the interest they had in their subject and the pleasure they derived from it, would not have devoted their energies to such a complicated and elaborate study as grammar, if it were only one of the six Ved~tflgas. But scholarship in the field of grammar was second in importance only to the Vedas themselves as is dearly shown by some Buddhist sfltras. 2a Bhartrhari emphasized its importance as a study in its own right. According to him scholarship in grammar should be placed higher than the others of the six Ved~figas (prathamam. chandasam ahgam) 2~ and elsewhere he praises it as the highest among the studies of the three Vedas which are made up of many branches of study. .5 He 21 Cf. Vfikyap. 1, 143.
22 tasmad akrtaka.m Sastra.m sm.rti~n v5 sanibandhanarn [ a$rityarabhyate M.st.aib gabdanam anugasanam // (V~kyap. I, 43).

28 In the various traditional sciences of India "Vy~kara.na" is mentioned next to the Vedas. 'Ch'eng-shih-lun' X, Miscellaneous Impurities, 136 (Taisho XXXII, p. 321 b); "Mah~tparinirv~n.a-sfitra' XIX (Taisho XII, p. 730 ab). 24 V~kyap. I, 11 SDS. XIII, 1. 87 (p. 295). This idea was shared by Patafijali 'pradhana.m ca s.at.sv ahges.u wakara~am [ pradhane ca k.rto yatnaO phalavan bhavati'

(Mahfibh~t.sya,p. I, 11. 19-20; cf. SDS., XIII, 1.84).

25 anekatfrthabheday~s trayya vaea.hpara.m padam (Vgtkyap. I, 144).

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also speaks of it as the foundation of all other studies. "As the species of the meanings of all words are subject to their forms (ak.rti), the study of grammar is the original source of all studies (vidya) in the world." 36 It is the foundation on which all other studies are based and can be likened to a purifying fire. ~7 "Being a purifying fire to all study, it shines brightly over all branches of learning. ''2s Sometimes it is likened to a light in the darkness (tamasijyotis). Likewise Bhart.rhari considers the study of grammar to be the most excellent of all the ascetic trainings (tapasam uttamam, tapa.h)29 and therefore it deserves the highest praise. The original aim of grammar was to study the structure of the sacred language of Sanskrit and thereby codify the various rules applied in the language, thus preserving its purity and preventing its corruption. As Vedic literature was written in Sanskrit, the endeavour to preserve the purity of the language meant the preservation of the Vedas themselves. Patafijali's statement that grammar should be studied in order that the Vedas be preserved 3~ (rak.sartham. Vedanam adhyeyam, vyakaran.am) illustrates this point. Bhartrhari inherited this traditional attitude towards grammar. As grammar aimed at checking the corruption and confusion of the language of the sacred Vedas 81, Bhart.rhari called it counteracting linguistic corruption 32 (va~maldndm. cikitsitam). What is actually meant by the right usage of a language? The grammatical rules of Sanskrit had been established by the sQtras of Pan..ini, the "V~trttika" of K~ty~yana and the "Mah~bha.sya" of Pata~jali. The works of these three came to be regarded by the scholars who came later, as representing the very highest authority. Bhart.rhari confirms this in his work. zz Thus the duty of the grammarians who came after those three pioneers lay not in codifying new rules but in preserving and propagating the rules which had already been fixed. This reflects the attitude of Indian society at this period, 100 B.C. and onwards, which gradually took on a tolerably stable character. What this society cherished was not the novelty of things but the durability of tradition. Therefore things which
2~ yath~rthajataya~ sarvab ~abdakrtinibandhana.h / tathaiva loke vidy~narn eca vidya paraya.nam//(V~tkyap. I, 15). 37 Vakyap. I, 14 ed. 3a pavitra.m sarvavidyanam adhividya.m ( = vidyasu) prakadate. (V~kyap. I, 14). 33 V~kyap. I, 11. 3o Mahhbh~.sya, I, p. 1 (ed. by Kielllorn). 3z bhavati ca gabdasa.mskaro vyakara.~astrasya prayojanam. (SDS. XIII, 1.59, of. 1l,

60.
~2 V~kyap. I, 14 (the aim of grammar is also said to be the perfection of words). a3 V~kyap. I, 23.

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had been handed down from the immemorable past were treasured and valued. The study of grammar claimed to be age-old and a part of the historical traditions. The correct usage of words (sadhutva) meant faithful conformation with the traditional rules of language. The usage held to be the correct one was that given in the traditional rules of grammar. Therefore it followed that "being right" meant "being old"; one was related to the other just like the back of something is related to its front. According to Bhart.rhari the sacred study of grammar aimed at continuity (nitya) and correctness of language,a4 "The aim of grammar is the knowledge of correctness of words. The rules of this sacred study have been handed down in an unbroken chain to the educated. ''a~ His attitude towards language as a social phenomenon is as thoroughly conservative as that of any other orthodox Brahmin scholar. What were his reasons for ranking the study of grammar so high, calling it the foundation of all other studies? The answer, we think, lies in the fact that all studies can be brought into existence only through the medium of language, either the written or the spoken word. The semantic relation can only be classified and expressed logically by means of words. At present grammar is the only study wherein the sole object is the analysis of words, a6 "Without grammar the understanding of the real nature of various words cannot exist. ''aT Bhart.rhari illustrates this point by means of the simile of the mirror which reflects the images of various objectsY 8 Supposing that it is only by studying grammar that the nature of words can be understood, then it is for grammarians to devote their energies to this study. With this in view, Bhart.rhari enters into philosophical speculations; he adopts a philosophical attitude to language which is quite separate from mere defense of grammatical rules and their propagation. He delved much deeper into linguistic problems than any of his predecessors had done and came to the conclusion that words were component parts of the Brahman and therefore on the same level as it. As this metaphysical attitude formed the nucleus of Bhart.rhari's philosophical ideas, his grammatical ideas transcended those of the grammarians before him. According to him, grammar leads the way to 34 V~kyap.I, 29. 8~ s~dhutvaj~navis.ay~ sai~ vy~kara.nasmrti.h [ avicchedena ~ist.dn~m ida.m sm.rtinibandhanam//(Vakyap. I, 143). 36 Cf. Vfikyap.I, 13 ab. 87 tattvdvabodha.h gabddna.m nasti vyakara.nad.rte ] (Vfikyap.I, 13 cd). 88 Vfikyap.I, 20.

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the Brahman (dsanna.m brahma.nas I, 11). He goes on to assert that grammar is a direct road (dgjasa I, 12) and that finally the highest Brahman can be reached through scholarship in g r a m m a r (I, 22 cd). Since reaching the Brahman means arriving at spiritual liberation, the study of grammar may be called the gate leading to spiritual liberation. 39 Therefore Bhart.rhari elevates grammar from a mere study in which rules on grammar are discussed to a philosophy of the inner-self (adhydtmagastra). " I t is the first step towards perfection. It is the truly royal road for those who deserve enlightenment ''~~ thus he praised the merits of grammar. "The knowledge of the inner self cleans dirt from the body, from speech, ~1from the mind and can be compared to a healing process. ''42 Bhart.rhari's theory which describes grammar as a study of the inner-self (adhydtmaddstra) which brings about spiritual liberation was of epochmaking importance in the history of grammar in India. The various rituals described in the Vedas aim at prosperity in the present world and heavenly rebirth in the next. The aim of g r a m m a r is to understand the language of the Vedic scriptures and from it prosperity in this and the other world can be attained. Kfityfiyana put into words his belief that the use of the language of grammatical sfltras leads to prosperity (ddstrapftrvake p r a y o g e 'bhyudaya.h);43 Patafijali endorsed this view too and other later grammarians believed they would find re-birth and happiness in heaven through their study of grammar. 44 But Bhart.rhari's belief was based on philosophical ideas; he claimed the aim behind the study of grammar to be much higher than re-birth in heaven; for hkm it meant the acquirement of Brahmanic wisdom; for him the study of grammar was a quest for spiritual liberation. This theory brought on a new significance to the study of grammar and one which differed from the theories of his predecessors. And of course,
39 dvdrarn apavargasya, I, 14. cf. ~abddnu~dsanagdstrasya ni.h~reyasasddhanatvat:n siddham. SDS. )(HI, 11.275-6. tasmdd vyakaran, agastra.m paramapurus.drthasadhanatayddhyetavyam iti siddham. (SDS. XI/I, 1.284). 4o idam ddya.m padasthdna .m siddhisopdnaparva.ndm / iya .m sd moks.amd.ndnam ajihmd rdjapaddhati.h // (V~kyap. I, 16). siddhi = kaivalya-prdpti (Pu.nyar~ja). He means spiritual liberation. 41 = apabhra.mgand.m nivrtti (Pu.nyar~ja). 4~ kayavdgbuddhivi.sayd ye mald.h samavasthitfl.h / cikitsdlak.sa.nddhydtma~dstrais tes.a.m viguddhaya.h//(Vakyap. I, 148). 43 Mahfibh~sya, 1, p. 10. 44 "Also others say thus: "If one word is known and used correctly, it will be a cow in the heavenly realm that brings about things one desires." And again others say thus: "They ride on the wagon that are made of words well combined and wellregulated and go to the heavenly realm where desirous pleasures are. But those who talk such wrong words as cikkamita go there troubled" (SDS. X-I/I, 11.92-96).

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it was his adoption of the Vedanta philosophy that brought about this great change in the study of grammar. In what way is the study of grammar a quest for spiritual liberation? To find an answer to this question we must refer to his ideas on metaphysics. With this in mind, a study of his metaphysics will be made in another article and, as an introduction to this, his theory concerning knowledge in general will be discussed first.
III. BHARTRHARI'S THEORY ON KNOWLEDGE

As Bhart.rhari's grammatical scholarship was based - albeit superficially - on the preservation of traditional usage, his scope in the realm of philosophy was consequently restricted. He was a staunch supporter of traditions (agama) and was strongly opposed to scholars who aimed at forming their philosophical ideas around a nucleus of logic (tarka). Though he admitted the existence of perception (pratyak.sa) and inference (anumana) applied by men in general, Bhart.rhari advocated the existence of something which could not be proved by either of these. "Various divine powers such as demons, pit.rs and vampires which exist outside the realm of perception and inference (employed by the ordinary man) are the result of certain processes such as asceticism. ''~5 What he means is that, though we cannot ascertain the powers of demons, pitrs and vampires etc. through perception or inference, nevertheless we cannot deny their existence. How then do we know that they exist? Through the agama, that is, through the source of the scriptures. "There is no ordinary lihga to prove the existence of the universal and the form, the essence and the species. Therefore some other source (i.e. that of the sacred books) is used. ''4n It hardly calls for mention that all philosophic schools belonging to the orthodox Brahmanical religion recognized the various sources of tradition, especially the Vedas, besides perception and inference; therefore no special mention is called for. But Bhart.rhari stressed with emphasis the importance of the dgama and as he held it in profound veneration he was strongly opposed to schools which resorted to philosophical thinking. Here again we get a glimpse of Bhart.rhari's particular attitude
4~ pratyaks, a m anumana .m ca vyatikramya vyavasthitd.h [ raks. a.hpit.rpi~acdna .m karmaja

eva siddhaya.h // (V~tkyap. I, 36). Instead of karmaja, the Benares edition reads karmanta. I adopted the reading of the Lahore edition accordingto the information

by Prof. de Jong. ~ samanyam akrtir bhavo jatir ity atra laukikam [ li~ga .mna sa.mbhavaty eva tendnyat parig.rhyate//(VSkyap. III, 14, 323. p. 605).

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as a scholar. He holds that "the meaning of things is indeed determined by the sacred scriptures", 47 and again, at the end of the second book of his V~kyapadiya where he discusscs in detail the tradition of the study of grammar, 4s he adds that "only through the teachings of various agamas can the mind reach clear understanding. How much can those who follow their own reasonings discover?" 49 And further: "Those who are full of illusions without the ~gamas and do not follow the teachings of the ancients will never attain to lucid wisdomS~ ''51 In other words, as far as Bhart.rhari was concerned, only the ~ruti and the smrti carried real authority; he criticized philosophers who formulated their own ideas, independent of tradition. Although there is, in this verse, no reference to any school of thought to which he was opposed, we are of the opinion that the materialists, the Buddhists, Jains, the Ny~ya-Vai~e.sika school and the S~flkhya school were among those which he combatted. Bhart.rhari, turning a bold front, proved that even if the orthodox Brahmanic school is attacked and challenged by liberal thinkers who flourish logic as a weapon, it can suffer no harm because of its long traditional superiority. "Therefore as the spirit (in the doctrine of subjectivity) (is not harmed by anything), so will those who follow the ways of the agama handed down to us without interruption meet with no refutation from the schools of logic (hetuv~da)." 52

His thinking was not confined to the field of metaphysics but extended to his activities as a member of society. He held that the laws (dharma) which regulated the lives of citizens in Indian society could neither be established nor refuted by theory (tarka) as they were based on the sacred agama. "The dharma is not founded on theory (alone) without the sacred ~gama. Even the wisdom of various .r.sis was derived from the sacred ~gama. ''53 " N o one can refute by (mere) theory the unin47 tayft (= ~ruty~) hy artho vidhiyate (= ni~e[yate), I, 130 d. Pu.nyar~ja'sinterpretation was followed. 48 Cf. A. Weber, lndische Studien, V. S. 158 ft.; V~kyap. II, 484 ft. 49 praj~a vivekam (= vai~radya.m) labhate bhinnair agamadarganai~ / kiyad va ~akyam unnetum svatarkam anudhdvata // (V~tkyap. II, 492). 59 Commenting on this statement, Pu.nyar~ja calls academic knowledge bhagavatf vidya, bhagavaff praj~a. There must be something in common with the Buddhist term of bhagavatipraj~aparamita in so far as expression is concerned. 5~ tat tad utpreks.ama.nana.m (= vikalpayatftm) pura.nair agamair rind / anupasitav.rddh6n~.m vidya natiprasMati // (V~kyap. II, 493). 5~ caitanyam ira yaA cayam avicchedena vartate / agamas tam upasino hetuvadair na bOAhyate//(Vakyap. I, 41). 58 na cagamad .rte dharmas tarke.na vyavati.slhate / .rs.f.nam api yaj j~ana.m tad apy agamahetukam // (V~kyap. I, 30).

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terrupted ways 5a of dharma, as they are generally acknowledged. ''55 According to Bhart.rhari even something which is rejected by the public or even considered to be contrary to all reason should nevertheless be obeyed and carried out if it is so stated in the sacred agama. He holds, too, that something which may be quite difficult to exist in actual life must nevertheless be acknowledged if it is laid down in the sacred agama. 56 His veneration of the sacred scriptures may be regarded as conservative in the extreme, even blindly enthusiastic. Thus, as we have shown, Bhartrhari's characteristics as a scholar were his veneration of the traditional agama and his refutation of logic. On what grounds did he refute logic? The following lines sum up these reasons. He stresses the fact that men may come to unexpected danger when they reflect and act purely according to logic. "Even as a blind man who hurries over a cliff by measuring his way step by step and releases his hold fails off that cliff, so it can easily happen that a man falls into a pit when he acts chiefly on inference (without the eyes of the agama)." 57 He likens the ~astras to the eyes as they enable us to have knowledge. 58 It is interesting to note that this argument was used by the V~ttsiputriya school which was a branch of Hinayana Buddhism. In commenting on the "Madhyamaka-karik~t", 9, 3, of N~tg~rjuna, Bhavya, a philosopher o f the M~dhyamika school, makes the following statement in the "Prajfi~t-pradipamfila-madhyamaka-v.rtti": "And yet some of the V~ttsiputriyas believe the contrary. We cannot approve of the theory which, according to the agama, holds that one who clings to existence (upadat.r) expiates the karmas of what looks to be the former existence and becomes one who dings to existence (upadat.r) of the (five) upadanaskandha. However, that the upadat.r does not exist is an established fact. Therefore we do not mean to assert by inference (anumana) that the upadat.r does not exist. This can be likened to the following: As a blind man hurries along a dangerous road by measuring his way step by step, thus when one acts chiefly by inference one easily runs into the danger of falling into a pit (Vfikyap. I, 42). 5~ With regard to the last part of the statement Pun.yarfija declares: agamdd dhi
lokaviruddha.m tarkaviruddham apy acara.na.rnpratlpadyante hist.5.h. ~s dharmasya c~vyavacchinn~.h panth~no ye vyavasthit~.h / na t~rnl lokaprasiddhatv~t kahcit tarke.na badhate // (Vakyap. I, 31).

~6 See Vfikyap. I, 131.

~7 hastaspar~ad ivandhena vi.same (= girimarge, Comm.) pathi dhavata [ anumanapradhanena vinipato na durlabhab /[ (Vfikyap. I, 42). The Benares edition reads: hastaspargadibadhena. But we adopt the reading of the Lahore edition, which coincides

with the reading of the Tibetan citation. s8 See Vfikyap. III, 14, 81 (19.490).

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This argument is not sound, because the gods themselves, on account of their various upadanaskandhas are designed as devas, and because the inference is not correct, as 'to measure one's way step by step', is found in negative instances (vipak.se sattva) and because those who chiefly make use of false inference (anumanaprabhasa) fall into a pit. As doubts arise, the sacred scriptures being open to followers of all beliefs, it is not right to draw a conclusion (avadhdra.na) based on this fact alone (pratij~d). It must be taken into account that the sacred scriptures have the same significance as the method o f inference has (hetu). For that which is not the direct object of perception (pratyak.sa) may be a cause of discriminative knowledge (dr.st.Ctnta). For instance, the inference is by nature (svabhava) a cause of discriminative knowledge." 59 Commenting on the above passage, Avalokitavrata remarks as follows: "In order to make the meaning clear the acarya Bhandrihari resorts to a simile of a blind man so as to point out the reasons why inference should be refuted..."~~
59 (1- yah na gnas ma bu.hi sde pa dag las kha cig phyir zlog par byed de -1) / . . . . . . . (2- lu has ~e bar len pa po ltar gyur pasha na gnas pa yod pa ltar hgyur ba.hi las yohs su zad pas [ mi lasogs pa.hiphuhpo Ke bar blab bahi Ke bar len pa po Kid duhgyur bar grags pas rjes ~u dpag pas ~e bar len pa po rned pa ~id du bstan pa kho bo cag mi .hdod de -2)
. . . . . . .

(3lob ba rkah pa.hi tshod dpags kyis / Kam ha.hi lam du rgyug pa ltar / rjes su dpag pa gtsor .hdsin pa / rnam par ltuh ba mi dka.ho // -3) shes bya ba lta bur .hgyur ro shes na / . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . de ni rigs pa ma yin te / . . . . . . . . . lha yah lha.hi Ke bar blab ba dag Kid la brten has lha ~id du gdags par bya ba yin pa.hi phyir daft / rkan paOi tshod dpags pa ni mi mthun pa.hi phyogs la yah yod pa.hi rjes su dpag pa Kid duma grub pa.hi phyir daft / rjes su dpag pa ltar snah ba gtsor bdsin pa ni Itun bar .hgyur ba.hiphyir ro / luh spyi yin pas the tshom skye bahi phyir yah de Kid lasnes par gzuh bas rai rigs te] luft ni rjes su dpag pa las don tha dad pa ma yin par gzuh bar bya ste [ mhon sum ma yin pa.hi don rtogs pahi rgyu yin pa.hi phyir / dper n a / rjes su dpag pa.hi rah gi bdag Kid bshin no / (125 a) (I cited the passage by courtesy Prof. J. Nozawa; cf. The Tibetan Tripitaka. Peking Edition, ed: by D. T. Suzuki, Tokyo-Kyoto 1957, vol. 95, p. 193, fol. 153a, 1.7 f). so don de Kid bsal bar bya baOi phyir slob dpon bha hdri ha ris rjes su dpag pa sun phyuti ha.hi khuhs bstan pabi phyir / (3 -3) shes bya ba smras te / dper na lob ba rkah pa.hi tshod dpag gis lam bde ba spates te ~am ha.hi lam du rgyug pa dih la sogs pa dag gis brdos pa la rdeg hchah gift rnam par ltuh ba rni dka.h ba de bshin du / yid ches pa.hi luh spa~s pa rjes su dpag pa.hi tshod dpag gis rtog ge skam po.hi lain du rgyug pa dag kyah tshe .hdi la yan .hkhrul pa.hi gnod par Ogyur la [ tshe phyi ma la yah bbras bu mi .hdodpar rnarn par ltu~ bar .hgyur ro shes zer ro / [vol. 97, p. 92, fol. 225b, 1. 2 f.] (The author is deeply grateful to Dr. Josho Nozawa, through whose kindness he was able to obtain the extracts from the Tibetan text quoted above.)

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Bhavya's statement above 61 is exactly the same as Bhart.rhari's in the V~kyapadiya. As the statement comes from a Buddhist work we can take it that the idea was fairly popular in ancient India as typical of Bhart.rhari. Why is it then not safe to have recourse to inference as a guiding principle7 He claims that there are roughly two arguments. In the first place he declares that it is absolutely impossible to ascertain precisely the vyapti which is an integral part of inference. In other words he doubts the existence of a proper subsumptive relationship of ideas. "Because of the fact that the nature of all things varies 62 according to conditions, place and time, it is difficult to ascertain the nature of things by inference. ''6s This statement is further commented on by Pu.nyar~ja: "Even the one and the same thing may assume a different function or character under different conditions or in different places. For instance, water is cold in a snow-bound place but hot in a heated pot. The same applies to difference in time; for example a fire feels very hot in the summer, but not so in the winter. Consequently the svabh~va of water cannot be known by inference; only by figama. Even that which is plain in its function (like fire for instance) will be impeded in this when brought into contact with another element." 6~ To illustrate this point Pun.yarfija writes: " F o r example the burning of a fire is impeded in a cloud; it can also be prevented by incantations and medicine." This idea of Bhart.rhari's was made use of by ~aflkara in his writings: "Even certain ordinary things such as gems, spells, herbs, and the like possess powers which, owing to difference of time, place, occasion, and so on, produce various opposite effects, and nobody unaided by instruction is able to find out by mere reflection (logic) the number of these powers, their flavouring conditions, their objects, their purposes, etc. ; how much more impossible is it to conceive without the aid of Scripture the true nature of Brahman with its powers unfathomable by thought !" 65 In this connection it is interesting to note that the doctrine "Just as 61 This verse is not found in the corresponding passage in the Chinese version of the
"Prajfi~-pradipa-mfila-madhyamaka-v~tti" translated by Prabhfikaramitra. Dr. Nozawa informs the writer that it may have been omitted when translated into Chinese. e~ This verse is incorporated in the Tattvasa.mgraha under the heading v. 1460.

~s avastha-de~a-kal~na.m bhedad bhinnasu ~akti.su / bhav~n~m anumanena prasiddhir atidurlabha//(V~kyap. I, 32). ~4 nirjBatahakter dravyasya tam tam arthakriya~ prati / viMs.t.adravyasa.mbandhe sa gaktibpratibadhyate//(VAkyap. I, 33). This verse is incorporated in the Tattvasa.mgraha under the heading v. 1461. The first pfida reads as vijaata~akter apy asya.

65 ~afikaraad Brahmasfitra 1I, 1, 27.

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the subsumptive relationship of two ideas cannot be absolutely established, inference in general cannot exist" was in circulation throughout India as the theory propounded by the Lok~tyata school of materialists. 66 It is ironical that Bhart.rhari, who advocated the sanctity of the orthodox Brahmanic agama, should have something in common with a school of materialists who were little better than heathens in his eyes. And, in the second point, he asserts that in actual life no inference can exist which will meet with the approval of everyone. "A fact verified after much thought by those skilled in inference may be interpreted in quite a different way by those who are even more skilled in inference." 67 Thus as far as logical reflections are concerned Bhart.rhari has reached an attitude of relativism or scepticism. His arguments refuting logic became famous in later years and various writings of the Vedanta school refer to these arguments. 68 Having assumed this attitude of relativism, Bhart.rhari declares inference to be incapable of persuading. According to him logic is powerless to move a person who is firmly convinced of the truth of some fact, a person who believes that fact to be as true as his senses tell him; therefore logical argumentation is powerless when it comes to persuading someone of something. "When a person does not doubt his knowledge even as he does not doubt his senses, how can anyone persuade him?" 66 This theory of relativism or scepticism was not new in India; it had been propounded by Safijaya as early as ]3uddha's time and the Jain belief had had similar philosophical inclinations from its inception. But the fact that an orthodox Brahmin should take up this attitude is remarkable indeed. It is interesting to note in passing that Saflkara adopted Bhart.rhari's philosophy as it was. This can be seen from the tone in which he propounded his doctrine in the following extracts from his writings. "In matters to be known from Scripture mere reasoning is not to be relied on for the following reason also. As the thoughts of man are altogether unfettered, reasoning which disregards the holy texts and rests on individual opinion only has no proper foundation. We see how argu66 SDS. I, 11. 70-102.

67 yatnenanumito 'py artha.h ku~alair anumat.rbhi.h ] abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathaivopapadyate/] (Vakyap. I, 34).
~8 Bhamati ad Brahmasfitra II, 1, 11; SDS. XVI, U. 820-821. This statement is also quoted in the Anum~na-parik.s~ of the Tattvasa.mgraha as a doctrine of Bhart.rhari (p. 426, v. 1462).

~9 yo yasya svam iva j~anam dar~ana.m nabhi~ankate ] sthita.m pratyak.sapak.se ta.m katham anyo (tarkagaranab) nivartayet // (V~kyap. I, 39).

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ments, which some clever men had excogitated with great pains, are shown, by people still more ingenious, to be fallacious, and how the arguments of the latter again are refuted in their turn by other men; so that, on account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to accept mere reasoning as having a sure foundation." "But that cognitions founded on reasoning do conflict is generally known; for we continually observe that what one logician endeavours to establish as perfect knowledge is demolished by another, who, in his turn, is treated alike by a third." 7o Here again ~aflkara is in agreement with Bhart.rhari's views. Bhart.rhari's doctrine brought much influence to bear on the later school of Advaitins. The great scholar of the school, M~tdhava accepted his views unreservedly. 71 (We may point out that a similarity exists between the views of Bhart.rhari and ~aflkara and those of the French philosopher Blaise Pascal as expressed in his Pens~es where he holds that the philosophical reflections of men are always one-sided and contradictory; that the Christian truth should be reverted to.) The next step is to discuss Bhart.rhari's arguments in refutation of inference. His two chief ones have been discussed earlier on; the first, objective and based on pure theory, the second based on the social and individual point of view. As the second one does not refute the essentials of inference they may be considered irrelevant. But "to rely on inference" is decidedly a social phenemenon and since he is opposed to it his arguments have points in them which merit attention. But do his statements prove inference to be false? Was Bhart.rhari truly opposed to it? To answer these questions we have to discuss his statements and his arguments. As his first point Bhart.rhari holds that in some cases A can be B, in others A cannot be B and that therefore no subsumptive relationship can exist between the two. But Bhartrhari admits that in cases where A can be B and the conditions (upadhi) which make this possible are represented by C, then there must be a subsumptive relationship between A and C and B. Then of course it can be imagined that in combining A with C conditions represented by D may be necessary to bring about the subsumptive relationship between A and C and B; and this ad infinitum. The very fact that he considered such problems proved that Bhartrhari himself presupposed the existence of subsumptive relationship. Indeed 7o Safikaraad Brahmas~tra II, 1, 11 (~nSS., I, pp. 449; 452). 71 SDS. XVI, 1. 818 L

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his argument to refute it r2 is based on inference. Therefore Bhart.rhari failed in his effort to refute inference for the simple reason that he could not unfold his own opinion without it. Consequently we may add that his arguments to refute inference are weak and faulty. As for his second statement, his assertions that the conclusions drawn by different philosophers conflict with one another is quite correct as a factual statement, but his conclusion "Therefore one should not rely on inference" is evidently derived from inference. For the proposition "One should not rely upon that which is not accepted by all" is presupposed as the major premise to the above statement. Here we come face to face with the interesting case of a philosopher who negates inference, taking recourse to it himself. Therefore the relativist and dubitative attitude of Bhart.rhari was contradictory in itself. Since scepticism or the theory of doubt is full of difficult points, as is noticed in the history of philosophy Eastern and Western, he had to acknowledge the difficulty of being absolutely sceptical. 73 However Bhart.rhari's real aim in refuting the power of inference was to minimize its importance and exalt the sanctity of the orthodox Brahmin agama. Thus all his statements quoted above point to the one conclusion, that "all inferences include falsehood" and he really believed this. "When one wishes to convey to others that what one said was untrue, when one declares that one's sayings were nothing but ties, one does not mean the actual stating of that statement. For if the saying itself be false, the words fail to convey the meaning they were meant to convey." 74 The above statement can be taken to mean that he refutes the argument that "an assertion that all is falsehood is self-contradictory and therefore cannot exist". In other words an assertion "all is false" can be either true or false. If it is true, he cannot possibly declare that "all is false" as the very assertion is true. On the other hand, however, if the assertion itself is false, it cannot exist. We know that a similar problem was discussed by European philosophers but in so far as it concerns Indian philosophy it was propounded by the opponents to the M~dhyamika philosophy. In the "Vigrahavy~tvartani" of N~g~trjuna we find the following argument: " I f (as the M~dhyamika asserts) the essence (nature) of things escapes us and cannot
72 V~kyap. I, 32. 78 See Paul Deussen, Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophic, II, 1, S. 212.

~4 [svavaky~nam asatyarthatapratipadanaya] sarvam mithyd bravfmfti [ukte] naitad vakya.m vivak$yate (= warthata na prasagjanfya) / tasya (= satyavakyagya) mithyabhidhane hi prakranto 'rtho na gamyate // (V~kyap. HI, 3, 25, p. 108).

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be found anywhere, then the very words that thou utterest lack their own essence and all things cannot be deprived of their nature". " I f thou assertest that only this sentence of thine has its essence (i.e. it is not false) then the very previous assertion will mean nothing when it is heard." 75 These arguments were brought forward in order to refute the doctrine of the Mfidhyamika that all things are void. Similar arguments were also found in the Ny~tya-sQtra (II, 1, 13-14). 78 Bhartrhari was against adding the statement " . . . . . is false" to an assertion. In other words, though he maintained that all things were false, he tried to find truth in that assertion at least. This can be traced in his statement that "inference is wrong and therefore the dgama is not wrong" thus totally refuting inference. As in his refutation of inference, Bhart.rhari had finally to betray the fact that he virtuaUy resorted to reasoning, although he ardently expressed his absolutely orthodox attitude in his arguments for the sacred scriptures. He held them in profound veneration maintaining that disobedience of their laws to be evil without questioning whether this was really right or wrong. But the sacred books, which Bhart.rhari believed in so absolutely, were collections of the wise words of philosophers who had lived hundreds, even a thousand, years before his time so that there were many phrases which were meaningless and their obvious or superficial meanings were found to be doubtful on philosophical and theological grounds. Sometimes scholars interpreted them in such a way that the original meaning was lost. Bhart.rhari himself admitted that this had happened. "Though all men are able through the agama to understand things the fruit of which is yet to be experienced, what is stated in the agama can be interpreted in the contrary meaning." 77 The above extract makes it clear that Bhart.rhari himself acknowledged the fact that various interpretations differed occasionally from and contradicted what was stated in the sacred books. Therefore when confronted with cases of this kind, it was logical reasoning on the part of scholars engaged in the elucidation of the text and not the sacred scriptures themselves which led to a final decision. This opinion was confirmed by 75 The Vigrahavyavartanf of Nagdrjuna with the author's commentary ed. by E. H. Johnston and Arnold Ktmst (Bruges, 1951),vv. 1-2. Also see part III of "Hui-chenghm" ("Rtsod-pa bzlog-pah.i tshig-leh.ur-byas-pa shes-bya-ba". "Vigrahavy~vartanik~rik~"). 76 This argument is in some ways similar to "nityasam~ j~ti.h" recognized by the Ny~ya school (Ny~tya-sfitraIV, 1, 25-26); cf. no. 74.
77 sarvo 'd.rs.t.aphalan arth~n agamat pratipadyate / viparita.m ca sarvatra ~akyate vaktum agame // (V~kyap. I, 142).

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Pu.nyarhja. 7s In addition Bhart.rhari had the following to say on this point: "There is a possibility that in interpreting the phrases of the sacred books the opinions of the monogenists and the dualists m a y differ as each derives his opinions from his own judgement." 79 It is indeed true that m a n y of the interpretations of words and phrases in the sacred books contradict each another. Even those who profoundly venerate the sacred books have to admit this. When confronted with such problems, we have to resort to human logic to decide which interpretation to use. The following words written by Bhart.rhari illustrate this clearly. "Logical argument (tarka) which does not contradict the sacred Vedas is as an eye to those who have not yet seen the truth. F o r the meaning of the sentences cannot be construed from the colour (that is the tangible, material contents of the sacred books) alone, s~ Even as colour which is a material thing can be perceived by the eyes, so can the contents of the sacred books only be comprehended by logical reflection. Therefore, though he appears to be a profound venerator of the sacred books, Bhart.rhari had to resort to logical reflection in the end. Pu.nyar~ja makes this point quite clear in the following lines: "Logic which does not conflict with the a g a m a is indeed a proper foundation on which to build knowledge. And contrarily agama which is not tempered with logic is meaningless." sl After all Bhart.rhari was virtually a philosopher and a free thinker who delved into metaphysical reflections while on the surface keeping agama as the basis of his philosophy, s~ (Saflkara also admits that logic is necessary for the interpretation of the sacred books.) s3
78 tasmad agama.m prama.nik.rtya kacid yuktir ucyarndna upodbalakatva.m labhate. -

(Pur)yaraja ad Vhkyap. I, 142).

7~ tasyarthavadar~pa.ni nigcitya svavikalpajab / ekatvina~n dvaitind.rn ca pravada bahudha mat&h // (V?akyap. I, 8). so Veda~dstravirodhf ca tarka~ caks.ur apagyatdrn / r~pamatrad dhi vakyarthalt kevalan navatis.thate [/(Vhkyap. I, 137). 81 agamdvirodh[ tarka eva pram&nam atarka~ cagamo viphala iti (ad V~kyap. I, 137); cf. ibid., I, 138.

82 The argument which Bhart.rhari employed to advocate the sacred Vedas was used by the materialists to refute them (SDS. I, 11.46f.). 83 "Just as in the case of several conflicting scriptural passages we explain all of them in such a manner as to make them accord with one, so ~ruti, if in conflict with other means of right knowledge, has to be bent so as to accord with the latter. Moreover, reasoning, which enables us to infer something not actually perceived in consequence of its having a certain equality of attributes with what is actually perceived, stands nearer to perception than ~ruti which conveys its sense by tradition merely" (Safikara ad BS. II, 1, 4). This problem is discussed more boldly in the Yogavasi#t.ha. The author says that a gastra, though it is derived from men, deserves to be accepted, if it is reasonable. One must follow reason. A speech, if reasonable, must be accepted

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Scholars who came after him were fully aware of Bhartrhari's ambiguous attitude. His veneration of the sacred books was disregarded as being common to other schools of thought and the metaphysical side of his studies which he had built up so carefully was examined with great interest; a~ this led to his being called a logician (naiy~yika) by the great scholar V~caspatimi~ra. T h e i r o n y ofthisis of course obvious; Bhart.rhari had always opposed the logicians of other schools of thought. And now we come to a discussion of his doctrine as a true believer in the sacred scriptures. Arguments which refute logic do not necessarily support the sacred books. And scriptures or sacred writings are not confined to the Brahmin belief alone; they are found in the Buddhist and Jain beliefs as well. Therefore Bhart.rhari must have had some good reason for insisting that only the sacred writings of the orthodox Brahmin belief should be honoured and revered. As we have discussed earlier, he acknowledged two classes of sacred books: those collected by the ancient rs.is (Vedas) and those compiled by scholars who came later (smrti). Bhart.rhari insisted that the minds of the .r.sis and the scholars in question were perfect and flawless, transcending the past and the future and it was not for shallow human understanding to refute what they had said and written. "The knowledge of the wise, lucid and unscathed in their minds, with knowledge concerning the past and the future, is as sound and reliable as that which we acquire through our senses. ''Ss "The truths told by those who see with the sacred eye, things which are un-

even from a child, but that which is not reasonable should be rejected like a piece of straw though it might be uttered even by Brahman, the creator. That man is certainly not wise who rejecting the beautiful water of the Ganges flowing before him drinks from a well thinking only that it belongs to his father:
api paurusam adeya.m ~dstram ced yuktibodhakam / anyat tv (trsarn api tydjya.rn bhavya.m nydyaikasevina [[ yuktiyuktam upadeya.m vacana.m balakad api [ anyat t.r.nam iva tyajyam apy ukta.m padmayoninft [/ yo 'srnattdtasya kftpo 'yam iti kaupa.m pibaty apab [ tyaktvft gfthga.m purastha~n ta~n ko na ~asty atigarhitam [[

(Yogav~sist.ha II, 18, 2--4; Vidhushekhara Bhattacharyya, The .Zlgamagastra of Gauqlapada, University of Calcutta, 1943, p. 303). 84 V~easpatimigra comments on the Brahmas~tra-bh~t.syaby ~aflkara as follows in I, 3, 28 where Saflkara refutes the spho.ta theory: "ditirnfttrarn atra sftcitarn, vistaras tu Tattvabinddv avagantavya iti / ala~n va naiyayikair vivddena.' (p. 260). Here Tattvabindu is the name of a book written by V~caspatimi~ra in accordance with the theory of the Bh~tt.t.as. See also Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, II, p. 403. s~ avirbh~taprak(tddnftm anupadrutacetasam / atitandgataj~na.m pratyaks, an na vi~is.yate [/(Vakyap. I, 37),

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perceivable because they are beyond perception, cannot be denied by inference."se Of course he did not admit the sensory perceptions to be correct in themselves. To prove this Bhart.rhari gave the following answers to the question as to whether things are really what our senses tell us they are. 87 "The empty sky appears to have a surface, just like fire-flies seem to be made of fire. When seen from a different aspect the empty sky has no surface and the fire-fly no fire." 88 "Therefore the wise observe correctly with the mind even those things which can be directly perceived by the senses. As intuition should be true knowledge, we should not represent the things which we perceive." 89 Bhart.rhari was very critical of perceptive recognition but respected intuition which the .r.sis esteemed so highly. And as the sacred writings were full of intuitive knowledge Bhart.rhari insisted that they be observed. He held that a certain knowledge exists in our daily life which cannot reach us through inference but only through our own perceptive experience. "Knowledge regarding jewels and gold which belongs to those who have made a study of these things cannot be fully conveyed to those who have made no study of them, except through learning and training; it cannot be derived from inference. ''9~ He then adds that the contents of the sacred scriptures are understood by the rs.is who practised Yoga.91 What was the object of the intuition of the .r.sis? According to his philosophy it was without doubt "the Brahman consisting of words". This point will be dealt with later. According to Bhart.rhari's philosophy too, the Vedas possess the highest authority because they are the reflection or image of the Brahman. Therefore his profound belief in the Vedas can be attributed to the fact that the .r.sis in ancient times held the intuition of the Brahman in profound veneration. Bhart.rhari accorded a place of primary importance to the training and discipline through which the intuition of the Brahman could be attained. But even in his philosophy, the Brahman is a state which transcends words; the .r.sis attained their
86 atindriyan asa.mvedyan pagyanty ar.se.na caksu.sa / ye bhavan vacana.m te.sa.m nanumanena badhyate // (Vfikyap. I. 38). sr vayarn yathavad artho d.r.st.a.h tathaiva ca vyavahari.syamaO / Puo.yar~ja's inter-

pretation was followed.

88 talavad d rgyate vyoma khadyoto havyavdd, iti / na cen nasti tala .mvyomni na khadyote huta~ana.h//(Vftkyap. II, 142, p. 140). a9 tasm~t pratyaks, am apy artha.m vidv~n [k.seta yuktita.h [ na dar~anasya prdm~.ny~t d.rgyam artha.m prakalpayet (= vyavahara.rn nirvahayet) // (V~kyap. II, 143, p. 140). 9o paresam asamakhyeyam abhyasad eva jayate / ma~.drftpyadivijganar.n tadvida~n nanumanikam//(VS.kyap. I, 35). 91 tathd r sf.ndm api yogajapratyaksagamyam eva. (Punyarftjaad I, 35).

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intuition through Yoga, a word-less and thought-less realm; and this is the reason why the Brahman cannot be explained in words. The teaching of the Brahman is simply the expediency of the imparting of truth to men. "Because the descriptions of things in the sacred writings are made in order to explain things by means of words, the avidydt itself is set forth by means of certain descriptions." 92 According to Pun.yarfija the contents of the sacred books are explained for the benefit of the stupid and to explain truth itself is an impossibility. 93 His statement that the explanations of the sacred scriptures is based on the avidya is a bold one for a Brahmanic scholar; Safikara shares his opinion in this. Bhart.rhari's view on this point will be discussed in full later. 94 Therefore as a scholar of traditional lore Bhart.rhari has a deep veneration for the sacred scriptures but as a philosopher he accords them little real value. In fact 95 from the point of view of philosophy the sacred scriptures were only of secondary importance. In conclusion we can sum up the following facts about Bhart.rhari: He professed to restore orthodox Brahmanic studies, especially the study of grammar; he attacked the general tendency in the schools of philosophy in his day to depend on logic alone at the same time advocating the sanctity of the sacred books. But in order to do this (refute logic and advocate the sanctity of the sacred books) he had to propound certain arguments and in so doing was obliged h i m s e l f - albeit unconsciously to resort to logical reflections. His fragmentary views regarding knowledge reveal that he recognized three ways in which knowledge could be obtained: 1) Perception through the senses (pratyak.sa); 2) Thinking by inference (anumana); 3) Intuition of the Brahman (aptavacana).
92 vyavaharaya manyante ~astrarthaprakriya yata.h / gastres,u prakriyabhedair avidyaivopavarnyate//(V~kyap. II, 234). The latter half of this statement is again recorded in I/I, 14, 78. (p. 489). 93 gastrarthaprakriyah, kevalam abudhanam vyutp~danaya ato na kgtstrg~.ni tattva.m vaktu.m parayanti. Punyar~tja ad V~kyap. II, 234. 94 V~kyap. I, 74; II, 240; II, 322 f. 95 According to a fragment ascribed to him and cited in a Tibetan text, Bhart.rhari thought even the sacred books were based on the parikalpa. The author's article: "Tibetan citations of Bhart.rhari's verses and the problem of his date", (Yamaguchi Commemoration Volume (Kyoto, 1955),p. 125). By courtesy of Rev. Jain Muni Jambuvijay the author came to know that the following verse is cited in Bhart.rhari's own commentary on v. I, 1 (Lahore ed.): sarvaparikalpanam abhdse 'py anavasthitaO / tarkagamanumanena buddhya parikalpita.h [/

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The first and second methods are those applied by ordinary men and according to one view-point of his, perception is stable and inference subsists on it. 96 While emphasizing however the fact that inference is unstable, he resorts to it in his own writings. The third method is to be found only in the ancient .r.sis and the Yogins who through a system of abstract meditation and rigid asceticism aim to become united with the Brahman. While the first two methods are earth bound, the last is not of this world. The sacred books are based upon the third method which is described and known as ~ptavaeana in India. The term pratyak.sa is sometimes used for the third as well as the first method since both methods base their experience on clear evidence. 97 Needless to say however the first and third methods differ from each other fundamentally. Though Bhartrhari revered the aptavaeana above all, in point of fact he made use of the three methods. The three methods, according to Bhart.rhari, are nothing but the self-manifestation of the absolute Brahman. This will be discussed in another article.
ADDENDA : WESTERN PARALLELS

Some of Bhart.rhari's dogmatical statements illustrate the mediaeval trends of thought which can be traced in other countries. In the following appendices the writer would point out certain parallels in the mediaeval West.
To page 292 A1-Mansur a Muslim Caliph published an edict in which he declared that God had decreed hell fire for those who believed that truth could be found by means of unaided reason. All books on logic and metaphysics were burnt. Algazel a Muslim philosopher wrote a book called "The Destruction of the Philosophers" pointing out that, since all the truth necessary to life is to be found in the Koran, speculation independent of revelation is pointless. Abelard in his famous book "Sic et Non", ("Yes and N o " ) states that

96 "If the words were founded upon the dar~ana (= pratyak.sa) there would be no need for inference. Indeed when the dar~ana is established why should be need for inference?" (na calam anumanaya kabdo darAanaparvaka.h / siddhe hi dar~ane ki.m syad anumanaprayojanam/[ (V~kyap. III, 13, 12, p. 436). ~7 In the Brahrnasfitras the Vedas are called pratyak.sa, cf. BS. I, 3, 28; III, 2, 24; IV, 4, 2O.

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nothing outside the scriptures is infallible; even Apostles and Fathers may err.
To page 297 Eubalides said as follows: "Wenn ich sage: ich liJge, liige ich dann oder sage ich die Wahrheit? Wenn ich dabei die Wahrheit sage, so ltige ich; wenn ich abet lfige, so sage ich eben die Wahrheit. Die L~sung liegt darin, dass in diesem Falle die Form des Urteils, welche den Anspruch involviert, etwas als seiend als wahr auszusagen, zuf~illigerweise mit dem Inhalt des Urteils in Widerspruch steht. Als Curiosurn mag in Erinnerung gebracht werden, dass es . . . von den Kretern heisst: " . . . Die Kreter sind immer LiJgner." (P. Deussen Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, II, 1, Leipzig, 1911, S. 212.) To page 298 According to the Muslim mystics, every text of the Koran had seven or seven hundred layers of interpretation, the literal meaning being only for the ignorant and the vulgar. It would seem to follow that a philosopher's teaching could not possibly conflict with the Koran; for among seven hundred interpretations there would surely be at least one that would fit what the philosopher had to say. (B. Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, New York, 1945, p. 426.) To page 302 The three kinds of knowledge, as were set forth by Bhart.rhari, were mentioned in nearly the same way by Thomas Aquinas; according to him there are three ways of knowing God: by reason, by revelation and by intuition of things previously known only by revelation, although he says almost nothing about the third way. (B. Russell, op. cit., p. 460.)

ABBREVIATIONS ~afikara ad BS. ~afikara: Brahmasfttra-bha.sya (AnSS. No. 21). Poona, 1900. The English translation of the passages of this work cited in this article is by Georg Thibaut, SBE., XXXIV (Oxford, 1890), and cited here with slight modifications. The Sarvadar$ana-sam. graha of Sfiya.na-Madhava,ed. by Vasudev SDS. Shastri Abhyankar. Government Oriental Series, No. 1 (Poona, 1924). Taisho The Taish6 Tripit.aka, ed. by J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe. Tattvasam.graha The Tattvasa.mgraha of ~fintarak.sita with the Commentary of Kamalaw ed. by Embar Krishnamacharya. Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. 30 (Baroda, 1926).

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Va~ap.

Vakyapad[ya, ed. with the commentary of Pun yar~tja and of HelSrSja. Benares Sanskrit Series (Benares, 1887-1907, 1928-1937).

P.S. In preparing the English translation Prof. Jun Orui of Toyo University, Tokyo, helped the author greatly. The translation was revised by Mrs. Koch. The rewritten MS. was looked over by Dr. Minoru Kiyota who has come from America to study with the author at the University of Tokyo. Here the author wants to express his sincere gratitude to these scholars, without whose kind help this article could not have been brought to its present state of completion.