Reyes vs. COMELEC Facts: G.R. No. 120905.

Renato Reyes was the incumbent mayor of the municipality of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. An administrative complaint was filed against him with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by Dr. Ernesto Manalo. It was alleged, that petitioner exacted and collected P50,000,00 from each market stall holder in the Bongabong Public Market. Also, that certain checks issued to him by the National Reconciliation and Development Program of the DILG were never received by the Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in the books of accounts of the same officer; and that he took 27 heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program after the latter had reared and fattened the cattle for seven months. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found petitioner guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the RTC of Oriental Mindoro. Later, the Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Vice Governor Pedrito Reyes, issued an order for petitioner to vacate the position of mayor and peacefully turn over the office to the incumbent vice mayor. But service of the order upon petitioner was also refused. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy wit the Comelec. Rogelio de Castro sought the disqualification of petitioner as candidate for mayor, citing the LGC. The Comelec canceled petitioners certificate of candidacy. However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong, apparently unaware of the disqualification of Reyes by the COMELEC, proclaimed him the duly-elected mayor. The Comelec en banc affirmed. Invoking the ruling in the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos, petitioner argues that his election on May 8, 1995 is a bar to his disqualification. G.R. No. 120940. Julius Garcia, who obtained the highest number of votes next to Reyes intervened, contending that because Reyes was disqualified, he (Garcia) was entitled to be proclaimed mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. The Comelec en banc denied Ga rcias prayer since a candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes in an election cannot be declared winner Issue: WON the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is not yet final because he has not been served a copy thereof. Held: No Ratio: The failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to deliver a copy of its decision was due to the refusal of petitioner and his counsel to receive the decision. As the secretary to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Mario Manzo, stated in his certification, repeated attempts had been made to serve the decision on Reyes personally and by registered mail, but Reyes refused to receive the decision. If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him, service is deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be considered validly served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would be valid were it not for his or his counsel's refusal to receive it. Indeed that petitioner's counsel knew that a decision in the administrative case had been rendered is evident in his effort to bargain with the counsel for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan not to have the decision served upon him and his client while their petition for certiorari in the RTC was pending. His refusal to receive the decision may, therefore, be construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the decision. The purpose of the rules on service is to make sure that the party being served with the pleading, order or judgment is duly informed of the same so that he can take steps to protect his interests, enable a party to file an appeal or apply for other appropriate reliefs before the decision becomes final. Petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Prudence required that, rather than resist the service, he should have received the decision and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in accordance with R.A. No. 7160, 67. But petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the decision became final on April 2, 1995, 30 days after the first service upon petitioner. The net result is that when the elections were held on May 8, 1995, the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already become final and executory. The filing of a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court did not prevent the administrative decision from attaining finality. An original action of certiorari is an independent action and does not interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of the reglementary period involved in the proceeding. Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal action during the pendency of the certiorari proceedings, there must be a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court directed to the lower court. In the case at bar, although a temporary restraining order was issued by the Regional Trial Court, no preliminary injunction was subsequently issued. The temporary restraining order issued expired

after 20 days. From that moment on, there was no more legal barrier to the service of the decision upon petitioner. Issue: WON petitioners reelection rendered the administrative charges against him moot and academic Held: No Ratio: The case at bar is the very opposite of Aguinaldo vs Comelec. Here, although Reyes brought an action to question the decision in the administrative case, the TRO issued in the action he brought lapsed, with the result that the decision was served on petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus validly removed from office and, pursuant to 40(b) of the LGC, he was disqualified from running for reelection. It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no provision similar to 40(b) which disqualifies any person from running for any elective position on the ground that he has been removed as a result of an administrative case. R.A. No. 7160 could not be given retroactive effect. Furthermore, the decision has not yet attained finality. As indicated earlier, the decision of the then Secretary of Local Government was questioned by the petitioner in this Court and that to date, the petition remains unresolved. All in all, herein Mayor Reyes was given by this Sanggunian a period of sixty one (61) days to file his verified answer however, he resorted to dilatory motions which in the end proved fatal to his cause. Veritably, he neither filed nor furnished the complainant a copy of his answer. Failure of the respondent to file his verified answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the complaint shall be considered a waiver of his rights to present evidence in his behalf ((1). Art. 126 of Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991). All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasijudicial, or administrative bodies (Sec. 16, Art. III of the Constitution). Indeed, it appears that petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to file his answer. He failed to do so. Nonetheless, he was told that the complainant would be presenting his evidence and that he (petitioner) would then have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. But on the date set, he failed to appear. He would say later that this was because he had filed a motion for postponement and was awaiting a ruling thereon. This only betrays the pattern of delay he employed to render the case against him moot by his election. Issue: WON Julius Garcia should be declared mayor in view of the disqualification of Renato Reyes Held: No Ratio: That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances. Garcia's plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The votes cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reason can not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. The subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him. As for Garcia's contention that the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in not deciding the case before the date of the election, suffice it to say that under R.A. No. 6646, 6, the COMELEC can continue proceedings for disqualification against a candidate even after the election and order the suspension of his proclamation whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. For the same reason, we find no merit in the argument that the COMELEC should have seen right away that Reyes had not exhausted administrative remedies by appealing the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and, therefore, should have disqualified him before the elections. Hagad vs. Gozo-Dadole

Facts: Criminal and administrative complaints were filed against respondents (Mayor Alfredo Ouano, ViceMayor Paterno Caete and Sangguniang Panlungsod Member Rafael Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City, by Mandaue City Councilors Magno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa O. Bercede) by Mandaue City Councilors Magno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa O. Bercede with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. The respondents were charged with having violated R.A No. 3019, as amended; Articles 170 and 171 RPC; and R.A. No. 6713. Councilors Dionson and Bercede averred that respondent officials, acting in conspiracy, had caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allocated appropriation therein from P3,494,364.57 to P7M without authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City. Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension, respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 LGC, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the President. Dionson and Bercede argued that the LGC could not have repealed, abrogated or otherwise modified the pertinent provisions of the Constitution granting to the Ombudsman the power to investigate cases against all public officials and that, in any case, the power of the Ombudsman to investigate local officials under the Ombudsman Act had remained unaffected by the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman denied the motion to dismiss and recommended the preventive suspension of respondent officials, except City Budget Officer Pedro M. Guido, until the administrative case would have been finally resolved by the Ombudsman. A petition for prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, was filed by respondent officials with the RTC. Acting favorably on the pleas of petitioning officials, respondent Judge issued a restraining order directed at petitioner, enjoining him from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order of preventive suspension issued in OMB-VIS-ADM-92-015. Issue: WON the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case Held: Yes Ratio: The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section 13(1,) Article X1, of the 1987 Constitution, while his statutory mandate to act on administrative complaints is contained in Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770. Section 21 of the same statute names the officials who could be subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. Taken in conjunction with Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, petitioner thus contends that the Office of the Ombudsman correspondingly has the authority to decree preventive suspension on any public officer or employee under investigation by it. Respondent officials, upon the other hand, argue that the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over local officials must be deemed to have been removed by the subsequent enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 which vests the authority to investigate administrative charges, listed under Section 60 thereof, on various offices In the case specifically of complaints against elective officials of provinces and highly urbanized cities. Thus, respondents insist, conformably with Section 63 of the Local Government Code, preventive suspension can only be imposed by: ". . . the President if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or an independent component city; . . ." There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus esf optimus interpretendi, i e, every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject. Certainly, Congress would not have intended to do injustice to the very reason that underlies the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution which "is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of

officialdom." Quite interestingly, Sections 61 and 63 of the present Local Government Code run almost parallel with the provisions then existing under the old code. The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what already prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the President. Respondent local officials contend that the 6-month preventive suspension without pay under Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60-day preventive suspension provided by Section 63 of the Local Government Code to even now maintain its application. The two provisions govern differently. In order to justify the preventive suspension of a public official under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a) the charge against the officer or employee should involve dishonestly, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) that charges should warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office would prejudice the case filed against him. The Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive suspension to all public officials, whether elective or appointive, who are under investigation. Upon the other hand, in imposing the shorter period of sixty (60) days of preventive suspension prescribed in the Local Government Code of 1991 on an elective local official (at any time after the issues are joined), it would be enough that (a) there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, (b) the evidence of culpability is strong,(c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d) the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. The contention is without merit. The records reveal that petitioner issued the order of preventive suspension after the filing (a) by respondent officials of their opposition on the motion for preventive suspension and (b) by Mayor Ouano of his memorandum in compliance with the directive of petitioner Be that, as it may, we have heretofore held that, not being in the nature of a penalty, a preventive suspension can be decreed on an official under investigation after charges are brought and even before the charges are heard. Naturally, such a preventive suspension would occur prior to any finding of guilt or innocence. Moreover, respondent officials were, in point of fact, put on preventive suspension only after petitioner had found, in consonance with our ruling in Buenaseda vs. Flavier, that the evidence of guilt was strong. Finally, it does appear, as so pointed out by the Solicitor General that respondent officials' petition for prohibition, being an application for remedy against the findings of petitioner contained in his 21 September 1992 order, should not have been entertained by the trial court. Salalima vs. Guingona Facts: This refers to the administrative complaint filed against Albay Governor Romeo Salalima, ViceGovernor Danilo Azafla, Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members Juan Victoria, Lorenzo Reyeg, Jesus Marcellana, Arturo Osia, Clenio Cabredo, Ramon Fernandez, Jr., Masikap Fontanilla, Vicente Go, Sr., and Nemesio Baclao relative to the retainer contract for legal services entered into between the Province of Albay, on the one hand, and Atty. Jesus R. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm, on the other, and the disbursement of public fund in payment thereof. The complaint alleges that by entering into the retainer agreement with private lawyers and paying P7, 380, 410.31 to the said private lawyers, respondents violated several provisions of law which warrants the imposition of administrative penalties against them. It is to be noted that respondents Victoria, Reyeg, Cabredo, Marcellana and Osia were not yet members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan when Resolution No. 129 was passed. However, the complaint alleges that these respondents were named in the complaint because they approved the supplemental budget/appropriation ordinances providing for the payment of the attorneys fees. Issue: WON respondents have incurred administrative liability in entering into the retainer agreement with Atty. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm and in making payments pursuant to said agreement for purposes of the case filed by NPC with the Supreme Court against the Province.

Held:

Yes

Ratio: Sec. 481 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) requires the appointment of a legal officer for the province whose functions include the following: Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the local government unit or any official thereof, in his official capacity is a party; Provided, That, in actions or proceeding where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to another component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be employed to represent the adverse party. The Supreme Court has ruled in Municipality of Bocaue, et al. v. Manotok, that local government units cannot be represented by private lawyers and it is solely the Provincial Fiscal who can rightfully represent them. This ruling applies squarely to the case at hand because Sec. 481 of the Local Government Code is based on Sec. 1681 of the Revised Administrative Code which was the subject of interpretation in the case of Municipality of Bocaue, et al. v. Manotok. In hiring private lawyers to represent the Province of Albay, respondents exceeded their authority and violated the abovequoted section of the Local Government Code and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court. qMoreover, the entire transaction was attended by irregularities. First, the disbursements to the lawyers amounting to P7,380,410.31 were disallowed by the Provincial Auditor on the ground that these were made without the prior written conformity of the Solicitor General and the written concurrence of the Commission on Audit (COA) as required by COA Circular No. 86-25 5 dated 2 April 1986. The respondents attempted to dispute this finding by presenting the Solicitor Generals conformity dated 15 July 1993. This conformity was, however obtained after the disbursements were already made in 1990 and 1992. What is required by COA Circular No. 86-255 is a prior written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General. Another irregularity in the transaction concerns the lawyers. Resolution No. 0 1-90 authorized the respondent Governor to sign and confirm a retainer contract for legal services with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm at 202 E. Rodriguez Sr. Blvd., Quezon City. The retainer contract signed by respondent Governor was, however, not only with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm but also with Atty. Jesus R. Cornago of Jamecca Building, 280 Tomas Morato Avenue, Quezon City. That Atty. Jesus R. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm are two separate entities is evident from the retained contract itself. In entering into a retainer agreement not only with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm but also with Atty. Jose R. Cornago, respondent Governor exceeded his authority under Resolution No. 01-90. Complicating further the web of deception surrounding the transaction is the fact that it was only Atty. Cornago who appeared as collaborating counsel of record of the Province in the Supreme Court case. Even the Solicitor General, in his letter to respondent Governor dated 15 July 1993, noted that the Province is represented in the Supreme Court by Attys. Ricafort Cornago and Glenn Manahan but not by the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm. Furthermore, the memorandum with the Supreme Court filed for the Province was signed by Atty. Cornago and not by the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm. Consequently, the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm was not counsel of record of the Province in G.R. No. 87479. And yet, six of the ten checks paid by the Province and amounting to more than P3.6 million were issued in favor of the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm through Atty. Antonio Jose Cortes. In other words, respondents disbursed money to the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm although the latter did not appear as counsel for the Province in the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 87479. Finally, the attorneys fees agreed upon by respondent Salalima and confirmed by the other respondents are not only unreasonable but also unconscionable. The contingent fee of 18% of the P2l4 million claim of the Province against NPC amounts to P38.5 million. The word unconscionable, as applied to attorneys fee, means nothing more than that the fee contracted for, standing alone and unexplained would be sufficient to show that an unfair advantage had been taken of the client, or that a legal fraud had been taken of the client, or that a legal fraud had been perpetrated on him.

The Province has a legal officer, Atty. Ricafort, who had already filed a comment on NPCs petition against the Province. The comment filed by Atty. Ricafort already covers the basic issues raised in the petition. When Atty. Cornago filed an appearance and subsequently a memorandum for the Province, the petition was already been given due course by the Supreme Court and the only pleading to be filed by the parties before the Court would issue its decision was a memorandum. Surely, one memorandum could not be worth P38.5 million. Furthermore, the professional character and social standing of Atty. Cornago are not such as would merit a P38.5 million fee for the legal services rendered for the Province. During the hearing, respondent Governor admitted that he had hired Atty. Cornago because they were schoolmates at San Beda College. It is evident that respondent Governor hired Atty. Cornago not on the basis of his competency and standing in the legal community but purely for personal reasons. Likewise, the standing of the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm is not such as would merit P38.5 million for one memorandum, which, in this case, it had not even filed because it was not the counsel of record. Hence, considering the labor and time involved, the skill and experience called for in the performance of the services and the professional character and social standing of the lawyers, the attorneys fee of P38.5 million is unconscionable. By allowing such scandalously exorbitant attorneys fees which is patently disadvantageous to the government, respondents betrayed a personal bias to the lawyers involved and committed abuse of authority. Grego vs. COMELEC Facts: On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by the Court Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by Nena Tordesillas. Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during the 1988, local elections. He won and, accordingly, assumed office. After his term, he sought reelection in the 1992 election. He again won. However, a case for quo warranto was filed by Cenon Ronquillo (Candidate for councilor), who alleged Basco's ineligibility to be elected councilor on the basis of the Tordesillas ruling. Other complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman and in the DILG. In 1995, Basco ran again for councilor. William Grego, claiming to be a registered voter of Precinct No. 966, District II, City of Manila, filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification, praying for Basco's disqualification, for the suspension of his proclamation, and for the declaration of Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilor of Manila's Second District. The Manila BOC however proclaimed Basco as a duly elected councilor of the Second District of Manila. In view of the proclamation, Grego filed an urgent motion seeking to annul the illegal proclamation. The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification ruling that the administrative penalty imposed by the SC on Basco was wiped away and condoned by the electorate who elected him. Issue: WON Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 apply retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992 Held: No Ratio: Petitioner submits that although the Code took effect only on January 1, 1992, Section 40 (b) must nonetheless be given retroactive effect and applied to Basco's dismissal from office which took place in 1981. It is stressed that the provision of the law as worded does not mention or even qualify the date of removal from office of the candidate in order for disqualification thereunder to attach. Hence, petitioner impresses upon the Court that as long as a candidate was once removed from office due to an administrative case, regardless of whether it took place during or prior to the effectivity of the Code, the disqualification applies. We do not, however, subscribe to petitioner's view. Our refusal to give retroactive application to the provision of Section 40 (b) is already a settled issue and there exist no compelling reasons for us to depart therefrom. Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is

expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively. It, therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the Local Government Code is not applicable to the present case." Issue: WON private respondent's election to office as City Councilor of Manila in the 1988, 1992 and 1995 elections wipe away and condone the administrative penalty against him, thus restoring his eligibility for public office Ratio: At first glance, there seems to be a prima facie semblance of merit to petitioner's argument. However, the issue of whether or not Basco's triple election to office cured his alleged ineligibility is actually beside the point because the argument proceeds on the assumption that he was in the first place disqualified when he ran in the three previous elections. This assumption, of course, is untenable considering that Basco was NOT subject to any disqualification at all under Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code which, as we said earlier, applies only to those removed from office on or after January 1, 1992. In view of the irrelevance of the issue posed by petitioner, there is no more reason for the Court to still dwell on the matter at length. Anent Basco's alleged circumvention of the prohibition in Tordesillas against reinstatement to any position in the national or local government, including its agencies and instrumentalities, as well as government-owned or controlled corporations, we are of the view that petitioner's contention is baseless. Neither does petitioner's argument that the term "any position" is broad enough to cover without distinction both appointive and local positions merit any consideration. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the Tordesillas decision did not bar Basco from running for any elective position. (And with prejudice to reinstatement..) In this regard, particular attention is directed to the use of the term "reinstatement." Under the former Civil Service Decree, 16 the law applicable at the time Basco, a public officer, was administratively dismissed from office, the term "reinstatement" had a technical meaning, referring only to an appointive position. In light of these definitions, there is, therefore, no basis for holding that Basco is likewise barred from running for an elective position inasmuch as what is contemplated by the prohibition in Tordesillas is reinstatement to an appointive position. Issue: WON private respondent's proclamation as sixth winning candidate on May 17, 1995, while the disqualification case was still pending consideration by COMELEC is void ab initio? Ratio: The inapplicability of RA 7166 Section 20(i) to the present case is very much patent on its face considering that the same refers only to a void proclamation in relation to contested returns and NOT to contested qualifications of a candidate. RA 6646 Section 6 does not support petitioner's contention that the COMELEC, or more properly speaking, the Manila City BOC, should have suspended the proclamation. The use of the word "may" indicates that the suspension of a proclamation is merely directory and permissive in nature and operates to confer discretion. What is merely made mandatory, according to the provision itself, is the continuation of the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest. Thus, in view of this discretion granted to the COMELEC, the question of whether or not evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant suspension of proclamation must be left for its own determination and the Court cannot interfere therewith and substitute its own judgment unless such discretion has been exercised whimsically and capriciously. The COMELEC, as an administrative agency and a specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has more than enough expertise in its field that its findings or conclusions are generally respected and even given finality. The COMELEC has not found any ground to suspend the proclamation and the records likewise fail to show any so as to warrant a different conclusion from this Court. Hence, there is no ample justification to hold that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion. Since Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646, the law which Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks to implement, employed the word "may," it is, therefore, improper and highly irregular for the COMELEC to have used instead the word "shall" in its rules. Moreover, there is no reason why the Manila City BOC should not have proclaimed Basco as the sixth winning City Councilor. Absent any determination of irregularity in the election returns, as well as an order enjoining

the canvassing and proclamation of the winner, it is a mandatory and ministerial duty of the Board of Canvassers concerned to count the votes based on such returns and declare the result. Finally, the cases of Duremdes, Benito and Aguam, supra, cited by petitioner are all irrelevant and inapplicable to the factual circumstances at bar and serve no other purpose than to muddle the real issue. These three cases do not in any manner refer to void proclamations resulting from the mere pendency of a disqualification case. Issue: WON Romualdo S. Maranan, a seventh placer, be legally declared a winning candidate Held: No Ratio: Obviously, he may not be declared a winner. In the first place, Basco was a duly qualified candidate pursuant to our disquisition above. Furthermore, he clearly received the winning number of votes which put him in sixth place. Thus, petitioner's emphatic reference to Labo v. COMELEC, where we laid down a possible exception to the rule that a second placer may not be declared the winning candidate, finds no application in this case. The exception is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Both assumptions, however, are absent in this case. Petitioner's allegation that Basco was well-known to have been disqualified in the small community where he ran as a candidate is purely speculative and conjectural, unsupported as it is by any convincing facts of record to show notoriety of his alleged disqualification. In sum, we see the dismissal of the petition for disqualification as not having been attended by grave abuse of discretion. There is then no more legal impediment for private respondent's continuance in office as City Councilor for the Second District of Manila. Joson vs. Exec. Sec. Facts: Oscar C. Tinio is the Vice-Governor of Nueva Ecija while Loreto P. Pangilinan, Crispulo S. Esguerra, Solita C. Santos, Vicente C. Palilio and Napoleon G. Interior are members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The private respondents filed with the Office of the President a complaint charging Governor Eduardo Joson with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. Allegedly, Joson belligerently barged into the Hall and angrily kicked the door and chairs in the Hall and uttered threatening words at private respondents during a scheduled session. Private respondents claim that this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a pending legislative measure supported by petitioner that Nueva Ecija obtain a loan of P150 million from the PNB. Josons acts were intended to harass them into approving this loan, which private respondents opposed the loan because the province had an unliquidated obligation of more than P70 million incurred without prior authorization from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Private respondents prayed for the suspension or removal of petitioner; for an emergency audit of the provincial treasury of Nueva Ecija; and for the review of the proposed loan in light of the financial condition of the province, Joson failed to file his answer despite numerous grant of extension. Thus, DILG Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez issued an order declaring Joson in default. Later, Joson, thru counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the letter complaint was not verified and that the DILG has no jurisdiction over the case and has no authority to require him to answer the complaint. Executive Secretary Torres issued an order placing Joson under preventive suspension for 60 days pending investigation of the charges against him. Also, the Motion to Dismiss was denied. Secretary Barbers directed the PNP to assist the implementation of the order of preventive suspension. Also, Vice Governor Oscar Tinio was appointed as Acting Governor. Joson filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA challenging the preventive suspension and default order. The CA dismissed the case. Joson claimed that there was nothing in his conduct that threatened the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or caused alarm to the employees. He said that like ViceGovernor Tinio, he was always accompanied by his official security escorts whenever he reported for work. He also alleged that the joint affidavit of Elnora Escombien and Jacqueline Jane Perez was false. Escombien was purportedly not inside the session hall during the incident but was at her desk at the office and could not in any way have seen petitioner in the hall. Issue: WON the filing of a letter complaint before the Office of the President was proper Held: Yes

Ratio: Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective local officials are governed by the Local Government Code of 1991.In all matters not provided in A.O. No. 23, the Rules of Court and the Administrative Code of 1987 apply in a suppletory character. Section 60 of Chapter 4, Title II, Book I of the LGC enumerates the grounds for which an elective local official may be disciplined, suspended or removed from office. When an elective local official commits an act that falls under the grounds for disciplinary action, the administrative complaint against him must be verified and filed under Section 61. In the instant case, Joson is an elective official of the province of Nueva Ecija. The letter-complaint against him was therefore properly filed with the Office of the President. According to petitioner, however, the lettercomplaint failed to conform with the formal requirements set by the Code. He alleges that the complaint was not verified by private respondents and was not supported by the joint affidavit of the two witnesses named therein; that private respondents later realized these defects and surreptitiously inserted the verification and sworn statement while the complaint was still pending with the Office of the President. We find no merit in the contention of the petitioner. The absence of the document, page or book number of the notarial register of the subscribing officer is insufficient to prove petitioner's claim. The lack of these entries may constitute proof of neglect on the part of the subscribing officer in complying with the requirements for notarization and proper verification. They may give grounds for the revocation of his notarial commission. But they do not indubitably prove that the verification was inserted or intercalated after the letter-complaint was filed with the Office of the President. Nor is the fact of intercalation sufficiently established by the affidavit of Solita Santos. Santos was one of the signatories to the letter-complaint. In her affidavit, she prayed that she be dropped as one of the complainants since she had just joined the political party of Joson. She decided to reveal the intercalation because she was disillusioned with the "dirty tactics" of Vice-Governor Tinio to grab power from petitioner Joson. Santos cannot in any way be considered an unbiased witness. Her motive and change of heart render her affidavit suspect. Assuming, nonetheless, that the letter-complaint was unverified when submitted to the Office of the President, the defect was not fatal. The requirement of verification was deemed waived by the President himself when he acted on the complaint. Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite. Verification is mainly intended to secure an assurance that the allegations therein made are done in good faith or are true and correct and not mere speculation. The lack of verification is a mere formal defect. The court may order the correction of the pleading, if not verified, or act on the unverified pleading if the attending circumstances are such that a strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served. Issue: WON the DILG has jurisdiction over the case Held: Yes Ratio: The Disciplining Authority is the President of the Philippines, whether acting by himself or through the Executive Secretary. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is the Investigating Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an Investigating Committee. The Secretary of the DILG, however, is not the exclusive Investigating Authority. In lieu of the DILG Secretary, the Disciplining Authority may designate a Special Investigating Committee. The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local officials is derived from his power of general supervision over local governments. The power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties. If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. The President's power of general supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law. Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires. The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government officials. A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special

Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to Joson's claim. The President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline. Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency. This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President. Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency. As head of the Executive Department, the President, however, may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally. The members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in certain matters because the President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time. Each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority. In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the DILG Secretary usurped the power of the President when he required petitioner to answer the complaint. Undisputably, the letter-complaint was filed with the Office of the President but it was the DILG Secretary who ordered petitioner to answer. Strictly applying the rules, the Office of the President did not comply with the provisions of A.O. No. 23. The Office should have first required petitioner to file his answer. Thereafter, the complaint and the answer should have been referred to the Investigating Authority for further proceedings. Be that as it may, this procedural lapse is not fatal. The filing of the answer is necessary merely to enable the President to make a preliminary assessment of the case. The President found the complaint sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further investigation. The judgment of the President on the matter is entitled to respect in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Issue: WON Joson was properly placed under preventive suspension Held: Yes Ratio: In view of petitioner's inexcusable failure to file answer, the DILG did not err in recommending to the Disciplining Authority his preventive suspension during the investigation. Preventive suspension is authorized under Section 63 of the LGC. Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, that is, after respondent has answered the complaint, when the evidence of guilt is strong and, given the gravity of the offense, there is a great possibility that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. The failure of respondent to file his answer despite several opportunities given him is construed as a waiver of his right to present evidence in his behalf. The requisite of joinder of issues is squarely met with respondent's waiver of right to submit his answer. The act of respondent in allegedly barging violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of armed men constitutes grave misconduct. The allegations of complainants are bolstered by the joint-affidavit of two (2) employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Respondent who is the chief executive of the province is in a position to influence the witnesses. Further, the history of violent confrontational politics in the province dictates that extreme precautionary measures be taken.' Executive Secretary Torres found that all the requisites for the imposition of preventive suspension had been complied with. Petitioner's failure to file his answer despite several opportunities given him was construed as a waiver of his right to file answer and present evidence; and as a result of this waiver, the issues were deemed to have been joined. The Executive Secretary also found that the evidence of petitioner Joson's guilt was strong and that his continuance in office during the pendency of the case could influence the witnesses and pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the evidence against him. Issue: WON the Resolution finding Joson guilty and imposing on him the penalty of suspension from office for six months without pay was proper Ratio: Settled is the rule that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence one may have in support of one's defense. To be heard does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. Thus, when respondent

failed to submit his position paper as directed and insisted for the conduct of formal investigation, he was not denied of his right of procedural process. The denial of petitioner's Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation is erroneous. Petitioner's right to a formal investigation is spelled out in the following provisions of A.O. No. 23. The records show that on August 27, 1997, petitioner submitted his Answer Ad Cautelam where he disputed the truth of the allegations that he barged into the session hall of the capitol and committed physical violence to harass the private respondents who were opposed to any move for the province to contract a P150 million loan from PNB. In his Order of October 8, 1997, Undersecretary Sanchez admitted petitioner's Answer Ad Cautelam but treated it as a position paper. On October 15, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation. Petitioner reiterated this motion on October 29, 1997. Petitioner's motion was denied on November 11, 1997. Secretary Barbers found petitioner guilty as charged on the basis of the parties' position papers. On January 8, 1998, Executive Secretary Torres adopted Secretary Barbers' findings and recommendations and imposed on petitioner the penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay. The rejection of petitioner's right to a formal investigation denied him procedural due process. Section 5 of A. O. No. 23 provides that at the preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall summon the parties to consider whether they desire a formal investigation. This provision does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to determine whether a formal investigation would be conducted. The records show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation. As respondent, he is accorded several rights under the law. An erring elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of an accused. These rights are essentially part of procedural due process. The local elective official has the (1) right to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel; (2) the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him; and (3) the right to compulsory attendance of witness and the production of documentary evidence. These rights are reiterated in the Rules Implementing the LGC and in A.O. No. 23. Petitioner's right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint against him was decided on the basis of position papers. There is nothing in the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide that administrative cases against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position papers. A.O. No. 23 states that the Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit their respective memoranda but this is only after formal investigation and hearing. A.O. No. 23 does not authorize the Investigating Authority to dispense with a hearing especially in cases involving allegations of fact which are not only in contrast but contradictory to each other. These contradictions are best settled by allowing the examination and cross-examination of witnesses. Position papers are often-times prepared with the assistance of lawyers and their artful preparation can make the discovery of truth difficult. The jurisprudence cited by the DILG in its order denying petitioner's motion for a formal investigation applies to appointive officials and employees. Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective government officials are not exactly similar to those against appointive officials. In fact, the provisions that apply to elective local officials are separate and distinct from appointive government officers and employees. This can be gleaned from the LGC itself. In the LGC, the entire Title II of Book I of the Code is devoted to elective officials. It provides for their qualifications and election, vacancies and succession, local legislation, disciplinary actions, and recall. Appointive officers and employees are covered in Title III of Book I of the Code entitled "Human Resources and Development." All matters pertinent to human resources and development in local government units are regulated by "the civil service law and such rules and regulations and other issuances promulgated thereto, unless otherwise provided in the Code." The "investigation and adjudication of administrative complaints against appointive local officials and employees as well as their suspension and removal" are "in accordance with the civil service law and rules and other pertinent laws," the results of which "shall be reported to the Civil Service Commission." It is the Administrative Code of 1987, specifically Book V on the Civil Service, that primarily governs appointive officials and employees. Their qualifications are set forth in the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the said Code. The grounds for administrative disciplinary action in Book V are much more in number and are specific than those enumerated in the Local Government Code against elective local officials. The disciplining authority in such actions is the Civil Service Commission although the Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities are also given the power to investigate and decide disciplinary actions against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. When a complaint is filed and the respondent answers, he must "indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation if his

answer is not considered satisfactory." If the officer or employee elects a formal investigation, the direct evidence for the complainant and the respondent "consist[s] of the sworn statement and documents submitted in support of the complaint and answer, as the case may be, without prejudice to the presentation of additional evidence deemed necessary x x x, upon which the cross-examination by respondent and the complainant, respectively, is based." The investigation is conducted without adhering to the technical rules applicable in judicial proceedings." Moreover, the appointive official or employee may be removed or dismissed summarily if (1) the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong; (2) when the respondent is a recidivist; and (3) when the respondent is notoriously undesirable. The provisions for administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials are markedly different from appointive officials. The rules on the removal and suspension of elective local officials are more stringent. The procedure of requiring position papers in lieu of a hearing in administrative cases is expressly allowed with respect to appointive officials but not to those elected. An elective official, elected by popular vote, is directly responsible to the community that elected him. The official has a definite term of office fixed by law which is relatively of short duration. Suspension and removal from office definitely affects and shortens this term of office. When an elective official is suspended or removed, the people are deprived of the services of the man they had elected. Implicit in the right of suffrage is that the people are entitled to the services of the elective official of their choice. Suspension and removal are thus imposed only after the elective official is accorded his rights and the evidence against him strongly dictates their imposition. Conducto vs. Monzon Facts: Complainant filed a complaint with the Sangguniang Panlungsod of San Pablo City against Benjamin Maghirang, the barangay chairman of Barangay III-E of San Pablo City, for abuse of authority, serious irregularity and violation of law as Maghirang appointed his sister-in-law, Mrs. Florian Maghirang, to the position of barangay secretary in violation of Section 394 of the LGC. At the same time, complainant filed a complaint for violation of Article 244 RPC with the Office of the City Prosecutor against Maghirang, which was, however, dismissed on the ground that Maghirangs sister-in-law was appointed before the effectivity of the LGC, which prohibits a punong barangay from appointing a relative within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity as barangay secretary. The order of dismissal was submitted to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. Complainant obtained an Opinion from Dir. Jacob Montesa of the DILG declaring the appointment of Maghirang void. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman dismissed the case but ordered Maghirang to replace his sister in law as barangay secretary. Later, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman granted the MR and ordered the filing of an information for unlawful appointment against Maghirang. With prior leave from the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, the City Prosecutor filed, in Criminal Case No. 26240, a motion for the suspension of Maghirang pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019. The judge denied the motion and ruled that since Maghirang was reelected as barangay chairman, the offenses committed during the previous term are not causes for removal. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the judge liable for ignorance of the law and that he be reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. The OCA said that it is well settled in Section 13 of RA 3019 that the court suspends any public officer against whom a valid information was filed against him. Issue: WON the judge was grossly ignorant of the law Held: Yes Ratio: All things considered, while concededly, respondent Judge manifested his ignorance of the law in denying complainants Motion for Suspension of Brgy. Chairman Maghirang, there was nothing shown however to indicate that he acted in bad faith or with malice. Be that as it may, it would also do well to note that good faith and lack of malicious intent cannot completely free respondent from liability. The findings and conclusions of the Office of the Court Administrator are in order. However, the penalty recommended, i.e., reprimand, is too light, in view of the fact that despite his claim that he has been continuously keeping abreast of legal and jurisprudential development (sic) in law ever since he passed the Bar Examinations in 1995, respondent, wittingly or otherwise, failed to recall that as early as 1967 in Ingco v. Sanchez this Court explicitly ruled that the re-election of a public official extinguishes only the administrative, but not the criminal, liability incurred by him during his previous term of office, thus:

The ruling, therefore, that -- when the people have elected a man to his office it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct if he had been guilty of any -- refers only to an action for removal from office and does not apply to a criminal case, because a crime is a public wrong more atrocious in character than mere misfeasance or malfeasance committed by a public officer in the discharge of his duties, and is injurious not only to a person or group of persons but to the State as a whole. This must be the reason why Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, which enumerates the grounds for extinction of criminal liability, does not include reelection to office as one of them, at least insofar as a public officer is concerned. Also, under the Constitution, it is only the President who may grant the pardon of a criminal offense. There is a whale of a difference between the two cases. The basis of the investigation which has been commenced here, and which is sought to be restrained, is a criminal accusation the object of which is to cause the indictment and punishment of petitioner-appellant as a private citizen; whereas in the cases cited, the subject of the investigation was an administrative charge against the officers therein involved and its object was merely to cause his suspension or removal from public office. While the criminal cases involves the character of the mayor as a private citizen and the People of the Philippines as a community is a party to the case, an administrative case involves only his actuations as a public officer as (they) affect the populace of the municipality where he serves. Then on 20 June 1969, in Luciano v. The Provincial Governor, et al.,[20) this Court likewise categorically declared that criminal liabilities incurred by an elective public official during his previous term of office were not extinguished by his re-election, and that Pascual v. Provincial Governor and Lizares v. Hechanova referred only to administrative liabilities committed during the previous term of an elective official. Petitioner's reliance on the loose language used in Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija that "each term is separate from other terms and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor" is misplaced. The Court has in subsequent cases made it clear that the Pascual ruling (which dealt with administrative liability) applies exclusively to administrative and not to criminal liability and sanctions. Thus, in Ingco v. Sanchez the Court ruled that the reelection of a public officer for a new term does not in any manner wipe out the criminal liability incurred by him in a previous term. Punishment for a crime is a vindication for an offense against the State and the body politic. The small segment of the national electorate that constitutes the electorate of the municipality of Antipolo has no power to condone a crime against the public justice of the State and the entire body politic. Reelection to public office is not provided for in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code as a mode of extinguishing criminal liability incurred by a public officer prior to his reelection. On the contrary, Article 9 of the Anti-Graft Act imposes as one of the penalties in case of conviction perpetual disqualification from public office and Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code declares that such penalty of perpetual disqualification entails "the deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held, even if conferred by popular election." It is manifest then, that such condonation of an officer's fault or misconduct during a previous expired term by virtue of his reelection to office for a new term can be deemed to apply only to his administrative and not to his criminal guilt. As succinctly stated in then Solicitor General (now Associate Justice) Felix Q. Antonio's memorandum for the State, "to hold that petitioner's reelection erased his criminal liability would in effect transfer the determination of the criminal culpability of an erring official from the court to which it was lodged by law into the changing and transient whim and caprice of the electorate. This cannot be so, for while his constituents may condone the misdeed of a corrupt official by returning him back to office, a criminal action initiated against the latter can only be heard and tried by a court of justice, his nefarious act having been committed against the very State whose laws he had sworn to faithfully obey and uphold. A contrary rule would erode the very system upon which our government is based, which is one of laws and not of men." While diligence in keeping up-to-date with the decisions of this Court is a commendable virtue of judges -and, of course, members of the Bar -- comprehending the decisions is a different matter, for it is in that area where ones competence may then be put to the test and proven. Thus, it has been said that a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and aware of well-settled and authoritative doctrines.[23) He should strive for excellence, exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice and the Rule of Law. Needless to state, respondent was, in this instance, wanting in the desired level of mastery of a revered doctrine on a simple issue.

Pablico vs. Villapando Facts: Solomon B. Maagad, and Renato M. Fernandez (members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Vicente, Palawan) filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan an administrative complaint against Mayor Alejandro A. Villapando for abuse of authority and culpable violation of the Constitution. Villapando allegedly entered into a consultancy agreement with Orlando Tiape (defeated mayoralty candidate) which amounted to an appointment to a government position within the prohibited one year period under the Constitution. Villapando claimed that he did not appoint Tiape, but he merely hired him and a consultant does not constitute an appointment to a government office or position as prohibited by the Constitution. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan found respondent guilty of the administrative charge and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from service. The Office of the President affirmed the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Villapando filed a certiorari and prohibition before the CA seeking to annul the decision of the Office of the President. The CA declared void the decision of the OP and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Issue: WON local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President, on appeal, can validly impose the penalty of dismissal from service on erring elective local officials Held: No Ratio: The pertinent portion of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides: Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds: An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court. It is clear from the last paragraph of the provision that the penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed only by a court of law. Thus, in Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al we held that "[t]he Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since such power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of the aforequoted Section 60." Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, however, adds that "(b) An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article [The grounds enumerated in Section 60, Local Government Code of 1991] by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other." The disciplining authority referred to pertains to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office of the President. As held in Salalima, this grant to the "disciplining authority" of the power to remove elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations. No rule or regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law, such as the LGC. Implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the law that they implement, for a regulation which operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a nullity. Even Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., the principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, expressed doubt as to the validity of Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the implementing rules. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, insofar as it vests power on the "disciplining authority" to remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove. As explained by the Court in Lacson v. Roque: "the abridgment of the power to remove or suspend an elective mayor is not without its own justification, and was, we think, deliberately intended by the lawmakers. The evils resulting from a restricted authority to

suspend or remove must have been weighed against the injustices and harms to the public interests which would be likely to emerge from an unrestrained discretionary power to suspend and remove." Office of the Ombudsman vs. Evangelista Facts: Respondents Ricardo Evangelista, Concepcion Melican and Grace Limos (respondents) are the mayor, municipal treasurer and accountant respectively, of Aguilar, Pangasinan. Priscilla Villanueva, the Co-Chair of the Local School Board of Aguilar, accused the respondents of having misappropriated the Special Education Fund (SEF).[3] The complainant alleged that the three respondents had used the SEF to purchase speech kit tapes and textbooks without the approval of the Local School Board. She also alleged that the speech kit tapes and textbooks were not received by the recipients. Villanueva specially pleaded that the respondents be preventively suspended.[5] Ombudsman placed respondents under preventive suspension for a period of four (4) months. The Ombudsman held that the proofs submitted by Villanueva showed strong evidence of guilt, that if duly proven the acts imputed against the respondents would constitute grave misconduct and dishonesty and that their continued stay in office would prejudice the fair and independent disposition of the case against them. 2007, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the order of the Ombudsman.[8] They claimed that they had been denied due process since they were never furnished with a copy of Villanuevas complaint. Court of Appeals granted the petition and set aside the order of the Ombudsman. The appellate court observed that even a cursory reading of the assailed order reveals that the requirements of R.A. No. 6770 were not complied with. It pointed out that under Section 26(2) of R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman is required to inform the accused of the charges; yet, the respondents learned of the charges against them only upon receipt of the suspension order. Court of Appeals found that there was haste in ordering the suspension since the Ombudsman signed the order prior to the Deputy Ombudsmans recommendation of approval. Issue: WON prevented suspension is properly ordered by the ombudsman Held: Yes Ratio: Procedural: Generally, to challenge appellate court decisions reversing rulings of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the appropriate recourse. As the Ombudsman assails the appellate courts misapplication of the law, the proper remedy is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Substantive: It is the consistent and general policy of the Court not to interfere with the Office of the Ombudsmans exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers.[12] The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.[13] As early as 1995, this Court ruled in Lastimosa v. Vasquez[14] and Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole,[15] that neither prior notice nor a hearing is required for the issuance of a preventive suspension order. The well-settled doctrine is solidly anchored on the explicit text of the governing law which is Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770. Section 24, two requisites must concur to render the preventive suspension order valid. The first requisite is unique and can be satisfied in only one way. It is that in the judgment of the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman, the evidence of guilt is strong. The second requisite, however, may be met in three (3) different ways, to wit: (1) that the offense charged involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (2) the charge would warrant removal from the service; or (3) the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The SEF was suddenly reduced to P343,763.30 from P783,937.60 without sufficient justification as revealed by this Courts evaluation of the Status of Appropriation, Allotment and Obligation as well as the Statement of Income and Expense, both certified as correct by respondent Limos no less. [23] Moreover, the certifications of numerous head teachers and principals that their schools did not receive the speech kits and textbooks are likewise strong evidence of dishonesty and grave misconduct on the respondents part. [24] This is bolstered by the fact that no disbursement was authorized by the local school board. In this case, the second requisite is satisfied by two circumstances. First, the offense definitely involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty. Second, the charge would warrant removal from the service. Dishonesty is intentionally making a false statement in any material fact. [25] Per the findings of the Ombudsman, there is strong evidence that private respondents made false statements as to the status of the SEF as well as the purchase of speech kits and textbooks. Likewise, a mayor like any other local elective official may be removed from office for dishonesty, oppression, gross negligence or dereliction of duty in accordance with Section 60(c) of the Local Government Code. In regard to respondents Melican and Limos, both are members of the civil service under Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules of Civil Service, dishonesty is a grave offense punishable with dismissal even as a first offense Section 24 does not require that notice of the charges against the accused must precede an order meting out preventive suspension. While a preventive suspension order may stem from a complaint, the Ombudsman is not required to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint prior to ordering preventive suspension. The requisites for the Ombudsman to issue a preventive suspension order are clearly contained in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770. The appellate courts stance that there is no longer any reason for the preventive suspension of the respondents as the pertinent documents are with the Commission on Audit likewise has no merit. Respondents argue there is no reason for suspension pendente lite as they could no longer tamper with the evidence. This Court found a similar argument in Bunye v. Escarreal[29] devoid of merit. We reiterate the rule that the prosecutionmust be given the opportunity to gather and prepare the facts for trial under conditions which would ensure non-intervention and noninterference from accused's camp.[30] Similar to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 emphasizes the principle that a public office is a public trust.[31] Part and parcel of this principle is a presumption that unless the public officer is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or both This Court also holds that there was no undue haste on the Ombudsmans part in issuing the preventive suspension order. The fact that the Ombudsman signed the order prior to her Deputy Ombudsmans recommendation does not affect its validity. A review of Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 reveals that the recommendation of the Deputy Ombudsman is not a condition sine qua non for the Ombudsman to issue a preventive suspension order. The preventive suspension order insofar as Mayor Evagelista is concerned has been rendered moot and academic. The Mayor was re-elected and proclaimed during the May 2007 elections as evidenced by the certificate of canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for the Municipality of Aguilar, Pangasinan.[34] This Court has consistently ruled that elective officials may not be held administratively liable for misconduct committed during a previous term of office.[35] The rationale for this rule is that it is assumed that the electorate returned the official to power with full knowledge of past misconduct and in fact condoned it. It should be stressed that this forgiveness only applies to the administrative liability; the State may still pursue the official in a criminal case. Sangguniang Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos vs. Punong Barangay Martinez Facts: Severino Martinez was administratively charged with Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption by petitioner through the filing of a verified complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan as the disciplining authority over elective barangay officials pursuant to Section 64 of RA 7160. The complaint was later

amended for Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner alleged that Martinez committed the following acts: 1. Failure to submit and fully remit to the Barangay Treasurer the income of their solid waste management project since 2001 particularly the sale of fertilizer derived from composting. 2. Failure to submit/remit to the barangay treasurer the sale of recyclable materials taken from garbage collection. 3. Using the garbage truck for other purposes like hauling sand and gravel for private persons without monetary benefit to the barangay because no income from this source appears in the year end report even if payments were collected x x x. 4. Using/spending barangay funds for repair, gasoline, lubricants, wheels and other spare parts of the garbage truck instead of using the money or income of said truck from the garbage fees collected as income from its Sold Waste Management Project. x x x. 5. Unliquidated traveling expenses for Seminar/Lakbay-Aral in 2003 because although a cash advance was made by the respondent for the said purpose, he, however, did not attend said seminar because on the dates when he was supposed to be on seminar they saw him in the barangay. x x x. 6. That several attempts to discuss said problem during sessions were all in vain because respondent declined to discuss it and would adjourn the session.x x x. For failure to file an Answer, Martinez was declared in default and was placed under preventive suspension for 60 days. Thereafter, the Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision which imposed upon Martinez the penalty of removal from office. The decision was conveyed to the mayor of Bayombong, Nueva Ecija. The mayor, however, issued a Memo wherein he stated that the Sangguniang Bayan has no power to order Martinez removal from office. However, the decision remains valid until reversed. Martinez then filed a special civil action for certiorari before the RTC. The court declared the decision void and maintained that the proper courts, and not the petitioner, are empowered to remove an elective official from office. Issue: WON the Sanggunian may remove Martinez, an elective local official, from office. Held: No Ratio: Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred upon the courts the power to remove elective local officials from office. During the deliberations of the Senate on the Local Government Code,[16] the legislative intent to confine to the courts, i.e., RTCs, the Sandiganbayan and the appellate courts, jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of elective local officials was evident. In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., the Court en banc categorically ruled that the Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since the power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the LGC. It further invalidated Article 125, Rule XIX of IRR. The Court nullified the rule since the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code exceeded its authority when it granted to the disciplining authority the power to remove elective officials, a power which the law itself granted only to the proper courts. Thus, it is clear that under the law, the Sangguniang Bayan is not vested with the power to remove Martinez. Petitioner contends that administrative cases involving elective barangay officials may be filed with, heard and decided by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, which can, thereafter, impose a penalty of removal from office. It further claims that the courts are merely tasked with issuing the order of removal, after the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan finds that a penalty of removal is warranted. The aforementioned position put forward by the petitioner would run counter to the rationale for making the removal of elective officials an exclusive judicial prerogative. In Pablico v. Villapando, the court declared that:The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove. (Emphasis supplied.) The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official from office is intended as a check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the disciplining authority. Vesting the

local legislative body with the power to decide whether or not a local chief executive may be removed from office, and only relegating to the courts a mandatory duty to implement the decision, would still not free the resolution of the case from the capriciousness or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Thus, the petitioners interpretation would defeat the clear intent of the law. Moreover, such an arrangement clearly demotes the courts to nothing more than an implementing arm of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang Bayan. This would be an unmistakable breach of the doctrine on separation of powers, thus placing the courts under the orders of the legislative bodies of local governments. The courts would be stripped of their power of review, and their discretion in imposing the extreme penalty of removal from office is thus left to be exercised by political factions which stand to benefit from the removal from office of the local elective official concerned, the very evil which Congress sought to avoid when it enacted Section 60 of the Local Government Code. As the law stands, Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides for the procedure for the filing of an administrative case against an erring elective barangay official before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. However, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan cannot order the removal of an erring elective barangay official from office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this power under Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of a grave nature and, if found guilty, would merit the penalty of removal from office, the case should be filed with the regional trial court. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction over the case even if it would be subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty less than removal from office is appropriate. On the other hand, the most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring elective barangay official is suspension; if it deems that the removal of the official from service is warranted, then it can resolve that the proper charges be filed in court. Petitioner alleged that an interpretation which gives the judiciary the power to remove local elective officials violates the doctrine of separation of powers. This allegation runs contrary to the 1987 Constitution itself, as well as jurisprudence.The doctrine of separation of powers is not absolute in its application; rather, it should be applied in accordance with the principle of checks and balances. The removal from office of elective officials must not be tainted with partisan politics and used to defeat the will of the voting public. Congress itself saw it fit to vest that power in a more impartial tribunal, the court. Furthermore, the local government units are not deprived of the right to discipline local elective officials; rather, they are prevented from imposing the extreme penalty of dismissal. Petitioner questions the Decision of the trial court for allowing the petition filed before it as an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. If, indeed, the Sangguniang Bayan had no power to remove Martinez from office, then Martinez should have sought recourse from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. This Court upholds the ruling of the trial court. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, which is based on sound public policy and practical consideration, is not inflexible. There are instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptions are: 1) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; 2) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; 3) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; 4) where the amount involved is relatively small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; 5) where the question raised is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; 6) where judicial intervention is urgent; 7) where its application may cause great and irreparable damage; 8) where the controverted acts violate due process; 9) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; 10) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 11) when strong public interest is involved; and 13) in quo warranto proceedings. As a general rule, no recourse to courts can be had until all administrative remedies have been exhausted. However, this rule is not applicable where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction and where the question or questions involved are essentially judicial. In this case, it is apparent that the Sangguniang Bayan acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order dated 28 July 2005 removing Martinez from office. Such act was patently illegal and, therefore, Martinez was no longer required to avail himself of an administrative appeal in order to annul the said Order of the Sangguniang Bayan.[24] Thus, his direct recourse to regular courts of justice was justified. Bien vs. Bo

Facts: Respondent Pedro B. Bo], since 1993, has applied with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) Legazpi City for the lease of a 10,000 square meter foreshore lot in Palale Beach, Bgy. San Isidro, Ilawod. Pending his application, he introduced improvements in the area necessary in putting up and in running a beach resort Office of the Ombudsman vs. CA and Barriga But a month before the DENR released its approval in April 2003 for the bidding of the lease covering the public land Col. Bo was applying for, his cottage and his coconut trees were destroyed. He had this occurrence entered in the police blotter in the Malilipot Municipal Police Station, and named Bgy. Captain Bello and Kgd. Bisona as those who led in the removal of his improvements to give way for the construction of twenty-two cottages, and that this was done in defiance of the directive of the DENR The bidding that was scheduled for June 2003 for the lease of the foreshore land never took place because the Sangguniang Barangay of San Isidro, Ilawod opposed Col. Bos lease application before the DENR, reasoning that the land should be used instead for barangay projects and not to benefit private individuals. The protest was then referred to the DENR-Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) for resolution. Land Management Officer (LMO) Santiago Olfindo took hold of the dispute and on October 21, 2003 conducted an ocular inspection on the public land. Findings: From the attached matrix it must be noted that almost all of the Barangay Officials had their own cottages and that the total cost of all improvements on the area subject of this case amounts to Four Hundred Seventy Nine. The matrix referred to by LMO Olfindo included [petitioner] Joephil Bien as one of the owners of the cottages built on Palale Beach on March 2003, and said report of LMO Olfindo became the DENR Regional Directors basis for denying the Sangguniang Barangays protest, finding that the cottages found therein were privately owned and illegally constructed, i.e., without securing the DENRs permit. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found all respondents therein, including herein petitioner Bien, administratively liable for Abuse of Authority - three (3) months suspension without pay for Abuse of Authority. CA denied respondents appeal Issue: WON petitioner is guilty of abuse of authority Held: Yes Ratio: In administrative cases, the requisite proof is substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. [6] In the case at bar, substantial evidence consisted in the findings of the DENR-PENRO identifying petitioner as one of the owners of the twenty-two (22) cottages illegally erected on the subject property covered by a lease application of respondent. The Final Report of the DENR-PENRO narrates the circumstances surrounding the conflict between respondent and the barangay officials of San Isidro Ilawod, concerning respondents application for lease of the subject property Moreover, the DENR Regional Executive Director categorically found that the barangay officials, respondents in the proceedings before the Deputy Ombudsman forLuzon, including herein petitioner Bien, illegally erected cottages on the subject property: The Sangguniang Barangay of San Isidro Ilawod, cannot, in the guise of resolutions assume the authority and task that pertain solely to the DENR as regards the administration

and management of the subject foreshore land. The introduction of improvements on the premises without the necessary permit from the DENR is illegal which we cannot countenance From the foregoing separate factual findings, respondent has sufficiently established that petitioner Bien was one of the barangay officials, albeit from a different barangay, who participated in the destruction of respondents cottage and coconut trees built and planted on the subject property. Petitioner further makes capital of the fact that he is not a barangay official of San Isidro Ilawod; necessarily, for him to be liable for abuse of authority, the exercise of power should have been done in the discharge of his office. His line of reasoning may be convincing had this been the only circumstance. But it must be taken into consideration that he is the ABC President to whom the barangay officials show deference to. Also, as correctly held by the Ombudsman, he is the ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan which is significantly mentioned to be the legislative body with the power to review barangay ordinances and with the authority to discipline barangay officials. The presence of his cottage as well as that of the other barangay officials in San Isidro Ilawod in Palale Beach showed an apparent connivance among them. It then follows that his participation as a higher authority had put a semblance of legality over the removal of complainants improvements in order that they may protect their personal interests over the foreshore lot. In this sense, there shows his misdemeanor as a public officer, an abuse of his authority Office of the Ombudsman vs. CA and Barriga Facts: Sonia Q. Pua (Pua), a Municipal Councilor of Carmen, Cebu, filed a complaint 4 with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas. Pua alleged that Virgilio E. Villamor (Villamor), Municipal Mayor; Bebelia C. Bontia (Bontia), Municipal Treasurer; and respondent Dinah C. Barriga (Barriga), Municipal Accountant, all public officials of Carmen, Cebu, entered into several irregular and anomalous transactions in their official capacity. These transactions pertained to the handling of the trust fund of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu in the Central Visayas Water and Sanitation Project. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas found Barriga guilty of misconduct and imposed on her the penalty of six months suspension from the service. In the same decision, the case against Villamor and Bontia were dismissed for being moot and academic. At the time, Villamor was no longer the incumbent mayor of Carmen, Cebu but the municipalitys elected vice-mayor and Bontia had already been dismissed from government service pursuant to a final decision of the Office of the Ombudsman dated 19 August 1998. 6 Upon review, petitioner Office of the Ombudsman modified the decision and found Barriga guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposed on her the penalty of suspension for one year CA denied appeal. SC affirmed and dismissed 2 MFRs. After a month, in a letter dated 10 August 2004, petitioner, through the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, again directed the municipal mayor of Carmen, Cebu to implement the Order dated 13 November 2002. In a letter11 dated 16 August 2004 addressed to petitioner, Barriga made a request that the implementation of the penalty of one-year suspension be held in abeyance pending the issuance of the entry of judgment by this Court in G.R. No. 160402. The request was denied by petitioner in a letter dated 3 September 2004. 12 Barriga then challenged the said letters of petitioner with the CA through a petition for review. Thereafter, in a Decision dated 18 March 2005, the CA denied Barrigas appeal. Barriga filed a motion for reconsideration. In a Resolution dated 16 June 2005, the CA modified its earlier decision and declared as null and void the orders of petitioner in the letters dated 10 August 2004 and 3 September 2004. The CA explained that the acts of petitioner went beyond mere recommendation but rather imposed upon the mayor to implement the order of suspension which run counter to its authority.

Issue: WON Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in nullifying the orders of the Office of the Ombudsman to the municipal mayor of Carmen, Cebu for the immediate implementation of the penalty of suspension from service of respondent Barriga even though the case was pending on appeal. Held: Yes Ratio: Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7: An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer. It is clear from the provision that when a public official has been found guilty of an administrative charge by the Office of the Ombudsman and the penalty imposed is suspension for more than a month, just like in the present case, an appeal may be made to the CA. However, such appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory and the implementation of the decision follows as a matter of course. The CA is incorrect. The provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman is clear that an appeal by a public official from a decision meted out by the Ombudsman shall not stop the decision from being executory. In Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals and Macabulos, 19 we held that decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending appeal in the CA. Thus, the Ombudsmans order imposing on Barriga the penalty of suspension from office for one year without pay is immediately executory even pending appeal in the Court of Appeals. Hulleza vs. Escalante Facts: Leonilo B. Hulleza (petitioner) was appointed City Engineer of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental on July 1, 2001. As city engineer, he is the head of the engineering department and in charge of all engineering and public works of the City of Cadiz. Pursuant to his position, he was receiving a salary of P27,529.00 and a RATA (Representation and Transportation Allowance) of P9,500.00 a month. On April 19, 2006, Hon. Mayor of Cadiz City, Salvador G. Escalante, Jr., (respondent) issued Memorandum Order No. 061-SGE- 20063, authorizing Melecio D. Bacomo, Jr. (Mr. Bacomo), City Planning and Development Coordinator, to sign documents relating to projects funded under the Twenty Percent (20%) Development Fund. Said Memorandum Order was later amended by Memorandum Order No. 069-SGE-20064, expanding Mr. Bacomo's authority to sign documents which includes preparation of program, implementation and payment of all infrastructure projects of the City regardless of the source of funds. The latest Memorandum did not however, relieve petitioner of his duty of preparing program of work and detailed estimate of infrastructure projects subject however to the authority of the respondent. In view of the foregoing Memoranda, payment for the projects were released to the contractors concerned even without the required Certificate of Completion signed by the petitioner. On September 11, 2006, petitioner filed a letter-complaint against Mrs. Fernandez before the Ombudsman of Cebu City regarding the release of payment of infrastructure projects without his approval. On July 2, 2007,

respondent Mayor issued Memorandum Order No. 112-SGE-20075, placing petitioner under floating status. The Memorandum states: In view of the charges filed against you before the Office of the Ombudsman and for the loss of trust and confidence, you are hereby placed under FLOATING STATUS until further notice. This unfortunate turn of events impelled petitioner to file a Complaint7 at the Office of the President against respondent for Abuse of Authority, Dishonesty and Dereliction of Duty premised on the following grounds: a) respondent unlawfully stripped him of his function as City Engineer because of his (petitioner) strict adherence to the guidelines and requirements for the release of payment of infrastructure and public work projects; and, his issuance of the Order of Suspension of work to T.S.D. Builders and Construction Supply and his recommendation to terminate the pakyaw labor of the construction of Gabaldon school building due to various contract violations; b) for placing him under floating status after the Ombudsman required the respondent to appear before it in connection with his letter-complaint against Mrs. Fernandez; and, c) that there was no basis to place him under floating status since there was no case filed against him with the Ombudsman. In refutation of petitioner's accusations, respondent in his Answer9 countered that in issuing Memorandum Order Nos. 061-SGE-2006 and 069-SGE-2006, he is merely exercising his duty as Chief Executive provided under Section 455 (b) of the Local Government Code, which necessarily includes the exercise of general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the city government as well as to ensure that city funds are applied to the payment of expenses and settlement of obligations of the City. 2009, the Office of the President rendered the assailed Decision, dismissing petitioner's complaint in this tenor: Complainant, through the requisite standard of substantial evidence, was not able to establish and convince this Office that respondent is liable for abuse of authority, dishonesty and dereliction of duty. Issue: WON the act of respondent Mayor in placing petitioner on floating status constitutes abuse of authority, dishonesty and dereliction of duty which are grounds for disciplinary action under Section 60 of RA 7160. Held: Yes Ratio: Abuse means to make excessive or improper use of a thing, or to employ it in a manner contrary to the natural or legal rules for its use. To make an extravagant or excessive use, as to abuse ones authority (Blacks Law Dictionary <5th Ed.>, II). It includes misuse Applying the foregoing legal definition, We find petitioner to have exceeded his authority in issuing the Floating Status Memorandum to petitioner as it is not in accordance with the legal precepts of law. For one, it is not grounded on just or valid cause. Section 2(3), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution mandatorily dictates that, No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. Loss of trust and confidence and the existence of a pending case are not among the valid grounds provided by law for removing or dismissing an employee from service. Moreso, records failed to show that petitioner was accorded due process prior to the issuance of the Floating Status Memorandum. Moreover, a careful reading of the assailed Order reveals that the floating status of petitioner does not contain a definite date or period of duration. To be specific, Memorandum Order No. 112-SGE-2007 simply states petitioner is hereby placed under floating status until further notice.

Although a charge of Malversation was filed against petitioner before the Ombudsman, this alone cannot be used as sufficient basis for the respondent to place petitioner under a floating assignment and removed from him the duties and responsibilities of a city engineer. Instead of issuing the Floating Status Memorandum, the most prudent and appropriate action the respondent could have done was to place petitioner on preventive suspension pending the trial of the malversation case he filed against the latter of which he is empowered under Section 8511 of the Local Government Code. On a different note, We give credence to the argument of petitioner that the issuance of the Floating Status Memorandum constitutes constructive dismissal. As City Engineer, petitioner holds a permanent appointment in the government service, he cannot be unilaterally stripped of his function and deprived of the the RATA he is entitled to receive without any valid cause and right to due process. Having ruled that petitioner was constructively dismissed in view of his unjust separation from work and absence of the benefit of procedural due process, he is entitled to be reinstated to his former position with corresponding payment of his RATA. On the argument that petitioner is not entitled to receive his RATA because DBM Circular and the General Appropriations Act (GAA) dictate that the actual performance of official duties and responsibilities is a prerequisite to the grant of RATA, We find the same inapplicable in the present case. The foregoing rule does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that under all circumstances, RATA is paid only if the RATA entitled officer actually discharges his office. There are times that the non-performance of duties may result from compliance with orders devoid of the employees volition such as suspension, termination resulting in reinstatement, or, as in this case, placed on floating status. Clear from the records that the issuance of a floating assignment to petitioner has effectively prevented him from actively performing his duties as City Engineer. Hence, under this circumstance, petitioner is still entitled to receive his RATA because his inability to perform the functions of his office is beyond his control and not of his own volition. However, it must be noted that under prevailing jurisprudence, an illegally terminated civil service employee is entitled to back salaries limited only to a maximum of five years and not full back salaries from his illegal termination up to his reinstatement. The same also applies with the payment of RATA. Thus, in the case at bar, petitioner is only entitled to receive his RATA limited to five years from July 2, 2007, the time when he was placed on floating status by respondent. With regard to the charge of Dishonesty and Dereliction of Duty, We concur with the findings of the Office of the President that petitioner failed to establish the same by the requisite proof. Verily, We find respondent guilty of abuse of authority in the performance his function beyond the contemplation of law by issuing the Floating Status Memorandum which amounted to the constructive dismissal of petitioner. However, the imposition of the appropriate penalty against the respondent is rendered moot and academic by the fact that respondent is no longer the Local Chief Executive of the City of Cadiz by reason of the expiration of his term of office per Our verification from the Website16 of the City Government of Cadiz which gave the information that the current Mayor of Cadiz City is Dr. Patrick G. Escalante. d. Sexual Harassment versus Elective Local Government Officials and Local Government Employees, Heads of Departments Civil Service Administrative Rule on Sexual Harassment

RA 7877 Book I, Title II, Chapter 4 LGC Mollaneda vs. Umacob Facts: affidavit-complaint for sexual harassment filed by Leonida Umacob ( respondent) against Arnold Mollaneda (petitioner) with the Civil Service Commission - Regional Office XI, Davao City (CSC-RO XI) in September 1994 alleging: 7:30 oclock more or less, in the morning, while inside the office of Mr. Rolando P. Suase, Admin Officer 2 of Davao City Schools, located at the Division Office Building, along Palma Gil St., Davao City, to follow-up my request for transfer from my present assignment to either Buhangin District or Bangoy District, Davao City, Mr. Rolando P. Suase was not around and it was school Division Superintendent, Mr. Arnold P. Mollaneda who was seated at his (Rolando's) table, All of a sudden he hugged and embraced me, then he kissed my nose and lip in a torrid manner. That I tried to resist but he forcibly held my neck so that he was able to kiss me in an easy way. That - not contented, he then mashed my left breast. He did the malicious act for several times, afterwhich he warned me not to tell anybody what he did to me inside the office. Meanwhile, pending resolution by the CSC-RO XI of respondents complaint, the DECS investigating committee recommended to the DECS Regional Director "the dropping of the case" for lack of merit. 8 On June 5, 1995, the CSC-RO XI issued a resolution charging petitioner with grave misconduct, oppression, abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service . The said office found there was a prima facie case against him9 and eventually elevated to the Civil Service Commission (Commission) the records of the case. Commission issued Resolution No. 973277 finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service . He was meted the penalty of dismissal from the government service with all its accessory penalties CA affirmed Issue: WON Mollaneda is guilty Held: yes Ratio: The fact that the Commission assigned Atty. Buena to hear and receive evidence does not render its factual findings unworthy of credence. In laying down the precedent that the matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is best performed by trial courts or administrative bodies rather than by appellate courts, this Court merely recognizes that the trial court or the administrative body as a trier of facts is in a better position to assess the demeanor of the witnesses and the credibility of their testimonies as they were within its proximal view during the hearing or investigation. At any rate, it cannot be gainsaid that the term administrative body or agency includes the subordinate officials upon whose hand the body or agency delegates a portion of its authority. Included therein are the hearing officers through whose eyes and ears the administrative body or agency observes the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses and listens to their testimonies. The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present

his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met. In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. It must be addressed that, the Commissions act of delegating the authority to hear and receive evidence to Atty. Buena is not without legal basis. Section 47, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987) provides that the Commission may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct an investigation on the complaint filed by a private citizen against a government official or employee. Going further, petitioner complains that he was not furnished a copy of Atty. Buenas notes and recommendation. The Court cannot empathize with him. In Ruiz v. Drilon,18 we unequivocally held that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendation of any investigating committee created to inquire into the charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against him during the hearing. 20 Besides, Atty. Buena's findings and recommendation are internal communications between him and the Commission Petitioners second argument requires no lengthy discussion. First, he did not raise the issue of forumshopping before the Commission.22 It bears emphasis that respondent merely furnished the DECS-RO XI a copy of her affidavit-complaint. And second, we surveyed the records and there is nothing therein which supports petitioners claim that the DECS-RO XI dismissed respondent's affidavit-complaint. The resolution22 of the DECS mainly recommended to the Regional Director of the DECS-RO XI the dropping of the case. A recommendatory resolution does not have the effect of actually disposing of a case. On petitioners assertion that the testimony of respondents witnesses are hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible in evidence, we are constrained to hold a different view. A reading of the testimonies of Umacob and Mariano shows that they were not presented to prove the truth of respondents accusations against petitioner, but only to establish the fact that respondent narrated to them what transpired between her and petitioner. While it is true that the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made Lastly, petitioner cannot find solace in the dismissal of the criminal case against him (act of lasciviousness in the MTC). Long-ingrained in our jurisprudence is the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case against an accused who is a respondent in an administrative case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence does not foreclose the administrative proceeding against him or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. In dismissing the case, the court is simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of the respondent beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction because of the presumption of innocence which the Constitution guarantees an accused.27However, in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence. 28 Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion Jacutin vs. People Facts: Juliet Q. Yee, then a 22-year old fresh graduate of nursing, averred that on 28 November 1995 her father accompanied her to the office of petitioner at the City Health Office to seek employment. Juliets father

and petitioner were childhood friends. On 01 December 1995, around nine oclock in the morning, she and her father went back to the office of petitioner. The latter informed her that there was a vacancy in a family planning project for the city and that, if she were interested, he could interview her for the job. Petitioner then started putting up to her a number of questions. When asked at one point whether or not she already had a boyfriend, she said no. Petitioner suggested that perhaps if her father were not around, she could afford to be honest in her answers to the doctor. The father, taking the cue, decided to leave. Petitioner then inquired whether she was still a virgin, explaining to her his theory on the various aspects of virginity. He hypothetically asked whether she would tell her family or friends if a male friend happened to intimately touch her. Petitioner later offered her the job where she would be the subject of a research program. When she got to the office, petitioner made several telephone calls to some hospitals to inquire whether there was any available opening for her. Not finding any, petitioner again offered her a job in the family planning research undertaking. She expressed hesitation if a physical examination would include hugging her but petitioner assured her that he was only kidding about it. Petitioner then invited her to go bowling. While driving, petitioner casually asked her if she already took her bath, and she said she was so in a hurry that she did not find time for it. Petitioner then inquired whether she had varicose veins, and she said no. Petitioner told her to raise her foot and lower her pants so that he might confirm it. She felt assured that it was all part of the research. Petitioner still pushed her pants down to her knees and held her thigh. He put his hands inside her panty until he reached her pubic hair. Surprised, she exclaimed hala ka! and instinctively pulled her pants up. She hesitated for a while but, eventually, raised it up to her navel. Petitioner then fondled her breast. Shocked at what petitioner did, she lowered her shirt and embraced her bag to cover herself, telling him angrily that she was through with the research. He begged her not to tell anybody about what had just happened. Before she alighted from the car, petitioner urged her to reconsider her decision to quit. He then handed over to her P300.00 for her expenses. On 16 December 1995, she attempted to slash her wrist with a fastener right after relating the incident to her mother. Noticing that Juliet was suffering from some psychological problem, the family referred her to Dr. Merlita Adaza for counseling. Dr. Adaza would later testify that Juliet, together with her sister, came to see her on 21 December 1995, and that Juliet appeared to be emotionally disturbed, blaming herself for being so stupid as to allow Dr. Jacutin to molest her. Dr. Adaza concluded that Juliets frustration was due to post trauma stress. The Sandiganbayan, through its Fourth Division, rendered its decision, dated 05 November 1999, penned by Mr. Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, finding the accused, Dr. Rico Jacutin, guilty of the crime of Sexual Harassment under Republic Act No. 7877. Issue: WON petitioner is guilty Held: Yes Ratio: Act 7877, SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands,

requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act. (a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when: (1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee. Petitioner was the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City, a position he held when complainant, a newly graduated nurse, saw him to enlist his help in her desire to gain employment. He did try to show an interest in her plight, her father being a boyhood friend, but finding no opening suitable for her in his office, he asked her about accepting a job in a family planning research project. While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city personnel, it should stand to reason, nevertheless, that a recommendation from petitioner in the appointment of personnel in the municipal health office could carry good weight. Indeed, petitioner himself would appear to have conveyed, by his words and actions, an impression that he could facilitate Juliets employment. Indeed, petitioner would not have been able to take undue liberalities on the person of Juliet had it not been for his high position in the City Health Office of Cagayan de Oro City. The findings of the Sandiganbayan were bolstered by the testimony of Vivian Yu, petitioners secretary between 1979 to 1994, of Iryn Lago Salcedo, Public Health Nurse II, and of Farah Dongallo y Alkuino, a city health nurse, all of whom were said to have likewise been victims of perverse behavior by petitioner. And finally, in the logbook, under the sub-heading, Others Present, the attendance of those who attended was individually handwritten by the persons concerned who wrote and signed their names. But in the case of Dr. Tiro and Dr. Rico Jacutin, their names were handwritten by clerk Sylvia Tan-Nerry, not by Dr. Tiro and Dr. Jacutin. However, Myrna Maagad testified that the logbook was passed around to attending individuals inside the conference room. Most importantly, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan must be respected by, if not indeed conclusive upon, the tribunal, no cogent reasons having been sufficiently shown to now hold otherwise. Conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, the grant of moral and exemplary damages by the Sandiganbayan must be tempered to reasonable levels. Moral damages are not intended to enrich a complainant but are awarded only to enable an injured party obtain some means that would help obviate the sufferings sustained on account of the culpable action of an offender. Its award must not appear to be the result of passion or undue prejudice, and it must always reasonably approximate the extent of injury and be proportional to the wrong committed. Indeed, Juliet should be recompensed for her mental anguish. Dr. Merlita F. Adaza, a psychological counseling expert, has found Juliet to be emotionally and psychologically disturbed and suffering from post trauma stress following her unpleasant experience with petitioner. The Court finds it fitting to award in favor of Juliet Yee P30,000.00 moral damages. In addition, she should be entitled to P20,000.00 exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against, or as a negative incentive to curb, socially deleterious actions Civil Service Commission vs. Belagan Facts: 2) separate complaints filed respectively by Magdalena Gapuz, founder/directress of the Mother and Child Learning Center, and Ligaya Annawi, a public school teacher at Fort Del Pilar Elementary School, against respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports

(DECS), all from Baguio City. Magdalena charged respondent with sexual indignities and harassment, while Ligaya accused him of sexual harassment and various malfeasances. Magdalenas sworn complaint alleges that sometime in March 1994, she filed an application with the DECS Office in Baguio City for a permit to operate a pre-school. One of the requisites for the issuance of the permit was the inspection of the school premises by the DECS Division Office. Since the officer assigned to conduct the inspection was not present, respondent volunteered his services. In the course of the inspection, while both were descending the stairs of the second floor, respondent suddenly placed his arms around her shoulders and kissed her cheek. Dumbfounded, she muttered, Sir, is this part of the inspection? Pati ba naman kayo sa DECS wala ng values? Respondent merely sheepishly smiled. At that time, there were no other people in the area. Sometime in September 1994, Magdalena read from a local newspaper that certain female employees of the DECS in Baguio City were charging a high-ranking DECS official with sexual harassment. Upon inquiry, she learned that the official being complained of was respondent. She then wrote a letter-complaint for sexual indignities and harassment to former DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria. On October 4, 1994, respondent was placed under suspension. On the part of Ligaya Annawi, she alleged in her complaint that on four separate occasions, respondent touched her breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her groins, embraced her from behind and pulled her close to him, his organ pressing the lower part of her back. On January 9, 1995, the DECS Secretary rendered a Joint Decision[4] finding respondent guilty of four (4) counts of sexual indignities or harassments committed against Ligaya; and two (2) counts of sexual advances or indignities against Magd alena. He was ordered dismissed from the service. Upon appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), on September 23, 1996, promulgated Resolution No. 966213[6] affirming the Decision of the DECS Secretary in the case filed by Magdalena but dismissing the complaint of Ligaya. The CSC ruled that respondents transgression against Magdalena constitutes grave misconduct. Thus: The acts of Belagan are serious breach of good conduct since he was holding a position which requires the incumbent thereof to maintain a high degree of moral uprightness. As Division Superintendent, Belagan represents an institution tasked to mold the character of children. Furthermore, one of his duties is to ensure that teachers in his division conduct themselves properly and observe the proper discipline. Respondent claimed that the numerous cases filed against Magdalena cast doubt on her character, integrity, and credibility. Respondent then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. As stated earlier, it reversed the CSC Resolutions and dismissed Magdalenas complaint. The Appellate Court held that Magdalena is an unreliable witness, her character being questionable. Given her aggressiveness and propensity for trouble, she is not one whom any male would attempt to steal a kiss. In fact, her record immediately raises an alarm in any one who may cross her path.[11] Issue: WON Respondent is guilty Held: Yes Ratio: Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy. [15] One statutory exception is that relied upon by respondent, i.e., Section 51 (a) 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which we quote here:

SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions. (a) In Criminal Cases: (3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged. It will be readily observed that the above provision pertains only to criminal cases, not to administrative offenses. And even assuming that this technical rule of evidence can be applied here, still, we cannot sustain respondents posture. Not every good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved under this provision. Only those which would establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged. This means that the character evidence must be limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of offense charged. [16] Thus, on a charge of rape - character for chastity, on a charge of assault - character for peaceableness or violence, and on a charge of embezzlement - character for honesty In the present administrative case for sexual harassment, respondent did not offer evidence that has a bearing on Magdalenas chastity. What he presented are charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries, malicious mischief, etc. filed against her. Certainly, these pieces of evidence are inadmissible under the above provision because they do not establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged. Obviously, in invoking the above provision, what respondent was trying to establish is Magdalenas lack of credibility and not the probability or the improbability of the charge. In this regard, a different provision applies. Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in the testimony given. It refers to a persons integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief Although she is the offended party, Magdalena, by testifying in her own behalf, opened herself to character or reputation attack pursuant to the principle that a party who becomes a witness in his own behalf places himself in the same position as any other witness, and may be impeached by an attack on his character or reputation.[23] With the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the character or reputation of a complaining witness in a sexual charge is a proper subject of inquiry. This leads us to the ultimate question is Magdalenas derogatory record sufficient to discredit her credibility? A careful review of the record yields a negative answer. First, most of the twenty-two (22) cases filed with the MTC of Baguio City relate to acts committed in the 80s, particularly, 1985 and 1986. With respect to the complaints filed with the Chairmen of Barangay Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, the acts complained of took place in 1978 to 1979. In the instant administrative case, the offense was committed in 1994. Surely, those cases and complaints are no longer reliable proofs of Magdalenas character or reputation. The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in according much weight to such evidence. Settled is the principle that evidence of ones character or reputation must be con fined to a time not too remote from the time in question.[24] In other words, what is to be determined is the character or reputation of the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement of the suit. Second, respondent failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted in any of the criminal cases specified by respondent. The general rule prevailing in a great majority of jurisdictions is that it is not permissible to show that a witness has been arrested or that he has been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his credibility

But more than anything else, what convinces us to sustain the Resolution of the CSC is the fact that it is supported by substantial evidence. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Magdalena testified in a straightforward, candid and spontaneous manner. Her testimony is replete with details, such as the number of times she and respondent inspected the pre-school, the specific part of the stairs where respondent kissed her, and the matter about her transient boarders during summer. Magdalena would not have normally thought about these details if she were not telling the truth. In reversing the CSCs Resolutions, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is ample evidence to show that Magdalena had a motive in accusing respondent, i.e., to pressure him to issue a permit. This is unconvincing. The record shows that respondent had already issued the permit when Magdalena filed her lettercomplaint. Indeed, she had no more reason to charge respondent administratively, except of course to vindicate her honor. Petitioner prays that we sustain its ruling penalizing respondent for grave misconduct and not merely for disgraceful or immoral conduct which is punishable by suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense.[35] Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government official. [36] To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer.[37] In grave misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest. [38] Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.[39] This is apparently present in respondents case as it concerns not only a stolen kiss but also a demand for a date, an unlawful consideration for the issuance of a permit to operate a pre -school. We are, however, not inclined to impose the penalty of dismissal from the service. Respondent has served the government for a period of 37 years, during which, he made a steady ascent from an Elementary Grade School Teacher to Schools Division Superintendent. In devoting the best years of his life to the education department, he received numerous awards.[41] This is the first time he is being administratively charged. He is in the edge of retirement. In fact, he had filed his application for retirement when Magdalena filed her complaint. Section 16, Rule XIV, of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 provides: SEC. 16. In the determination of penalties to be imposed, mitigating and aggravating circumstances may be considered. j. length of service Narvasa vs. Sanchez, Jr. Facts: The parties to this case are employees of the Municipality of Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya (the LGU). Petitioner Teresita G. Narvasa is a senior bookkeeper while respondent Benjamin A. Sanchez, Jr. is the municipal assessor. The instant case stemmed from three cases of sexual harassment filed separately against respondent by petitioner along with Mary Gay P. de la Cruz and Zenaida M.Gayaton, who are also employees of the LGU. On or about April 22 to 25, 2002, Gayaton received several messages from respondent stating: (1) I like you; (2) Have a date with me; (3) Dont tell to (sic)others that I told that I like you because nakakahiya; (4) Puso mo to pag bigay moto sakin, I would be very happy and (5) I slept and dreamt nice things about you. Finally, as far as petitioners complaint was concerned, she asserted [8] that, on November 18, 2000, during a

field trip of officers and members of the St. Joseph Multi-Purpose Cooperative to the Grotto Vista Resort in Bulacan, respondent pulled her towards him and attempted to kiss her. Based on the investigation conducted by the LGUs Committee on Decorum and Investigation (CODI), respondent was found guilty of all three charges by Municipal Mayor Marvic S. Padilla. For the offenses committed against De la Cruz and Gayaton, respondent was meted the penalties of reprimand for his first offense of light harassment and 30 days suspension for his first offense of less grave sexual harassment. His transgression against petitioner, however, was deemed to be grave sexual harassment for which he was dismissed from the government service. On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) passed only on the decision in the case filed by petitioner since, under the CSC rules, the penalty of reprimand and/or suspension of not more than 30 days cannot be appealed. The CSC dismissed the appeal but modified Mayor Padillas order by holding respondent guilty of grave misconduct instead of grave sexual harassment.[9] The same penalty of dismissal from the service, however, was meted out to respondent. The CA modified the CSC resolution, finding respondent guilty only of simple misconduct.[10] Accordingly, the penalty was lowered to suspension for one month and one day. Issue: whether the acts committed by respondent against petitioner (since the CSC resolution only touched upon petitioners complaint) constitute simple misconduct or grave misconduct. Held: Yes Ratio: Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior.[11] To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. [12] In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.[13] We disagree with the CA that neither corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule attended the incident in question. RA [14] 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, took effect on March 5, 1995. Respondent was charged with knowledge of the existence of this law and its contents, more so because he was a public servant. His act of grabbing petitioner and attempting to kiss her without her consent was an unmistakable manifestation of his intention to violate laws that specifically prohibited sexual harassment in the work environment. Assuming arguendo that respondent never intended to violate RA 7877, his attempt to kiss petitioner was a flagrant disregard of a customary rule that had existed since time immemorial that intimate physical contact between individuals must be consensual. Respondents defiance of custom and lack of respect for the opposite sex were more appall ing because he was a married man. The CA, however, interpreted respondents repeated apologies to petitioner as an indication of the absence of intention on his part to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. On the contrary, such persistent attempts to make peace with petitioner indicated how well respondent was aware of the gravity of the transgression he had committed. Section 53 of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases provides a list of the circumstances which may be considered in the determination of penalties to be imposed.[15] The CA considered respondents more than ten years of government service and claim of being awarded Most Outstanding Municipal Assessor of Region II for three years as mitigating circumstances. Again, we disagree. Length of service as a factor in

determining the imposable penalty in administrative cases is a double-edged sword.[16] In fact, respondents long years of government service should be seen as a factor which aggravated the wrong that he committed. Having been in the government service for so long, he, more than anyone else, should have known that public service is a public trust;[17] that public service requires utmost integrity and strictest discipline, and, as such, a public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity. [18] Furthermore, we note that this is the third time that respondent is being penalized for acts of sexual harassment. We are also alarmed by the increasing boldness in the way respondent displayed his unwelcome affection for the women of his fancy