5/16 EMAIL FROM PHILIP CONCERNING CHRIS'S EDITS ON THE QUESTIONS:

Stephanie --

I think these could be improved by putting the bottom set of questions

about building on the joint inquiry up top, and use only the first two
of those.

Then I would follow with the oversight questions, but first lead them
off with these questions:

1. Do you think the Congress bears any responsibility for the systemic
problems that contributed to the 9/11 attack?

2. If Congress had done an after-action report on its own performance,

what would top your suggested list of 'lessons learned' for the
Congress?

Then put a heading — Some Specific Oversight Issues — for the rest of
the questions.

Philip
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X^ I

Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
Panel 2: Intelligence Oversight and the Joint Inquiry

May 22,2003
This panel focuses on Congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community, as well as the
Joint Inquiry's investigation of the Intelligence Community's performance prior to the September
11th attacks. The panel consists of current and former leaders of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). Set
forth below are questions that (1) cover several of the major challenges facing Congress in
conducting oversight of intelligence, and (2) solicit recommendations for areas for the
Commission's investigation that build upon the Joint Inquiry's findings.

OVERSIGHT
1. Effectiveness Of Congressional Oversight. What do you see as the principal problems with
current Congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community?
• Do you see the committees' original purpose — curtailing abuses — now superceded by
other objectives such as improving the management of the intelligence community and
allocating resources? How are the Committees doing on this score?
• What are your chief recommendations as to how the oversight function can be improved?
What would you change in terms of structure, function, or staffing?
• Do you believe that the Members and the staff have enough time, expertise and
information to carry out their oversight functions properly? What do you recommend?

2. Oversight or Micromanagement? The classified annexes to the intelligence authorization and

appropriations bills — giving detailed guidance to the community on the expenditure of funds,
and requiring reports to Congress on scores of different topics — are now hundreds of pages in
length.
• Do these annexes represent an appropriate level of oversight, or do they represent
micromanagement and an unnecessary limit on the DCI's flexibility?
• Is guidance from the Committees at the proper level of strategic direction, or do Members
and staff have a tendency to get too far down in the weeds?
• If the latter, what do you do about it? How do you curb micromanagement and yet insure
that Congress gets the information it needs to perform oversight properly?
• In short, how do you get the system of Executive-Legislative interaction in the
intelligence community to work better?
3. The Intelligence Committees'Jurisdiction. The HPSCI has more expansive jurisdiction than
the SSCI. How do the intelligence committees work with the Armed Services, Judiciary, and
Appropriations Committees and the House Homeland Security Committee concerning
intelligence oversight and resource allocation?
• Do you advocate re-aligning jurisdictions so that there is better coverage and fewer
"seams" between the world of foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement?

4. The Rotation System. How does the rotation system (limits on the terms of Members'
Committee service) affect oversight capability?
• How serious of a problem is term limits on Members' service on the intelligence
committees?
• What recommen4ations would you make as to how Members are appointed to the
Intelligence Committees, and as to how long they may serve on the Committee?

5. The Effect Of Secrecy On Congressional Oversight. One often gets the impression that the
Intelligence Committees do their work all alone. Members really cannot talk very much to their
colleagues about their work; and public scrutiny — by press, NGOs, and outside experts, so
helpful in other areas of public policy -- is exceedingly limited. The oversight process places an
awful lot of responsibility in the hands of the Intelligence Committees.
• How do the Executive Branch's security rules impact Congress's ability to conduct
oversight of intelligence?
• Do you have any recommendations as to how the oversight process can be broadened,
without jeopardizing the protection of sources and methods?
• How, specifically, would you change security rules?

WORK OF THE JOINT INQUIRY

1. Building On The Joint Inquiry. Given the Joint Inquiry's investigation of the Intelligence
Community, what areas concerning intelligence do you recommend that the Commission study?
• What lessons should the Commission learn from the Joint Inquiry's experience in
examining the Intelligence Community?
• What recommendations from the Joint Inquiry do you believe are the most important for
the Commission to consider?
2. Questions For The Commission. As you know, the Commission has a mandate to tell the story
of the September 11th attacks and recommend ways to prevent future attacks.
• What do you think are the most critical questions for the Commission?
• What is the most important advice you would give us?

3. The Joint Inquiry's Call For A Director Of National Intelligence. What has been the public
reaction to the Joint Inquiry's recommendation for creation of a Director of National
Intelligence?
• How important is such a recommendation?
• How exactly would a DNI interact with the Secretary of Defense? What, if anything,
would be different from their current relationship?