Gatchalian vs Comelec Facts: the Comelec promulgated Rsolution RR707 holding that "donations of billboards to the Commission by foreigners

or companies or corporations owned and controlled partially or wholly by foreigners are not covered by the provision of Sec. 56 of the Revised Election Code." The Comelec also promulgated Resolution No. RR-731 to the effect that the ban in Sec. 46 of the Revised Election Code, as amended, does not cover the projected campaign for funds and other contributions by the Advertising Council of the Philippines and others similarly situated, during the 120 days immediately preceding a regular or special election; and "that in line with the ruling in its resolution numbered RR-707, donations and contributions for the above campaign may be received from foreigners, companies or corporation owned and/or controlled wholly or partially by foreigners. The petitioner, a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention, filed a petition with the Comelec impugning the validity of said Resolutions Nos. RR-707 and 731 as violative of Sec. 56 of the Revised Election Code. Sec. 56 of the Revised Election Code provides that No foreigner shall aid any candidate, directly or indirectly, or to take part in or to influence in any manner any elections. The prohibited active intervention of foreigners thereunder may consist of: (1) aiding any candidate, directly or indirectly, in any election; (2) taking part in any election; and (3) influencing in any manner any election. The Comelec denied the petitioner's petition on, the ground "that contributions by foreigners to the Comelec Billboards Committee for the purpose of financing costs of Comelec billboards are not made in aid or support of any particular candidate in a particular district and that the allocation of space for its candidate is allowed by lottery, nor would it in any way influence the result of the election. Issues: 1. WON the term "any elections" as used in Sec. 56 of the REC includes the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention as implemented by RA. 6132. 2. WON the term "foreigner as employed in the law includes both natural and juridical persons or associations or organized groups, with or without legal personality. 3. WON The third issue is whether the term "any candidate" in Sec. 56 comprehends "some candidates" or "all candidates." 4. WON the word "aid" is understood to mean to support, to help, to assist or to strengthen or to act in cooperation with. Held: 1. Yes, because Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 expressly enumerates prohibited acts "In addition to and supplementing prohibited acts provided for in the Revised Election Code." Said Sec. 56 of the Revised Election Code, as amended, defines one such prohibited act or corrupt election practice. Moreover, Sec. 2 of Res. No. 2 states that the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention "shall be held on the second Tuesday in November, 1970 in accordance with the Revised Election Code," which is restated in Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6132. 2. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that a law is understood to contain, by implication, if not by its expressed terms, all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose. And that the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of its part. Under Sec. 39 of Art. III of the Revised Election Code, "the term "person" includes an individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation and any other organization or group of persons."4 Sec. 39 refers to contributions from or expenditures by any person for the purpose of influencing or attempting to influence the election of candidates. The contributors to electoral campaign funds are either natural or artificial persons, or an organized group of persons without separate legal personality. Sec. 39 even goes further by including in the definition of the term "person," a committee or any other group of persons which may not have any juridical personality. Moreover, under Sec. 185 of the Revised Election Code, as amended, Sec. 56, a violation of which is a serious election offense under Sec. 183 of the same Code, may be violated by an entity which, if found guilty, shall be sentenced to pay a fine of from five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) and its President, officials and employees performing duties connected with the offense committed are liable as principals, accomplices or accessories as the case may be, in addition "to the responsibility of such entity."5 To limit the term "foreigner" to natural persons would be unrealistic and would remove much of the bite in the prohibition. It should not be disputed that juridical persons or organized groups whether civic, fraternal, religious, professional, trade, or labor have more funds than individuals with which to subsidize a candidate. Consequently, the influence of a juridical person or organized group, which is a contributor or donor, is greater than that of any natural person. Furthermore, any, juridical person organized group has more interests to protect than any of its component members or stockholders. And if the interest of the individual stockholders or members of the juridical person or organized group were also to be considered, because usually the stockholders or members have common cause with their corporation or organized group, such artificial person or organized group together with its members will be under a more compelling motivation to aid a candidate or to influence the conduct as well as the outcome of the election even to frustrate the holding of the election if it is necessary to protect, if not enhance, their interests.

It has likewise been held that in the absence of an expressed statutory provision or instruction the word "person" comprehends private corporations unless it appears that it is used in a more limited sense, and that prima faciethe word "person" under even a penal statute which is intended to inhibit an act, must be a "person in law" that is, an artificial as well as a natural person and therefore includes corporations if they are within the sphere and purpose of the statute.6 There is nothing in the Revised Election Code, much less in Sec. 56 itself, indicting that the term "foreigner" is limited only to natural persons. Neither is there any provision in the same Revised Election Code expressly or impliedly suggesting that the circumstances of an artificial person in law are not identical to those of natural persons covered by the prohibition in the Revised Election Code. On the contrary, there is greater reason to believe that the law-maker feared more the assistance and influence of artificial persons in the elections than the aid of natural persons. Hence, the law utilizes the more generic term "foreigner." 3. The term "any can candidate" should be construed also to mean some or all candidates. It has been held that the term "any candidate" voted for at any election refers to "candidates"; 9 and that the term "any person" is not limited to "any person" in the singular, but is applicable as well to two or more persons. 10. When the context so indicates, the word may be construed to mean, and indeed it has been frequently used in its enlarged and plural sense, as meaning "all," "all or every," "each," "each one of all," "every," without limitation; indefinite number or quantity, an indeterminate unit or number of units out of many or all, one or more as the case may be, several, some. Penal laws, like Sec. 56 and the Revised Penal Code, usually refer to the felon in the singular. It is possible that, to play safe or for his own protection, the donor may aid or assist both opponents or all of them, especially if they have approximately the same political strength or following. 4. In law, the word "aid" is understood to mean to support, to help, to assist or to strengthen or to act in cooperation with. On the other hand, the term "to take part" means to participate or to engage in; while the term "influence" means to use the party's endeavors, though he may not be able to carry his point, or to exert or have an effect on the nature or behaviour of, or affect the action or thought of, or modify; or to sway; to persuade; to affect; to have an effect on the condition or development of; to modify or act upon physically, especially in some gentle, subtle, or gradual way; or to exert or maintain a mental or moral power upon or over; to effect or sway by modifications, feelings or conduct. It would indeed be a myopic view and the height of naivete to believe that donations for Comelec billboards will not aid the candidates nor in any way influence the elections, no matter how small the contributions may be. The fact that alien donors have no direct participation in the distribution or allocation of the Comelec billboards, does not inevitably mean that they have no participation in the elections nor exercise any influence in the same, nor give assistance to any candidate. Billboards are means of propaganda. Supplying billboards to all candidates is an assistance greater than the aid that may be given to one candidate. The influence therefore that may be exerted jointly by the donors on all the candidates is correspondingly as great, because all the candidates benefited thereby will naturally be grateful to the donors for such needed materials for their publicity or propaganda. This is even worse than supporting a single candidate, because if the latter's opponent wins he will not be amenable to influence by those who supported the adversary out in donations of this sort, whoever wins will feel grateful. The contributions or donations, no matter how small, can effect the thinking or attitude of the victorious candidates in dealing with matters involving foreigners, and more so when the sum total of all these donations is to be taken into account. The aggregate total will certainly generate a greater influence on the triumphant candidates than the contribution of one foreigner considered separately or individually. Then again, masterminds and financiers almost always stay in the background from where they issue order to those who are either their outright dummies or who are beholden to them. This will open the floodgates to undesirable alien influences in our country, which may be exercised subtly and covertly in many guises and forms. In matters of national interest as well as affecting civil liberties, the caveat is obsta principiis oppose or resist from the very beginning such "erosion of small encroachments." The resolutions of the Commission on Elections Nos. RR-707 and are hereby declared illegal and null and void.

G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992 LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner, vs. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION and THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents. Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act No. 6683 was approved on 2 December 1988 providing for benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act, as follows: Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on 30 January 1989 with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results. 1 Her letter for reconsideration dated 25 April 1989 pleaded thus: With due respect, I think the interpretation of the Honorable Commissioner of RA 6683 does not conform with the beneficent purpose of the law. The law merely requires that a government employee whether regular, temporary, emergency, or casual, should have two consecutive years of government service in order to be entitled to its benefits. I more than meet the requirement. Persons who are not entitled are consultants, experts and contractual(s). As to the budget needed, the law provides that the Department of Budget and Management will shoulder a certain portion of the benefits to be allotted to government corporations. Moreover, personnel of these NIA special projects art entitled to the regular benefits, such ( sic) leaves, compulsory retirement and the like. There is no reason why we should not be entitled to RA 6683. Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) emphasized: We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted. The provision of Section 3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 does not only require an applicant to have two years of satisfactory service on the date of separation/retirement but further requires said applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment status as of December 2, 1988, the date of enactment of R.A. 6683. The law does not contemplate contractual employees in the coverage. Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, the date of your separation from the service, is co-terminous with the NIA project which is contractual in nature, this Commission shall sustain its original decision. In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari, insisting that she is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683. Her arguments: It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 requires an applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment status. Likewise, the provisions of Section 23 ( sic) of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1, implementing guidelines of R.A. No. 6683, provides: "2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A. No. 6683 are the following: a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform specific activities or services with a definite expected output: i.e. membership in Task Force, Part-Time, Consultant/Employees. b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police (PC-INP). c) Appointive officials and employees who retire or elect to be separated from the service for optional retirement with gratuity under R.A. No. 1616, 4968 or with pension under R.A. No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 6680 or P.D. No. 1146, an amended, or vice- versa. d) Officials and employees who retired voluntarily prior to the enactment of this law and have received the corresponding benefits of that retirement/separation.

e) Officials and employees with pending cases punishable by mandatory separation from the service under existing civil service laws, rules and regulations; provided that if such officials and employees apply in writing within the prescriptive period for the availment of the benefits herein authorized, shall be allowed only if acquitted or cleared of all charges and their application accepted and approved by the head of office concerned." Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not belong to any one of them. Ms. Chua is a full time employee of NIA entitled to all the regular benefits provided for by the Civil Service Commission. She held a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A, a position which belongs to the Administrative Service. . . . If casuals and emergency employees were given the benefit of R.A. 6683 with more reason that this petitioner who was holding a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A and has rendered almost 15 years of faithful, continuous service in the government should be similarly rewarded by the beneficient ( sic) purpose of the law. 4 The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment petitioner's exclusion from the benefits of Republic Act No. 6683, because: 1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per appointment papers kept by the Administrative Service in the head office of NIA (the service record was issued by the Watershed Management and Erosion Control Project (WMECP), Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija). The project, funded by the World Bank, was completed as of 31 December 1988, after which petitioner's position became functus officio. 2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA her position is not included in its regular plantilla. She belongs to the non-career service (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient; on the other hand, retirement presupposes employment for a long period. The most that a non-career personnel can expect upon the expiration of his employment is financial assistance. Petitioner is not even qualified to retire under the GSIS law. 3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's appointment is permanent, security of tenure is available only for the term of office (i.e., duration of project). 4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant separation or retirement benefits but reorganization 5 to streamline government functions. The application of the law must be made consistent with the purpose for which it was enacted. Thus, as the expressed purpose of the law is to reorganize the government, it will not have any application to special projects such as the WMECP which exists only for a short and definite period. This being the nature of special projects, there is no necessity for offering its personnel early retirement benefits just to induce voluntary separation as a step to reorganization. In fact, there is even no need of reorganizing the WMECP considering its short and limited life-span. 6 5. The law applies only to employees of the national government, government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters and local government units. Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the parties, the Court is called upon to define the different classes of employees in the public sector (i.e. government civil servants). Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as amended) deems an employment regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. No equivalent definition can be found in P.D.No. 807 (promulgated on 6 October 1975, which superseded the Civil Service Act of 1965 R.A. No. 2260) or in the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 promulgated on 25 July 1987). The Early Retirement Law itself (Rep. Act No. 6683) merely includes such class of employees (regular employees) in its coverage, unmindful that no such specie is employed in the public sector. The appointment status of government employees in the career service is classified as follows: 1. permanent one issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which appointment is made, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules and Standards promulgated in pursuance thereof; 7 2. temporary In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment should be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, That such temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available. 8 The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as: (1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required; (2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;

(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President. (4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs; (5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate merit system; (6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and (7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. 9 The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by: . . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made. Included in the non-career service are: 1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff; 2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and their personal confidential staff(s); 3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or confidential staff; 4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency. 5. emergency and seasonal personnel. 10 There is another type of non-career employee: Casual where and when employment is not permanent but occasional, unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature (Caro v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96 Phil. 945) Consider petitioner's record of service: Service with the government commenced on 2 December 1974 designated as a laborer holding emergencystatus with the NIA Upper Pampanga River Project, R & R Division. 11 From 24 March 1975 to 31 August 1975, she was a research aide with temporary status on the same project. On 1 September 1975 to 31 December 1976, she was with the NIA-FES III; R & R Division, then on 1 January 1977 to 31 May 1980, she was with NIA UPR IIS (Upper Pampanga River Integrated Irrigation Systems) DRD. On 1 June 1980, she went to NIA W.M.E.C.P. (Watershed Management & Erosion Control Project) retaining the status oftemporary employee. While with this project, her designation was changed to personnel assistant on 5 November 1981; starting 9 July 1982, the status became permanent until the completion of the project on 31 December 1988. The appointment paper 12 attached to the OSG's comment lists her status as co-terminus with the Project. The employment status of personnel hired under foreign assisted projects is considered co-terminous, that is, they are considered employees for the duration of the project or until the completion or cessation of said project (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27 June 1990). Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years government service. Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987, provides:

WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated June 22, 1984, the Civil Service Commission is charged with the function of determining creditable services for retiring officers and employees of the national government; WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order No. 966 provides that all previous services by an officer/employee pursuant to a duly approved appointment to a position in the Civil Service are considered creditable services, while Section 6 (a) thereof states that services rendered oncontractual, emergency or casual status are non-creditable services; WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid provisions inasmuch as some contractual, emergency or casual employment are covered by contracts or appointments duly approved by the Commission. NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services rendered on contractual, emergency or casual status, irrespective of the mode or manner of payment therefor shall be considered as creditable for retirement purposes subject to the following conditions : (emphasis provided) 1. These services are supported by approved appointments, official records and/or other competent evidence. Parties/agencies concerned shall submit the necessary proof of said services; 2. Said services are on full time basis and rendered prior to June 22, 1984, the effectivity date of Executive Order No. 966; and 3. The services for the three (3) years period prior to retirement are continuous and fulfill the service requirement for retirement. What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal, project, co-terminous or contractual personnel? All are tenurial employees with no fixed term, non-career, and temporary. The 12 May 1989 CSC letter of denial 13 characterized herein petitioner's employment as co-terminous with the NIA projectwhich in turn was contractual in nature. The OSG says petitioner's status is co-terminous with the Project. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizes the status of a co-terminous employee (3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person whose entrance in the service is characterized by confidentiality by the appointing authority or that which is subject to his pleasure or co-existent with his tenure. The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified into the following: a) co-terminous with the project When the appointment is co-existent with the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of funds for the same; b) co-terminous with the appointing authority when appointment is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority. c) co-terminous with the incumbent when appointment is co-existent with the appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or termination of the services of the incumbent the position shall be deemed automatically abolished; and d) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g. "co-terminous for a period of 3 years" the appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration thereof, the position is deemed abolished. It is stressed, however, that in the last two classifications (c) and (d), what is termed co-terminous is the position, and not the appointee-employee. Further, in (c) the security of tenure of the appointee is guaranteed during his incumbency; in (d) the security of tenure is limited to a specific period. A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees. We see no solid reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary, casual andemergency employees. But specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The legislature would not have made a specific enumeration in a statute had not the intention been to restrict its meaning and confine its terms and benefits to those expressly mentioned 14 or casus omissus pro omisso habendus est A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. 15 Yet adherence to these legal maxims can result in incongruities and in a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 16 comes to mind where, workers belonging to a work pool, hired and re-hired continuously from one project to another were considered non-project-regular and permanent employees.

Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive projects during a span of fifteen (15) years. Although no proof of the existence of a work pool can be assumed, her service record cannot be disregarded. Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." . . . In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. 17 Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause were we to sustain respondents' submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by said law. The maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be the applicable maxim in this case but the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that: No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the Maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus. 18 During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early Retirement Law), in response to Congressman Dimaporo's interpellation on coverage of state university employees who are extended appointments for one (1) year, renewable for two (2) or three (3) years, 19 he explained: This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early retirement and voluntary separation. It is irrespective of the actual status or nature of the appointment one received, but if he opts to retire under this, then he is covered. It will be noted that, presently Pending in Congress, is House Bill No. 33399 (a proposal to extend the scope of the Early Retirement Law). Its wording supports the submission that Rep. Act No. 6683 indeed overlooked a qualified group of civil servants. Sec. 3 of said House bill, on coverage of early retirement, would provide: Sec. 3. Coverage. It will cover all employees of the national government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual, emergency and contractual employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years government service as of the date of separation. The term "contractual employees" as used in this Act does not include experts and consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform specific activities or services with definite expected output. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act. (emphasis supplied) The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to trim the bureaucracy, hence, vacated positions are deemed abolished upon early/voluntary retirement of their occupants. Will the inclusion of co-terminous personnel (like the petitioner) defeat such objective? In their case, upon termination of the project and separation of the project personnel from the service, the term of employment is considered expired, the officefunctus officio. Casual, temporary and contractual personnel serve for shorter periods, and yet, they only have to establish two (2) years of continuous service to qualify. This, incidentally, negates the OSG's argument that co-terminous or project employment is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient, whereas, retirement presupposes employment for a long period. Here, violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution becomes glaring because casuals are not even in the plantilla, and yet, they are entitled to the benefits of early retirement. How can the objective of the Early Retirement Law of trimming the bureaucracy be achieved by granting early retirement benefits to a group of employees (casual) without plantilla positions? There would, in such a case, be no abolition of permanent positions or streamlining of functions; it would merely be a removal of excess personnel; but the positions remain, and future appointments can be made thereto. Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered years of continuous service should be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their application prior to the expiration of their term, and as long as they comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose. In this connection, Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1990 (5 March 1990) implementing Rep. Act No. 6850, 20 requires, as a condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven (7) years of government service which need not be

continuous, in the career or non-career service, whether appointive, elective, casual, emergency, seasonal, contractual or co-terminous including military and police service, as evaluated and confirmed by the Civil Service Commission. 21 A similar regulation should be promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of co-terminous personnel who survive the test of time. This would be in keeping with the coverage of "all social legislations enacted to promote the physical and mental well-being of public servants" 22 After all, co-terminous personnel, are also obligated to the government for GSIS contributions, medicare and income tax payments, with the general disadvantage of transience. In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. While the application was filed after expiration of her term, we can give allowance for the fact that she originally filed the application on her own without the assistance of counsel. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must be granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years the minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a favorable disposition of petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683, in accordance with the pronouncements in this decision. SO ORDERED GETZ CORPORATION PHILS., INC., OSCAR G. BALAGOT, EDUARDO M. ORTIZ, JOSELITO M. TAN, and BEATRIZ ALO, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ALEJANDRO R. BONCAROS, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, Branch 1, and the SPOUSES SAMUEL ERUM and LETICIA ERUMrespondents. Petitioner Getz Corporation Philippines, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the distribution and sale of consumer goods as well as machinery and heavy equipments throughout the Philippines. The other petitioners are officers of the corporation. Respondent Samuel Erum was employed by petitioner corporation on January 3, 1969 as Territory Salesman. He was subsequently promoted to the position of Area Manager, then to District Manager. He was District Manager for the Visayas and Mindanao areas with home base at Cebu City when his services were terminated on January 8, 1979 by petitioner corporation for alleged loss of trust and confidence, gross negligence in the performance of managerial functions, and violation of company policies. On March 20, 1979, respondent, with his wife Leticia Siwa Erum as his co-plaintiff, filed against petitioner-corporation and its officers with the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, an action for Recovery of Termination Pay, Other Employment Benefits and Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 7214. 1 He prayed that his dismissal be declared oppressive, malicious and illegal; that the effective date of termination of his employment be fixed as of the date of the finality of the Decision; and that petitioners be ordered to pay in solidum, his unpaid salary and other employment benefits, termination pay, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs. On June 18, 1979, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action; that venue was improperly laid; and that the Complaint stated no cause of action in so far as plaintiff Leticia Siwa Erum is concerned. 2 On December 5, 1980, the Trial Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, stating that the controversy over the act of severance of employment and the money claims resulting therefrom arose out of employer-employee relationship which fall squarely within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters.t@lF The Court cited the case of Garcia vs. Martinez 3 to support its ruling. 4 Respondent moved for reconsideration 5 citing the Resolution of this Court in that same case of Garcia vs. Martinez, 90 SCRA 331 (1979), wherein we set aside the Decision in the same case rendered earlier, on the basis of Presidential Decree No. 1367, which took effect on May 1, 1978, giving ordinary Courts jurisdiction to award actual and moral damages in case of illegal dismissal. Said amendatory decree was deemed a curative statute and given retroactive effect to cover a claim filed in a regular Court before the issuance of the decree. On April 9, 1981, the Trial Court applying the ruling in Calderon vs. Court of Appeals, 6 which was also based on PD 1367, reconsidered and set aside its Order of December 5, 1980, reinstated the case, and directed the petitioners to file an Answer thereto. 7 Petitioners sought to reconsider the Order, claiming that the Calderon case is not applicable, and that the case arose out of employer-employee relationship and is not a simple money claim. 8 The Trial Court denied reconsideration on September 1, 1981. 9 Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction (CA-G.R. No. SP-13157-SCA) seeking to set aside the Orders dated April 9, 1981 and September 1, 1981 of the Trial Court, and praying that the latter Court be ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 7214. 10

On January 26, 1982, respondent Court of Appeals upheld the questioned Orders of the Trial Court and dismissed the Petition for lack of merit. 11 A Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration was filed by petitioners arguing that the Trial Court had no jurisdiction to rule on the legality of respondent's dismissal, to fix the date of termination of his employment, and to award salary and other employment benefits. 12 Respondent Court of Appeals denied the Motion stating that the arguments set forth therein regarding difficulties arising from the division of jurisdiction between Courts and the Ministry of Labor are more properly directed to the Legislature. 13 On April 6, 1982, petitioners filed the present Petition for Review on certiorari contending that the Calderon case upon which the respondent Courts relied upon, is not applicable in this case as the acts complained of arose out of employer-employee relationship which properly pertains to the Labor Arbiters; and that under Presidential Decree No. 1691, private respondents' claim for actual and compensatory damages are now within the exclusive competence of the labor tribunals. On April 21, 1982, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that the grounds relied upon for review are without merit, reiterating the applicability of the Calderon case; that the grounds raised are unsubstantial to merit consideration by this Court; and that the Petition is intended for delay. We considered respondents' Motion to Dismiss as their Comment and gave due course to the Petition. We find merit in petitioners' submissions. The dismissal from the service of respondent, Samuel Erum, gave rise to the cause of action in this case. His claims for termination pay, other employment benefits, and damages, clearly arose out of an employer-employee relationship. Although the cause of action came into being when PD 1367 expressly stipulating that "Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral or other forms of damages" was still in effect, and upon which the Calderoncase was premised, said Decree was no longer applicable when the Trial Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on December 5, 1980, and when it reconsidered and set aside said Order of dismissal on April 9, 1981 and reinstated the case in its docket. PD 1367 had been superseded by PD 1691 enacted on May 1, 1980, which restored to Labor Arbiters and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) exclusive jurisdiction over all money claims of workers and all other claims arising from employer-employee relations, including moral and exemplary damages. 14 The pertinent provisions of PD 1691, read: 1wph1.t Article 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have theoriginal and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non- agricultural: 1. Unfair labor practice cases; 2. Unresolved issues in collective bargaining, including those that involve wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; 3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; 4. Cases involving household services; and 5. All other claims arising from employer-employee relations, unless expressly excluded by this Code. (b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters, compulsory arbitrators, and voluntary arbitrators in appropriate cases provided in Article 263 of this Code (Emphasis supplied). The provisions reading "all money claims of workers ..." and all other claims arising from employer-employee relations ..." are comprehensive enough to include claims for moral and exemplary damages of a dismissed employee against his employer. 15 Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental has no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by private respondents before it for unpaid salary and other employment benefits, termination pay, moral and exemplary damages. WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted and the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals hereby set aside. Respondent Judge is directed to dismiss Civil Case No. 7214 without prejudice to the right of respondent Samuel Erum to refile his claims against petitioner Getz Corporation Philippines, Inc., with the proper Regional Office of the Ministry of Labor and Employment. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-30761 July 11, 1973 THE SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, THE MAYOR, and THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF MANDAUE, PROVINCE OF CEBU, respondents. Petition for writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in Civil Case No. R-10631, upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 23, series of 1966, as amended by Ordinance No. 25, series of 1967, of the Municipality of Mandaue, Cebu, imposing "a graduated quarterly fixed tax based on the gross value of money or actual market value at the time of removal of the manufactured articles from their factories or other manufacture or processing establishments." In enacting the said ordinances, the municipal council of Mandaue invoked as basis of its authority Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act). The relevant portion of Section 1, Ordinance No. 23 (1966), as amended by Ordinance No. 25 (1967), provides as follows: SECTION 1. Municipal License Tax On Proprietors Or Operators Of ... Breweries, ... Proprietors or operators of ... breweries, ... within the territorial limits of this municipality shall pay a graduated quarterly fixed tax based on the gross value in money or actual market value at the time of removal, of the manufactured articles from their factories ... during the preceding quarter in accordance with the following schedules: ...: CLASS QUARTERLY LICENSE TAX P160.00 and P0.30 for QUARTERLY GROSS VALUE each P1,000.00 or fraction thereof in excess 1 P37,500.00 or over of P37,500.00 gross value. 2 P31.250.00 to P37,499.99 P158.00 per quarter 3 25,000.00 to 31,249.99 132.00 " " 4 20,000.00 to 24,999.99 105.00 " " 5 15.000.00 to 19,999.99 83.00 " " 6 12.500.00 to 14,999.99 63.00 " " 7 10,000.00 to 12,499.99 50.00 " " 8 8,750.00 to 9,999.99 42.00 " " 9 7,500.00 to 8,749.99 37.00 " " 10 6,500.00 to 7,499.99 31.00 " " 11 5,500.00 to 6,499.99 27.00 " " 12 4,500.00 to 5,499.99 23.00 " " 13 3,750.00 to 4,499.99 19.00 " " 14 3,000.00 to 3,749.99 16.00 " " 15 2,500.00 to 2,999.99 13.00 " " 16 2,000.00 to 2,499.99 11.00 " " 17 1,750.00 to 1,999.99 9.00 " " 18 1,500.00 to 1,749.99 8.00 " " 19 1,250.00 to 1,499.99 7.00 " " 20 Less than P1,250.00 5.00 " " The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Ordinance No. 23 which was not amended by Ordinance No. 25 states: Payment of Municipal License Tax. A fixed tax imposed on this ordinance must first be paid before any person can engage in business and is payable for each taxable business; ... The graduated fixed tax provided in this ordinance shall be paid at the Office of the Municipal Treasurer quarterly, on or before the twentieth of January, April, July and October; ... . Provided further, That as regards businesses already operating at the time this ordinance takes effect, the tax for the initial quarter shall be paid pursuant to the provisions of this ordinance and shall be based on the gross value in money during the quarter immediately preceding, ... . Within the time fixed for the payment of the license taxes herein imposed, the taxpayers shall prepare and file with the Municipal Treasurer, a sworn statement of the gross value in money during the preceding quarter on the basis of which the tax shall be assessed and collected. ... .

The basic Ordinance was No. 88, 1 which took effect on September 25, 1962, but this was amended by Ordinance No. 23 (January 1, 1967), and by Ordinance No. 25 (January 1, 1968). Petitioner, a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing beer and other products with a subsidiary manufacturing plant in Mandaue, Cebu, since December, 1967, paid the taxes prescribed in the aforesaid ordinance, protest thus: P309.40 on January 22, 1968 and P5,171.80 as of July 18, 1968, computed respectively "on the basis of 70,412 and 2,203.070 cases of beer manufactured and removed from said Mandaue plant, multiplied by P7.60 which is the prevailing market price (wholesaler's price) per case of beer at the time of the removal". Claiming that it is adversely affected by the ordinance, which in its view was beyond the power and authority of the municipality to enact, petitioner brought and action in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI, for the annulment of said ordinance. Petitioner contends that (1) the phrase "gross value in money or actual market value" employed in the questioned ordinance clearly referred to "sales or market price" of the articles or commodities manufactured thereby indicating a manifest intent to impose a tax based on sales, and (2) that to impose a tax upon the privilege of manufacturing beer, when the amount of the tax is measured by the gross receipts from its sales of beer, is the same as imposing a tax upon the product itself. Respondents upon the other hand insist that the tax imposed in the questioned ordinance (1) is not a percentage tax or a tax on the sales of beer but is a tax on the privilege to engage in the business of manufacturing beer, and the phrase "actual market value" was merely employed as a basis for the classification and graduation of the tax sought to be imposed; (2) that it is not a specific tax because it is not a tax on the beer itself, but on the privilege of manufacturing beer; and (3) that with conversion of Mandaue into a city on June 21, 1969, the appeal has become moot, because the prohibition against the imposition of any privilege tax on sales or other taxes in any form based thereon, is applicable only to municipalities. While We have heretofore announced the doctrine that the grant of power to tax to charterred cities and municipalities under Section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act is sufficiently plenary, 2 it is, however, subject to the exceptions and limitations contained in the two (2) provisos of the same statute. In other words, the municipal corporation should not transcend the limitations imposed by the statute on the basis of which the power to tax is sought to be exercised. Thus, We held in the Marinduque case, 3 that an ordinance providing for a graduated tax based on either "gross output or sales" violates the prohibition on municipalities against imposing any percentage tax on sales, or other taxes in any form based thereon, as the only standard provided for measuring the gross output is its peso value, as determined from true copies of receipts and/or invoices that the taxpayer is required to submit to the municipal treasurer. We are thus confined to the narrow issue of whether or not the challenged ordinance has transcended the exceptions and limitations imposed by section 2 of Republic Act 2264. Section 2 of the aforecited statute provides: Provided, That municipalities and municipal districts shall, in no case, impose any percentage tax on sales or other taxes in any form based thereon nor impose taxes on articles subject to specific tax ... . Section 1 of Ordinance No. 88 of the Municipality of Mandaue, as amended by Ordinances Nos. 23 (1967) and 25 (1968), specifically provides that the graduated quarterly tax shall be "based on the gross value in money or actual market value at the time of removal, of the manufactured products ... from their factories ... during the preceding calendar year ... . Well settled is the rule that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, technical or commercial terms and phrases, when used in tax statutes, are presumed to have been used in their technical sense or in their trade or commercial meaning. Thus, the phrase "gross value in money" has a welldefined meaning in our tax statutes. For instance, the term "gross value in money" of articles sold, bartered, exchanged or transferred, as used in Sections 184, 185 and 186 of the National Internal Revenue Code, has been invariably used as equivalent to "gross selling price" and has been construed as the total amount of money or its equivalent which the purchaser pays to the vendor to receive or get the goods. 4 It must be noted that the ordinance specifically provides that the basis of the tax is the "gross value in money or actual market value" of the manufactured article. The phrase "actual market value" has been construed as the price which an article "would command in the ordinary course of business, that is to say, when offered for sale by one willing to sell, but not under compulsion to sell, and purchased by another who is willing to buy, but under no obligation purchase it, 5 or the price which the property will bring in a fair market after fair and reasonable efforts have been made to find a purchaser who will give the highest price for it. 6 The "actual market value" of property, for purposes of taxation, therefore means the selling price of the article in the course of ordinary business. Considering that the phrase "gross value in money" is followed by the words "or actual market value", it is evident that the latter was intended to explain and clarify the preceding phrase. For the word "or" may be used as the equivalent of "that is to say" and gives that which precedes it the same significance as that which follows it. It is not always disjunctive and is sometimes interpretative or expository of the preceding word. 7 Certainly We cannot assume that the phrase "or actual market value" was a mere surplusage, for it serves to clarify and explain the meaning and import of the preceding phrase. In any event, it is the duty of the courts, so far reasonably practicable, to read and interpret a statute as to give life and effect to its provisions, so as to render it a harmonious whole.

It is also significant to note, that there is a set ratio between the amount of the tax and the volume of sales. Thus if the "gross value in money or actual market value" of the beer removed from the factory exceeds P37,500.00 per quarter, the taxpayer is required to pay a quarterly license tax of P160.00 plus P0.30 for every P1,000.00 or fraction of the excess. In other words in excess of P37,500.00, the taxpayer will pay to the municipality a certain amount of tax measured by a percentage of the sales. It is therefore evident that the challenged ordinance was a transparent attempt on the part of the municipality to impose a tax based on sales. Although section 2 of the ordinance in question provides in a vague manner that the tax shall be assessed and collected on the basis of the sworn statement of the manager of a firm or corporation "of the gross value in money during the preceding quarter," in actual practice the quarterly tax levied upon the petitioner, was computed on the basis of the total market of the beer, per quarter, as shown by the shipping memorandum certified to by the storekeeper of the Bureau Internal Revenue assigned to the brewery. Thus the amounting to P309.40 and P5,171.80, paid by petition January 22, 1968 and July 18, 1968, were actually determined respectively on the basis of 70,412 and 2,203.070 cases manufactured and removed from the Mandaue plant, multiplied by P7.60 which is the prevailing market price (wholesaler's price) per case of beer. In Laoag Producers' Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. vs. Municipality of Laoag, 8 We held that the challenged ordinance imposed a tax based on sales, although the ordinance merely imposed a "municipal tax or inspection fee of on one-half (1/2) centavo on every kilo of Virginia leaf tobacco, garlic and onion on all wholesale dealers and vendors" because, in its application, it does impose a tax based on sales, as it is based the number of kilos sold and purchased by him and when the wholesaler or vendor accumulates his stock, he does so for only one purpose, to sell the same at the appropriate time, and "he cannot by its very nature, carry on his business unless he sells what he has bought." Similarly, in the case at bar, the circumstance that the tax is imposed upon petitioner at time of removal from the factory of the manufactured beer, and not on the date of actual sale, is not of important consequence since petitioner will, in the end, sell the beer removed from the factory, because by the nature of its business, it has no alternative but to sell what it has manufactured. We therefore hold that the questioned ordinance imposed tax based on sales and therefore beyond the authority of the municipality to enact. Having reached this conclusion, it becomes unnecessary to pass upon the additional question posed, i.e., whether or not the challenged ordinance imposes a tax on a product subject to specific tax. Respondents however claim that with the conversion Mandaue into a city pursuant to Republic Act No. 5519, which was approved on June 21, 1969, the issue has already become moot, since the prohibition contained in section 2 of Republic Act 2264 applies only to municipalities and not to chartered cities. The same contention has been rejected in City of Naga v. Court of Appeals, 9 and Laoag Producers' Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. v. Municipality of Laoag, supra, where We ruled that the legality of an ordinance depends upon the power of the municipality at the time of the enactment the challenged ordinance. Since the municipality of Mandaue had no authority to enact the said ordinance, the subsequent approval of Republic Act No. 5519 which became effective June 21, 1969, did not remove the original infirmity of the ordinance. Indeed there is no provision in the aforecited statute which invests a curative effect upon the ordinances of the municipality which when enacted were beyond its statutory authority. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed judgment is hereby reversed and Ordinance No. 23, series of 1966, as amended by Ordinance No. 23, series of 1966, which became effective January 1, 1968, of the Municipality of Mandaue, Cebu, is hereby declared null and void. Respondents are also ordered to refund the taxes paid by Petitioners under the said ordinance, with legal interest thereon. No costs. NILO A. MALANYAON, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. HON. ESTEBAN M. LISING, as Judge of the CFI of Camarines Sur, Br. VI, and CESARIO GOLETA, as Municipal Treasurer of Bula, Camarines Sur, Respondents-Appellees. The question which is presented to Us for resolution in this petition for review concerns the interpretation of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which stipulates: Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. The facts are stated in the Order dated October 3, 1980, of the respondent judge: The late Mayor S.B. Pontanal is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. P-339 for Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Upon the filing of the case against him in court and after hearing, he was suspended from office and during his incumbency he died. Due to his death the charge against him in Criminal Case No. P-339 was dismissed. Petitioner now contends that any disbursement of funds by the respondent, Cesario Goleta, in his capacity as Municipal Treasurer in favor of the heirs of the late Mayor for salaries corresponding to the period he was under suspension and other benefits will be illegal and contrary to the provisions of Section 13 because said late Mayor S.B. Pontanal was not acquitted of the charge against him. Nilo A. Malanyaon, the petitioner, was formerly a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur. He filed an action to declare illegal the disbursement made by Cesario Goleta as Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of Bula, Camarines Sur, to Venancia Pontanal, widow of the late

Mayor S.B. Pontanal, in the amount of P5,000.00 representing a portion of the salary of the late Mayor as such mayor of said municipality during the period of his suspension from August 16, 1977 up to November 28, 1979, and to restrain or prevent respondent Cesario Goleta as such Municipal Treasurer of the aforementioned municipality from further paying or disbursing the balance of the claim. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(Par. 1 of the Order, supra.) However, the respondent judge dismissed the action on the ground that the criminal case against the late Mayor S.B. Pontanal due to his death amounted to acquittal. We grant the petition and set aside the Order of the court a quo. It is obvious that when the statute speaks of the suspended officer being acquitted it means that after due hearing and con sideration of the evidence against him the court is of the opinion that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal of the case against the suspended officer will not suffice because dismissal does not amount to acquittal. As aptly stated in People v. Salico, 84 Phil. 722, 732-733[1949]: Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that defendants guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc. The only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper term acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has presented all its evidence, the defendant moves for the dismissal and the court dismisses the case on the ground that the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case is decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted before the court of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case the defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction. Respondents invoke Art. 81, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that Death of the accused pending appeal extingui shes his criminal and civil liability. We do not see the relevance of this provision to the case at bar. For one thing the case against Mayor Pontanal was not on appeal but on trial. For another thing the claim for back salaries is neither a criminal nor a civil liability. It is in fact a right provided the conditions of the law are present.:onad WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be well-taken, the same is hereby granted, the order of the court a quo is hereby set aside and another one is entered declaring illegal the payment of municipal funds for the salaries of the late Mayor S.B. Pontanal during his suspension from office and ordering the respondent treasurer to retrieve payments so far disbursed. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-25577 March 15, 1966

ONOFRE P. GUEVARA, petitioner, vs. RAOUL M. INOCENTES, respondent. This decision is written in keeping with the statement we made in our resolution dated February 16, 1966. Petitioner was extended an ad interim appointment as Undersecretary of Labor by the former Executive on November 18, 1965, having taken his oath of office on November 25 of the same year, and considering that the ad interim appointment for the same position extended to respondent by the incumbent Executive on January 23, 1966 is invalid in spite of Memorandum Circular No. 8 issued by the latter on the same date declaring all ad interimappointments made by the former Executive as having lapsed with the adjournment of the special session of Congress at about midnight of January 22, 1966, petitioner brought before this Court the instant petition for quo warranto seeking to be declared the person legally entitled to said office of Undersecretary of Labor. The petition is predicated on the following grounds: (1) under Article VII, Section 10(4) of the Constitution, petitioner's ad interim appointment is valid and permanent and may only become ineffective either upon express disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or upon the adjournment of the regular session of Congress of 1966; (2) here there has been no express disapproval by the Commission on Appointments because the same has never been constituted during the special session called by President Marcos in his Proclamation No. 2, series of 1966; and (3) there has been no adjournment of the Congress as contemplated in the Constitution because (a) the aforesaid special session was suspended by the House on Saturday, January 22, 1966 at 10:55 p.m. to be resumed on Monday, January 24, 1966 at 10:00 a.m.; (b) the resolution approved by the Senate on January 23, 1966 at past 2:00 a.m. for adjournment sine die is not the adjournment contemplated in Article VII, Section 10(a) of our Constitution; (c) the suspension by the House or the adjournment by the Senate to resume the session on January 24, 1966 at 10:00 a.m. meant the end of the special session and the start of the regular session as a continuous session without any interruption; and (d) the phrase "until the next adjournment of the Congress" must be related with the phrase "until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments" so that the adjournment contemplated should refer to a regular session during which the Commission on Appointments may be organized and allowed to discharge its functions as such. Respondent, on the other hand, set up the following defenses: (1) petitioner's ad interim appointment lapsed when Congress adjourned its last special session called under Proclamation No. 2 of President Marcos; (2) an ad interimappointment ceases to be valid after each term of Congress and so petitioner's appointment must have lapsed as early as December 30, 1965; (3) petitioner's ad interim appointment as well as others made under

similar conditions, is contrary to morals, good customs and public policy, and hence null and void; and (4) petitioner's appointment is void in the light of the doctrine laid down in Rodriguez, Jr. vs. Quirino, G.R. No. L-19800 October 28, 1953. After due deliberation, the Court resolved that the ad interim appointment extended to petitioner on November 18, 1965 by the former Executive lapsed when the special session of Congress adjourned sine die at about midnight of January 22, 1966, as embodied in our resolution dated February 16, 1966. We will now elaborate on the reasons expressed in said resolution. The important provision to be considered is Article VII, Section 10, Subsection 4 of our Constitution, which provides: The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. A perusal of the above-quoted provision would at once reveal that it is the clear intent of the framers of our Constitution to make a recess appointment effective only (a) until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments, or (b) until the next adjournment of Congress, and never a day longer regardless of the nature of the session adjourned. And this is so considering the plain language of the aforesaid provision which is free from any ambiguity in the light of the well-settled rule of statutory construction that "when the intention of the legislature is so apparent from the face of the statute that there can be no question as to its meaning there is no room for construction" (Vol. 2, Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 316). Hence, the above provision contemplates two modes of termination of an ad interim appointment, or of one made during the recess of Congress, which are completely separate from, and independent of, each other. And while during the special session called under proclamation No. 2 no Commission on Appointments was organized by Congress, the second mode of termination, however, had its constitutional effect, as when Congress adjourned sine die at about midnight of January 22. 1966. Such adjournment, in legal contemplation, had the effect of terminating petitioner's appointment thereby rendering it legally ineffective. Petitioner's theory that the first mode of termination consisting in the disapproval by the Commission on Appointments should be inseparately related with the clause "until the next adjournment of Congress" in the sense that the Commission has to be first organized in order that the last mode may operate is untenable considering that the latter is not dependent upon, nor influenced in any manner by the operation of the former. As already stated, the two modes of termination are completely separate from and independent of each other. If the framers of the Constitution had intended to make the operation of the second clause dependent upon the prior constitution of the Commission on Appointments they should have so stated in clear terms considering that the first clause implies a positive act of the Commission, while the second an entirely separate and independent act of Congress. Indeed, the theory of petitioner, if carried to its logical conclusion, may result into the anomaly that, should Congress be controlled by a party not inclined to organize said Commission, or should there arise a group which for reasons of its own indulges in obstructionism, the Commission on Appointments contemplated in the Constitution is never organized as a consequence of the action of either, any appointment made during the recess of Congress would never run the test of legislative scrutiny and would thereby then be always considered permanent even if it is extended ad interim, a result which, to be sure, was never intended by the framers of our Constitution. It thus becomes imperative that we avoid such absurd result. It is true that the provision of the Constitution we are now considering in speaking of the mode of termination epitomized in the phrase "until the next adjournment of the Congress" does not make any reference to any specific session of the Congress, whether regular or special, but such silence is of no moment, for it is a well-known maxim in statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish we should not distinguish. UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT NEC NOS DISTINGUERE DEBEMUS (Robles vs. Zambales Chromite Mining Company, et al., G. R. No. L-12560, September 30, 1958). Consequently, it is safe to conclude that the framers of our Constitution in employing merely the word adjournment as a mode of terminating an appointment made during the recess of Congress had in mind either the regular or special session, and not simply the regular one as contended by petitioner. Under our tripartite form of government predicated on the principle of separation of powers the power to appoint is inherently an executive function while the power to confirm or reject appointments belongs to the legislative department, the latter power having been conferred as a check on the former. This power to check may be exercised through the members of both Houses in the Commission on Appointments. But although the Commission on Appointments is provided for in the Constitution, its organization requires congressional action, and once organized, by express provision of the Constitution, it "shall meet only while Congress is in session." Consequently, if for any reason Congress adjourns a regular or special session without organizing the Commission on Appointments, Congress should be deemed to have impliedly exercised said power to check by allowing the ad interim appointments to lapse as provided for in the Constitution. The next important inquiry is: Since Congress in its special session held under Proclamation No. 2 of the President, series of 1966, did not deem it wise to organize the Commission on Appointments to act on the recess appointments made by the former Executive, can it be said that Congress is deemed to have impliedly exercised its power to check on such recess appointments when it adjourned its special session at about 12:00 o'clock midnight of January 22, 1966? The answer must of necessity be in the affirmative inasmuch as that special session actually adjourned in legal contemplation at about 12:00 midnight of January 22, 1966 considering that the Senate adjourned sine die at about said hour. Although the House allegedly suspended its session at 10:55 p.m. on January 22, 1966 to be resumed on Monday, January 24, 1966, at 10:00 a.m., Congress cannot be considered to be in special session subsequently to January 22 for the reason that the House without the Senate which had adjourned sine die, is not "Congress." Indeed, when the

Senate adjourned at 12:00 midnight on January 22, 1966 this adjournment should be considered as the "next adjournment of the Congress" of the special session notwithstanding the alleged suspension of the session earlier by the House for the reason that neither the House nor the Senate can hold session independently of the other in the same manner as neither can transact any legislative business after the adjournment of the other. None other than President Macapagal and Speaker Cornelio Villareal expressed such opinion when as members of the Lower House in 1954 they expoused and defended the same on the floor as can be seen from the following transcript of the congressional record: Mr. MACAPAGAL . . . Since the Senate has, by its own responsibility, adjourned one and a half hours ago, therefore, under the present facts, in our Constitution this House is automatically adjourned, and therefore it is improper and illegal for us to continue the proceedings farther. xxx xxx xxx

Mr. VILLAREAL Mr. Speaker, although it is true that I do not want to appeal from the ruling of the Chair, nonetheless, I maintain that our actuations from the time we approved that resolution will be illegal acts, and I do not want this Congress to commit illegal acts because it will affect the dignity of this Chamber. We are not unaware of the facts. I invite the Presiding Officer and everybody here to go to the Senate now, and if they accept my challenge, let us go so that I can prove to them that there is not one ghost of any Senator in that Chamber. The Senate has actually adjourned, Mr. Speaker, and are we to have a fiction here that the Senators are still holding a session? We approved that resolution of adjournment before twelve o'clock tonight knowing that the Senate adjourned two or three hours ago. Are we crazy here to believe that the Senators are still holding sessions? How can we in conscience justify our actuations here that we are still doing something for the benefit of the people when in fact and in truth we are not because we cannot do so? . . . Mr. Speaker, let us be frank; let us be honest to ourselves; let us not ridicule ourselves; let us adjourn now because we having nothing to do and all that we will do will be illegal beginning now. . . . Mr. Speaker. I honestly believe that legally we cannot do anything any further, and if I am the author of a bill pending approval, I would not submit the bill for passage now because that will be the subject of litigation in court as to whether such approval will be legal or not, and I would never risk my committee report to be submitted after the approval of that resolution, knowing fully well that actually and physically that Upper Chamber has already adjourned. (Congressional Record, House of Representatives, 3rd Congress, Republic of the Philippines, First Regular and First Special Sessions, Vol. I, pp. 4091 and 4094).1wph1.t As a corollary, the theory that there was a continuous session without any interruption when the house allegedly suspended its session at 10:55 p.m. on January 22, 1966 to be resumed on Monday, January 24, 1966 at 10:00 a.m. cannot be accepted, because such theory runs counter to wellestablished parliamentary precedents and practice. Thus, for one thing, between January 22, 1966 at 10:55 p.m. and January 24, 1966 at 10:35 a.m. when the House opened its regular session, there intervened January 23, 1966, which was Sunday, and as such is expressly excluded by the Constitution as a session day of Congress. For another, it is imperative that there be a "constructive recess" between a special and regular session, as when a regular session succeeds immediately a special session or vice-versa, and so a special session cannot be held immediately before a regular session without any interruption nor can both be held simultaneously together. Hinds' Precedents has the following to say on the matter: The commissions granted during the recess prior to the convening of Congress in extraordinary session November 9, 1903, of course furnished lawful warrant for the assumption by the persons named therein of the duties of the offices to which they were, respectively, commissioned. Their names were regularly sent to the Senate thereafter. If confirmed, of course they would hold under appointment initiated by the nomination without any regard to the recess commission. If not confirmed, their right to hold under the recess nomination absolutely ended at 12 o'clock meridian on the 7th of December, 1903, for at that hour the extraordinary session ended and the regular session of Congress began by operation of law. An extraordinary session and a regular session can not coexist, and the beginning of the regular session at 12 o'clock was the end of the extraordinary session; not a constructive end of it, but an actual end of it. At 12 o'clock December 7 the President pro tempore of the Senate said: Senators, the hour provided by law for the meeting of the first regular session of the Fifty-eighth Congress having arrived, I declare the extraordinary session adjourned without day. Aside from the statement upon the record that the "hour had struck" which marked the ending of the one and the beginning of the other, the declaration of the President pro tempore was without efficacy. It did not operate to adjourn without day either the Congress or the Senate. Under the law the arrival of the hour did both. The constitutional provision that the commission shall expire at the end of the next session is self-executing, and when the session expires the right to hold under the commission expires with it. If there be no appreciable point of time between the end of one session and the beginning of another, since of necessity one ends and another begins, the tenure under the commission as absolutely terminates as if months of recess supervened. (Hinds' Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States, Vol. V, p. 854.) Considering now petitioner's ad interim appointment and others extended under similar conditions in the light of the doctrine we laid down in the Aytona case, we may say that they were even more irregular than those involved in said case to the extend that they may be avoided even on this

ground alone. Thus, while President Garcia only extended 350 ad interim appointments after he had lost the election, President Macapagal made 1,717 ad interimappointments most of which were made only after the elections in November, 1965. As a consequence, the following anomalies were noted: a former presidential assistant was appointed judge of three different salas, another was appointed to a non-existing branch of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, while still another who had a pending disbarment case received an ad interim appointment as judge of first instance. This is indeed a far cry from the following admonition we made in the Aytona case: Of course, nobody will assert that President Garcia ceased to be such earlier than at noon of December 30, 1961. But it is common sense to believe that after the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, his was no more than a "caretaker" administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President, and he should not do acts which, he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. The time for debate had passed; the electorate had spoken. It was not for him to use his powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up of vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and the planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse of Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby to deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments. (Aytona vs. Castillo, et al., G.R. No. L-19313, January 20, 1962.) It is hoped that now and hereafter such excess in the exercise of power should be obviated to avoid confusion, uncertainty, embarrassment and chaos which may cause disruption in the normal function of government to the prejudice of public interest. It is time that such excess be stopped in the interest of the public weal. Wherefore, petition is denied. No costs. G.R. No. 96412. August 24, 1998 ANICETA RAMIREZ, AGUSTIN RAMIREZ, JR., LORNA RAMIREZ, NESTOR RAMIREZ, ROMEO RAMIREZ, CHITO RAMIREZ, PANCHO RAMIREZ, MARLON RAMIREZ, OSCAR RAMIREZ, SPOUSES VICENTE AND BALDOMERA ANION, AND SPOUSES ELMER AND BENG TEE SUNBANUM, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES BENEDICTO AND EVANGELINE RAMOS , Respondents. DECISION PURISIMA, J.: At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking to review and set aside the Decision dated April 18, 1990 and Resolution dated December 5, 1990 of the Court of Appeals,1 reversing the Order dated March 12, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 14,2 in Civil Case No. CEB-3801, and denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and Addendum to the Motion for Reconsideration. Involved here are two (2) Deeds of Sale over one and the same parcel of land in dispute. The first deed of sale is impugned for alleged non-payment of the full purchase price. The other deed is theorized upon as a mere equitable mortgage. The said first Deed of Sale3 was executed on December 18, 1965 by the spouses Agustin Ramirez and Aniceta Ramirez, as vendors, and Maria vda. de Ramos, as vendee, over a parcel of land registered in vendors names under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21560, for and in consideration of the sum of P28,000.00. Vendee took physical possession of the property deeded out but title thereto was not transferred in her name. The second Deed of Sale in question was inked on March 25, 1977 by Benedicto Ramos, as vendor, and Vicente Anion, as vendee. When Maria vda. de Ramos, mother of vendor Benedicto Ramos, died on April 7, 1974, he inherited subject parcel of land sold to his late mother under the first sale. As the sole heir, he (Benedicto Ramos)adjudicated to himself the said parcel of land and in the same instrument he conveyed the property to Vicente Anion, for and in consideration of the sum of P20,000.00, as evidenced by the Settlement and Extrajudicial Adjudication of the Estate of Maria vda. de Ramos by a Sole Heir with Simultaneous Sale of Inheritance dated March 25, 1977.4 Complications arose on December 29, 1982, when Agustin Ramirez, one of the vendors in the first sale, died. His wife, Aniceta, and children, Agustin, Jr., Lorna, Nestor, Romeo, Chito, Pancho, Marlon, and Oscar, all surnamed Ramirez, adjudicated to themselves the same parcel of land sold under the aforementioned first sale, and second sale. As shown in the Settlement and Extrajudicial Adjudication of Estate of Agustin Ramirez by the Undersigned Heirs with Deed of Sale,5 dated December 20, 1984 (Exhibit 4), the above- named heirs of Agustin Ramirez sold the same property under controversy for P95,000.00, to the spouses, Vicente Anion and Baldomera Anion, who thereafter conveyed the said property to the spouses, Elmer Sunbanum and Beng Tee Sunbanum, in whose names TCT No. T-93448 issued. On July 4, 1984, Atty. Manuel F. Ong, lawyer of Benedicto Ramos, sent a letter (Exhibit 2) to Aniceta Ramirez (wife of Agustin Ramirez and co-vendor in the first sale) demanding from the latter, the delivery of TCT No. T-21560.6 On July 19, 1984, Anicetas lawyer, Atty. Anastacio Muntuerto, Jr., wrote

a reply-letter7 (Exhibit 3), explaining that the Transfer Certificate of Title asked for could not be delivered for the reason that full consideration of the first sale was never paid and whatever partial payment made thereunder was refunded to Benedicto Ramos. On May 14, 1985, the spouses, Benedicto Ramos and Evangeline Ramos, the private respondents herein, brought a Complaint 8 for Quieting of Title, Annulment of Sale, Cancellation of Certificate of Title, Damages, etc., docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-3801 before Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, assailing the series of transfers from the heirs of Agustin Ramirez to the spouses Anion. The Complaint was later amended9to implead the spouses Sunbanum, as defendants. The heirs of Agustin Ramirez, spouses Anion, and spouses Sunbanum, the petitioners in this case, sent in their Answer, 10 theorizing that the first sale was never consummated because its full consideration was not paid, and the private respondents (plaintiffs below) have no cause of action since Benedicto Ramos had sold the same property to the petitioner, Vicente Anion. In their Reply,11 private respondents countered that the second sale was not really a sale but was just executed to guarantee a debt or performance of an obligation. Although such Reply was not verified, attached thereto was a duly verified Answer of Benedicto Ramos (private respondent here) in an ejectment case instituted against him by the herein petitioner, Vicente Anion. The verified Answer so attached contained the allegations averred in the said Reply. On July 1, 1985, petitioners interposed a Motion to Dismiss12 in the Civil Case No. CEB-3801 for quieting of title, on the ground of lack of cause of action on the part of plaintiffs, now private respondents. In an Order13 dated March 12, 1986, the trial court granted the said Motion to Dismiss; ruling, thus: WHEREFORE, for utter lack of cause of action and in view of the foregoing considerations, the complaint is ordered dismissed, as the same is hereby dismissed. The plaintiffs are hereby ordered to vacate the premises in question (Lot 1584 of the Cebu Cadastral Survey) and to deliver and surrender the possession thereof to spouses Vicente C. Anion and Baldomera Echivarre. The said Order of dismissal was premised on a finding that the private respondents (plaintiffs) were deemed to have admitted the genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Sale in favor of petitioner Vicente Anion, as a result of their failure to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of subject Deed. On March 24, 1986, from the challenged Order of Dismissal, private respondents filed with the trial court their Notice of Appeal14 to the Court of Appeals. And on April 18, 1990, the Court of Appeals came out with a Decision15 the dispositive portion of which, reads: WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and a new one entered: 1) Declaring the deed, Exhibits 1-A and F to be an equitable mortgage: 2) Ordering plaintiffs-appellants to pay defendant-appellee Vicente C. Anion the sum of P20,000.00, with legal interest thereon from the date of this judgment; 3) Declaring the deed of sale portion (Exh. D) in the Settlement and Extra Judicial Adjudication of Estate of Agustin Ramirez by the Undersigned Heirs with Deed of Sale (Exh. 4) as null and void and without effect; 4) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Cebu City to cancel; (a) TCT No. 92295 issued in the names of Aniceta, Agustin, Lorna, Ester, Romeo, Chito, Pancho, Marlon, and Oscar, all surnamed Ramirez; (b) TCT No. 92796 issued in the names of the spouses Vicente C. Anion and Baldomera Echivarre; (c) TCT No. 93448 issued in the names of Elmer Sunbanum and Beng Tee U. Sunbanum; restore TCT No. 21560 issued in the names of the spouses Agustin Ramirez and Aniceta Ramirez and thereafter cancel the same and issue a new one in the names of the spouses Benedicto Ramos and Evangeline Ramos. In its said Decision, the Court of Appeals opined that there was substantial compliance with the rule requiring denial under oath of an actionable document16 considering that the Reply of private respondents (plaintiffs below) had verified attachments, like the verified Answer aforesaid, and a Counter-Affidavit17 of Benedicto Ramos in a case of estafa filed against him by Vicente Anion, which counter-affidavit and verified pleading contained the same allegations of the Reply in question. The Court of Appeals adjudged the second deed of sale sued upon as an equitable mortgage because of the unusually inadequate price of the property supposedly conveyed thereunder, let alone the fact that vendor Benedicto Ramos continued possessing subject property even after the execution of such contract. Guided by the said observations, the respondent Court concluded that the attendant facts and circumstances aforestated wereindicia of an equitable mortgage within the contemplation of Article 1602 of the New Civil Code.

Petitioners presented a Motion for Reconsideration18 and Addendum to Motion for Reconsideration19 but to no avail. The same were denied by the Court of Appeals Resolution20 dated December 5, 1990; holding, as follows: xxx Firstly, that letter [Atty. Muntuertos letter to Atty. Ong] was written and presented after Maria vda. de Ramos had died (she died in April 1974), and no longer had the opportunity to refute the truth of the statement. Secondly, if the sale had never been consummated, it should have been rescinded long ago, but, no documentary evidence has been presented to prove there was such a rescission. x x x Thirdly, there is no evidence to show how much of the purchase price remained unpaid. x x x No mention is made of any balance still due and owing. xxx Fourthly, the letter is not evidence of prior knowledge by plaintiff-appellant Benedicto Ramos of the alleged invalidity of his title. It must be remembered that the letter was in response to his demand from defendants-appellees Ramirez for the title to the property. This demand is an indication of a lack of knowledge on his part about any flaw in his title. x x x 21 Dissatisfied with the adverse ruling thus handed down by the Court of Appeals, petitioners have come to this Court via this petition for review on certiorari; placing reliance on the assignment of errors, that: I THE RESPONDENT COURT GROSSLY ERRED IN IGNORING EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT RAMOS NEVER ACQUIRED ANY VALID TITLE TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IT APPEARING THAT THE PURCHASE PURPORTEDLY MADE BY MARIA VDA. DE RAMOS ON DECEMBER 18, 1965 OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY FROM THE RAMIREZ SPOUSES WAS FOUND TO BE FLAWED FOR FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION AND THUS THE LAND IN QUESTION WAS THEREFORE NEVER LAWFULLY AND VALIDLY INHERITED BY HIM. II THE RESPONDENT COURT CONSEQUENTLY ERRED IN NOT AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURTS FINDING THAT THE RAMIREZES HAD ALWAYS BEEN THE LAWFUL OWNERS OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND THEIR SALE (EXH. 4 AND EXH. D) OF SAID PROPERTY TO THE ANION SPOUSES WAS LEGAL. HENCE, IT WAS ERROR TO DECLARE THE SALE AS NULL AND VOID. III IN ANY EVENT, THE RESPONDENT COURT GROSSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY BY RESPONDENT RAMOS IN FAVOR OF THE SPOUSES ANION WAS NOT AN ABSOLUTE SALE BUT AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE, THE BASIS OF THE CONCLUSION BEING PURELY CONJECTURAL, SPECULATIVE AND CONTRARY TO THE INTENT AND SPIRIT OF ARTICLE 1602 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS WELL AS ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE. IV CONSEQUENTLY, THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE LOWER COURTS ORDER AND IN NOT AFFIRMING THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT. The fate of the first and second assigned errors hinges on the validity or invalidity of the (first) sale by the spouses Ramirez in favor of the late Maria vda. de Ramos. If valid, the third sale of the same property, from the heirs of Agustin Ramirez to the herein petitioner, Vicente Anion, would be a complete nullity for, then, the former would have nothing to convey to the latter. 22 This Court does not review findings of fact by the Court of Appeals unless the findings of the appellate court are mistaken, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings culled by the trial court of origin.23 Here, after a careful study, we perceive no infirmity or anything reversible in the aforesaid findings arrived at by respondent Court of Appeals. The same are factual and correct. Petitioners contend that the first sale over subject parcel of land, from the spouses, Agustin Ramirez and Aniceta Ramirez, to Maria vda. de Ramos, was never consummated allegedly due to non-payment of the whole purchase price. To support this stance, petitioners invite attention to a letter of Atty. Anastacio Muntuerto, Jr., lawyer of petitioner Aniceta C. Ramirez, to Atty. Manuel Ong, lawyer of private respondent Benedicto Ramos, informing the latter that the entire consideration of the first sale was never paid and that private respondent Benedicto Ramos had been refunded whatever partial payments were made therefor.

But apart from such letter alluded to, petitioners failed to introduce any other evidence to substantiate the theorized non-payment of the full purchase price of the parcel of land deeded out in the first sale, and refund of whatever partial payment of the consideration thereof. Consequently, we discern no sufficient basis for disturbing the finding and conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the vendee of the first sale, Maria vda. de Ramos (now deceased), fully paid the purchase price of P28,000.00. From the Deed of Sale executed on December 18, 1965 by the spouses, Agustin Ramirez and Aniceta Ramirez, in favor of Maria vda. de Ramos, it can be gleaned unerringly that there was full payment of the stipulated purchase price. No downpayment or installment payment is therein mentioned or intimated. There is, therefore, no other conclusion derivable therefrom than that the total consideration of the first sale was fully paid and the said sale was duly consummated. Then, too, is the fact that the Deed of Sale under scrutiny was notarized by Notary Public Alfredo Marigomen. As regards the refund of partial payments theorized upon by the petitioners, the same is not only hard to believe. It does not conform to reason and human experience. For instance, it is unbelievable and difficult to fathom how amounts supposedly paid to private respondent Benedicto Ramos were refunded without any reliable document or piece of paper reflecting the alleged refund referred to by petitioners. If there was indeed any refund of the purchase price, the petitioners should have, at least, produced admissible evidence of such theory of refund. Furthermore, if the purchase price of P28,000.00 was never paid, why did the spouses Ramirez, as vendors, not rescind the first sale on the ground of non-payment in full of the purchase price? This omission was never explained by the petitioners. Succinct and unmistakable is the provision of Article 1191 of the New Civil Code under which rescission of the sale is a remedy available to an unpaid vendor. A contract of sale is reciprocal and bilateral. Thus, if the vendee of the first sale, the late Maria vda. de Ramos, never performed her reciprocal obligation to pay the full consideration of the said sale, the aggrieved vendors, spouses Agustin Ramirez and Aniceta Ramirez, who are now in the great beyond, could have brought an action for the rescission of the first sale. That they did not take such proper recourse could only mean that there was no ground for them to avail of the remedy of rescission inasmuch as the purchase price of the first sale was fully paid, after all. Sustainable is the opinion of the Court of Appeals that the letter of Atty. Muntuerto to Atty. Ong aforementioned could not be used as evidence against the deceased, Maria vda. de Ramos, who no longer had the opportunity to refute the truth of the statement. 24 Equally impressed with merit is the finding of the same appellate court - that private respondent Benedicto Ramos was unaware of any flaw afflicting his title, as could be deduced from the letter of Atty. Ong to Aniceta Ramirez, demanding delivery of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21560 covering subject property. The said letter evinced private respondent Benedicto Ramos good faith and complete trust in his rightful ownership of the said parcel of land, without knowing any defect in his title thereto. With the foregoing disquisition leading to the ineluctable conclusion that the first sale, entered into by Agustin Ramirez, with marital consent, and Maria vda. de Ramos, was lawfully consummated, it stands to reason and conclude that the subsequent deed of sale made by the heirs of Agustin Ramirez in favor of the herein petitioner Vicente Anion, over the same parcel of land was void, sans any force and effect, for the simple reason that they(heirs of Agustin Ramirez) had no right to sell the parcel of land in question which they never inherited. To repeat, the said parcel of land was validly conveyed, in a manner absolute and irrevocable, to the late Maria vda. de Ramos, who acquired absolute ownership thereover, so much so that upon her demise, her sole heir, the herein private respondent Benedicto Ramos, became the owner thereof by hereditary succession. The next to pass upon is the third assigned error vis-a-vis the real nature of the transaction entered into by and between Benedicto Ramos and Vicente Anion. Was the instrument of sale inked in favor of petitioner Vicente Anion an equitable mortgage, in actuality? As heretofore stated, the Court of Appeals ruled in the affirmative, citing Article 1602 of the Civil Code, which reads: Art. 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, in any of the following cases: (1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate; (2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise; (3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed; (4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price; (5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold; (6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation. In any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits, or other benefit to be received by the vendee as rent or otherwise shall be considered as interest which shall be subject to the usury laws. (n) The Court of Appeals based its finding of an equitable mortgage on paragraphs 1 and 2 of the aforecited law in point because the price or consideration of the supposed sale was considered unusually inadequate, and the vendor, private respondent Benedicto Ramos, continued to

possess the property transacted upon even after the execution of the deed of sale, thereby bringing the contract within the purview of Article 1602, N.C.C. To be sure, records on hand show by preponderance of evidence, that the Deed of Sale litigated upon was, in reality, one of equitable mortgage. Even assuming that the conclusion by the Court of Appeals on the inadequacy of the purchase price could be anemic of evidentiary backing, the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties portrayed or signified that the sale was, in truth and in fact, an equitable mortgage. Paragraphs (2) and (6) of Article 1602 apply in view of the undeniable fact that the vendors did not relinquish possession of the property even after the sale and, as earlier stressed upon, the document of sale they signed was only to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation. Verily, vendor Benedicto Ramos clung to the possession of the property, after the deal in 1977, and his possession was undisturbed until 1985, when an ejectment suit was instituted against him by petitioner Vicente Anion. But, again, in such ejectment case, private respondent Benedicto Ramos categorically and unequivocally narrated before the trial court that the sale being impugned was just devised to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.25 It should also be noted that on December 20, 1984, the petitioner, Vicente Anion, bought the same property from the heirs of Agustin Ramirez. If the Deed of Sale executed in 1977 by private respondent Benedicto Ramos and petitioner Vicente Anion was truly a sale, why did petitioner Vicente Anion agree to buy the same property from the Ramirezes in 1984? The second purchase made by petitioner Vicente Anion of the same property has reinforced private respondents submission that the Deed of Sale in 1977 was merely to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation. Well settled to the point of being elementary is the doctrine that where the vendor remains in physical possession of the land as lessee or otherwise, the contract should be treated as an equitable mortgage.26 And the real intention of the parties is determinative of the true nature of the transaction.27 In light of the foregoing ratiocination and conclusion, the fourth assignment of errors has neither legal nor factual basis. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15013 is hereby AFFIRMED en toto. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-22443 May 29, 1971 THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE ACETYLENE COMPANY, and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents. This is a petition filed by the Commissioner of Customs for review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in its Case No. 1147, ordering the herein petitioner to refund to the Philippine Acetylene Co., Inc. the amount of P3,683.00 which it had paid under protest as special import tax on one (1) custom built liquefied petroleum gas tank. The facts were stipulated by the parties as follows: 1. That the Philippine Acetylene Company is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines; 2. That said company is engaged in the manufacture of oxygen, acetylene and nitrogen and packaging of liquefied petroleum gas in cylinders and tanks; 3. That sometime in 1957 the protestant imported from the United States one custom-built liquefied petroleum gas tank which arrived via the S/S 'PLEASANT VILLE' under Register No. 1356, and declared in Import Entry No. 94060, series of 1957; and . 4. That the amount of P3,683.00 was assessed thereon as special import tax and which (sic) was paid under protest by the importer-protestant as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 12690 dated February 25, 1958. According to Charles L. Butler, manager of the Philippine Acetylene Co., Inc., the imported custom-built liquefied petroleum gas tank is simply a large cylinder which is used as container for liquefied petroleum gas obtained from the CALTEX Refinery in Bauan, Batangas and transported to the company's plant in Manila. The gas does not undergo any chemical change and is sold to consumers in the same state as when it was acquired from the refinery, except that before it is sold the gas is pumped into smaller cylinders, which are labeled with the company's trademark "Philigas." Under the foregoing facts the issue presented for resolution is purely one of law, namely, whether or not the Philippine Acetylene Co., Inc., insofar as its packaging operation of liquefied petroleum gas is concerned, may be considered engaged in an industry as contemplated in section 6 of Republic Act No. 1394 and therefore exempt from the payment of the special import tax in respect of the gas tank in question. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 1394, insofar as it is pertinent to the issue, provides:

Section 6. The tax provided for in section one of this Act shall not be imposed against the importation into the Philippines of machinery and/or raw materials to be used by new and necessary industries as determined in accordance with Republic Act numbered Nine Hundred and One; ...; machinery, equipment, accessories and spare parts, for the use of industries, miners, mining enterprises planters and farmers; ... In finding that the Philippine Acetylene Co., Inc. is engaged in industry within the meaning of the abovequoted provision, the Tax Court held that the term industry should be understood in its ordinary and general definition, which is any enterprise employing relatively large amounts of capital and/or labor. On such premise the Tax Court concluded that inasmuch as the Philippine Acetylene Co., Inc. employs considerable labor and capital in packaging liquefied petroleum gas purchased by it and selling the same for profit, it is engaged in industry and hence is exempt from the payment of the special import tax in connection with the tank used as container. The following observations in the brief for the petitioner are apropos: ... in the exempting provisions of Republic Act No. 1394, the exempted items are divided into separate and specific enumerations. The term 'industries' is used in two distinct groups. The first group of exempted industries refers exclusively to those falling under the new and necessary industries as defined in Republic Act No. 901. In the second, the term "industries" is classed together with the terms miners, mining enterprises, planters and farmers. ... If Congress really intended to give the term "industries" its ordinary and general meaning and thus grant tax exemption to all ventures and trades falling under the said ordinary and general definition, it should have eliminated the words "new and necessary industries' and 'mining enterprises" since these two ventures are already covered by the term "industries" in its ordinary and general meaning. On the other hand, the fact that the language of the law specifically segregates new and necessary industries under Republic Act No. 901 among those entitled to the tax exemption, in effect, restricts the meaning and scope of the word "industries." The argument appears logical and reasonable. Since the term "industries" as used in the law for the second time is classified together with the terms "miners, mining enterprises, planters and farmers", the obvious legislative intent is to confine the meaning of the term to activities that tend to produce or create or manufacture, such as those of miners, mining enterprises, ]planters and farmers. The Tax Court's interpretation would lead to a Patent inconsistency, in that while the first part of the law confines the exemption to new and necessary industries, another part would extend the exemption to all other industries, regardless of their nature, as long as they employ labor and capital for profit-making purposes. In granting the exemption, it would have been illogical for Congress to specify importations needed by new and necessary industries -- as the term is defined by law and in the same breath allow a similar exemption to all other industries in general. The respondents make much of the interpretation of the term "industries" by the Secretary of Finance in his First Indorsement dated November 19, 1956, to wit: Any Productive enterprise which employs relatively large amounts of capital and/or labor falls under the term 'industries' as used in Section 6 of Republic Act No. 1394. Assuming ng the correctness of such interpretation, what should be noted is that it stresses the productive aspect of the enterprise. The operation for which the respondent company employs the gas tank in question does not involve manufacturing or production. It is nothing but packaging; the liquefied gas, when obtained from the refinery, has to be placed in some kind of container for transportation to Manila. When sold to consumers, it undergoes no change or transformation, but is merely placed in smaller cylinders for convenience. The process is certainly not production in any sense. The phrasing of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 1394, to be sure, is rather vague and infelicitious, particularly in the repetition of the word "industries." It is such lack of precision in the law that gives rise to litigious controversies concerning its proper application. One of the established rules of statutory construction, however, is that tax exemptions are held strictly against the taxpayer, and if not expressly mentioned in the law must be within its purview by clear legislative intent. In the present case the construction adhered to by the respondents in reference to the scope of the term "industries" as employed for the second time in Section 6 of Republic Act No. 1394 is contrary to such rule. For if the term were all inclusive, and meant industries in general, that is, those which involve relatively large amounts of capital and/or labor regardless of their productive or nonproductive nature, there would be no point in making a separate classification with respect to "new and necessary industries" for purposes of the tax exemption. We hold, therefore, that to be entitled to exemption under the second classification in the statute the industry concerned, in connection with the activity for which the importation is made, must be engaged in some productive enterprise, not in merely packaging an already finished product to facilitate its transportation. In a comparable case this Court has held that the tax exemption in connection with the processing of gasoline and the manufacture of lubricating oil does not extend to pump parts imported by the processor and leased to gasoline stations for their use in servicing customers' vehicles, overruling the argument of the petitioner therein that the marketing of its gasoline product "is corollary to or incidental to its industrial operations." (ESSO Standard, Eastern, Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Customs, 18 SCRA 488). WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is reversed and that of the Collector of Customs of Manila and the Commissioner of Customs upheld. Costs against respondent Philippine Acetylene Co., Inc.

G.R. No. L-17663 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ISAURO SANTIAGO, defendant-appellee. The information herein alleges that defendant Isauro Santiago has committed the crime of "libel" as follows: That on or about the 5th day of October 1959, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, for the evident purpose of injuring the name and reputation of Arsenio H. Lacson, and of impeaching and besmirching the latter's virtue, honesty, honor and reputation, and with the malicious intent of exposing him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, did then and there wilfully, feloniously, maliciously and publicly call said Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson, in the course of a political speech delivered at 392 Fraternal, Quiapo, in said city, thru the medium of an amplifier system and before a crowd of around a hundred persons, the following, to wit: "Arsenio Hayop Lacson, pinakawalang hiyang Alkalde, Mayor Lacson raped a woman at the Aroma Cafe and another City Hall employee in Shellborne Hotel", which are false, malicious and highly defamatory statements against Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson, delivered with no good intentions or justifiable motive, but solely for the purpose of injuring the name and reputation of said Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson and to expose him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. Defendant moved to quash this information upon the ground that the crime charged therein is, not libel, but oral defamation, which has already prescribed, it having been allegedly committed on October 5, 1959, or more than six (6) months prior to the filing of the information on August 11, 1960. The Court of First Instance of Manila granted this motion and, accordingly, quashed the information, with costs de oficio. Hence, this appeal by the prosecution. The only issue in this case is whether the crime charged in the information is oral defamation, under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, or libel, under Article 355, in relation to Article 353, of the same Code. Said provisions read: ART. 358. Slander. Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period toprision correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos". ART. 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party. ART. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. The prosecution maintains that "the medium of an amplifier system", thru which the defamatory statements imputed to the accused were allegedly made, falls within the purview of the terms "writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means", appearing in said Article 355, in the sense, at least, that in "amplifier system" is a means "similar" to "radio" bqnLL8C. This pretense is untenable. To begin with, as correctly stated in defendant's brief, "radio as a means of publication is "the transmission and reception of electromagnetic waves without conducting wires intervening between transmitter and receiver" (Library of Universal Knowledge)" (see, also, 18 Encyclopedia Britanica, p. 285), "while transmission of words by means of an amplifier system", such as the one mentioned in the information, "is not thru "electromagnetic waves" and is with the use of "conducting wires" intervening between the transmitter . . . and the receiver . . . . Secondly, even the word "radio" used in said Article 355, should be considered in relation to the terms with which it is associated "writing, printing, lithography, engraving . . . phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition or cinematographical exhibition" all of which have a common characteristic, namely, their permanent nature as a means of publication, and this explains the graver penalty for libel than that prescribed for oral defamation. Thus, it has been held that slanderous statements forming part of a manuscript read by a speaker over the radio constitute libel (Sorensen vs. Wood, 243 N.W. 82, 82 A.L.R. 1109; Nules vs. Wasner, 20 P. [2d] 487, 104 A.L.R. 877), whereas the rules governing such offense were declared inapplicable to extemporaneous remarks of scurrilous nature, made ad libitum in the course of a radio broadcast by a person hired to read a prepared text, but not appearing thereon (Summit Hotel Co. vs. National Broadcasting Co., PA-124 A.L.R. 963). IN SHORT, the facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of oral defamation punished in Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribed six (6) months after its commission, or on April 5, 1960 (Articles 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code), over four (4) months before the filing of said information, in view of which the order appealed from is affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.