Ensuring a Stable and Denuclearized Korean Peninsula By: Evan Kalikow

Executive Summary With nuclear ambitions and a new leader in Kim Jong-un, North Korea proves to be a cause for concern among states worldwide. China and the United States are particularly affected by the threat of North Korean nuclear weaponry. In order to promote denuclearization and bring stability and peace to the Korean peninsula, it is recommended that the United States lead a set of negotiations in which it eases from its position of denuclearization-above-all-other-issues and works with China to best use the latters leverage over North Korea to promote peace and diminished nuclear weaponry. Background Information The Korean peninsula has been a location of uncertainty and intrigue in international politics for quite some timein particular because of the powerful and often uncooperative North Korean regime. As a state with ambitions to develop a nuclear program, North Korea plays an important role in the international sphere, and policies made with regards to North Korea have the potential to affect many sovereign states. North Koreas nuclear weapon aspirations have caused prominent states to take action. For many years in the past decade, the United States, Japan, China, Russia, and South Korea have engaged with North Korea in Six-Party Talks, which negotiated various forms of aid and diplomatic resources to North Korea in exchange for nuclear destabilization (Cha 2009: 121). However, these discussions ended in July of 2009 after North Korea violated the terms of the talks by issuing three tests of nuclear weapons (Cha 2009: 121-122). With the transfer of power from the late Kim Jong-il to his son Kim Jong-un in December 2011, new opportunities for diplomatic games and denuclearization have arisen. What these opportunities will lead to and how they are shaped will depend on the complex interests of two countries: the China and the United States. China must walk a fine line between supporting North Korea and working to denuclearize the state. China does not want to see North Korea expand its nuclear programin fact, China has potentially more leverage

than the United States to ensure that North Koreas power remains limited, as it provides North Koreans access to necessities such as food, fuel, and medicine and can limit that access if necessary (Shen 2009: 177). In fact, China provides approximately 70 percent of [North Koreas] oil and most of its food assistance and Chinese economic assistance to North Korea accounts for about half of all Chinese foreign aid (Glaser and Billingsley 2012:5). On the other hand, the government of China is terrified that engaging in such preventative measures would destabilize North Korea and cause millions of North Korean refugees to seek asylum within the borders of China (Shen 2009: 177-178). Conversely, the United States is not nearly as integrated with North Korea as is China. The United States, however, is more adamant than China about limiting North Koreas military and nuclear capabilities, as the US has obligations through alliances with Japan and South Korea to help protect the countries from any potential aggression from North Korea (Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart 2012: 4). These competing influences among the two most influential state actors make a potential solution to the North Korean problem difficult, but there are several feasible policy options available for consideration. Option 1: China-Driven Negotiations This policy option would follow the model set by Hui Zhang in his August 2009 article Ending North Koreas Nuclear Ambitions: The Need for Stronger Chinese Action. Zhang suggests that, in the wake of the failure of the Six-Party Talks, it is Chinas responsibility to take a harder stand against a nuclear North Korea because China has the necessary leverage and a more powerful North Korea would work against Chinese interests (Zhang 2009). This would likely be an effective policy plan, as China has the capability to deny necessary resources to North Korea in exchange for cooperation regarding denuclearization. The United States, South Korea, and Japan would support these actions as well, as they would provide for a less nuclear and more stable Korean peninsula. Chinese citizens would also favour such a proposal, as more than two-thirds of [recent survey]

respondents believe Beijing should take stronger actions to constrain Pyongyangs nuclear ambitions (Zhang 2009). However, China may not be willing to suspend (or threaten to suspend) aid to the area, fearing that a sudden end of essential aid programs could cause a diaspora of North Korean refugees to China. Although China has more leverage to negotiate with North Korea than the United States in this issue, it also bares more of the risk. Option 2: US-Driven Negotiations In contrast to the first option would be a policy option placing the United States as the primary decision-maker, as proposed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). That CSIS report, authored by Bonnie Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, suggests that China has not had any incentive to waver from its policy of giving significant aid to North Korea and that a change in Chinese policy can only come from United States pressure. They argue that, in order for this change to take place, the United States must not relax on its position of holding other issues of negotiation (i.e. peace treaties, aid, normalization, etc.) conditional on denuclearization; otherwise, the negotiation process will not be successful (Glaser and Billingsley 2012: 23). This policy also addresses concerns in the event of the failure or dissolution of North Korea, saying that the United States can assuage Chinese fears of the massive costs it would incur by offering financial support from Japan, South Korea, and the United States itself (Glaser and Billingsley 2012: 23-34). This is a well-reasoned policy that addresses multiple issues regarding the North Korean nuclear situation. It would prove more fruitful than earlier diplomatic discussions; additionally, it would give China more confidence that a denuclearized or more lightly aided North Korea would not fail (or, failing that, that the United States, South Korea, and Japan would assist in the collateral damage of North Korean failure). It is possible, however, that this policy would be difficult to sell to the United States population. The view of the North Korean government among American citizens tends to be negative, and a policy shift away from a denuclearization or

bust approach may not be amenable to the American electorate, especially if such a policy would also allocate funds to give aid to North Korea or China. Option 3: Third Party Negotiations Another potential solution would be for an international organization such as the United Nations to create a situation in which China and the United States would engage in talks with North Korea. Through this arrangement, the UN could set the stage for a negotiation with the caveats that the United States be comfortable deemphasizing denuclearization above all other issues, that China be more willing to use its aid as a bargaining tool, and that North Korea cease provocation through nuclear missile tests. This policy would be beneficial in two ways. First, by having a third party initiate the negotiations, there would be less domestic and international political damage to China and the United States than if either one had made the initial call for discussions. Second, because the UN would back the negotiations, they would have international support, increasing the pressure on the participating states to reach a fair and reasonable agreement. This policy may be too optimistic, though, as it would be difficult for the UN to use its influence to coerce such powerful states into making crucial concessions before negotiations even properly begin. Recommended Policy Of these policy recommendations, Option 2: US-Driven Negotiations is the most likely to be effective and practical and is thus the recommended course of action. Past United States endeavors to negotiate peace with North Korea have ended in frustration, and those experiences have jaded the general American public, causing thoughts of North Korea negotiating primarily to extract concessions from its counterparts while making commitments it does not intend to keep to run prevalent (Pritchard and Tinelli 2010: 9). In order to combat this perception and have North Korea be true to their word, China must be willing to threaten suspension of aid to North Korea. China will only be amenable to such actions if the United States will offer support. China-driven negotiations would work, but

there is no motivation for China to change its strategy without a push from the United States. And while the UN-driven negotiation policy could be effective, its implementation is not nearly as plausible as a US-driven negotiation policy. Thus, the policy of US-driven negotiations has the greatest potential to produce real results and stabilize the Korean peninsula.

References Cha, V (2009) What Do They Really Want?: Obamas North Korea Conundrum, The Washington Quarterly 32 (4), pp. 119-138 Chanlett-Avery, E and Rinehart, I (2012) North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation, Congressional Research Service, pp. 1-23 Glaser, B and Billingsley, B (2012) Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean Peninsula, Center For Strategic and International Studies, pp. 1-68 Pritchard, C and Tilelli, J (2010) U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula, Council on Foreign Relations, pp. 1-76 Shen, D (2009) Cooperative Denuclearization toward North Korea, The Washington Quarterly 32 (4), pp. 175-188 Zhang, H (2009) Ending North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions: The Need for Stronger Chinese Action, Arms Control Today, July/August 2009