This article was downloaded by: [Australian National University Library] On: 13 January 2011 Access details: Access

Details: [subscription number 907447645] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 3741 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713445348

The Ulama in Pakistani Politics

Mohamed Nawab bin Mohamed Osmana a S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore

To cite this Article bin Mohamed Osman, Mohamed Nawab(2009) 'The Ulama in Pakistani Politics', South Asia: Journal of

South Asian Studies, 32: 2, 230 247 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/00856400903049499 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00856400903049499

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, n.s., Vol.XXXII, no.2, August 2009

The Ulama in Pakistani Politics

Mohamed Nawab bin Mohamed Osman S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore
Downloaded By: [Australian National University Library] At: 02:00 13 January 2011

Abstract The ulama are important gures within Muslim societies. In the Indian subcontinent, their inuence has transcended the socio-religious realm to include the political realm as well. This paper is an attempt to examine the role of the ulama in Pakistani politics. It also seeks to build a trajectory of their future inuence in Pakistani politics. There are four parts to the paper. The rst part will examine the historical role of the ulama in the Indian sub-continent. The second part will examine their politics in the period between 1947 and 1979. The third part will highlight how the rise to power of General Zia-ul-Haq and the Afghanistan War of 1979 emboldened the ulama to start seriously contesting for political power. Lastly, the paper will look at how the ulama were again empowered by the military regime of General Musharraf to play an important role in Pakistani politics.

Dening the Ulama As scholars of Islamic law and the Hadith, and exegetes of the Quran and religious guides, the ulama have shaped the dominant religious discourse in Muslim societies throughout most of Islamic history.1 Yet there is no consensus among Muslims even over the basic denition of ulama. While in the widest sense the term is not limited to those with religious education but includes anyone who is knowledgeable,2 alim can also refer to one who is knowledgeable in the Islamic intellectual disciplines including Islamic theology

It should be noted that the term ulama is plural; its singular form is alim. In this sense, a grammarian, linguist, mathematician or literary poetic expert is also an alim, even though not knowledgeable in Islamic jurisprudence.
2

ISSN 0085-6401 print; 1479-0270 online/09/020230-18 2009 South Asian Studies Association of Australia DOI: 10.1080/00856400903049499

THE ULAMA

IN

PAKISTANI POLITICS

231

Downloaded By: [Australian National University Library] At: 02:00 13 January 2011

and jurisprudence.3 Moreover the ulama are not thought to represent God; nor are they treated as in any way divine. The authority that a particular scholar may enjoy is a function of his formal and informal education and his social and scholastic networking and inuence. In Islamic lands, the authority of the ulama was recognised by the state (whether the caliph, sultan or amir) in return for the scholars granting legitimisation for the ruler. The trade-o was that the state employed the scholars in the legal courts and educational institutions, and ceded to them control and regulation of sharia lawas well as the authority to dene what was orthodox and heretical. In return, the scholars generally tolerated the often irreligious and lax conduct of the ruling class. This was the pattern set under the Umayyads and consolidated by the Abbasids.4 However, the potential for the ulama to withdraw their support or legitimisation has always existed,5 even though it has rarely occurred.

A Brief History of the Ulama in the Indian Sub-Continent (later Pakistan) Kalim Bahadur noted that the ulama in the Indian sub-continent have usually been content with an exalted position in the power structure as consultants on religious matters.6 A quick study of the history of Islam in the sub-continent will give credence to this argument. The ulama in India were often subservient to Muslim rulers but remained inuential on issues related to sharia, a crucial part of the legal system for most of the Mughal period.7 Ira Lapidus observes that the role of the Muslim ruler in India is always seen in accordance with how he implements sharia.8 As such, Mughal emperors, with the exception of Akbar, were sensitive to the ulama and often allowed them to control matters of religion. The ulama consequently exercised considerable inuence over the running of religious aairs, and on Mughal policies. For example Alim Shaykh Abdul Haqq (15711642) was inuential at the court of Emperor Jahangir
3

It should be noted that while a general term, ulama, is used to represent someone trained in the religious sciences, strictly speaking an alim is an expert in theology. A fuqaha is an expert in jurisprudence and a falasifah is a philosopher. 4 See G.E. Von Grunebaum, Classical Islam: A History, 600 A.D. to 1258 A.D (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005), pp.6499. 5 Some of the ulama did withdraw their support for the caliphs and openly challenged the system. For instance, Imam Abu Hanifa (699767 CE) criticised the Abbasid rulers for their brutal suppression of the opponents of their rule. 6 Kalim Bahadur, The Rise of the MMA in Pakistan, in Ajay Darshan Behera and Joseph C. Mathew (eds), Pakistan in a Changing Strategic Context (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2004), p.193. 7 Muzaar Alam, The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India: Awadh and Punjab, 170748 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986), p.114. 8 Ira Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.442.

232

SOUTH ASIA

(15691627), encouraging him to limit the rights of non-Muslims.9 Serving the state structure meant that the ulama were able to maintain a certain degree of power and status while at the same time promoting the ideals of Islam.

Downloaded By: [Australian National University Library] At: 02:00 13 January 2011

The Ulama and the Pakistan Movement The struggle for the independence of India proved to be a turning point for the ulama in South Asia. In the early twentieth century, they began to assert their independence and press for a leadership position instead of simply latching on to a political authority. Part of the reason the ulama decided to play a more active role in politics was due to the perceived secular nature of the Muslim leadership in India. Muhammad Ali Jinnah (18761948), leader of the Indian Muslim League, was the man who most clearly articulated the idea of an Indian Muslim identity andthough a late convertafter 1940 advanced the cause of Pakistan with vigour. As he told the Lahore session of the All-India Muslim League in March 1940: Hindus and Muslims belong to two dierent religions, philosophies, social customs and literature.10 However although Islam was used by some League leaders as a motivating force to rally Muslims to the cause of Pakistan, the state the League was committed to create would be secular, not theocratic. Jinnah and his closest lieutenants were determined to make Pakistan a constitutional democracy. Perhaps they saw no contradiction between an Islamic state and a polity governed according to modern democratic principles? At any rate, Pakistans Muslim League founders sought to t Islam into their contemporary constitutional design. Yet, there remained a key contradiction in all of this between Islam as a rallying cry, and the expectation created amongst the supporters of the Pakistan Movement that this new state would be governed in accordance with the sharia. Many ulama were opposed to Jinnah and felt that he aimed to secularise the Muslims of India. Most fervent among them were the ulama of the Jamiat-eUlama-e-Hind (JUH). The JUHs ultimate objective was the formation of an Islamic state modelled after the Mughal Empire. Led by Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani (18791957), the JUH opposed the two-nation theory.11
During Emperor Jahangirs reign, the Rajput nobility, who had been important during the reign of Akbar, were slowly supplanted by the Persian nobility. See M.L. Roy Choudhury, The State and Religion in Mughal India (Calcutta: Indian Publicity Society, 1951), pp.1089. For the life and works of Shaykh Abdul Haqq, see Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, Hawat-I-Shaikh Abdul Haqq Muhaddith Dehlawi (Delhi: 1953). 10 Sailesh Kumar Bandopadhaya, Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1991), p.177. 11 Mawlana Madani was one of the foremost scholars of India and a fervent supporter of Indian nationalism. For more on his life, ideas and works, see Syed Mohammad Mian, The Prisoners of Malta (Delhi: Manak, 2005).
9

THE ULAMA

IN

PAKISTANI POLITICS

233

Indeed Madani argued that faith was universal and could not be contained within national boundaries. Yet somewhat inconsistently, he also contended that Muslims should be loyal to the nation of their birthalong with their nonMuslim fellow citizens.12 To underline the point, he cited the example of the Covenant of Medina, which he claimed was a charter for Muslims and nonMuslims to co-exist in a peaceful manner. Thus Madani opposed the idea of a separate state for Indias Muslims. A majority of JUH leaders and workers too opposed the Leagues project and considered the demand for Pakistan a British conspiracy to divide India.13
Downloaded By: [Australian National University Library] At: 02:00 13 January 2011

The position of the JUH ulama was hotly criticised, however, by other Muslim intellectuals such as Muhammad Iqbal (18771938) and Mawlana Mawdudi (19031979).14 The writings of Mawdudi refuted the idea of composite nationalism and promoted instead that of a separate and ideological Muslim nationhood.15 Mawdudi believed that Madani had been carried away by his hatred for the British and had twisted history and facts. He refuted Madanis assertion that Muslims and Jews constituted a single nation under the Covenant of Medina. Mawdudi expounded the view that the Covenant bought an alliance between Jews and Muslims for a period of time, but that immunity for the Jews and other non-Muslims was revoked upon the Prophets conquest of Mecca.16 Mawdudi also felt that the life-tracks of the Hindu and Muslim communities paralleled each other and therefore could never be merged.17 However, Mawdudi too was opposed to the leadership of the Pakistan Movement. While he did not explicitly oppose the formation of a separate nation for the Muslims in India or the Indian Muslim League, Mawdudi felt that the heterogeneous nature of a League that included many Muslims who
12 Abdus Sattar Ghazali, Islamic Pakistan: Illusions and Reality (Islamabad: National Book Club, 1996). See also the discussion on nationhood and qawmiyyat, equated by the ulama with the modern concept of the territorial nation, in Hussein Ahmad Madani, Composite Nationalism and Islam (New Delhi: Manohar, 2005), pp.55100. 13 Sayyid Pirzada, The Politics of the Jamiat-e-ulama-e-Islam (JUI) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.4. 14 Muhammad Iqbal is one of the most celebrated Muslim thinkers and was one of the rst Muslim politicians to call for the formation of a separate Muslim state in the Indian sub-continent. For his biography, see Javed Iqbal, Zinda Rood (Lahore: Sang-E-Maal, 1992). Mawlana Mawdudi was one of the most inuential Muslim thinkers of India. He was the founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami and became its rst leader. After the establishment of Pakistan, he demanded an Islamic state in Pakistan. Mawdudi authored a number of works and journals. Among the most authoritative biographies of Mawdudi are Syed Asad Gilani, Mawdudi: Thought and Movement (Lahore: Farooq Hassan Gilani, 1978); and Syed Reza Vali Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 15 Ghazali, Islamic Pakistan: Illusions and Reality. 16 Abul Ala Mawdudi, Tahrik-i-Azadi-I-Hind awr Musalaman (Lahore: Islamic Publishers, 1964), pp.30425. 17 Saa Amir, Muslim Nationhood in India: Perceptions of Seven Eminent Thinkers (New Delhi: Kanishka Publishers, 2000), p.225.

234

SOUTH ASIA

were secularists, communists and socialists would hinder eorts in forming a true Islamic state.18 A small but signicant number of Deobandi ulama though supported the Muslim League scheme. Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanwi (18631943) of the JUH was one. Disappointed with the attitude of the Madani-led faction, Thanwi argued that supporting the League was the only lawful course for Muslims in India.19 His intervention led to a four-day conference in Calcutta in August 1945 where the All-India Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam (AIJUI, later the JUI) was formed under the leadership of Mawlana Shabbir Ahmad Uthmani (18871949).20 The JUI favoured the establishment of a state approximating that presided over by the four Righteously Guided Caliphs of the seventh century. And the ulama of the Barelvi orientation also sent their support to the Pakistan Movement,21 in 1945 forming the Jamhuriyah-i-Islamiyah to urge Indian Muslims to get behind it.22 The ulamas politics during this period were thus essentially dened by their position on Pakistan. Although attitudes were mixed, enough ulama backed the Pakistan Movement to give it religious legitimacy.23 Interestingly, both sides claimed the positions they took up were intended to defend the health of Islam in the Indian sub-continent.

Downloaded By: [Australian National University Library] At: 02:00 13 January 2011

The Ulama in Pakistani Politics after Independence, 194778 Upon the inception of Pakistan in 1947, many North Indian ulama, such as Mawdudi and Uthmani, joined the mass migration of Muslims to the new state. Even some JUH leaders who were opposed to the idea of Pakistan moved there. Once relocated, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), the Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam (JUI), and even some ulama who had become members of the League pushed for the adoption of an Islamic constitution.24 The JUI also actively promoted the cause
Mawdudi, Tahrik-i-Azadi-I-Hind awr Musalaman, pp.223. Pirzada, The Politics of the Jamiat-e-ulama-e-Islam (JUI), p.5. 20 Ibid., p.10. 21 The Barelvi ulama believe in a Sustic form of Islam. The name Barelvi originates from the groups place of origin in Bareilly, Utter Pradesh, India. For more on the Barelvi ulamas views on the Pakistan Movement, see Usha Sanyal, Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi and His Movement, 18701920 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.30228. 22 Ishtiaq Hussein Quireshi, Ulama in Politics (Karachi: Maaref Limited, 1974), p.366. 23 Ian Talbot notes that the support the ulama of the Barelvi school and the pirs (saints) gave to the Pakistan Movement was instrumental in the formation of Pakistan. See Ian Talbot, Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp.968. 24 The All-India Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam (AIJUI) was renamed Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam after the formation of Pakistan. The party split into three factions in the 1990s and was renamed again according to the names of its three leaders. Mawlana Fazul Rehman led the JUI(F), Mawlana Sami-ul-Haq the JUI(S) and Mawlana Ajmal Qadri the JUI(A).
19 18

THE ULAMA

IN

PAKISTANI POLITICS

235

of Islamic education. Meanwhile a new Barelvi party, the Jamiat-e-Ulama-ePakistan (JUP), was formed to ensure that Muslims of that persuasion were represented politically in the new state, although the JUP too focused heavily on Islamic education.25 While these parties were initially willing to work together towards their common goal of an Islamic constitution, sectarian and political dierences began to surface once the constitution had been achieved.

Downloaded By: [Australian National University Library] At: 02:00 13 January 2011

Establishing an Islamic Constitution The Jamaat-e-Islami ulama led the campaign for an Islamic constitution.26 The JI believed that Pakistan had been designated as an Islamic state and should therefore be governed by the rules of Islam, which meant both an Islamic constitution and sharia.27 But the new Pakistan government was unsettled by the agitation of the JI leaders, and clamped down on the organisation. JI newspapers and journals such as Tarjumanul Quran and Tasnim were closed and several leaders of the JI, including Mawdudi, were apprehended.28 In response the ulama groups banded together to demand that Islam be accorded a proper place in the polity. Even Mawlana Shabbir Ahmad Uthmani lent his support to the plan. The Pakistan government was put in a x: to object to the demand made by the ulama might be seen as an objection to Islam itself. While it procrastinated, the JI went from strength to strength in the forum of public opinion. Emboldened, the JI joined with Mawlana Zafar Ahmad Thanwi, the eminent scholar Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi, members of the Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam, and 31 other prominent ulama to demand an Islamic state. Specically, they furnished the government with a list of 22 principles for the state to follow.29 This campaign bore fruit when the nal draft of the constitution, published in 1956, named the state the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and declared that no law repugnant to
Similarly to the JUI, the JUP also split into ve factions: the Sunni Tehreek; Dawat-e-Islami; Punjab Sunni Tehreek; Jamaat-e-Ahl-e-Sunnat; and Tehreek-e-Tahauz-e-Namoos-e-Risalat. The main focus of discussion for this section will be on the JI and the JUI(F), the two most important ulama groups in Pakistan. 26 Jamaat-e-Islami is an Islamic party formed by Mawlana Mawdudi. It is currently a political party that aims to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan. See Seyyed Reza Vali Nasr, The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution: The Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994), p.123. 27 Interview with Syed Munawwar Hassan, Secretary-General of the Jamaat-e-Islami, interview by author, tape recording, Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, Mansoorah, Multan Road, Lahore, 25 December 2004. 28 Jamaat-e-Islami, Rudaad-I-Jamaat-e-Islami (Proceedings of the Jamaat-e-Islami), Vol.6 (Lahore: Jamaat-EIslami, 1992), pp.1334. 29 Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), pp.2167.
25

236

SOUTH ASIA

the teachings of the Quran and the Hadith could be passed.30 The ulamas strategy of collaboration and dissent had prevented the government from manipulating Islam for its own ends. Instead, it had allowed the ulama to set the terms of the public debate and dene the role of Islam within the new state. Another aspect of the ulamas political position during this period was their strong rejection of military rule and the promotion of democracy. While Mawdudi and many ulama rejected democracy as a Western practice, they believed that democracy allowed humans complete freedom to augment and change laws even if those laws were based on shariawhich they saw as the law of God.31 Moreover Mawdudi saw in democracy a convenient means to achieve his Islamic state. In 1958 the Pakistani military under General Ayub Khan staged a coup that overthrew the Pakistan Muslim League government. To undermine the military, the JI joined the Combined Opposition Parties (COPs), a political grouping that comprised various secular parties linked to Fatima Jinnah, the sister of Mohamed Ali Jinnah. The COPs opposed Ayub Khan in the 1963 presidential elections.32 Then in 1967 Mawdudi set up a further alliance of opposition parties under the banner of the Democratic Action Committee (DAC). At a series of mass meetings and gatherings culminating in a roundtable conference convened in March 1969, the DAC called for Ayub Khans resignation. Shortly after the end of the conference, Ayub Khan did indeed resign, prompting the JI to claim the credit. The JIs opposition to military rule and its call for a return to democracy strongly improved its public standing. Even some Pakistanis of secular disposition were willing to lend it a helping hand to get rid of the government. At the same time the JI mollied its critics by soft-pedalling on potentially divisive issues. After Zulkar Ali Bhutto took power following the elections of 1970 and Pakistans civil war, JI ulama continued to oppose the government, but during this period other ulama in the JUI were more vocal on the Islamic front. The 1970 election marked an important turning point for the ulama in the JUI, who won seven seats in the provincial assembly of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and went on to form a coalition government there in partnership with the nationalist National Awami Party (NAP). JUI head Mufti
30

Downloaded By: [Australian National University Library] At: 02:00 13 January 2011

For more on the Islamic provisions in the Pakistani constitution, see G.W. Choudhary, Constitutional Development in Pakistan (London: Longman Group, 1969), pp.1023. 31 Mawlana Abul Ala Mawdudi, Islamic Law and Constitution (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1960), p.260. 32 Vali Nasr, The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution, p.155.

THE ULAMA

IN

PAKISTANI POLITICS

237

Mahmud became the new chief minister of the province. Although brief,33 JUI rule in the NWFP made plenty of waves. As soon as he became chief minister Mahmud launched a programme of Islamisation, establishing a board of ulama to bring the laws into accordance with the Quran and Sunnah. As a result, a number of new Islamic laws were enacted. Later, the ulama cooperated with the military under the banner of the Pakistan National Alliance to overthrow the hostile Bhutto government at the centre.34 The big breakthrough for the ulama however came when General Zia-ul-Haq staged a successful coup against Bhutto in 1978. During Zias rule the JI built up a harmonious working relationship with the military regime despite the latters initial rhetoric of promoting democracy. The bases for that cooperation were Zias support for Islamisation, and his Afghan policy. Yet the accession to inuence cost the JI much of the support and legitimacy it had earlier gained among the Pakistani populace. The emergence of General Zia-ul-Haq posed a serious dilemma to the JI. The general, a long-time supporter of the party, was a devout Muslim and had a personal respect for Mawlana Mawdudi. Zia had even given copies of Mawdudis Tafhimul Quran (Understanding the Quran) as prizes to soldiers who had won a debate organised by the Army Education School.35 Zia had intimated in fact that one of the key aims of his coup was to open the way for an Islamisation drive. But his praetorian coup ran against the tenets of an Islamic polity as well as those of the democratic political order that Mawdudi had advocated in the past. Still the JI was prepared to work with Zia to Islamise Pakistan. In line with that goal, four JI leaders accepted ministerships, and another a judge-ship of the federal sharia court, an appellate bench with powers of judicial review.36 Additionally, two of its supporters were appointed members of the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), a constitutional body that had the job of formulating recommendations leading to the introduction of an Islamic penal code and the Islamisation of the economic system.

Downloaded By: [Australian National University Library] At: 02:00 13 January 2011

33

The NWFP government was dismissed after a few weeks by the president acting on the advice of Prime Minister Bhutto. See Pirzada, Jamiat-e-ulama-e-Islam, p.67. See also Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military, in International Crisis Group Asia Report, No.49 (20 March 2003), pp.615, for a comprehensive overview of the ulamas politics in post-independence Pakistan. 34 For more on the Pakistan National Alliance, see Anwar H. Syed, Pakistan in 1976. Business as Usual, in Asian Survey, Vol.XVII, no.2 (Feb. 1977), pp.18190. 35 Stanley Wolpert, Zul Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.281. 36 Vali Nasr, The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution, p.45.

238

SOUTH ASIA

Downloaded By: [Australian National University Library] At: 02:00 13 January 2011

The relationship between the JI and Zia was sealed when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. The JI had been privy to Pakistans Afghan policy following the communist coup there in 1977. Leading Afghan resistance leaders such as Burhanuddin Rabbani approached Qazi Hussein Ahmad, then the JI party chief in the NWFP, for assistance in ghting the communists. The JI leaders met the Pakistani generals to formulate a policy.37 When the Afghanistan War broke out, Zia took the JI into his condence and used its religious backing to legitimate the war as a jihad. The war thus opened the inner sanctum of the government to the party. As well it gave the party access to some of the funds and arms owing to the mujahidin and provided JI members and the members of its student wing, the Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba, with military training.38 The party also used its new governmental connections to secure more support for its client groups in Kashmir such as the Harakat-ulMujahidin and the Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir.39 The Afghanistan War also provided an opportunity for Zia to work closely with the other prominent ulama party, the JUI. For Zia, the JUI was useful as it had strong support among the Pathans of the NWFP and Baluchistan. And its chain of madrasahs in those regions provided a fertile recruiting ground for the war in Afghanistan. With the exception of those in the JUP, all Pakistan ulama publicly supported the Zia regime. However as his rule neared its end, some of the ulama began to desert Zia in favour of the opposition. The period between 1977 and 1985 can be seen one of mixed failure and success for the ulama. At an ideological level, it saw many of their Islamic demands, such as the promulgation of sharia law and greater state-initiated Islamisation, implemented. The Afghanistan War also proved a boon because it exposed the mujahidin to the ulamas religious and political inuence, boosted the ulamas image in Islamic revivalist circles, and gave them a greater pan-Islamic image.40 But perhaps the most important gain for the ulama during that period was the close relationship they managed to build up with key elements in the Pakistani army. On the debit side, their association with the ruling regime cost the ulama much public support. People gravitated to secular non-Islamist parties such as the Pakistan Peoples Party, the PPP, the Pakistan Muslim League, the
37

Interview with Qazi Hussein Ahmad, Ameer Jamaat-e-Islami, interview by author, tape recording, House 130, St 14 Sector E 7 Islamabad, 31 December 2004. 38 Vali Nasr, The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution, p.195. 39 Interview with Mansoor Jaafar, Jamaat-e-Islami worker, interview by author, tape recording, Jamaat-eIslami Pakistan, Mansoorah, Multan Road, Lahore, 2 January 2005. 40 Seyyed Reza Vali Nasr, Islamic Opposition to the Islamic State: The Jamaat-e-Islami, 197788, in International Middle East Studies, Vol.XXV, no.2 (May 1993), p.269.

THE ULAMA

IN

PAKISTANI POLITICS

239

PML(N) and the Mohajir Qaumi Movement. Over the next two decades, the ulamas inuence steadily declined as the PPP, led by Benazir Bhutto, and the PML(N), led by Nawaz Sharif, dominated the political scene.

Downloaded By: [Australian National University Library] At: 02:00 13 January 2011

The Ulama in Decline, 198599 In particular the ulamas involvement with Zia-ul-Haq had several important consequences. As John Esposito has argued, the co-opting of Islamist groups by governments has often handicapped such groups and led to them losing their political clout with the masses.41 This certainly happened in Pakistan, as can be seen from the 1985 legislative elections sanctioned by the military regime. The JI managed to win only 10 out of the 68 seats that it contested in the National Assembly.42 Signicantly, many of the JI leaders closely associated with Zias regime were defeated. The ulama in the JUI(F) boycotted the elections. Even so, their political support fell. With Zias death in 1988, the JI ulama tried to salvage something from the wreckage, joining the Islami Jumhuri Ittihad (Islamic Democratic Alliance) or IDA, led by Zias close aide, Nawaz Sharif.43 But in the event the IDA was beaten by the PPP and the JI once again found itself in opposition. Moreover having managed to win only eight seats its inuence within the coalition declined. And the JUI(F) too was reduced to eight seats in the new assembly. Consequently when Nawaz Sharif regained oce in 1990after Bhuttos government was sackedthe JI remained on the periphery of power, and Sharif ignored the partys demands to have its leader in parliament made chairman of the Accounts Committee. In the 1993 elections things went from bad to worse. The JI decided to contest on its own ticket but managed to secure only three seats. Meanwhile the JUI(F) employed alliance politics in pursuit of a larger political space for itself. Realising that it would not obtain any real power on its own, the JUI(F) took advantage of the PPPs desperation for coalition partners to secure several important parliamentary positions,
41

Esposito was writing in relation to the Muslim Youth Assembly of Malaysia (ABIM) and how it had suered after founding members such as Anwar Ibrahim and Siddiq Fadhil left the group to join the Malaysian government. See John Esposito and John Voll, Islam and Democracy (London: Oxford University Press, 1987), p.190. 42 Report on the General Elections, 1985, Vol.3 (Islamabad: Election Commission of Pakistan, n.d.). 43 Under the Zia regime, Nawaz Sharif was the chief minister of the state of Punjab from 1985. Following the death of Zia, Sharifs party, the Pakistan Muslim League, won the largest number of seats in the state of Punjab, allowing him to be appointed chief minister. He became prime minister in 1990 following the general elections called after the sacking of Benazir Bhutto. His government was thrown out of oce in 1993 where he lost the prime ministership to Benazir once again. In 1997, following the elections, he became prime minister. He was deposed from power in 1999 by the military coup led by General Musharraf.

240

SOUTH ASIA

including that of chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee on Foreign Aairs, handed to Mawlana Fazlur Rehman. However this tactic proved only a short-term palliative. By 1997 the JUI(F) had broken with the PPP and was focusing on building up its support in the madrasahs. The continuing exclusion of the ulama from political power led them to look for other instruments of support. Both the JI and the JUI(F) put a lot of eort into establishing new Islamic schools. Between 1988 and 2002, the number of madrasahs linked to the JUI(F) and the JUI(S) increased from 1,840 to 7,000, while madrasahs linked to the JI increased from 96 to 500.44 (Earlier, under Ziaul-Haq, the ulama had been given free rein to expand Islamic education in Pakistan.45) The focus on madrasahs had its roots in the desire of the ulama to support two of their key projects, Afghanistan and Kashmir. As mentioned earlier, many madrasahs were vital recruiting grounds for the Afghanistan War. However, with the end of the war in 1988, the ulama began to focus their energy on ensuring that the faction they supported in Afghanistan would end up in control of Kabul. In 1992 the Afghanistan government of Dr. Najibullah nally collapsed. The JI insisted that the new government in Afghanistan must include leaders of the Jamiat-e-Islami Afghanistan and the Hizb-e-Islami, two of its client groups.46 However the Nawaz Sharif government refused to accommodate this demand and instead chose to recognise the government headed by Sibghatullah Mojaddedi of the Afghanistan National Liberation Front.47 Meanwhile the ulama from the JUI(F) increased their inuence in Afghanistan through the Taliban, many of whom had been educated in madrasahs run by the party.48 Fortuitously the JUI(F) was, at this point, part of a coalition government led by Benazir Bhutto. With the support of the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI), the JUI(F) convinced Bhutto to back a plan to aid the Taliban insurgency on the understanding that a Taliban government in Kabul would be amenable to the construction of a trans-Afghanistan pipeline to carry oil from the Central Asian Muslim republics to Pakistan. Important to this vision, too, was the fact that numbers of Central Asian students who had

Downloaded By: [Australian National University Library] At: 02:00 13 January 2011

44

Ali Riaz, Global Jihad, Sectarianisms and the Madrassahs in Pakistan, IDSS Working Paper No 85, p.18 [http://www.idss.edu.sg/publications/workingpapers.asp?selYear2005&selTheme7]. 45 For more on the expansion of Islamic education under Zia, see Pakistan: Madrasahs, Extremism and the Military, International Crisis Group Asia Report, No.36 (29 July 2002), pp.1011. 46 Khurram Murad, Defeat in the 1993 Elections: Reasons and Aspects, Jasarat (11 November 1993), p. 27. 47 For more on Mojaddedi, see his ocial website at www.mojaddedi.org/index.html. 48 In fact, the word Taliban is the plural of talib or student in Urdu.

THE ULAMA

IN

PAKISTANI POLITICS

241

studied in the JUI(F)s madrasahs were now an important part of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.49 Moreover because the mujahidin cause in Afghanistan was broadly popular in Pakistan these international intrigues led to a revival of the ulamas standing among the Pakistani populace. By the time of the 1999 military coup staged by General Pervez Musharraf, the religious elites were poised to reap the benets.

Downloaded By: [Australian National University Library] At: 02:00 13 January 2011

The Rise of the Ulama, 19992007 The period since 1999 has been marked by the return of the ulama to a position of prominence in Pakistani political society. Indeed, the ulama are now more powerful than they have ever been in Pakistani history. The events of September 11 brought about far-reaching consequences for Pakistan. The JI was quick to blame Jews for the attack,50 whereas the US had accused Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. The JI followed up this bizarre allegation by launching a massive campaign to discredit the Pakistan government, accusing the latter of being a US stooge. In truth, many of the ulama had close ties to Osama bin Laden and the Taliban leadership.51 With the commencement of US and NATO military operations in Afghanistan, the Pakistan government was asked to provide logistical support and seal its western borders. The JIs inuence was boosted by the wave of anti-American feeling created in Pakistanespecially in the NWFP and Baluchistanby the Western intervention. Riding this tide, the ulama moved to coordinate the response of the countrys various religious parties. This led to the formation of a peak body known as the Afghan Defence Council (ADC).52 Immediately the ADC launched a protest campaign against the foreign meddling across the border. But the war continued nonetheless. After the Taliban surrendered, the ADC was renamed the Pak-Afghan Defence Council (PADC).53 Its intransigent stand against the Karzai government in Kabul has greatly enhanced the ulamas image in the eyes of many Pakistanis. The success of the PADC led the JI leadership to stitch together an electoral alliance among the religious parties in preparation for the 2002 general
Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (London: Penguin Books, 2002), p.140. Interview with Syed Munawwar Hassan, Lahore, 25 December 2004. 51 Ibid. For links between the JUI and the Taliban, see Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2000), pp.131. 52 S. Warriach, Election 2002, Facts and Figures, The Daily Jang (10 October 2002). 53 Ibid.
50 49

242

SOUTH ASIA

Downloaded By: [Australian National University Library] At: 02:00 13 January 2011

elections. The alliance was called the Muttahida Majlisi Amal (MMA). The JIs involvement was instrumental, since it was open to all Muslims, which meant that members of dierent sects such as Barelvis, Deobandis and Shia54 were represented in it.55 This gave the religious factions a neutral ground on which to discuss policy issues. Soon the JI oces became the unocial secretariat of the alliance, and subsequently its chief, Qazi Hussein Ahmad, was appointed as MMA secretary-general. On election day the MMA walked away with 46 national assembly seats and 80 in the provincial assemblies, making it the third largest group in the parliament.56 The Pakistan Muslim League (Q), a party cobbled together by Musharraf from the remnants of Nawaz Sharifs PML(N), with 77 seats, was approached to form a government but it was well short of an overall majority. It needed a coalition partner. The MMA was the obvious choice. A deal was struck, giving the ulama a key strategic position at the centre of Pakistani politics. In addition, the MMA took power in its own right in the NWFP and became a key member of the coalition government formed in Baluchistan. Yet another important aspect of the MMAs victory was the inuence it acquired in the senate. All four provinces of Pakistan have equal representation in the upper house at the national level. Due to its huge majority in the NWFP assembly, the MMA picked up more than one-third of all senate seats, much more than any other group. This gave the party veto over the law-making process of the country.57 Flushed with its victory, the MMA immediately demanded that Musharraf step down as Pakistani president. The rise of the ulama in Pakistani politics a year after the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 validates the perception that Islamism is now a force to be reckoned with in Pakistan and that the military may be the

The dierent Islamic parties in Pakistan often reected a particular sectarian tendency. The Deobandis were represented by the JUI(F) and the JUI(S), the Barelvis by the JUP, the Wahhabis (or Ahle-Hadith, as they are known in the sub-continent) by the Jamiat-e-Ahle-Hadith, and the Shia by the Tehreek-e-Jafari. The Ahle-Hadith movement, stressing pure Wahhabi Islam, found support among some of the ulama in Pakistan in the 1970s who decided to form an Islamic party. The Shia in Pakistan belong mostly to the Ithna Asharite (Twelver) branch of the sect. Although other Shia sects such as the Ismailis exist in the northern areas of Pakistan, they are less organised than the Twelver Shia, who are more politically active and formed organisations and parties to secure political inuence. For more on the Shia, see Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shii and Sunni Identities, in Modern Asian Studies, Vol.32, no.3 (July 1988), pp.6949. 55 Interview with Qazi Hussein Ahmed. 56 District Reporter, Musharaf and the Religious Parties, Dawn (11 April 2002). The Pakistan Peoples Party was second largest with 63 seats. 57 Farooq Tanwir, Religious Parties and Politics in Pakistan, in International Journal for Comparative Sociology, Vol.XXXXIII, no.3 (Dec. 2002), pp.2545.

54

THE ULAMA

IN

PAKISTANI POLITICS

243

Downloaded By: [Australian National University Library] At: 02:00 13 January 2011

only institution able to prevent the country from going down the path of a Taliban-style Islamic revolution.58 But the army has itself become close to the religious parties. Some observers suggest that it was the military, acting behind the scenes, which really cobbled together the religious alliance. One might add that it was the MMAs votes in parliament in 2003 that gave General Musharraf the two-thirds majority he needed to change the constitution, thereby legitimising his coup and the scores of ordinances he had issued since seizing power.59 However, cautious of the militarys proven tendency to hang on to power, the JI ulama asked the army to progressively implement a democratic constitution based on sharia.60

The Ulamas Ascent to Power Holding an absolute majority, the MMA moved quickly to implement its Islamic agenda in the NWFP province. As a rst step, it got up an assembly resolution calling on the provincial government to ban bank interest and reinstate Friday as a weekly holiday. It then set up a stacked committee which duly recommended the enforcement of Islamic hudud punishments, including stoning and the amputation of limbs, and the introduction of the death penalty for blasphemy and the consumption of liquor.61 The next step was a bill passed on 2 June 2003, to implement sharia in the province. This was followed by directives to bureaucrats to pray ve times a day and follow sharia law, curbs on the sale of music and videos, the destruction of posters featuring women and advertising Western products, and the imposition of a complete ban on alcohol.62 Meanwhile, the MMAs madrasah-educated cadres were encouraged by the government to help police the new laws through vigilantism and violence. Thus religious leaders in the Bajaur agency threatened to raise a lashkar (soldier) to wipe out elements spreading obscenity and un-Islamic culture.63 Finally the MMA government strengthened the clout of the sharia court by appointing ulama aligned to the party to it.
Frederick Grare, Islam, Militarism and the 20072008 Elections in Pakistan, Carnegie Papers, South Asia Project, No.70 (August 2006), p.3 [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?faview& id18553&progzgp&projzsa]. 59 Musharraf needed to change the constitution so that he could simultaneously hold the position of army chief and president of the country. The 1973 Pakistan Constitution did not allow for this. Twenty-nine other amendments were also made, leading to an expansion of Musharrafs power. See Hussein Haqqani, Pakistan between Mosque and Military (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2006), pp.25960. 60 Abdul Rashid Moten, Revolution to Revolution: Jamaat-e-Islami in the Politics of Pakistan (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2002), p.169. 61 Back to Friday as Holiday, Friday Times (3 Mar. 2003) [www.thefridaytimes.com/nuggets.htm, accessed 12 May 2005]. 62 Interview with Syed Munawwar Hassan, Lahore, 25 December 2004. 63 Anwarullah Khan, Video Shops Given a Week to Close, Dawn (Karachi) (29 Dec. 2002).
58

244

SOUTH ASIA

Downloaded By: [Australian National University Library] At: 02:00 13 January 2011

The Ulama and the Military The common assumption is that the ulama are beholden to the military.64 But the reality is more complex. The ulama are these days able to hold their own when dealing with military regimes because they have successfully inltrated the army, especially in the lower rungs. For the ulama, the religious indoctrination of the army is part of their long-term strategy to gain control of the country through a soft Islamic revolution.65 As Hassan Askari-Rizvi notes, as early as the 1970s many ocers began to display an attraction to JI ideology and the teachings of Mawlana Mawdudi.66 This was especially the case within the ISI. Senior ISI ocers such as Hamid Gul and Javed Nasir came to support a policy of subjecting army personnel to religious indoctrination.67 By the 1980s new recruits were being asked to swear an oath of allegiance on the Quran and were being regularly examined on their knowledge of the tenets of Islam.68 Sami ulHaq, the chancellor of Darul Uloom Haqqani madrasah and a former leader of one of the MMAs component parties, noted in an interview in 2004 that the US had assessed Pakistans army wrongly, and that the army was now Islamic.69 It is not an understatement. The rank and le of the Pakistani military have become radicalised. As for its ocers, some at least now answer to the mullahs bidding. Thus while the popular assumption has been that the ulama are pawns of the military, in reality the ulama have acted independently. They utilise their relationship with the Pakistani military and elements of the government to their benet, but when they think the government is not acting to further the interests of Islam they are quite happy to join peripheral groups in agitating against the government. Indeed leading ulama in the JI and the JUI(F) have tolerated lesser ulama within their ranks launching violent attacks against government leaders and establishments.70 A case in point was the 2004
64 See Grare, Islam, Militarism and the 20072008 Elections in Pakistan; Bahadur, The Rise of the MMA in Pakistan; and Moten, Revolution to Revolution: Jamaat-e-Islami in the Politics of Pakistan. 65 The more prominent Jamaat leaders did not state explicitly their strategy of trying to gain control of the army but maintained that their eorts at dawah within the army has given birth to an army that is closer to God. The Jamaat leaders I spoke to in Peshawar and Mardan indicated this strategy openly. Interviews with Jamaat leaders in January 2005. 66 Hassan-Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan (Lahore: Sang-e-Maal Publications, 2002), p.246. 67 Interview with Qazi Hussein Ahmed. 68 Conversation with an ISI ocer in Lahore. 69 See Jessica Stern, Meeting with the Muj, in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.XXXXXVII, no.1 (Jan./ Feb. 2001), p.43. Mawlana Ilyas Khan from the Laskhar-e-Toiba also alluded to this during my interview with him. Interview with Mawlana Ilyas Khan, member of Lashkar-e-Toiba, interview by author, tape recording, Muridke, 2 January 2005. 70 Seyyed Vali Nasr identies a similar trend between Shia ulama. He cites the example in Iraq of Moqteda Al-Sadr and Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, who have been playing what he described as a Bad Guy, Good Guy game. See Seyyed Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conicts within Islam will Shape the Future (New York: Norton, 2006).

THE ULAMA

IN

PAKISTANI POLITICS

245

attempt by members of Jaish-e Muhammad to kill Shaukat Aziz, the thenprime minister, an operation spearheaded by a peripheral alim, Maulvi Imtiaz Ahmed.71 Since the Jaish-e Muhammad and Maulvi both have close links with the JUI(F), it is likely that the latter was aware of, and may have even initiated, the attempted assassination. Violence is part of the ulamas strategy of sending a clear message to the government that if Islamisation is slowed or blocked, they will seek to bring it down.72

Downloaded By: [Australian National University Library] At: 02:00 13 January 2011

The Ulama and Kashmir There is no doubt that the Pakistani ulama have become closely linked to the army. The JI has long been in the forefront of Kashmiri resistance to Indian rule. Indeed the JI is an invaluable proxy of the Pakistani state in this respect because it is the only separatist outt in Kashmir that demands unication of the valley with Pakistan.73 The JIs main tactic is to increase unrest in Indian Kashmir and then convince international public opinion through its oshoots in Europe and North America that Delhi is engaged in the violation of human rights.74 However by the late 1990s, the inuence of the JI-supported groups had begun to wane, and other groups linked to the JUI(F), such as Harakat ulAnsar (HUA) and Jaish-e-Mohammed, gradually took their place at the centre of the resistance movement. Thus in late December 1999 the HUA hijacked an Indian Airlines plane to Kandahar and used the resulting leverage to secure the release of Mawlana Masood Azhar, its leader, and two other militants being held in Indian jails. Azhar quickly returned to Pakistan, where he was permitted to stage a huge rally in Karachi on 5 January 2000 attended by his gun-toting followers.75 And the ulama have also from time to time mobilised sympathisers in India, including the Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), to further their cause. The existence of these links was uncovered in late 2002 when Maharashtra police seized 30 compact discs containing speeches of Azhar, now chief of Jaish-e Mohammad, along with clippings of communal riots in Gujarat, from

71 72

Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Free Press, 2006), p.236. Interview with Khalid Rahman, Director-General, Institute of Policy Studies, Nasr Chambers, Block 19, Markaz F-7, Islamabad, 31 December 2004. 73 Since 1947 a branch of the Jamaat-e-Islami has existed in Kashmir. It is independent from the Jamaat in Pakistan but is linked to it ideologically. The Jamaat-e-Islami came under greater inuence from the Pakistani JI after the Kashmiri uprising in 1989. See Grare, Political Islam in the Indian Subcontinent, p.83. 74 Ibid. 75 Zahid Hussain, Freed Militant Surfaces, ABC News.com [http://web.archive.org/web/20000901092056/ http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/militants000105.html].

246

SOUTH ASIA

the SIMI oces in Aurangabad.76 The subsequent arrest of Sayeed Shah Hasseb Raza and Amil Pervez, senior members of the SIMI, has also conrmed links between the SIMI and Pakistani Islamist groups.77 Investigating ocers believed that the duo were in Kolkata to carry out subversive activities and recruit youth for jihadi activities.78 After the formation of the MMA, rivalry between the JI and the JUI(F) ceased, meaning that the military cannot use one group of ulama against another. This has given the ulama more political `-vis the army. leverage vis-a
Downloaded By: [Australian National University Library] At: 02:00 13 January 2011

Controlling the Tribal Areas The ulama are extremely inuential and powerful in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan.79 The JUI(F) in particular has signicant support in the region due to its predominantly Pashtun leadership.80 Accordingly, the government has increasingly turned to the JUI(F) to help it try to pacify the local tribes. This policy paid o for Islamabad in 2006, when a deal was struck with a leading local militant, Mujahideen Shura, through the good oces of JUI(F) parliamentarian Mawlana Merajuddin Qureshi.81 The deal promised an amnesty and nancial incentives in return for pledges to renounce violence, and to the surrender of Al-Qaeda and other foreign militants.82 In North Waziristan, a similar agreement was reached, again with the assistance of the JUI(F), when Mawlana Fazlur Rehmans mediation produced a month-long ceasere by the Mujahidin Shura there on 25 June 2006.83 Ironically, these deals have led to the further Talibanisation of the Northern Areas. However, the Talibanisation trend has not limited itself to the FATA region. It is, in fact, extending to the urban centres, as is evident from the recent tension created by the Red Mosque clerics in Islamabad. In March 2007 these clerics launched an anti-vice campaign, demanding that the government impose
For more on the SIMI, see www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/terroristoutts/simi.htm. Times of India (4 Mar. 2002); and Animesh Roul, Students Islamic Movement of India: A Prole, in Terrorism Monitor, Vol.4, no.7 (6 April 2006), pp.910. 78 Hassan Abbas, Proles of Pakistans Seven Tribal Agencies, in Terrorism Monitor, Vol.4, no.20 (19 Oct. 2006). 79 Ibid. 80 Seyyed Reza Vali Nasr, Military Rule, Islamism and Democracy in Pakistan, in Middle East Journal, Vol.58 (Spring 2004), pp.195209. 81 Dawn (30 Sept. 2006). 82 Dawn (21 June 2004). For more on the crisis, see Pakistans Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants, International Crisis Group Asia Report, No.125 (11 Dec. 2006). 83 Ibid., p.18.
77 76

THE ULAMA

IN

PAKISTANI POLITICS

247

sharia law and Islamic rule in Islamabad. As part of their strategy in the campaign, the Red Mosques students have launched anti-vice squads, taking upon themselves the responsibility for vandalising music and CD stores and also threatening the owners to switch to alternative businesses. True, in other parts of Pakistan, such as the regions of Punjab and Sindh, the ulamas inuence is more limited. This is due to the strong Su tradition that governs Islam in these areas. However, there are signs that the ulama are gearing up to support clandestine activities in Pakistani urban centres too, such as Karachi and Lahore. The government through its weakness and vacillation has inadvertently empowered a new generation of Pakistani militants linked to the Taliban while strengthening their patrons, the Pakistani ulama.

Downloaded By: [Australian National University Library] At: 02:00 13 January 2011

Present and Future Prospects Both within and outside the electoral system, the ulama will remain an important element in Pakistani politics. Similar to the engagement they forged with the Musharraf regime, the ulama will continue to wield inuence in the military, in tribal areas and among militants in India and Afghanistan; and they will continue to use that leverage to undermine any Pakistani government unwilling to accede to their Islamisation agenda. They have, in this sense, emerged as the true inheritors of the Pakistani political system. The common factor in the policies pursued by Pakistani governments over the last two decades has been an increasing emphasis on promoting conformity with religious values through the introduction of rigid Islamic laws.84 These laws and policies are largely the legacy of ulama activism.

84

For a comprehensive overview of these policies, see Ghazali, Islamic Pakistan.