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A. LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS CASES: 1. COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS vs. THE BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONERS G.R. No. L-11216 March 6, 1916 Facts: COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Spain and engaged in business in the Philippine Islands as a common carrier of passengers and merchandise by water: On June 7, 1915, the Board of Public Utility Commissioners issued and caused to be served an order to show cause why they should not be required to present detailed annual reports respecting its finances and operations respecting the vessels owned and operated by it, in the form and containing the matters indicated by the model attached to the petition. They are ordered to present annually on or before March first of each year a detailed report of finances and operations of such vessels as are operated by it as a common carrier within the Philippine Islands, in the form and containing the matters indicated in the model of annual report which accompanied the order to show cause herein. COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS denied the authority of the board to require the report asked for on the ground that the provision of Act No. 2307 relied on by said board as authority for such requirement was, if construed as conferring such power, invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the part of the Legislature to delegate legislative power to the board. It is cumbersome and unnecessarily prolix and that the preparation of the same would entail an immense amount of clerical work." ISSUE: Whether or not it is constitutional to require COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS to pass a detailed report to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners of the Philippine Islands? Whether the power to require the detailed report is strictly legislative, or administrative, or merely relates to the execution of the law? HELD: The order appealed from is set aside and the cause is returned to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners with instructions to dismiss the proceeding. RULING: The section of Act No. 2307 under which the Board of Public Utility Commissioners relies for its authority, so far as pertinent to the case at hand, reads as follows: Sec. 16. The Board shall have power, after hearing, upon notice, by order in writing, to require every public utility as herein defined: (e) To furnish annually a detailed report of finances and operations, in such form and containing such matters as the Board may from time to time by order prescribe. The statute which authorizes a Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require detailed reports from public utilities, leaving the nature of the report, the contents thereof, the general lines which it shall follow, the principle upon which it shall proceed, indeed, all other matters whatsoever, to the exclusive discretion of the board, is not expressing its own will or the will of the State with respect to the public utilities to which it refers. Such a provision does not declare, or set out, or indicate what information the State requires, what is valuable to it, what it needs in order to impose correct and just taxation, supervision or control, or the facts which the State must have in order to deal justly and equitably with such public utilities and to require them to deal justly and equitably with the State. The Legislature seems simply to have authorized the Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require what information the board wants. It would seem that the Legislature, by the provision in question, delegated to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners all of its powers over a given subject-matter in a manner almost absolute, and without laying down a rule or even making a suggestion by which that power is to be directed, guided or applied. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. The Supreme Court held that there was no delegation of legislative power, it said: The Congress may not delegate its purely legislative powers to a commission, but, having laid down the general rules of action under which a commission shall proceed, it may require of that commission the application of such rules to particular situations and the investigation of facts, with a view to making orders in a particular matter within the rules laid down by the Congress. NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE

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In section 20 (of the Commerce Act), Congress has authorized the commission to require annual reports. The act itself prescribes in detail what those reports shall contain. In other words, Congress has laid down general rules for the guidance of the Commission, leaving to it merely the carrying out of details in the exercise of the power so conferred. This, we think, is not a delegation of legislative authority. In the case at bar the provision complained of does not law "down the general rules of action under which the commission shall proceed." nor does it itself prescribe in detail what those reports shall contain. Practically everything is left to the judgment and discretion of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners, which is unrestrained as to when it shall act, why it shall act, how it shall act, to what extent it shall act, or what it shall act upon. The Legislature, by the provision in question, has abdicated its powers and functions in favor of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners with respect to the matters therein referred to, and that such Act is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. The Legislature, by the provision referred to, has not asked for the information which the State wants but has authorized and board to obtain the information which the board wants. 2. US vs Tang Ho (1922) G.R. 17122 Facts: At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose". Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or corn within the meaning of this Act, but does not specify the price of rice or define any basic for fixing the price. August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold. Then, on August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price. Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced. The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved July 30, 1919; that the GovernorGeneral issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law was first published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of August, 1919. Issue: WON the delegation of legislative power to the Governor General was valid. Held: By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or anyone else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra dealt with rules and regulations which were promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture for Government land in the forest reserve. These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it cannot delegate it legislative authority. The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative power is pointed out and clearly defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says: That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other department of the government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government established by the constitution. Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it may be provided that it shall become operative only upon some certain act or event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall be suspended. The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to depend. It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations were promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and that he would not commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a crime.

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When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not "any cause" for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale "of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53." We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void. 3. PEOPLE VS VERA The constitutional question must be raised by the proper party. A proper party is one who has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. To be a proper party, one must have legal standing or locus standi. FACTS: Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by Cu Unjieng allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon. ISSUE: WON equal protection is violated when the Probation Law provides that only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer may the probation system be applied. HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation. The SC declared the old probation law as unconstitutional. 4. Emmanuel Pelaez vs. The Auditor General FACTS: From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said executive orders. Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain from the respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the executive orders aforementioned. ISSUE: Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the President does not have the authority to create municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative department. RULING: Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be fai thfully executed. The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned.

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Such control does not include the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the President more power than what was vested in him by the Constitution. The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities referred to. 5. Edu vs. Ericta | Fernando, J. (1970) FACTS - Respondent Galo on his behalf and that of other motorist filed a suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the Reflector Law (RA 5715) as an invalid exercise of the police power, for being violative of the due process clause. In a manifestation he further sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that said statute is upheld as constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner Edu, implementing such legislation, be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power. - CFI Judge Ericta ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction directed against the enforcement of such administrative order. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS WoN the Refelctor Law (RA 5715) and Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner Edu are unconsititutional. HELD NO. RATIONALE As to RA 5715: Valid exercise of Police Power of the State. - The Reflector Law requires that all motor vehicles must have sufficient reflector lights or other similar warning devices attached to the corners of said vehicles, otherwise said vehicles shall not be registered. It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power to promote public safety. - Justice Laurel in Calalang vs. Williams: Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state." - Primicias v. Fugoso: Police power is "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people." - Justice Malcolm: "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." - Morfe v. Mutuc: Police power could be hardly distinguishable with the totality of legislative power. - It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is to quote Justice Malcolm anew "the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable of powers," extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out "to all the great public needs." - Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. - What is critical or urgent changes with the time." The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined. - RA 5715 is a legitimate response to a felt public need, and is thus a valid exercise of police power by the State. - The Court says that our 1935 Constitutions philosophy is a repudiation of laissez -faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual. The modern period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of government activity (police power). This was in response to Respondent Galos reliance on his argument of laissez-faire predicated on American State Court decisions. As to Administrative Order No. 2: Constitutional - Admin. Order No. 2 has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act. There is also a section on dimensions, placement and color of said reflectors. Provision is then made as to how such reflectors are to be "placed, installed, pasted or painted." - under Republic Act No. 4136, of which the Reflector Law is an amendment, petitioner, as the Land Transportation Commissioner, may, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, issue rules and regulations for its implementation as long as they do not conflict with its provisions. - What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. - A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability. - Standard: at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.

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Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. - The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained is "safe transit upon the roads." - J.B.L. Reyes in People vs. Exconde: All that is required is that the regulation should germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the law prescribes. - It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. 6. Agustin Vs. Edu | 88 SCRA 195| G.R. No. L-49112| February 2, 1979 Facts: President Marcos issued the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which states that all owners, users or drivers shall have at all times one pair of early warning devise (EWD) in their cars acquire from any source depending on the owners choice. The Letter of Instruction was assailed by petitioner Leovillo Agustin to have violated the constitution guarantee of due process against Hon Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of national Defense, Hon. Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communication and Hon. Aquino, Minister of Public Highways. Because of such contentions, the Implementing Rules and Regulation was ordered to be suspended for a period of 6 months. Petitioner alleges that EWD are not necessary because vehicles already have hazard lights (blinking lights) that can be use as a warning device. Also petitioner contest that the letter of instruction violates the delegation of police power because it is deemed harsh, oppressive and unreasonable for the motorists and those dealers of EWD will become instant millionaires because of such law. Issue: Whether or not Petitioners contentions possess merit. Held: Petitioners contentions are without merit because the exercise of police power may interfere with per sonal liberty or property to ensure and promote the safety, health and prosperity of the State. Also, such letter of instruction is intended to promote public safety and it is indeed a rare occurrence that such contention was alleged in a instruction with such noble purpose. Petitioner also failed to present the factual foundation that is necessary to invalidate the said letter of instruction. In cases where there is absence in the factual foundation, it should be presumed that constitutionality shall prevail. Pres. Marcos on the other hand possesses vital statistics that will justify the need for the implementation of this instruction. As signatory to the 1968 Vienna Conventions on Road Signs and Signals, our country must abide with the standards given as stated in our Constitution that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of International Law as part of the law of the la nd. In the case at bar, the Vienna Convention also requires the use of EWD. Vehicle owners are not obliged to buy an EDW. They can personally create a EWD provided that it is in accordance to the specifications provided by law. Petitioners allegation agai nst the manufacturers of EDW being millionaires is deemed to be an unfounded speculation. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed. The restraining order regarding the implementation of the Reflector Law is lifted making the said law immediately executory. 7. Free Telephone Workers Union vs Ople Political Law Control Power over the Ministries [Cabinet] Alter Ego Forms of Government FACTS: On September 14, 1981, there was a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor (Ople) for unfair labor practices and arbitrary implementation of a Code of Conduct. Several conciliation meetings called by the Ministry followed, with petitioner manifesting its willingness to have a revised Code of Conduct that would be fair to all concerned but with a plea that in the meanwhile the Code of Conduct being imposed be suspended a position that failed to meet the approval of private respondent. Subsequently, respondent, on September 25, 1981, certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and enjoined any strike at the private respondents establishment. Private respondent, following the lead of petitioner labor union, explained its side on the controversy regarding the Code of Conduct, the provisions of which as alleged in the petition were quite harsh, resulting in what it deemed indefinite preventive suspension apparently the principal cause of the labor dispute. Ople issued the certification for compulsory arbitration pursuant to the provisions on strikes of the Labor Code this is to avoid adverse effects to the national interest. ISSUE: Whether or not such provision is an undue delegation of power. HELD: FTWU failed to make out a case of undue delegation. The President shall have control of the ministries. It may happen, therefore, that a single person may occupy a dual position of Minister and Assemblyman. To the extent, however, that what is involved is the execution or enforcement of legislation, the Minister is an official of the executive branch of the government. The adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential character. Article VII on the presidency starts with this provision: The President shall be the head of state and chief executive of the Republic of the Philippines. Its last section is an even more emphatic affirmation that it is a presidential system that obtains in our government. Thus: All powers vested in the President of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and the laws of t he land which are not herein provided for or conferred upon any official shall be deemed and are hereby vested in the President unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise. However, it must be stressed that the exercise of such competence cannot ignore the basic fundamental principle and state policy that the state should afford protection to labor. Whenever, therefore, it is resorted to in labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts affecting national interest, the State still is required to assure the rights of workers to self -organization,

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collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. At this stage of the litigation, however, in the absence of factual determination by the Ministry of Labor and the National Labor Relations Commission, this Court is not in a position to rule on whether or not there is an unconstitutional application. 8. PHILCOMSAT Vs. Alcuaz| 180 SCRA 218| G.R. No.84818| December 18, 1989 Facts: Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing. Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional. Held: Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative. But respondents contention that notice and hearing are not required since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and temporary in nature is erroneous. Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, providing for the proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing, dictates that a Commission has power to fix rates, upon proper notice and hearing, and, if not subject to the exceptions, limitations or saving provisions. It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case. WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents is hereby SET ASIDE. 9. FULL CASE G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995 CHIONGBIAN vs. HON. OSCAR M. ORBOS, Executive Secretary; These suits challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (R.A. No. 6734), authorizing the President of the Philippines to "merge" by administrative determination the regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous Region, and the Executive Order issued by the President pursuant to such authority, "Providing for the Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanao." A temporary restraining order prayed for by the petitioners was issued by this Court on January 29, 1991, enjoining the respondents from enforcing the Executive Order and statute in question. The facts are as follows: Pursuant to Art. X, 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, calling for a plebiscite to be held in the provinces of Basilan, Cotobato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga. In the ensuing plebiscite held on November 16, 1989, four provinces voted in favor of creating an autonomous region. These are the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. In accordance with the constitutional provision, these provinces became the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. On the other hand, with respect to provinces and cities not voting in favor of the Autonomous Region, Art. XIX, 13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscites shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions. Provided, however, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions. Pursuant to the authority granted by this provision, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued on October 12, 1990 Executive Order No. 429, "providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao." Under this Order, as amended by E.O. No. 439 (1) Misamis Occidental, at present part of Region X, will become part of Region IX. (2) Oroquieta City, Tangub City and Ozamiz City, at present parts of Region X will become parts of Region IX. (3) South Cotobato, at present a part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII. (4) General Santos City, at present part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII. (5) Lanao del Norte, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX. (6) Iligan City and Marawi City, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX. Petitioners in G.R. No. 96754 are, or at least at the time of the filing of their petition, members of Congress representing various legislative districts in South Cotobato, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Lanao del Norte and Zamboanga City. On November 12, 1990, they wrote then President Aquino protesting E.O. No. 429. They contended that There is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and cities within the existing regions some of which did not even take part in the plebiscite as in the case of the province of Misamis Occidental and the cities of Oroquieta, Tangub and Ozamiz and restructure them to new administrative regions. On the other hand, the law (Sec. 13, Art. XIX, R.A. 6734) is specific to the point, that is, that "the provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions." The transfer of the provinces of Misamis Occidental from Region X to Region IX; Lanao del Norte from Region XII to Region IX, and South Cotobato from Region XI to Region XII are alterations of the existing structures of governmental units, in other words, reorganization. This can be gleaned from Executive Order No. 429, thus

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Whereas, there is an urgent need to reorganize the administrative regions in Mindanao to guarantee the effective delivery of field services of government agencies taking into consideration the formation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. With due respect to Her Excellency, we submit that while the authority necessarily includes the authority to merge, the authority to merge does not include the authority to reorganize. Therefore, the President's authority under RA 6734 to "merge existing regions" cannot be construed to include the authority to reorganize them. To do so will violate the rules of statutory construction. The transfer of regional centers under Executive Order 429 is actually a restructuring (reorganization) of administrative regions. While this reorganization, as in Executive Order 429, does not affect the apportionment of congressional representatives, the same is not valid under the penultimate paragraph of Sec. 13, Art. XIX of R.A. 6734 and Ordinance appended to the 1986 Constitution apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives of Congress of the Philippines to the different legislative districts in provinces and cities. 1 As their protest went unheeded, while Inauguration Ceremonies of the New Administrative Region IX were scheduled on January 26, 1991, petitioners brought this suit for certiorari and prohibition. On the other hand, the petitioner in G.R. No. 96673, Immanuel Jaldon, is a resident of Zamboanga City, who is suing in the capacity of taxpayer and citizen of the Republic of the Philippines. Petitioners in both cases contend that Art. XIX, 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because (1) it unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated and (2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law. In addition, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673 challenges the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that the power granted by Art. XIX, 13 to the President is only to "merge regions IX and XII" but not to reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly not to transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City. The Solicitor General defends the reorganization of regions in Mindanao by E.O. No. 429 as merely the exercise of a power "traditionally lodged in the President," as held in Abbas v. Comelec, 2 and as a mere incident of his power of general supervision over local governments and control of executive departments, bureaus and offices under Art. X, 16 and Art. VII, 17, respectively, of the Constitution. He contends that there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only a grant of the power to "fill up" or provide the details of legislation because Congress did not have the facility to provide for them. He cites by analogy the case of Municipality of Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan, 3 in which the power of the Governor-General to fix municipal boundaries was sustained on the ground that [such power] is simply a transference of certain details with respect to provinces, municipalities, and townships, many of them newly created, and all of them subject to a more or less rapid change both in development and centers of population, the proper regulation of which might require not only prompt action but action of such a detailed character as not to permit the legislative body, as such, to take it efficiently. The Solicitor General justifies the grant to the President of the power "to merge the existing regions" as something fairly embraced in the title of R.A. No. 6734, to wit, "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," because it is germane to it. He argues that the power is not limited to the merger of those regions in which the provinces and cities which took part in the plebiscite are located but that it extends to all regions in Mindanao as necessitated by the establishment of the autonomous region. Finally, he invokes P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772 which provides: 1. The President of the Philippines shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the National Government. In exercising this authority, the President shall be guided by generally acceptable principles of good government and responsive national government, including but not limited to the following guidelines for a more efficient, effective, economical and development-oriented governmental framework: (a) More effective planning implementation, and review functions; (b) Greater decentralization and responsiveness in decision-making process; (c) Further minimization, if not, elimination, of duplication or overlapping of purposes, functions, activities, and programs; (d) Further development of as standardized as possible ministerial, sub-ministerial and corporate organizational structures; (e) Further development of the regionalization process; and (f) Further rationalization of the functions of and administrative relationships among government entities. For purposes of this Decree, the coverage of the continuing authority of the President to reorganize shall be interpreted to encompass all agencies, entities, instrumentalities, and units of the National Government, including all government owned or controlled corporations as well as the entire range of the powers, functions, authorities, administrative relationships, acid related aspects pertaining to these agencies, entities, instrumentalities, and units. 2. [T]he President may, at his discretion, take the following actions: xxx xxx xxx f. Create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge, or integrate entities, agencies, instrumentalities, and units of the National Government, as well as expand, amend, change, or otherwise modify their powers, functions and authorities, including, with respect to government-owned or controlled corporations, their corporate life, capitalization, and other relevant aspects of their charters. g. Take such other related actions as may be necessary to carry out the purposes and objectives of this Decree. Considering the arguments of the parties, the issues are:

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(1) whether the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative in character, as petitioners contend, or whether it is executive in character, as respondents claim it is, and, in any event, whether Art. XIX, 13 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the President's discretion; (2) whether the power given is fairly expressed in the title of the statute; and (3) whether the power granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions the provinces and cities in which either did not take part in the plebiscite on the creation of the Autonomous Region or did not vote in favor of it; and (4) whether the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City. It will be useful to recall first the nature of administrative regions and the basis and purpose for their creation. On September 9, 1968, R.A. No. 5435 was passed "authorizing the President of the Philippines, with the help of a Commission on Reorganization, to reorganize the different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the government, including banking or financial institutions and corporations owned or controlled by it." The purpose was to promote "simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government." 4 The Commission on Reorganization created under the law was required to submit an integrated reorganization plan not later than December 31, 1969 to the President who was in turn required to submit the plan to Congress within forty days after the opening of its next regular session. The law provided that any reorganization plan submitted would become effective only upon the approval of Congress. 5 Accordingly, the Reorganization Commission prepared an Integrated Reorganization Plan which divided the country into eleven administrative regions. 6 By P.D. No. 1, the Plan was approved and made part of the law of the land on September 24, 1972. P.D. No. 1 was twice amended in 1975, first by P.D. No. 742 which "restructur[ed] the regional organization of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi" and later by P.D. No. 773 which further "restructur[ed] the regional organization of Mindanao and divid[ed] Region IX into two sub-regions." In 1978, P.D. No. 1555 transferred the regional center of Region IX from Jolo to Zamboanga City. Thus the creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the President the power "to merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices. As this Court observed in Abbas, "while the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, 4 of the Constitution]." The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes." 7 The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries 8 which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor General 9 or as "administrative in nature." There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions. The question is whether Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of the power granted and whether in any event the grant of power to him is included in the subject expressed in the title of the law. First, the question of standard. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied.10 Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation. 11 With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public business." 12 Indeed, as the original eleven administrative regions were established in accordance with this policy, it is logical to suppose that in authorizing the President to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" in view of the withdrawal from some of those regions of the provinces now constituting the Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was to reconstitute the original basis for the organization of administrative regions. Nor is Art. XIX, 13 susceptible to charge that its subject is not embraced in the title of R.A. No. 6734. The constitutional requirement that "every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" 13 has always been given a practical rather than a technical construction. The title is not required to be an index of the content of the bill. It is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all provisions of the statute are germane to that subject. 14 Certainly the reorganization of the remaining administrative regions is germane to the general subject of R.A. No. 6734, which is the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Finally, it is contended that the power granted to the President is limited to the reorganization of administrative regions in which some of the provinces and cities which voted in favor of regional autonomy are found, because Art. XIX, 13 provides that those which did not vote for autonomy "shall remain in the existing administrative regions." More specifically, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673 claims: The questioned Executive Order No. 429 distorted and, in fact, contravened the clear intent of this provision by moving out or transferring certain political subdivisions (provinces/cities) out of their legally designated regions. Aggravating this unacceptable or untenable situation is EO No. 429's effecting certain movements on areas which did not even participate in the November 19, 1989 plebiscite. The unauthorized action of the President, as effected by and under the questioned EO No. 429, is shown by the following dispositions: (1) Misamis Occidental, formerly of Region X and which did not even participate in the plebiscite, was moved from said Region X to Region IX; (2) the cities of Ozamis, Oroquieta, and Tangub, all formerly belonging to Region X, which likewise did not participate in the said plebiscite, were transferred to Region IX; (3) South Cotobato, from Region XI to Region XII; (4) General Santos City: from Region XI to Region XII; (5) Lanao del Norte, from Region XII to Region IX; and (6) the cities of Marawi and Iligan from Region XII to Region IX. All of the said provinces and cities

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voted "NO", and thereby rejected their entry into the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as provided under RA No. 6734. 15 The contention has no merit. While Art. XIX, 13 provides that "The provinces and cities which do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions," this provision is subject to the qualification that "the President may by administrative determination merge the existing regions." This means that while non-assenting provinces and cities are to remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of the Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other regions as the exigency of administration may require. The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services. There will be no "transfer" of local governments from one region to another except as they may thus be regrouped so that a province like Lanao del Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX. The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to the division or merger of local governments, which all have political consequences on the right of people residing in those political units to vote and to be voted for. It cannot be overemphasized that administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for political representation. Petitioners nonetheless insist that only those regions, in which the provinces and cities which voted for inclusion in the Autonomous Region are located, can be "merged" by the President. To be fundamental reason Art. XIX, 13 is not so limited. But the more fundamental reason is that the President's power cannot be so limited without neglecting the necessities of administration. It is noteworthy that the petitioners do not claim that the reorganization of the regions in E.O. No. 429 is irrational. The fact is that, as they themselves admit, the reorganization of administrative regions in E.O. No. 429 is based on relevant criteria, to wit: (1) contiguity and geographical features; (2) transportation and communication facilities; (3) cultural and language groupings; (4) land area and population; (5) existing regional centers adopted by several agencies; (6) socio-economic development programs in the regions and (7) number of provinces and cities. What has been said above applies to the change of the regional center from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City. Petitioners contend that the determination of provincial capitals has always been by act of Congress. But as, this Court said in Abbas, 16 administrative regions are mere "groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, . . . [They] are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays." There is, therefore, no basis for contending that only Congress can change or determine regional centers. To the contrary, the examples of P.D. Nos. 1, 742, 773 and 1555 suggest that the power to reorganize administrative regions carries with it the power to determine the regional center. It may be that the transfer of the regional center in Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City may entail the expenditure of large sums of money for the construction of buildings and other infrastructure to house regional offices. That contention is addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to its legality and it is settled that courts are not the arbiters of the wisdom or expediency of legislation. In any event this is a question that we will consider only if fully briefed and upon a more adequate record than that presented by petitioners. WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. 10. SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC [270 SCRA 106; G.R. No.127325; 19 Mar 1997] Facts: Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly proposeamendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petitionrising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of peoples ini tiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention. Issues: (1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. (2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative. (3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment of the Constitution. Held: Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated, cannot be

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delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to peoples initiative. The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Courts dec ision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic. CASES: 1. Lovina vs. Moreno | Reyes, J.B.L., J. (1963) FACTS - This case started with a petition of numerous residents of Macabebe, Pampanga to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, complaining that the spouses Lovina had blocked the "Sapang Bulati", a navigable river and asking that the obstructions be ordered removed, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056. - After notice and hearing to the parties, the said Secretary found the constructions to be a public nuisance in navigable waters, and, in his decision ordered that the land owners, spouses Lovina, to remove five (5) closures of Sapang Bulati; otherwise, the Secretary would order their removal at the expense of the respondent. - The Lovinas filed a petition in the CFI to restrain the Secretary from enforcing his decision. The trial court, after due hearing, granted a permanent injunction, which is now the subject of the present appeal by the respondents-appellants, Moreno, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, and Yonzon, the investigator. - The position of the plaintiffs-appellees is that Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary of Public Works and Communications with sweeping, unrestrained, final and unappealable authority to pass upon the issues of whether a river or stream is public and navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such waters and is constitutive as a public nuisance, and whether the law applies to the state of facts, thereby Constituting an alleged unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS/HELD: WON RA 2056 is unconstitutional. NO RATIONALE - (R.A. 2056) merely empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions or encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private person was anyway entitled to make, because the bed of navigable streams is public property. - It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act necessarily involves the determination of some questions of fact, such as the existence of the stream and its previous navigable character; but these functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the exercise of the power granted by law. - This is validly conferable upon executive officials provided the party affected is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly required by Republic Act No. 2056, section 2. - The delegation by Congress to executive or administrative agencies of judicial or quasi-judicial functions is incidental to the exercise by such agencies of their executive or administrative powers, and is thus not a violation of the Separation of Powers. - One important class of cases in which discretion may properly be vested in administrative officers are those cases in which a general rule or prohibition is laid down and power is vested in an executive officer to determine when particular cases do or do not fall within such rule or prohibition. Power exercised under such statutes, calling for the exercise of judgment in the execution of a ministerial act, is never judicial in nature within the sense prohibited by the Constitution. - A direct precedent can be found in the "Bridge cases" upholding the constitutionality of the U.S. River and Harbor Act, that empowered Secretary of War to take action, after hearing, for the removal or alteration of bridges unreasonably obstructing navigation. On the issue of undue delegation of power, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled as follows: - The statute itself prescribes the general rule applicable to all navigable waters, and merely charged the Secretary of War with the duty of ascertaining in each case, upon notice to the parties concerned, whether the particular bridge came within the general rule. This is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative or judicial power to the Secretary. *Other matters: - Appellees invoke American rulings that abatement can not be done except through court proceedings; but these rulings refer to summary abatements without previous hearing, and are inapplicable to the case before us where the law provides, and the investigator actually held, a hearing with notice to the complainants and the, appellees, who appeared therein. It is a well-known rule that due process does not have to be judicial process. - As to the argument that the action of the Secretary amounts to a confiscation of private property: - The Court found that there is sufficient evidence to hold that the creek was in fact navigable before it was closed by the spouses Lovina. - It is a well-established rule that findings of fact in executive decisions in matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect from the courts in the absence of fraud, collusion, or grave abuse of discretion. PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION

2. ALEGRE v. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS FACTS: Petitioner is engaged in the production of abaca and its exportation to foreign markets. He applied to the respondent for a permit to export one hundred bales of abaca to England, but was denied. He was advised by the respondent that he would not be permitted to export the abaca in question without a certificate from the Fiber Standardization Board.

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So he filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the provisions of the Administrative Code for the grading, inspection and certification of fibers, in particular, sections 1772 and 1244 of that Code, are unconstitutional and void. ISSUE: Whether or not the authority vested in the Fiber Standardization Board is a delegation of legislative power. HELD: NO. The Legislature has enacted a law which provides for the inspection, grading and baling of hemp before they can be exported to other countries and the creation of a board for that purpose, vesting it with the power and authority to do the actual work. Such authority is not a delegation of legislative power and is nothing more than a delegation of administrative power in the Fiber Board to carry out the purpose and intent of the law. In the very nature of things, the Legislature could not inspect, grade and bale the hemp, and from necessity, the power to do that would have to be vested in a board or commission. The petitioner's contention would leave the law, which provides for the inspection, grading and baling of hemp, without any means of its enforcement. If the law cannot be enforced by such a board or commission, how and by whom could it be enforced? The criticism that there is partiality or even fraud in the administration of the law is not an argument against its constitutionality. CASES: LIMITS ON THE RULE MAKING POWER

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