EPU Research Papers

Politics and Ethnic Dimension of the Conflict in Burma Issue 07/08

Project-Co-ordinator & Editor: Ronald H. Tuschl, Author: Soe Myat Nwe, Supervisor: S.P.Udayakumar

Table of Contents Abstract ........................................................................................................... 3 Chapter 1 Politics ......................................................................................... 4 Introduction .................................................................................................. 4 1.1. The Burmese Opposition ...................................................................... 6 1.2. Background of the intractable conflicts of Burma .................................. 9 1.2.1. Burma since Independence from Britain in 1948 ............................... 9 1.2.2. Ne Win Era or the military ruled period 1962-1988 .......................... 16 1. 2.3. 1988 to 1992: a failed window of opportunity.................................. 19 Chapter 2 - Ethnicity and Conflict .................................................................. 22 2.1. Ethnic Issues....................................................................................... 22 2.2. Underneath the mess.......................................................................... 23 2.3. Ethnic Conflict or Division along Economic Interests .......................... 25 Conclusion and Recommendations............................................................... 29 Bibliography................................................................................................... 34 Editorial ......................................................................................................... 36

Abstract This paper highlights the present situation, conflicts and ethnic issues in Burma. It focuses on some principal political players in Burma affairs and examines the influence of these players on the conflict situation. It questions the root causes of the conflict by throwing a different light on the ethnic conflicts, long seen as at the core of the civil wars. It argues that ethnic identity has been misused for political purposes by scholars and organisations, thereby unnecessarily deepening the ethnic divisions and prolonging the crisis. It does not support the argument that international economic sanctions are helping to resolve the political crisis, and ultimately the Burmese people. As concluding remarks this analysis recommends some proposals to reduce the tension and break the political impasse in which Burma finds itself.

Chapter 1 Politics Introduction

Peace Studies aims to prevent war, to de-escalate war and to provide solutions to international conflicts. However, Peace Studies is useless if not applied as a strategy for change. Leaving the causes of conflicts unchanged will unavoidably lead to renewed conflict at a larger stage. The UN was established to maintain world peace and security after the end of World War II. However, the irony is that while the UN exists over 60 years, there are ongoing wars around the world, including in Burma.
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Another irony is that the biggest intergovernmental organization, the United Nations and its Security Council, is controlled by the world largest arms producers and dealers. Those superpower arms-dealers are sitting in Security Council as permanent members with a veto power over any resolution. Not without importance since that the establishment of international sanctions regimes and the authorization for military action are powers exercised through the UNSC. There is often debate on the nature of the security threat whether it poses a regional, international threat or is instead an internal affair within a sovereign state, such as apparently is the case for Burma. It is often unclear if the permanent Security Council members are pursuing their proper national interest or advancing international peace and security. In the case of Burma, the United Nations is attempting to find a solution to Burma's political problems. Among the UN efforts, aimed at both
1

After the1988 uprising, with the formation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), Burmas official name was changed from the post-1974 form, the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. The Union of Burma had been adopted after Burma gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1948. In July 1989 the military regime changed the name again, to the Union of Myanmar (or Myanmar Naingngan, a direct translation of the official name in the Burmese language). In this study, I use the name Burma referring to the Union of Burma or the Union of Myanmar.

the reigning military junta and the opposition party National League for Democracy (NLD), was UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan's decision to nominate a Special Representative for political issues and a Special Envoy for human rights. The UN sent Special Representatives including Razali Ismail from 2001 to 2004, and then his successor Ibrahim Gambari from 2006 up to now, to initiate talks between the generals and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.2 In 2006, members of the Security Council were again busy discussing Burma due to a successful lobbying by strong opposition groups based in the US. The US Permanent Mission to the UN proposed a draft resolution for Burma concerning the continued house arrest of Nobel Peace laureate and main opposition figure Aung San Suu Kyis, and human rights violations. The attempt however failed due to a rare double-veto of Russia and China. No member of the UNSC denied abuses by Burma's junta, which have been regularly condemned in the 192-member General Assembly, yet the issue at stake was whether Burma posed an international or regional security threat. Beyond this South Africa, Russia and China argued that the UN Human Rights Commission was in a better position to deal with these issues. Congo, Qatar and Indonesia abstained. This failure raises the question of how genuine the international community is to induce change in Burma. There is apparently no appropriate platform within the UN to do any of this, apparent from endless and ineffective discussions. The US and EU look alike, posturing against the rising nonwestern super powers, China and Russia who are the apparent protectors of the Burmese Generals. Yet some observers would argue that the US and EU are just applying double-standards, trying to score easy points in the public arena but not necessarily wanting to be more effective than their political rivals. They portray themselves as the protectors of democracy and human rights, yet on the other hand allow companies such as Chevron Oil Company (US) and Total Oil Company (France) to continue business as usual.3

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is the most prominent opposition leader in Burma and won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991. 3 Despite the EU and the US economic sanctions against Burma, the US Oil company Chevron and French Oil Company Total continue business with the generals. Many see this as applying a double standard.

If this is indeed the cynical game of international politics then unfortunately the Burmese people is badly served. This unfortunately seems the current situation surrounding the conflict situation in Burma. Nothing seems what is. An illustration to the point is the widespread belief among international observers that ethnicity is at the root of the conflict and civil war in Burma. This thesis will examine Burmas conflict from a variety of perspectives, including the historical background. It will argue that ethnicity is an issue of concern but cannot serve as a paradigm to explain the root cause of the conflict. Ethnicity has been overstated and abused to serve different interest groups, none necessarily really committed towards a peaceful solution. Starting with an analysis of Burmese politics and the contemporary opposition groups, the thesis will finally formulate recommendations for resolving Burmas lingering conflict.

1.1. The Burmese Opposition It is reasonable to suggest that almost 17 year long opposition to the military regime has failed in achieving its major objectives of political freedom and democracy. Opposition has largely been reduced to the shouting of slogans by the Burmese exile community and their mostly well-intended international sympathizers. Shouting Free Suu Kyi has become a fashion statement among protestors for human rights. The birthday of the famous opposition leader is celebrated in different parts of the world sometimes with music bands and other entertainment. As an example, the RFA news agency reported: Global protests will be staged this week, thousands of birthday cards have been sent and a pop star will release a song to draw attention to the plight of Burmas pro-democracy leader, a news story on Aung San Suu Kyis Web site said.4 Despite this political support little has changed for the better in Burma. Precious natural resources have been sold off by the regime on a huge scale. According to the World Fact Book, the 2006 export figure raised to $3.56
Radio Free Asia, Aung San Suu Kyi's Birthday Sparks New Calls for Her Release, 2005, retrieved from http://www.rfa.org/english/news/social/2005/06/17/burma_birthday/
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billion, a figure undoing the best efforts of the boycotts by democracy supporters, who mostly envisage smaller trade and products.5 Indeed major loopholes do exist making the US trade boycott a farce. After the annulled elections of 1990, Congress passed the Customs and Trade Act, enabling the president to impose sanctions against Burmawhich then-president George HW Bush declined to do. In 1997, President Clinton finally did sobut with a loophole allowing those firms who were already in Burma before 1990 to remain. The 2003 Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act barred Burmese imports, but still failed to move against US corporations grandfathered in under the existing law. (See the US State Department's "2005 Investment Climate: Burma" and the free-market Cato Institute's anti-sanctions factsheet, "US Sanctions against Burma: A Failure on All Fronts")6 There seem added problems to the Western sanctions. The sanctions are, in theory, aimed at both imports and exports with Burma thereby damaging the Burmese national economy. Yet business as usual reigns when it comes to the rich natural resources from Burma. Burma is now the largest natural gas exporter in Southeast Asia. Dara ORourke, Associate Professor of Environmental and Labor Policy University of California at Berkeley, states in his article Transnational at Work: Fueling Oppression (in Burma) the following: While leaders of many countries such as the United States and Canada officially oppose the actions of the SLORC, they continue to allow multinational corporations based in their countries to operate and invest in Burma, buoying the unstable and financially strapped regime. Multinational oil companies based in the United States, Canada, England, Japan and Australia have directly invested over $400 million in Burma since 1989 .. The nine multinational oil companies that signed the first contracts with the SLORC in 1989 included Amoco (United States), Unocal (United States), Idemitsu (Japan), Royal Dutch Shell (Netherlands/United Kingdom), Yukong Oil (South Korea), Broken Hill Petroleum (Australia), Petro Canada (Canada), Croft Exploration (United Kingdom) and Kirkland Resources (United Kingdom).

Retrieved from; https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html note: official export figures are grossly underestimated due to the value of timber, gems, narcotics, rice, and other products smuggled to Thailand, China, and Bangladesh] (The World Fact Book) (2006 est.) 6 Bill Weinberg, UNOCAL still In Burma, 10/02/2007, see http://ww4report.com/node/4510

These firms were reported to have paid between $5 million and $8 million each in signing bonuses to the Burmese regime. 7 Unsurprisingly, this has impacted on Burma's poorest. Present Western sanctions are claimed to be based on the militarys failure to hand over power to NLD party, which had won the election in 1990. However, the Burmese Dr. opposition, led in Burma by the National League for Democracy (NLD), seems not to take into account the economic plight of ordinary Burmese. Heikkila-Horn remarked in The Quest for Democracy in Burma: Ideas of Aung San and Aung San Suu Kyi that: Suu Kyi criticizes Ne Wins economic mismanagement of Burma but carefully avoids presenting any distinct plans for future economic policies. Instead Suu Kyi concentrates on emphasizing human rights and liberal democracy8 For the junta on the other hand, maintaining an army of 400,000 soldiers demands tax revenue which is currently not available in the capital. Regional commanders have to be economically self-sufficient, implying that they are actively involved in the economic sector thereby distorting the market with privileged access to capital and markets, fixed pricing and, worse, nepotism. Infrastructure works is at the core of central planning and, lacking capital to finance these, contract are given to business people close to the government who in return may receive other benefits such as concessions, export privileges, and even prime real estate. Not the economy, put preserving the Union of Myanmar is the first priority of the military regime. Only if the later is guaranteed a normal economy can be restored. The regime points out that significant part of the borders are not under full government control thereby missing out on significant income from the lucrative cross-border trade. They also point towards the progress made and the cease fire agreements concluded with the Kokang and the Wa (1989), the Kachin Independence Organization (1994), New Mon State Party (1995) and thirteen other former insurgent groups. More importantly is the normalization of these agreements within a constitutional arrangement and draft constitution
Rourke, Transnationals at Work: Fueling Oppression (in Burma)), viewed on 01/06/2007, Retrieved from www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Transnational_corps/FuelOppress_Burma.html 8 Heikkila-Horn, The Quest for Democracy in Burma; Ideas of Aung San and Aung San Suu Kyi, P.127
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was finalized in mid-July 2007.

Observers would point out that the later

process is flawed since the main opposition NLD walked out in protest of the National Convention claiming that the process was a sham.

1.2. Background of the intractable conflicts of Burma To understand this intractable conflict, it is necessary to going back to the history. It will provide a better view on the contemporary conflict in Burma.

1.2.1. Burma since Independence from Britain in 1948 The territory known as the Union of Burma has a rather complex history. The known history of Burma was started by the Mon in the period of about 300 BC. The kingdom of Burma and its ascendancy started in the 11th century. Until the final British annexation in 1886, the kingdom of Burma was an independent country with its own civil administration and long history of civilization. Shan, Mon and the Burmans competed for dominance and each experienced both rises and falls in their political power throughout the history of the region. By the time British finally defeated the last Burmese king, the Burmans had come to dominate the area now called Burma. At last Burmans were the strongest ruler in the 19th century up to the British colonized the region. There was less a sense of ethnic identity than a competition for political and economic power. The research associate with the Burma Fund, Toe Zaw Latt comments that There was little 'ethnic awareness' in the modern political sense during these times, and 'ethnic identity' was not used or politically mobilized, even for warfare. Kings and kingdoms were personal, dynastic, and legitimated not by reference to the people as ethnic collectivises. Ethnicity was politically nonexistent and irrelevant as basis of identity. Rather, reference was made to

mythical religious events and figures and cosmology to legitimate and justify rule.9 With colonization the nationalisation process accelerated, moving away from city state alliances to nation states, finally ensuing in administrative dominance by a Western state, in the case of Burma, the United Kingdom. Applying "divide and rule" policies, the British divided Burma into two parts; Burma Proper and a periphery. Burma Proper was ruled directly by the British whereas in the periphery British allowed local rulers, who were usually hereditary chiefs, control their own area under their own administration and as a British "protectorate". The British accelerated ethnic divide by giving privileges to nonBurmans. Under British supervision, Indians immigrated en masse to Burma serving as the administrative class and in the police. Other groups, mostly already Christianized by early missionaries, had been less influential under the Burmese kings, British successfully manoeuvred them to be serving as trustees into the British colonial military and police, and receiving education. It has been said that there are three Ms of colonization Military, Merchants, and Missionaries. Hill tribe areas were isolated; the living standard was by far lower than lowland area. Taking advantages of this weakness, missionary offered education and health care for hill tribes that persuade to convert Christianity. It was working because the administrative and organizing authorities behind those churches are sufficiently powerful to endow missionary programs10 Unsurprisingly, this policy of divide created both ethnic identity and sense of belonging rarely witnessed before colonialism, and resentment among those not belonging, mainly the majority Burmese. The privileged groups increased their power base and in return were increasingly loyal towards the colonial masters. Next to the immigrated Indians, one of the most loyal groups to the British was the Karen, chosen to form the core of the military. Russel Andrus points out in Burmese Economic Life that At one time, Christian Karens numbered 22 percent of the student body of the
Toe Zaw Latt, 2005, p. 6, Politics of Reconciliation in Burma. The Burma Fund ( Technical Advisory Network of Burma WP 07) 10 Khaing and Brant, Missionaries Among the Hill Tribes of Burma, 1961, p.45, Asian Survey, Vol.1, No.1
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University of Rangoon, while they were only about 2 percent of the total population of Burma.11 Resentment came soon with previous co-existing communities becoming suspicious towards each other and instilling distrust instead of unity to fight against the colonizer. The British encouraged animosity between the Christian Karens and the Buddhist Burmans. The former served in the army established by the British and when the latter collaborated with the Japanese occupation during WW2, it was unavoidable that the two groups were to clash. The nationalist struggle, led by independence hero and symbol of Burmese nationalism, Aung San, was characterized by hardship in contrast to the Karen elite who enjoyed the privileges given to them. The early days of World War II weakened the British and the Karen courageously withstood the Japanese, allowing the British to retreat. In contrast the Burmese nationalists saw their chance and rose up against the colonial power, believing that the Japanese were to offer them independence. Realizing later that this collaboration was not resulting in the hoped for outcome, Aung San finally turned his allegiance to the Allies but misapprehension between the Karen and Burmans continued. After the warfare Karen were seeking their own post-colonial independence while the leader of the Burmese independent movement was having his discussions for the entire nation with London. Independence was to be given however conditions were set in the Kandy and the Aung San/Attlee agreements. Finally the Panglong agreement, negotiated between Aung San and the people from the periphery hill areas, laid the foundations for an independent country. Burma became the Union of Burma on the 4st of January, 1948. But this auspicious day was also the start of years of conflict. Burma entered into civil war less than three months after her independence and continued conflict until today. The Burmese Communist Party or Communist Party of Burma (CPB), of which Aung San was initially one of its founders, disagreed with the way Aung Sans Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League (AFPFL), the ruling government party, had negotiated independence and denounced the latter as a fake. For years the
Cited in Lintner, Bertil. Burma in Revolt: opium and insurgency since 1948, second edition, 1999, p. 51
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Communists were at the front of the national struggle for independence but the British systematically excluded them from political dealings and thereby enabled a split among the nationalist leaders. In the middle of 1946 a new governor was appointed with a mandate to offer the non-communist leaders of the AFPFL a majority of seats on his council and Aung San the vice presidency. However, the acceptance of office by some of the leagues leaders led to a split in the national front. The communist members received no seats (except briefly), and relations between them and the rest deteriorated. Toward the end of 1946, an increasing number of conservatives had joined the league, and the communists were eased out of their former leadership posts. After the expulsion of the communists, the league negotiated with the British government, and it was agreed in January 1947 that followed elections for a constituent assembly that would draft a constitution, independence would be granted within one year. 12 With the assassination of Aung San in 1947, vice president U Nu became the leader of the AFPFL. U Nu had neither the support of the army nor could he count on the trust of the communists. When he took the first Prime Ministerial post in the independent Burma, there were severe challenges waiting for him. The political situation was a total chaos and the U Nu democratic government was losing control. The Communists were military campaigning against the government and they were seizing many places under their control. Hugh Tinker, in his book The Union of Burma, described the situation as follows: The Communist campaign developed mainly in Pegu District, and to a lesser extent in Myingyan, Bassein, and the Delta. Throughout April they seized police stations, occupied small towns and villages, looted rice, and sabotaged communications. 13 The new rulers and their one-time communist allies or comrades became enemies and locked themselves in a civil war that was to last for more than forty years. This was however not the sole problem. The Karen believed to the last that London was to grant them independence. Hugh Tinker observed that: British friends who had been ashamed at the abandonment of the Karens by the British Government encouraged them to
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13

Owen (Edt.), et al. The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia A New History, 2005, p. 331. Tinker, The Union of Burma: The Study of the First Year of Independence, 1967, p. 35

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believe that they would receive weapons and other aid from overseas. The activities of Lieut-Colonel J.C.Tulloch, M.C., in Calcutta and Alexander Campbell of the Daily Mail in Rangoon (both formerly of Force 136) were discovered by the Burma Government, and Campbell was expelled from Burma.
14

(Tinker, p.37) When this was not the case, the Karen organised

and revolted against the central government. There were disgruntled Karens who wished to take advantage of the Governments helplessness. A movement began in Papun to set up a Karen Government; a revolt broke out in Karenni, led by a pretender to the throne; Thaton and Moulmein were occupied at the end of August by Karen rebels, including Union Military Police mutineers. 15 The constitutional flaws became obvious already at the early stages of independence. The Karen, but also the Patriotic Party of pre-war colonial Prime Minister U Saw, decided not to take up the places allocated to them in the Constituent Assembly, preparing for independence thereby foregoing an opportunity to influence the outcome. Angelene Naw noted that: Representatives of the Chin, Kachin, and Shan came to Panglong to discuss the future rights and responsibilities within the Union of Burma. The Karen, who were at that time divided among those who supported the AFPFL and those who favoured a complete separation from Burma, attended the conference only as observers. 16 Due to the sharp deadline for approving a new Constitution by the British Parliament, after three meetings a document is submitted, leaving several issues unresolved. Shan, Kachin and Karenni. Three (3) constitutional states were accepted: The Chin got their territory nominated as a

Special Division. The Shan State received the right of secession by plebiscite after 10 years. Shortcoming were, one, new states had not defined their own constitution including judiciary and administrative structures. Secondly, the Karen territory was ill-defined and its borders needed to be decided through a future referendum. Third, there was no clear demarcation between federal and state powers. As it stood Burma Proper had a veto over all state laws.
14 15

Ibid. Ibid., p.37 16 Naw, Aung San and the struggle for Burmese Independence, 2001, p.200

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The situation was thus remarkably chaotic and open from frustration on all ends. With Aung San, the only leader with the proven capacity to keep the nation together, assassinated, the Karen created their paramilitary formation, the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO). The well-organized KNDO, rooted in the old British colonial army, was close to seize Rangoon military. The government of U Nu felt threatened, reacted by increasing the national security forces and forming the territorial units (Sitwundans) which embraced amateur soldiers, of former Socialists and of the Yellow flag People Volunteer Organization (PVO). The PVO was paramilitary groups, created by Aung San in his earlier days, which had clashed with the Karens during the WWII. Hence, instead of pacifying the situation, healing wounds were reopened again resulting in intractable problems, some of which can still be witnessed today. In 1949 few urban places remained under government control. Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Smith Dun, himself a Karen, was removed out of his function. He was replaced by the military strong man who was to rule Burma for 26 years until 1988, Gen. Ne Win. Slowly but steadily the governments army took the control of the areas back from the rebels. Gen. Ne Win became viewed as a hero by many unionists. Edited by Norman G. Owen, comments in The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia: A New History that: The government survived the civil war but was greatly weakened by the turmoil and conflict that the country had experienced. It was able to regain control for several reasons; the creation of a strong national army; modest aid from Britain, India, and a few other states; and the support of anticommunist elements in the bureaucracy, the commercial classes, and the monkhood. Helpful to the government also was the fact that the insurgents fought each other as much as they fought the army. By the early 1950s the governments legitimacy had also become heavily dependent on the charisma of the devoutly Buddhist Prime Minister Nu, known to the world, using the Burmese honorific for senior males (literally Uncle), U Nu. 17 The intrusion into the Shan hills of defeated Kuomintang (KMT) troops at the end of Chinas civil war gave another blow to the new independent

17

Owen (Edt.), et al. The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia A New History, 2005, P. 333

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nation. The KMT, secretly supported by the US, organized the traditional lowyield opium cultivation in a never seen export modality, using its profits to continue first an ideological war but later on turning it in an opportunistic business opportunity. The narco-business vegetated on and, in turn, prolonged instability. A few years later, in January 1961, after a visit of Prime Minister U Nu to Beijing, the Red Army would stage their own invasion in the Northern Shan State chasing the KMT towards Thailand. Only the military seemed to escape the total chaos plaguing the country and even the democratic government. U Nu resigned in 1956 due to internal power struggle inside the party. His rival, U Ba Swe, is to become shortly Prime Minister but has to allow U Nu back in office less than a year later. Under the pressure of rivalling factions the ruling AFPFL finally split into two, and U Ba Swe, U Kyaw Nyein and thirteen other ministers resigned. A Special Parliamentary Session confirms that the early November elections are to be postponed until April 1959 and the power is handed over on 28 October 1958 for an initial six (6) months to General Ne Win as Prime Minister of a caretaker government. Ne Win has all military institutions united under the slogan One blood, one voice, one command. One year and a half later, the popular Gen. Ne Win did return the office to U Nu government and in the February 1960 general elections were held. In his address, the winner of the elections, U Nu, promises constitutional revision and the possibility for the Shan State to renegotiate its position within the Union. Gen. Ne Win felt disappointed and travelled to the US. In the eyes of many he gave the new civil government relative stability, a recovering economy and labour harmony. Moreover he had gracefully retired several high ranking officers and kept to his promise not to intervene during the elections. A growing split between the popular military and a deceiving civil government became apparent. Everything seems set for a military coup. Martin Smith notes that the first real evidence of the support of the federal Movement commanded came in June/July 1961 at a minority peoples conference in Taunggyi staged by the Shan Leaders, Sao Shwe Theik and Sao Hkun Hkio, a former AFPFL Foreign Minister. ( ) Any such solution was anathema to Ne Win and the Tatmadaw leaders who, in over a decade of constant fighting under their slogan One Blood, One Voice, One Command 15

had come to see themselves as the lone protectors of the Unions national integrity and the Federal Movements as merely another guise for the insurgents separatist demands. 18

1.2.2. Ne Win Era or the military ruled period 1962-1988 On the second of March 1962 Gen. Ne Win stages a coup detat before a federal Nationalities Seminar in Rangoon, supported by U Nu, came to any conclusion of revisiting the Constitution in favour of federalism and a feared secession of the Shan State. The latter was arrested, together with many other political leaders, and the old federal Constitution abolished. It is hard to say if the military coup was avoidable. The new democracy had proven unable to provide peace, stability and development. Not all was due to internal factors; proxy armies defending external ideological interests, interference and outright interventions were an essential part of the destabilization. The Burmese scholar Thant Myint U, grandson of the former Burmese Secretary General of the UN and himself educated in Harvard and Cambridge University, noted that: There were the repeated foreign interventions-by the Americans, the Thais, and the Chinese Nationalists, by the Soviets and the Chinese Communists-all adding fuel to the fire, making impossible any local solution to Burmas civil war.19 (U, Thant Myint , 2006, p. 289) The military build-up and the broad popularity the Tatmadaw (Burmese Army) received in bringing back stability and peace as a care-taker for the democratically elected but incapable government, gave the army a strong voice as defender of the Nation. Even later dissidents were initially won by a military solution. Ven.U Rewata Dhamma, secretary of the International Burmese Buddhist Sangha Organization, quoted by author Martin Smith, observed: Many people supported Ne Win when he first seized power. Many were fed up with U Nu and the way he had played around with issues like the ethnic minority question. They liked the idea of a strong ruler who promised

Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 1999, pp. 195-196. See also Norman G. Owen, et al. The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia A New History, 2005, pp. 334 19 Thant Myint U, The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma, 2006, Farrar, Straus and Giroux. New York. p. 289

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change and who could solve all their problems. It was rather like Hitler in Germany. The trouble with Ne Win is that, whatever his intentions, power (it was never money) corrupted him.20 What started with popular support became a disaster over time. The era of New Win extended from 1962 to 1988 and was marked by xenophobism, isolation, and a self-defeating Burmese Way to Socialism. International observers of the contemporary Burmese conflict easily relegate the current problems entirely to the Ne Win period, and refer as mitigating factors to the wider nationalist movements among newly independent former colonies. In The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia: A New History, suggests that: The military coup of March 1962 that ended the civilian government of U Nu took place during an era of strident nationalism and fears of neo-colonialism in much of Asia and Africa. Far from immune to this atmosphere, Burma was driven in on itself; most of the international linkages that had brought it into the global economy during the previous hundred years were cut off. The army began by dismantling the political structures that had arisen in the first fourteen years of independence and replacing them with others that the Revolutionary Council, as the coup group named themselves, could supervise. 21 The above analysis however seems hardly compatible with the assessment of other observers when describing the reasons of Ne Wins coming to power. For most international observers, there is little doubt about the allocation of blame for contemporary Burmas plight. After the army coup of 1962, a military regime led by General Ne Win adopted a series of policies aimed at converting Burma to a strictly socialist and autarkic economy. Certainly the country faced serious economic and political problems in the immediate aftermath of independence, including several secessionist movements among ethnic minorities in border regions. But as a recent obituary article pointed out, Ne Win did not manage to solve any of these problems. In fact his policy of state control, isolation and repression made things worse. Ethnic groups became bolder. Opium chiefs expanded their fiefs and corrupted the soldiers sent to close them down. Burma had been the worlds largest exporter of rice, but by 1973 could hardly provide enough for
20 21

Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 1999, p. 204 Owen (Edt.), et al. The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia A New History, 2005, p. 497

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its own needs. Income per person fell from $670 a year in 1960 to $200 in 1989. 22 While Ne Win may have been unable to resolve the multitude of challenges confronting the nation, may even have worsened the situation, it does not undo the reality of any of these challenges existing before he came to power. As much as the emerging democracy had failed to bring a solution to these challenges, the Ne Win dictatorship, despite being briefly successful as a caretaker, will ultimately also fail. Even Ne Win himself might have doubted the power of the Tatmadaw to succeed. In The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia: A New History, suggests that: Initially the Revolutionary Council attempted to form a national unity party with the leaders of the political parties that had been in the 1950s. However, except for one left-wing group, they all refused, apparently believing that the military eventually would hand over power back to them as it had done in 1960. Such a belief proved to be illusory. None of the leading politicians of the 1950s ever returned to power, and most were soon forgotten. The Revolutionary Council subsequently established its own political party, the Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) in order to mobilize support for the government and dominate rival political forces. 23 Ne Win was thus not at the bottom of the forces pulling the young nation apart and he therefore cannot be considered as the start of Burmas current problems. It is correct though that his reign did not prove particularly helpful to resolve the many problems challenging the country. His Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) became a synonym of nepotism with membership helping advancement within public service careers, offering privileges in education, allowing networking and economic deals to name a few. By 1981 there were a million and a half members. It would set a lightening example for the current day State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) with its civilian branch of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA). The Revolutionary Council and the U Nus democratic government both
22

Anne Booth, The Burma Development Disaster in Comparative Historical Perspective, SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research, p.1, VOl.1, No. 1, Spring 2003, ISSN 1479-8484, p.1 23 Owen (Edt.), et al. The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia A New History, 2005, p. 497

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implemented nationalist economic policies.

Foreign and larger domestic

businesses were nationalized, and Ne Wins government heavily controlled the trade. Peasants initially benefited when the government declared all their debts absolve in 1963 but the peasants came increasingly under government control, and as government rice purchase prices declined, so did production; soon Burma lost its position as one of the pre-eminent rice-exporting countries of the world. Foreign exchange revenues also declined, and throughout the 1960s economic growth was minimal.24 The BSPP remained the sole governing body until 1988. There was periodic uprising by the students and dissidents against the one party rule in 1962, 1974, and again in 1976. Ne Win controlled the country with iron fist. However, his government was not able to fulfil the need to employ the educated, to expand the formal economy, to control the flourishing informal border trade, to halt the booming opium business, or, more significantly, to unite the nation. Gradually, the education system crumbled and the University of Rangoon, once considered the best within the wider region, fell victim to political oppression, a selective use of academic works, and a restriction of free opinion. Ne Win discouraged students to study social or political science, history, or any study which could bring awareness and critical thinking with it. With also the media in from control Ne Win de facto isolated the country. The fall was complete when in 1987, the UN declared Burma a least developed country. With the sudden devaluation and demonetization of the currency, discontent was at its peak and people joined the students in their public protest. Ne Win resigned in 1988 and the transitory SPDC took over the reign. As a final note in this chapter, and perhaps cynically, it were not specific ethnic groups protesting in 1988 against the Burmans, it was the nation as a whole suffering and finally rejecting Ne Win.

1. 2.3. 1988 to 1992: a failed window of opportunity The 1988 nationwide demonstrations against Ne Win and the BSPP

24

.Owen (Edt.), et al. The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia A New History, 2005, p. 498

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was an internationally well-published Burmese quest for democracy. Thousands of students and civilians were killed in the uprising. It still was for many a surprise when the Burmese strongman Ne Win resigned in July. A new military coup staged on 17 September installed the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) by the next army generation. The SLORC apparently maintained the policies that Burmese historian Dr. Maung Maung, who ruled Burma about one month during the chaos, had established including the promise that multiparty elections were to be held as soon as stability was restored. The elections, as promised, were held in May 1990. The National League for Democracy (NLD) won about 60 percent of the vote and 392 seats out of the 485 contested. The sister Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) was the most successful ethnic minority political party wining another 23 seats, the second highest number of any party. However, the election results never translated in a handing over of power by the SLORC. As analysed by the Burmese academic Maung Aung Myo in a working paper of the Australian Strategic & Defence Studies Centre (Australian National University), the relations between the SLORC, dominated by the Tatmadaw, and the NLD soured fast: In early July 1990, barely a month after election, U Kyi Maung, the then chairman of the NLD, made a reference to the holding of a Nuremberg-type of trial in Yangon after the NLD came into power, in an interview with a foreign journalist. The remark somewhat reflected the call by the NLDs young turks for U Ne Win and SLORC members to be put on trial. Although U Kyi Maung denied such a threat was a major problem, he did suggest that some individuals, such as [Major General] Khin Nyunt might reasonably feel themselves pretty insecure. It seems that a mob mentality was growing within the youth wing of the NLD.
25

At the same time, in defiance of the authority of the SLORC, the NLD prepared to arrange the transfer of power on its own by drafting an interim constitution and called for convening parliament in September 1990. The SLORC government had planned neither to convene the parliament nor to draft a constitution for political transition in Burma for about two years after the
Myo, The Tatmadaw in Myanmar Since 1988: An Interim Assessment, WP no. 342, p.2, 1999,. See also Owen, et al. The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia A New History, 2005, p. 504
25

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election. The drafting of a new constitution was a major issue even before the May elections. In his first speech after the SLORC came to power, it was stressed that a constitution was necessary before a transition of power was to find place. The SLORC again repeated the same after the elections making clear that the peoples representatives should draw up a constitution in consultation with the Tatmadaw, incorporating the militarys corporate interest before a new civil government could be formed (Myo, 1999, p. 3 and 4).26 Dialogues between the military and the NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi did not resolve the political impasse and both parties started blaming each other. The deadlock preventing political transition also marked the beginning of the end of the reform. Confronted by the non-compromising attitude of the NLD, hard-line thinking prevailed in the Tatmadaw and by mid-1992, the SLORC stood firmly on the idea of need to have a revolutionary government to lead the political transition, to guide the drafting of a new constitution in which a future political role of the military would be guaranteed, and to form massorganisations to gain public support. Again the political leadership in Burma, be it military junta or the opposition, failed to reach compromise and failed therefore its people and their aspirations for peace, economic progress and stability. Vocal opposition circles lobbied for economic boycotting, a measure deplored by many. Academic Thant Myint U sadly morns that: Many have now heard of Aung San Suu Kyi and are vaguely aware of the reluctance of the ruling generals to give up power. Almost no one, though, is aware of the civil war or the reasons why Burmas military machine developed and the country became so isolated in the first place. The paradigm is one of regime change, and the assumption is that sanctions, boycotts, more isolation will somehow pressure those in charge to mend their ways. The assumption is that Burmas military government couldnt survive further isolation when precisely the opposite is true: Much more than any other part of Burmese society, the army will weather another forty years of isolation just fine.27 The historical overview in Chapter one highlighted the problems faced
26 27

Ibid, pp. 3 and 4. U, Thant Myint , the River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma, 2006, Farrar, Straus and Giroux. New York, p. 342

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in preparing for independence, the polarization around ethnic issues, the difficulties of the new independent nation, the role of the military, and the 1988 popular uprising which, perhaps surprisingly to the current political observers, did not put ethnic groups against each other, but instead the broad population against the military. It also demonstrated the flaws of the political leadership, continuing divide instead of seeking compromise, and not properly reacting to windows of opportunities. Political immaturity left space for the military to enter an area which is not theirs, reduced the economy to one of the most promising in Asia to a least developed country (LCD), ruined the health and education systems, started a diaspora of young people looking for better economic prospects abroad, and led to the international call of the United Nations Country Team in July 2001 for more humanitarian assistance.

Chapter 2 - Ethnicity and Conflict 2.1. Ethnic Issues Recent studies on Burma focus on the struggle for democracy and on human right violations but the military government. However, little has been said that the problems are rooted in Burma's post-war history and too much attention has been given to the symptoms instead of underlying problems. To understand the present, one must look in the past. As stated earlier, three Anglo-Burmese wars, a century of colonial rule, Japanese occupation, independence and ensuing civil war, Kuomintang (KMT)s intervention in the Shan State, US, Chinese and Thai involvement supporting proxy armies first along ideological lines and later sucking out natural resources, the narcotics business flourishing in areas of instability and in turn furthering the already volatile situation, all these elements need to be taking in consideration when attempting to comprehend and analyse the political, social and economic situation today. To complicate the situation further, Burmas economic situation was in disarray after years of socialist experimenting, civil war and insurgent groups

22

controlling vast areas of the borders and thereby depriving the central government of vast revenue on a flourishing but uncontrollable border trade, and isolation under Dictator Ne Win. It is thus too simplistic to refer to Spain, Portugal, Greece, Chile, Brazil and Argentina, the Philippines and Indonesia, and to wonder why Burma cannot simply follow the same pattern. Not one country has the same history and not one country is offered the same opportunities at similar moments in time.

2.2. Underneath the mess It can be argued that todays situation reflects the pre-colonial period of competing kingdoms or city states. However, in the political evolution of Burma, as mentioned earlier, the border lines and the nation state was a creation by the British first and later confirmed by the regional and international community. Accepting a sense of nation state would be helpful to seek consensus among the different stakeholders. Instead and sadly, often with the best intentions, many foreign groups and non governmental organizations deepen the ethnic break lines. For instance, George Soros Open Society Initiative (OSI) gives most of its scholarships and support to the Karen ethnic group. This trend among Western experts is rooted in the old formula of the early missionaries who preferred certain groups over other (i.e. the Karen, Chin and Kachin were Christianised by the Baptist, thereby differentiating these groups against their Buddhist, Muslim, or animist co-patriots and strengthening the respective identity of these groups). In many ways, several non-governmental groups, focussing on particular ethnicities, continue the British colonial thinking of reigning by dividing and hinder solutions. In their co-work article Missionaries among the Hill Tribes of Burma, authors Mi Mi Khaing and Charles S. Brant put it as follows: The missionary effect among the Karens fostered the ideal of Karen nationality and taught this people to feel group pride and dignity... It assured them that under the then prevailing British law they had equal rights with other peoples. But the sequel was that there arose a group of sectarian Karen zealots who eventually, in 23

1948, led many of their people into futile armed rebellion against the newly independent government rather than compromise what was, on any showing, a ridiculously exorbitant and unworkable set of demands for a Karen State.28 This paper does not deny the existence of ethnic differences, customs and traditions, even though they may intermingle and oftentimes are hard to distinct. It argues that emphasizing the differences in contrast to what binds people in Burma, is not very useful. Many countries in South East Asia and beyond face similar challenges of nationhood embracing multiple identities, but are able to govern as one, thereby embracing the many. Therefore, one should try to approach the ethnic issue from the view of a functioning nationhood, and not from a point of divisions and separation. With Burmas independence, the different groups were aware of the existing differences but acknowledged the new state. All but one, seen that a Karen elite hoped that their unique relationship with the British would lead to their own separate state away from Burma. Agreement of February 1947. The respect for the mutual differences and the understanding of each other resulted in the Panlong It was elements within the Karen who first would take up their arms, in their possession since the British colonial occupation, against the new State. It created distrust and resulted in an arm race among other groups, breaking away in ever smaller entities not necessarily always along ethnic lines but more often reflecting geographical dominance and economic interests. The late ethnic problem came with the foreign scholars and experts work on different cultural groups of Burma and which result the deeper creation of separate identity along the line of ethnic. Much support is for instance going to different border communities, or producing publications in different languages such as Shan, Mon, Karen further encouraging the separatist feelings and ethnic identities of the people in the border areas. Foreign scholars, often influenced by early missionary expert families operating in often remote areas of the country, were fascinated by this splintering and as a paradigm, easier to comprehend, used ethnicity as the
28

Khaing and Brant, Missionaries Among the Hill Tribes of Burma, 1961, p.45, Asian Survey, Vol.1, No.1, p. 49

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lowest common denominator to define this trends.

They often sketched

Burman not only as a newly independent impoverished Third World country still fighting for economic independence, but as a multi-ethnic country on the verge of collapse. Ironically, this is exactly how the junta wants the country to be viewed it puts them in the role of saviors without which the country is to collapse. The justification for any dictatorship is security, or in Burmese terms the unification of the country. In an interview with Times Asia, Sandra Burton raised the following question to Aung San Su Kyi: The government also spends a lot of time talking about the ethnic minorities and how until you settle that problem, no government can really function--that the next government to emerge will benefit from the kind of talks that are going on. The answer of the national opposition leader was the following: Why don't you talk to the ethnic minorities and find out what they feel about it? We don't represent an ethnic minority party. Mind you, in the CRPP [the Committee Representing the People's Parliament), which the NLD announced last year] there are four ethnic nationality parties represented. I would suggest that you talk to them directly. That would be better than getting my views or those of the SPDC, which always would, of course, be in their own favour.29

2.3. Ethnic Conflict or Division along Economic Interests An interesting point of view is given by Benedict R O G. Anderson. He stated that: It is very striking that in the colonial period there were no ethnic anti-colonial parties or organizations. The final organizational form of this opposition, the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League, included people from every major minority group, including Indian and Chinese It is striking to note that the opposition was not primarily ethnic at all, but came from two multiethnic communist parties, and from Christian-Karen military personnel who temporarily received clandestine British military support and feared for their futures once the British were gone. All of these groups wanted power at

29

Sandra Burton, Interview: Aung San Su Kyi, Asia Times, Vol. 154, No. 19, 1999, November 15.

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the center, not separation from it. 30 This early political evolution indeed reflected the pre-colonial political order with city-states scattered around the area of present day Burma and paying tribute to the capital. These tribute-paying entities were not They identified themselves Ethnically linked with necessarily organized along ethnic lines, having Shan living in the valley, Mon on the hill tops, and Wa in the mountains. according to the geographical area, the resources they needed for economic survival, and the name or dynasty of their leaders. similar groups and villages across the country, ethnicity gave a sense of belonging but was not the motivator to decide living in one are or another territory under one or another leadership. Some groups surely were a dominating ethnicity in certain areas, but nowhere where they the exclusive inhabitants, being scattered across the country and depending on a local leadership. This reality is far away from what the international media today puts forward as being Burmas biggest problem its division along pure ethnical lines. Certainly, insisting on ethnicity mobilizes political support. In her work Identity and Victimhood, Diane Ennss says that: On the one hand, identity is considered to be socially and politically constructed - ethnicity is useful for political purpose - while on the other, identity is thought to be about an inherent need for culture and belonging.31 But, to the same author, it has also the potential to serve a third purpose the one of victimhood. She adds: ( ) like Luc Huyse states that there has been a shift from the cult of hero to the cult of the victim. Suffering instead of heroism now attracts public and political consideration and adds that victim empowerment is not a blessing in all circumstances. It can become an obstacle to peaceful coexistence and mutual trust. 32 Playing a role as a victim is the essential way to appeal the support from its own and oversea. Some prefer to perceive the Mong Tai Army, also
Benedict R.OG. Anderson, Southeast Asian Tribal Group and Ethnic Minorities, Harvard University Cultural Survival Report 22, 1987, pp. 8-9 31 Diane Enns, Identity and Victimhood: Questions for Conflict Management Practice, Berghof Occasional Paper No.28, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, May 2007, p. 9 32 Ibid. p. 3
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called the Shan United Army, disbanded in 1996 after the surrender of its leader Khun Sa, as the heroic Shan nationalistic army opposing the truants in Rangoon. Initially they might indeed have been such but, tragically perhaps, ended up as the biggest drug army in the world. Using ethnicity as a weapon, fitting the old-missionary views best understood by the Western world, gives the best assurance of continued support and aid from international groups. Ethnic cleansing is a trendy paraphrase, mobilizing vast amounts of sympathy, media attention, political credit, and money. The irony is that exactly this border aid to specific ethnic groups, provided with oftentimes the best intentions, in fact continues the conflict. A prove in case, for those who have been watching the recent 2007 developments in Burma, would have noted that the street protests in the big cities were neither one of Christians or Muslims versus Buddhists against each other, nor of Karen, Panlong or Mon versus Burman but instead of the people in the largest sense feasible, led by the Buddhist monks, against the Buddhist junta. While the vast majority of international stakeholders might operate in good but rather blind faith, yet one cannot undo the feeling that at least some regional and international stakeholders might have continued their proxy interference in Burmese politics not any longer by sponsoring weapons and armed fight along ethnic lines but by providing so-called humanitarian aid alongside the same divides. Diane Enns writes: Wimmer explains that there exists a wide range of responses to this increase in ethno-political conflict, from the argument that ethnic minorities are in need of self-determination not because of a genuine sense of community rather because foreign powers aim to weaken the state, which results in the encouragement of minority discourses to the idea that the feeling of ethnic belonging is a subjective reality.33 Could it be that certain interest groups would not want to have a strong stable Burma in its midst thereby giving up on the economic benefits which can be derived from a continued instability? This may prove difficult to answer within this paper and we limit ourselves to arguing that the ethnic
33

Diane Enns, Identity and Victimhood: Questions for Conflict Management Practice, Berghof Occasional Paper No.28, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, May 2007, p. 9

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issues, perhaps a valid social break line, is not necessarily the break line impeding todays political progress. To the contrary it might a construed, intentional or not, argument to halt the progress sought after. The following quote out of the Azerisites Ethnic Group Discussion, is provocative: Members of an ethnic group generally claim a strong cultural continuity over time, although some historians and anthropologists have documented that many of the cultural practices on which various ethnic groups are based are of recent invention.34 Benedict Anderson identified the conflict in Burma as a class problem rather than an ethnic issue. As in Indonesia, the deep lines of conflict in Burma remain those of class. It is often said that the radical programme of nationalization launched in 1962 was aimed at the Indians and Chinese minorities; but in fact the assault was against the post-colonial middle class in general, including various Burmese groups. The military regime sought to build a strong class base among peasants and workers across ethnic lines and found itself up against many of those British sponsored ethnic elites once sheltered with the Scheduled Areas. Unsurprisingly, these elites attempted to defend their positions by defining themselves as the champions of ethnic identity against Burman domination."35 Today, with opposition and scholars emphasizing the Burman tyranny on the other vulnerable groups, the first lady of Burma, the present chief of state Major General Than Shwes wife is ethnic Pao, and the previous Prime Minister Soe Win (updated: the Prime Minister passed away in October 2007) is Inthar from the Karenni state. Junta leaders such as Khin Nyunt and even Ne Win were not pure Burman, but from mixed blood with Chinese ascendants. The most famous actresses, actors, and singers are nonBurmans, who enjoy popularity among people from the entire country. Nobody bothers supporting artists regardless from being ethnic Karen, Shan, Kachin or Chin. People hardly even conscious what ethnicity they represent. No coincidence, as explained in this chapter, the ethnic identity gets more pronounced when reaching the battle grounds close to the border. The
Friedlander 1975, Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, Sider 1993, Azerisite website, retrieved from http://www.azerisite.com/ethnicgroup.html 35 Benedict R.OG. Anderson, Southeast Asian Tribal Group and Ethnic Minorities, Harvard University Cultural Survival Report 22, 1987, pp. 8
34

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need to belong, the politicization and victimization, next to the manipulation, intentionally or not, become factors complicating a political solution. The above is no excuse not to provide equal rights for the citizens of Burma. Everyone who belongs to Burma should deserve citizenship and other associate rights, including those groups struggling at the borders. Inclusiveness and belonging are essential to create a nationhood and modern State. It is up to its people, regardless ethnicity, to rebuild the country in its many aspects, socially, economically and politically, benefiting generations and enabling them to live in dignity, freedom and with mutual respect. Instead of insisting what divides us, lets discuss what binds us and seek ways to strengthen the latter. In fact, three are many opposition figures who engaged in non-violent struggle against the self-imposed military rulers. In their fight against the regime, ethnicity does not play a role but justice, fairness, freedom and respect for diversity do. Whatever the fight is, now it is time for national reconciliation and finding the way to rebuild strong Union of Burma in which every nationality enjoy the rights equally.

Conclusion and Recommendations The September 2007 uprising is a direct result of the economic hardship. The human rights abuses along the borders are the result of an unfinished political process of unification, rooted first by colonialism and later by external interference. The principal solutions are to uplift the national economy and to find ways to share the profits among all political stakeholders, accepting that not mutual humiliation but national convergence of interests is the way for the future. When making recommendations for conflict resolution strategies we need to take in mind eight factors: (1) opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, led by strong beliefs and principles although claiming to be ready to compromise, has not been able to break the stalemate; (2) sanctions are not working; (3) China and India do have geo-strategic interests and Asian countries in

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general have taken over the role of influence the West once had; (4) the UN Security Council became a battleground between the West, led by the US, and other countries; (5) the US and the West at large are not ready to intervene military making their pressure toothless; (6) humanitarian aid is in dire need but insufficiently available; (7) therefore Burmese people will continue to suffer twice, both politically and economically, finding themselves between a hammer (hardliners within the junta) and a nail (hardliners within the opposition); and finally (8) that the September 2007 events was a repetition of October 1988 and eventually avoidable seen the opportunities for dialogue offered in the past. As stated earlier, violence can come in many ways; direct as in the number of people dying from the hand of the military on the streets of Rangoon or in the jungle or indirect as in the number of people suffering and dying from bad economic management and economic sanctions against the nation. What is less understood that violence can also be attributed to the omission to support people when they need it most. Indeed, the most cynical loss of life comes when people protest on the streets to complain of the dire economic living situations they have to face, only to be killed by bullets of the junta, as happened both in 1988 and again in 2007. The first recommendation is thus to stop the trade restrictions and dramatically increase humanitarian assistance within the country. Sanctions will not work as long as the neighboring countries are not ready to cooperate, and they are not since they do not necessarily consider a democratic Burma a stable one. Sanctions are even outright ridiculous if companies as Chevron and Total can continue their business undisturbed. The second recommendation is to stimulate tourism. largely isolated under the regime of Ne Win. Burma is an overwhelmingly Buddhist country, with strong social cohesion and control, Isolation is not considered a punishment to the junta; it became a defensive reflex and a safe-haven from international pressure. The country needs more exposure to new ideas, other cultures, other patterns of thinking, not less. With economic growth comes added economic responsibility. be replaced by more skilled and professional ones. Not surprisingly, the military proved awful economic managers who better are to Since this might not 30

happen soon, allow the international financial institutions back in the country. With loans and grants from the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank and the International Monetary Funds, come obligations and responsibilities. The recent cancellation, a reaction to the bloody crackdown of the September 2007 events and the killing of a Japanese journalist, of the Japanese government to establish a human resources centre at the Rangoon University, where courses in economics, management and Japanese were to be taught, is in contrast with this recommendation.36 A fifth recommendation is to halt support in the border areas to ethnic groups, apart from basic humanitarian needs and protection. Instead promote cease-fire agreements and support the border areas from within by increasing the development aid within the country to levels comparable to neighboring countries. Less people will become internally displaced and less people will seek economic betterment by leaving the country as an illegal migrant or a victim of human trafficking. Control on the borders by Burmese authorities has an added advantage since it allows an increased central tax revenue and will take away one of the main obstacles of the economic mismanagement, the need for military economic self-sufficiency resulting in unfair competition, monopolies and human right abuses such as forced labor and the like. Having focused on the economic situation, surely benefiting the junta yet equally improving the fate of the people at large, it is time to take in account the political situation. The sixth recommendation relates to perhaps one of the most difficult issues promoted by Martin Luther King, not to humiliate the opponent, create bitterness and chaos, but to gain friendship and understanding, resulting in a sense of shame in the eyes of the oppressor and finally in reconciliation. In other words, give the junta some credit for the work undertaken (i.e. ceasefire agreements, infrastructure works) since there will remain more than enough for the junta to be ashamed off. This attitude does not equal to cowardice or collaboration, but to a strategy of starting dialogue and trust. The junta has been blamed of all evil and immorality in the West and while the junta should not be exonerated for its mistakes, a fair process demands some fair amount of critical thinking since many of the
Japan adds to pressure on Burma, BBC News, October 16, 2007; retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7046267.stm
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reports issued by opposition groups are less void of interests than one would like to assume. Million of US dollars are annually transmitted to the most diverse groups, especially those located at the borders. George Soros alone
37

channels USD 2 million a year trying to pave the way for democracy in Burma heading the project out of a Fifth Avenue office in New York. It contributes to some 100 groups each year, none operating from Rangoon, and offers scores of academic scholarships to Burmese who might someday play a role in a democratic Burma. year.38 In addition it finances the shadow The claim within certain government in an office outside Washington, D.C. at a cost of USD 85,000 a Fortunately, this trend is changing. opposition circles to channel most of the aid through the cross-borders, thereby reaching an important target group but consisting of a very limited number of needy within the country, has been turned around since the UN Country Team appeal in 2001 for more assistance within the country.39 Countries politically outspoken on Burma, such as the UK, have since made a turnaround and increased aid levels up to 8 million in 2007, with specific emphasis on education, health and humanitarian needs.40 promised to quadruple if they were to come in power. This amount was deemed insufficient by many; the opposition Conservative party Andrew Mitchell, shadow minister for development stated to the press that: Cambodia is receiving 12m; Vietnam, a country that is storming out of poverty, is receiving 52m from the British taxpayer; and China, which had a trade surplus last month of $24bn, is receiving 40m this year and, I think, next year. We do not think that that set of priorities is correct.41 However, to return to our previous argument, those aid providers working within the country will be inclined at least publicly to be only moderately critical to the junta, if not their operations may be restricted or halted (i.e. ICRC restrictions since 2006),
David Serchuk, Burmas Billionaire, Forbes Magazine, April 23, 2007 ; can be retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/business/global/2007/0423/058.html 38 Ibid. 39 Burma Campaign UK Applauds British Government Action on Burma, Burma Campaign UK, October 08, 2007; from http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/pm/weblog.php?id=P296 40 UK will double aid to fight poverty in Burma, UK/DFID Press Release, October 30, 2007; can be found on http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/pressreleases/burma-double-aid.asp 41 Tania Branigan, Government Bows to Pressure to Boost Aid for Burma, The Guardian, October 31, 2007; to be retrieved from http://politics.guardian.co.uk/foreignaffairs/story/0,,2202268,00.html
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whereas the survival of the non-governmental agencies working on the outside of the countries will logically depend on the contrary reflex amplifying the situation and thereby justifying the continuation of the money flows. Aid and the justification for aid to Burma have been politicized for far too long. Aid and politics should serve the people; aid and the people should not serve politics.

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Editorial

Tuschl, Ronald H. (Editor) / Nwe, Soe Myat (Author) / Udayakumar, S.P. (Supervisor): Politics and Ethnic Dimension of the Conflict in Burma, EPU Research Papers, Issue 07/08, European University Center for Peace Studies (EPU), Stadtschlaining/Austria 2008.

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