Dr. Hans Seeres vs COMELEC Political Law Leadership Disputes Within a Party List FACTS: 1.

. BUHAY PARTY LIST- ROBLES CHAIRPERSON * duly registered with COMELEC --buhay participated in the 2001/2004 elections and ROBLES was the PRESIDENT ***including the Certificates of Nomination of representatives, carried the signature of Robles as president of BUHAY. 2.SENEREs - filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to Certificates Of nomination ARGUMENTS: a.)Seeres alleged that he was the acting president and secretary-general of BUHAY b.)Seeres would claim that the nominations made by Robles were, for lack of authority, null and void owing to the expiration of the latters term as party president. c.)Seeres asserted that Robles disqualified from being an officer of any political party, the latter being the Acting Administrator of the Light Railway Transport Authority (LRTA), a government-controlled corporation. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its challenged Resolution dated June 19, 2007, which declared respondent Robles as the duly authorized representative of BUHAY, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except the instant petition.

RULING:Hold-Over Principle Applies #The constitution and by-laws of BUHAY do not expressly or impliedly prohibit a hold-over situation. As such, since no successor was ever elected or qualified, Robles remained the President of BUHAY in a hold-over capacity. #SC DISMISSED THE PETITION

POWER OF THE COMELEC TO RESOLVE LEADERSHIP DISPUTES OF PARTY LIST

3#ANGLADLADLGBTPARTYV.COMELEC,GRNo.190582,April8,2010
#LAD LAD LGBT PARTYLIST - National organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. #This is a petition for Certiorari under rule 65 of the Rules of court, with an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction filed by LGBT PARTY against the RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMMISION ON COMELEC dated November 11, 2009 (the first assailed resolution) and December 16 2009 (the second assailed Resolution0 in SPP No. 09-228). #The COMELEC refusal to accredit ANG LADLAD as a party list organization under Republic Act (RA) 7941 otherwise known as the Party List System Act. #The COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel. ARGUMENTS: -Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity) -FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION -Non-Discrimination and International Law ISSUE: WON COMELEC RULING: #SC PETITION GRANTED #The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners application for party-list accreditation.

POWER OF THE COMELEC TO RESOLVE LEADERSHIP DISPUTES OF PARTY LIST

1#VICTORINO ALDABA VS COMELEC GR. 188078 JANUARY 25 2010 The Invalidation Of R.A 9591 The Lone District Of Malolos Act # Resolution No. 8771 DECLARING THE CONVERSION OF MALOLOS CITY INTO A LONE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL THEREBY REVERTING SAID CITY TO ITS PREVIOUS STATUS AS PART OF THE FIRST LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT OF THE PROVINCE OF BULACAN # Republic Act No. 9591 AN ACT AMENDING SECTION 57 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8754, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MALOLOS #The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) created a resolution, Resolution Number 09-0544, in the matter of Republic Act No. 9591 on the allocation of one (1) legislative district for the City of Malolos.

#COMELEC that it was impracticable for Congressto create a district with contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory because Malolos city lies at thecenter of the First Legislative District. The geographic lay-out of the First Legislative District is not aninsuperable condition making compliance with Section 5 (3) impracticable. To adhere to theconstitutional mandate, and thus maintain fidelity to its purpose of ensuring efficient representation,the practicable alternative for Congress was to include the municipality of Bulacan in Malolos City'slegislative district. Although unorthodox, the resulting contiguous and compact district fulfills theconstitutional requirements of geographic unity and population floor, ensuring efficient representationof the minimum mass of constituents.

#RULING: The Supreme Court declared the creation of the new legislative district as unconstitutional on 28 January 2010. The Supreme Court further reaffirmed on 10 March 2010 its decision to declare the creation of the new legislative district as unconstitutional, thus, the city will return to being part of the 1st District of Bulacan.

POWER OF THE COMELEC TO RESOLVE LEADERSHIP DISPUTES OF PARTY LIST 2#G.R. No. 204100:1-BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (1BROPGBI) VS COMELEC ARGUMENTS: #Petitioner 1BRO-PGBI is a multi-sectoral party list registered with the COMELEC on February 13, 2004. Petitioner participated in the 2004 party list elections but failed to garner enough votes to secure a seat in the House of Representatives. Petitioner did not participate in the 2007 and 2010 elections. On June 4, 2012, petitioner filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party List System of Representation in the May 13, 2013 elections. Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of thevotes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections #On August 2, 2012, COMELEC issued Resolution 9513 setting all PARTY-LIST groups or organizations that are existing and retained in the List of Registered PARTY-LIST Parties for summary evidentiary hearing. 1BRO-PGBI complied and submitted the aforementioned requirements. However, on October 16, 2012, the COMELEC cancelled the Certificate of Registration and Accreditation of 1BRO-PGBI on the ground that 1BRO-PGBI failed to define the sector it (seeks) to represent. ISSUE: Whether the MINERO ruling can be use as a legal basis in delisting PGBI. Held: According to the Court, the MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence ,it cannot sustain PGBI's delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,organizations or coalitions under the party-list system RULING# The Supreme Court grants PGBIs petition and accordingly, annul COMELEC Resolution No.8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is concerned and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 which denied PGBI's motion for reconsideration. PGBI is qualified to be voted upon asa party-list group or organization in the May 2010 elections ****COMELEC Resolution No.8679
IN THE MATTER OF THE DEPUTATION OF THE PROSECUTORS OFTHE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO HANDLE ELECTION OFFENSE CASES.IN THE MATTER OF THE FAILURE OF PARTY-LIST ORGANIZATIONS TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 6(8) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7941
Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. - The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
MINERO RULING--COMELEC denied the motion and in response, pointed out that the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections.

On July 9 and July 18, 2007, respectively, the COMELEC issued two resolutions proclaiming BUHAY as a winning party-list organization for the May 2007 elections entitled to three (3) House seats and it also declared Robles as the duly authorized

representative of BUHAY, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction HELD: A special civil action for certiorari may be availed of when the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling the proceeding. It is the proper remedy to question any final order, ruling and decision of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. For certiorari to prosper, however, there must be a showing that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion and that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the present case, a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law was available to Seeres. The 1987 Constitution cannot be more explicit in this regard. It is undisputed that the COMELEC, sitting as National Board of Canvassers, proclaimed BUHAY as a winning party-list organization for the May 14, 2007 elections, entitled to three (3) seats in the House of Representatives. The proclamation came in the form of two Resolutions dated July 9, 2007 and July 18, 2007, respectively. Said resolutions are official proclamations of COMELEC considering it is BUHAY that ran for election as party-list organization and not the BUHAY nominees.

US vs Barrias 11 Phil 327 FACTS: Defendant Aniceto Barrias was charged in CFI with violations of par. 70 and 83 of Circular no. 397.Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397 reads as follows: No heavily loaded casco, lighter, orother similar craft shall be permitted to move in the Pasig River without being towed by steam or moved by other adequate power.Paragraph 83 reads, in part, as follows:For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable toa fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court.Counsel for the appellant attacked the validity of paragraph 70 on two grounds: Firstthat it is unauthorized by section 19 of Act No. 355; and, second, that if the acts of thePhilippine Commission bear the interpretation of authorizing the Collector topromulgate such a law, they are void, as constituting an illegal delegation of legislativepower.The complaint in this instance was framed with reference to sections 311 and 319 [19 and311] at No. 355 of the Philippine Customs Administrative Acts, as amended by Act Nos.1235 and 1480. Under Act No. 1235, the Collector is not only empowered to makesuitable regulations, but also to "fix penalties for violation thereof," notexceeding a fine of P500. ISSUE: WON Collector of Customs can fix the penalty of a law? HELD: The answer is in the Negative. Although the Collector of Customs can make and publish rules andregulations but it cannot make the duty of the legislature to fix the penalty of a certain law. It is in this case that it will be an illegal delegation of power.One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has locatedthe authority, there it must remain; only by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until theconstitution itself is changed.This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another.

United States v. Grimaud 220 U.S. 506 (1911)

Grimaud and some other people were letting their sheep graze in the Sierra Forest Reserve without a permit. They were fined. They appealed. o The Forestry Reserve Act (30 Stat. 35) authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to make regulations about the use of Forest Reserves.

Grimaud argued that the Forestry Reserve Act was unconstitutional because it was an impermissible delegation of authority (aka a violation of the NonDelegation Doctrine). Basically, the Non-Delegation Doctrine says that only Congress is empowered to write laws, the Executive Branch cannot write laws. So Congress is forbidden from giving an Executive Branch Agency (like USDA) the power to write laws. See Yakus v. United States (321 U.S. 414 (1944)). The Trial Court dismissed the case. The US appealed. The Appellate Court affirmed. The US appealed. The US Supreme Court reversed and found the Forestry Reserve Act constitutional. o The US Supreme Court found that it would be impractical for Congress to provide general regulations for grazing rights, and therefore it is within their power to confer that power to an Administrative Agency (in this case USDA). o The Court found that Congress may delegate the power to "fill up details" where it has indicated its will in the Statute, and it may make violations of such regulations punishable as indicated in the Statute. o The Court noted that Congress cannot delegate legislative power to an Administrative Agency. Basically, this case said that it would be impractical for Congress to set all the little nitpicky rules and regulations that are required. So, they are allowed to set broad policies (aka intelligible principles), and allow an Administrative Agency to write the specific regulations and come up with the details. o See the later case of Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'n (531 U.S. 457 (2001)), which upheld the Clean Air Act'sbroad delegation of authority to the EPA to set air quality standards.
o

People of the Philippines vs Rosenthal

Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies

Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmea were founders and shareholders of the ORO Oil Company. The main endeavor of the company is to mine, refine, market, buy and sell petroleum, natural gas and other oil products. Rosenthal and Osmea were found guilty of selling their shares to individuals without actual tangible assets. Their shares were merely based on speculations and future gains. This is in violation of Sections 2 and 5 of Act No. 2581. Section of said law provides that every person, partnership, association, or corporation attempting to offer to sell in the Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with the Insular Treasurer the various documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of twenty-pesos. Sec 5, on the other hand, provides that whenever the

said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is satisfied, either with or without the examination herein provided, that any person, partnership, association or corporation is entitled to the right to offer its securities as above defined and provided for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person, partnership, association or corporation a certificate or permit reciting that such person, partnership, association or corporation has complied with the provisions of this act, and that such person, partnership, association or corporation, its brokers or agents are entitled to order the securities named in said certificate or permit for sale; that said Treasurer shall furthermore have authority, when ever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said certificate or permit, and that an appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer may be had within the period of thirty days to the Secretary of Finance. Rosenthal argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional because no standard or rule is fixed in the Act which can guide said official in determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued, thereby making his opinion the sole criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the result that, legislative powers being unduly delegated to the Insular Treasurer, Act No. 2581 is unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Internal Treasurer. HELD: The SC is of the opinion that the Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person, partnership, association or corporation applying therefor has complied with the provisions of this Act, and this requirement, construed in relation to the oth er provisions of the law, means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act No. 2581 have been complied with. Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation is in the public interest. In view of the intention and purpose of Act No. 2581 to protect the public against speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky and against the sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations, we incline to hold that public interest in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits. And the term public interest is not without a settled meaning. Rosenthal insists that the delegation of authority to the Commission is invalid because the stated criterion is uncertain. That criterion is the public interest. It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide determinations. The purpose of the Act, the requirement it imposes, and the context of the provision in question show the contrary. . .

G.R. No. 204100:1-BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (1BRO-PGBI) Petitioner 1BRO-PGBI is a multi-sectoral party list registered with the COMELEC on February 13, 2004. Petitioner participated in the 2004 party list elections but failed to garner enough votes to secure a seat in the House of Representatives. Petitioner did not participate in the 2007 and 2010 elections. On June 4, 2012, petitioner filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party List System of Representation in the May 13, 2013 elections. On August 2, 2012, COMELEC issued Resolution 9513 setting all PARTY-LIST groups or organizations that are existing and retained in the List of Registered PARTY-LIST Parties for summary evidentiary hearing. 1BRO-PGBI complied and submitted the aforementioned requirements. However, on October 16, 2012, the COMELEC cancelled the Certificate of Registration and Accreditation of 1BRO-PGBI on the ground that 1BRO-PGBI failed to define the sector it (seeks) to represent. On November 15, 2012, 1BRO-PGBI filed this Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Immediate Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order to assail the resolution of COMELEC en banc. ARGUMENTS: 1. The Honorable COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it ordered the automatic review by the en banc of the division resolutions granting petitions for registration of party list groups despite the constitutional provision that the en banc can only review decisions of the division upon the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Section 3 of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution establishes the two-tiered organizational and functional structure of the COMELEC, which requires that election cases should first be resolved by a division of the COMELEC and then the en banc upon a motion for reconsideration. No less than the Constitution demands that the COMELEC en banc can only act on election cases if brought to it through a motion for reconsideration. 2. The Honorable COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it called for summary evidentiary hearing to determine continuing compliance in pursuance with the requirements of RA No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani case but the resulting resolution mainly discussed trivial matters that are not connected with the continuing compliance. Instead of determining whether petitioner complied with the requirements of the law, the COMELEC did not comprehensively determine if indeed, the organization was able to meet the qualifications and guidelines set by law and Ang Bagong Bayani case. The respondent opted to shift its focus on other trivial matters instead of giving weight to the voluminous documents that were submitted to show continuing compliance. 3. The Honorable COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it concluded that petitioner does not intend to represent any marginalized or underrepresented sector. A perusal of the given roster of members of petitioner would show that majority of its members belong to the professional sector. However, this should not be construed to the effect that the organization, as a result, does not intend to represent any sector enumerated by the Constitution or by law as marginalized or underrepresented. Such conclusion is palpably out of order, considering that professionals is one of the sectors enumerated by the supreme law and the fact that the same is within the multi-sectoral groups that petitioner seeks to represent. 4. The Honorable COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that the nominees do not belong to the sector of marginalized and underrepresented. The nominees of petitioner have faithfully complied with the necessary documents as required by the assailed Resolution and have presented sufficient proofs that they possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications by law. Jurisprudence starting from Banat v. COMELEC shows that the law does not look on financial status or any other attributes/ requirements of membership, i.e. how members are called/classified; rituals/beliefs/tattoos enjoyed and observed by the members

themselves that are not in violation of any law, or any factors that the organization may have as long as the same is not inconsistent with the genuine purpose of the party list system, it is but proper to expect that the COMELEC shall do the same. PRAYER: petitioner prays of the Honorable Supreme Court that: 1. Upon the filing of this petition and upon finding that the same is sufficient in form and substance, that the same be given due course and that a TRO and/or SQAO be issued enjoining the COMELEC en banc from implementing and enforcing its October 16, 2012 Omnibus Order in so far as petitioner is concerned; 2. After due proceedings, to render a decision granting the petition and ordering the issuance of the writ of certiorari, declaring the omnibus resolution as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction and therefore, null and void; 3. A decision be rendered ordering the respondent to promulgate a new resolution confirming the petitioners registration and accreditation as a multi-sectoral organization under the PLS; and thereafter including the petitioner in the list of qualified organizations that will participate in the May 13, 203 elections under the PLS. Other reliefs and remedies just and equitable are likewise prayed for.

In Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v COMELEC, GR No. 190529, the Supreme Court upheld the right of the petitioner to be voted for in the May 10, 2010 elections but owing to time constraints and supervening circumstances, petitioner was not able to participate in the 2010 elections.

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC Leave a comment ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC Facts: Petitioner is a t. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC. Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation. In its Comment, Issue: WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution; WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds. Held: Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and under -represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that *n+o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non -establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation of the non -establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose. Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decenc y or morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability. As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.

\Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc vs COMELECG.R. No. 190529 Ponente: Justice Brion Facts:The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) files a petition for review and a motion for reconsideration to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13,2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009. These resolutions delistedPGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. According to Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941, known as Party -List System Act, COMELEC,upon verified complaint of any interested party, may remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, theregistration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if: (1) it fails to participatein the last two preceding elections or (2)fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. For May 2010 Elections, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-listgroups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions.Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of thevotes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections.PGBI filed its opposition to Resolution No. 8679 and likewise, sought for accreditation as a party-listorganization. One of the arguments cited is that the Supreme Court's ruling in G.R. No. 177548 MINERO(Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association) vs COMELEC cannot apply in the instant controversy.One of the reasons is because the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from PGBI's. Additionally, ther e q u i r e m e n t of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 179271 B A N A T (Barangay Association for Advancement and National Transparency) vs COMELEC.COMELEC denied the motion and in response, pointed out that the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, asMINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections.Issue:Whether the MINERO ruling can be use as a legal basis in delisting PGBI.Held:According to the Court, the MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence,it cannot sustain PGBI's delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.First the law is clear in that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independenceof one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which itordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two separate reasons for delisting.Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941 andtherefore, simply cannot stand. It s basic defect lies in its characterization of the non -participation of a party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote. What MINERO effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not participate in an electionnecessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a confused interpretationof the law, given the law's clear and categorical language and the legislative intent to treat the two scenariosdifferently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law - in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation notwithin the contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the laW

Instead, what should be taken into account is the ruling in BANAT vs COMELEC where the 2% party-listvote requirement provided in RA 7941 is partly invalidated.The Court rules that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b)of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional; it finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available partylist seats exceeds 50.The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.To reiterate, Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votesin two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the BANAT ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. This ishow Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied under the authority of the Supreme Courtto state what the law is and as an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established).The most compelling reason to abandon MINERO and strike it out from ruling case law is that it was clearly an erroneous application of the law - an application that the principle of stability or predictability of decisions alone cannot sustain. MINERO did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the legislature and to the rule of law in general. Therefore,

the Supreme Court grants PGBIs petition and accordingly, annul COMELEC Resolution No.8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is concerned and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 which denied PGBI's motion for reconsideration. PGBI is qualified to be voted upon AS A party-list group or organization in the May 2010 elections