L'armée de L'air - Instrument de Puissance Pour La France

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LArme de lair,
instrument de puissance
pour la France
Cet ouvrage est tlchargeable sur le site de la RDN
www.defnat.com
SALON DU BOURGET 2013
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Les missions permanentes
Le C2 franais de dfense arienne : un outil forg dans la dure
MICKAL AUBOUT, YOHAN DROIT, MARIE-MADELEINE MARAIS, TONY MORIN
Le C2 Air franais est aujourdhui indispensable la dfense arienne du territoire ainsi quaux oprations
extrieures. De la gense des oprations ariennes aux dernires volutions, cet article retrace lhistoire dune
des capacits socles de lArme de lair.
Composante nuclaire aroporte : une dynamique dexcellence
EMAA
La composante nuclaire aroporte franaise, incarne dans les Forces ariennes stratgiques (FAS), est,
depuis 1964, un pilier fondamental de lexpression de la puissance franaise. Elle est un lment central et
fdrateur du dveloppement de lArme de lair.
LArme de lair et la scurit nationale
EMAA
Pour rpondre lenjeu de scurit nationale, ltat peut sappuyer sur les capacits socles de lArme de lair.
Les spcificits de cette arme contribuent efficacement et de manire adapte la scurit nationale.
Sommaire
Introduction - Une nouvelle approche des fonctions stratgiques
DENIS MERCIER
La capacit agir vite et loin travers 3 engagements rcents
De lAfghanistan au Mali :
le modle afghan 10 ans aprs, une pertinence intacte
GRAUD LABORIE
Lauteur revient sur la gense du modle afghan et sur sa premire utilisation en Afghanistan, pour en com-
prendre les grands principes. Ltude des conflits rcents confirme que le modle afghan est un outil strat-
gique dominante arienne qui reste tout fait pertinent, la valeur coercitive leve quand il est employ
dans les bonnes conditions. Il ncessite dtre pleinement reconnu et intgr dans la palette doptions stra-
tgiques que permettent nos armes.
Harmattan : tmoignage dun commandant descadron de Rafale
LOC RULLIRE
La campagne arienne libyenne est le fruit dune minutieuse prparation. LArme de lair, confronte une
guerre o les acteurs sont parfois difficiles discriminer, a su adapter son outil pour effectuer des frappes
prcises.
Serval : une opration emblmatique du rle de lArme de lair
EMAA
LArme de lair est un instrument de puissance. Une opration comme Serval au Mali travers la ractivit,
les capacits de commandement, les aptitudes ISR et la mobilit stratgique et tactique que lArme de lair
permet le dmontre avec clat.
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volution du champ de bataille et puissance arienne horizon 15 ans
GRGORY BOUTHERIN, CHRISTOPHE PAJON
Lidentification des volutions du champ de bataille lhorizon des quinze prochaines annes peut sembler
tre une gageure. Toutefois, en sinspirant des tendances lourdes, il est possible didentifier trois principaux
axes de changement : nombre et nature des acteurs prsents sur le champ de bataille, prolifration des tech-
nologies, nature des milieux daffrontement. Cette analyse est centrale afin de prparer la puissance aro-
spatiale affronter les dfis de demain, qui tendent placer les temporalits au cur des rflexions futures.
Approche prospective
Les capacits socles au cur de sa modernisation
Capacits C2 de lArme de lair,
un cur stratgique au profit de la dfense et de la scurit nationale
EMAA
Grce son aptitude superviser et diriger des oprations ariennes ( C2 Air), lArme de lair est un rel
instrument de puissance offrant la France une capacit-cl majeure pour lexcution de ses responsabilits
internationales.
Il nest de Machiavel dans le drone que sa partie humaine
CHRISTOPHE FONTAINE
Pour lauteur, expert en ce domaine, lemploi du drone ne diffre de celui de lavion de combat que par
lendurance en vol que permet le dport du pilote terre. Il explique ainsi que les rticences en faire un
outil de combat comme les autres sont nulles et non avenues.
Pour une gestion dynamique des points dappui de la France
EMAA
Cet article met en lumire la dilatation de lespace stratgique suite lacquisition de lA400Met du MRTT.
La projection de force et de puissance de la France senvisage ainsi au travers dune approche plus dynamique
du maillage de nos points dappuis.
Intervention immdiate : lapport du Rafale dans les oprations rcentes
YOHAN DROIT
Le Rafale se distingue par sa polyvalence totale. Son dploiement sur diffrents thtres permet dapprhen-
der son volution et dapprcier sa complte adaptation tous les types doprations dans lesquelles lArme
de lair a t engage depuis prs de dix ans.
Regard sur la formation du futur pilote de combat :
sur terre ou en lair, simulez !
COLIN BLTTLER, CYRIL CAMACHON
La simulation sest progressivement impose comme un mdia srieux pour former et entraner les pilotes
de combat. Toutefois, le vol rel doit rester la pierre angulaire dune formation dexperts du milieu aro-
nautique militaire. Le meilleur quilibre entre ces deux modalits de formation pourrait-il tre trouv dans
la simulation embarque en vol rel ?
Les hommes et les femmes de lArme de lair
EMAA
De par la qualit de leur formation, les hommes et les femmes de lArme de lair sont de rels atouts pour
la dfense en gnral mais galement pour lensemble de la socit civile quils contribuent irriguer des
valeurs quils dveloppent au sein de leur mtier.

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Ladaptation des capacits militaires
EMAA
Le paysage stratgique des dix dernires annes a t domin par les conflits dits asymtriques. Si ce contexte a
mis laccent sur certaines capacits, il ne doit pas servir de prtexte labandon des autres, plus adaptes
la haute intensit.
La coopration militaire dans lEspace : le cas franco-amricain
BATRICE HAINAUT
La France et les tats-Unis ont dvelopp trs tt des cooprations entre agences spatiales nationales. La
coopration scientifique volue aujourdhui vers une coopration plus politique, ayant pour cadre lutilisa-
tion militaire de lEspace. Ce renouveau est en partie le fait dune administration amricaine voulant faire
voluer sa diplomatie spatiale.
Prparation et mise en page : Jrme Doll
Couverture : Emmanuel Batisse (PAO - Cesa)
La Revue Dfense Nationale est dite par le Comit dtudes de dfense nationale
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Secrtaires de rdaction : Marie-Hlne Mounet, Jrme Doll,
Arnaud Ablaoui, Valrie Andreeva et Alexandra Angotti
Abonnements : liane Lecardonnel - Tl. : 01 44 42 38 23
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DL 80750 - 2
e
trimestre 2013 - ISSN : 2105-7508 - CP n 1014 G 85493 du 9 septembre 2010
Imprime par Bialec, Nancy, 95 boulevard dAustrasie, BP 10423, 54001 Nancy cedex
Glossaire
Note de la rdaction - Le choix a t fait, uniquement pour le glossaire, de ne pas appliquer la rgle de typographie
qui consiste mettre en italique le nom du matriel et des programmes. Le bas-de-casse sapplique pour les sigles
(franais) qui se prononcent ; il ne sapplique pas pour les sigles trangers.
AASM : Armement air-sol modulaire
ACCS : Air Command and Control System
APOD : Air Port of Desembarkation
ASMPA : Air-sol moyenne porte amlior
AWACS : Airborne Warning and Control System
BITD : Base industrielle et technologique de dfense
C2 : Commandement et contrle
Cafda : Commandement air des forces de dfense arienne
CAOC : Combined Air and Space Operations Center
CDAOA : Commandement de la dfense arienne et des oprations ariennes
CENTCOM : US Central Command
Csar : Complexe dexploitation semi-automatique du radar
CIE : Commandement interarmes de lEspace
Cnes : Centre national dtudes spatiales
CNOA : Centre national des oprations ariennes
CO.AIR : Centre des oprations de lArme de lair
Coda : Centre des oprations de la dfense arienne
Comanfor : Commandant de la force
Cos : Commandement des oprations spciales
Cosmos : Centre oprationnel de surveillance militaire des objets spatiaux
CPCO: Centre de planification et de conduit des oprations
DCA : Dfense contre aronefs
EATC : Commandement du transport arien europen
ESA : European Space Agency / ASE : Agence spatiale europenne
F2T2EA : Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess
FAA : Federal Aviation Administration
FAS : Forces ariennes stratgiques
FMV : Full-Motion Video
GGE : Group of Governmental Experts
Graves : Grand rseau adapt la veille spatiale
GS : Gestion de systmes
IADC : Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Commitee
ISR : Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
JDAM : Joint Direct Attack Munition
JFAC AFCP : Joint Force Air Component de lAfrique centrale et de lOuest
JSOTF-N : Joint Special Operations Task Force-North
JTAC : Joint Terminal Attack Controller
Male : Moyenne altitude, longue endurance
MCCE : Centre de coordination multimodal en Europe
MRTT : Multi Role Tanker Transport
NADGE : NATO Defense Ground Environment (Infrastructure lectronique de la dfense arienne de lOtan)
NRF : Force de raction de lOtan
NSP : National Space Policy
OEF : Operation Enduring Freedom
OODA : Observation-Orientation-Dcision-Action / OODA : Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action
Oscgane : Observation spectrale et caractrisation des satellites gostationnaires
OUP : Operation Unified Protector
OSF : Optronique secteur frontal
PT : Per cent Transfer
PPS : Posture permanente de sret arienne
RAF : Royal Air Force
RBE 2 : Radar balayage lectronique 2 plans
ROVER : Remote Operations Video Enhanced Receiver
Satam : Systmes dacquisition et de trajectographie des avions et munitions
SATCP : Sol-air trs courte porte
Scalp-EG : Systme de croisire conventionnel autonome longue porte-Emploi gnral
SCCOA : Systme de commandement et de contrle des oprations arospatiales
SEAD : Suppression des dfenses ariennes adverses
SIC : Systme dinformation et de communication
Spectra : Systme de protection et dvitement des conduites de tir du Rafale
Strida II : Systme de transmission et de reprsentation des informations de dfense ariennes
TAA : Technically Advanced Aircraft
TACP : Tactical Air Control Parties
TER : Transfer Effectiveness Ratio
TIRA : Tracking and Imaging Radar
TST : Time Sensitive Target
Une nouvelle approche
des fonctions stratgiques
Gnral darme arienne. Chef dtat-major de lArme
de lair.
Denis Mercier
C
est avec un trs grand plaisir que jouvre, pour la premire fois, loccasion
de la tenue dun Salon du Bourget, un numro spcial de la Revue Dfense
Nationale consacr lArme de lair. travers de nombreuses contributions
de qualit, ce numro nous offre une excellente opportunit de dcouvrir comment
lArme de lair sappuie sur cinq capacits socles pour rpondre ses nombreux
engagements. En effet, ce sont bien les capacits planifier, commander et condui re
les oprations ariennes (1), recueillir du renseignement (2), intervenir imm-
diatement (3), se projeter vite et loin (4), se former et sentraner au bon
niveau (5) qui permettent lArme de lair dtre prsente sur notre territoire natio-
nal et en dehors.
Cest par la modernisation de ces capacits que demain, lArme de lair
pourra toujours tre un instrument de puissance au service de la Nation, prsente
dans chacune des cinq fonctions stratgiques (dissuasion, protection, connaissance
et anticipation, prvention et intervention). Car ce qui fait la cohrence et la force
de lArme de lair cest bien son aptitude pouvoir mettre au service de ces fonc-
tions lensemble de ses capacits.
Le nouveau Livre blanc sur la Dfense et la Scurit nationale qui vient dtre
rdig dcline ltat des menaces et conforte cette approche par fonctions strat-
giques, introduites par le Livre blanc sur la Dfense de 1994 et largies par celui de
2008. Il permet didentifier les champs devant tre matriss pour permettre
l tat dassurer la protection et la scurit de ses citoyens, celles des intrts vitaux
de la France tant sur le territoire national qu lextrieur de ses frontires.
Or, lune des contraintes majeures laquelle ce dernier est aujourdhui
confront est dtermine par lindispensable matrise des dpenses publiques qui,
sur fond de crise financire profonde, rogne singulirement ses marges de
manuvre. Toutefois, les performances des nouveaux appareils de combat, quils
soient hlicoptres, avions de chasse ou de transport, allies des concepts
dem ploi plus ractifs ouvrent de nouvelles perspectives pour apprhender les cinq
fonctions stratgiques au travers dune approche plus holistique des complmenta-
rits et de la dynamique qui structurent la relation de ces fonctions entre elles.
Les Cahiers de la Revue Dfense Nationale
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En effet, en constatant limbrication certaine de ces fonctions stratgiques
et en apprhendant chacune dentre elles dans une perspective plus dynamique, il
apparat possible de rpondre aux enjeux auxquels nous devons faire face en
sap puyant davantage sur un recentrage sur le territoire national et sur quelques
points dappui, favorisant la concentration de nos moyens, garante dconomies.
En premier lieu, limbrication des fonctions entre elles est multiple. Elle
vaut par les moyens quelles appellent mettre en uvre mais aussi par les champs
quelles recouvrent et qui ne sont pas tanches les uns aux autres. De mme,
lob jectif de dfense et de scurit pour la France ne rsulte pas dune approche
squentielle de ces fonctions mais bien dune approche parallle et souvent simul-
tane. Partant de ce constat, et sappuyant sur les possibilits offertes par la tech-
nologie, lexploitation de la polyvalence des moyens comme des procdures doit
constituer un axe de travail essentiel.
La fonction connaissance et anticipation est par essence celle qui illustre
le mieux linterdpendance des fonctions entre elles car sa matrise garantit celle
des quatre autres. Elle justifie de ce fait le maintien de leffort dont elle bnficie
depuis 2008, en particulier dans le domaine spatial et celui de la cyberdfense. Les
actions contribuant la ralisation de cette fonction doivent senvisager selon deux
axes diffrents.
Dune part, il y a celles qui sont menes en amont des crises et qui per met-
tent de les anticiper. Elles reposent aujourdhui sur les capacits de nos moyens spa-
tiaux, de nos sources de recueil cyberntiques, lectromagntiques, humaines et sur
lemploi de vecteurs spcialiss dploys en fonction de zones dintrts parti-
cu lires. On peut aller plus loin encore en exploitant toutes les opportunits de
missions auxquelles sont amens participer certains de nos moyens dans le cadre
des autres fonctions stratgiques. Nous devons en particulier nous appuyer davan-
tage sur nos moyens ariens de projection et largir leur doctrine demploi.
Dautre part, lorsque la crise a clat, sa matrise suppose de pouvoir
sap puyer sur des moyens dont la permanence sur zone est assure. ce titre, le
dveloppement de lemploi des drones doit encore progresser et faire lobjet dun
rel effort.
Lapprhension de cette imbrication et de la polyvalence peut galement
contribuer sortir du contexte de trs grande spcificit caractrisant la dissuasion,
sans pour autant fragiliser la sret de lemploi de ses moyens. De mme, il faut
intgrer dans la rflexion stratgique, le fait que cette fonction offre aux armes
franaises un domaine dexcellence, qui tire vers le haut leurs capacits opration-
nelles (ciblage, mission de longue dure, traitement des cibles stratgiques, entre
en premier), renforant ainsi les autres fonctions stratgiques et plaant de fait la
France un trs haut niveau de crdibilit.
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En second lieu, il est possible aujourdhui denvisager notre recentrage sur
le territoire mtropolitain et sur quelques emprises hors du continent europen
sans pour autant compromettre les autres fonctions stratgiques. Ce mouvement
nest toutefois possible qu deux conditions qui doivent contribuer structurer un
outil de dfense agile et inscrit dans une logique dynamique.
La premire est relative la rnovation du dispositif de nos points dappuis
considrer selon une approche plus dynamique, incorporant la capacit de
rebond que permettent ces positionnements. Ce recentrage nest pas synonyme de
rsignation et ne vise en aucun cas quitter nos points dappuis traditionnels. Mais
pour loprer, il faut en repenser et en rnover le dispositif pour exploiter au mieux
la nouvelle allonge stratgique que nos nouveaux moyens de projection et de ravi-
taillement offriront prochainement nos forces armes.
La deuxime condition est relative limprieuse ncessit de continuer
figurer au rang des nations les plus crdibles en matire dintervention, fonction
indissociable de notre culture de la responsabilit internationale. Dans ce domaine
particulirement exigeant en termes de ressources, des voies nouvelles doivent tre
imagines afin de disposer du juste besoin, juste temps sans toutefois renoncer
lambition dhonorer notre capacit imposer notre volont politique.
Toute intervention repose sur le triptyque action immdiate, projection de
forces et capacit durer. Laction immdiate implique ncessairement le besoin de
prserver les moyens indispensables au maintien dun haut degr de comptence
dans les domaines oprationnels les plus exigeants, prservant notre capacit den trer
en premier pour, selon une mtaphore britannique, Punch over our weight . La
capacit durer, intervenant aprs la phase de haute intensit dune opration, ne
repose pas sur les mmes exigences. Le niveau de prparation et dquipement des
forces qui interviendront dans ce cadre doit tre adapt en consquence.
Ces conditions poses, le recentrage sur le territoire national peut senvisa-
ger car nous disposons de capacits de commandement et de contrle robustes qui
offrent un fort potentiel et permettent, encore plus quhier, un commandement
centralis et une excution dcentralise de toute opration denvergure avec une
ractivit extrme. Mieux exploiter ces aspects, cest la fois garantir nos conci-
toyens outre-mer la prsence rapide de ltat en cas de crise majeure tout en mna-
geant une empreinte rduite, cest prserver notre vocation mondiale et cest co-
nomiser nos moyens pour agir sur tout le spectre des fonctions stratgiques.
Enfin par le recentrage sur le territoire national, il est possible denvisager
un renforcement de la collaboration interministrielle pour amliorer la scurit de
nos concitoyens et la rsilience de ltat. Toutes les synergies doivent tre exploi-
tes, depuis le suivi des moyens jusqu limbrication des structures de comman-
dement et de gestion de crises en passant par la valorisation des missions dentra-
nement au profit de besoins ponctuels de ltat.
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Ainsi, imbrication, polyvalence et approche dynamique permettent

dap prhender les cinq fonctions stratgiques sous un angle diffrent qui, sans
remettre en cause leur importance relative, exploite leurs potentialits propres en
favorisant notre recentrage sur le territoire national offrant par la mme occasion
une rponse adapte la matrise de nos finances publiques.
Cest dans cette optique, conforte par le Livre blanc sur la Dfense et la
Scurit nationale, que lArme de lair poursuit sa modernisation et consolide ses
capacits socles afin de toujours remplir ses missions permanentes de dissuasion et
de protection du territoire national et de ses approches, afin de maintenir sa capa-
cit dintervention immdiate au plus haut niveau. Elle continue doffrir linstru-
ment de puissance dont la France a besoin pour exercer ses responsabilits tant sur
la scne internationale quau service de la dfense de ses citoyens.
R
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Les missions permanentes
Le C2 franais
de dfense arien ne :
un outil forg dans la dure
Les capitaines Aubout et Droit, le lieutenant Marais et le
sous-lieutenant Morin sont chargs de recherche au Centre
dtudes stratgiques arospatiales (Cesa).
Mickal Aubout
Yohan Droit
Marie-Madeleine Marais
Tony Morin
R
sultat de 50 ans defforts, le C2 (Commandement et contrle) Air franais
constitue le systme nerveux des oprations ariennes et, ce titre, est tota-
lement constitutif de la puissance arienne de la France. Runissant une
structure de commandement, une organisation, des processus et des moyens
humains et techniques, le C2 Air permet de commander, planifier, programmer et
conduire des oprations ariennes au-dessus, depuis ou hors du territoire national.
Lhistoire du C2 en France est intimement lie lhistoire de la dfense
arienne du territoire et des moyens de dtection, de commandement et de contr le
affrents. Les principes fondamentaux de fonctionnement du C2 dcoulent, intrin-
squement, de lemploi de la puissance arienne.
Gense du C2: de linvention des principes la naissance du C2 moderne
La Premire Guerre mondiale et lmergence dune premire organisation de type C2
Durant la Grande Guerre, les premires mesures de dfense passive, contre
les Zeppelin puis contre les bombardiers allemands Gotha menaant Paris, pous sent
la mise en place dun organisme charg de centraliser les informations, issues des
tours de guet et des systmes de dtection acoustique par transmission tlpho-
nique, de les analyser puis de dcider des mesures adopter. Ainsi, le camp retran-
ch de Paris, mis en place par le gouverneur militaire de Paris ds 1914, voit
limplantation de moyens de DCA (Dfense contre aronefs) et descadrilles de
chasse. Cette organisation perdure durant toute la guerre. Plus lEst, confront
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une importante offensive allemande dans le secteur de Verdun, le commandement
franais pose le principe de lemploi en masse de laviation pour reprendre lavan-
tage. Lobjectif est dacqurir et de conserver la matrise de lair au-dessus du
thtre dopration par lemploi coordonn de lensemble des moyens ariens
pr sents sur le thtre. Suite au succs de cette dmarche, une premire structure,
la division arienne, est cre en 1918 afin de coordonner laction de toute lavia-
tion de combat sur le front de lEst.
Naissance du C2 moderne lors de la bataille dAngleterre
Cependant, le C2, tel quon le conoit actuellement, prend rellement son
essor, en 1940, durant la bataille dAngleterre au dbut de la Seconde Guerre mon-
diale. Face aux raids de bombardement de la Luftwaffe, la Royal Air Force (RAF)
pose les principes fondamentaux modernes de fonctionnement du C2. Dabord,
elle sappuie sur des moyens de dtection constitus par la chane ctire de radars
Chain Home : elle dtermine ainsi les axes dattaque et le nombre approximatif
dennemis en vol. Ensuite, ces informations sont centralises et analyses au sein
du centre des oprations du Fighter Command qui attribue aux units de combat
les axes dinterception et les zones couvrir. La cl du succs du Fighter Command
repose alors sur sa rapidit de traitement de linformation et la promptitude des
bases ariennes mettre en lair les chasseurs. Ce processus correspond la boucle
OODA (Observation, Orientation, Dcision, Action) que conceptualisera, bien
des dcennies plus tard, lAmricain John Boyd.
Ds la Premire Guerre mondiale, notamment partir de la bataille de
Verdun, on voit lemploi de moyens ariens coordonns. Les grands principes de
coordination des moyens ariens sont mis au jour : commandement centralis et
excution dcentralise.
En 1940, la bataille dAngleterre illustre toute limportance du C2 dans le
succs des oprations militaires. Lorganisation du Fighter Command mise en place
lors de la bataille dAngleterre signe la naissance du C2 moderne dans le sens dune
mise en rseau des diverses composantes (surveillance radar et guet arien, units
de chasse) sous un commandement unique qui centralise linformation et la plani-
fication des oprations.
Construction dune capacit nationale post-Seconde Guerre mondiale
La gestion des moyens ariens mais galement terrestres (dfense anti-
arienne, radar, base arienne) dans le cadre doprations ariennes na eu de
cesse, depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, dvoluer au fur et mesure de la
complexification des matriels, du grand nombre des units grer mais galement
des espaces gographiques surveiller. Durant les dcennies qui suivent la fin de la
guerre, lvolution du C2 est porte par de nombreuses avances technologiques :
lentre en service des avions raction, lvolution technologique des systmes de
Le C2 franais de dfense arien ne :
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dtection, tant en porte quen capacit de discrimination, lessor exponentiel des
technologies de linformation et de la communication induit par la modernisation
constante des composants lectroniques.
En France, le C2 connat un tournant majeur avec la cration de
lOrganisation du Trait de lAtlantique (Otan) et lmergence dun adversaire dis po-
sant dimportants moyens ariens et terrestres. Linstauration dun C2 franais
moderne est mettre en relation avec le dveloppement de la dfense arienne dont
est en charge lArme de lair. Dans un premier temps, la fin des annes 1940, qui-
pe en radar par les Anglais, lArme de lair implante son centre des oprations, sur
le modle de la salle des oprations de la RAF, Paris, dans les sous-sols de la caser ne
des gardes mobiles de la place de la Rpublique. En 1957, elle dispo se dun nouveau
site, le Centre des oprations de la dfense arienne (Coda), Taverny. Compte tenu
de la ncessaire ractivit lie la mission, lunicit du com mandement sim po se et,
en 1961, lArme de lair cre une structure centralise ddie la dfen se arienne :
le Commandement air des forces de dfense arienne (Cafda), Taverny
(Val- dOise). Il fdre lensemble des moyens, du rseau maill de dtection aux
avions dinterception et permet de fournir en temps rel les lments dap prciation
de la situation au profit du Premier ministre, autorit politique res ponsable de la
dfense arienne du pays. Cette chane extrmement ractive relie le sommet de
l tat au pilote dans son aronef et assure en tous lieux et toutes circonstances la
sou verainet de lespace arien national. En 1965, les attributions des commandants
de zones ariennes de dfense sont dfinies. Outre leur tat-major, ils disposent dun
C2 rgional compos dun centre doprations, de moyens de dtection et de
contr le et des moyens dinterception affrents.
cette priode, le C2 franais, au niveau de la dtection et du contrle
arien, connat une importante modernisation. Les stations radar sont modernises
en tant dotes du systme Csar (Complexe dexploitation semi-automatique du
radar) et du Strida II (Systme de transmission et de reprsentation des informations
de dfense arienne). Le lancement du systme Strida en 1960 constitue une tape
majeure de la construction de loutil C2 en France. Cette modernisation sera conti-
nue tout le long des dcennies suivantes. Paralllement, lArme de lair adopte les
concepts demploi communs aux autres forces ariennes de lAlliance atlantique et
intgre le rseau NADGE (NATO Defense Ground Environment). Ce faisant, elle
accepte des changes dinformations et une liaison permanente avec les structures
Otan. Ainsi, le C2 franais bnficie des informations permettant dtablir la situa-
tion arienne gnrale des approches de la mtropole. Lenjeu pour le C2 franais
est dobtenir une couverture arienne globale du territoire fusionne en une seule
reprsentation de lespace arien. En dpit de la sortie de la France de lorganisa-
tion militaire intgre de lAlliance en 1966, lArme de lair continue tre relie
au systme NADGE. Dailleurs, linstar des exercices Tiger Meet, les units de
lArme de lair maintiennent un entranement avec ses partenaires de lAlliance,
particulirement dans le domaine C2 avec lorganisation de missions ariennes
16
simules. Larchitecture du C2 permanent franais perdure jusquau dbut des
annes 1990 et la cration du CDAOA en 1994. Les moyens, quant eux, nont
cess dvoluer via des modernisations successives et lentre en service dquipe-
ments nouveaux, tels les E-3F AWACS la fin des annes 1980.
Un C2 Air franais robuste et interoprable
volution conceptuelle et capacitaire du C2 Air franais
Le dbut des annes 1990 voit deux volutions majeures. Dune part, la fin
de la guerre froide met plus en avant une posture expditionnaire, symbolise par
len gagement dans la guerre du Golfe, et donc limportance du C2 dans les oprations
extrieures. Dautre part, les progrs majeurs des technologies dinformation et de
communication conduisent lavnement du concept de Network centric warfare.
Les annes suivant la fin de la guerre froide sont particulirement riches
pour le C2 franais. Tout dabord, lArme de lair squipe dun systme de dtec-
tion et de commandement aroport, les E-3F AWACS, lui confrant de nouvelles
possibilits, notamment dans le cadre dinterventions extrieures. Ensuite, les leons
tires de la guerre du Golfe consacrent le besoin de disposer de systmes perfor-
mants de commandement, de contrle, de communication et de renseignement,
dsormais, indispensables toute guerre moderne. En 1994, afin de sadapter cette
nouvelle donne, lArme de lair accole sa structure existante en mtropole les
comptences et outils ddis aux oprations extrieures. Le Commandement de la
dfense arienne et des oprations ariennes (CDAOA) est cr. Outre, la mission
de dfense arienne, le CDAOA entretient et dveloppe lexpertise de lArme de
lair au commandement des oprations ariennes.
Au niveau capacitaire, ces volutions se traduisent par le lancement en
1993 du Systme de commandement et de contrle des oprations ariennes
dsormais arospatiales (SCCOA). Systme de systmes le Strida y est
intgr mettant en rseau lensemble des acteurs intervenant dans toutes les op-
rations arospatiales, le SCCOA est la colonne vertbrale de lemploi des moyens
ariens franais. Ce programme est lanc en parallle du systme Air Command and
Control System (ACCS) de lOtan, qui met en commun les systmes de conduite
des oprations ariennes des pays membres, y compris la France qui fait partie de
ce programme. Le SCCOA doit permettre :
l dassurer sans discontinuer les missions permanentes de dissuasion et de
protection du territoire national ;
l aux vecteurs ariens militaires de remplir leurs missions H24 dans
les pa ce arien national en toute scurit ;
17
l de projeter, dans la dure, une centaine davions de combat sur trois bases
ariennes de thtre ;
l la mise en uvre les moyens de transport arien, de surveillance et de ravi-
taillement en vol ncessaires aux oprations, afin dappuyer la projection des forces ;
l dassurer, si besoin, le rle de nation-cadre en ce qui concerne le com-
mandement de la composante arienne dune coalition, tout en assurant sa parti-
cipation au niveau du commandement interarmes de thtre.
Le dveloppement du SCCOA sinscrit dans une dmarche incrmentale.
lheure actuelle, le SCCOA dbute ltape 4 qui verra notamment la bascule des
Centres de commandement et de contrle vers une structure intgre ACCS de
lOtan. Son dveloppement accompagne la transformation des armes franaises.
Il sagit de se doter dun instrument capable de couvrir lensemble du spectre des
oprations arospatiales et de sadapter aux volutions de celles-ci.
Ds lors, le SCCOA doit tre pens comme un outil permettant daboutir
lautonomie de dcision et daction en matire doprations ariennes. Au
moment de lengagement en Irak en 1991, les moyens franais sont peu adapts
la conduite dune opration arienne en coalition et se traduisent par une certaine
dpendance lgard des moyens de commandement de la coalition. 20 ans plus
tard, au cours de lopration Unified Protector en Libye, les capacits du C2 Air
permettent la France de conduire les premires frappes du 19 mars 2011, dont
limpact politique et stratgique est dterminant pour le succs de lopration.
Le C2 Air actuel
lheure actuelle, la France dispose dun outil C2 Air performant, robus te
et interoprable. Le C2 Air permet de commander, planifier, programmer et
conduire depuis des structures fixes ou dployables des oprations ariennes
au- dessus du territoire national, depuis le territoire national et mme lextrieur
du territoire. Le C2 Air franais peut tre dcompos en deux grands ensembles
fonctionnels : le C2 Air permanent et le C2 Air expditionnaire. Le C2 Air per-
manent assure la conduite dun large ventail de missions ariennes au-dessus du
territoire national tandis que le C2 Air expditionnaire prend en charge la condui te
des oprations ariennes extrieures, que la conduite de ces oprations soit assure
depuis les structures C2 en France ou ltranger. Le C2 Air franais peut se
rsu mer schmatiquement de la faon suivante :
l Sauvegarde arienne
l Surveillance de lEspace et dfense antimissile
l Oprations sur le territoire national
l Oprations ariennes extrieures :
- conduites depuis le territoire
- conduites depuis des structures hors du territoire
C2 Air expditionnaire
C2 Air permanent
}
}
18
Mission premire du C2 Air permanent, la surveillance et la protection du
ciel national reposent sur la structure de commandement et de conduite fournie
par le Centre national des oprations ariennes (CNOA). Les capacits franaises
en la matire sont robustes et reconnues. Le dispositif franais de sret arienne
permet la surveillance des quelque 11 000 mouvements ariens quotidiens au-des-
sus du territoire national.
Depuis le 11 septembre 2001, le C2 charg de la dfense arienne au-dessus
du territoire national sest beaucoup concentr sur la menace terroriste. Cela a eu pour
consquence le besoin particulier de travailler de manire plus interministriel le. La
prsence, au sein du CNOA, de personnes reprsentant ou relevant de diffrents
ministres accrot la fluidit des oprations. Leur rle dinterface amliore la synergie
interministrielle. Tous les acteurs tatiques chargs de la lutte contre le terrorisme
sont ainsi intgrs dans la mme boucle dinformation. Paralllement, des efforts ont
t fournis en matire de coopration intertatique. Des accords bilatraux ont t
signs entre la France et des pays contigus dans le but de parvenir une anticipation
plus prcoce et une action plus efficace contre les menaces.
Les oprations menes grce au C2 Air permanent incluent aussi bien des
raids longue distance que lentranement des forces ariennes sur le territoire ou
des missions de service public. Le C2 Air permanent permet en effet la France de
mener des frappes conventionnelles longue distance. Grce cet outil C2,
la France est capable de projeter une patrouille de Rafale quips du missile de
croi sire Scalp, accompagns de ravitailleurs et dun AWACS et dots de moyens
de communication longue distance pour commander une frappe de missiles de
croi sire, depuis le CO.AIR (Centre des oprations de lArme de lair, bas
Balard) ou depuis Lyon (CNOA). Cette capacit, unique, permet aux dcideurs
politiques de dlivrer des effets militaires prcis en quelques heures, en tout lieu et
avec une empreinte au sol faible, voire nulle.
Dispositif particulier de sret arienne, oprations de recherche et de
sauvetage des aronefs en dtresse, lutte contre les activits illicites comme le
narcotrafic, lutte contre les feux de fort ou encore laide aux populations dans le
cas de catastrophe naturelle, le C2 Air permanent permet la mise en uvre de
nombreuses missions de service public dont la particularit est la coordination de
lemploi de moyens civils et militaires.
La mission de surveillance de lEspace est confie au CDAOA, charg de
mettre en uvre le radar Graves (Grand rseau adapt la veille spatiale). Les don-
nes obtenues, analyses et rgulirement mises jour, permettent de constituer une
situation spatiale . court terme, des amliorations de Graves sont prvues, ainsi
que le dveloppement dun dmonstrateur (Oscgane pour Observation Spectrale
et Caractrisation des satellites GostatioNnairEs) effectuant la spectroscopie de
satellites gostationnaires. La mise en uvre coordonne de ces senseurs et logiciels
de traitement associs met en lumire lexistence dune boucle oprationnelle
19
* Boucle oprationnelle spatiale
Dtection : Grce aux moyens Graves (pour lorbite basse) et Oscgane (pour lorbite gostationnaire).
Analyse : Sollicitation des logiciels Ciborg et STK.
Orientation : Orientation des capteurs de trajectographie (Satam) ou dimagerie (Tira).
Action : Manuvre anticollision, planification doprations, dcision politique
spatiale * finalise : DtectionAnalyseOrientationAction, qui nest pas sans
rap peler la boucle OODA.
Depuis le mois de fvrier 2010, un lien Confidentiel dfense est tabli entre
le Cnes (Centre national dtudes spatiales), diffusant lexpertise, et le CDAOA,
outil oprationnel de mise en uvre. La dmarche a abouti la mise en place dun
centre spatial permettant de fournir quotidiennement une situation trs prcise en
fusionnant les informations issues de lensemble des capteurs et qui sera mis en
uvre lavenir sur la base arienne de Lyon-Mont-Verdun. Ce Centre opration-
nel de surveillance militaire des objets spatiaux (Cosmos) reprsente ainsi un vri-
table C2 spatial.
Fruit dun effort men dans la dure, la France dispose dun C2 Air
permanent performant qui lui permet dassurer la mission rgalienne de protection
de lespace arien national tout en assurant des missions extrmement diversifies.
Composante nuclaire aroporte :
une dynamique dexcellence
tat-major de lArme de lair.
EMAA
Une composante aroporte dfinie au juste besoin nuclaire
Les forces ariennes nuclaires sont composes de ressources dfinies selon le
principe de stricte suffisance et dimensionnes au juste besoin nuclaire : red-
fini en 2008, il a conduit notamment au sein de lArme de lair la rduction de
trois deux escadrons de chasse nuclaires. Ces forces permettent dinfliger des dom-
mages inacceptables tout acteur qui sen prendrait aux intrts vitaux de la nation.
Le caractre permanent de la dissuasion nuclaire franaise et les dlais de raction
imposs ncessitent de conserver un volume de ressources ddies (quipages, avions,
soutien technique) et denvironnement (protection, accompagnement du raid) nces-
saire la ralisation de la mission. Ce contrat permanent de la dissuasion nuclaire
engage ainsi lensemble de lArme de lair et revt la plus haute priorit.
La dynamique engendre par la composante nuclaire aroporte
La composante nuclaire aroporte se caractrise par son aptitude inter-
venir, en permanence, dans des dlais trs brefs. Pour ce faire, elle dispose datouts
intrinsques de premier plan. Elle offre une grande souplesse dans ses modes
dactions et une grande prcision de frappe. Face une possible atteinte nos int-
rts vitaux, cette diversification des modes daction crdibilise au plus haut point
la dissuasion nuclaire.
La russite de la mission nuclaire requiert des savoir-faire oprationnels
les plus exigeants. Compte tenu des implications internationales, des distances
parcourir, des menaces rencontres et de la prcision exige des frappes, les
comptences des quipages sont parmi les plus leves.
La ncessaire rigueur et lobligation de sret sont les fondements dun esprit
de corps qui sert de base toute action des Forces ariennes stratgiques (FAS).
Depuis 1964, anne de la premire prise dalerte nuclaire par un
Mirage IV arm, la mission de dissuasion nuclaire a favoris lmergence non
seulement de savoir-faire spcifiques oprationnels mais galement techniques.
20
21
Lautonomie demploi, indispensable la dissuasion, a ncessit le dveloppe-
ment de moyens spcifiques, durcis et souvent innovants, pour garantir une efficaci t
oprationnelle totale. Ainsi, les contre-mesures lectroniques mais aussi le systme de
navigation et la fonction de suivi de terrain automatique ont rsult dtudes pous ses
qui ont crdibilis la composante et garanti sa fiabilit oprationnelle. Ces capacits
ont naturellement t dclines au profit des moyens assurant les missions conven-
tionnelles de lArme de lair (suivi de terrain du Mirage 2000D, moyens de guerre
lectronique). Il en va de mme des moyens de communications qui, eux aussi, ont
une obligation de robustesse et de performan ce ; cela a profit galement lam lio-
ration du niveau de lensemble des com munications aronautiques.
La mission de dissuasion est galement un catalyseur dexcellence des
com ptences industrielles et technologiques participant la BITD (Base indus-
trielle et technologique de dfense). Certains programmes majeurs dvelopps au
profit des FAS (vecteur et effecteur) ont pu se dcliner dans des systmes duaux
au profit de lArme de lair. Par ailleurs, compte tenu de la nature mme des
pro grammes engags, certaines comptences ont d rester strictement nationales.
Ainsi, leffort financier consacr ces filires dexcellence a bnfici par la suite
dautres dveloppements industriels dampleur. Sont plus particulirement concer-
ns les secteurs de la propulsion (matrise de la technologie statoracteur), de
la rodynamique (le domaine de vol allant des plus basses aux plus hautes alti-
tudes), des environnements mcaniques et thermiques extrmes des missiles super-
soniques longue porte, de la pntration dobjectifs durcis et trs dfendus ou
encore le durcissement des lectroniques vis--vis dagressions nuclaires.
Un ple dexcellence nuclaire reconnu
dont le caractre prioritaire doit toujours tre prserv
Le processus de certification nuclaire de nos nouveaux systmes nuclaires
militaires (Rafale/missile ASMPA) sest appuy sur un savoir-faire unique et a t
couronn de succs. La modernisation des forces ariennes stratgiques a mis en
exergue, une fois encore, la matrise nuclaire du personnel de lArme de lair et
le maintien de ses comptences en la matire. Ce savoir-faire, en matire de
mis sion nuclaire aroporte, est assez rare et reconnu.
Il convient de souligner que toute perte de comptence dans le domaine
trs spcifique du nuclaire porte immdiatement atteinte la crdibilit de loutil
et ncessite des mesures de grande ampleur pour reconstruire ces savoir-faire. Un
de nos allis en a fait lamre exprience lorsque, sous la pression des engagements
extrieurs des vingt dernires annes, ses units dlaissrent la prparation opra-
tionnelle la mission nuclaire au profit de leur mission conventionnelle. LArme
de lair franaise affirme de son ct la prservation absolue de la priorit la
mis sion de la dissuasion nuclaire.
22
Des aptitudes indniables aux missions conventionnelles
dans la limite offerte par le contrat de dissuasion
Pour autant, les quipages des forces ariennes stratgiques ne sont pas stric-
tement cantonns dans la mission nuclaire. Si celle-ci demeure le fondement de la
prparation oprationnelle, lemploi des quipages dans une autre mission est faci-
lit par la polyvalence de lavion et offre au chef militaire une diversification des
capacits dans le domaine conventionnel. Cest aussi le cas pour la flotte davions
ravitailleurs qui fournit tous les jours, et sous toutes les latitudes, un soutien aux
avions de combat franais voire allis. Demain, avec la mise en service du MRTT
(Multi Role Tanker Transport), cette capacit sera encore amliore.
Les Forces ariennes stratgiques savent contribuer la ralisation de
contrats conventionnels de lArme de lair en fournissant un vivier dquipages
dune qualit rare participant la mise en uvre de la puissance arienne en op-
rations. Cette utilisation de moyens humains et matriels ddis la mission de
dissuasion ncessite un choix spcifique au regard de lapprciation de la situation
gopolitique du moment qui est faite par lautorit politique. Elle ne peut tre
envisage de manire systmatique.
Lanalyse des derniers conflits montre que, lorsque cela est possible et dans
la limite offerte par le contrat de dissuasion, les forces ariennes stratgiques sont
parfaitement adaptes pour participer, ds les premires heures et dans la dure,
aux missions conventionnelles. Elles permettent ainsi lensemble des acteurs de
lopration de bnficier de leurs remarquables expertises tactiques et techniques
acquises grce leur prparation initialement dvolue la mission nuclaire.
LArme de lair
et la scurit nationale
EMAA
L
a lgitimit de ltat dpend, entre autres, de sa capacit assurer la scuri t
de nos concitoyens, tant sur le territoire national qu lextrieur de nos fron-
tires. On constate cependant que les moyens dont dispose ltat pour
rpondre cette exigence sont de plus en plus limits, que la frontire entre la
dfense et la scurit est de moins en moins marque et que de nouveaux acteurs
(collectivits locales, ONG) qui ne sont pas directement sous lautorit de l tat,
jouent un rle croissant. Il sagit l de facteurs poussant un rapprochement de ces
deux champs autrefois bien compartiments.
Dun point de vue technique, les grandes fonctions qui sous-tendent la
scurit et la dfense nationale prsentent de remarquables similitudes : dans ces
deux contextes, il sagit dapprcier la menace ou le risque, davoir lintelligence de
situation, dvaluer toutes les options dintervention, de planifier et de coordonner
des moyens ou encore de mesurer les effets obtenus, ceci au moyen de systmes
dinformation et de communication et gnralement sous la pression de lurgence.
Certes, les contraintes lies lenvironnement peuvent tre diffrentes mais il fau-
dra toujours chercher sauvegarder des vies ou poursuivre une mission complexe
dans un souci dconomie de moyens.
Transpose dans un contexte de scurit nationale, larme arienne sait
apporter une contribution efficace et adapte. Elle peut, en outre, proposer des ini-
tiatives concrtes doptimisation des capacits interministrielles, dont la mise en
uvre peut tre trs rapide et les effets sinscrire dans des perspectives de court,
moyen et long terme.
Court terme: optimisation des moyens de ltat
LArme de lair assure dj au quotidien les missions de Police du ciel,
das sistance en vol des aronefs en panne ou gars, ainsi que de recherche et de sau-
vetage suite un accident arien. Elle couvre rgulirement dune bulle de pro tec-
tion les sommets de chefs dtats, les rassemblements importants de per sonnes
(crmonies du dbarquement). Au service de la lutte contre la criminalit
orga nise, elle est en mesure de participer la recherche et la poursuite des aronefs
23
24
utiliss pour les trafics illicites. Experte de la 3
e
dimension, elle dispose doutils et de
comptences lui permettant de grer, depuis des centres fixes ou mobiles, la coordi-
nation dune activit arienne civilo-militaire en situation durgence.
Sappuyant sur ces comptences disponibles et plus particulirement sur le
processus de dcision de la dfense arienne, rattachant directement le Premier
ministre aux moyens de protection de lespace arien national et de ses appro-
ches (satellites, radars, avions dinterception, hlicoptres), les centres de
Commandement et de contrle (C2) de lArme de lair pourraient servir dpine
dorsale un dispositif plus large de gestion de crise, en agrgeant des cellules inter-
ministrielles de crise.
De plus, pour accrotre lefficacit des secours, le recours aux moyens du
ministre de la Dfense peut tre systmatis. Les drones, conus pour surveiller de
larges zones sur de longues priodes, sont en mesure dapporter une aide prcieu se
des autorits civiles pour lvaluation permanente de la situation, la coordination
des moyens ou le relais des communications. Les avions de reconnaissance, qui
appuient dj la Gendarmerie dans la lutte contre le grand banditisme, prsentent
aussi de belles perspectives. Les capacits de transport arien militaire (avions, hli-
coptres) disposent enfin de la ractivit et de la souplesse demploi autorisant leur
rquisition rapide en gestion de crise.
Cet emploi partag des moyens de ltat peut aboutir la condition que les
administrations connaissent mieux les capacits militaires dintervention. Il faut
donc encourager la pratique rgulire dexercices interministriels, linstar des
exercices de scurit nuclaire (niveau local, dpartemental, national). En effet, la
rsilience de ltat sinscrit dans une logique de prparation continue et systma-
tique pour lesquels la dfense peut aider les pouvoirs publics en sappuyant sur sa
matrise des processus de planification.
Par ailleurs, le maillage des bases ariennes reprsente un atout essentiel. Il
offre dabord aux pouvoirs publics des points dappui sanctuariss, naturellement
ouverts laction interministrielle (capacit daccueil, plateformes aroportuaires,
dtection radar, rservoir de forces, relais de communication, soins et secours).
Ensuite, ce rseau peut tre immdiatement mis au service de ltat en cas de perte
des moyens aroportuaires et de contrle arien civils (dfaillance technique globa le,
cyber-attaques massives) et permettre dassurer, en scurit, des acheminements
critiques (vacuations mdicales, transports dautorits, rapatriements).
Moyen terme: de nouveaux horizons
Le phnomne de mondialisation et les volutions technologiques ont
plac les flux des valeurs et des ressources au cur des enjeux mondiaux. Dans le
domaine arospatial, le transport arien reprsente environ 3 % en volume du
commerce international de marchandises, mais 40 50 % de sa valeur. La libert
25
de mouvement dans ce milieu, assure par lensemble des moyens de dfense
arienne et de Police du ciel, constitue dj un vritable dfi. En outre, la 3
e
dimen-
sion permet de surveiller de vastes tendues terrestres ou maritimes o transitent
les flux de ressources. Il convient donc denvisager une nouvelle approche de la
contribution de larme arienne ces enjeux de stabilit nationale.
Dans cette perspective, une rflexion prospective sur le dispositif de pr-
positionnement de nos forces simpose. Une piste consiste mettre sur pied un
rseau de hubs aroportuaires en sappuyant sur les possibles complmentarits
quoffrent nos allis (britanniques, amricains), en dveloppant des accords
diplomatiques spcifiques ou en dployant des moyens descale dans le monde.
Les capacits de projection stratgique actuelles et surtout futures (A400M,
MRTT pour Multi Role Tanker Transport), associes au prpositionnement de
moyens ariens, permettront alors une grande ractivit face aux menaces pesant
sur la scurit de nos approvisionnements ariens, maritimes ou terrestres.
Paralllement, les dpartements et collectivits doutre-mer sont parfois
soumis des risques naturels majeurs qui peuvent prendre des dimensions
extrmes, dpassant la simple coordination des secours et exigeant des capacits de
rponse rapides pour restaurer les fonctions vitales de ltat. Sinscrivant dans cette
dmarche de projection lointaine et rapide, lArme de lair pourrait ainsi apporter
un soutien consquent et organis aux dispositifs interministriels dassistance.
Dune faon gnrale, ce dispositif dlongation venir doit tre pens au
profit de ltat au sens large, pour offrir la capacit de transport stratgique de
lArme de lair lensemble des ministres. Le convoyage des billets de la Banque
de France ou dautres moyens tatiques sensibles vers les Dom-Com (dpartements
et collectivits doutre-mer) en serait une premire illustration.
Long terme: construire un esprit de dfense civile
Enfin, la scurit dun pays repose invariablement sur lengagement de ses
concitoyens. Lducation de la jeunesse est ainsi un lment majeur et doit faire
lobjet de toutes les attentions. La promotion dun esprit de dfense civile peut ds
lors senvisager par lintermdiaire des coles de la Dfense.
Le modle des Cadets de lair qui sengagent servir dans la rserve en
contrepartie dune formation aronautique, inspir dun quivalent britannique et
mis en place dans les coles de lArme de lair, peut constituer un objectif poli-
tique porteur car facteur de cohsion sociale, de rayonnement populaire et de
valeurs lies la scurit.
De la mme faon, il peut tre intressant de dvelopper la promotion
de la dimension dfense et scurit dans les parcours universitaires en gnral,
26
linstar des stages proposs aux tudiants des Instituts universitaires de formation
des matres (IUFM) dans les coles dofficiers. Enfin, il pourrait tre propos
den richir lactivit des Trinmes acadmiques *, par une participation largie aux
acteurs de la scurit civile.
Pour rpondre lenjeu de scurit nationale, ltat peut donc sappuyer

sur les capacits socles de lArme de lair, offrant la caractristique dun usage dual
et interministriel : centres C2 ; rseau de bases ariennes ; capacit de surveillan ce
de reconnaissance ; capacit de transport stratgique ; outil de formation. Aprs
une premire tape doptimisation interministrielle de ces moyens, cette approche
laisse prsager terme de belles perspectives sur un spectre plus large de missions.
* Trinmes acadmiques
Organisation dcentralise rassemblant lducation nationale, le Dfense et lInstitut des hautes tudes de dfense
nationale (IHEDN) sur le thme de la scurit.
R
D
N
La capacit agir vite et loin
travers 3 engagements rcents
le modle afghan 10 ans aprs,
une pertinence intacte
Colonel de lArme de lair, ancien commandant de lesca-
dron de transport 1/61 Touraine, diplm de lAir Command
and Staff College et de la School of Advanced Air and Space
Studies.
Graud Laborie
L
e 10 novembre 2001, les forces de lAlliance du Nord capturaient
Mazar-e-Charif, prcipitant ainsi la chute du rgime des taliban un mois
plus tard. loccasion de cette premire victoire importante depuis le
dclenchement de lopration Enduring Freedom, le monde entier dcouvrait les
images de combattants occidentaux cheval au sein de la cavalerie du gnral
Dostum. Ce tmoignage de limplication de forces spciales aux cts de lAlliance
du Nord soutenue par la puissance arienne de la coalition allait donner naissance
un an plus tard au concept de modle afghan , thoris et popularis par Stephen
Biddle, chercheur de lUS Army War College. Dix ans aprs sa naissance, quel est
lhritage du modle afghan ? A-t-il t appliqu sur dautres thtres dopration ?
Est-il toujours pertinent dans le cadre des oprations au Mali ou de futurs conflits ?
Pour rpondre ces questions, il est ncessaire de revenir sur la gense du
modle et sur sa premire utilisation en Afghanistan, pour en comprendre les
grands principes. Ltude des conflits rcents montre que le modle a galement t
employ dans le nord de lIrak lors de lopration Iraki Freedom en 2003, avant de
refaire son apparition en Libye durant lopration Unified Protector. Ces trois
exemples permettent den dfinir prcisment les caractristiques, avantages et
limitations. Ils confirment que le modle afghan est un outil stratgique domi-
nante arienne qui reste tout fait pertinent, la valeur coercitive leve quand il
est employ dans les bonnes conditions. Il ncessite dtre pleinement reconnu et
intgr dans la palette doptions stratgiques que permettent nos armes.
Naissance dun concept: Afghanistan, octobre 2001-mars 2002
La gense du concept de modle afghan date des premires semaines de lop-
ration Enduring Freedom (OEF ). Suite aux attaques du 11 septembre, le National
Security Council propose au prsident Bush deux options concernant lAfghanistan.
29
30
La premire, fruit des travaux du Joint Chiefs of Staff, privilgie une approche conven-
tionnelle ncessitant le dploiement de cinq divisions sur plu sieurs mois avant de
dbuter lattaque contre le rgime taliban. La seconde, prsente par la CIA, prdit la
chute du rgime grce aux effets conjugus de la puissance arien ne amricaine, de
forces spciales et dallis afghans. Ce plan sus cite le rejet des militaires du Pentagone.
Il renvoie aux expriences peu convaincantes en la matire durant la guerre du
Vietnam, lorsque les forces spciales allies aux tribus montagnardes tentrent sans
succs dendiguer le flot dhommes et de matriels transitant par la piste Ho Chi
Minh. Dans le cas de lAfghanistan, il recueille pourtant toute lattention du secr-
taire dtat la Dfense Donald Rumsfeld, pour plusieurs raisons.
Tout dabord il permet une riposte rapide, conforme aux attentes de la
Maison-Blanche et de la population amricaine traumatise par lam pleur des
attaques terroristes. LAfghanistan, isol, sans accs maritime, se prte mal au
dploiement massif de troupes ncessitant la ngociation daccords de transit et de
stationnement avec les pays limitrophes. Linvasion sovitique de dcembre 1979,
partie de ses rpubliques dAsie centrale, ne souffrait pas dune telle limitation. Le
plan de la CIA sappuie ensuite sur une puissance arienne dont la ltalit et la pr-
cision sont sans commu ne mesure par rapport au Vietnam. Lemploi de larme
arienne, en combinaison avec des forces spciales quipes de dsignateurs laser
portables et capables de fournir des coordonnes GPS prcises, offre des possibili-
ts nouvelles encore largement sous-estimes en 2001. Donald Rumsfeld les a
cependant entrevues. Il a dbut une profonde rforme de loutil militaire amri-
cain, jug trop lourd et ne tirant pas assez les bnfices de sa supriorit technolo-
gique
(1)
. Le concept Shock and Awe , dvelopp en 1996 par des chercheurs de
la National Defense University, a attir lattention du secrtaire la Dfense : une
combinaison de vitesse, prcision et puissance de feu qui paralyse lad versaire avec
un minimum de forces
(2)
. Il peut trouver en Afghanistan sa pre mi re application
grandeur nature mais avec un segment sol limi t aux forces spciales.
Le plan de la CIA est donc finalement retenu, principalement du fait des
contraintes gographiques et diplomatiques daccs lAfghanistan, et de la nces-
sit politique dagir vite. La CIA peut galement sappuyer sur des relations solides
avec lAlliance du Nord, tablies dans les mois qui prcdent le 11 septembre. La
suite est connue : la campagne arienne dbute le 7 octobre par lattaque du rseau
de dfense arienne rudimentaire des taliban et de leur infrastructure de com man-
dement et de contrle (C2). Le 15 octobre, les forces spciales amricaines ont
rejoint les troupes de lAlliance du Nord et prparent loffensive contre les princi-
paux bastions taliban, en particulier Mazar-e-Charif. Sans vhicules, elles ont
recours au mode de locomotion le mieux adapt aux pistes troites des montagnes
(1) Robert Kagan : Finding the Target: the transformation of American military policy ; New York, Encounter Books, 2006 ;
p. 293.
(2) Harlan K. Ullman et James P. Wade : Shock and Awe: Achieving rapid dominance ; Washington, National Defense
University Institute of National Security Strategy, 1996 ; p. xxiv-xxvi.
31
afghanes : le poney. Les positions retranches dfendant la ville tombent les unes
aprs les autres face laction combine de laviation de la coalition et des com bat-
tants du gnral Dostum. La chute de Mazar-e-Charif le 10 novembre marque le
dbut de la fin pour le rgime taliban, qui abandonne son dernier bastion de
Kandahar le 6 dcembre, aprs seulement 60 jours de campagne.
En novembre 2002, le premier article de fond sur le nouveau modle
afghan parat sous la plume de Stephen Biddle. Cet auteur en fixe les principales
caractristiques, les avantages mais aussi les limitations, dmontres dans les
premiers mois de 2002. En effet, lemploi dallis afghans pour finir le travail
et liquider les combattants dAl-Qada retranchs Tora Bora ou dans la valle de
Shah-e-Khot (opration Anaconda) ne rencontre pas le succs escompt. Dans le
second cas, la faible motivation des combattants afghans censs dbusquer et refou-
ler lennemi hors de la valle conduit leur repli ds les premires difficults,
laissant les troupes amricaines affronter seules un ennemi dtermin.
Application au Kurdistan irakien: mars-avril 2003
Si les premiers mois dEnduring Freedom sont relativement bien documents
en France, lutilisation du modle afghan dans le nord de lIrak au printemps 2003
lest beaucoup moins. L aussi, ce sont les conditions gographiques et lenvironne-
ment diplomatiques qui vont obliger le Pentagone reproduire le mode opratoire
afghan. La planification ralise par lUS Central Command (CENTCOM) pour la
chute de Saddam Hussein prvoyait le dploiement depuis la Turquie de la
4
th
Infantry Division (4 ID) dans le nord de lIrak. la mi-mars, malgr une intense
activit diplomatique, le CENTCOM finit par se rendre lvidence que la Turquie
ne se joindra pas la coalition et nautorisera pas louverture dun front nord depuis
sa frontire. En dsespoir de cause, le gnral Tommy Franks dcide de recourir des
forces spciales pour fixer les 13 divisions irakiennes positionnes par Saddam
Hussein pour couvrir sa frontire Nord. Pour le CENTCOMle danger est de voir ces
divisions redployes au Sud face au Kowet quand le dictateur irakien aura compris
que la menace venant de la Turquie sest dissipe. Le CENTCOM dcide donc
dengager 48 quipes de 12 hommes des 3
rd
et 10
th
Special Forces Group, soutenues
par la puissance arienne de la coalition et infiltres auprs des Peshmergas kurdes,
pour tenter de remplacer le rle initialement rserv la 4 ID.
La tche est ardue : les 50 000 70 000 miliciens kurdes sont courageux et
motivs mais ne possdent aucun matriel lourd. Leur aptitude loffensive est
inexistante. Leur tactique de prdilection consiste monter des attaques frontales
coteuses contre les positions des 70 000 110 000 hommes des forces rgulires
irakiennes et des 20 000 soldats de la Garde rpublicaine. Les forces spciales am-
ricaines qui constituent la Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (JSOTF-N)
sont infiltres par la voie des airs le 23 mars sans leurs vhicules et leurs quipe-
ments de communication, bloqus en Turquie. Le guidage des frappes se fera donc
32
essentiellement par radio, sans liaison de donnes. Le soutien arien nest gale-
ment pas la hauteur de lAfghanistan : les moyens ariens de la coalition sont
bass dans le golfe Arabo-Persique, loin du nord de lIrak. Sans les bases prvues en
Turquie, seule laronavale des porte-avions en Mditerrane peut tre utilise mais
elle est galement loin et limite en capacits.
Les forces spciales amricaines vont pourtant atteindre les trois objectifs
qui leur taient donns : fixer la plus grosse partie des divisions irakiennes sur la
ligne verte (la frontire entre le Kurdistan irakien et le reste de lIrak), dtruire les
camps dentranement du groupe terroriste Ansar al-Islam et stabiliser les villes de
Mosul et Kirkuk. Rparties le long de la ligne verte, en groupes composs dune
quipe de 12 hommes et dun Combat controller de lUS Air Force rattachs une
unit de 100 300 Peshmergas, les forces spciales utilisent les connaissances du
terrain et le renseignement des allis kurdes pour diriger les feux de laviation sur
les units irakiennes. Durant les 16 jours doprations, jamais les troupes de
Saddam Hussein ne russissent trouver la parade. La puissance arienne dirige
efficacement par les Combat controllers va parvenir compenser linfriorit num-
rique, matrielle et tactique des allis kurdes.
Nanmoins, les succs de la JSOTF-N sont parfois obtenus de justesse ou
au prix de dommages collatraux. Ainsi lors des combats de la passe de Debecka,
deux quipes amricaines et leurs allis chappent de peu lannihilation face une
com pagnie motorise irakienne renforce par de nombreux blinds. Gne par le
mauvais temps, laction des bombardiers amricains conduit la perte de
17 com battants kurdes frapps par erreur par un chasseur F-14D. Les forces sp-
ciales ne doivent leur survie qu lemploi de missiles antichar Javelin pour repous-
ser les blinds ennemis. Heureusement, lamlioration mto du lendemain permet
de venir bout de la colonne irakienne. La JSOTF-N affronte galement une autre
dif ficult majeure : le manque de capacit ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance) ddie son activit, la priorit tant rserve la couverture de
lavance amricaine par le sud. La coalition va ainsi perdre la trace de la division
dli te Nabuchodonosor, qui russira se redployer au centre de lIrak pour faire
face lattaque par la troue de Karbala.
Le modle afghan nest donc pas sans risques. Mme si son utilisation dans
le Nord de lIrak peut tre justement qualifie de succs pour la coalition, elle
rv le galement ses limites, lies en particulier des moyens ariens limits.
Le modle afghan, antidote lenlisement en Libye
Comme le montre lexemple irakien, le rle de catalyseur de la puissance
arienne jou par les forces spciales ncessite une importante prsence au sol pour
tre efficace. La JSOTF-N incluait pas moins de 600 hommes aux cts des
Peshmergas kurdes. Une opration dune telle ampleur nest pas la porte des seuls
33
(3) Jean-Christophe Notin : La vrit sur notre guerre en Libye ; Paris, Fayard, 2012 ; p. 471.
(4) Philippe Gros : De Odyssey Dawn Unified Protector : bilan transitoire, perspectives et premiers enseignements de
lengagement en Libye in Fondation pour la recherche stratgique, note n 04/11, avril 2011 ; p. 18.
services daction clandestine, aux effectifs bien moins consquents. Or le recours
des forces spciales statut militaire, trop nombreuses pour rester invisibles, avec
les risques de perte associes, nest pas anodin sur le plan politique. Leur acti-
vi t ncessite un certain niveau de reconnaissance par leur gouvernement.
Si ce point ne posait pas de difficults particulires pour la Maison-Blanche
dans le cas de lAfghanistan ou de lIrak, il se rvle beaucoup plus problmatique
pour la France ou la Grande-Bretagne lors de lopration Unified Protector (OUP).
En effet, la rsolution 1971 du Conseil de scurit des Nations unies autorise la
mise en uvre de toutes les mesures ncessaires pour protger les populations et
zones civiles menaces dattaques en Jamahiriya arabe libyenne, y compris
Benghazi, tout en excluant le dploiement dune force doccupation trangre sous
quelque forme que ce soit . La nature des mesures ncessaires tant laisse
lap prciation des membres de la coalition, le terme reste suffisamment ambigu
pour permettre un soutien actif lopposition libyenne. Nanmoins, lexclusion de
troupes au sol fait reposer ce soutien sur les seuls moyens ariens et maritimes,
laissant peu de possibilit de coordination troite avec laction des insurgs.
Lemploi de forces spciales se limite donc officiellement dans les premires
semaines au rle de conseillers auprs du CNT. Pourtant, on retrouve des forces sp-
ciales qataries, miraties mais aussi franaises et britanniques aux cts des insurgs
lors de la chute de Tripoli la fin du mois daot. Leur rle est alors symptomatique
dun recours au modle afghan dans lequel, comme le dcrit Jean-Christophe Notin,
la chane mise en place par le Cos [Commandement des oprations spciales] flui-
difie considrablement le processus observation-destruction
(3)
. Pourquoi ce chan-
gement ? Est-il le fruit dune stratgie dlibre de la coalition mise en place ds le
dbut dUnified Protector ou le rsultat dune adaptation la situation ? Les premires
tudes de la campagne contre Kadhafi laissent plutt pencher pour la deuxime rai-
son. Une fois le coup darrt port aux forces loyalistes dans leur offensive sur
Benghazi, la coalition fait face un risque denlisement, perceptible ds la fin du mois
davril. Ltude de la Fondation pour la recherche stratgique (FRS), conduite cette
priode, pointe dj les limitations de linsurrection, incapable elle seule de forcer
lennemi se concentrer et manuvrer pour offrir une cible plus vulnrable la puis-
sance arienne. Elle pro pose galement le dploiement de Tactical Air Control Parties
(TACP) des forces spciales pour augmenter lefficacit des frappes ariennes
(4)
. Face
au peu dvolution des fronts de Brega et Misrata, le recours au modle afghan est
donc une vidence qui va simposer galement au pouvoir politique des tats les plus
rsolus de la coa lition. Il est symptomatique de constater que malgr les assauts des
hlicoptres et des chasseurs bombardiers pour dbloquer les verrous des villes
ctires, cest du Djebel Nefoussa que vient le salut pour linsurrection, une zone o
34
les forces sp ciales occidentales et arabes sont particulirement actives depuis le
printemps 2011. Leur rle aux cts des insurgs berbres balaye un large spectre
dem ploi, comme lexplique une tude du Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
(5)
:
fourniture darmes et de matriel par voie terrestre et arienne, formation et entra-
nement des insurgs pour les prparer lassaut sur Tripoli, intgration de loffensive
terrestre avec la campagne arienne de lOtan, renseignement et guidage des frappes
lors des combats.
Face au risque denlisement, la coalition a donc recours lescalade vers un
modle afghan dans lemploi de ses forces spciales, afin de pallier ladaptation des
forces pro-Kadhafi aux modes daction dune campagne arienne pas assez intgre
laction des insurgs. Lexemple libyen confirme donc la pertinence intacte du
modle afghan dix ans aprs son apparition. Il rvle galement un des paradoxes
de la puissance arienne dans le cas de lOUP : elle satisfait le niveau politique en
permettant de marquer et concrtiser sa dtermination ds les premires heures des
oprations, sans engagement au sol. Nanmoins elle nest rellement efficace au
plan militaire quen intgrant un segment sol capable de catalyser ses effets pour
aider linsurrection remporter la dcision.
Le modle afghan la loupe forces et faiblesses
Les exemples de lAfghanistan, de lIrak et de la Libye, permettent de dfi-
nir les principales caractristiques du modle et den explorer les avantages et les
limitations. Le modle peut se rsumer simplement au triptyque suivant : puis-
san ce arienne et forces spciales utilises en partenariat avec des forces indignes
pour la conduite doprations aroterrestres. Les forces spciales agissent principa-
lement en catalyseur de la puissance arienne, ce qui permet aux partenaires locaux
de lemporter malgr une infriorit numrique ou matrielle. Ainsi, lors de la
bataille pour Mazar-e-Charif, lAlliance du Nord a pu lemporter avec
2 000 hommes face 5 000 combattants taliban bien retranchs et mieux quips.
Les forces spciales peuvent galement assurer plusieurs fonctions au-del du gui-
dage des frappes : formation, encadrement, conseil technique et renseignement au
profit du commandement indigne. En terme de ciblage, cest le concept de full
spectrum targeting qui est le mieux adapt pour capturer lensemble des effets ren-
dus possibles par le modle : les moyens ariens ltaux guids par les forces sp-
ciales frappent les forces adverses, les moyens non ltaux renseignent, ravitaillent
en armes ou en vivres. Le moral, les capacits militaires, la population qui soutient
les allis locaux sont la cible prserver tout comme le moral, les capacits de
com mandement et de contrle, les capacits militaires de lennemi sont la cible
dtruire. Limpact psychologique de larme arienne sur ladversaire est dautant
(5) Royal United Services Institute : Accidental Heroes: Britain, France and the Libya Operation in Interim RUSI
Campaign Report, septembre 2011 ; p. 11-12.
35
(6) Charles J. Dunlap : Shortchanging the Joint Fight? An airmans Assessment of FM 3-24 and the case for developing truly
joint COIN doctrine ; Maxwell AFB, Air University Monograph, 2007 ; p. 41.
(7) Voir les ractions suite la perte dun chasseur turque : Syrias downing of Turkish jet demonstrates sophisticated air
defense in Seattle Times, 27 juin 2012 (www.seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/218535968_Syria27.html).
(8) Benjamin S. Lambeth : Air Power against Terror: Americas conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom ; Santa Monica,
RAND, 2005 ; p. 352.
(9) Stephen Biddle : Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy ; Carlisle Barracks,
US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, novembre 2002 ; p. 37.
plus fort quil est incapable den contrer les effets, comme lattestent les tmoi-
gnages de prisonniers taliban capturs lors de lOEF
(6)
.
Plusieurs conditions sont ncessaires pour que le modle afghan fonctionne.
Elles affectent ses trois composantes et en dterminent ses limitations.
En termes de puissance arienne, les succs en Afghanistan, Irak et Libye
ne doivent pas faire oublier que le pr-requis indispensable toute vellit dappli-
cation du modle est lacquisition et le maintien de la supriorit arienne. Ce pr-
requis peut ncessiter une campagne longue et coteuse, rdhibitoire contre un
ennemi la dfense antiarienne robuste. Les dbats rapports par les mdias sur
une possible intervention militaire en Syrie sont un bon exemple
(7)
. Sans suprio-
rit arienne, le modle est tout simplement inapplicable. Une fois celle-ci acqui se,
rien nest encore gagn. Les allis locaux et les forces spciales restent particulire-
ment vulnrables face aux troupes ennemies suprieures en nombre et quipement,
comme dmontr lors de la bataille de Debecka (cf. supra). Il faut donc pouvoir
compenser cette infriorit par un soutien arien sans faille. Des capacits ISR
haute endurance sont ncessaires pour viter toute mauvaise surprise, do une
campagne dont la composante arienne ultra-sophistique contraste souvent avec
la rusticit des troupes au sol. Ainsi, selon une tude de la RAND, les premiers mois
de lOEP ont t bien plus gourmands en liaisons de don nes que la campagne ira-
kienne plus conventionnelle de 2003
(8)
.
Le soutien aux forces amies requiert galement un vrai savoir-faire en
matire dappui arien, incluant ses aspects ltaux et non ltaux. La prcision de
larmement guid doit saccompagner dune ltalit modulable en fonction de la
facult dadaptation de lennemi. Aprs avoir fait lexprience des effets destruc-
teurs de la puissance arienne allie sur ses colonnes motorises trs exposes,
comme Tarin Kowt le 18 novembre 2001, les taliban recourent des positions
dfensives trs bien prpares et camoufles, que les JDAM (Joint Direct Attack
Munition) de 2 000 lbs (environ 900 kg) ne parviennent pas rduire totalement.
Ainsi, lors de lopration Anaconda en mars 2002, les forces amricaines hlipor-
tes sur lobjectif Ginger restent constamment prises partie par les militants
dAl- Qada trs bien retranchs dans des positions qui rsistent plusieurs frappes
conscutives
(9)
. LOUP confirme galement ce besoin de disposer dune vaste
palet te darmement couvrant tout le spectre deffets destructeurs. Dans le cas
libyen ce sont des munitions effet limit qui manquaient, comme la dmontr
36
le recours des bombes inertes guides laser pour frapper sans dommages collat-
raux lennemi dissmin dans un environnement urbain trs dense. La Royal Air
Force va galement avoir recours de faon intensive ses munitions Brimstone, trs
bien adaptes, au point de quasiment puiser son stock
(10)
.
Dans la catgorie des moyens non ltaux, le besoin de disposer dune solide
aviation de transport tactique est ncessaire, afin dtre capable dinfiltrer les forces
spciales, de les ravitailler et de fournir ventuellement de lquipement aux allis
indignes, comme dmontr en Libye dans le Djebel Nefoussa. Des moyens daro-
largage de prcision peuvent pallier labsence de terrains datterrissage scuriss et
lisolement des troupes amies
(11)
. Il faut videmment rajouter tout cela les moyens
inhrents toute campagne arienne : commandement et contrle, ravitaillement en
vol, recherche et sauvetage au combat On laura compris, cest lensemble des
modes daction ariens quil faut matriser, ce qui limite de facto le nombre darmes
capables dappliquer le modle afghan de faon autonome, ou tout du moins dy
contribuer de faon dcisive au sein dune coalition. Limportant dispositif arien
ncessaire peut vite limiter lattrait dun modle qui parat pourtant si peu gourmand
en moyens humains et matriels dans son segment terrestre. Le travail en coalition
permet videmment de compenser certaines lacunes.
En termes de segment sol, les forces spciales doivent videmment matri-
ser toutes les techniques et procdures dappui arien. Leur rle dpasse cependant
largement le simple guidage de frappes. Lopration Anaconda a dmontr les
limites des capacits ISR aroportes : malgr un mois dobservation intensive
dune zone dopration couvrant seulement 100 km
2
, la moiti des positions enne-
mies avaient chapp la dtection avant le dclenchement de lopration. Il faut
donc recourir des forces au contact pour pallier ces limitations quand la gogra-
phie des lieux est dfavorable. Cest le cas dans lenvironnement montagneux dune
grande partie de lAfghanistan mais galement dans lenvironnement urbain qui
caractrise de plus en plus les zones de conflit moderne. Le rle des forces spciales
est donc de compenser au maximum les limites des capteurs, en transmettant le
renseignement obtenu de premire main ou recueilli auprs des allis indignes. Il
agit galement double sens, en permettant ces allis de bnficier des informa-
tions recueillies par les capteurs aroports. Les premires tudes de lOUP font
clairement apparatre lemploi de forces spciales occidentales dans ce rle lors de
lavance rebelle sur Tripoli
(12)
.
Linteraction avec des allis indignes ncessite galement lentretien de
linguistes et dexperts rgionaux au sein des forces spciales, capables dinteragir
rapidement et efficacement avec les partenaires locaux. Si en Afghanistan les
(10) RUSI : op. cit. ; p. 6.
(11) RUSI : op. cit. ; p .11 ; Jean-Christophe Notin : La vrit sur notre guerre en Libye ; Fayard, 2012, p. 391-392 ; Jean-
Marc Tanguy : Harmattan : Rcits et rvlations ; Nimrod, 2012 ; p. 51.
(12) RUSI : op. cit. ; p. 12 ; Jean-Christophe Notin : op. cit. ; p. 470-471.
37
(13) Jean-Christophe Notin : op. cit. ; p. 526.
(14) Richard Andres, Craig Wills, Thomas E. Griffith : Winning with Allies: the strategic value of the Afghan Model
in International Security, vol. 30, n 3, hiver 2005/2006 ; p. 34.
quipes amricaines ont pu sappuyer sur les contacts de la CIA avec lAlliance du
Nord, il a fallu plusieurs semaines aux forces spciales arabes et occidentales pour
construire un partenariat efficace avec des allis libyens gographiquement disper-
ss et sans commandement unifi.
Lexistence de ces allis constitue la troisime composante du modle
afghan, dont la qualit principale rside dans la disponibilit en tant qualli de
circonstance. La prsence de forces indignes relativement crdibles politiquement
et militairement est videmment indispensable la russite du modle. Le choix de
ce partenaire local nest pas neutre. Dans une insurrection rassemblant diffrents
mouvements contre un ennemi commun, le soutien accord certains au dtri-
ment dautres nest pas sans arrire pense politique pour lorganisation des
rapports de force qui dicteront la future gouvernance du pays.
Dans les critres qui dterminent le choix de cet alli, le niveau de crdibi lit
militaire nest pas forcment dterminant sil est compens par une forte capacit
mobiliser suffisamment de combattants potentiels. Lexprience prouve quil est
pos sible de saccommoder dun trs large ventail de situations. Le futur combattant
na pas forcment besoin dtre particulirement form ni entran sil est possible de
lui dispenser les rudiments ncessaires au combat dans des zones hors de porte de
lennemi. Lquipement peut galement tre fourni par la voie des airs si ncessaire,
comme le montre le cas du Djebel Nefoussa. Une fois le com battant sur le pied de
guerre, les forces spciales dispensent leurs conseils son encadrement, assurent la
coordination des frappes ariennes et contribuent syn chroniser laction des forces au
sol avec le plan de campagne arienne. Contre toute attente, le rsultat est la vic toire
du ptissier en armes sur le soldat professionnel
(13)
.
Il est malgr tout ncessaire davoir bien conscience des limitations tactiques
du partenaire indigne, pas forcment apte comprendre et excuter des manuvres
complexes face un ennemi expriment. Les forces spciales en nombre limit
restent toujours vulnrables face une brusque dbandade de leurs allis. Un point
est galement capital pour la russite du modle : les protagonistes doivent partager
peu ou prou les mmes objectifs stratgiques. La chute du rgime taliban lors des
premires semaines dEnduring Freedomou celle du rgime de Kadhafi offraient cette
communaut dintrt ncessaire au succs commun. En revanche, les exemples de
Tora Bora ou de lopration Anaconda rvlent le danger de ne pas disposer de forces
terrestres en nombre suffisant pour pallier la dficience de lalli afghan, en loccur-
rence peu motiv par la chasse aux combattants trangers dAl-Qada, qui plus est en
plein hiver, sur un terrain particulirement montagneux
(14)
.
38
Le modle afghan et lopration Serval
Le 12 janvier 2013, la France dclenchait lopration Serval au Mali, afin de
stopper loffensive terroriste au Sud du fleuve Niger et dempcher ces mouvements
de menacer ltat malien. Aprs une premire phase de raction et de stabilisation,
loffensive tait lance pour reprendre la boucle du Niger puis restaurer lintgrit
du territoire malien au Nord. Les premires leons de lopration Serval font-elles
apparatre un recours au modle afghan ? Force est de constater que les premires
semaines se prtaient mal sa mise en application, du fait de lextrme faiblesse de
forces armes maliennes, incapables de jouer le rle de lalli local suffisamment cr-
dible sur le plan militaire. Lintervention franaise est justement une rponse appor-
te cette extrme faiblesse. Les militaires franais se retrouvent donc en premire
ligne, aux cts des units maliennes qui avaient gard une certaine cohsion et dont
le moral et lefficacit militaire se trouvent regonfls par un puissant soutien arien
et une imposante prsence dunits combattantes franaises au sol. Cette forte
proportion dunits franaises en premire ligne, en particulier lors de la reprise de
la boucle du Niger, ne permet pas dappliquer le modle afghan.
Nanmoins, le modle a visiblement jou un rle plus important lors de
loffensive dans le massif des Adrars, en sappliquant un alli africain particuli-
rement crdible pour la guerre du dsert : les forces tchadiennes. Lintervention des
troupes du gnral Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno (fils du prsident tchadien), en
particulier lors de la bataille de la valle de lAmetettai, incorporait un soutien de
laviation et des hlicoptres de combat franais, ce qui implique la prsence
dquipes de contrleurs avancs auprs des units tchadiennes pour coordonner et
guider ces moyens ariens
(15)
.
Le modle afghan garde donc toute sa pertinence dans le conflit malien ds
lors quil trouve un alli africain suffisamment capable sur le plan militaire pour
sappliquer, ce qui confirme la criticit de cette condition pour sa bonne mise en
uvre. Le modle afghan aurait t donc incapable de tenir seul le front des pre-
miers jours de lopration Serval. Nanmoins, auprs dunits africaines capables
militairement, il offre un champ dapplication valable.
Quelles implicationspour les forces ariennes ?
Le modle afghan est donc loin de reprsenter la panace pour les conflits
modernes. Son emploi rpond des critres prcis pour avoir une chance de suc cs.
Il nest pas sans risque pour lalli indigne, qui dpend du soutien arien tranger,
et pour le commando des forces spciales vulnrable en cas de dfection de son
partenaire local. Il peut ncessiter une certaine dose de patience stratgique pour
(15) Voir en particulier Larme tchadienne aux avant-postes de la guerre au Mali in Le Monde, 4 mars 2013 ou
Lappui crucial des Tchadiens au Nord du Mali in Le Figaro.fr, 17 mars 2013.
39
(16) Lies en grande partie aux maladresses de la 101
st
Airborne Division dploye aprs la fin des combats, si lon en croit
Richard Andres : The Afghan Model in Northern Iraq in The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 29, n 3, juin 2006 ;
p. 414-417.
(17) Les limites de linterventionnisme par dlgation in DSI n 87, dcembre 2012 ; p. 10-11.
voir ses effets se matrialiser, mme si compar une campagne plus convention-
nelle, il permet effectivement une rapidit de mise en uvre qui saccommode bien
des qualits intrinsques de larme arienne : projection de puissance rapide,
allon ge, agilit, ubiquit, puissance de feu, souplesse demploi. Il ne garantit pas de
pouvoir gagner la paix une fois la campagne termine : le retour des taliban en
Afghanistan, la dtrioration de la situation au nord de lIrak dans les mois qui ont
suivi la chute de Saddam Hussein
(16)
, les incertitudes qui psent encore sur
lavenir de la Libye sont autant de raisons de rester prudent.
Nanmoins, dix ans aprs son apparition, le modle afghan a confirm son
caractre dactualit et sa pertinence avec la Libye. Ses qualits intrinsques de cata-
lyseur de larme arienne contribuent en augmenter lutilit stratgique. Son cot
la fois politique et financier reste infrieur celui dune campagne convention-
nelle. Il ne rsout pas forcment les conflits lui seul mais cest le lot de toute inter-
vention militaire, quelle soit conventionnelle ou non. Il peut nouveau prsenter
des opportunits dapplication dans larc de crise, o subsistent de nombreux
rgimes totalitaires hostiles mais vulnrables face une insurrection dtermine.
Cest en tout cas lavis des stratges amricains : le retrait dIrak, la mort dOussama
Ben Laden et la rduction du dficit budgtaire ont conduit le prsident Obama
donner de nouvelles orientations stratgiques qui tranchent avec la dcennie
prcdente. Plus exigeants dans la nature et le lieu de leurs engagements, les tats-
Unis cherchent sappuyer sur des partenaires crdibles, dans une logique de rpar-
tition des tches, en particulier lorsque leurs intrts vitaux ne sont pas en jeu. Le
modle afghan leur permet de sengager a minima en tirant le meilleur parti de leur
supriorit dans le domaine arien.
Pour la France, lheure des choix capacitaires, force est de constater que
le modle suscite toujours la mfiance, voir le rejet. Son qualificatif dinterven-
tionnisme par dlgation est la preuve dune sous-estimation de lengagement
politique et militaire quil ncessite. Ses limitations sont rgulirement mises en
exergue au dtriment de sa valeur coercitive, alors quil contribue justement
renforcer lefficacit des interventions militaires lorsque la situation impose le
soutien dun partenaire local sans dploiement massif de forces au sol. Ses effets
potentiellement nfastes sur lvolution du format des armes sont galement poin-
ts du doigt, comme lexplique un article rcent : ce modle [] pourrait en
outre justifier des rductions du format des forces terrestres
(17)
. Cette critique
tend faire oublier un peu vite les conditions ncessaires lemploi du modle
afghan, suffisamment particulires pour limiter la tentation den faire le mode
daction systmatique.
40
Il serait donc prjudiciable de priver nos armes de cet outil la valeur
coercitive dmontre, dautant plus quelles disposent dj de tous les lments
ncessaires sa mise en uvre. Le maintien du savoir faire en matire dappui
arien, forg en Afghanistan et dmontr en Libye, dune solide composante de
forces spciales air rompue cet usage, sintgrant dans un ensemble plus large
de forces spciales interarmes capables de former, dentraner et de conseiller des
partenaires trangers, doit tre sanctuaris. Il saccompagne videmment dune
force arienne fournissant le cadre dapplication du modle, son commandement
et contrle, ses capacits ISR, ses moyens ltaux et non ltaux. Tous ces lments
existent et ont fait leur preuve. Il faut maintenant reconnatre leur caractre sym-
biotique dans le cadre du modle afghan et intgrer pleinement ce modle dans la
palette doptions stratgiques de nos armes. Comme le rsume un de ses meilleurs
avocats, les futurs planificateurs doivent considrer le modle comme un mode
daction de premire importance plutt quune procdure durgence
(18)
.
(18) Richard Andres, Craig Wills, Thomas E. Griffith : Winning with Allies: the strategic value of the Afghan Model in
International Security, vol. 30, n 3, hiver 2005/2006 ; p. 47.
lments de bibliographie
Richard Andres : The Afghan Model in Northern Iraq in The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 29, n 3, juin 2006 ;
p. 395-422.
Richard Andres, Craig Wills, Thomas E.Griffith : Winning with Allies: the Strategic Value of the Afghan Model
in International Security, vol. 30, n 3, hiver 2005-2006 ; 49 pages.
Stephen Biddle : Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: implications for Army and Defense Policy in US Army War
College Strategic Studies Institute ; Carlisle Barracks, novembre 2002 ; 58 pages.
Steve Coll : Ghost Wars: the Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September
10, 2001 ; New York, Penguin Books, 2004 ; 712 pages.
Charles J. Dunlap : Shortchanging the Joint Fight? An airmans Assessment of FM 3-24 and the Case for Developing Truly
Joint COIN Doctrine ; Maxwell AFB, Air University Monograph, 2007 ; 112 pages.
Philippe Gros : De Odyssey Dawn Unified Protector : bilan transitoire, perspectives et premiers enseignements de
lengagement en Libye in Fondation pour la recherche stratgique, Note n 04/11, avril 2011 ; 25 pages.
Robert Kagan : Finding the Target: the Transformation of American Military Policy ; New York, Encounter Books,
2006 : 444 pages.
Benjamin S. Lambeth : Air Power against Terror: Americas Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom ; Santa Monica,
RAND, 2005 ; 412 pages.
Jean-Christophe Notin : La vrit sur notre guerre en Libye ; Fayard, 2012 ; 583 pages.
Royal United Services Institute : Accidental Heroes: Britain, France and the Libya Operation in Interim RUSI
Campaign Report, Londres, septembre 2011 ; 13 pages.
Abdulkader H. Sinno : Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond ; Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2008 ;
336 pages.
Jean-Marc Tanguy : Harmattan : Rcits et rvlations ; Nimrod, 2012 ; 160 pages.
Harlan K. Ullman et James P. Wade : Shock and Awe: Achieving rapid dominance ; Washington, National Defense
University Institute of National Security Strategy, 1996 ; 142 pages.
Harmattan :
tmoignage dun commandant
descadron de Rafale
Lieutenant-colonel, pilote de chasse, a command
lEscadron de chasse 01.007 Provence sur Rafale du
dbut dHarmattan jusquau 6 septembre. Actuellement
Chef de la division Retex-innovation-coordination au
bureau pilotage de ltat-major de lArme de lair.
Loc Rullire
L
e 17 mars 2011, jour du dclenchement de lopration Harmattan, a t
prcd dune priode dune quinzaine de jours, qui a permis de recueillir les
lments de renseignement ncessaires pour que le commandement puisse
prendre la dcision dassumer cette premire mission.
Celle-ci a consist en une entre en premier : un dfi que lArme de lair
releva avec brio. Elle la assume en toute connaissance de cause, aprs une analy se
fonde sur ces quinze jours dvaluation de la situation. Bien sr, il avait t
demand, au pralable, de disposer de retours quotidiens des analyses en cours afin
dtre le mieux prpar possible. Des missions de reconnaissance avaient t tu-
dies. Elles nont finalement pas t effectues mais cela a permis de prendre de
lavance dans cette prparation.
Le 19 mars en fin de matine, les pilotes de lEscadron de chasse
1/7 Provence , savaient en marchant vers leurs avions que la mission tait rali-
sable, grce tout ce travail en amont. Ce fut nanmoins un moment relativement
particulier pour les quipages, puisquils passaient du temps de paix au temps de
crise sans aucune transition et sans prparation complmentaire. Ils ont opr
depuis leur cadre quotidien, raffirmant ainsi la vocation de combat de la base
arienne. Il apparaissait cependant ncessaire deffectuer une transition psycholo-
gique. Un sas a donc t cr artificiellement : la plupart du personnel engag dans
lopration a dormi sur base la veille de la premire mission ; ce qui a permis dtre
prt le Jour J.
Pour agir avec une telle ractivit, il convient bien sr de bnficier dune
prparation oprationnelle trs tendue. Cest pour cela que les quipages sentra-
nent tout au long de lanne, pour faire face un large panel de missions. Restait
savoir quelle serait la raction des forces pro-Kadhafi. Il tait connu que la
41
42
mena ce arienne se rvlerait faible mais nanmoins difficile prendre en compte
en raison des rgles dengagement relativement restrictives qui avaient t fixes
lArme de lair. Linconnu portait surtout sur la position et le niveau dengagement
des systmes sol-air. Une fois sur place, il sest avr que les moyens ariens staient
dplacs vers le grand sud mais que les systmes sol-air restaient trs prsents et
actifs, protgeant notamment les troupes qui montaient vers Benghazi. Un SA-8 *
a dailleurs t trs actif toute la journe du 19 mars puisque pendant les trois
heures de crneau initial sur zone, il a tent dobtenir en vain une victoire facile.
Ce SA-8 sera dtruit quelques jours plus tard par dautres avions de la coalition.
Harmattan :
tmoignage dun commandant descadron de Rafale
* 9K33 Osa
Ce missile sol-air haute mobilit et de trs courte porte est de conception sovitique : son code Otan est SA-8 Gecko.
Ce premier jour, le dispositif franais comptait une premire patrouille de
quatre Rafale, en configuration air-air, dont le but tait dasseoir la no-fly zone au sud-
ouest de Benghazi et de permettre une deuxime patrouille de Rafale, en configu-
ration reconnaissance, de raliser le recueil de renseignement sur toute la bande
cti re de Benghazi Syrte. Le but tait de fournir aux membres de la coalition une
premire image complte de la situation tactique sur cette bande ctire. De plus, il
fallait prparer larrive dune deuxime vague constitue de Mirage 2000D, de Rafale
et de Mirage 2000-5. Cest cette deuxime vague qui a opr les frappes qui ont
per mis de desserrer ltau autour de Benghazi.
Ces frappes se sont rvles prcises comme lont t toutes celles de lop-
ration. 100 % des munitions tires par les avions de combat franais taient des
munitions de prcision. Cela a dmontr un engagement dune grande slectivit
et une totale matrise des effets. Pour tre slectif, cependant, il convient de pou-
voir discriminer. Pour les units, ce fut bien l le plus important dfi de cette op-
ration. Labsence de troupes au sol les privait du nud culturel et oprationnel
quest le JTAC (Joint Terminal Attack Controller). En cela, elles taient trs loin de
leur savoir-faire dploy en Afghanistan. Elles devaient, en sus dune campagne
arienne classique, protger la population et pour cela, engager directement les
forces pro-Kadhafi qui la menaaient sur le terrain, sans avoir recours aux quipes
spcialises dans les missions dappui. Comme lon pouvait sy attendre, les forces
pro-Kadhafi ont trs vite compris et exploit ces difficults. Elles ont abandonn
leurs moyens lourds, beaucoup trop visibles, et privilgi lemploi de pick-up,
moins signant . Elles ont galement recherch en permanence limbrication la
plus complte avec les forces du CNT (Conseil national de transition, cest--dire
la coalition doppositions Kadhafi) et la proximit immdiate des populations
civiles. Cela a forcment complexifi nos oprations. Leur but consistait bien sr
compliquer la tche de lArme de lair, gnrer des difficults didentification et
43
Harmattan :
de prise de dcision et, in fine, augmenter considrablement le risque politique
de chaque frappe, cherchant mettre mal la cohsion de la coalition.
Pour lutter contre cette asymtrisation du conflit, il a fallu mettre en
place un travail collaboratif extrmement performant. Tous les acteurs ont travaill
en rseau, relis entre eux par des liaisons de donnes tactiques ou par phonie et il
a fallu partager entre tous les acteurs le juste niveau dinformation ncessaire pour
complter la comprhension de la situation de chacun. Les avions de combat,
drones, plates-formes ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), AWACS et
Centres de commandement navaient jamais travaill avec un tel degr de synergie
entre eux, ces derniers fdrant le renseignement issu de tous les capteurs sur zone.
Quand limbrication tait trop forte, cest souvent lanalyse dans le temps long qui
a permis dapprhender la ralit dune cible. Lorigine de son camp dapparte-
nan ce et la ralit dune menace directe pour la population pouvaient ainsi tre
dtermines. Les drones ont reprsent de prcieux outils, travaillant en parfaite
complmentarit avec les avions de combat.
Une des missions que jai effectue en mai illustre pleinement cette utilisa-
tion de lensemble des moyens en synergie un point jamais rencontr sur dautres
thtres par le pass. Ce jour-l, nous travaillions en complte autonomie avec ma
patrouille dans le Djebel Nafoussa lorsque le CAOC (Combined Air and Space
Operations Center), via lAWACS, nous a demand de rejoindre et travailler avec un
drone Predator trs au sud de notre position. Ce drone avait remon t toute une
fili re de ravitaillement des fronts du Djebel Nefoussa durant plus de trois heures. Il
a ensuite engag successivement trois patrouilles diffrentes qui, en une heure tren te,
vont frapper tous les objectifs relevs pendant cette longue prio de danalyse.
Concernant lautorisation douverture du feu, il a fallu trouver un com promis
entre un processus centralis et un processus dcentralis. Finalement, le pilotage de
cette dlgation sest opr au quotidien, vers le niveau le plus bas et le plus acceptable
possible. Dun jour lautre, la ralit des enjeux tait trs diffrente ainsi tantt les
quipages avaient lautorisation, dans le cockpit, dengager le feu, tantt cette autori-
sation tait retenue des niveaux considrablement plus levs.
Dans un contexte demploi tel que celui-ci, le Rafale a reprsent un outil
polyvalent qui a permis de couvrir lensemble du spectre des missions ariennes en
une semaine et, surtout, de dployer un nombre rduit davions pour une diversi t
de missions relativement importante. Pendant ce temps, les missions en Afghanistan
taient effectues. Lavion a donn, dans le thtre libyen, une belle dmonstration
de sa polyvalence. Ses sous-systmes ont galement montr de remarquables qualits
de prcision, performances et fiabilit.
En guise de conclusion, la Libye fut, pour les quipages, un engagement la
fois proche du standard afghan de par sa complexit mais trs loign en ralit du
fait du contexte politique, stratgique et tactique fort diffrent. La ralit du terrain
44
tait toute autre. Il a dailleurs fallu sextraire du paradigme afghan, se dfai re de
cette culture stratgique et tactique que les passages en Afghanistan avaient lgu.
En Libye, les quipages ont d se rapproprier une fonction importante qui, en
Afghanistan, est donne au JTAC, consistant en la capacit de dsigner et identifier
une cible. Ce fut un challenge de tous les instants. LAfghanistan a toutefois donn
cette culture de laction sre, qui a permis de se montrer slectif. Une certaine cultu-
re du doute a t dveloppe ainsi quune relative mesure dans les effets produits.
Soulignons que les quipages engags dans ce conflit ont fait montre de beaucoup
dhumilit et de retenue aussi souvent que ncessaire.
Harmattan :
Serval :
une opration emblmatique
du rle de lArme de lair
EMAA
L
e serval est un chat sauvage de taille moyenne que lon trouve en Afrique. Ce
flin, dot de longues pattes, peut bondir instantanment sur plus de trois
mtres avec une prcision et une force telle quil peut assommer voire tuer
sa proie limpact. galement dot de facults auditives trs performantes, tapi
dans la brousse, il est capable dentendre et dobserver en toute discrtion. Cest un
tueur redoutable qui domine largement ses proies et dpasse les autres prdateurs
par ses qualits de chasseur. On ne pouvait pas rver nom de baptme plus adapt
pour une opration o lArme de lair a si bien illustr ces caractristiques.
De fait, lopration Serval, dcide le 11 janvier dernier par le prsident de
la Rpublique, donne corps un certain nombre doptions prises par lArme de
lair et permet de les confronter avec la ralit stratgique et oprationnelle. Cette
opration met en lumire quatre capacits fondamentales intimement lies qui
charpentent laptitude au combat de lArme de lair, encadrent son dveloppe-
ment futur et lui procurent une porte stratgique qui en font le pivot de notre
outil de dfense : capacit de raction immdiate, structure de commandement et
de conduite en temps rel, permanence de la surveillance et du recueil de rensei-
gnement, mobilit stratgique. En outre, cette opration rappelle que le soutien de
nos allis est indispensable pour intervenir hors de nos frontires.
Aptitude intervenir sans dlai
Lanalyse des oprations menes au Mali permet de souligner la premire
des capacits fondamentales de lArme de lair : son aptitude intervenir sans
dlai. Elle est lessence mme de lemploi de larme arienne et linscrit dans un
tempo unique. Ceci prend dautant plus dacuit que, dans les oprations, limm-
diatet devient la norme du fait du raccourcissement de la boucle politique-
information-opinion. Ainsi, mis en alerte NDjamena ds la dcision prise par le
prsident de la Rpublique dans la matine du 11 janvier, les Mirage 2000D ont
men dans la nuit les premires frappes sur les objectifs adverses. De mme, alors
45
46
qu Saint-Dizier, lescadron de chasse 1/7 Provence ntait pas en alerte ce
jour-l, 36 heures aprs la dcision du prsident de la Rpublique, le 13 janvier, ses
Rafale dtruisaient en plein cur du Mali plus de vingt objectifs avec une prci-
sion mtrique. Dune dure de 9h35, ce fut le plus long raid (plus de 4 000 km)
jamais opr par des chasseurs bombardiers franais. En moins de trois jours, une
quarantaine dobjectifs taient traits, dtruisant des moyens offensifs, des centres
de commandement, des bases dentranement ou des bases logistiques dstructu-
rant profondment les forces adverses.
Cette excellence oprationnelle nest rendue possible que par la qualit des
hommes et des femmes qui servent lArme de lair et qui sont entrans cette rac-
tivit. Elle leur permet de surmonter les obstacles qui se dressent sur leur route. Si
la prouesse des quipages est de nature frapper les esprits, il faut garder en tte que
la ractivit est la mesure du maillon le plus lent. Or, comme le 19 mars 2011
(opration Harmattan), lArme de lair a montr quelle est un outil dune grande
cohrence dont les bases ariennes sont un moyen de combat particulirement effi-
cace qui a su se conjuguer avec une implication forte des bases de dfense dans leurs
fonctions de soutien oprationnel. Point de synthse des chanes de soutien, des
chanes technico-oprationnelles, les bases ariennes oprent sous lautorit du
commandant de base vers lequel converge toute la chane de commandement.
Cest parce quelles oprent H24, que les bases ariennes de lArme de lair peuvent
basculer instantanment du temps de paix au temps de crise et quelles apportent le
soutien ncessaire aux forces ariennes projetes pour durer.
Enfin, cest galement parce que les hommes et les femmes de lArme de
lair bnficient dune formation et dune activit continue et dont le volume des
entranements et la rgularit des exercices sont suffisamment levs que les proc-
dures sont rodes, les rflexes acquis et lagilit trs largement dveloppe. Cela
repose ncessairement sur une activit arienne suffisante qui permet de mener les
quipages au degr dexpertise ncessaire pour conduire des missions opration-
nelles complexes. Ainsi, forts dun entranement raliste et dune activit arienne
de 180 heures par an, certains pilotes de Rafale ont effectu leur premire mission
de guerre lors du raid du 13 janvier. Un mode de fonctionnement cyclique qui
alternerait prparation oprationnelle, engagement et rgnration ne permettrait
pas cette ractivit. Le niveau dactivit des quipages, et travers eux, de toute
lArme de lair est un gage majeur de son efficacit.
Cohrence et efficacit de ses moyens
de commandement et de conduite adapts au temps rel
Cette aptitude intervenir sans dlai dpend troitement de la capacit
fondamentale de lArme de lair assurer la cohrence et lefficacit de ses moyens
de commandement et de conduite. Capacit dautant plus fondamentale quune
opration telle que Serval engage et met en uvre selon un cycle dcisionnel trs
Serval : une opration emblmatique
47
court, toutes les composantes oprationnelles de lArme de lair o quelles se
trouvent et quelle quen soit la nature. Pour donner une pleine efficacit
laction arienne et lui permettre de rpondre au mieux aux ambitions de la cam-
pagne interarmes, la matrise dun environnement aussi complexe et ractif sup-
pose donc de pouvoir sappuyer sur une chane de commandement et de conduite
rationnelle capable de dialoguer en temps rel avec toutes les parties prenantes
autorisant la fois la continuit de la conduite des oprations et leur planification
selon une vision globale de lengagement.
Ainsi, les premires missions ariennes de lopration Serval, dclenches
directement par le Centre de planification et de conduite des oprations (CPCO),
ont t programmes et conduites par le JFAC AFCO (Joint Force Air Component
de lAfrique centrale et de lOuest) rcemment mis en place NDjamena pour
piloter lactivit des moyens ariens prpositionns en Afrique. Cette structure de
commandement a grandement facilit le travail du CPCO car elle lui a permis de
sappuyer demble sur une structure oprative lui permettant de lancer immdia-
tement la campagne arienne et danticiper plus facilement les dveloppements de
lopration. La vision de la campagne arienne est porte par le gnral comman-
dant la composante arienne Serval. Conseiller air du Comanfor Serval, il est res-
ponsable de lorganisation de lespace arien de la zone doprations, il participe
lallocation des moyens ariens aux objectifs de la campagne interarmes et assume
la responsabilit de planifier, programmer et conduire la campagne arienne int-
grant lensemble des missions ariennes. Cette architecture du commandement est
dautant plus ncessaire quil faut pouvoir convenablement orchestrer dans la zone
des moyens nombreux et aux missions diverses. On compte en effet prs dune cen-
taine dappareils oprant quotidiennement au-dessus du thtre dopration de
jour comme de nuit : oprations dans la profondeur, reconnaissance, surveillance,
coute, appui feu, oprations aroportes, transport tactique, transport stratgique,
ravitaillement en vol, hlicoptres de combat ou de transport, etc.
Le rle jou par le Centre national des oprations ariennes (CNOA) de
Lyon doit galement tre soulign. Serval a montr que lArme de lair est dsor-
mais capable denvisager diffremment la planification et la conduite des opra-
tions ariennes. Grce aux moyens techniques dont se dote progressivement Lyon
(essentiellement SIC Systme dinformation et de communication et satelli-
taires : Satcom, HF, IP, LDT, POIA) et aux comptences rassembles sur le site
(planificateurs, chefs conduite, officiers de renseignement, experts des liaisons de
donnes tactiques, experts des radio-transmissions, experts de linformatique, etc.),
les units oprationnelles du Commandement de la dfense arienne et des opra-
tions ariennes (CDAOA) de Lyon (JFAC, CNOA, Centre de renseignement air
ou CRA), renforces dautres lments venus de toute lArme de lair, sont dsor-
mais capables de pleinement planifier, programmer et conduire les oprations
ariennes o quelles se ralisent, depuis le sol mtropolitain comme depuis le
thtre. La projection sur le thtre de lE-3F, les liaisons Satcom, HF et Chat
48
Iridium, la mise en place dquipements de gestion de liaison 16 (MIDS-JRE) et
lenvoi possible de la vido de lHarfang (FMV) en salle conduite, donnent au
centre C2 (Commandement et conduite) de Lyon les moyens de supervision temps
rel qui lui sont ncessaires pour conduire les oprations ariennes.
Il est ainsi particulirement instructif de raliser le dfi qua reprsent le
premier raid offensif men par quatre Rafale le 13 janvier au dpart de leur base de
Saint-Dizier. Il naurait pas pu tre ralis dans de tels dlais sans un cur opra-
tionnel tel que celui de Lyon qui en a programm les moindres dtails et en a assu r
le contrle tactique jusquau recueil final sur NDjamena. Le principe de reach back
par Lyon a ainsi galement dmontr sa pleine efficacit ds le dbut de lopra-
tion. Cette dernire continue aujourdhui dtre contrle selon ces principes : la
planification de la campagne arienne est faite depuis Lyon, la conduite depuis
NDjamena.
Enfin, pour tirer partie au maximum des qualits de larme arienne que
sont ses facults dadaptation et sa souplesse demploi, la chane de commande-
ment et de conduite doit aussi avoir la capacit de procder et dordonner en temps
rel des changements dobjectifs. Ceci dautant plus que ladversaire fait preuve
dune grande fugacit et quil est indispensable de rduire au maximum la boucle
entre dtection et frappe. Il faut pouvoir mettre en rseau les moyens ISR
(Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), les moyens de contrle et de
commandement et les moyens de combat. Sur un thtre aux longations si
grandes, la prsence dun AWACS est un facteur crucial. Ainsi, le 19 fvrier 2013
lorsque des lments franais en mission de reconnaissance dans le massif de
lAdrar une cinquantaine de kilomtres au sud de Tessalit, ont t pris partie
par des groupes terroristes, instantanment, une patrouille de Mirage 2000D, en
mission dappui au profit des troupes au sol dans la zone, est intervenue et a dtruit
deux nids de mitrailleuses lourdes. De mme, il nest pas rare de voir le CNOA
procder en temps rel des changements dobjectifs au cours de missions de
reconnaissance. Tout ceci nest possible qu condition de sappuyer sur des proc-
dures prouves, des capacits techniques fiables et du personnel entran.
cet gard, la manuvre SIC fait partie intgrante de lexercice de la puis-
sance arienne parce quelle suppose dtre parfaitement en phase avec les objectifs
de campagne pour dimensionner convenablement la nature et les flux de donnes
quils soient hertziens, satellitaires ou informatiques, quil sagisse de texte,
dimages, de vidos ou de voix
Moins visible, mais tout aussi essentielle, lappui la manuvre arienne
doit galement pouvoir se reposer sur une architecture de commandement tech ni co-
logistique, elle aussi, en parfaite synchronisation avec les objectifs de la campagne
arienne afin dassurer une disponibilit maximum des moyens mis en uvre.
49
Besoin de disposer en permanence
dune capacit de surveillanceet de recueil de renseignement
Une troisime capacit fondamentale de larme arienne dcoule des
moyens de surveillance et de recueil de renseignement quelle doit imprativement
mettre en uvre pour permettre la pleine efficacit des oprations, non seulement
ariennes mais galement interarmes. En effet, les appareils, les systmes offensifs,
les objectifs retenus dans chacune des zones dengagement, la coordination tem-
porelle et spatiale des moyens engags, les liaisons ncessaires aux units engages
au sol comme en vol, se nourrissent aujourdhui dune quantit de donnes prove-
nant de capteurs multiples allant du renseignement humain au satellite en passant
par les aronefs et les drones. Ainsi, lors du raid du 13 janvier, la programmation
des armements, les donnes ncessaires la dsignation des objectifs ordonns par
le CPCO ont converg vers lEscadron de chasse 1/7 de Saint Dizier jusque tard
dans la nuit. Elles se sont appuyes sur des dossiers dobjectifs qui ont t labors
dans des dlais trs contraints.
Le dispositif sest initialement appuy sur un triptyque satellite
Mirage F1CRAtlantique 2 qui a trs rapidement t complt par le dploiement de
drones Harfang. En effet, le traitement des donnes recueillies se devait de pouvoir
dpasser une simple articulation squentielle de chacun des acteurs pour laisser place
leur fusion dans une action en temps rel : surveillanceidentification
dcisiondsignationtir. Cette capacit temps rel est indispensable pour ce
type dopration, tant les cibles sont agiles, rapides et disperses sur de vastes
espaces. Elle est un marqueur fort de laction arienne. Lengagement du drone
Harfang est donc venu complter lefficacit oprationnelle du dispositif grce en
particulier lintgration de ses images dans la boucle dcisionnelle. Il offre sur la
totalit de la zone doprations 14 heures de prsence continue par vol. Il permet
ainsi lengagement immdiat de patrouilles de Rafale ou de Mirage 2000D,
auxquelles sont transmises en vol les donnes indispensables au traitement des
cibles que les oprateurs drones identifient.
Cet engagement confirme une tendance qui saccentue anne aprs anne et
pour laquelle le drone tend devenir un nud central indispensable la condui te
de toute campagne arienne. Le recours aux drones se fait en effet de plus en plus
frquemment pour vrifier avant toute frappe quil ny a pas de dgts col latraux
possibles. Il sagit l dune pratique qui stend mme la frappe dobjectifs plani-
fis ayant fait lobjet dune analyse amont trs prcise. De plus, ce thtre est carac-
tris par ses trs grandes dimensions qui rduisent le temps utile des patrouilles sur
zone et conduit mcaniquement en multiplier le nombre. En lab sence dAWACS,
la prsence de drones offre dindispensables relais de communication qui facilitent
le transfert dinformations dune patrouille lautre. Cependant, la capacit drone
reste notoirement insuffisante compte tenu de ltendue de la zone traiter et de la
permanence y assurer. La perte de temps induite par les longs transits depuis
50
Niamey pourrait tre rduite si plusieurs Male (Moyenne altitude, longue endurance)
pouvaient oprer de concert. La couverture de la surveillance en serait par ailleurs
plus large. De plus, cela permettrait de faire face lmergence soudaine dun besoin
nouveau tel que celui qua fait natre la frontire du Nigeria et du Cameroun la
dernire prise dotage franaise.
La mobilit stratgique
La quatrime capacit fondamentale est la capacit de projection stratgique
dont limportance est quotidiennement mise en lumire sur ce thtre dopration,
grand comme lEurope
(1)
, et loign plus de 4 000 km de la mtropole. En 1946,
le gnral Grardot, Chef dtat-major de lArme de lair, laffirmait dj : laviation
de transport est le complment indispensable une aviation de chasse que lon veut
mobile stratgiquement . Cette assertion applique lArme de lair doit bien vi-
demment tre tendue lensemble de nos forces. Seule larme arienne peut donner
laction de la France une vritable envergure stratgique et rpondre aux grands dfis
logistiques et oprationnels qui se posent elle. Les cinq premires semaines de lop-
ration Serval, ont ainsi vu la France projeter en toute urgence plus de 19 000 tonnes
de matriels sur le thtre, soit plus que ce quelle a rapatri dAfghanistan en une
anne. Lampleur de la manuvre logistique ne saurait donc tre msestime. Si
lArme de lair sest aujourdhui organise pour projeter, de faon modulaire, des
capacits de transit interarmes (APOD : Air Port of Desembarkation) et dinstallation
de dtachements ariens, seule une vraie capacit de transport arien stratgique
permet lintendance de suivre , dans des conditions aussi exigeantes, tant en terme
de dlai que dallonge.
De mme, les misions confies nos avions de combat sont longues, mul-
tiples et se jouent sur de trs grandes distances. Elles ncessitent des capacits de
ravitaillement en vol importantes et ont, ds lors, conduit au dploiement sur le
thtre de plus de la moiti de nos C135. Cette russite ne doit pas occulter le fac-
teur limitant induit par la fiabilit relative de nos tankers dont lge avanc, 49 ans
de service, fait peser un risque permanent de rupture capacitaire, ce qui rend
dau tant plus pertinent larrive, au plus tt, du MRTT (Multi Role Tanker
Transport) au sein de lArme de lair. De plus, il faut garder lesprit une rgle
simple connue depuis le Kosovo et qui veut que le nombre de tankers engags
conditionne directement le nombre de sorties de nos appareils de combat. Nos
dficits en matire de ravitaillement en vol nous contraignent, comme en Libye,
nous appuyer sur des moyens amricains depuis fin janvier. Cet appoint particu li-
rement apprciable ne permet cependant pas de rpondre lensemble de nos
besoins. Ainsi, lors de lac crochage du 19 fvrier, la patrouille de Mirage 2000D a
d quitter la zone avant le dsengagement car le tanker ntait plus en mesure de
(1) Llongation partir de NDjamena vers le centre du Mali est quivalente la distance Paris-Saint-Petersbourg.
51
ravitailler. Larrive dune patrouille en renfort depuis Bamako na t possible
quaprs larrive dun nouveau tanker sur son orbite, laissant nos troupes plusieurs
heures sans appui arien.
Lentre en service de lA400M et du MRTT (un A330 modifi) changera
donc la donne, non seulement par laccroissement significatif de la charge offerte
dont les armes disposeront, mais galement par la rapidit de projection et par
loptimisation de la manuvre que ces nouvelles flottes permettront.
Bamako constitue aujourdhui un goulot dtranglement conduisant un
ralentissement des flux logistiques induits par la saturation de la plateforme et la
mise en mouvement de longs et lents convois pour rejoindre les zones de combats
situes plus de 350 kilomtres. quipe dA400M, le pont arien aurait pu se faire
au plus prs sur les terrains de Mopti, Tombouctou ou Gao, permettant de gagner
plusieurs jours pour concentrer les forces. En outre, la prsence de cet appareil aurait
contribu simplifier la manuvre logistique intra-thtre aujourdhui complique
par les nombreuses ruptures de charge induites sur les terrains de Bamako, Niamey,
Dakar ou NDjamena impliquant plus de 26 appareils tactiques de six nations dif-
frentes. De plus, les A400M pourront faire la rotation sur le thtre dans la jour-
ne, divisant par trois les dlais ncessaires cette projection. Au-del de cette per-
formance oprationnelle, ce sont galement tous les moyens descale et les capacits
de traitement de la chane logistique oprationnelle qui sen trouveront affectes et
donc les capacits de traitement de flux qui devront tre adaptes.
De mme, le raid du 13 janvier illustre le changement dchelle que nous
connatrons. Trois C135, ont accompagn le raid des quatre Rafale, leur dlivrant
prs de cent tonnes de ptrole. Mais ils nont transport en mme temps quune
infime partie du matriel et du personnel indispensables ce dispositif pour pou-
voir oprer en continu de jour comme de nuit. Dans un avenir proche, cette mme
manuvre pourra tre excute avec seulement 2 MRTT qui transporteront dans
le mme temps lensemble du dtachement, et 2 A400M qui transporteront sur
NDjamena en six heures seulement lensemble du fret. Ainsi, en moins de
48 heures, lArme de lair sera capable de dployer plus de 4 000 kilomtres un
dispositif offensif significatif.
En outre, cette opration vient galement rappeler qu la mobilit strat-
gique inter-thtre se superposent des besoins simultans dappui tactique intra-
thtre. Lopration aroporte sur Tombouctou effectue le 29 janvier, trs embl-
matique par certains aspects, illustre surtout la manire dont la projection arien ne
permet des bascules instantanes deffort sur le thtre en appui de la manuvre
interarmes, contribuant directement son acclration. La simultanit de ces
exigences de mobilit et dappui suppose donc que le format des moyens de pro jec-
tion par air ne soit pas uniquement pens sur la base des ncessits de la projection
inter-thtre. De plus, la dimension tactique suppose galement de disposer des
appareils de transport dont les caractristiques oprationnelles doivent garantir
52
laptitude au combat. Ainsi les capacits tactiques de lA400Massocies ladapta-
tion militaire de sa soute lui permettent de dployer les moyens terrestres (hlico-
ptres, blinds), immdiatement oprationnels ds leur dchargement, sur la zone
dengagement dans un environnement rustique.
Cooprations allies
Cet engagement met galement en lumire la dpendance dans laquelle
nous sommes vis--vis de nos allis. Elle ne pourrait avoir lieu sans leur contribu-
tion active que ce soit dans le cadre de la projection logistique inter-thtres et intra-
thtre (25 %) qui a mobilis sur le premier mois pas moins de 110 missions allies
que dans les domaines ISR pour lesquels amricains et britanniques ont engag un
JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System), un Predator et un Sentinel
R1. Ces deux derniers pays tant, avec la France, les seuls disposer dune capacit
intervenir dans des dlais similaires et dlivrer des effets militaires aussi puissants.
Le dialogue stratgique, entretenu en particulier entre nos trois armes de lair,
contribue largement faciliter la mise en commun et lintgration des moyens allis.
Cet aspect est par ailleurs renforc par la crdibilit de la chane de commandement
air mise en place. Elle offre nos par tenaires un gage de cohrence et de scurit
quant lemploi de leurs moyens que pourrait solliciter le Comanfor.
Enfin, il nest pas inutile de souligner que simultanment cet engagement

au Mali, la mission permanente de dissuasion dvolue lArme de lair continue
dtre assure sans la moindre altration, condition indispensable la crdibilit de
cette fonction stratgique fondamentale pour la scurit de notre pays. Le contrat des
forces ariennes stratgiques, priorit de lArme de lair, est rempli tous les jours.
De mme, lArme de lair maintient la Posture permanente de sret
arienne (PPS) pour garantir la souverainet et la protection de lespace arien natio-
nal, en particulier face la menace terroriste. Cette mission est rendue dau tant plus
ncessaire que lengagement de la France accroit significativement la menace qui
pse sur le territoire national. Les moyens attribus la permanence oprationnelle
ont par ailleurs t reconfigurs. Ainsi les Mirage 2000 de dfense arienne ont rem-
plac les Rafale pour la mission de PPS afin de permettre aux avions les plus
modernes dtre affects en priorit sur le thtre africain. En effet, les qualits du
Rafale, dj dmontres en Libye, font de lui un appareil parfaitement adapt aux
missions sur le continent africain. Sa polyvalence lui permet de mener la fois des
missions de frappes ariennes mais aussi de reconnaissance. Son allonge et son auto-
nomie lui garantissent de rester sur zone pendant une dure importante afin de trai-
ter une cible haute valeur ajoute en temps rel ou dap porter si ncessaire un
appui aux troupes engages au sol. Enfin, la varit de ses capteurs et des armements
53
quil est en mesure demporter lui octroie une puissance de feu le rendant capable
de traiter de nombreux objectifs avec un maximum de prcision.
En conclusion, par ses qualits propres lArme de lair a contribu don-
ner un coup darrt rapide et significatif au dveloppement de loffensive terroris te
particulirement menaante pour lintgrit du Mali. Cet engagement montre une
nouvelle fois que lArme de lair est un outil oprationnel aujourdhui pleinement
cohrent et un acteur majeur de la stratgie militaire dont lefficacit militaire
rpond aux attentes politiques.
R
D
N
Les capacits socles au cur
de sa modernisation
Capacits C2 de lArme de lair,
un cur stratgique au profit
de la dfense
et de la scurit nationale
tat-major de lArmee de lair.
EMAA
Un C2 robuste et crdible issu dune longue exprience
au service de la mission de sret arienne
Les enseignements de la Seconde Guerre mondiale consacrent limportan ce
de lacquisition de la supriorit arienne en pralable toute action militaire et se
traduisent pour la France et la protection de son territoire par la ncessit de btir
une dfense arienne crdible et efficace. LArme de lair acquiert progressivement
les outils (radars, systmes de communication, vecteurs) et le savoir-faire (proc-
dures et comptences du personnel) qui dcoulent de ce besoin : tablissement et
apprciation de la situation arienne gnrale, capacit didentification des
menaces et guidage des intercepteurs sur les cibles potentielles.
Compte tenu de la ncessaire ractivit lie la mission, lunicit du com-
mandement simpose et, en 1961, lArme de lair cre une structure centralise
ddie la dfense arienne. Ce commandement fdre lensemble des moyens, du
rseau maill de dtection aux avions dinterception et permet de fournir en temps
rel les lments dap prciation de la situation au profit du Premier ministre, auto-
rit politique responsable de la dfense arienne du pays. Cette chane extrme-
ment ractive relie le sommet de ltat au pilote dans son aronef et assure, en tous
lieux et en toutes circonstances, la souverainet de lespace arien national.
Aujourdhui, le dispositif franais de sret arienne permet la surveillance
des quelque 11 000 mouvements ariens quotidiens et peut dclencher, soit une
mission dinterception en vue deffectuer des mesures actives de sret arienne,
soit une mis sion dassistance un aronef en difficult. Les vnements du
11 sep tembre ont soulign toute la pertinence du dispositif de sret arienne mis
en place par la France, reconnu comme lun des mieux adapts pour lutter contre
la menace ter ro ris te.
57
58
Permanence, ractivit, mise en place de rgles dengagement, russite de la
mission structureront galement de manire durable la culture de laviateur acqui se
avec son exprience de la mission de sret arienne.
De mme, lArme de lair a trs tt intgr la nouvelle dimension que
lEspace joue dsormais dans le quotidien de la vie de la nation et de sa scurit.
Elle a tendu ses capacits dvaluation de situation et de surveillance ce nouveau
domaine et en a structur la diffusion dalerte relative aux menaces dont il peut tre
porteur (retombe de dbris extra-atmosphriques, trajectographie des satellites
dobservation, etc.).
Dveloppement dun vritable savoir-faire en matire de conduite
des actions ariennes dampleur sur les thtres doprations ltranger
Les bouleversements gopolitiques partir des annes 1990 conduisent la
France intervenir de plus en plus souvent hors de ses frontires dans un cadre
interarmes et interallis. Les missions ariennes mobilisent dsormais des disposi-
tifs daronefs complexes par leur nombre, leur diversit et la multiplicit des effets
obtenir sur un adversaire pens comme un systme global et prsentant des
vul nrabilits.
LArme de lair franaise sadapte cette nouvelle donne. Forte de sa
cul tu re du commandement acquise grce la dfense arienne et sappuyant sur un
personnel rompu des processus relativement proches, elle accole sa structure
existante en mtropole les comptences et outils ddis aux oprations ariennes
extrieures. Le Commandement de la dfense arienne et des oprations ariennes
(CDAOA) est cr : outre la mission de dfense arienne dont il a la charge,
ce commandement entretient et dveloppe lexpertise de lArme de lair au
commandement des oprations ariennes ; il forme son personnel
(1)
, fournit les
infrastructures daccueil fixes ou mobiles et les processus adapts qui permettent
toute la flexibilit ncessaire aux oprations mener.
Ce mouvement sinscrit en parallle des volutions conceptuelles et doctri-
nales de lOtan. La mise sur pied dune force de raction dcide au Sommet de
Prague en 2002 constitue un outil puissant de dveloppement de linteroprabili t
entre les pays membres. La crdibilit de lArme de lair reconnue par lensemble
de ses allis, par ailleurs conforte par lexpertise technique que les industriels fran-
ais ont su dvelopper en matire de rseaux de commandement et de communi-
cation, lui permet de prtendre naturellement au commandement de la Force de
raction de lOtan (NRF). Il constitue aujourdhui une contribution essentielle aux
capacits oprationnelles de lAlliance.
Capacits C2 de lArme de lair, un cur stratgique
au profit de la dfense et de la scurit nationale
(1) Le Centre danalyse et de simulation pour la prparation aux oprations ariennes (CASPOA), cr en 1997, est devenu
un centre dexcellence de lOtan et forme, en plus du personnel franais, nombre dtrangers au commandement et la
conduite des oprations ariennes.
59
(2) Missions ariennes de reconnaissance photographique au profit de dossiers dobjectifs en soutien pralable linterven-
tion de forces de police ; surveillance de lespace arien autour dinstallations sensibles (centrales nuclaires, sites ptrochi-
miques, tablissements pnitentiaires) ; surveillance de manifestations loccasion dvnements de grande visibilit
(sommets de chefs dtat, Jeux olympiques) ; suivi de plan de vol daronefs suspects de se livrer des activits illicites.
Lyon, un cur stratgique pour superviser
les missions ariennes en France et ltranger
Ainsi, la capacit commander et conduire les oprations ariennes (C2)
simpose comme la condition sine qua non de lefficacit oprationnelle dune
Arme de lair et donne au pays qui la possde une vritable force dinfluence et
dentranement au service de la coalition mise en place pour rpondre la situa-
tion de crise ou durgence.
Aujourdhui, lvolution des technologies de linformation ouvre des
pers pectives plus larges encore. On peut voir se dessiner, moyen terme, de
nou veaux quilibres dans le commandement des oprations conjuguant encore
plus troitement les synergies entre des moyens dploys de plus en plus lgers et
le centre permanent de commandement et de conduite Air (CNOA) de Lyon. Ce
dernier dveloppe progressivement ses capacits de superviser, diriger et coordon-
ner en permanence, et avec ractivit, lensemble des missions ariennes que la
France pourrait tre amene raliser au-dessus ou hors de son territoire national.
La matrise dune capacit C2 projetable permettra par ailleurs la France dassu-
mer son rle de nation-cadre en coalition.
Vers une coopration largie au profit de la scurit nationale
Les besoins dvaluation de la situation arienne ont galement conduit
louverture linterministriel. De l sest dveloppe une coopration avec les
douanes, laviation civile, la Police nationale et la Gendarmerie nationale. Des mis-
sions sont rgulirement ralises au profit de ces entits
(2)
.
Ces exemples de cooprations fructueuses laissent entrevoir des perspec-
tives qui aujourdhui nont pas encore t compltement explores. Il sagit de
sin terroger sur le potentiel que peut offrir un outil aussi performant et ouvert que
ce qui existe sur Lyon au profit de la scurit nationale comprise dans son accep-
tion la plus large, cest--dire non limite aux menaces militaires. Ainsi, en cas de
catastrophe naturelle ou industrielle, le ministre de la Dfense peut tre en
mesu re, sous faible pravis, de mettre disposition dun prfet et sous son autori t,
la structure C2 de Lyon et une partie de ses ressources humaines et matrielles, afin
que ce dernier puisse exercer ses responsabilits en matire dapprciation de situa-
tion et de coordination des moyens de ltat engags dans les oprations de
secours. Dans le registre de loptimisation des moyens de ltat au quotidien, les
missions dentranement des drones de lArme de lair, qui offrent des capacits en
matire de surveillance, dendurance et de discrtion, pourront tre valorises par
60
le choix de zones spcifiques dintrt au profit dun ministre et ce, partir du C2
de Lyon o sont programmes les missions ariennes.
Ainsi, loptimisation de ses ressources humaines et matrielles conduit
lArme de lair concentrer ses structures dcisionnelles et maintenir la dcen-
tralisation de ses capacits daction : un C2 fort Lyon sappuyant sur un rseau de
bases ariennes en mtropole, loutre-mer voire ltranger, points de dpart de
toute action arienne. Cette nouvelle structure de C2 Air apparat comme le cur
stratgique o pourra se construire une coopration largie des ministres engags
dans la mission de scurit nationale. Enfin, son ouverture lEurope est envisa-
geable et constitue un atout supplmentaire. Elle peut contribuer au dveloppement
de capacits europennes de planification et de conduite civilo-militaires au service
de lapproche globale de rponse aux crises et situation durgence.
Il nest de Machiavel dans le drone
que sa partie humaine
Lieutenant-colonel de lArme de lair, brevet de lcole
de Guerre, Commandant en second de lEscadron de
drones 01.033 Belfort .
Christophe Fontaine
Note de la rdaction : cet article a t publi dans la RDN en ligne (Tribune n 358), le 9 avril 2013.
L
es drones seraient, aux dires de certains auteurs spcialistes du droit ou des
conflits modernes, le nouveau danger que les populations devraient
craindre. Au-del des questions thiques lies leurs utilisations et aux
aspects moraux de leurs engagements, ils pourraient reprsenter un grave danger
sils tombaient dans de mauvaises mains . linverse, lavion serait bien plus
humain et plus civilis, et produirait moins de bavures. Et de voir prolifrer une
ter minologie outrancire visant faire croire que le drone nest quun robot
agissant de manire automatise, la suite de prises de dcisions mcanises,
entranant des bavures lors dlimination sans procs de citoyens dclars indsi-
rables selon des processus ou des actions hors de tout cadre lgal. Rien nest plus
loign de la vision franaise de lemploi de ces systmes.
Une surveillance permanente diffuse en temps rel
Aujourdhui, la premire raison dtre de lemploi des drones nest pas, en
effet, de dlivrer un armement sur des cibles de manire clandestine de lautre ct
dune frontire. Il sagit dabord, et avant tout, dessayer de pallier la faiblesse intrin-
sque de larme arienne qui est de ne pouvoir occuper durablement lespace arien
pralablement conquis pour surveiller ce qui se passe au sol. En effet, un avion, quil
soit de dfense arienne, de bombardement ou de renseignement, ne peut voler conti-
nuellement. Il doit se poser pour changer de pilote car les vols de longue dure sont
prouvants pour les avions mais aussi, et surtout, pour les hommes. Ainsi, les drones
sont-ils employs principalement dans des missions qui ne peuvent pas tre ralises
par les avions pilots : la surveillance du sol grce des multiples capteurs (optique,
radar, laser). Le drone ayant t libr du principal handicap dans sa capacit de
persistance dans lespace arien, cest--dire lhomme bord, il devient ainsi loutil
idal pour permettre de ne jamais quitter des yeux une cible potentielle et son
envi ronnement. Mais, et l est le paradoxe, lhomme reste dans la boucle dcision-
nelle et oprationnelle. La technologie des transmissions par satellite permet juste de
61
62
placer en lair en permanence une sentinelle avec des yeux lectroniques et de trans-
mettre en temps rel aux dcideurs la nature de lobservation.
lissue de ce processus de surveillance, car le premier mtier des drones
est bien de faire du renseignement, une frappe peut tre dcide. Mais le drone
Male (pour Moyenne altitude, longue endurance) nemporte pas toujours une arme
car tre arm ampute sa capacit durer sur zone ; masse gale, plus on empor te
darmement, moins on emporte de carburant. Pour autant, le drone dans cette
phase de surveillance, et ventuellement de tir, nest pas un robot. Cest tout le
contraire. Depuis le cockpit, vritable centre nerveux de lavion, tout un quipage
humain saf faire. Il faut piloter lavion, optimiser lemploi des capteurs, analyser et
recouper les renseignements, identifier la ou les cibles, vrifier avec ltat-major
leur conformit du point de vue du droit et des objectifs de lopration, dfinir
lar mement le plus adapt la mission. Et enfin, il faut encore que des hommes
donnent lordre de procder au guidage dune munition de prcision sur la cible.
Et cela se fait dans une transparence laquelle aucun autre systme darme nest
contraint. En effet, toutes ces phases, du renseignement au tir, sont filmes, trans-
mises aux chelons de dcision en temps rel, enregistres et stockes. Ce proces sus
est supervis par des conseillers juridiques et conduit sous la direction des chefs
militaires ou politiques. On peut ainsi trs bien imaginer que des membres de
commissions denqutes par lementaires, pourraient consulter les enregistrements
de ces tirs afin de vrifier tous les lments lgaux de leur planification, leur rali-
sation et leur dclenchement.
Quelques mots sur les principales critiques de lemploi des drones
Dabord, la question de lthique et de la morale
Le fait que des pilotes soient aux commandes des drones devrait dfiniti-
vement faire taire cette rumeur du robot tueur maraudant et assassinant sans rete-
nue et de manire dshumanise. Les drones ne sont finalement que des avions
comme les autres si ce nest quils sont pilots depuis le sol. Mme si cela est diffi-
cile imaginer, aucun systme nest plus humanis dans sa mise en uvre et dans
le contrle de son action, quun drone. Certes, lquipage agit via un il num-
rique et une liaison satellite, et nest pas physiquement engag sur le terrain. Faut- il
pour que la guerre soit thique, si tant est quelle puisse ltre, revenir aux temps
anciens du duel lpe ou au combat mains nues ? Nest-il pas lgitime dessayer
dagir distance face un adversaire qui utilise des engins explosifs improviss ou
des bombes humaines ? toutes les phases du processus, lhomme est, et reste,
dans la boucle. Jusque dans le guidage terminal de larme.
Quant la dcision de tuer tel ou tel, ce nest pas le drone qui la prend, ni
le pilote, ni encore le chef de mission : cest le dirigeant politique. Et cest le mme
63
processus que laction soit ouverte (cest--dire dans le cadre dune action lgitime
du point de vue du droit) ou clandestine (cest--dire que ltat sautorise utiliser
des moyens secrets pour obtenir des effets sur des cibles en dehors de tout cadre
lgal). Hier, certains utilisaient des parapluies empoisonns, aujourdhui, dautres
utilisent une autre arme, les drones. Pour autant, pour que le drone vole dans un
espace arien, il faut, moins dtre furtifs (les drones amricains Predator et Reaper
ne le sont pas) disposer au moins de laccord tacite de ltat survol pour agir.
Sinon, comment imaginer que des avions qui volent peine plus vite que des
avions de tourisme modernes, pourraient rester pendant des heures en toute impu-
nit au-dessus dun territoire ?
Ensuite, lutilisation des drones serait contraire au droit
Ces derniers agiraient, voire assassineraient , en dehors de tout cadre
juridique et lgal. Si lon admet comme postulat que les drones rpondent aux
mmes rgles que les autres aronefs militaires voluant dans un espace arien rgi
par un cadre juridique dfini, alors la question de la lgalit de leur emploi est hors
sujet. Si leur emploi seffectue la suite dun accord entre les deux pays, utilisateur
des drones, dune part, et territoire survol, dautre part, l-encore, la question ne
se pose pas. Lenjeu rside en revanche bien dans lassurance que ceux qui rgissent
le processus de dcision et demploi des armes, et ceux qui sont affects au pilota ge
et mettent en uvre la politique des lus de la Nation, soient sensibiliss aux
ques tions dthique et forms aux problmatiques juridiques.
En outre, la notion de contrle parlementaire des actions des forces armes
en gnral, et des services spciaux en particulier, est une vraie question pour toute
dmocratie qui se respecte. Cest cela qui doit prmunir lemploi dshumanis
dun systme darme. Que ce soit un drone, un tireur dlite, une bombe guide
laser ou par GPS, un missile de croisire, un obus de mortier ou une torpille nest
pas la question. Loutil nest rien sans la volont et la dcision humaine.
En revanche, la question de lintroduction de lintelligence artificielle dans
des systmes de combat de demain pose de relles questions sur le plan de lthique
et de la morale. Mais les drones dont nous parlons et dont la France souhaite se
doter court terme, ne rentrent pas dans cette catgorie.
Enfin, lemploi des drones serait dangereux
Ils pourraient en effet tomber entre de mauvaises mains, voire tre utiliss
par des puissances belliqueuses ou des groupes arms terroristes. La faiblesse des
drones au-del de la vulnrabilit de leur plateforme comme voqu supra, reste
effectivement leur dpendance aux multiples liaisons satellites. Elles sont ncessaires
pour les piloter distance et pour recueillir le fruit des diffrents yeux et oreilles lec-
troniques quils emportent. Pour autant, si intercepter un drone et prendre son
64
contrle distance reste thoriquement possible, sa ralisation pratique ncessite
une technologie complexe, ne serait-ce que parce que son cockpit, cest--dire
lem placement partir duquel le pilote contrle le systme, est dport et rpond
des standards industriels spcifiques. Et mme si linformatique a fait des progrs
qui, paradoxalement permettent aux hackers de pntrer les rseaux, intercepter un
drone, prendre son contrle et redfinir sa mission et sa trajectoire, relve pour
lins tant de la science-fiction. Le faire voler alors que son propritaire sait quil a t
perdu ne changerait pas pour autant les fondamentaux de la guerre arienne. Tout
objet non identifi sera intercept, et sera, dfaut de rpondre aux injonctions ou
un plan de vol, abattu.
De plus, ce qui fait peur au profane nest pas forcment apprci par le
terroriste comme tant le moyen le plus efficace pour agir. Les attentats du
11 septembre sont un bon exemple de dcalage entre les peurs des premiers et la
ralisation des seconds. On a longtemps craint une frappe terroriste avec des armes
nuclaires drobes lex-URSS alors quAl-Qada a utilis des avions civils comme
missiles contre les tours du World Trade Center. Les actions dalors ont dmontr
en outre que pour le terrorisme islamiste, la dimension de la mort en martyr res-
tait fondamentale. Chacun conviendra que cest impossible raliser depuis un
cockpit de drone qui, par dfinition, est au sol.
Contrairement ce qui est donc gnralement admis aujourdhui, les

drones restent encore extrmement dpendants des hommes. Ainsi, de manire
paradoxale, aucun systme darme nest plus humanis dans sa mise en uvre et
dans le contrle de son action, quun drone. Son il dport transmet en temps
rel et de manire continue, via un cordon ombilical numrique reliant le monde
rel lquipage qui le surveille, les informations aux autorits politiques qui dci-
dent de lemploi dune arme. Le bombardement est mrement rflchi et nest donc
jamais une action ralise de manire robotise, parce que conduit au moyen de
drones. Car derri re ces objets volants laspect futuriste, il y a toujours des
hommes. Et ces derniers agissent dans un cadre politique et juridique conforme au
droit de la guerre. Les valeurs morales lies leur formation les prmunissent contre
des agissements dshumaniss.
Pour linstant, et sans prjuger des conclusions du Livre blanc, ni gager lave-
nir, la priorit pour la France est plutt de poursuivre la monte en puissance de la
com posante de drone Male de surveillance multi-capteurs que dac qurir une nou-
velle capacit de frappe. LArme de lair a acquis un savoir-faire et une expertise
reconnus dans tous les thtres doprations quil serait dommageable de perdre en
raison dune rupture capacitaire. Le contrle de commissions den qutes parlemen-
taires devraient de toute manire assurer au citoyen que lem ploi des drones Male en
matire de surveillance, ou terme, de mission de bombardement, soient conformes
65
au droit. Avant tout, cest donc bien des choix politiques qui tuent par les mains des
responsables militaires professionnels qui agissent en leur nom, et non les drones.
Sil y a donc bien du Machiavel dans lemploi des drones, cest quintrins-
quement les hommes en constituent encore le cur.
Pour une gestion dynamique
des points dappui de la France
EMAA
L
es volutions gostratgiques et gopolitiques des courts, moyens ou longs
termes ne remettront pas fondamentalement en cause la vocation dacteur
mondial de la France. En effet, cette dernire dcoule de la conjugaison de
nombreux facteurs : culture de la responsabilit internationale, force nuclaire
indpendante, rang occup dans une conomie mondialise, multilatralisme
ancr de lappareil diplomatique, rseau damitis et dalliances tiss dans le
monde, tendue des dpartements et collectivits doutre-mer (Dom-Com) et
Zones conomiques exclusives (ZEE), etc. Ces travaux portent davantage sur la
question de la profondeur et lintensit de laction que la France entend mener
dans le monde pour peser sur le cours des vnements, que sur la remise en cause
dune ambition mondiale.
Cependant lvolution de nombreux facteurs, quils soient conomiques,
diplomatiques, politiques, socitaux, technologiques ou militaires nous impose de
dfinir des options innovantes permettant la France de rpondre sa vocation
mondiale et portant sur de nouvelles stratgies daccs. Elles doivent en mme
temps rester ralistes sur les moyens daction mettre en uvre.
De nouvelles caractristiques techniques
cet gard, la rflexion doit porter sur le moyen de diversifier les dispositifs
permettant daccrotre la mobilit de nos forces. Elle doit par nature intgrer llon-
gation que nous pouvons confrer nos interventions, dpendant de nos capacits de
projection, mais galement des dispositifs mis en place pour en accrotre aisment la
porte. Cette rflexion est rendue dautant plus ncessaire par larrive de nouveaux
vecteurs tels que lA400Mds 2013, puis le MRTT (Multi Role Tanker Transport) en
2017, qui apportent rapidit, allonge et capacit demport suprieure.
Non seulement leurs caractristiques nouvelles faciliteront les interventions
directement depuis la mtropole mais elles rendront galement la visibilit de la
France et la flexibilit de son action plus grandes encore. En effet, potentiellement,
la France sera instantanment et significativement prsente partout dans le monde.
Quon y songe, alors quil faut trois jours un Transall pour rejoindre La Runion
66
67
avec 7 tonnes de fret, un A400M atteindra Saint-Denis avec trois fois plus de fret
en 14 heures seulement. Sur Djibouti, cest un aller-retour dans la journe qui sera
possible. De mme, si la France avait su sassocier ses partenaires australiens lors
de lopration Santal au Timor oriental en 1999, la rapidit de son intervention et
le volume de ce quelle y avait initialement dploy avaientt t contraints par le
rayon daction et la capacit de nos C130 qui avaient alors rejoint Darwin (Nord
de lAustralie) en quatre jours. Ds 2013, dans un contexte similaire, la France
pour ra dployer deux trois fois plus de matriel en moins de 24 heures.
qui conduisent une dilatation de notre espace stratgique
Ainsi avec cette nouvelle capacit de transporter plus, plus loin et plus vite,
on assiste une vritable dilatation de notre espace stratgique. Cette dilatation
donnera notre diplomatie une porte plus grande encore. Elle liera non pas
vir tuellement, mais concrtement et de manire plus dynamique encore, la mtro-
pole aux antipodes. Aussi, compltant la prsence de la France permise par les bti-
ments de la Marine nationale, lArme de lair pourra y ajouter linstantanit de
son action directement depuis Paris. Elle renforcera notre crdibilit, mais surtout
assira davantage encore la prsence franaise dans les nombreux forums rgionaux
au sein desquels la France sige lgitimement du fait de ltendue de ses ZEE, en
particulier dans le Pacifique et locan Indien. cet gard, les accords de dfense
comme les accords Franz, avec nos partenaires australiens et nozlandais, gagne-
ront en substance.
Enfin, comme le rappellent fort justement les analyses dAlain Boinet et
Benot Miribel sur laction humanitaire dans les situations de crise et post-crise
(1)
,
larme assume un rle important dans des situations de catastrophe, notamment
grce ses capacits de transport et de logistique. Elle peut aussi contribuer effica-
cement lvacuation de ressortissants franais et autres dans des situations
dur gence (Liban, t 2007). Enfin, dans les situations ncessitant trs rapidement
des capacits chirurgicales et mdicales, ses hpitaux de campagne peuvent soigner
des blesss et sauver des vies (Cachemire, automne 2005) . Ces nouvelles caract-
ristiques donneront galement une plus grande capacit dintervention qui, sur ce
plan-l galement, renforcera linfluence de la France et son rle dacteur
incon tournable et responsable de la scne internationale.
Pour une gestion dynamique de nos points dappuis
Toutefois, le changement dchelle qui va tre confr laction de la
France ne sera possible qu la condition dinscrire la nature et lemploi de ces
(1) Alain Boinet et Benot Miribel : Analyses et propositions sur laction humanitaire dans les situations de crise et post-
crise (Rapport M. Bernard Kouchner, ministre des Affaires trangres et europennes) ; mars 2010.
68
nou veaux moyens dans une perspective qui tire avantage de leurs qualits intrin-
sques et qui sache aussi sappuyer sur un dispositif novateur et dynamique de type
hub and spoke , permettant dintervenir et de rayonner moindre frais partir
de points dappuis adapts.
De fait, les conditions dune intervention rapide de nos moyens reposent,
entre autres, sur lexistence dun dispositif sappuyant sur un maillage suffisamment
toff ajoutant nos points dappuis traditionnels des solutions complmentaires,
accroissant nos garanties daccs. En effet, nos forces prpositionnes actuelles, qui
contribuent de manire significative la stabilit et la scurit mondiale, ne rpon-
dent quen partie ces exigences futures. Il est ncessaire damplifier davantage
enco re la pertinence de ce rseau en dveloppant, sur un mode gagnant-gagnant ,
des partenariats particuliers dont lobjectif doit tre de permettre le dploiement
quasi-immdiat de dispositifs militaires ou de scurit civile, depuis des escales aptes
monter rapidement en puissance. Ce dispositif, qui doit offrir une gradation de
solutions, passe par la ngociation pralable daccords diplomatiques destins acc-
lrer le dploiement de nos moyens dintervention ou de ceux de nos allis. Cette
approche, non contraignante, sadapte aisment toute volution gostratgique.
Elle doit tre complte par le prpositionnement de matriels et la mise sur pied
descales permanentes dimportance variable et judicieusement positionnes.
La France dispose cet gard de nombreux atouts qui permettraient
moindre cot de rpondre cet objectif.
Ainsi, elle entretient des relations troites avec nombre de pays placs
proximit de zones dintrts stratgiques dont nous pouvons davantage exploiter
les potentialits. Dans cette perspective des pays tels que Singapour (dont la for ma-
tion des pilotes se fait Cazaux) et lInde sont des partenaires sur lesquels nous
pourrions davantage nous appuyer. Au-del dune coopration oprationnelle
fruc tueuse avec ces pays, la programmation dexercices conjoints sur place doit
contribuer prparer et roder les procdures de monte en puissance de ces points
dappuis potentiels, voire mettre en place du matriel.
Qui doit jouer avec la complmentarit des rseaux allis
En outre, nos allis britanniques et amricains, galement puissances aux
ambitions mondiales, sappuient sur un maillage potentiellement complmentaire
au ntre que nous pourrions ventuellement exploiter, soit en contrepartie de la
mise disposition de nos propres points dappuis ou dune contribution dans le
cadre dun partage de leur cot dutilisation. Les points dappuis britanniques et
surtout amricains ouvrent principalement la route du Sud-Est asiatique et sur le
Pacifique. Ils permettent dtendre, voire de faciliter, notre zone daction vers de
nouveaux centres dintrts. Au vu des zones traditionnelles dengagement de la
France, ils offrent des facilits ponctuelles de projection (dploiements ou appuis)
69
et permettent galement denvisager de nouvelles voies de coopration, notam-
ment en matire de prparation oprationnelle.
Il en est de mme pour nos partenaires du Commandement du transport
arien europen (EATC) et du Centre de coordination multimodal des transports
en Europe (MCCE), avec qui nous partageons des problmatiques communes en
matire de projection de forces. Le dveloppement concert dun rseau mondial
doit constituer un axe de travail fort qui en outre contribuera cimenter la
construction de la dfense europenne. Il y a une vritable stratgie dvelopper,
tant en matire dquipements que de dploiement. Elle sera gnratrice dcono-
mie de moyens et de concentration des efforts.
Par ailleurs, les rseaux de compagnies ariennes quipes dAirbus,
com munaut laquelle appartiendront nos A400M et MRTT, offrent des poten-
tialits qui mritent dtre explores. Sur la base dintrts communs vidents, des
partenariats pourraient tre envisags contribuant structurer un dispositif articu l
autour de hubs largissant notre couverture mondiale. Ils peuvent aussi
per mettre de partager nos pices, nos moyens techniques, descale ou dassistance
nos quipages voire leurs renforts.
Et qui rend la France visible
Enfin, le dveloppement et lentretien dun tel rseau fiabilis, nourri
dchanges rguliers ou dexercices conjoints avec les pays htes, contribuent au
rayonnement et linfluence internationale de la France. Ils ncessitent un effort
diplomatique quil ne faut pas occulter et qui suppose de mettre en place des
cooprations suffisamment consistantes.
Les nouveaux vecteurs sur le point dentrer en service induisent la dilatation

de notre espace stratgique, permettent une quasi-instantanit de nos rponses et
exigent une approche dynamique dun rseau rnov de points dap puis. Conjugu
la complmentarit du maillage dont disposent nos allis amricains et britan-
niques, cest une nouvelle dimension qui est donne laction de la France, la
ren dant encore plus visible, plus flexible et plus globale.
Intervention immdiate :
lapport du Rafale
dans les oprations rcentes
Capitaine, charg de recherche au Centre dtudes strat-
giques arospatiales (Cesa).
Yohan Droit
Pour les aviateurs et la communaut Rafale, le 19 mars 2011 tait une grande inconnue.
Nous ne connaissions pas encore la totalit de lordre de bataille libyen,
nous savions quil y avait des missiles sol-air actifs et pourtant,
nous avons envoy nos pilotes des milliers de kilomtres de leurs bases,
avec des rgles dengagement pratiquement faites pour loccasion.
Mettez-vous dans la tte du pilote qui va dcoller ce moment-l
Gnral darme arienne Denis Mercier, chef dtat-major de lArme de lair
P
rogramme emblmatique et colonne vertbrale de laviation de chasse fran-
ai se, le Rafale se distingue par sa polyvalence totale et son horizon dunique
avion de chasse des forces armes franaises. Entr en service dans lArme
de lair en juin 2006, le Rafale connat une exprience oprationnelle dj trs riche
autour de sa participation aux oprations en Afghanistan, en Libye et au Mali. Son
dploiement sur ces diffrents thtres permet dapprhender son volution tant
oprationnelle que capacitaire et dapprcier sa pertinence au service des oprations
rcentes.
Monte en puissance oprationnelle en Afghanistan
Immdiatement aprs sa mise en service oprationnel, dcision est prise de
dployer le Rafale sur le thtre afghan. Il y est dploy quatre reprises en 2007,
2008, 2009 et 2011, une premire fois Douchanb puis Kandahar. Les oprations
en Afghanistan sollicitent le Rafale sur une partie prcise du spectre des oprations :
les missions dappui arien rapproch dans un contexte de contre-insurrection.
Dans un premier temps, le Rafale au standard F2 est employ en patrouille
mixte avec le Mirage 2000D, arm avec des bombes guidage laser GBU-12. Dans
son standard F2, le Rafale possde des capacits dattaque au sol, mais elles sont
limites temporairement par labsence de nacelle de dsignation laser et de lAASM
(Armement air-sol modulaire). Il est donc assist par le Mirage 2000D pour la dsi-
gnation des objectifs au sol. Au cours des diffrents dtachements, le Rafale gagne
70
71
lapport du Rafale dans les oprations rcentes
en maturit oprationnelle. La mise en service oprationnel de lAASMen 2008
(1)
constitue notamment un palier important dans la courbe de maturit du Rafale.
LAASM offre au Rafale la capacit de tir tout temps distance de scurit et assu-
re une complmentarit apprciable avec les munitions guidage laser. Son emploi
en Afghanistan permet de valider en opration lefficacit du couple RafaleAASM.
Lors de son dernier dploiement en 2011, en plus demporter des GBU- 12
et lAASM, le Rafale part au combat au standard F3 avec la nacelle Damocls, le sys-
tme ROVER (Remote Operations Video Enhanced Receiver) et une conduite de tir
air-sol de son canon parfaitement intgre qui lui confrent une efficacit opra-
tionnelle maximale. Ces amliorations considrables consacrent lautonomie du
Rafale dans la mission dattaque au sol. Les oprations en Afghanistan permettent
de confirmer lefficacit et la fiabilit du systme Rafale en opration dans un cadre
rustique. Bien que les modalits des oprations en Afghanistan soient loin de
solliciter la totalit des capacits oprationnelles du Rafale, la polyvalence du vec-
teur et de ses quipages est valide sur un thtre dopration. Lintgration de
capacits air-air et air-sol dans un mme vecteur apporte une plus-value opra-
tionnelle trs importante. En particulier, la fusion des donnes issues de la Liaison
16, du mode air-air du RBE 2 (Radar balayage lectronique 2 plans), de lOSF
(Optronique secteur frontal) et de Spectra (Systme de protection et dvitement des
conduites de tir du Rafale) offre lquipage une excellente connaissance de la situa-
tion tactique arienne.
Lengagement en Afghanistan signe le premier emploi en opration du
Rafale. Aprs une ncessaire phase de monte en puissance, compte tenu du dlai
de huit mois entre sa mise en service et son premier dploiement, le Rafale atteint
au standard F3 son plein rendement oprationnel.
Le Rafale entre en premier au-dessus de la Libye
Cet aguerrissement joue un rle essentiel au moment du dclenchement de
lopration Harmattan et autorise une intervention immdiate du Rafale dans le
conflit libyen. Conformment aux ordres donns par le prsident de la Rpublique
suite au vote de la rsolution du Conseil de scurit de lONU le 17 mars 2011,
lArme de lair se tient prte intervenir 48 heures plus tard au moment du
Sommet international du 19 mars Paris. Afin de concrtiser la volont politique,
un premier raid au-dessus de Benghazi est organis afin de faire cesser les attaques
contre la population.
Pour cette mission stratgique, les avions de lArme de lair doivent oprer
plus de deux mille kilomtres de leurs bases-mres en Mtropole au-dessus dun
(1) Deux bombes AASM sont tires en Afghanistan par un Rafale B (cest--dire biplace) le 20 avril 2008, moins de
dix jours aprs sa mise en service oprationnel.
72
thtre encore dfendu. La premire mission du 19 mars 2011 au-dessus de
Benghazi sorganise en trois vagues davions de lArme de lair, chacune compre-
nant des Rafale. Une premire vague a pour mission dimposer la zone dexclusion
arienne, la deuxime doit effectuer une mission de reconnaissance pour examiner
la situation au sol, enfin, la troisime vague a pour objectif de frapper les moyens
militaires menaant la population de Benghazi. Ce premier raid, dont le droule-
ment a t largement relat, remplit tous ses objectifs puisque linstauration de la
zone dexclusion arienne empche tout aronef libyen de sen prendre la popu-
lation et que la destruction de six blinds menaant Benghazi conduit les forces
pro-kadhafistes se retirer.
Pour lArme de lair, limportance de la distance couvrir, linconnu de la
situation sur place et la prsence de systmes sol-air actifs dans la zone doprations
permettent de mesurer lexploit ralis par les aviateurs lors de cette mission
den tre en premier sur un thtre toujours dfendu et plus de deux mille kilo-
mtres de leurs bases. Il sagit dune grande premire pour lArme de lair qui
dmontre ainsi sa capacit se projeter longue distance et entrer en premier sur
un thtre en toute autonomie. Cette capacit militaire, rare et trs exigeante,
range lArme de lair franaise parmi les forces ariennes qui comptent. Le succs
de cette mission valide lorganisation ainsi que lentranement et la prparation des
personnels. Au niveau stratgique, ltroite imbrication du temps politique et
du tempo des oprations ariennes permet de donner immdiatement corps la
volont du prsident de la Rpublique et dassurer la crdibilit de la France sur la
scne internationale. LArme de lair a dmontr quelle est capable de rpondre,
dans un dlai qui se compte en heures, aux demandes du politique.
Au cur de cette mission stratgique, dcrite comme prilleuse, le Rafale
est littralement en premire ligne. Lenvoi du Rafale en premier en mission de
supriorit arienne dmontre tout dabord une nouvelle fois toute la confiance
quaccorde lArme de lair son chasseur polyvalent. Les performances de son
sys tme darmes, notamment celles de son systme dauto-protection Spectra, le
meilleur systme en service dans lArme de lair et celles de lAASM guidage GPS
permettant de tirer distance de scurit, dsignent le Rafale comme outil sr,
performant et adapt la mission. Qui plus est, les Rafale envoys au-dessus de la
Libye remplissent ce 19 mars trois missions diffrentes : supriorit arienne,
reconnaissance et bombardement dobjectifs dopportunit, dmontrant toute
ltendue de leur polyvalence.
Lensemble de la campagne arienne dmontre la pleine polyvalence du
Rafale son standard F3 dfinitif. Il effectue avec succs toutes les missions dvolues
laviation de chasse : supriorit arienne, frappe au sol sur des objectifs planifis ou
dopportunit, et reconnaissance sur un thtre dopration exigeant et non
dpour vu de menace arienne. Lengagement du Rafale en Libye voit galement le
premier emploi du missile de croisire Scalp-EG (Systme de croisire conventionnel
autonome longue porte-Emploi gnral) dans une mission de frappe stratgique dans
73
la profondeur. La campagne arienne en Libye valide par le feu larrive maturit,
aussi bien technique quhumaine, du Rafale au sein de lArme de lair.
Au-del de lefficacit oprationnelle que la polyvalence du Rafale apporte
la manuvre arienne, on peut en apprcier la pertinence au regard de lcono-
mie des moyens quelle autorise. Ainsi, ce sont les mmes Rafale qui, un jour, effec-
tuent une mission de supriorit arienne et, le jour suivant, ralisent une frappe
air-sol. Et, au-del de lavion lui-mme, ce sont les mmes pilotes et quipages, et
le mme personnel de soutien technique qui mettent en uvre le Rafale. Cette
polyvalence permet de dployer un nombre rduit davions pour une diversit de
missions relativement importante. En effet, combien davions spcialiss, avec les
quipements et personnels ddis, aurait-il fallu dployer pour raliser les mmes
missions ? Avec quel cot ? Lconomie des moyens techniques et humains sest
rvle tre un paramtre majeur pour lArme de lair lorsquil a fallu quelle main-
tienne un rythme oprationnel important dans la dure.
Par rapport son emploi habituel en Afghanistan, lengagement du Rafale en
Libye se signale par un contexte plus incertain, la prsence avre de menaces sol-air
et la mise en uvre dun spectre de capacits plus large. Au cours de lopration
Harmattan, les avions franais dtruisent plus de 1 000 objectifs et effectuent envi-
ron 5 600 sorties ariennes, dont plus de 4 000 sorties pour lArme de lair
(2)
. Les
Rafale Air effectuent pour leur part 1 039 sorties pour 4 539 heures de vol. Avec
1 039 sorties, les Rafale de lArme de lair reprsentent environ 20 % des sorties de
combat franaises et 25 % des sorties de combat de lArme de lair, assurant une part
essentielle de la contribution arienne franaise aux oprations au-dessus de la Libye.
La participation des ailes franaises aux oprations en Libye signe lexcellence de
laviation franaise en Europe. Alors que les moyens ariens amricains habituels sont
en retrait, on ne mesure pas assez lapport du Rafale. Son efficacit et ses capacits
uniques crdibilisent fortement laction franaise auprs des allis et dmontrent aux
yeux de tous que la France dispose dun outil militaire performant.
Le Rafale et la projection de puissance
la suite du dclenchement de lopration Serval au Mali, une patrouille
de quatre Rafale est mise en uvre depuis sa base de Saint-Dizier afin deffectuer
une mission de bombardement sur les bases arrires des groupes terroristes.
Les quatre Rafale, arms dAASM et de GBU-12 et accompagns de ravi-
tailleurs C-135, dcollent le 13 janvier 2013 de la base arienne de Saint-Dizier pour
se projeter plus de six mille kilomtres. Au cours de cette mission, qui ncessite
plus de 9h40 de vol, les quipages prennent pour objectif et dtruisent des camps
(2) Libye : les aviateurs dans lopration Harmattan in Air actualits, hors-srie 2012 ; p. 72-73
74
dentranement, des infrastructures et des dpts logistiques des groupes terroristes
avant de se poser sur la base arienne de NDjamena.
Cette mission de bombardement du Rafale est historique par son allonge,
sa dure et lillustration quelle apporte de la capacit de projection de la puissan ce
arienne. Pour autant, lavion de combat ne constitue que le dernier maillon essen-
tiel dune chane oprationnelle cohrente. Celle-ci est btie autour de capacits
essentielles telles que laptitude au commandement et au contrle des oprations
ariennes, le renseignement, le ravitaillement en vol qui permettent laviation de
combat de raliser des missions de bombardement plus de six mille kilomtres du
territoire national.
Considre sur la dure, lvolution du Rafale en Afghanistan et en Libye
est impressionnante. Du standard F2 limit au tir de GBU-12 avec laide de la dsi-
gnation laser dun Mirage 2000D au standard F3 capable demporter et de tirer de
faon autonome laide de sa nacelle Damocls des armements guidage laser, des
AASM et des missiles Scalp, le Rafale connat une volution capacitaire majeure
entre son premier dploiement en Afghanistan en 2007 et son engagement en
Libye en 2011. Celle-ci est autant due aux enseignements des oprations quau
dveloppement normal des standards et des quipements prvus.
Lapport du Rafale du point de vue de lintervention immdiate sest tra duit
par deux premires pour le Rafale et lArme de lair avec une mission dentre en
premier sur un thtre non-permissif en Libye et la ralisation de la plus longue
mission de bombardement de lhistoire de lArme de lair au Mali. Il garantit ainsi
la France une capacit daction trs longue distance et sous trs faible pravis.
Regard sur la formation
du futur pilote de combat :
Docteurs en psychologie exprimentale, chercheurs au sein
de lquipe Facteurs humains et milieux oprationnels
du Centre de recherche de lArme de lair (Crea).
Colin Blttler
Cyril Camachon
A
fin dexploiter pleinement les aronefs de combat de dernire gnration
(e.g., Rafale, A400M, MRTT, NH90) et dtre aptes rpondre au contrat
oprationnel, les pilotes de combat doivent, aujourdhui plus que jamais,
sappuyer sur des outils de formation adapts, leur permettant dacqurir les
com ptences ncessaires en un minimum de temps. Dans ce cadre, les moyens de
simulation (au sol, en vol rel simulation embarque ) sont prsents comme
LA rponse tous ces dfis. Quen est-il rellement ? Cet article amnera un clai-
rage sur la plus-value et le primtre dutilisation de ces moyens de formation.
Prambule
Les contraintes budgtaires, les restructurations des bases ariennes et des
escadrons, la restriction des espaces ariens ddis lentranement et le niveau
dengagement des Forces dans le monde rendent la prparation des pilotes de
combat de plus en plus difficile. En effet, cela rduit considrablement le nombre
dheures de vol sur avion de combat. De plus, les avions de combat de dernire
gnration sont plus complexes matriser car leurs systmes embarqus sont plus
importants et les missions oprationnelles sont, elles aussi, plus varies. Ainsi, le
temps de formation ne cesse de crotre. Comment, dans ces conditions, est-il pos-
sible de former des pilotes hautement qualifis, sensibiliss le plus tt possible aux
systmes ultra-technologiques des avions darmes de dernire gnration, aptes
rpondre au contrat oprationnel, en un minimum de temps, tout en mai trisant le
cot et en assurant la scurit de tous ?
En aronautique, la rponse habituelle pour remdier au manque dheure
de vol est la simulation au sol. Il peut paratre extravagant de rajouter au sol tel-
lement cela semble vident. Cest pourtant une distinction ncessaire maintenant
75
76
que les innovations technologiques permettent de faire de la simulation lors de vols
rels ! Cette antinomie de faade se transforme trs vite en cohrence et en un atout
indniable pour la formation actuelle et future des pilotes de combat. En effet, la
simulation en vol rel permet de reproduire tout ou partie des fonctionnalits de
lavion de combat, mais un cot de mise en uvre bien moindre. Clairement, cela
permettrait de se former en cole de formation aux manuvres et procdures tac-
tiques qui sont habituellement excutes en situations oprationnelles de com bat.
De plus, comme nous le verrons par la suite, la simulation embarque en vol rel
permet de saffranchir de certaines limites de la simulation sol.
Ainsi, ces outils de formations que sont la simulation de vol au sol et la
simulation embarque en vol rel apparaissent comme la panace pour rpondre
la limitation drastique du nombre dheures de vol en avion de combat opration-
nel. Bien entendu, cette der nire assertion nest vraie quen partie. Lobjectif de cet
article est de mon trer comment ces outils devraient tre utiliss pour obtenir une
relle plus-value dans la formation aronautique militaire.
La simulation au sol: un faux couteau suisse
La simulation au sol est un moyen privilgi dans la formation au pilotage
afin de rduire le nombre dheures de vol rel. Celle-ci nest possible que si les
com ptences acquises en simulateur se transfrent positivement en vol rel :
cest- - dire rutilise efficacement en vol rel. Moins dheures de vol rel sont ainsi
ncessaires pour apprendre cette comptence. Le risque de la simulation sol est de
deux ordres, soit aucun transfert ne se produit (pas dconomie dheures de vol)
soit un transfert ngatif se produit (plus dheures de vol rel ncessaires pour
com penser cet effet). Lobjectif de cette partie est dapporter des lments de
rflexion pour limiter les potentiels aspects ngatifs de la simulation : de mauvais
apprentissages.
Il est largement admis que cest le versant technologique de la simulation
qui reut la plus large attention en matire de conception, au dtriment de laspect
spcifiquement pdagogique. Seulement, il est admis que la qualit du dveloppe-
ment technologique nest pas forcment responsable de meilleurs apprentissages.
En effet, tout dpend du type de comptences que lon veut y voir entranes, car
ces dernires ne se transfrent pas toutes aussi efficacement. De plus, la question
que se pose tout formateur est celle du ratio optimal entre le nombre dheures de
vol rel et de vol en simulateur. Le but tant de trouver le meilleur compromis
effi cience/finance. Il sera prsent dans un premier temps le rapport entre les types
de comptences apprendre en simulateur et leur transfrabilit. Dans un second
temps, nous verrons que pour trouver ce ratio heures de vol rel/vol en simulation
il est ncessaire dvaluer lefficience des simulateurs en fonction.
77
Du bon usage de la simulation au sol
Depuis de nombreuses annes, il est admis quune formation mixant heure
de simulation et heure de vol rel permet un gain financier. Seulement, la plupart
des recherches scientifiques sur le sujet portent quasi exclusivement sur des comp-
tences lies linstrumentation de bord (i.e., savoir utiliser les instruments de son
cockpit). En effet, les limites technologiques des simulateurs dantan ne permettaient
pas vraiment davoir une visualisation extrieure de grande qualit. Avec le dve-
loppement technologique des simulateurs, ce biais est rduit et nous pouvons obser-
ver quelques recherches dans le but daffiner la qualit de lapprentissage sur un
panel de comptences plus large. Les recherches rcentes nous permettent davoir
un point de vue sur lefficacit de lapprentissage sur simulateur pour des comp-
tences allant de linstrumentation de bord, aux comptences de vol vue et mme
de manuvrabilit de lavion (cest--dire les comptences psychomotrices).
Les recherches nous indiquent que les comptences lies aux instruments et
la Gestion de Systme (i.e., lorsquun cockpit est compos non plus dinstruments
aiguilles mais dordinateurs de bord) sont celles qui sacquirent et se transfrent
le mieux. Cest--dire que lon observe systmatiquement un transfert positif mme
avec un simulateur low cost (e.g., PC familial avec un logiciel du commerce). En
revanche, concernant le transfert de comptences motrices (i.e., lie la manu-
vrabilit de lappareil) les rsultats sont mitigs. Avoir un simulateur reproduisant
les mouvements de cabine permet daugmenter le ralisme et la sensation
dimmersion dans le monde virtuel. Si limmersion est favoriser en simulation,
nous pouvons observer quil existe des moyens bien moins coteux pour y parvenir
(e.g., scnariser la situation dapprentissage pour mieux plonger lutilisateur dans le
monde virtuel). Cependant, en matire de transfert de comptence motrice, leffet
nest pas clairement dmontr. Il semble prfrable, pour ces comptences, de les
entraner en vol rel et non dans un simulateur peu ou trs coteux. La dernire
catgorie de comptences, celles lies au vol vue, est celle qui ne donne pas lieu
une rponse manichenne. En effet, les recherches dmontrent que certaines
comptences de vol vue peuvent tre entranes efficacement avec une visualisa-
tion rudimentaire (e.g., atterrissage) alors que dautres requirent une visualisation
de grande qualit (e.g., navigation vue).
Ainsi, la qualit de lapprentissage sur simulateur est grandement fonction
du type de comptences apprendre. Cest pourquoi la ncessit dvaluer objec-
tivement les simulateurs lorsquils sont en service est indispensable pour bien dter-
miner aspects positifs et aspects ngatifs.
Attention au miroir aux alouettes
Il est ici question de lvaluation de lefficacit des simulateurs. Cette
valuation recouvre deux objectifs. Le premier est de savoir si la formation sur le
78
simulateur se transfre, comptence par comptence, en vol rel. Le deuxime
objectif est de trouver in fine le meilleur ratio rel/simul dans la formation.
Alors quhabituellement lvaluation est subjective (i.e., avis des utilisateurs
du simulateur), il existe des mesures objectives telles que le Per cent Transfer (PT)
et le Transfer Effectiveness Ratio (TER). Le PT permet de calculer le nombre
dheures de vol conomises via lutilisation du simulateur, alors que le TER per-
met de mesurer plus finement lapport du simulateur pour chaque type de com-
ptences qui y sont entranes. Si une comptence nest pas ou mal transfre en
vol rel, il suffit de ne plus la pratiquer sur le simulateur. Au bout du compte, le
simulateur pourra tre utilis avec une efficacit optimale.
Ltape qui suit est de calculer le ratio optimal entre les heures de vol rel et
simul. Le Cost Effectiveness Ratio est une extension du TER en rajoutant la dimen-
sion des frais du simulateur et des vols rels. Au final, il est possible de calculer le
temps dutilisation de la simulation au maximum de son efficacit, le temps des vols
rels au plus juste besoin, pour une formation optimale au plus juste cot.
Lutilisation claire de ces mthodes objectives dvaluation du transfert
dapprentissage et donc, de lefficacit du simulateur, devrait permettre :
1) dviter les risques de transfert ngatif,
2) dorienter lutilisation de chaque simulateur vers son potentiel maximum,
3) de calculer un ratio optimal simulation/rel dans un cursus de formation.
Plus globalement, ces mesures permettraient de comparer lefficacit dune
mthode de formation par rapport une autre (e.g., dun syllabus un autre).
La simulation sol na cess de progresser au cours des dernires dcennies.
Elle sest mme positionne comme un mdia srieux pour favoriser certains
apprentissages. Pour autant, les pilotes sont unanimes sur les limites de la simula-
tion au sol (pas de sensation proprioceptive, stress diffrent, etc.). Une nouvelle
forme de simulation pourrait dpasser ces cueils. En effet, les avions dots dun
cockpit moderne (i.e., tout cran) autorisent la mise en uvre dune capacit de
simulation embarque (Embedded Simulation). Cette capacit offre la possibilit
dinjecter dans les systmes de bords rels des entits virtuelles permettant lillu-
sion de prsenter un environnement tactique raliste. La deuxime partie traite
plus particulirement de cette capacit.
La simulation embarque: en route vers le futur (proche)
La capacit de simulation embarque se matrialise travers la gnration
dun environnement tactique virtuel dans lequel des menaces fictives ou des
vnements de tout type sont simuls et prsents sur les interfaces du cockpit.
79
Par exemple, un cran sur le cockpit peut prsenter les traces en mouvement repr-
sentant les adversaires et les allis comme le ferait le radar de lavion de combat
oprationnel alors quaucun radar nest prsent sur lavion de formation. Il devient
ainsi possible un pilote dutiliser son avion dans des conditions tactiques opra-
tionnelles. Ainsi, la simulation embarque permet une augmentation de lefficaci t
de lentranement, en garantissant une richesse de lenvironnement tactique simu l
dans des conditions de vol rel.
Plusieurs avantages se dgagent de cette technologie. Premirement, il sera
possible de dpasser le niveau de complexit tactique des entranements actuels car
la simulation embarque soulagera cognitivement le pilote de certains calculs men-
tal ce qui favorisera ses capacits de division de lattention (i.e., le pilote pourra
faire plus de tches et plus complexes quil ne peut le faire actuellement). De plus,
cette possibilit denrichissement de lenvironnement tactique en formation per-
mettra au pilote de se crer un bagage exprientiel trs proche des conditions du
terrain oprationnel. Cela facilitera dautant plus son activit en tant que pilote au
sein des forces.
Bien entendu, toutes les activits ne sont pas ralisables en simulation
embarque. Par exemple, il sera difficile de sentraner des missions dans les-
quelles le pilote doit interagir avec des lments par contact visuel direct travers
la verrire, et pourtant bien matrialiss dans sa simulation embarque. Cest pour-
quoi, dans lattente que certaines technologies comme la ralit augmente arrivent
maturit, il semble pour lheure plus raisonnable de sentraner des activits
ncessitant des interactions avec des lments prsents au-del de la porte visuel le
(Beyond Visual Range). Dans ces conditions, le risque de contradictions entre ce qui
est affich sur les crans de la simulation embarque et ce quil est possible de voir
lextrieur du cockpit est limit. Dautres limitations partages avec la simulation
au sol existent aussi, telles que le niveau dintelligence artificielle des entits
virtuelles ou encore la fidlit du comportement des menaces virtuelles.
Cependant, lvaluation des risques de cet outil est difficile anticiper du fait
dune cruelle absence dinformations formalises (recherches scientifiques et retour
dexprience). La rcence de cette technologie au sein des forces, et encore plus lors
de la formation, ncessite de baser la rflexion sur une technologie existante qui se
rapproche le plus possible des caractristiques de la simulation embarque : la moder-
nisation des cockpits des avions de formation, cest--dire les Technically Advanced
Aircraft (TAA). En effet, alors que cette modernisation technologique est cense
rduire les risques encourus en vol, la Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) sest
rendu compte dun taux dattrition plus lev pour ces types dappareil que pour les
appareils dancienne gnration. Les facteurs produisant le plus derreurs peuvent tre
regroups en deux catgories : laugmentation de la quantit dinformations analy-
ser et lautomatisation des systmes. La solution recommande par la FAA pour
rduire ces problmes est de fortement accentuer la formation des pilotes sur les
nouvelles comptences que ncessite la Gestion de systmes (GS). Il semble ainsi que,
80
pour favoriser un emploi efficient de la simulation embarque, tout en limitant les
risques, il soit ncessaire dinclure trs tt dans la formation du pilote lacquisition de
nouveaux types de comptences basiques . En effet, alors que les avions dancien ne
gnration requraient une part plus importante de basiques de vol, les nouveaux
sys tmes requirent en plus des comptences de GS. Ainsi, la formation des futurs
pilotes devrait pouvoir faire coexister ces deux types de basiques .
En rsum, les forces ariennes doivent faire face une rduction des pos si-
bilits de formation sur avion de combat oprationnel. Le but est donc de former
le mieux possible les jeunes pilotes aux comptences spcifiques de lavion opra-
tionnel avant quils ne commencent voler dessus
(1)
. Trois grandes classes de
com ptences sont acqurir : 1) les comptences de vol, les basics, 2) les comp-
tences en Gestion de Systmes et 3) les comptences en tactique de combat. La
simulation au sol est performante et fiable pour dvelopper les comptences de GS
et de tactique. Seulement, la simulation au sol nest pas performante pour se for-
mer aux comptences de vol. Seul le vol rel est efficient pour ce type de comp-
tence. Cest pourquoi la simulation embarque en vol rel reprsente un atout dans
la formation car elle permet de former ces trois classes de comptences.
Nanmoins, pour parvenir matriser la simulation embarque, le pilote doit
savoir matriser au pralable la GS. Cest donc par une formation progressive, base
sur un savoir-faire sculaire, et articulant soigneusement ces nouveaux outils, tels
que la simulation au sol et la simulation embarque, que les forces ariennes pour-
ront surmonter les enjeux actuels et futurs de la formation du pilote de combat
(2)
.
(1) Julien Donnot et Vincent Ferrari : Loptimisation de la formation du pilote de combat par downloading : limites et risques
(Rapport de recherche) ; EMAA/BPLANS, 2012.
(2) Cyril Camachon et Colin Blttler : La simulation embarque : limites et risques pour la formation et lentranement du
PN (Rapport de recherche) ; EMAA/BPLANS, 2012.
Les hommes et les femmes
de lArme de lair
tat-major de lArmee de lair.
EMAA
L
aviateur est dabord, comme ses frres darmes, un combattant, conscient que
la finalit de son mtier peut lobliger donner la mort mais aussi la
recevoir. Il doit faire face aux difficults avec la mme bravoure et le mme
engagement que ses grands anciens. Sur le territoire national comme au-del de nos
frontires, il affronte des situations de plus en plus complexes, souvent prilleuses et
caractrises par lurgence. Il soppose des adversaires ingnieux, capables de varier
leurs modes opratoires, en vol comme au sol. Pour faire face ces menaces, il doit
ds lors disposer des ressorts intellectuels, techniques et moraux ncessaires pour
sadapter individuellement aux conditions varies de ses engagements.
Aussi, laviateur a-t-il dvelopp des valeurs, respect, intgrit, service et
excellence, qui guident quotidiennement son action.
Une formation qui dveloppe valeurs et sens de la mission
Pour lArme de lair, la formation est un lment capital de lexcellence
quelle recherche dans lexcution des missions qui lui sont confies. Le milieu
aronautique, par les exigences techniques et humaines quil impose, en est la
matrice fondamentale. Aussi, la matrise de bout en bout de cette dernire garan-
tit la cohrence de laction quotidienne de lArme de lair.
Dans cette perspective, il sagit de pouvoir assurer la parfaite imbrication de
trois domaines qui constituent un triptyque cohrent et qui, en aucun cas, ne doi-
vent tre disjoints : la formation du combattant, la formation du spcialiste du
milieu aronautique et le niveau dencadrement envisag. Cette ralit structure
fondamentalement un modle dorganisation propre lArme de lair.
Les hommes et les femmes de lArme de lair constituent ainsi une vri-
table quipe, forte dune cinquantaine de mtiers diffrents, fdre par laction
dans le milieu arien. Quel que soit leur niveau de responsabilit et quel que soit
leur domaine daction, ils partagent une mme culture aronautique qui leur per-
met de travailler facilement ensemble et russir les missions qui leur sont confies.
81
82
Au prisme de leur formation, les aviateurs sont capables de penser de mani re
originale dans lincertitude et la tension, tout en restant fidles leurs valeurs. Ils
savent oprer dans un grand espace dautonomie, dautant mieux valori s quil est
accompagn par une grande responsabilisation de chacun. Il sagit toujours de ser vir,
de cultiver lexcellence, ce qui implique des devoirs, ce qui ncessi te de res pecter au
quotidien le sens de lengagement au service de la Nation.
Ces valeurs rayonnent au-del de lArme de lair
Indissociables de la performance de lArme de lair, les valeurs de laviateur
sont porteuses de performance dans toute organisation.
Les comptences techniques acquises et les qualits dveloppes par les
aviateurs, telles que la rigueur, le got des responsabilits, le sens du commande-
ment ou encore les aptitudes pdagogiques, sont autant dlments mettre en
avant pour valoriser les acquis par lexprience. Il faut veiller en renforcer la por-
te, dautant plus quils sont aisment transposables au profit dautres ministres ou
dans le monde entrepreneurial.
chaque niveau de responsabilit, du simple excutant au cadre de haut
niveau, un parcours au sein de lArme de lair peut tre un gage de russite. Ainsi,
les carrires au sein de lArme de lair peuvent offrir non seulement des perspec-
tives la jeunesse franaise mais contribuer galement la former pour le plus
grand bnfice du corps social et de lconomie franaise. Nombre de bassins
dem ploi se flicitent de lducation des militaires du rang quils recrutent au sein
de nos bases ariennes. Nombre dentreprises puisent chez nos sous-officiers, des
cadres de matrise aux comptences techniques larges. Nombre dofficiers poss-
dent les qualits de management indispensables au fonctionnement de nombreuses
entreprises en France, voire mme leur reprise. LArme de lair est donc, pour
beaucoup, un des derniers lieux o lascenseur social nest pas en panne.
Ainsi, par lducation et la formation quils reoivent, les hommes et les
femmes de lArme de lair sont des vecteurs de transmission de ces valeurs dans la
Nation.
Quels axes defforts pour demain?
La gestion des ressources humaines de lArme de lair doit poursuivre sa
modernisation, offrir une large flexibilit et garantir, par la formation, latteinte des
objectifs oprationnels fixs en optimisant ses cots.
La mission de lArme de lair se caractrise par la permanence quotidien ne
quelle assure au profit de la scurit et de la dfense des Franais. Elle est aussi dter-
mine par la haute ractivit qui sous-tend toute action arienne. Cest pourquoi
de lArme de lair
83
de lArme de lair
son personnel doit acqurir un socle commun de prparation oprationnelle qui
rponde ces exigences.
De plus, pour les missions les plus ambitieuses et difficiles telles que la
capacit dentrer en premier, elle doit pouvoir offrir une prparation oprationnel le
de trs haut niveau un volume de force plus restreint.
Enfin, elle doit savoir sinscrire dans la dure, en jouant finement sur les
diffrents niveaux dentranement de son personnel.
En corollaire et dans un contexte de resserrement des armes, le recours
la rserve oprationnelle est indispensable pour complter le dispositif de remon-
te en puissance. Les objectifs de volume de la rserve du dernier Livre blanc
(2008) nont pas t tenus. Il faut absolument mettre en place une politique glo-
bale cohrente intgrant un dispositif dincitation des entreprises sengageant
vis--vis de la dfense et permettant la valorisation de lengagement des rservistes
au sein de la socit civile.
Modernit est galement synonyme dune capacit sortir du cadre tradi-
tionnel qui dictait jusqu prsent la gestion des carrires de nos officiers et sous-
officiers. Il est indispensable de savoir se doter dune capacit rorienter le per-
sonnel mi-parcours. La matrise du modle dorganisation impose notamment de
savoir penser la formation des cadres militaires de haut niveau vers deux voies : soit
le commandement des armes soit vers dautres ministres ou vers le secteur priv.
LArme de lair offre la dfense un outil remarquable rsolument tourn

vers lavenir. Sa richesse repose sur des aviateurs passionns et la motivation exem-
plaire. Impliqus au quotidien sous tous les cieux, ce sont des citoyens franais fiers
de leur engagement au service de leur pays dont ils portent haut les couleurs. Aussi,
lArme de lair doit-elle continuer leur fournir une formation de qualit leur
per mettant de servir au meilleur niveau la nation. En retour, la nation en retirera les
subsides bien au-del de la seule satisfaction des contrats oprationnels.
R
D
N
Approche prospective
volution du champ de bataille
et puissance arienne
horizon 15 ans
Le capitaine Boutherin, docteur en droit public, est chef
de lquipe Prospective et tudes de scurit au sein du
Centre de recherche de lArme de lair (Crea). Christophe
Pajon, docteur en Science politique habilit diriger des
recherches, y est chercheur.
Grgory Boutherin
Christophe Pajon
Note prliminaire - Les propos et rflexions sont propres leurs auteurs et nengagent aucunement lArme de lair ou
le ministre de la Dfense. Le prsent article est tir dune tude ralise par les auteurs au profit de ltat-major de
lArme de lair intitule Lvolution du champ de bataille et son impact sur la puissance arospatiale horizon des quinze
prochaines annes.
L
es armes, et plus globalement le ministre de la Dfense, ont entam un
processus de transformation et dadaptation de leurs outils lenvironne-
ment international dans lequel ces derniers sont appels voluer dans les
annes venir. LArme de lair nchappe pas cette volution et a, de la mme
manire, entam un processus comparable qui doit la conduire au-del de lhori-
zon de 2025. Cette transformation doit alors saccompagner, fort logiquement,
dune rflexion plus globale sur lvolution et la nature du changement du champ
de bataille selon la mme dmarche prospective. Cest cette rflexion que les dve-
loppements suivants proposent de nourrir.
Les rcentes interventions tmoignent dune volution dans la nature des
conflits, des milieux dintervention, des adversaires et, de facto, dans lemploi fait
de la puissance arospatiale. Ce dernier rompt trs nettement avec les oprations
menes durant la dcennie 1990.
Faut-il cependant voir dans ces volutions un quelconque caractre dimen-
sionnant pour les engagements futurs ? Toutes les volutions du champ de bataille
ont-elles un impact causal direct sur lemploi de la puissance arospatiale, voire sur
ses caractristiques ?
Lobjet de cet article est alors de dtecter les volutions, actuelles ou futures,
du champ de bataille qui pourront ventuellement impacter lexercice de la puis-
sance arospatiale.
87
88
La multiplication des acteurs sur le champ de bataille
Le constat de laccroissement du nombre des acteurs et de leur nature nest
pas une tendance nouvelle. Toutefois, cette recomposition et la complexit de cette
mosaque de rseaux se sont accentues depuis lidentification du phnomne il y a
plusieurs dcennies. Sur le champ externe, la forme tatique nest plus la seule pos-
sder les ressources ncessaires au dveloppement dune action sur la scne interna-
tionale. Les organisations non gouvernementales, les organisations internationales, les
mouvements transnationaux, les entreprises prives, les socits militaires/de scurit
prives, en sont aussi des acteurs. La nature collective mme de lacteur des relations
internationales se voit battue en brche. Le rle de lindividu, le touriste ou le terro-
riste, serait le signe ultime de latomisation de la socit internationale. Par son action
(attentat, envoi dune vido sur Internet) ou par sa simple prsence (enlvement, vic-
time), lindividu devient un acteur des relations internationales. Dun point de vue
interne, les tats se voient concurrencer, jusqu limplosion parfois, par des acteurs
collectifs infra-tatiques qui remettent en cause la lgitimit de la structure politique.
Des conflits forcment contre-insurrectionnels
Le champ de bataille reflte alors dans un espace plus restreint cette remi-
se en cause dun double monopole tatique : celui de la matrise des relations inter-
nationales et celui de la lgitimit politique interne. La caractrisation des acteurs
du champ de bataille confirme en effet ce brouillage de la frontire interne/
externe. Ainsi, les Organisations non-gouvernementales (ONG) de type organisa-
tions de solidarit internationale interviennent sur le champ de bataille via leur
division oprationnelle, mais recueillent leur financement auprs des tats et des
organisations intergouvernementales grce des militants et des structures implan-
tes notamment dans les tats occidentaux. Elles ne sont pas forcment trans-
nationales mais parfois identifies une nation. La communication visant la
promotion de leur action sur le champ de bataille a un objectif double : lever des
fonds et accrotre leur capital mdiatique auprs des populations occidentales.
Cette lgitimit leur servira dans le cadre de ngociations, notamment financires,
avec les autorits publiques nationales et/ou internationales. Les socits militaires,
bien quintervenant sur le terrain, existent et dveloppent elles aussi des relations
contractuelles avec certains tats selon des systmes normatifs distincts, questions
juridiques dfinies nationalement quelles importent dans une certaine mesure sur
le champ de bataille. Il sagit l de deux exemples, mais qui illustrent particulire-
ment la fin de lappropriation tatique du champ de bataille, qui est le symptme
et lune des consquences de la multiplication des acteurs. Lautre consquence qui
entrane un accroissement de la complexit du champ de bataille est la confronta-
tion dune multiplicit de rationalits. Chacun dentre eux a ses propres priorits,
ses propres enjeux qui ne relvent pas du mme registre : militaires, politiques,
mdiatiques, normatifs (morale, droit).
volution du champ de bataille et puissance arienne
horizon 15 ans
89
horizon 15 ans
Du point de vue des parties belligrantes, lune des principales, et vraisem-
blablement des plus notables, volutions du champ de bataille de ces dernires
annes semble videmment tenir au caractre non-tatique des adversaires auxquels
doivent avoir faire face les forces occidentales. lexception du conflit ayant
oppo s, en aot 2008, la Gorgie et la Russie, la majeure partie des conflits contem-
porains voit en effet lopposition ou la collaboration de forces conventionnelles des
insurgs ou mouvements non tatiques. LIrak, lAfghanistan, le Sud Liban, la Libye
ou encore le Mali en apportent de notables illustrations. La question qui domine
nombre danalyses actuelles est alors celle de ladaptation de la puissance arospa-
tiale, conue dabord pour rpondre la menace dun adversaire tatique. La
thorie des cercles concentriques de Warden formalisait, de ce point de vue, cette
forme dengagement en envisageant ladversaire comme un systme dcisionnaire
quasi-organique, dot de capacits dcisionnelles et dac tion . Or, comment faire
face un adversaire a priori dpourvu de centres de gravit ? La rponse consiste
tout dabord ne pas avoir une vision tronque du modle systmique de Warden
qui dfinissait une entit stratgique comme toute organisation qui peut op-
rer de faon autonome ; cest--dire qui se dirige et se supporte elle-mme .
Comme lexplique Joseph Henrotin, si l adversaire typique de Warden tait un
tat, une vision systmique permet dtendre le raisonnement aux groupes insur-
gs : eux aussi fonctionnent avec un leadership (dirigeants et idologues), des
organes essentiels (plates-formes mdiatiques en ligne, par exemple), des infra-
structures (systme financier ou de passeurs), une population (soutenant les
insurgs) et des forces dployes . Sil est donc actuellement important de conce-
voir les moyens de rpondre ces situations, le besoin sera toujours existant
lho ri zon des quinze prochaines annes, horizon auquel ladversaire non tatique
sera toujours dans une situation de refus de laffrontement direct, fugace et donc par
l mme rapide, imprvisible, difficilement identifiable/discriminable, lger. En
effet, ces traits caractrisent la nature objective des guerres irrgulires, pour
employer la terminologie clausewitzienne. Si lon postule lexistence de tels conflits
dans lavenir, on suppose galement, en effet, la prsence dun adversaire possdant
ces traits. Reste, cela tant, quil faut galement se prmunir contre un autre danger
qui serait de considrer la contre-insurrection comme tant, invitablement et inva-
riablement, lunique forme de guerre dans les quinze prochaines annes.
Des acteurs non-belligrants
Outre la nature des adversaires, ce type de conflit a permis de mettre parti-
culirement en lumire limportance dautres acteurs non belligrants. Ainsi, selon
le type danalyse, ces groupes dindividus, vivant ou non sur le thtre doprations
(on pense pour lessentiel aux populations locales ou nationales, aux mdias et aux
ONG), peuvent tre considrs de trois manires diffrentes et simultanes : en tant
quinstrument, objectif voire centre de gravit ; en tant quacteur autonome ; et,
enfin, en tant que contexte.
90
la diffrence du territoire qui peut tre tenu, la population nest pas un
objet inerte : elle possde son propre caractre et son intentionnalit volue. Cest
parce quelle est un acteur, quelle peut tre convaincue par lune ou lautre des par-
ties. La considrer seulement comme un objet ou un lment de lenvironnement
physique peut conduire la transformer en un alli volontaire (support logistique,
rservoir de recrutement) de ladversaire asymtrique. Ainsi, la population, ou
plutt son soutien, devient un objectif stratgique pour les parties prenantes.
Si les moyens (persuasion ou terreur) varient dun protagoniste lautre (et
de son systme de valeur), la population reprsente un lment de la conqute.
Gagner les curs et les esprits : lexpression aujourdhui largement connue et
rpandue reflte une ralit et une volution du champ de bataille. Comme le
met en exergue le gnral Sir Rupert Smith dans la troisime partie de son ouvra ge
Lutilit de la force, les finalits pour lesquelles nous nous battons ont chang , la
population est devenue le centre de gravit des oprations contemporaines.
Objectif stratgique, la conqute du soutien de la population appelle une redfi-
nition de lusage de la force et surtout lvaluation de son impact sur la population,
prise en tant quopinion publique.
Il dcoule de cet objectif, un certain nombre de contraintes, de principes
ou de paradigmes que lon peut prsenter comme suit :
l comprendre la population afin de mieux apprhender la manire dont
elle peroit ou peut percevoir les actions des forces conventionnelles ;
l faire comprendre les objectifs et y faire adhrer la population ;
l venir en soutien la population, lui apporter une large aide, aussi bien dun
point de vue mdical que dinfrastructure ( ce niveau, il apparat bien que les moyens
ddis laromobilit jouent un rle essentiel dans ce soutien la population, que ce
soit par le ravitaillement et les vacuations sanitaires notamment) ;
l matriser la violence (usage proportionn, viter les pertes civiles) et
donc au pralable possder, outre des rgles dengagement trs strictes, une large
gamme darmements effets progressifs ou de mode daction permettant de modu-
ler les effets afin de ne pas en faire un argument pour les insurgs dans la lutte
dinfluence quils conduisent ;
l rpondre aux arguments de persuasion et actions sociales de ladversaire
point par point.
Ces rgles et objectifs font alors de la population un environnement contrai-
gnant pour les forces occidentales, ce dont ladversaire cherche tirer avantages.
Puissance arienne et population
De manire spontane, un certain nombre dlments pourrait contribuer
penser que la puissance arospatiale nest que peu concerne par ce recentrage de
horizon 15 ans
91
horizon 15 ans
la rflexion stratgique sur la population. Cette vision est videmment fausse. La
prservation de la population et la limitation des dommages collatraux sont deve-
nues pour la puissance arospatiale un enjeu central et ce pour plusieurs raisons :
les grands principes du droit des conflits arms (distinction, ncessit, proportion-
nalit, humanit), la judiciarisation de la guerre, limportance devant tre accorde
aussi bien la lgitimit de laction qu la perception de celle-ci par les opinions
publiques, la guerre de la communication et donc dans une certaine mesure
linstrumentalisation pouvant tre faite par les adversaires de toutes frappes non
discriminantes.
De plus, il est videmment essentiel de garder lesprit la prise en compte des
effets politiques. Il est en effet devenu commun que de rappeler quun succs tactique
peut, facilement, dboucher sur un chec stratgique. La destruction dun rseau lec-
trique peut, par exemple, induire des coupures dnergie dans lalimentation dune
usine de purification des eaux. Ces dfaillances pourront elles-mmes avoir des cons-
quences sur la vie quotidienne et la sant de la population civile locale.
Finalement, ces diffrents lments confirment que, si larme arienne, a pu
tre un temps loutil central de la guerre industrielle et dune certaine conception
nord-amricaine de laffrontement, ses volutions (technologiques et demploi) la
rendent particulirement propre laction au sein de la population. Loin de
conduire la centralisation et la rupture avec la ralit des oprations, concep-
tion trs orwellienne de la technologie, sa sophistication la rapproche du terrain
et de lhomme : dconcentration de la dcision, renforcement des liens horizon-
taux et boucle dcisionnelle courte, observation intime et discriminante de la
population et de ladversaire (pattern of life) par les drones. Paradoxalement, la
technologie dploye par larme arienne offre une conomie des moyens et des
hommes loin dune formalisation abstraite.
Multiplication des acteurs, des natures protiformes, un acteur tatique
toujours prsent mais dont les pratiques peuvent galement largement sinspirer
des mthodes de guerre irrgulires sont autant de traits qui sagrgent pour consti-
tuer une premire tendance lourde de lvolution du champ de bataille.
La puissance arospatiale face au paradoxe de la modernit
chez ladversaire: entre rusticit et haute technologie
De manire comparable ce qui a t soulign pour les acteurs, le change-
ment du point de vue technologique ne peut tre apprhend de manire uni-
directionnelle. Aussi, la puissance arienne devrait continuer tre mme de faire
face des adversaires possdant un potentiel technologique comparable, ou tech-
nologiquement asymtrique, ou bien encore alliant, selon les moments ou les
domaines dactions, la trs haute technologie et des moyens dpasss selon les stan-
dards des nations les plus industrialises.
92
Toutefois, ce constat ralis, et en ayant postul que lavance technologique
reste un facteur cl dans la conduite de la guerre et central dans le cadre de la troisi me
dimension dans laquelle prvaut la loi du plus fort * , la question du nombre de
comptiteurs et de la forme de leur contestation de la supriorit arien ne des forces
armes les plus avances reste entire. La ou les rponses fluctuent et rsul tent de la
prise en compte de deux sources de tensions : les moyens financiers et matriels dis-
ponibles (ce qui renvoie partiellement la nature tatique ou non-ta tique de lad-
versaire) et le niveau de sophistication des technologies.
Dune part, en raison du cot toujours plus lev de la recherche et du
dveloppement des technologies les plus sophistiqus et de la multiplicit des
domaines dexpertise coordonner, le ticket dentre dans le club des puissances
ariennes est lev. Il en rsulte quil ne rassemble que des acteurs tatiques (
lex ception dun embryon de force arienne comme tel peut tre le cas avec les
Tigres tamouls). Mais, cette condition nest pas suffisante. En effet, ce chiffre
dcrot encore si on ne compte que les tats capables de gnrer une force arien ne
pouvant accomplir autre chose que des missions dautodfense. Sous cet angle, le
paysage deviendrait alors particulirement contrast, entre un nombre de plus en
plus rduit de comptiteurs crdibles (en raison des cots croissants) et une forme
de dsert technologique. En ralit, la situation est beaucoup plus nuance.
En effet, tout dabord, il y a, et il y aura, prolifration de technologies aro-
nautiques, essentiellement russes et chinoises, mme si la prolifration des aronefs
russes comme chinois ne remet pas ncessairement, et invitablement, en cause la
supriorit arienne des forces occidentales. Cette tendance est concomitante
celle du passage de considrations essentiellement quantitatives dautres qualita-
tives. Cette volution est directement lie lentre dans les forces des appareils de
4
e
gnration et larrive de la 5
e
(quand bien mme celle-ci soit restreinte un
nombre limit dtats).
Ensuite, entre 2005 et 2015, 4 000 avions de combat (y compris avions
lgers) seront produits dans le monde dont les deux tiers seront des avions de com bat
polyvalents. Ce qui va tre suivi entre 2015 et 2025 par le remplacement des flottes
de 3
e
gnration. Une rduction globale du nombre davions de combat dans le
monde est probable, en raison de la recherche dune plus grande polyvalence des vec-
teurs et dune meilleure performance globale. Par ailleurs, la recherche des avantages
horizon 15 ans
* La 3
e
dimension : un espace o prvaut la loi du plus fort
Cest notamment ce sur quoi insistait le gnral Denis Mercier, Chef dtat-major de lArme de lair, en soulignant
que [l]e combat pour la matrise des espaces ariens peut tre anticip car celui qui soppose un adversaire dans
ce milieu doit se signer et prparer son affrontement visage dcouvert, contrairement aux espaces terrestres ou mari-
times dans lesquels des modes daction asymtriques fragilisent les quilibres, notamment par tous les dispositifs de
minage. La puissance arospatiale est dmonstrative. La loi du plus fort en reste llment dterminant : GAA Denis
Mercier : Penser la puissance arospatiale de 2025. Cinq principes pour guider la rflexion in Air & Space Power
Journal Afrique et francophonie, 2
e
trimestre 2012, vol. 3, n 2, p. 9.
93
horizon 15 ans
quoffrent les systmes de drones va non seulement crotre mais se gnraliser et ne
restera trs certainement pas le privilge des armes fort potentiel technologique.
Enfin, la puissance arospatiale devra alors savoir dvelopper des systmes
de dtection et didentification particulirement efficaces afin de faire face des
technologies rustiques que savent employer, notamment, les adversaires non
ta tiques.
Cela tant, le constat de la prolifration des technologies arospatiales ninduit
pas automatiquement lmergence de comptiteurs crdibles, et encore moins leur
gnralisation horizon 15 ans, et cela essentiellement pour trois raisons :
l Ces systmes darmes ncessitent des comptences prcises rsultant dune
formation initiale, de lacquisition et de la transmission dune exprience opration-
nelle consquente ainsi que de leur maintien par la participation rgulire des exer-
cices notamment interarmes et interallis. Or, de fait, peu nombreux sont les tats
pouvant combiner des technologies avances et lensemble de ces lments.
l Ces systmes darmes doivent de plus tre intgrs dans un systme C2
particulirement performant afin de pouvoir fournir leur plein potentiel.
l Enfin, outre que ces systmes darmes doivent bien sr possder les arme-
ments adquats, ils doivent tre troitement lis un rseau de surveillance arienne
et de dfense antiarienne efficaces et performants.
Cependant, il semble ncessaire et important de prendre en considration
aussi la tendance la prolifration des systmes antiariens, quand bien mme, une
fois encore, la diffusion des systmes de missiles sol-air ne doit pas tre considre
ponctuellement mais rintgre dans une structure de dfense.
En synthtisant ce tour dhorizon de lvolution du champ de bataille
du point de vue technologique, trois axes dvolutions potentielles se dgagent :
l Poursuite et acclration de la prolifration des systmes darmes, y
compris pour les gnrations les plus rcentes.
l Prolifration au profit des acteurs non tatiques.
l mergence de plus en plus marquante de la capacit des acteurs en par-
ticulier non tatiques adapter, transformer et dtourner des systmes
darmes et/ou des technologies civiles.
Pour la puissance arienne, il en rsulte ds lors la ncessit de sattendre
un large spectre de menaces et une grande imprvisibilit. Au-del des rponses
en termes de stratgie de moyens et de modes daction, il apparat fondamental de
garder lesprit que, dune part, ladversaire nest pas forcment tout le temps et en
tout lieu technologiquement infrieur sur le champ de bataille et, dautre part, si
tel est le cas, cela ne postule pas quil est dnu de moyen de nuisance.
94
La puissance arospatiale entre champ de bataille
et champ daffrontement
Des milieux complexes
Au-del des acteurs et des moyens, lanalyse de lvolution du champ de
bataille doit naturellement porter une attention particulire au terrain sur lequel
seront mises en uvre les forces armes en gnral et, pour ce qui nous intresse ici,
la puissance arienne en particulier. De ces caractristiques rsultent en effet des
contraintes sur les moyens dploys et leurs effets attendus et rels. nouveau,
lactualit trace une ligne dvolution attache un espace particulier, la ville.
Toutefois, la rserve initiale soit ne pas considrer les volutions actuelles comme
tant ncessairement les ralits de demain pousse prendre des distances avec ce
quon pourrait qualifier de tout urbain . La montagne en tant quespace de confron-
tation est, par exemple, un environnement complexe appelant aussi la mise en uvre
dun certain nombre de moyens arospatiaux selon des paradigmes sensiblement dif-
frents. Cest trs clairement ce quont rcemment illustr les oprations au Mali,
notamment lors des phases offensives visant les sanctuaires des groupes arms situs
dans les Ifoghas et lAdrar. Cela a conduit la mobilisation et la coordination dun
grand nombre daronefs de tout type (Rafale, Mirage 2000D, C-135, drone Harfang,
Atlantique 2) pour mener des frappes simultanes contre plusieurs objectifs. En outre,
la confrontation des volonts ne se limite plus aujourdhui la surface terrestre et
nimplique pas ncessairement lusage, mme matris, de la force arme. LEspace
comme le cyberespace deviennent de vritables champs daffrontement : extension ou
composante du champ de bataille, leur nature ainsi que les menaces les peuplant et
qui pourront y transiter appellent des considrations elles aussi particulires.
Les conflits contemporains, quil sagisse de lAfghanistan, de lIrak, des
conflits opposant les forces israliennes au Hezbollah et au Hamas au Sud Liban et
dans les Territoires palestiniens, ou bien sr de la Libye, tmoignent dun glissement
du champ de bataille vers des milieux particulirement complexes, et notamment
vers les villes. La ville ou la montagne ne sont certes pas des milieux nouveaux pour
les forces. En existe-t-il dailleurs encore dans lesquels les hommes ne se soient-ils
pas dj battus ? Lhistoire militaire regorge dexemples de bataille ou de guerre
menes dans ces environnements, consquence directe du fait que la ville possde
une valeur en raison de la concentration des pouvoirs politiques, conomiques,
sociaux, culturels et de la charge symbolique qui est la sienne. Les villes continue-
ront donc naturellement tre un enjeu des conflits. Mais plus encore, le champ de
bataille urbain tendra certainement se gnraliser, non seulement du fait du ph-
nomne durbanisation croissante lchelle mondiale, comme peuvent le relever
nombre de projections mais galement par la volont mme de certains acteurs. Les
adversaires des forces occidentales sont en effet enclins rechercher dans cet envi-
ronnement un rle galisateur en contournant la puissance militaro-technologique
de ces dernires. Le combat en zone urbaine, en milieu clos, tend alors devenir un
horizon 15 ans
95
horizon 15 ans
moyen dautant plus privilgi pour le plus faible quil sagit de zones, dune part,
que ladversaire connat dautant mieux quil y vit gnralement et a pu se prparer
au combat et, dautre part, qui complexifient lintervention. La ville est en effet un
environnement qui offre nombre davantages au dfenseur : refuges, imbrication
avec les populations, obstacles pour le dploiement de vhicules blinds, pour
lemploi de larme arienne Par ailleurs, outre le positionnement gographique de
la ville elle-mme (cuvette, sommet, plaine, etc.), sa gographique propre peut dif-
frer (centre-ville occidental, ancien, priphries rsidentielles et pavillonnaires,
industrielles, etc.). La ville, au sens large, tend ainsi devenir en soi un milieu phy-
sique de plus en plus complexe en raison de son volution propre.
Comme le souligne Olivier Zajec, [l]e combat urbain reprsente sans
conteste le champ dengagement futur le plus probable et le plus dimensionnant pour
les forces armes des pays occidentaux. La puissance arienne nest pas la seule ten-
ter de rsoudre lquation difficile quil pose. Pour laviation comme pour les forces
terrestres, le thtre urbain, par dfinition complexe et changeant, constitue un dfi
majeur . Cela tant, la puissance arospatiale joue un rle minent en milieu urbain
pour plusieurs raisons. Dune part, elle permet de disposer une connaissance situa-
tionnelle fondamentale dans ce milieu complexe et volutif grce aux capacits
ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) permanentes quelle met en uvre les
drones et qui prsentent lavantage dtre hors de porte des menaces sol/air de type
armes lgres et SATCP (Sol-air trs courte porte) contrairement aux aronefs
voilures tournantes qui peuvent difficilement faire du vol statique dans ce milieu
sans tre exposs. Lintrt que prsentent les drones en milieu urbain est tout aussi
avr dans les phases amont dune action arme comme lillustrent particulirement
bien les quatre mois dacquisition de renseignements et de go-rfrencement qui ont
prcd la seconde offensive sur Falloujah (novembre 2004) ou lors du conflit qui a
oppos Isral au Hezbollah lt 2006. Dautre part, la puissance arospatiale auto-
rise des modes dactions atypiques afin de limiter les dommages collatraux dont
lemploi de munition avec une charge non explosive en bton, limage de ce qui a
pu tre fait par des Mirage 2000D franais en Libye.
Dmatrialisation du champ de bataille
Mais la ville, de nouveau, nest pas tout. Elle nest pas le seul visage du lieu
daffrontement futur. Une tentative de dfinition du champ de bataille tendrait
souligner combien ses contours sont difficiles tracer, rsultat en partie de son
extension des sphres non forcment physiques. Cette tendance nest bien sr pas
soudainement apparue, mais correspond au dveloppement et larrive maturi t
de technologies de plus en plus performantes.
Dune part, la numrisation du champ de bataille, dont la mise en rseau
est lun des principaux instruments, reprsente laffirmation dun vritable champ
daffrontement, dont les adversaires chercheront acqurir le contrle ou pour le
96
moins nous en contester les avantages offerts. Ce premier espace, gnralement
qualifi de cyberespace, tend devenir un milieu o les menaces vont croissant,
tant il sagit dun milieu stratgique duquel dpendent aussi bien les oprations
militaires que plus largement nos socits modernes. Il importe dailleurs pour
cette dernire raison davoir une prise en compte globale de cette sphre daffron-
tement. Autrement dit, si lArme de lair est trs largement dpendante de cette
sphre et si, naturellement , il lui incombe dassurer la scurit de ses rseaux et
systmes dinformation, le cyberspace reste en revanche un domaine commun,
aussi bien aux diffrents acteurs militaires que plus largement lensemble des
acteurs civils ou militaires. Aussi, la prise en compte des vulnrabilits et des
menaces, et donc la surveillance, relve de dmarches inter (-armes, - agences,
-services et -ministrielles).
Extension du champ de bataille
Dautre part, plus embryonnaire pour linstant en termes de menace, mais
nanmoins sujet proccupation, lespace (exo- et extra-atmosphrique) apparat
aussi comme un milieu o sexprimeront les rivalits et sexerceront des rapports de
force tant ce milieu est essentiel la conduite des oprations militaires que vrita-
blement stratgique pour le dveloppement de nos socits. Lune des principales
raisons tient tout dabord au fait que la matrise de lespace reprsente, dune
manire quelque peu semblable larme nuclaire, un enjeu de rang pour les tats.
La course au premier satellite (habit et non-habit), puis la conqute de la Lune
entre les tats-Unis et lURSS, appartenait ce type de registre. Cette motivation
na pas disparu aujourdhui. On la retrouve dans les discours accompagnant les
programmes spatiaux de certains tats, comme par exemple lIran, devenu dixi me
puissance spatiale mondiale avec le lancement dun satellite (Omid, Espoir) le
4 fvrier 2009, lors des clbrations des 30 ans de la Rvolution islamique.
Au-del de lenjeu de souverainet et/ou de rayonnement, qui peut guider
les programmes spatiaux, ce sont aussi bien des intrts stratgiques que tactico-
opratifs qui poussent les tats, ou groupes dtats, accder lEspace, tenter
de le matriser, voire en dnier laccs dautres. Ainsi, prolongement ou produit
du dveloppement du cyberespace, le domaine spatial est devenu essentiel, indis-
pensable, toute opration militaire de par son utilisation dans le domaine des
tlcommunications, de lobservation, de la navigation, de lalerte avance, etc. De
manire connexe la dpendance au cyberespace, les forces armes modernes sont
donc soumises lutilisation de lespace qui concourt trs largement la conduite
des oprations militaires sur terre. Ds lors, les capacits spatiales apparaissent
dautant plus sensibles que leur neutralisation, au sens le plus large du terme,
nui rait sans conteste la conduite des oprations. Il apparat ainsi logique de
lin t grer dans lanalyse des milieux du champ de bataille et, donc, de chercher
dgager les futures volutions.
horizon 15 ans
97
horizon 15 ans
Plus quune autre composante, lArme de lair a une responsabilit parti-
culire, si ce nest quasi-naturelle lgard de ce milieu. Bien que lon conteste
par fois la continuit de la troisime dimension et de lespace pour des motifs rele-
vant des sciences physiques, celle-ci demeure une ralit de manire pratique.
Les ncessaires adaptations peuvent tre rsumes au dveloppement et au
durcissement des flottes satellitaires, soit dans un cadre strictement national, soit
plus probablement dans un cadre europen. Les efforts dj consentis dans ce
domaine ont fait de la France et de lEurope des puissances spatiales de premier
rang. Leur poursuite est ncessaire pour bnficier dune relle et totale autonomie
de dcision et de conduite des oprations. la lumire de la rapidit des volutions
technologiques, politiques et des ralisations de certains tats, tout bref relche-
ment dans les efforts budgtaires et technologiques, mais galement doctrinaux,
pourrait avoir des consquences fortement prjudiciables. Aujourdhui, la France
bnficie avec le radar Graves (Grand rseau adapt la veille spatiale) dun rel
avantage en matire de connaissance situationnelle spatiale quil importe, bien sr,
non seulement de conserver et donc de protger, mais galement dlargir afin
danticiper tout risque ou menace dans ce milieu qui tendra tre de plus en plus
contest lhorizon des quinze prochaines annes. Il sagit donc de rflchir aux
parades et mcanismes de dissuasion spatiaux face lhypothse de laffirmation
par certains tats dune ventuelle arsenalisation de lespace. Le renforcement des
capacits de surveillance et de dtection serait en effet dissuasif en ce sens quil
permettrait didentifier lorigine dune attaque contre un segment satellitaire.
Le Temps, lment central du champ de bataille
voquer les volutions que connat le champ de bataille et qui seront ame n
le caractriser lhorizon des prochaines annes, doit enfin conduire sin tresser
une notion centrale qui est celle du temps. Centrale, en effet, en ce que le temps
est vritablement devenu un enjeu majeur des conflits, chacun cherchant le ma-
triser, imposer son rythme lautre. Garder un avantage temporel sur lad versaire,
un coup davance , conserver linitiative, reprsente en effet lune des conditions
classiques du succs de la manuvre militaire. Lacclration du temps et lvolution
de la nature de ladversaire, de ses modes et milieux daction, etc., transforment alors
sensiblement ce pralable.
La permanence ou la matrise du temps long
Lun des dfis pour la puissance arospatiale dans lenvironnement conflic-
tuel tel quil est amen voluer, marqu par la fugacit des cibles et le refus de
laf frontement direct des adversaires apparat finalement devoir tre celui de
conjuguer matrise de la force, connaissance situationnelle et ractivit. Ces deux
derniers aspects renvoient la ncessit pour la puissance arospatiale de savoir ma-
triser les temps long (permanence en vol) et court. De ce point de vue, les rcentes
98
oprations ont tmoign du rle central dvolu aux drones pour ce faire. Outre le
fait quils loignent lHomme de la zone de risque, ils offrent surtout comme prin-
cipal avantage celui de matriser le temps long, de durer sur zone. Ils offrent, autre-
ment dit, lavantage de la permanence. Cette caractristique est dau tant plus essen-
tielle que le temps est devenu un trait marquant des conflits contemporains et un
lment vraisemblablement structurant des conflits de demain.
Les adversaires agissent un double niveau de temporalit. Ils chercheront,
dune part, faire durer lengagement des forces pour les conduire lessoufflement
en profitant de plus en plus des diffrents relais mdiatiques pour influer sur les
opinions publiques, sur leur perception de la lgitimit de lintervention, voire
chercheront-ils tirer profit de leur faible capacit de rsilience. Leur objectif en
jouant sur le temps long est alors de nature stratgique . linverse, ils utilise-
ront, dautre part, au niveau tactique, le temps court. Nayant pas les capacits
daffronter directement la force, ils prfreront, comme nous lavons vu, faire le
choix de la fugacit et de la dissimulation en profitant notamment de la complexi t
des environnements. La force dploye doit alors savoir matriser le temps court.
En cela, la permanence est un gain oprationnel certain : loccupation du ciel en
permanence, couple une mise en rseau des capteurs et des rcepteurs, permet
davoir une pleine connaissance situationnelle, une vision totale du champ de
bataille et une image commune de la situation oprationnelle ; elle offre une ma-
trise, au niveau tactique et opratif, du temps long, permettant dagir sur le temps
court en captant linstant fugace. Si la guerre du Kosovo avait rvl certaines
limites en la matire, la permanence des plates-formes ISR, tout temps, apparat
aujourdhui comme une vritable innovation tactico-oprative en offrant une cou-
verture de zones et en alimentant les forces (ariennes comme terrestres) en rensei-
gnement de manire continue et instantane. Les exemples en tmoignant sont
nombreux : que ce soit au Liban ou Gaza, en Irak ou en Afghanistan, aucune force
engage dans un conflit ne peut dornavant faire lconomie de cette permanence
que confrent les drones.
Mais la permanence des plateformes peut offrir un avantage autre que la
seule acquisition du renseignement. De la mme manire que le sont (temporaire-
ment) le Show of Presence et le Show of Force, les drones ont un rle dissuasif au
niveau tactique au sens premier du terme et contribuent un emploi matris de
la force. En faisant planer non forcment une menace mais une prsence au-dessus
dune zone, laissant entendre aux adversaires quils sont perptuellement observs
et que la raction de la force tend devenir de plus en plus courte dans le temps,
les drones contribuent influer sur la prise de dcision et inciter les adversaires
ne pas agir . Cette fonction dissuasive des drones qui sen trouve renforce
ds lors que les plateformes sont armes offre un niveau de graduation suppl-
mentaire dans lemploi de la force dautant plus essentiel dans des oprations de
contre-insurrection ou de stabilisation que la protection et laide la population,
et plus clairement son soutien, sont dterminants.
horizon 15 ans
99
horizon 15 ans
Ladaptation lacclration du rythme
Derrire les avantages quoffrent les drones en termes de renseignement et
de matrise de linformation, cest bien la notion de ractivit qui se dessine en fili-
grane. Cette problmatique nest bien sr pas nouvelle en soi et est au cur aussi
bien du concept de boucle OODA (Observation, orientation, dcision, action)
que du cycle de traitement dune cible dit F2T2EA (Find, Fix, Track, Target,
Engage, Assess). Mais les oprations contemporaines, quil sagisse de celles
conduites par Isral ou de celles menes en Afghanistan et en Irak, rvlent le carac-
tre central de cet aspect et limportance aussi bien de savoir effectuer des ciblages
dopportunit que de pouvoir traiter des Time Sensitive Target (TST). Dans les
rcentes oprations de contre-insurrection, le ciblage dopportunit a pu constituer
lessentiel des missions offensives de la puissance arospatiale. La ncessit de ma-
triser le temps court, et lextrme le temps rel, apparat comme lune des prin-
cipales consquences des volutions que connat le champ de bataille. En cher-
chant par exemple se fondre dans la population ou profiter des diverses zones
dombre quoffrent les centres urbains, les adversaires tentent dimposer leur
ryth me. Il sagit donc de matriser le temps long (permanence) et de contracter
celui scoulant entre lobservation et laction. Cest de ce point de vue que les
drones prsentent un avantage incommensurable : la permanence quils autorisent
associe leur capacit transmettre linformation directement, en continu et en
temps rel, permet une acclration du rythme et une matrise du temps.
Sil ressort finalement une importance toute particulire de lensemble
observation/frappe , matriser le tempo en particulier des fins de ractivit dans
le dclenchement dune opration ncessite galement un autre degr un impor-
tant niveau de dcentralisation, qui nest ds lors pas sans consquence en termes
organisationnels. De ce point de vue, les oprations au Mali illustrent particulire-
ment bien le savoir-faire de lArme de lair en terme de ractivit. Elles tmoignent
par l mme de tout lintrt quil y a pouvoir conduire des oprations depuis le
CNOA (Centre national des oprations ariennes) de Lyon Mont-Verdun.
Parmi les nombreuses dimensions et nature du changement du champ de

bataille, seules quelques-unes, parce quayant un possible lien direct avec lemploi
de larme arienne, ont t mises en exergue. Il sagit dune lecture dun environ-
nement complexe qui a pour objectif desquisser un paysage avec une forme de
subjectivit qui exclut toute exhaustivit. En effet, si une tendance, un axe dvo-
lution central ressort de lanalyse de lvolution du champ de bataille, cest
laccroissement continu de sa complexit, li de manire troite laccroissement
du tempo, du rythme sur le champ de bataille et de son volution.
Cette tendance centrale a des consquences contrastes et nuances sur les
caractristiques de la puissance arospatiale. Elle peut renforcer lim portance de ces
100
dernires et donc accrotre son propre rle sur le champ de bataille. La description
et les tendances qui traverseront lenvironnement de bataille (tendu mais aussi
confin et dspatialis, pouvant tre dshumanis mais aussi peupl, aux menaces
diffuses et permanentes, etc.) mettent en valeur le traditionnel triptyque ( Plus
haut, plus vite, plus loin ) caractrisant la puissance arospatiale.
Cependant, afin de conserver cet avantage initial, voire de multiplier les effets
et les bnfices procurs par cette trinit de caractristiques, il convient peut-tre de
remettre plus en exergue les qualits des vecteurs de la troisime dimension : la flexi-
bilit (adaptabilit) et la permanence. Dj identifis dans lInstruction 1000 portant
Doctrine interarmes demploi des forces en oprations, ces qualits devraient deve-
nir des caractristiques de la puissance arospatiale. Ce quintette Plus haut, plus
vite, plus loin, plus flexible, plus longtemps serait alors loutil le plus adapt face
la complexification du champ de bataille ainsi qu lintensification de son rythme.
Si le temps est bien lenjeu central des prochains engagements arms, cest bien la
capacit le matriser qui sera gage de succs des oprations.
horizon 15 ans
lments de bibliographie
Joseph Henrotin : Peut-on penser une campagne coin en stratgie arienne ? Lapport de Warden in Dfense
& scurit internationale n 54, dcembre 2009, p. 29.
Rupert Smith : Lutilit de la force : lart de la guerre aujourdhui ; conomica, fvrier 2007 ; 396 pages.
Olivier Zajec : Puissance arienne et milieu urbain ; Compagnie europenne dintelligence stratgique, 10 juillet 2007 ;
p. 5-6.
Ladaptation
des capacits militaires
EMAA
S
i la nature de la guerre est invariable, ses formes sont mouvantes et souvent
complexes. Les conflits dans lesquels nos forces armes ont t rgulirement
engages en attestent. Ils sont caractriss par un spectre particulirement
large allant de laffrontement intertatique la confrontation asymtrique avec des
acteurs sub-tatiques , conjuguant high tech et low tech .
Une rapide perspective historique nous rappelle que la domination des
puissances occidentales dans nombre de conflits tatiques conventionnels passs
(guerres de Core, du Vietnam, des Malouines, isralo-arabes, du Golfe, au
Kosovo) a rsult de la supriorit de leurs aviations. La conqute de la matrise de
lair a t permise par des innovations tactiques (Mig Alley en Core, opration Bolo
au Vietnam) et des innovations techniques (vitesse jusque dans les annes 1970,
manuvrabilit et furtivit partir des annes 1980). La supriorit arienne
conteste par lavnement des missiles dans le cadre de la guerre du Vietnam a t
rtablie durablement grce lavnement de la guerre lectronique et du renforce-
ment des concepts de formation et dentranement (Red Flag).
Depuis les annes 2000, les conflits successifs en Irak (2
e
intervention en
2003) et en Afghanistan ont, quant eux, concentr la pense stratgique sur les
modles asymtriques et les approches contre-insurrectionnelles tendant mini-
miser le rle de laviation. Or le retour dexprience dmontre que pour le milieu
arien, il y a continuit du risque entre les phases de coercition et de stabilisation.
Le milieu tant sans frontire, la loi du plus fort simpose. De mme, au Liban en
2006, Isral a fait la douloureuse exprience dune prospective stratgique biaise
en se retrouvant face des units paramilitaires quipes darmements modernes et
puissants.
Les dclenchements inopins de lopration Harmattan comme de lopration
Serval tmoignent toutefois de limprvisibilit de futures conflictualits. La prpara-
tion et ladaptabilit des forces armes franaises ont permis de rpondre cette crise.
En parallle, lexpansion conomique des pays mergents et laccs aux tech-
nologies accroissent le risque de se retrouver confronts des adversaires dots dune
force significative. Alors que les budgets de dfense occidentaux diminuent, les pays
101
102
mergents connaissent une course aux armements et investissent dans les techno-
logies militaires de pointe, notamment laronautique *. La prolifration des techno-
logies de dfense anti-arienne et anti-navire est galement au centre des intrts. Il
peut sagir de missiles anciens mais galement de dernire gnration comme le S300.
Ces armements offrent un rapport cot/efficacit trs favorable aux pays mergents
et permettent dempcher une arme plus puissante laccs une zone.
Ladaptation
* Une course aux armements chez les mergents
Ainsi en 2011, les dpenses militaires en Asie ont augment de 14 %, essentiellement tires par la Chine (+ 18,75 %
par an jusquen 2015) et lInde (+ 17 % en 2012). Il en va de mme pour les autres puissances mergentes : Indonsie
(+ 8,8 %), Vietnam (+ 8,92 %), Taiwan (+ 10 % par an), Russie (+ 580 milliards deuros sur 10 ans), Brsil (+ 30 %
entre 2001 et 2010). La Russie va notamment construire 600 chasseurs de cinquime gnration T-50 avec lInde,
la Core du Sud sapprte acheter 60 appareils, Taiwan souhaite rnover ses 145 F-16.
Sans contre stratgie, ces capacits peuvent aussi permettre un tat mal
intentionn dentraver le libre accs aux espaces communs, (un dtroit, une voie
arienne.), et ainsi atteindre le cur de notre conomie. Pour rpondre effica-
cement ce type de dfis, les forces armes doivent tre capables dagir dans
lensemble des espaces (air, mer, terre, espace cyber et extra-atmosphrique). Le
concept Air Sea Battle dvelopp aux tats-Unis vise contrer les stratgies anti
access/area denial dun peer competitor . Il promeut un systme de forces int-
gres, interconnectes, disposant dun rseau de communication rsilient et pou-
vant lancer des attaques en de multiples points et au cur des systmes adverses.
lvidence, lavenir, il faonnera les coalitions menes par les tats-Unis aux-
quelles il faudra pouvoir contribuer.
La question qui se pose est donc celle dune adaptation de nos capacits et
de nos structures militaires face lvolution du caractre contemporain de la
guer re. La focalisation sur les menaces asymtriques qui ont surtout t le lot des
combats endurs par nos troupes au cours des dix dernires annes, pourrait
conduire des rsultats dans le court terme stratgique mais pourrait galement se
rvler dangereusement inapproprie face une rsurgence brutale, toujours
pos sible, dun conflit haute intensit.
Ainsi, la contraction des ressources budgtaires ne doit pas conduire une
opposition entre ces deux paradigmes et donner limpression quil sagit ncessai-
rement de faire un choix exclusif.
Il faut, dans ce contexte, conduire une adaptation des capacits militaires, qui
permette de remplir les missions dans des formats probablement rduits, tout en cher-
chant minimiser limpact sur la dgradation des contrats oprationnels. Si des axes
dvolution peuvent tre identifis, il faut avant tout semployer conserver les capa-
cits fondamentales qui font que la France dispose aujourdhui dun outil militaire
103
Ladaptation
solide et hautement crdible : agir de faon significative en offrant un spectre deffets
militaires large, disposer de la capacit rare entrer en premier, tre moteur et influent
dans une coalition, maintenir une cohrence globale de loutil.
Des capacits fondamentales auxquelles la France ne peut renoncer
sans perdre de son influence
La France doit prserver tout prix sa capacit intervenir de faon imm-
diate et significative, en demeurant apte entrer en premier. Pour satisfaire cette
condition, le domaine arien est primordial. En effet, son contrle est le pralable
toute opration, afin de garantir la capacit de dcision du gouvernement, sa
capacit de peser sur les dcisions dune coalition et permettre la libert daction
des forces. Cest l dun domaine dexcellence de la France dont lArme de lair est
le cur et qui nest partag que par deux autres puissances, les tats-Unis et le
Royaume-Uni. Cette capacit repose sur le partage et la matrise de linformation
en temps rel, sur laptitude mettre sur pied des structures de commandement et
de contrle dont la matrise est complexe mais aussi sur une longation stratgique
rapidement mise en uvre.
Cest bien la cohrence globale de loutil qui permet la puissance arien ne
de sexprimer, en garantissant aux autorits gouvernementales de bnficier jusqu
la dernire extrmit dun large ventail doptions dans le traitement des crises,
per mettant de garder un niveau dautonomie suffisant, gage de notre souverainet.
Cette cohrence se traduit par une complmentarit mais aussi une interdpen-
dance troite de capacits distinctes (planification, commandement et conduite des
oprations, valuation de situation, modes daction varis produisant un large
panel deffets militaires, soutien des moyens engags ravitaillement en vol, guer re
lectronique notamment, soutien depuis la mtropole et sur les sites dploys des
units engages). Cette cohrence ncessite en outre le maintien dun niveau de
qualification et dentranement permanent du personnel, dautant plus exigeant
que les quipements mis en uvre par lArme de lair requirent un haut niveau
de technicit et une autonomie importante des oprateurs.
Si les contraintes budgtaires fortes lgitiment une tendance la rvision
des formats, la crdibilit et la capacit dinfluence de la France ncessitent de
conserver un seuil capacitaire, tant sur lventail du spectre couvert que sur le
volu me de forces qui peuvent tre engages, en particulier dans les domaines les
plus critiques au niveau europen (AWACS, ravitaillement en vol, transport strat-
gique). Cette notion de seuil permet de caractriser un niveau quantitatif nces-
sai re pour assurer de manire simultane les diffrentes fonctions oprationnelles
dans le cadre de la scurit du territoire et de la contribution une action visible
et significative en coalition.
104
Des axes dadaptation dvelopper
pour dgager des conomies financires
Si la France doit conserver sa capacit fondamentale intervenir de manire
autonome dans la zone dintrt, elle pourra sappuyer sur une nouvelle approche de
ses qualits intrinsques dlongation pour intervenir au-del. En effet, les capacits
renforces dlongation de larme arienne lies aux nouvelles performances de ses
vecteurs et une gestion dynamique dun rseau adapt de points dappuis quil reste
tablir permettent de rpondre lloignement de lespace de crises majeures .
Des tudes sont mener pour adapter nos modes de fonctionnement, en
particulier dans la manire de gnrer et entretenir les comptences qui exigent des
moyens importants, notamment pour les capacits ariennes. Il sagit doptimiser
les outils et les process dentretien des comptences. Plusieurs pistes peuvent tre
voques telles que laugmentation de la part dentranement synthtique (simula-
tion), ou le transfert dune partie de la formation et de lentranement actuellement
ralise sur des flottes dont lactivit est onreuse vers des plateformes moins chres
exploiter, quipes de systmes virtuels pour prserver la valeur ou la qualit des
heures dentranement. Ce principe permettrait de prserver la capacit interve-
nir dans une phase initiale de haute intensit et, dans un second temps, la capaci t
durer, grce un rservoir de forces entran diffremment et moindre cot.
Un autre axe dadaptation possible consiste mutualiser certaines capacits
avec nos principaux partenaires. Une premire opportunit rside dans la valorisa-
tion des synergies avec les partenaires membres de lOtan, dans une logique de
mutualisation avec le recours des financements communs, dont nous pourrions
tirer profit (financement de linfrastructure de certaines de nos bases par exemple
via le projet Air Basing ).
Une seconde approche consiste tablir des convergences sur les normes
demploi, par exemple en dveloppant des structures europennes, tudies notam-
ment dans le domaine du transport stratgique et du ravitaillement en vol. Ces
nouvelles structures, souples, volutives et fort potentiel de croissance, permet-
tront didentifier les sources de mutualisation et dconomie, et de favoriser les
accords de coopration. Elles permettront in fine le partage doutils et de structures
sur la base dune participation tiroir (chaque pays pouvant dcider des
domaines dapplication : maintenance, formation, scurit des vols, prparation de
mission) sans remettre en question les principes de souverainet (chaque pays
conservant le contrle oprationnel de ses moyens).
Dans cette logique de gains financiers par le biais dadaptations capaci-
taires tout en veillant minimiser les impacts sur les contrats oprationnels, la
valorisation de la rserve oprationnelle est envisager. Des units de rservistes
pourraient avantageusement compenser des rductions engages sur des capacits
Ladaptation
105
Ladaptation
particulirement soumises des pics dactivit, notamment pour armer les struc-
tures de Commandement et de contrle (C2).
Dautres pistes demeurent enfin ouvertes pour rechercher de nouvelles res-
sources financires extrabudgtaires. De nouvelles cessions de frquences mritent
dtre tudies, notamment dans le domaine des tlmesures. Un axe nouveau
consiste galement tenter dobtenir des financements europens pour les capaci-
ts duales concourant la scurit europenne. En effet, la recherche et le dve-
loppement du secteur de laronautique civile et militaire reprsentent la plus
gran de part de la Base industrielle et technologique de dfense (BITD) en Europe
et en France, dveloppant 20 technologies parmi les 27 classes critiques. En outre,
les retombes apportes par ces technologies vers le secteur industriel sont fr-
quentes, et bien au-del du secteur de laronautique. La R&T tant un vecteur
adapt du renforcement de la construction de lEurope de la Dfense, cet axe est
porteur de belles perspectives.
Enfin, des amliorations ne devraient pas tre cartes en explorant des
cots matriss de nouveaux concepts qui se dmarquent de ceux proposs tradi-
tionnellement par nos partenaires amricains. Lutilisation de bombes planantes ou
de missiles de croisire, associs aux nouvelles capacits ISR (satellites, capteurs
lectromagntiques Spectra du Rafale), constitue une approche prometteuse dans le
domaine de la suppression des dfenses ariennes adverses (SEAD).
La coopration militaire
dans lEspace :
le cas franco-amricain
Lieutenant de lArme de lair, chercheur au sein de lquipe
Prospective et tudes de scurit du Centre de recherche
de lArme de lair (Crea). Doctorante en Science politique
lUniversit Paris II Panthon-Assas.
Batrice Hainaut
C
ertains signes ne trompent pas. Les Franais et les Amricains ont opr un
rapprochement tout en subtilit. Il sagit, tout dabord, dun rapproche-
ment en matire de politique trangre gnrale. On se souvient de la prise
de parole audacieuse de Dominique de Villepin, alors ministre des Affaires tran-
gres, le 14 fvrier 2003 devant lAssemble gnrale des Nations unies, sopposant
une intervention arme aux cts des Amricains en Irak. Cette diatribe avait
contribu tendre les relations diplomatiques franco-amricaines. Comble de cette
rupture , elle sappuie sur la possession par la France de capacits autonomes de
dcision grce, notamment, aux capteurs optiques des satellites Hlios. En effet, les
images prises par ces derniers navaient pas t en mesure de confirmer la thse
amricaine selon laquelle il y avait prsence darmes de destruction massive sur le
sol irakien.
Mais le temps a pass, et les diplomates ont uvr. Llection en France
dun nouveau prsident de la Rpublique en 2007 a amorc une re nouvelle dans
les relations franco-amricaines. Les deux tats ont ainsi uvr ensemble sur de
multiples dossiers ports jusquaux Nations unies et en particulier, pour certains,
au niveau du Conseil de scurit. Bon an, mal an, la rupture de 2003 sest douce-
ment fait oublier, la confiance sest peu peu rinstaure. Lexpression employe
par Hubert Vdrine rsume finalement bien les relations entre les deux tats :
Amis, allis, mais pas aligns .
Si le domaine spatial peut tre lorigine dun dsaccord diplomatique
profond (lengagement sur un thtre dopration en vue dy mener une guerre), il
peut aussi parfois savrer tre un formidable outil de rapprochement entre tats.
Rappelons que la France et les tats-Unis sont des puissances spatiales et se font
relativement mutuellement confiance. Voil deux lments qui constituent une
base fondamentale toute ventualit de coopration.
107
108
Une coopration inter-agences ancienne et fructueuse
La coopration franco-amricaine entre agences spatiales est une ralit
ancienne. La National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) et le Centre
national des tudes spatiales (Cnes) ont tabli des partenariats solides dans des
domaines varis. On peut notamment citer deux exemples importants, le pro gram me
Jason et la coopration sur la question des dbris en orbite. Malgr cette coopration
inter-agences qui pourrait apparatre comme exclusivement civi le, les implications
militaires sont envisageables dans les deux cas de figure. Le succs du programme
exprimental Topex-Posedon en 1992 a ouvert la voie une collaboration long terme
dans le domaine de laltimtrie radar. Le but est ainsi de recueillir des donnes de pr-
cision sur les courants ocaniques et leurs variations ainsi que sur la mesure du niveau
des mers. Cette coopration Cnes-NASA se pour suit aujourdhui, notamment grce
lenvoi prvu en 2014 dun troisime satellite (Jason 3).
La seconde coopration symptomatique des bonnes relations inter-agences
Cnes-NASA est celle mene sur les dbris spatiaux. Bien quancienne, elle revt
aujourdhui une dimension plus stratgique lie lintrt croissant que suscite cette
problmatique au sein des enceintes multilatrales. lorigine, les scientifiques de la
NASA sinquitaient de la production de dbris suite aux essais antisatellites du
dpartement de la Dfense amricain, notamment celui de septembre 1985. Les
experts de la NASA tentrent alors de sensibiliser la communaut scientifique inter-
nationale sur cette question des dbris via les agences spatiales nationales. Lexplosion
dun tage dAriane le 26 novembre 1986 aurait en outre pouss la NASA prendre
contact avec lAgence spatiale europenne (ESA) et initier des groupes de travail sur
les dbris spatiaux. Cette problmatique trouve galement un cho favorable auprs
du Cnes. Les contacts informels sinstitutionnalisent ensuite en 1993 par la cration
de lInter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) organisation tech-
nique fdrant aujourdhui les analyses sur le sujet.
Dernier exemple rcent de cette collaboration fconde, la fabrication et
lenvoi sur Mars du rover Curiosity dont la mission est danalyser le sol de cette pla-
nte. Le fait quil sagisse l du rsultat dune collaboration fructueuse entre la
France et les tats-Unis, et notamment entre le Cnes et la NASA, est pourtant rela-
tivement peu connu. On peroit bien, avec ces quelques exemples, que la coop-
ration fut rendue possible par la poursuite dintrts scientifiques communs et le
fait que les scientifiques de part et dautre de lAtlantique, par leurs changes nom-
breux, ont su tablir une relation de confiance durable.
La coopration militaire par lchange de donnes et de pratiques
Ce type de relation est plus difficile tablir au niveau militaire dans la
mesure o les domaines de coopration touchent le plus souvent la souverainet
nationale et sont donc gnralement du ressort des dcideurs politiques. La France
La coopration militaire dans lEspace :
109
a fait le choix, il y a maintenant prs dun demi-sicle, dtre une puissance spatia le.
Li alors la doctrine de la dissuasion, lEspace a ainsi revtu une dimension strat-
gique. Autour de cette ambition originelle, la France dveloppe, peu peu,
len semble du spectre des capacits spatiales (tlcommunications, observation,
navigation, coute, alerte avance). Lutilisation du spatial devient de ce fait une
com posante cl des activits militaires et un multiplicateur de forces notamment
lors des oprations extrieures. La France sest dote en juillet 2010 dun comman-
dement unifi le Commandement interarmes de lEspace (CIE) qui constitue
le point den tre pour toute question spatiale relevant de la comptence des armes.
Pour tre considre comme une puissance spatiale complte, la France
doit disposer de quatre lments indispensables : avoir un accs autonome
lEspace, avoir une industrie capable de concevoir et fabriquer des lanceurs et des
satellites, tre capable de grer un segment sol et, enfin, tre en mesure de surveiller
lEspace. Les trois premiers sont acquis et la capacit de surveillance de lEspace est
en plein dveloppement. Le Code de la dfense inclut cette dernire dans la
dfen se arien ne largie relevant du Commandement de la dfense arienne et
des oprations ariennes (CDAOA) et en particulier de sa division Surveillance
de lEspace . LArme de lair, sous la direction du CIE, assure la surveillance de
lEspace extra-atmosphrique. Cette comptence spcifique attribue lArme de
lair est expressment militaire et touche alors au domaine du renseignement. La
sensibilit de ce secteur rend ltablissement de cooprations plus ardu mais pas
non plus impossible.
En effet, le domaine sensible par excellence est celui du renseignement. Les
Amricains sont les allis des Franais et en matire spatiale, ces derniers sont sou-
vent dpendants des donnes amricaines. Si le canal existe, il nen demeure pas
moins trs restreint. Par exemple, la France nappartient pas cette communaut de
partage de renseignement unique au monde que lon connat sous lexpression des
Fives Eyes . Elle constitue un remarquable forum dchange dinformations anim
par les tats-Unis, regroupant galement le Royaume-Uni, le Canada, lAustralie et
la Nouvelle-Zlande. Certes, en matire spatiale, tous ces tats ne brillent pas par
leurs capacits. Cela tant, lexistence de cette communaut repose avant tout sur les
liens historiques que les uns et les autres ont su tisser. Cette alliance tablit une
confiance totale entre les acteurs. Les tats-Unis ont ainsi rcemment (2010) sign
un accord de coopration avec lAustralie concernant la surveillance de lEspace. Cet
accord est dautant plus intressant pour les tats-Unis quil leur permet de couvrir
une zone leur chappant encore, lhmisphre Sud.
Si la France nappartient pas cette communaut de renseignement, ce qui lui
permet dailleurs de prserver son indpendance dans lapprciation de situation, un
lment a cependant fait voluer les relations franco-amricaines dans le domaine du
renseignement : lacquisition par la France du systme Graves (Grand rseau adapt
la veille spatiale). Le radar, livr lArme de lair en dcembre 2005, est capable de
dtecter tout objet suprieur un mtre carr, sur volant le territoire franais et se
110
situant entre 400 et 1 000 km daltitude. Lacquisition de cette capacit, conue
lorigine comme dmonstrateur, a permis la France de voir . Le radar a fait ses
preuves au-del des esprances. Daprs les estimations amricaines et europennes
datant de 2012, plus de 23 000 objets mesurant plus de 10 cm gravitent actuellement
autour de la terre une vitesse moyenne de 25 000 km/h. Le systme Graves permet,
en surveillant lorbite basse qui est lorbite la plus encombre de satellites mais aussi
de dbris, de constituer un catalogue denviron 3 000 objets.
Loutil oprationnel sest alors aussi transform en outil diplomatique quand
ce dernier a permis de dtecter des satellites sensibles, inconnus auparavant. Avec
lacquisition de cette capacit technologique, cest toute la crdibilit de la France en
tant que puissance spatiale qui a t raffirme. partir du moment o la France a
eu en sa possession une monnaie dchange , elle devenait un partenaire crdible
avec lequel il tait de bon ton de cooprer, ne serait-ce que pour savoir ce quil tait
capable de voir. Cet pisode a constitu lamorce de la coopration franco-amricai ne.
Aprs deux ans dexistence informelle, le forum de coopration spatiale franco-
am ri cain a t officialis le 14 mai 2009. Plus tard, le 8 fvrier 2011, une dclaration
de principes a t signe entre Alain Jupp, alors ministre des Affaires trangres et
Robert Gates, secrtaire dtat la Dfense des tats-Unis, afin de favoriser la coop-
ration franco-amricaine dans le domaine de la surveillance de lEspace.
Un autre signe douverture est la participation historique de la France au
Schriever Wargame de 2012. Ldition 2012 de cette simulation organise depuis
2001 par lUS Air Force Space Command, fut la premire ouverte aux pays membres
de lOtan. Lobjectif de cet exercice est de planifier et de coordonner les capacits spa-
tiales et cyber des tats-membres au cours dun scnario particulier. Si lOtan nen
est qu ses dbuts en matire spatiale, les possibilits de dveloppements sont impor-
tantes. Ainsi, la participation cette simulation ne doit pas tre considre comme
anecdotique. Elle permet en effet de ctoyer les allis, de confronter les points de vue,
les manires de procder et ainsi damliorer la coordination des capacits spatiales
entre les tats. De plus, on peut imaginer que la rintgration de la France au sein
du Commandement militaire intgr de lOtan en 2009 permet doptimiser ces
dveloppements. Enfin, on peut ainsi considrer que la relation spatiale franco-
amricaine peut adopter le cadre privilgi de lOtan pour se raliser pleinement.
Une diplomatie spatiale amricaine en mutation
Ce rapprochement plus rcent est galement attribuer larrive au pou-
voir de Barack Obama en janvier 2009. Bien quune inflexion dans le domaine spa-
tial ait t amorce la fin du mandat de George W. Bush, cela na pas pour autant
donn lieu un vritable renouveau de la coopration. linverse, la publication en
2010 dune nouvelle politique spatiale, la National Space Policy, a laiss entrevoir le
changement, au moins dans le ton. La prcdente NSP (2006) avait soulev
des inquitudes quant lventuelle conception et utilisation darmes antisatellites.
111
Elle refltait, au moins dans le ton, lapproche unilatraliste, si ce nest militariste, de
ladministration Bush. La NSP 2010 tranche nettement dans le ton avec celle de
2006, et notamment en ce quelle souligne que les systmes spatiaux de toutes les
nations doivent pouvoir voluer dans lEspace sans tre gns par des interfrences
mises par dautres. Plus encore, elle met clairement laccent sur la coopration, y
compris militaire. Le but vis est ainsi dviter les incomprhensions ou les erreurs
dapprciation dans lEspace devenu un milieu de plus en plus convoit, conges-
tionn et contest. Les appels la coopration ne sont bien sr pas uniquement des-
tins la France. Reste cependant quils constituent une fentre dopportunit int-
ressante pour mener bien une collaboration plus troite. Cette opportunit a
dailleurs t saisie par la France et lEurope qui ont dcid de promouvoir un code
de conduite europen dans lEspace. Ce projet, visant viter tout conflit dans
lEspace en favorisant la communication entre les tats spatiaux de plus en plus
nombreux, est une initiative qui fut particulirement pousse sous la prsidence
franaise de lUnion europenne durant le second semestre 2008. Alors que les tats-
Unis font habituellement preuve dune opposition de principe tout texte suscep-
tible de limiter leur libert daction dans lEspace, ce projet na pas t dem ble
reje t. Certes, il fait bien vi demment lobjet de dbats contradictoires en interne.
Cependant la volont pr sidentielle amricaine soriente davantage vers un soutien
affich au processus dlaboration de ce code. Notons encore que le statut du texte
en Code de conduite per met au Prsident amricain de ladopter sans devoir le
faire valider par le Snat, beaucoup plus frileux sur ces questions. lin ver se, dans le
cas dun trait, le Snat aurait le ratifier la majorit des deux tiers. La dmarche
du projet de code de conduite dans lEspace est donc dans len semble soutenue par
ladministration am ricaine, moyennant quelques modifications.
Cette dmarche politique et diplomatique vient parfaire un rapprochement
inter-agences (ancien) et une collaboration militaire (toutes proportions gardes).
Les consultations internationales sur ce code ont t lances. Elles visent en mme
temps faire la promotion de ce code linternational. Mme si ce projet est
sou te nu par les diffrentes agences des Nations unies, il est discut en dehors de
toute enceinte multilatrale et notamment onusienne afin dviter tout blocage des
ngociations comme cela peut avoir lieu la Confrence du dsarmement. Un
groupe dexperts gouvernementaux (GGE : Group of Governmental Experts) a
rcemment t mis en place. Compos dune dizaine de pays, il est charg de
dis cu ter de lop portunit de rglementer les relations intertatiques dans lEspace.
Ce groupe est relativement actif et peut servir la cause du code. Au sein du GGE,
la France, les tats-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne se consultent en amont afin dadop-
ter une position commune lors des runions avec les autres partenaires. Mme si
cette dmarche se ralise au niveau des ministres des Affaires trangres et du
Dpartement dtat, il est symptomatique dun certain renouveau des relations
transatlantiques. Il est en outre intressant de rappeler que les armes de lair de ces
trois tats ont par ailleurs mis en place un partenariat privilgi via le groupe
de rflexion stratgique trilatral, dont lobjectif est de renforcer la comprhension
112
et la connaissan ce mutuelle afin dassurer une plus grande interoprabilit.
LEspace est naturellement prsent travers les applications oprationnelles qui
intressent directement lemploi des moyens arospatiaux de ces trois armes.
Les Franais et les Amricains ont ainsi davantage doccasions de se
ren con trer et dchanger. Ces lieux dapprentissages croiss auront pour effet
lho mognisation des conceptions, des prfrences, des croyances, pralables
llaboration et la diffusion de rgles et de politiques multilatrales. Mais la
constatation dun objectif commun (ne pas faire de lEspace un champ de bataille)
ne doit pas faire oublier que les deux puissances spatiales ont une stratgie doccu-
pation du milieu diffrente. Les tats-Unis ont en effet dvelopp la doctrine de la
Space dominance qui oriente encore aujourdhui leurs actions. Entre les deux tats
existe nanmoins un fort potentiel de cooprations futures notamment en matire
de surveillance de lEspace, domaine dans lequel lArme de lair est seule comp-
ten te sur ces questions. Cette dernire joue ainsi un rle minent, car au-del de
ces changes de donnes, elle permet aussi la France de conserver un niveau de
sou verainet suffisant pour sassurer une autonomie dans lapprciation de situa-
tion et par l de dcision.
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LArme de lair,
an Instrument
of Power for France
This issue is downloaded from the website of RDN
www.defnat.com
SALON DU BOURGET 2013
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Permanent missions
French Command and Control of Air Defence a Brief History
MICKAL AUBOUT, YOHAN DROIT, MARIE-MADELEINE MARAIS, TONY MORIN
French command and control (C2) is now an essential element of air defence of the homeland, and of exter-
nal operations. In tracing the history of C2 from the very beginning of air operations through to the latest
developments, this article highlights one of the fundamental capabilities of the French Air Force.
The Airborne Nuclear Component: an Approach to Excellence
EMAA
The Strategic air forces (FAS) are the airborne component of the French nuclear deterrent and, since 1964
have been fundamental to the expression of French power. This component remains a central and unifying
element for the development of the French Air Force.
The Air Force and National Security
EMAA
In responding to the challenge of maintaining national security, the French state can rely upon the funda-
mental capabilities of its Air Force. The very special capabilities of this Force contribute effectively and
appropriately to that national security.
Contents
Introduction - A New Approach to Strategic Functions
DENIS MERCIER
The capability to act fast and far: three recent commitments
From Afghanistan to Mali:
The Afghan Model 10 Years on, Still Wholly Relevant
GRAUD LABORIE
The author takes us back to the Afghan model, and to its first use in Afghanistan, to remind us of its basic
principles. Study of recent conflicts has confirmed that the Afghan model, an air-dominated strategic tool,
is as relevant as ever and has high coercion value when used in the right conditions. Moreover, it is a tool
whose strength should be recognised and which should be integrated into the range of strategies that may
be put into effect by our forces.
Operation Harmattan: A Rafale Squadron Commanders Tale
LOC RULLIRE
The air campaign in Libya was the fruit of careful preparation. Faced with a campaign in which the parti-
cipants were sometimes difficult to distinguish, the French Air Force was able to adapt its resources to carry
out precision strikes.
Serval: an Exemplary French Air Force Operation
EMAA
An air force is a powerful tool: in Operation Serval in Mali, the French Air Force has fully demonstrated this
fact through its reactivity, command and ISR capabilities, and its strategic and tactical mobility.
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The Battlefield and Air Power 15 Years From Now
GRGORY BOUTHERIN, CHRISTOPHE PAJON
Trying to identify changes in the battlefield fifteen years from now might seem to be attempting the impos-
sible. In drawing inspiration from clear trends, it is nevertheless possible to see three major changes:
the number and type of players present on the battlefield, a proliferation of technologies, and the nature of
the environments of conflict. Such analysis is central to preparing aerospace power for the challenges of
tomorrow.
Looking to the future
The fundamental capabilities at the heart of modernisation
Air Force Command and Control,
the Strategic Heart of Defence and National Security
EMAA
Through its ability to supervise and drive air operations (using C2 Air), the French Air Force represents for
France a real instrument of power, and provides the country with a key capability in the execution of its
international responsibilities.
The Only Machiavellian Aspect of the Drone is its Human Element
CHRISTOPHE FONTAINE
The author, who is an expert in the field, considers that the drone differs from a combat aircraft only to the
extent that its in-flight endurance allows the pilot to remain on the ground. From this standpoint, he
explains the invalidity of any reticence to use the drone as a tool like any other during combat.
A Case for the Dynamic Management of French Overseas Bases
EMAA
This article spotlights the expansion of strategic space that will result from the introduction of A400M and
MRTT aircraft. French force and power projection can now be envisaged using a more dynamic approach
to the networking of our support bases.
Immediate Action: the Contribution of Rafale to recent Operations
YOHAN DROIT
Rafale is notable for its completely multi-role aspect. Its deployment in many different theatres of conflict
enables us to understand its development better, and to see how it has been able to adapt fully to all of the
types of operation to which the French Air Force has been committed over the past ten years.
Simulator Training for Future Combat Pilots
COLIN BLTTLER, CYRIL CAMACHON
There has been a gradual increase in simulation as an essential ingredient in the training of combat pilots.
That notwithstanding, real flight remains the cornerstone of training experts in the military aeronautical
environment. Could the best balance between the two be found in on-board simulation during real flight?
The Men and Women of the French Air Force
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By dint of the quality of their training, the men and women of the French Air Force are genuine assets to
defence in general, but also to the whole of civil society to which they contribute in terms of the values they
develop within their profession.

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107
Adapting Military Capability
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Over the past ten years the strategic landscape has been dominated by what are called asymmetric conflicts.
Whilst this context has served to highlight certain capabilities, it should not be used as a pretext for abando-
ning others which are best suited to high-intensity conflict.
Franco-American Space Cooperation
BATRICE HAINAUT
Very early in the game France and the United States developed cooperation between their respective natio-
nal space agencies. Scientific cooperation is today developing into more political cooperation in a frame-
work for military use of space. This change partly results from the American administration, which would
wish to develop its space diplomacy.
Translation directed by Mike Storey
Translation team: Barry Cox, Richard Eyres, John Halford and Mike Storey
Cover : Emmanuel Batisse (Cesa CAD section)
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Glossary
AASM: Armement air-sol modulaire
ACCS: Air Command and Control System
APOD: Air Port of Desembarkation
ASMPA: Air-sol moyenne porte amlior
AWACS: Airborne Warning and Control System
BITD: Base industrielle et technologique de dfense
C2: Commandement et contrle
Cafda: Commandement air des forces de dfense arienne
CAOC: Combined Air and Space Operations Center
CDAOA: Commandement de la dfense arienne et des oprations ariennes
CENTCOM: US Central Command
Csar: Complexe dexploitation semi-automatique du radar
CIE: Commandement interarmes de lEspace
Cnes: Centre national dtudes spatiales
CNOA: Centre national des oprations ariennes
CO.AIR: Centre des oprations de lArme de lair
Coda: Centre des oprations de la dfense arienne
Comanfor: Commandant de la force
Cos: Commandement des oprations spciales
Cosmos: Centre oprationnel de surveillance militaire des objets spatiaux
CPCO: Centre de planification et de conduit des oprations
DCA: Dfense contre aronefs
EATC: European Air Transport Command
ESA: European Space Agency / ASE: Agence spatiale europenne
F2T2EA: Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration
FAS: Forces ariennes stratgiques
FMV: Full-Motion Video
GGE: Group of Governmental Experts
Graves: Grand rseau adapt la veille spatiale
GS: Gestion de systmes
IADC: Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Commitee
ISR: Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
JDAM: Joint Direct Attack Munition
JFAC AFCP: Joint Force Air Component de lAfrique centrale et de lOuest
JSOTF-N: Joint Special Operations Task Force-North
JTAC: Joint Terminal Attack Controller
Male: Moyenne altitude, longue endurance
MANPADS: Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems
MCCE: Movement Coordination Centre Europe
MRTT: Multi Role Tanker Transport
NADGE: NATO Defense Ground Environment
NRF: NATO Response Force
NSP: National Space Policy
OEF: Operation Enduring Freedom
OODA: Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action / OODA: Observation-Orientation-Dcision-Action
Oscgane: Observation spectrale et caractrisation des satellites gostationnaires
OUP: Operation Unified Protector
OSF: Optronique secteur frontal
PT: Per cent Transfer
PPS: Posture permanente de sret arienne
RAF: Royal Air Force
RBE 2: Radar balayage lectronique 2 plans
ROVER: Remote Operations Video Enhanced Receiver
Satam: Systmes dacquisition et de trajectographie des avions et munitions
Scalp-EG: Systme de croisire conventionnel autonome longue porte-EG
SCCOA : Systme de commandement et de contrle des oprations arospatiales
SEAD: Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
SIC: Systme dinformation et de communication
Spectra: Systme de protection et dvitement des conduites de tir du Rafale
Strida II: Systme de transmission et de reprsentation des informations de dfense ariennes
TAA: Technically Advanced Aircraft
TACP: Tactical Air Control Parties
TER: Transfer Effectiveness Ratio
TIRA: Tracking and Imaging Radar
TST: Time Sensitive Target
A New Approach
to Strategic Functions
General (Air), Chief of the French Air Staff.
Denis Mercier
O
n the occasion of the Salon du Bourget, it with great pleasure that I prefa ce
for the first time this special edition of Revue Dfense Nationale, dedicated
to the French Air Force. Through its many high quality contributions, this
edition offers the excellent opportunity to discover how the French Air Force puts
its five core capabilities into action across its numerous commitments. The five
capabilities, of planning, commanding and conducting air operations; collecting
intelligence; immediate response; rapid and long distance projection; and high-
level training are those which ensure the Air Force is ready for action within our
sovereign territory and beyond. Modernisation of these capabilities will ensure that
tomorrows Air Force will remain a powerful tool in the service of the nation,
sup porting the five strategic functions of deterrence, protection, awareness and
anticipation, prevention and intervention. The very coherence and strength of the
Air Force is rooted in its ability to put all its capabilities into effect in support of
these functions.
The recently-published defence White Paper on defence and national secu ri ty
(the Livre blanc) describes current threats and supports the approach by strategic
functions, which was originally introduced in the 1994 Livre blanc and broadened
somewhat in that of 2008. Il allows identification of those areas that need to be fully
understood in order for the state to ensure the protection and security of its citizens
and of Frances vital interests both on national territory and beyond its borders.
One of the major constraints affecting defence planning today is the essen-
tial need for control of public expenditure which, given the current deep financial
crisis, is significantly eating into any margin for manoeuvre. Despite that, the per-
formance of new combat aircraft, be they helicopters, fighter or transport aircraft,
allied with more reactive ways of employing them, open up new possibilities for
perceiving the five strategic functions through a more holistic approach to how
their complementarity might be used in mutual support.
Better knowledge of the interlinking of these functions and understanding
each one of them with a view to greater dynamism will make it possible to respond
to the challenges facing us by greater emphasis on refocusing forces on national
7
8
ter ritory and a number of key points, thereby favouring concentration of assets,
which in turn brings savings.
In the first place we should take account of the many links between these
functions. These interconnections have value in terms of the assets they can call
upon, and also the fields of activity they cover, which are not isolated from each
other. In the same way, the ultimate objective of providing defence and security for
France does not result from some sequential application of these functions but
from one that is parallel, and frequently simultaneous. With this as the starting
point, and with the support of all that technology affords us, it is essential that we
work towards better exploitation of the multiplicity of roles that our assets and
procedures offer.
The very essence of the awareness and anticipation function is the best
illustration of the interdependence of functions, since complete understanding and
mastery of it is the guarantor of how the other four operate. That alone justifies
the effort expended upon it since 2008, in particular in the fields of space and
cyber-defence. The actions contributing to the success of this function need to be
exercised along two different paths.
On one hand, there are those actions which take place before crisis occurs,
and which allow the latter to be anticipated. Today, they rely on our capability in
space, on our computer, electromagnetic and human intelligence resources, and on
the use of specialised resources which are deployed as appropriate to the particular
areas of interest concerned. We could go further still by exploiting every opportu-
nity afforded by missions for other strategic functions on which our assets are
deployed. In particular, we need to make greater use of our air projection assets,
and broaden their doctrine of use.
On the other hand, once the crisis has happened, getting on top of it
pre sumes reliance upon assets that can be maintained permanently in-area. To this
end, developing the use of drones must not only continue, but also be the subject
of significant effort.
Knowledge of this interlinking and of the multi-role aspect of our forces
can also contribute to a move away from the highly-focused role of deterrence
without in any way reducing the certainty of deploying assets for that role.
Similarly, we have to bring into our strategic thinking the fact that this function
affords French forces an area of expertise which enhances their operational capabi-
lities, such as targeting, long-term missions, handling of strategic targets and ini-
tial entry to a zone. In doing so, it adds strength to other strategic functions and
puts France in the top league of credibility.
In the second place, todays environment makes it possible to envisage the
refocusing of forces on national territory and in a few areas of influence outside
Europe, without at the same time compromising the other strategic functions.
A New Approach
9
A New Approach
However, this is only possible under two conditions, which must contribute to the
construction of an agile system of defence and be part of an overall dynamic.
The first of these relates to planning the modernisation of our strengths
within the framework of a more dynamic approach that includes recovery ability.
This refocusing does not amount to some form of resignation, and is in no way
intended as a reduction in our traditional strengths, but to make it work we have
to rethink and renew our organisation in order to get greatest benefit from the new
strategic reach that our new projection assets will soon offer to our armed forces.
The second condition relates to the pressing need to continue to figure
among the most credible nations in terms of intervention capability, something
that is inseparable from our culture of international responsibility. Intervention is
hugely demanding of resources, and new ways have to be found in order to have
just what is needed, at just the right time without giving up our aim of honouring
our ability to impose our political will.
Any intervention relies on the three-pronged approach of immediate
action, force projection and staying power. Immediate action necessarily implies a
need to preserve essential assets at a high degree of competence in the most deman-
ding of operational sectors, which in turn preserves our initial entry capability in
order for us to punch above our weight. Staying powerthe capacity to sustain
longer-term operationscomes into play after the high intensity phase of an ope-
ration, but has different requirements. As a consequence, the level of equipment
and preparation of the forces concerned have to be adapted accordingly.
Accepting these conditions, refocusing forces onto our own territory can
still be envisaged because we have robust command and control capabilities with
great potential and which more than ever before allow highly reactive centralised
command, yet decentralised execution, of any wide-ranging operation. Through
better use of these aspects we will be able to guarantee our overseas citizens rapid
arrival of French state forces should a major crisis arise, whilst at the same time
maintaining a reduced force level. In this way we will preserve our worldwide
ambition and economise on use of our assets in order to act within the entire range
of the strategic functions.
As a final note, the refocusing also means it will be possible to consider
strengthening inter-ministerial collaboration in order to improve the security of
our fellow citizens and the resilience of the state. We have to exploit all synergies
from support of assets to the links between command and crisis management
structures, and including improved training missions for the benefit of the coun-
trys occasional needs.
So there we have it: interlinking, multi-role capability and a dynamic
approach all contribute to appreciation of the five strategic functions from a diffe-
rent angle without calling into question their relative importance. This different
10
viewpoint is aimed at exploiting the particular potential of each function in sup-
port of the refocusing of forces on national territory and at the same time offering
a solution that fits in with control of public expenditure.
Against the background of the Livre blanc on defence and national securi ty,
it with all this in view that the French Air Force is continuing its modernisation
programme and consolidating its core capabilities in order to continue to fulfil its
permanent missions of deterrence and protection of our territory and its
approaches, and to maintain its immediate intervention capability at the very
highest level. It will continue to give France the force it needs to exercise its
res ponsibilities both internationally and in the defence of its citizens.
A New Approach
R
D
N
Permanent missions
French Command and Control
of Air Defence a Brief History
Captains Aubout and Droit, Lieutenant Marais and
Second Lieutenant Morin are researchers at the Centre for
strategic aerospace studies (Cesa).
Mickal Aubout
Yohann Droit
Marie-Madeleine Marais
Tony Morin
F
ifty years of effort have made the French system for command and control
of air operations (C2 Air) the nerve centre of air operations and as such it is
central to French air power. C2 Air brings together the command structure,
organisation, processes and technical and human resources which allow it to
com mand, plan, programme and conduct air operations above, from or beyond
national territory.
The history of C2 in France is intimately linked to the history of air defence
of the territory and the means of detection, command and control that go with
it. The basic principles of how C2 operates flow naturally from the way air power
is used.
Genesis of C2: from invention of the principles to the birth of modern C2
The First World War and the emergence of the first C2-type organisation
During the Great War, the first passive defence measures, against the
Zeppelins and Gotha bombers that threatened Paris, led to the establishment of an
organisation tasked with centralising through telephone messages information
coming from watchtowers and from acoustic detection systems, with analysing it
and then deciding what needed to be done. As a result, the fortified camp in Paris,
which had been set up by the military governor of Paris in 1914, received anti-air
defence equipment and fighter squadrons. This organisation lasted throughout the
entire war. Further east, confronted by the huge German offensive around Verdun,
the French command advanced the principle of mass use of aviation to regain the
advantage. The objective was to win and retain mastery of the air above the theatre
of operations by coordinated use of all air assets present there. After the success of
13
14
this move, an initial structure, the air division, was created in 1918 to coordinate
all combat aviation action on the Eastern Front.
Birth of modern C2 during the Battle of Britain
Despite these initial measures, C2 as we currently recognise it really took
off in 1940, during the Battle of Britain, at the start of the Second World War. In
the face of the Luftwaffes bombing offensive, the Royal Air Force established the
modern fundamental principles of how C2 should operate. They relied at first on
the detection capabilities of the Chain Home coastal radar chain, from which were
established the bearings of incoming attacks and the approximate number of
enemy aircraft. This information was then centralised and analysed in the opera-
tions centre of Fighter Command, which passed intercept axes and areas to cover
to the combat aircraft units. The key to Fighter Commands success lay in the
speed of information handling and promptness with which the air bases launched
their fighter aircraft. This process corresponded to the OODA loop (Observation,
Orientation, Decision, Action), which was conceptualised decades later by the
American John Boyd.
Thus from the First World War, and in particular from the Battle of
Verdun, there was coordinated use of air assets. The guiding principles of coordi-
nation of air assets were then brought up to date with centralised command and
decentralised execution.
In 1940, the Battle of Britain illustrated the importance of C2 in success-
ful military operations, and indeed Fighter Commands organisation set up in the
Battle of Britain was the birth of modern C2 in the sense of bringing together the
different components (surveillance radar, air observers and fighter aircraft units) in
a single network under a single command which centralised information and plan-
ned operations.
Construction of a national capability post-World War Two
Management of ground and air assets (air defence, radar, and air bases) used
in air operations has been in constant development since the Second World War.
This evolution has followed the increasing complexity of equipment, the greater
number of units to manage and the geographical areas that it has been necessary to
keep under surveillance. Throughout the decades following the end of the war, the
development of C2 has been carried along by numerous technological advances,
among which figure the arrival of jet aircraft, the technological developments made
in detection systems in both range and discrimination capability, the exponential
growth in information technology, and the improvement in communications as a
spinoff from the continual modernisation of electronic components.
15
C2 in France reached a major turning point with the creation of NATO
and the emergence of an adversary with a vast range of air and ground assets at his
disposal. The establishment of modern French C2 has to be seen in relation to the
development of the French Air Forces air defence role. Once equipped with radar
supplied by the British, at the end of the nineteen-forties the Air Force took its first
step, in in setting up its operations centre on the RAF model in the centre of Paris,
in the basement of the mobile guards barracks on Place de la Rpublique. In 1957,
a new site became available in Taverny, which became the air defence operations
centre (Centre des oprations de la dfense arienne CODA, in the north-wes tern
suburbs of Paris). In view of the necessary reactivity that this task imposes, a single
command was essential and in 1961 the Air Force created a centralised structure
dedicated to air defence, the air defence forces air command (Commandement air
des forces de dfense arienne CAFDA), still in Taverny. This brought together all
the assets, from the sensor and detection network to the interceptor aircraft,
the re by offering real-time information on a situation to the Prime Minister, who
is the political authority responsible for air defence of the country. This highly
reactive chain linked the highest authority of the state to the pilot in his aircraft,
and ensured sovereignty of national airspace everywhere and in all circumstances.
Air defence areas and their commanders were defined in 1965: in addition to his
HQ, each had a regional C2 with its operations centre, detection and control
equipment and the associated interceptors.
At the time, French C2 was undergoing considerable modernisation of its
detection and air control assets. The radar stations were being modernised and fit-
ted with the Cesar semi-automatic radar system (Complexe dexploitation semi-
auto matique du radar) and the Strida II air defence communications and display sys-
tem (Systme de transmission et de reprsentation des informations de dfense arienne).
Introduction of Strida in 1960 was a major step forward in C2, and the general
modernisation continued throughout the following decades. In parallel with all this,
the Air Force adopted the concepts of use common to other NATO air forces and
integrated the NADGE network (NATO Air Defense Ground Environment). In
doing so, the Air Force could thereafter exchange information, and maintain per-
manent liaison with NATO structures, thereby gaining access to information which
allowed an overview of the general air situation on approaches to mainland France.
The challenge for French C2 was to obtain overall aerial cover of the homeland,
fused together to give a single picture of its airspace. Despite Frances exit from the
NATO Integrated Military Structure in 1966, the Air Force retained its connection
to NADGE. Furthermore, in a similar fashion to the Tiger Meet exercises, French
Air Force units kept up their training with Alliance partners, particularly in the field
of C2, through organising simulated air missions. The permanent French C2 archi-
tecture remained until the beginning of the nineteen-nineties and the creation of
the air defence and air operations command (Commandement de la dfense arienne
et des oprations ariennes CDAOA) in 1994. Air defence assets have continued to
16
develop through successive modernisations and the entry into service of new equip-
ment, such as the E-3F AWACS at the end of the nineteen-eighties.
French C2 Air: robust and interoperable
Developments in the concept and capability of French C2 Air
The start of the nineteen-nineties saw two major developments: the end of
the Cold War encouraged a more expeditionary posture, symbolised by the Gulf
war, and consequently increased use of C2 in external operations; and considerable
progress in information and communication technologies led to the arrival of the
concept of network-centric warfare.
The years following the end of the Cold War were particularly good for
French C2. First, the Air Force received E-3F AWACS airborne warning and
com mand system, which gave much greater scope, particularly in external interven-
tions. Thereafter, the lessons learned from the Gulf War hammered home the need
for effective systems of Command, control, communication and intelligence (C3I)
in any modern war situation. In adapting itself to this new environment, in1994 the
Air Force brought its competence and systems for dealing with external operations
alongside the existing structure in mainland France, to create the CDAOA. Over and
above its air defence tasking, CDAOA maintains and develops the Air Forces exper-
tise in commanding air operations.
With regard to capability, these developments led to the launch in 1993 of
the system for command and control of air (now aerospace) operations (SCCOA),
into which Strida was incorporated, thus networking together all players involved in
aerospace operations. SCCOA has become the backbone of the deployment of
French air assets. The programme was started in parallel with NATOs Air Command
and Control System (ACCS), which brings together all member countries systems
for conduct of air operations, including that of France. SCCOAs task is to:
l Ensure the permanent deterrent missions and protection of national
territory without any interruption;
l Allow all military air assets to conduct their missions 24 hours per day,
in national airspace and in complete security;
l Provide for the long-term deployment of one hundred combat aircraft in
three in-theatre air bases;
l Provide the air transport, surveillance and in-flight refuelling assets that
are operationally necessary to supporting the deployment of forces;
17
l Take on, if needed, the role of lead nation for command of the coalition air
component, and ensuring its participation at the in-theatre joint command level.
The development of SCCOA was just one step in a series of steps.
Currently, SCCOA is beginning stage 4, which will see the move from separate
command and control centres to a NATO integrated ACCS structure. Its deve-
lopment has followed the transformation of the French armed forces, and is aimed
at providing a mechanism that is capable of covering the entire spectrum of aeros-
pace operations and adapting to changes in them.
Henceforth, the SCCOA should be thought of as a tool which allows inde-
pendence of decision-making and action in air operations. At the time of the Iraq
war in 1991, French structures were ill-adapted to the conduct of a coalition air
operation, and there was a necessary dependence on coalition command struc-
tures. Twenty years later, during operation Unified Protector, the C2 Air capability
allowed France to conduct the first strikes on 19 March 2011, whose political and
strategic impact was a determining factor in the success of the operation.
Current C2 Air
Today, France has high performance C2 Air, which is robust and interope-
rable. From both fixed and deployable structures t allows command, planning,
programming and conduct of air operations over, from, and even outside national
territory. The French C2 Air can be divided into two major functional groups:
permanent C2 Air and expeditionary C2 Air. The permanent group provides for the
conduct of a wide range of air missions over national territory, while the expeditio-
nary C2 concerns itself with the conduct of external air operations, be they directed
from C2 structures in France or overseas. French C2 Air can be set out as follows:
l Air protection
l Space surveillance and anti-missile defence
l Operations on national territory
l External air operations :
- conducted from the homeland
- conducted from structures outside the homeland
expeditionary C2 Air
permanent C2 Air
}
}
The primary mission of the permanent C2 Air is surveillance and protection
of national skies: it relies on the command and control structure of the national air
operations centre (Centre national des oprations ariennes CNOA), and French
capability in this field recognised as robust. The French system for air security
provides for the surveillance of some 11,000 air movements daily over our soil.
Since the 11 September 2001, the C2 system for air defence of national
airspace has been focused on the terrorist threat. A consequence of this has been
the exceptional need for a greater level of inter-ministerial work. The presence
18
within CNOA, of representatives of the various ministries improves the flow of
operations, and their interface role improves inter-ministerial synergy. Everyone
involved in the fight against terrorism is therefore integrated into the same infor-
mation loop. In parallel with this, there have been efforts towards better coopera-
tion between countries. France has signed bilateral agreements with bordering
countries with the aim of achieving earlier warning and more effective action
against threats.
The kinds of operation that permanent C2 Air has supported include long-
range raids, in-country training of air forces, and public service missions. Permanent
C2 Air gives France the ability to conduct long-range conventional strikes: for
example, France is now capable of projecting a patrol of Rafales carrying Scalp crui se
missiles, in company with air-to-air refuelling tankers and an AWACS, all fitted with
long-range communications, in order to command a cruise missile strike from
COAIR or from Lyon. This unique capability affords the political decision-makers
the ability to deliver precision military effects anywhere, and in just a few hours,
with a very smallor even noground footprint.
Permanent C2 Air allows the mounting of many public service missions
which require coordination of the use of civil and military assets, such as security
of the skies, search and rescue of aircraft in distress, fighting illegal activity such as
drugs trafficking, fighting forest fires and assistance to populations following
natu ral disasters.
CDAOA also conducts the space surveillance mission, and directs employ-
ment of the large space watch network (Grand rseau adapt la veille spatiale
Graves). The data obtained from it is analysed and regularly updated to build a space
picture. Improvements to Graves are planned for the near future, as well as the deve-
lopment of a demonstrator for spectral observation and characterisation of geostatio-
nary satellites (Observation spectrale et caractrisation des satellites gostationnaires
Oscgane), which will perform spectroscopy on geostationary satellites. The coordi-
nated setting to work of these sensors and their associated software highlights the exis-
tence of spatial operational loop of Detection
(1)
Analysis
(2)
Orientation
(3)
Action
(4)
, which is essentially the OODA loop in a dif ferent disguise.
Since February 2010, a secure defence communications line has been esta-
blished between CNES, a centre of expertise, and CDAOA, the operational autho-
rity. This has led to the establishment of a space centre that is planned for the Lyon
Mont-Verdun air base, and which will be able to give a very precise daily situation
by merging the information coming from all sensors. This future operational
(1) By Graves (for low orbit) and Oscgane (for geostationary orbit).
(2) Using CIBORG and STK software.
(3) Direction of trajectory-measuring (Satam) or imagery (Tira) sensors.
(4) For example, anti-collision manoeuvres, operations planning or political decisions.
19
centre for military surveillance of spatial objects (Centre oprationnel de sur veillan ce
militaire des objets spatiaux Cosmos) will therefore be a centre for real space-
orientated C2.
Many years of dedicated work has given France a permanent C2 Air capabi-
lity that enables the country to ensure the overarching mission of protection of natio-
nal airspace and at the same time to conduct other missions of highly diverse nature.
The Airborne Nuclear Component:
an Approach to Excellence
French Air Staff.
EMAA
An airborne component based on nuclear sufficiency
The nuclear air forces are composed of assets that are allocated according
to the principle of strict sufficiency and sized to meet the appropriate nuclear
need. This need was redefined in 2008 and led to the reduction from three to two
Air Force squadrons of nuclear-capable fighter aircraft. These forces are capable of
inflicting unacceptable damage on any player who threatens the vital interests of
the nation. The permanent character of French nuclear deterrence, and the reac-
tion times that such deterrence implies, requires the support of a considerable
volume of dedicated resources, including crews, aircraft and technical support, as
well as the security environment needed for effecting the overall mission, which
involves physical protection (on the ground) and in-flight escort. This permanent
tasking to provide nuclear deterrence requires the commitment of the entire Air
Force and is accorded the highest priority.
The dynamism created by the airborne nuclear component
The airborne nuclear component is notable for its permanent ability to
deploy at short notice. To do this it has some obvious intrinsic assets: it offers great
flexibility in its modes of action and great precision in strike. If faced with a
possible attack on our vital interests, these diverse modes of action enhance beyond
measure the credibility of nuclear deterrence.
The success of the nuclear mission relies on the most demanding of opera-
tional knowhow: taking into account the international implications, the distances
to be covered, the threats encountered and the precision required of the strikes, the
competence sought from the crews is of the highest order.
The necessary rigour and the need for security are the foundations of a
team spirit which lies behind all the operations of the strategic air forces (Forces
ariennes stratgiques FAS).
20
21
The first armed Mirage IV was put on nuclear alert in 1964: since then,
the nuclear deterrent mission has led to the creation of both operational and tech-
nical expertise.
Autonomy in use is essential to deterrence, and it has necessitated the deve-
lopment of particular types of hardened and often innovative materiel to guaran-
tee complete operational effectiveness. As a result, advanced research has led to the
development of electronic countermeasures, a navigation system and an automatic
terrain-following capability, which have all added to the credibility of the compo-
nent and guaranteed its operational reliability. These capabilities have naturally
been passed on to assets of the Air Force which perform a conventional role
electronic warfare measures and the Mirage 2000s terrain-following system, for
example. The same goes for communications systems, which also have a need for
robustness and performance: their development has led to general improvement in
aeronautical communications.
The deterrent mission is also the catalyst for industrial and technological
excellence within the defence industrial and technological base. Through cause and
effect, some major programmes which have been developed for the FAS have been
expanded into dual systems to the broader benefit of the Air Force. A further point
is that, by the very nature of the programmes undertaken, some skill areas have had
to remain strictly national. Because of this, investment in these skills has been of
benefit to other major industrial developments. Among these, in particular are
propulsion (ramjet technology), aerodynamics (flight from the lowest to the
highest altitudes), the extreme mechanical and thermal environments of long-
range supersonic missiles, penetration of hardened and heavily defended targets
and hardening of electronic components against nuclear attack.
A recognised centre of nuclear excellence
The nuclear certification process for our new military nuclear systems
Rafale with the ASMPA (the advanced medium range air to ground missile), for
exampleis based on unique knowledge, and has had remarkable success.
Modernisation of the strategic air forces has highlighted once again the nuclear skill
of Air Force personnel and their competence in the subject. These skills concerning
the airborne nuclear mission are quite rare and highly regarded. It is worthy of note
that any loss of competence in the very specialised field of nuclear weapons has an
immediate effect on the credibility of the system overall and requires substantial
measures to be taken to rebuild the necessary knowledge. One of our allies has had
bitter experience of this as a result of pressure of external commitments over the past
20 years, during which its units neglected their preparation for the operational
nuclear role in favour of their conventional roles. The French Air Force affirms its
absolute commitment to the priority of the nuclear deterrent role.
22
Conventional capability within the constraints of the nuclear role
All that said, the crews of the strategic air forces are not channelled exclu-
sively into the nuclear mission, albeit that role remains fundamental to operatio-
nal preparation. The deployment of personnel to other roles is eased by the multi-
role capability of the aircraft, and provides the military chief with a range of capa-
bilities within the conventional field. This is also true for the fleet of tanker aircraft
which every day and at all latitudes provide support to French and allied combat
aircraft. Soon, with the entry into service of the A330 multi-role transport tanker,
this capability will be further improved.
The strategic air forces contribute to the Air Forces conventional tasking
by supplying a pool of high quality crews who participate in the establishment of
air power on operations. This use of manpower and material dedicated to the
deterrent mission means careful choices have to be made with regard to the politi-
cal authoritys view of the geopolitical situation at the time. Such use cannot be
allowed to become routine.
Analysis of recent conflicts shows that, when possible within the constraints
of the requirements for the nuclear role, the strategic air forces are completely adap-
ted to participate from the outset and in the long term in conventional missions. In
this way, all involved in the operation can benefit from the remarkable tactical and
technical expertise that has been acquired during training for the nuclear role.
The Air Force
and National Security
French Air Staff.
EMAA
T
he legitimacy of the state depends, amongst other things, on its ability to
ensure the security of our fellow-citizens, both on national territory and
outside our frontiers. However, the resources which the state makes avai-
lable to respond to this imperative are increasingly limited; the boundary between
defence and security is less and less clear and new actors (local government, NGOs
and so on) who are not directly under the authority of the state are playing an
increasing role. These are factors pushing towards a rapprochement of these two
spheres which were formerly well compartmented.
From a technical point of view, the major functions which underlie security
and national defence possess some remarkable similarities: both areas involve appre-
ciating the threat or risk, collecting intelligence on the situation, evaluating all the
options for intervention and planning and coordinating the resources or measuring
the effects achieved. All of this requires information and communication systems
and is usually performed under pressure of events. Certainly, the constraints resul-
ting from the environment may change, but it will always be necessary to seek to
save lives or to undertake a complex mission whilst keeping an eye on saving
resources.
When it finds itself in a national security context, the air arm can make an
effective and appropriate contribution. It can also propose positive approaches to
optimising inter-ministerial capabilities, whose deployment can be very rapid and
adapted to a short, medium or long-term perspective.
The short term: optimisation of state resources
The Air Force already carries out airspace control missions on a daily basis.
These may include in-flight assistance to aircraft which have technical problems or
are lost, as well as search and rescue missions following an air accident. It regularly
provides a protective bubble over Heads of States summits and other important
gatherings of people, such as D-Day ceremonies. In support of the struggle against
organised crime, it is able to participate in the search for or pursuit of aircraft being
used for illegal trafficking. As the experts in the third dimension, it has the means
23
24
and the capabilities to manage the coordination of civil-military air activity in an
emergency situation from fixed or mobile centres.
The Air Forces command and control (C2) centres are based on readily-
available capabilities and, more to the point, on the air defence decision process,
which directly connects the Prime Minister to the systems for the defence of natio-
nal airspace and its approaches. These include satellites, radars, interceptor aircraft
and helicopters. The C2 centres can serve as the backbone of a wider crisis mana-
gement system, bringing together the inter-ministerial crisis cells.
In addition, to increase the efficacy of the system, the resort to ministry of
defence resources can be formalized. UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle), designed
to watch over large regions for long periods, are capable of providing valuable help
to the civil authorities in making a permanent assessment of the situation, the
coordination of resources or as communication relays. Reconnaissance aircraft,
which already support the Gendarmerie in their work against crime, also prove
their worth. Finally, the Air Forces transport capability, consisting of aircraft and
helicopters, offer a speed of reaction and flexibility of use, which justify their rapid
requisition in a crisis situation.
This shared use of state resources can be made to work well, as long as civil
administrations are better aware of the capabilities for intervention that the mili-
tary forces can offer. To achieve this we need to encourage regular inter-ministerial
exercises on the lines of the nuclear security exercises, which involve local, depart-
mental and national level participation. The resilience of the state is bound up in
the logic of continuous and systematic preparation in which defence forces can aid
the civil power, based on their expertise in planning processes.
The network of military air bases offers another major advantage. First of
all, it offers the civil power secure strong points, readily available to inter-ministe-
rial action with its accommodation capability, airport facilities, radar, reserves of
trained men, communications facilities, medical and other assistance and more
besides. Moreover, this network can immediately be placed at the service of the
state in the event of a loss of airports and civil air control following a general tech-
nical breakdown or a massive cyber attack, for example. It can also provide the safe
transport of critical cargoes such as medical evacuation, transport of senior officials
or repatriated nationals.
Medium term: new horizons
Globalisation and technological developments have together put the flow
of finance and resources at the heart of world business. In the aerospace domain,
air transport carries about three percent by volume of international trade in mer-
chandise but 40 to 50 percent of its value. Maintaining freedom of movement
within it, guaranteeing it by the range of air defence resources and surveillance of
The Air Force
25
The Air Force
the skies, is already a considerable challenge. In addition, the third dimension
makes possible the surveillance of the vast spaces of land and sea across which this
flow of resources transits. It is time to envisage a new approach to the contribution
of the air arm to these issues of national stability.
With this in view, a forward-looking review of the deployment of our
pre-positioned forces is required. One approach consists setting up a network of
airport hubs based on possible complementarity with our allies, perhaps the
United Kingdom and the United States, establishing specific diplomatic agree-
ments, or deploying staging facilities across the world.
Our current and, in particular our future, strategic projection capabilities
with the A400M and MRTT (Multi Role Tanker Transport), and the associated
pre-positioning of air resources, would then give us the ability to react quickly
when the security of our air, maritime or terrestrial trade is threatened.
In parallel, overseas Departments and territories are occasionally subject to
majorsometimes extremenatural disasters which require more than simple
coordination of emergency help, and therefore need rapid-response capabilities to
restore the vital functions of the state. In this scenario of long-distance and rapid
projection, the Air Force could provide important and organised aid to inter-
ministerial aid teams.
In general terms, this future system should be considered as available to the
state in its wider sense, so that the Air Forces strategic transport capability is available
to all ministries. The transport of banknotes from the Banque de France or other
sensitive government cargoes to the overseas territories might be a first example.
Long term: build a spirit of civil defence
Finally, the security of a country invariably relies on the commitment of its
citizens. The education of the young is a major element and warrants close atten-
tion. The promotion of a spirit of civil defence could therefore be engendered by
means of defence schools.
The model of air cadets who engage to serve in the reserves in exchange for
aeronautical training, inspired by the British example and set up in Air Force
schools, could form a policy objective promoting social cohesion, an expression of
popular feeling and of the values linked to security.
In the same way, it could be interesting to develop the promotion of the
defence and security dimension in university courses in general, following the
example of the courses in officer schools offered to students at teacher training
col leges.
26
Finally, the activities of the Trinmes acadmiques * could be enriched by
means of a wider participation by those connected with civil defence.
To respond to the issue of national security, the state can depend on the
solid foundation of the Air Forces capabilities, which offer the characteristics of
dual and inter-ministerial usage: C2 centres, a network of air bases, the capacity
for reconnaissance and surveillance, a strategic transport capability and a capacity
for training. After a first stage of inter-ministerial optimisation of these resources,
this approach suggests promising perspectives of a larger spectrum of missions in
the fullness of time.
The Air Force
* Trinmes acadmiques
Decentralised organisations bringing together the ministry of national education, defence and the Institute for
advanced studies in national defence (IHEDN) on the theme of security.
R
D
N
The Capability to Act Fast and Far:
three Recent Commitments
The Afghan Model 10 Years on,
Still Wholly Relevant
Colonel (Air), former commander of transport squadron
1/61 Touraine; Graduate of the Air Force Command
and Staff College and of the School of Advanced Air and
Space Studies.
Graud Laborie
O
n 10 November 2001, Northern Alliance forces captured Mazar-i-Sharif,
bringing about the collapse of the Taliban regime a month later. With this
important victory, the first since the start of Operation Enduring Freedom,
the whole world discovered pictures of western fighters on horseback amongst
General Dostums cavalry. This indication of the involvement of Special Forces
alongside the Northern Alliance, supported by coalition airpower would give birth
a year later to the Afghan Model concept, propounded and popularised by
Stephen Biddle, researcher at the US Army War College.
What is the legacy of the Afghan model ten years on? Has it been relevant
to other operational theatres? Is it still relevant in the framework of operations in
Mali or of future conflicts?
To answer these questions, we have to go back to the beginnings of the
model and its first implementation in Afghanistan, if we are to understand the
basic principles. Study of recent conflicts reveals that the model was also used in
northern Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, before reappearing in
Libya during Operation Unified Protector. These three examples offer a precise
definition of its characteristics, advantages and limitations. They confirm that the
Afghan model is a strategic tool, mainly airborne, that is still completely relevant,
with high coercive value when employed in the right conditions. It should be fully
recognised and incorporated into our armed forces range of strategic options.
Birth of a concept: Afghanistan, October 2001 to March 2002
The beginnings of the Afghan model concept date from the first weeks of
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). After the 9/11 attacks, the National Security
Council gave President Bush two options for Afghanistan. The first, fruit of the
29
30
labours of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, favoured the conventional approach requiring
the deployment of five divisions over a period of several months before starting the
assault on the Taliban regime. The second option, presented by the CIA, predic-
ted the fall of the regime through the joint efforts of US airpower, Special Forces
and Afghan allies. This option was not to the liking of the Pentagon military. It
had too much of the flavour of unconvincing experiences during the Vietnam war,
where Special Forces, allied with Montagnard tribes tried unsuccessfully to stem
the flood of men and materiel along the Ho Chi Minh trail. For the Afghanistan
issue, however, it caught the eye of Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, for seve-
ral reasons. Firstly, it offered a rapid response, in accordance with the expectations
of the White House and of the American people, traumatised by the scale of the
terrorist attacks. Isolated, with no access by sea, Afghanistan didnt lend itself to
massive troop deployments, requiring negotiations for transit and stationing with
neighbouring states. The 1979 Soviet invasion, initiated from its Central Asian
republics was not subject to the same restrictions. Next, the CIA plan was based
on airpower, whose lethality and accuracy were far beyond anything available in
Vietnam. Airpower, combined with Special Forces equipped with portable laser
designators, and able to give exact GPS coordinates offered new possibilities that
were still largely underestimated in 2001. Donald Rumsfeld glimpsed them, none-
theless. He initiated a major reform of the American military arm, considered too
ponderous and unable to make enough use of its superior technology.
(1)
The Shock
and Awe concept, developed in 1996 by researchers of the National Defence
University had drawn the Defense Secretarys attention: a combination of speed,
accuracy and firepower that paralyses the enemy with a minimum of force.
(2)
Its
first full-scale application later took place in Afghanistan, but with the ground
element restricted to Special Forces.
The CIA plan was finally adopted, chiefly because of the geographic and
diplomatic constraints of access to Afghanistan, and the political need to act quick-
ly. The CIA could also make use of its solid relationship with the Northern
Alliance, established in the months before 9/11. What followed is well known: the
air campaign started on 7 October with an attack on the Talibans rudimentary air
defence network and command and control infrastructure (C2). On 15 October,
American Special Forces joined up with Northern Alliance forces to prepare the
offensive against the main Taliban strongholds, particularly Mazar-i-Sharif.
Without vehicles, they used the transport mode best adapted to the narrow trails
of the Afghan mountains: the pony. The entrenched positions defending the town
fell one after the other in the face of the joint action of coalition airpower and
General Dostums fighters. The fall of Mazar-i-Sharif on 10 November marked the
(1) Robert Kagan, Finding the Target: the transformation of American military policy, New York, Encounter Books, 2006,
p. 293.
(2) Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, Shock and Awe: Achieving rapid dominance, Washington, National Defense
University Institute of National Security Strategy, 1996, p. xxiv-xxvi.
31
beginning of the end for the Taliban regime, which abandoned its last stronghold
in Kandahar on 6 December after a campaign of just 60 days.
In November 2002 the first in-depth article on the new Afghan Model
appeared with Army War College researcher Stephen Biddles by-line. The author
defined its chief characteristicsnoting advantages and limitationsthat had been
demonstrated in the first months of the same year. The use of Afghan allies to
finish the job and liquidate the Al-Qaeda fighters who were dug in in Tora Bora or
in the Shah-e-Kot valley (Operation Anaconda) did not meet with the hoped-for
success. In the second case, the weak motivation of the Afghan soldiers who were
supposed to unearth and push the enemy out of the valley, led to their retreat at the
first sign of difficulty, leaving the US troops alone to face a determined enemy.
The application to Iraqi Kurdistan: March-April 2003
Whilst the first months of Enduring Freedom are fairly well documented in
France, application of the Afghan model in northern Iraq in spring 2003 is far less
so. Here again, geographic conditions and the diplomatic environment combined to
oblige the Pentagon to reproduce the Afghan operational pattern. US Central
Commands (CENTCOM) planning for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein envisa-
ged the deployment from Turkey of the 4
th
Infantry Division (4 ID) into northern
Iraq. By mid-March, in spite of intense diplomatic activity, CENTCOM was forced
to recognise that Turkey would not join the coalition and would not authorise the
opening of a northern front from its border. Somewhat in despair, General Tommy
Franks decided to use special forces in order to tie down the 13 Iraqi divisions
deployed by Saddam Hussein to cover his northern frontier. For CENTCOM the
danger was to see these divisions redeployed to the south, opposite Kuwait, once the
Iraqi dictator realised that the danger from Turkey had dissipated. CENTCOM
then decided to commit 48 teams of 12 men from the 3
rd
and 10
th
Special Forces
Group, supported by coalition airpower and infiltrated alongside the Kurdish
Peshmergas, in an attempt to assume the role originally assigned to the 4 ID.
It was a difficult task: the 50,000 to 70,000 Kurdish militiamen were brave
and motivated, but had no heavy equipment, and their offensive capability was
non-existent. Their favourite tactic consisted of mounting costly frontal attacks on
positions held by the 70,000 to 110,000 men of the Iraqi regular forces, and the
20,000 soldiers of the Republican Guard. The American Special Forces who
constituted the Joint Special Operations Task-Force North (JSOTF-N) were infil-
trated by air on 23 March without their vehicles and communications equipment,
which were held up in Turkey. Air strike guidance therefore had to be conducted
essentially by radio, without data links. Air support was also not up to Afghanistan
standards: the coalitions air resources were based in the Persian Gulf, a long way
from northern Iraq. Without the planned Turkish bases, only naval aviation from
32
carriers in the Mediterranean could be used, but that was also a long way away and
limited in capability.
However the American Special Forces were able to accomplish the three
missions assigned to them: to pin down the greater part of the Iraqi divisions on
the Green Line (the border between Iraqi Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq), destroy
the training camps of the terrorist group Ansar-al-Islam, and stabilise the cities of
Mosul and Kirkuk. Spread out along the Green Line, in groups of 12 men plus a
US Air Force combat air controller attached to a unit of 100 to 300 Peshmergas,
the Special Forces used the local knowledge and intelligence of their Kurdish allies
to direct air strikes on Iraqi units. During the 16 days of operations, Saddam
Husseins troops never managed to sort the problem out. Airpower, effectively
directed by the combat controllers made up for the numerical, material and tacti-
cal inferiority of the Kurdish allies.
Nonetheless, the successes of JSOTF-N were sometimes achieved with dif-
ficulty and at the cost of collateral damage. As with the fighting in the Debecka
Pass, two American teams and their allies narrowly escaped annihilation at the
hands of an Iraqi Motor Rifle company reinforced by a large number of tanks.
Hindered by bad weather, American bombing led to the loss of 17 Kurdish
combatants hit by mistake by an F-14 D fighter. The Special Forces owed their sur-
vival to their Javelin anti-tank missiles which pushed back the enemy armour.
Fortunately an improvement in the weather the next day allowed them to finish
off the Iraqi column. The JSOTF-N was also faced with another major problem:
the lack of dedicated ISR capability (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance),
priority being given to covering the American advance from the south. The coali-
tion lost all trace of the elite Nebuchadnezzar division, which managed to redeploy
to central Iraq to confront the attack through the Karbala breach.
The Afghan model is not, therefore, risk-free. Even if its application in nor-
thern Iraq can be justly qualified as a coalition success, it also reveals the limita-
tions, particularly with restricted air resources.
The Afghan Model, an antidote to bogging down in Libya
As the Iraqi example shows, the role of catalyst for airpower played by the
American Special Forces demands a considerable ground element to be effective.
The JSOTF-N consisted of no less than 600 men alongside the Kurdish
Peshmergas. An operation on this scale is not within the capacities of the clandes-
tine operations services alone, with their far fewer numbers. Hence the use of mili-
tary special forces, too numerous to stay invisible, with the associated risks of fata-
lities, is not anodyne in political terms. Their activity requires a certain element of
recognition by their government.
33
If this aspect posed no particular difficulty for the White House in the cases
of Afghanistan and Iraq, it has been shown to be much more of a problem for
France and Great Britain during Operation Unified Protector. Resolution 1971 of
the UN Security Council authorised the use of all measures necessary to protect
populations and civilian areas threatened by attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
including Benghazi, whilst excluding the deployment of any kind of foreign occu-
pation force. The types of measure necessary for this being left to the discretion of
coalition members, the terms were sufficiently ambiguous to allow active support
to the Libyan opposition. However, the exclusion of ground troops put the res-
ponsibility for support solely on the air and sea resources, with not much possibi-
lity of tight coordination with insurgent action.
Officially, therefore, the use of Special Forces in the first weeks was limited
to the role of advisors to the CNT. But by late August, special forces from Qatar, the
Emirates, and also from France and Great Britain were to be found along with the
insurgents at the fall of Tripoli. Their role symptomizes a resort to the Afghan model,
as described by Jean-Christophe Notin, where the chain established by Special
Operations Command did much to lubricate the observation/destruction process.
(3)
Why the change? Was it the result of coalition strategy from the beginning of
Unified Protector, or of adaptation to the situation? Early studies of the campaign
against Gaddafi lean towards the second hypothesis. Once the loyalist forces had
been stopped short in their offensive against Benghazi, the coalition ran a risk of
getting bogged down that was perceptible from the end of April.
A study for the (French) Strategic Research Foundation carried out in this
period already indicated the limitations of the insurrection, on its own incapable of
forcing the enemy to concentrate and manoeuvre thereby offering a more vulnerable
air target. The study also proposed the deployment of Special Forces Tactical Air
Control Parties to increase the effectiveness of airstrikes.
(4)
With stagnation on the
Brega and Misrata fronts, resort to the Afghan model seemed obvious also to the
political authorities of the more resolute coalition states. It is also relevant to obser ve
that despite the helicopter and fighter bomber attacks to free the coastal towns, the
insurrections salvation came from the Jebel Nefoussa, where the Western and Arab
special forces had been particularly active since spring 2011. Their role, alongside
the Berber insurgents covered a wide spectrum, as explained in a study by the Royal
United Services Institute (RUSI)
(5)
: supply of weapons and materiel by air and land,
training insurgents for the assault on Tripoli, integration of the ground offensive
with the NATO air campaign, and intelligence and airstrike guidance during
com bat.
(3) Jean-Christophe Notin, La vrit sur notre guerre en Libye, Paris, Fayard, 2012, p. 471.
(4) Philippe Gros, De Odyssey Dawn Unified Protector : bilan transitoire, perspectives et premiers enseignements de
lengagement en Libye, FRS, Note No. 04/11, April 2011, p. 18.
(5) RUSI, Accidental Heroes: Britain, France and the Libya operation, Interim RUSI Campaign Report, September
2011, p. 11-12.
34
Faced with the risk of bogging down, the coalition resorted to an escalation
based on the Afghan model, using special forces, in order to counter the pro-Gaddafi
forces adaptation to the operational methods of an air campaign insufficiently
integrated with insurgent action. The Libyan example therefore confirms the intact
relevance of the Afghan model 10 years after its birth. It shows also one of the para-
doxes of airpower in the OUP situation: it gives satisfaction at the political level by
affirming determination from the earliest moments of operations, without a ground
commitment. However, it is only really effective in military terms if it integrates a
ground element capable of catalysing its effects to help the insurrection win the day.
The Afghan model under the microscope strengths and weaknesses
The Afghan, Iraqi and Libyan examples allow us to define the chief cha rac-
teristics of the model, and to explore the advantages and the limitations. It can be
summed up simply in the form of the following triptych: airpower, and special
forces in partnership with local forces, for the conduct of air-ground operations.
Special forces operate primarily as a catalyst for airpower, allowing local forces to
carry the day in spite of numerical and materiel inferiority. As happened in the
battle for Mazar-i-Sharif, the Northern Alliance with 2,000 men was able to win
against 5,000 well-entrenched and well-equipped Taliban fighters. Special Forces
can also assume roles beyond airstrike guidance: training, supervision, technical
advice and intelligence support to the local command. In targeting terms, the
concept of full spectrum targeting is best adapted to seizing the totality of the
effects that the model makes possible: lethal airpower guided by special forces
stri ke the enemy forces, non-lethal resources provide intelligence and resupply of
men, equipment and rations. Morale, military capabilities, and the population
supporting the local allies are the targets for preservation, just as the morale,
com mand and control and military capabilities of the enemy are the targets for
destruction. The psychological impact of the air arm on the adversary is that much
stronger in that he is incapable of countering its effects, as testified by Taliban
pri soners captured during Enduring Freedom.
(6)
A number of conditions are needed for the Afghan model to function cor-
rectly. They affect the three components, and determine the limitations of the model.
In airpower terms, success in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya should not make us forget
that the prerequisites indispensable to any attempt to apply the model are the acqui-
sition and maintenance of air superiority. This prerequisite may impose a long,
costly and crippling campaign against an enemy with robust air defence. The discus-
sions in the media of a possible military intervention in Syria are a good example.
(7)
(6) Charles J. Dunlap, Short changing the Joint Fight? An airmans assessment of FM 3-24 and the case for developing truly
joint COIN doctrine, Maxwell AFB, Air University Monograph, 2007, p. 41.
(7) See the reaction following the loss of a Turkish fighter in Syrias downing of Turkish jet demonstrates sophisticated air
defence, Seattle Times, 27 June 2012.
35
Without air superiority, the model is quite simply inapplicable. Even once acquired,
all is not yet won. Local allies and Special Forces are still particularly vulnerable when
faced with enemy troops with superior numbers and equipment, as shown by the
battle of Debecka. Such inferiority must be compensated by unfailing air support.
High endurance ISR capabilities are vital to avoiding nasty surprises, hence a cam-
paign whose ultra-sophisticated air component is often in contrast with the rusticity
of troops on the ground. According to a RAND study, the first months of Operation
Enduring Freedom were far more demanding of data links than the more conventio-
nal Iraqi campaign of 2003.
(8)
Support for friendly forces equally requires great air support know-how, in
both its lethal and non-lethal aspects. The accuracy of a guided weapon must go
hand-in-hand with adjustable lethality according to the enemys ability to adapt.
Having experienced the devastating effects of allied airpower on its very exposed
motorised columns, as at Tarin Kowt on 18 November 2001, the Taliban retreated
to well-prepared and camouflaged defensive positions that even the 2,000lb JDAM
could not totally destroy. During Operation Anaconda in March 2002, the
American heli-borne forces on objective Ginger had a very hard time with Al-Qaeda
militants well dug in to positions that resisted a number of consecutive strikes.
(9)
Unified Protector also confirmed the need for a wide range of armament covering the
full spectrum of destructive effect. In the Libyan case, limited-effect munitions were
in short supply, shown by the recourse to using laser-guided inert bombs, to strike
the enemy scattered in a densely populated urban environment without collateral
damage. The Royal Air Force likewise made intensive use of its well-adapted
Brimstone munitions, to the point of virtually exhausting its stocks.
(10)
In the non-lethal category, there is a vital need for solid and reliable tacti-
cal transport aircraft support, to be able to infiltrate special forces, to resupply
them and to supply equipment to local forces, as at the Jebel Nefoussa in Libya.
Precision airdropping capabilities can offset the lack of secured landing sites and
the isolation of friendly forces.
(11)
To that must of course be added the inherent
resources of any air campaign: C2, in-flight refuelling, combat search and rescue,
and more still. Clearly, a whole range of air operational capabilities has to be mas-
tered, which de facto puts a limit on the number of air forces capable of applying
the Afghan model independently, or at least of making a decisive contribution
within a coalition. This necessary major air effort can quickly reduce the attraction
of a model, whose ground component might seem less demanding in human and
(8) Benjamin S. Lambeth, Airpower against Terror: Americas conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom, Santa Monica, Rand,
2005, p. 352.
(9) Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the future of warfare: implications for army and defence policy, Carlisle Barracks,
US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002, p. 37.
(10) Royal United Services Institute, op. cit. footnote 5, p. 6
(11) RUSI, op. cit. foot note 5, p. 11, Jean-Christophe Notin, op. cit. foot note 3, p. 391-392, and Jean-Marc Tanguy,
Harmattan : Rcits et rvlations, Paris, Nimrod, 2012, p. 51.
36
materiel resources. Operating in a coalition will clearly compensate for certain
shortcomings.
As to the ground sector, special forces must obviously be able to master all
the techniques and procedures of air support. Their role however goes way beyond
simple air strike guidance. Operation Anaconda illustrated the limits of air-portable
ISR capabilities: in spite of a month of intensive observation of an operational zone
covering no more than 100 square kilometres, half the enemy positions had escaped
detection before the start of the operation. When the geography is unfavourable, the
forces in contact have to make up for these limitations. This is the case in the moun-
tainous terrain of a great part of Afghanistan, but also in urban environments, which
are increasingly the theatres of modern conflict. The role of special forces is therefo re
to compensate as far as possible for the limits of sensors, by sending information
obtained at first hand or gathered by local allies. That works in both directions, allo-
wing the allies to benefit from information gathered by airborne sensors. The
employment of Western special forces in this role during the rebel advance on Tripoli
emerges clearly from the initial studies of Operation Unified Protector.
(12)
Interaction with local allies also needs the maintenance of a pool of linguists
and regional experts within the special forces, capable of interacting quickly and
effectively with the local partners. Although in Afghanistan the American teams were
able to draw on the CIAs contacts with the Northern Alliance, it took several weeks
for the Western and Arab special forces to build an effective partnership with the geo-
graphically scattered Libyan allies, who lacked a unified command.
The existence of these local allies is the third component of the Afghan
model, whose chief quality lies in their availability as allies of circumstance. The
presence of forces that have a degree of political and military credibility is of cour-
se crucial to the success of the model. The choice of local partner cannot be a neu-
tral one, for in an insurrection gathering together different movements against a
common enemy, the support given to some rather than others gives rise to politi-
cal consideration of the organisation of force relationships which will dictate the
future government of the country.
Amongst the criteria which determine the choice of this ally, the level of
military credibility is not necessarily determining if it is compensated by the abi-
li ty to rally sufficient numbers of potential combatants. Experience shows that it is
possible to adapt to a wide range of situations. The future combatant does not have
to be particularly well trained if it is possible to instruct him in the necessary rudi-
ments of combat in areas out of hostile range. Equipment can be supplied by air
if needed, as at Jebel Nefoussa. Once the combatant is on a war footing, the spe-
cial forces can give advice to the leaders, ensure the coordination of airstrikes and
contribute to the synchronisation of ground force action with the air campaign
(12) RUSI, op. cit. footnote 5, p. 12, and Jean-Christophe Notin, op. cit. footnote 3, p. 470-471.
37
(13) Jean-Christophe Notin, op. cit. footnote 3, p. 526.
(14) Richard Andres, Craig Wills, Thomas E. Griffith, Winning with Allies: the strategic value of the Afghan model,
International Security, vol 30, No. 3, Winter 2005/2006, p. 34.
(15) See particularly Larme tchadienne aux avant-postes de la guerre au Mali, Le Monde, 4 March 2013; and Lappui
crucial des Tchadiens au nord du Mali, Le Figaro.fr, 17 March 2013.
plan. Against all expectations, the result is the victory of the armed greengrocer
over the professional soldier.
(13)
It is nonetheless essential to be well aware of the tactical limitations of the
local partner, not necessarily able to understand or execute complex manoeuvres
against an experienced enemy. Special forces in their limited numbers are always
vulnerable to a sudden collapse of their allies. A capital point for the models suc-
cess is that the protagonists must share essentially the same strategic objectives. The
fall of the Taliban regime in the first weeks of Enduring Freedom or of the Gaddafi
regime gave the common interest needed for common success. On the other hand,
the examples of Tora Bora or of Operation Anaconda reveal the danger of not
having enough ground troops to offset the shortcomings of the Afghan ally, poor ly
motivated for the pursuit of foreign Al-Qaeda fighters, especially in the depths of
winter, in particularly mountainous terrain.
(14)
The Afghan model and Operation Serval
On 12 January 2013, France set in motion Operation Serval in Mali, to stop
the terrorist offensive south of the river Niger and to hinder these movements from
threatening the State of Mali. After an initial phase of reaction and stabilisation, the
offensive was launched to retake the Niger loop and then to restore the integrity of
Malis northern territory. Do the first lessons learned from Operation Serval indicate
recourse to the Afghan model? It has to be admitted that the first few weeks did not
really lend themselves to its application, because of the extreme weakness of the Mali
armed forces, incapable of playing the role of a sufficiently militarily credible local
ally. The French intervention was shaped as a response to this weakness. French sol-
diers were on the front line, alongside those Malian units which had retained a degree
of cohesion, and whose morale and military effectiveness were boosted by strong air
support and the presence on the ground of an impressive number of French combat
elements. This strong French presence up front, notably during the recapture of the
Niger loop, ruled out the application of the Afghan model.
Nonetheless, the model evidently played a more important role at the start
of the offensive into the Adrar Mountains, in its application to an African ally of
considerable military credibility in desert warfare: the Chadian armed forces. The
intervention of General Mahamet Idriss Deby Itmos troops, especially during the
Ametettai valley battle, included French combat aircraft and helicopters, which
imply the presence of forward air controllers attached to the Chadian units to
coordinate and guide them.
(15)
38
The Afghan model retains all its relevance, therefore, in the Mali conflict,
having finally found an African ally sufficiently militarily capable for its application,
which alone confirms the crucial importance of this condition for its effecti ve appli-
cation. The Afghan model could not have worked in the first days of Operation
Serval, but with militarily capable African units it became viable.
Implications for the Air force
The Afghan model is far from being a panacea in modern warfare. To suc-
ceed it must meet precise criteria. It is not risk-free for the indigenous allies, is
dependent on foreign air support or special forces commandos, and is vulnerable
in the event of the defection of its local partner. It needs a dose of strategic patien ce
before its effects can be seen, even if, by comparison with a more conventional
campaign it offers the possibility of swift execution, which fits well with the intrin-
sic qualities of air power: rapid power projection, long reach, agility, ubiquity, fire-
power and flexibility. It cannot guarantee to win the peace once the campaign is
over: the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the deterioration of the situation in
northern Iraq in the months following the fall of Saddam Hussein,
(16)
and the
uncertainties still prevailing over Libyas future are all reasons for prudence.
Nonetheless, ten years after its appearance, the Afghan model reaffirmed its
relevance in Libya. Its intrinsic qualities of catalyst for the air arm serve to increa se
its strategic utility. Its political and financial cost is lower than for a conventional
campaign. It may not resolve conflicts on its own, but that is so for all military
interventions, conventional or not. It opens possibilities for its application in the
crisis arc where there is a number of hostile regimes, totalitarian but vulnerable to
a determined insurrection. That, at any rate is the opinion of American strategists:
the withdrawal from Iraq, the death of Osama bin Laden, and the need to reduce
the budget deficit have led President Obama to announce new strategic directions
that break with the previous decades. More demanding in the type and place of
their commitments, the United States is seeking to make use of credible partners,
with whom tasks can be sharedparticularly those whose vital interests are not at
stake. The Afghan model allows the United States to commit minimally, making
best use of their superiority in the air.
For France, at a time of decisions regarding capabilities, it has to be said that
the model arouses suspicion, even outright rejection. Calling it delegated interven-
tionism is proof of an under-estimation of the political and military com mitment
it involves. Its limitations are regularly highlighted, to the detriment of its coercive
value, when in fact it reinforces the effectiveness of military interventions whenever
(16) Largely due to the clumsiness of the 101st Airborne Division deployed after the battles were over, according
to Richard Andre in The Afghan Model in Northern Iraq, The Journal of Strategic studies, vol.29, No. 3, June 2006,
p. 414-417.
39
(17) Dfense et Scurit International, Les limites de linterventionnisme par dlgation, DSI No. 87, December 2012,
p. 10-11.
(18) Richard Andres, Craig Wills, Thomas E. Griffith, op. cit. footnote 14, p. 47.
the situation imposes the support of a local partner without large-scale deployment
of ground troops. Its potentially damaging effects on the evolution of the size and
shape of the armed forces also comes under fire, as seen in a recent article: this
model.could be used to justify reductions in ground forces.
(17)
This criticism
tends to forget too quickly the necessary conditions for the models use, which are
special enough to prevent it from being regarded routinely as the most desirable
method of operation.
It would therefore be detrimental to our armed forces if they were depri-
ved of this tool of demonstrated coercive value, not least because they already have
all the elements needed for its implementation. We must preserve the air support
expertise forged in Afghanistan and demonstrated in Libya, a solid component of
special forces airmen trained in those techniques, as part of a larger grouping of all-
arms special forces capable of training and advising foreign partners. It naturally
goes hand-in-hand with an air force capable of supplying the framework for appli-
cation of the model, its C2, its ISR capabilities and its lethal and non-lethal
resources. All these elements exist and have proved their worth. We must now
acknowledge their symbiotic character within the framework of the Afghan model,
and incorporate it fully in the range of strategic options for our armed forces. As
one of its best advocates sums it up, planners in the future should consider the
model as an operational method of primary importance rather than as an emer-
gency procedure.
(18)
Operation Harmattan: A Rafale
Squadron Commanders Tale
Lieutenant Colonel (Air) and fighter pilot. Former
commander of Rafale squadron 01.007 'Provence' from the
start of operation Harmattan until 6 September. Currently
head of the Retex (lessons learned) innovation and coordi-
nation division of the Air Staff's monitoring bureau.
Loc Rullire
O
peration Harmattan began on 17 March 2011. The preceding two weeks
were used to gather the elements of intelligence necessary to enable the
chain of command to take the decision to launch its first mission of the
campaign, a challenge which the Air Force took up with enthusiasm. It did so fully
conversant with the situation, after an analysis based on those two weeks of study.
Of course, daily reports on the analyses in progress had been requested in order to
be as well prepared as possible. Reconnaissance missions were considered but these
did not in the end take place. The work did nonetheless enable preparations to be
moved forward.
Late on the morning of 19 March, the pilots of fighter squadron 01.007
Provence walked towards their aircraft knowing that the mission was achievable,
thanks to all the preparatory work. It was nevertheless a strange moment for the
crews, who were passing from peacetime to a time of crisis without any transition
or additional preparation. They were working from their peacetime base, thus
confirming the combat function of an airbase. Some psychological transition was
necessary, however: an artificial disconnection was created, and most of the person-
nel involved in the operation slept on the base the night before that first mission.
This helped the crews to be ready not only physical, but also mentally, for D-day.
To react quickly to such changes it is highly advisable to have undergone a
long period of operational preparation. This is why crews train throughout the
year, to be able to cope with a wide range of missions. The reaction of the pro-
Gaddafi forces remained to be seen. The air threat was known to be weak,
although it was difficult to take into account because of the relatively restrictive
rules of engagement which had been imposed on the Air Force. The main unk-
nowns concerned the location and level of readiness of the ground-to-air defence
systems. Once in theatre the enemy aircraft proved to have been relocated to the
southern part of the country but the ground-to-air systems remained in place and
very active, in particular to protect the troops moving towards Benghazi. An SA-8
40
41
Operation Harmattan:
A Rafale Squadron Commanders Tale
was also very active throughout the day of 19 March, and during the three hours
of the initial phase it tried in vain to gain an easy victory. This SA-8 was destroyed
a few days later by other coalition aircraft.
On the first day, the French force included a first patrol of four Rafales, in
an air-air configuration, whose task was to impose the no-fly zone to the south-
west of Benghazi in order for a second Rafale patrol, in a reconnaissance configu-
ration, to carry out intelligence gathering over the coastal strip from Benghazi to
Syrte. The aim was to provide the coalition members with a complete initial pic-
ture of the tactical situation in this coastal sector. Also, it was necessary to prepare
for the arrival of a second wave, made up of Mirage 2000D, Rafale and Mirage
2000-5. This second wave carried out strike missions, which enabled the vice to be
tightened around Benghazi.
These strikes proved to be accurate, as were all those of the operation. All
of the munitions fired by the French combat aircraft were precision weapons. This
reflected the careful selection of targets and a total mastery of the effects. To be
selective, however, requires the ability to discriminate. For the units involved this
was certainly the biggest challenge of the operation. The absence of troops on the
ground deprived them of the cultural and operational support of the Joint
Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC). In this respect, the units were following very
different procedures from those used in Afghanistan. In addition to a conventio-
nal air campaign they had to protect the population, which meant directly enga-
ging the pro-Gaddafi forces which threatened them on the ground, without the aid
of specialized support teams. As might be expected, the pro-Gaddafi forces quick-
ly appreciated and exploited these difficulties. They abandoned their heavy and
highly visible equipment and took to pickup trucks, which were less identifiable.
They also tried continually to mingle with National Transition Council (NTC)
forces and with the civilian population. This inevitably complicated our opera-
tions. Their aim was of course to complicate the Air Forces task, generate problems
with identification and decision-making, and ultimately to increase considerably
the political risk of each strike, seeking to hamper the coalitions cohesion.
To counter this asymmetrisation of the conflict, it was necessary to set up
an extremely effective collaborative organization. All the players worked in a
network, connected by tactical data links or by phone, and the appropriate level of
information had to be shared among the participants to ensure that everyone
understood the situation. Combat aircraft, UAVs, Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance assets (ISR), AWACS and headquarters had never worked with
such a degree of synergy, while the latter organizations integrated the intelligence
from all sensors in the area. When the intermingling became too close, it was often
a longer-term analysis which enable the reality of a target to be established. Its true
allegiance as well as the reality of a direct threat to the population could thus be
determined. The UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle or drones) represented a
precious resource, working in harmony with the combat aircraft.
42
Operation Harmattan:
A Rafale Squadron Commanders Tale
One of the missions which I carried out in May illustrates the combined
effectiveness that resulted from using a range of assets, to a degree which I have
never met in other theatres in the past. That day, we were working in total auto-
nomy with my patrol in the Jebel Nafoussa region when the Combined Air
Operations Centre (CAOC), via AWACS, asked us to join and work with a
Predator UAV far to the South of our position. This UAV had watched a resupply
route for the Jebel Nafoussa fronts over more than three hours. The CAOC
subsequently committed three different patrols in succession which were to attack
all the targets identified during this long period of analysis.
As for the authorisation for opening fire, a compromise had to be found
between a very centralised and a very de-centralised process. Ultimately, the wor-
king of the system on a daily basis was delegated to the lowest acceptable level.
From one day to another the reality of the situation changed so that sometimes the
crews had the authorisation to open fire while sometimes it was retained at a consi-
derably higher level.
In such an operational context, the Rafale was an adaptable tool which
enabled the whole range of missions to be covered during a week and, above all,
allowed a reduced number of aircraft to be deployed to cover a relatively wide
diversity of missions. During this time missions were undertaken in Afghanistan.
In the Libyan theatre the aircraft gave a very convincing demonstration of its adap-
tability. Its sub-systems also showed remarkable qualities of precision, performan-
ce and reliability.
By way of conclusion, for the crews, Libya was a deployment which was
close to the Afghan standard with regard to its complexity, but very different in its
political, strategic and tactical context. The terrain was altogether different too.
We also had to abandon the Afghanistan model: to get rid of the strategic and
tactical culture which Afghanistan deployments had instilled in us. In Libya, the
aircrews had to relearn an important functionwhich, in the Afghanistan model,
lies with the JTACthat is, the ability to designate and identify a target. This was
a constant challenge. However, experience in Afghanistan gave us a culture of
certainty of action, which has enabled us to appear selective. A certain culture of
doubt has taken root in its place as well as an awareness of the effects produced.
Let us say that the crews involved in this conflict have displayed great humility and
restraint whenever necessary.
Serval: an Exemplary
French Air Force Operation
French Air Staff.
EMAA
T
he Serval is a mid-sized African wildcat. The feline is blessed with a long
stride; it can leap more than three metres with precision from a standing
start, generating so much force that it stuns or even kills its prey on impact.
It has very good hearing, conceals itself in the bush, and can listen and observe
while itself remaining unseen. It is a formidable killing machine which overpowers
its prey, and it surpasses other predators in its qualities as a hunter. One could not
dream up a more descriptive codeword for an operation in which the French Air
Force has so well demonstrated the same characteristics.
Operation Serval was launched by decision of the President of the Republic
on 11 January 2013. It resulted from a certain number of options which had been
taken up by the Air Force, allowing them to be tested against strategic and opera-
tional reality. This operation highlighted four fundamental, intimately linked
capabilities which frame the Air Forces aptitude for combat, point to its future
development, and give it the strategic reach which makes it the pivot of our defen ce
capability. These are:
l Immediate reaction capability;
l A structure of command and operations working in real time;
l Continuity of surveillance and intelligence gathering;
l Strategic mobility.
Immediate reaction
Analysis of the Mali operation underlines the first of the Air Forces
fundamental capabilities: its immediate reaction capability. This is even more a key
quality when, in operations, immediacy becomes the normal when the political/
news/public opinion cycle becomes foreshortened. The first demonstration of this
was by the Mirage 2000D detachment stationed at NDjamena in Chad. Having
been first alerted of the Presidential decision during the morning of 11 January, it
carried out its first strike on enemy objectives the same night. Similarly, although
43
44
the fighter-bomber Squadron 1/7 (Provence) at Saint-Dizier was not on alert
status on that day, on 13 January (36 hours after the Presidential decision), its
Rafales destroyed more than 20 targets in the centre of Mali with pinpoint preci-
sion. This mission of more than 4,000 km lasted 9 hours and 35 minutes, the lon-
gest ever raid by French fighter-bombers. In three days some forty objectives were
destroyed: they included weapon systems, command centres, training and logistic
bases, and they deeply demoralised the enemy.
This operational excellence was only made possible by the quality of our
Air Force serving men and women, who are trained to be reactive and overcome
difficulties. While the prowess of the various teams is impressive, it needs to be
borne in mind that reactivity is a function of the slowest element involved. As on
19 March 2011, the Air Force showed that it is a finely tuned instrument whose
air bases are a particularly efficient combat organisation. It demonstrated exem-
plary integration with our system of defence bases, whose function is operational
support. The air base was where the lines of operational support and technical sup-
port were melded; it operated under the base commander who had all decision-
making responsibility. It is an air bases 24-hour operating cycle which allows it to
switch instantly from peacetime operation to crisis management mode; it is also
the base which supports its aircraft when they are detached elsewhere.
Finally, it was also because Air Force men and women benefit from indivi-
dual training and continuous activity. Their standards of training combined with
regular exercises are high enough for procedures to be thoroughly learned and
practised properly, for reflexes to be acquired, and for agility to be developed over
a wide range of activities. The key to all this is sufficient flying hours to allow crews
to develop the expertise needed for complex operational missions. As the benefi-
ciaries of realistic training and 180 flying hours per year, some Rafale pilots flew
their first warlike mission on 13 January. This reactivity could not be achieved just
by a cyclic timetable alternating operational preparation, action and then recupe-
ration: the aircrew activity levels and (through them) those of the entire Air Force
are major guarantees of efficiency.
Coherence and efficacy of command and working procedures,
adapted to real operations
The skill of rapid intervention is based on the Air Forces fundamental
capability of exploiting the coherence and the efficacy of its command system and
working procedures. This is even more fundamental in operations such as Serval,
which encompass operational components of all nature wherever they happen to
be, and which are set in motion at short notice with a very short decision cycle.
For its action to be fully effective and responsive in a joint force operation, the Air
Force has to master a complex and reactive environment. It needs a chain of
com mand and standardised procedures capable of interacting in real time with all
45
involved; this leads to continuity of planning and operations based on a common
view of what is needed.
The first air missions of Serval, mounted directly by CPCO, were planned
and controlled by the JFAC AFCO (Joint Force Air Component de lAfrique
cen trale et de lOuest) recently established at NDjamena to direct those air
resources pre-positioned in Africa. This command structure greatly eased the work
of CPCO since it permitted an immediate launch of air operations and the
pre- planning of follow-on strikes.
The concept of operations was the responsibility of the Air Officer
commanding the air component, who was also the air adviser to Comanfor Serval.
He was responsible for the organisation of the airspace in the zone of operations:
he took part in the joint service allocation of air resources to tasks, and he was res-
ponsible for the planning, programming and execution of the overall air campaign,
integrating all air resources.
This command architecture is even more important when coordination of
a variety of air resources is needed, operating diverse missions simultaneously in an
operational zone. In- theatre about one hundred missions were launched daily,
operating round the clock: these included deep penetration, reconnaissance,
surveillance, monitoring, fire support, parachute operations, tactical and strategic
air transport, air-to-air refuelling, combat and transport helicopters.
The role played by the National Air Operations Centre (CNOA) in Lyon
should also be mentioned. Serval demonstrated that the Air Force can now look at
the planning and conduct of air operations in a new way. The technical resources
which are being steadily acquired by Lyon (essentially SIC and satellites,
SATCOM, HF, IP, LDT and POLA), and the skills available on site (planners,
controllers, intelligence officers, experts in tactical data linkage, radio and IT
spe cialists etc), mean that the operational units of CDAOA Lyon (JFAC, CNOA
and CRA), reinforced by other elements drawn from the entire Air Force, are now
entirely capable of planning, programming and conducting air operations on a
world-wide basis, both from French soil and elsewhere.
The projection into the theatre of E-3F, point to point links using SATCOM,
HF and Chat Iridium, the installation of Link 16 equipment (MIDS-JRE), and the
ability to receive Harfang (FMV) video on site give the Lyon C2 centre the real-time
supervision capability needed to direct air operations.
It is particularly instructive to look at the challenge represented by the first-
ever offensive operation carried out by Rafales on 13 January, which was mounted
directly from their base in Saint-Dizier. It would have been impossible to mount
it at such short notice without an operations centre such as Lyon where the sortie
was planned to the last detail, and where tactical control was exercised right up to
the final debriefing at NDjamena. The principle of reach back using Lyon has
46
demonstrated its full value ever since the start of the operation. It is a continuing
process: the basic principle is that air campaign planning takes place in Lyon, while
operations are run from NDjamena.
Finally, so as to exploit to the maximum air powers trump cards of quick
reaction and flexibility of use, the command and control network must also be able
to change objectives in real time.
When the enemy makes only fleeting appearances it is essential to reduce
the detection-to-strike reaction time to the minimum. We must be able to network
ISR assets (Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) with appropriate C2
arrangements and strike assets. In a theatre where distances are so great, the avai-
lability of an AWACS is a crucial factor. For example, on 19 February French
ground reconnaissance elements in the Massif de lAdrar (some fifty kilometres
south of Tessalit) were engaged by terrorists. A Mirage 2000D patrol was in the
area, armed for close air support missions: it attacked rapidly, destroying two heavy
machine guns. Equally, it is not infrequent for the CNOA to change the objectives
of reconnaissance missions in real time. None of this is possible without well-
proven procedures, reliable technical capabilities and well-trained personnel.
In this respect the SIC manuvre is integral to the exercise of air power
because it must be perfectly in phase with the campaign objectives in order to be
able properly to dimension both the nature and the flux of data. The data source
can be one or more of ground-based radio, satellite or IT, and the data itself may
be in the form of text, image, video or voice.
Less visible, but equally essential support for air operations must be based
on a reliable technical and logistic command structure. This has also to synchro-
nise perfectly with the air campaigns objectives in order to achieve maximum avai-
lability of the resources committed.
The need for permanent surveillance and intelligence data
A third fundamental capability of air operations derives from the acquisi-
tion and monitoring resources it must have to support operations effectively; this
applies to joint as well as to air operations. This involves the airframes themselves,
the offensive systems, the objectives listed in each zone of engagement, the coor-
dination of resources in both time and space, and the ground and air communica-
tions links needed. The result is a mass of data from many types of sensor, ranging
from humans to satellites, and includes that from aircraft and drones. For the
13 January mission, for example, the weapons programming and the data needed
to designate the targets ordered by the CPCO was arriving in Saint-Dizier until
late in the night, and was supported by target dossiers which had to be produced
under severe time constraints.
47
The organisation was initially supported by a troika of satellite/FICR/ATI,
rapidly supplemented by the deployment of Harfang drones. The processing of the
data collected was designed to go beyond simple sequential processing by each of the
players involved; it was instead merged by real-time processing, leading to much
more rapid handling of the surveillance-identification-designation-launch cycle.
A real-time capability is essential for this type of operation where targets are agile,
fleeting and dispersed over vast areas, and is a major characteristic of airpower.
Fielding the Harfang drone therefore completed the operational effective-
ness of the organisation, by integration of its images into the decision-making
process. It has a loiter capability of 14 hours per mission over the entire zone of
operations; immediate action by Rafale or Mirage 2000D combat patrols could be
(and indeed were) triggered by targeting data uploaded to them in real time by the
drones controllers. This technique is proof of a trend which has been growing year
by year: the drone is fast becoming the single most essential element in all air ope-
rations and is increasingly being used prior to any strike to verify that there will be
no collateral damage, a practice which is growing even when planned strikes have
benefited from prior detailed analysis.
Furthermore, this theatre covers a vast area, which both reduces the loiter
time of air patrols over a combat zone and evidently increases the number needed
to maintain constant coverage. In the absence of AWACS, drones act as vital
rebroadcast stations for information transfer between air patrols. Nevertheless, our
drone capability remained notoriously insufficient, bearing in mind the size of the
area to be covered and the continuous surveillance that was needed. The waste of
time due to long transit flights from Niamey would have been much reduced had
we been able to field a few MALE drones acting in concert; the coverage would
also have been better, and we would have been able to deal with sudden emergen-
cies, or a new task such as the recent French hostage crisis on the Nigeria-
Cameroon frontier.
Strategic mobility
The fourth fundamental capability is the strategic projection capability
whose importance is constantly being emphasised in this theatre the size of Europe,
and 4,000 km from France. In 1946 General Gradot, the then Chief of Air Staff,
remarked that transport aircraft are the indispensable partners of fighter aircraft if
we want the latter to be strategically mobile. While at the time this assertion applied
only to the Air Force, it is now obviously relevant to all our armed forces.
It is only the Air Force which can give France a true strategic capability and
respond to the major logistic and operational challenges involved. During the first
five weeks of Operation Serval France projected some 19,000 tons of materiel into
the theatre: this is more than was repatriated from Afghanistan over a whole year.
48
The scope of this logistic feat should not be underestimated. While the Air Force
is currently organised to project joint transit capabilities and the mounting of over-
seas detachments in a modular way, only a true strategic air transport capability
will allow the logistic chain to function properly in what is such a challenging sce-
nario in terms both of time and range.
Similarly, the missions with which our combat aircraft are tasked are long,
multiple and long range. They require major air-to-air refuelling capabilities: this
operation saw the deployment in-theatre of more than half our C135 fleet. This
success should not be allowed to hide the limiting factor imposed by the relative
unreliability of these tankers; their advanced age (some 19 years) brings with it the
permanent risk of capability failure, making it urgent to bring MRTT into servi ce
as soon as possible.
Furthermore, we need to keep in mind a simple rule learned from the
Kosovo crisis, which is that the number of tankers available has a direct relation-
ship with the number of combat sorties that can be flown. Our shortcomings in
this field have constrained us (as in Libya) to have to rely on American assets since
the end of January. Even so, this particularly valuable help is still not enough to
meet all our needs. During the ground action of 19 February, for example, a
Mirage 2000D patrol had to quit the combat zone before disengagement because
the tanker was no longer able to carry out its task. The arrival of another combat
air patrol from Bamako was made possible only by the arrival of a further tanker
on its orbit; our troops had no close air support for several hours.
The entry into service of A400M and MRTT will therefore represent a step
change. Not only will our airlift capability be significantly increased, but also our
speed of projection and the use of air transport as a whole will both be improved.
Bamako is currently a choke point which slows down logistic activity due to the
saturation of the base platform. The result is that long and slow-moving convoys
have to be organised to deliver materiel to the combat zone, some 350 km away.
An air bridge using A400M could have delivered cargo to airheads much closer to
the zone of operations such as Mopti, Timbuctou or Gao, allowing us to concen-
trate our forces several days earlier than we did.
Furthermore, the use of this aircraft would have much simplified intra-
theatre logistics, which are complicated today by the need to tranship cargoes on
the airfields at Bamako, Niamey, Dakar and NDjamena: 26 tactical transport air-
craft from 6 different nations are involved. The A400M can make a daily rotation
into the theatre inside 24 hours, dividing projection time by a factor of three. Over
and above this operational performance, local transit resources and the processing
capability of the logistic chain are also affected, and in consequence the control of
logistic flow has to be adapted.
49
The 13 January mission highlights the operational benefits we will be able
to enjoy. Three C135 accompanied the four Rafale delivering nearly 100 tons of
fuel, but at the same time they were able to carry only a very small proportion of
the materiel and personnel needed to give such a detachment a 24-hour operating
capability. In the near future the same task will be carried out by two MRTT,
which will be able to lift the entire detachment, and two A400M, which will be
capable of lifting the entire cargo load to NDjamena in six hours. The Air Force
will thus be able to project a significant operational capability over some 4,000 km
inside 48 hours.
Such an operation serves to remind us that strategic inter-theatre mobility
is overlain on the needs of intra-theatre tactical support. The airborne assault on
Timbuktu carried out on 29 January, certain aspects of which are classic, illustrates
above all the way in which the projection of air power in a theatre can be switched
instantly to support joint operations, contributing directly to their acceleration.
The concurrency of the requirements for mobility and support means that
the formats of air projection must not be based solely on the requirements of inter-
theatre projection. Furthermore, the tactical dimension also dictates that we need
transport aircraft whose operational characteristics need to include the guarantee
of combat-ready delivery. The tactical capabilities of the A400M, together with the
militarisation of its cargo hold means that it can deliver ground force assets such
as helicopters and armoured vehicles which are operational immediately on deli-
very into the operational zone, using unprepared airstrips.
Co-operation with allies
This campaign throws a new light on the degree of our dependence on our
allies: it could not have taken place without their active cooperation. In the field
of inter- and intra-theatre logistic projection (25 per cent), no less than 110 allied
missions were needed. In the field of ISR the USA and the UK deployed a JSTAR,
a Predator and a Sentinel R1. These two countries, with France, are alone in being
capable of deploying such sophisticated assets, with such powerful military perfor-
mance, at such short notice. The intimate strategic dialogue which links our three
air forces contributed in great measure to easing the sharing and integration of
these allied resources. This aspect was reinforced by the credibility of the Air Force
chain of command: it gave our partners the guarantees of coherence and security
for their resources that they needed when the latter were tasked by Comanfor.
Finally, it is useful to emphasise that at the same time that the Mali opera-
tion was taking place, the Air Forces permanent mission of nuclear deterrence
continued without the slightest change, an essential condition for maintaining the
50
credibility of this strategic function which is fundamental to the security of our
country. The operational task of the strategic air squadrons, Air Forces priority task,
is fulfilled every single day.
Similarly, the Air Force maintains the permanent airspace security posture
which guarantees the sovereignty and protection of our national airspace, parti-
cu larly against terrorist threats. This mission has become even more necessary since
Frances policies have significantly increased the threat which looms over our natio-
nal territory. The resources committed to its operational continuity have had to be
reconfigured: air defence Mirage 2000s have replaced the Rafale for this task, thus
allowing our most modern aircraft to be allocated to the African theatre.
Rafales qualities, already demonstrated in Libya, make it perfectly adapted
to that continent. Its multi-role capability allows it to be tasked for both strike and
reconnaissance. Its range and endurance give it a very good loiter capability over a
zone where it can attack high value targets in real time or, when necessary, provi de
close air support to troops on the ground. Its wide range of sensors and weapon
configurations give it the firepower needed to deal with a variety of targets with a
maximum of precision.
To conclude, the unique properties of the Air Force contributed to the
rapid and significant blocking of a terrorist offensive which was particularly threa-
tening to Malis integrity. This operation showed yet again that the Air Force is an
entirely coherent operational tool, and a major player in a military strategy whose
success meets political expectations.
R
D
N
The fundamental capabilities
at the heart of modernisation
the Strategic Heart of Defence
French Air Staff.
EMAA
A robust and credible C2 developed
from long experience of the air security mission
The lessons of the Second World War have consecrated the importance of
achieving air superiority at the outset of any military operation, which means that
to protect French territory we had to create a credible and effective air defence
capability. The Air Force progressively acquired the tools (radars, communications
and aircraft) and the knowhow (procedures and staff competence), which devolve
from this need: evaluation of the general air situation, the ability to identify threats
and guide interceptors to potential targets. The need for rapid reaction dictated
unified command, and in 1961 the Air Force created a central structure dedicated
to air defence. This command absorbed all the resources, from the detection
network to the interceptor aircraft, and is able to give real-time situation reports to
the Prime Minister, the political authority responsible for the nations air defence.
This highly reactive chain links the highest levels of the State with the pilot in his
aircraft, and ensures at all time and in all places sovereignty over the nations air
space. Today, the French air security network is capable of the surveillance of some
11,000 air movements daily, and can put in train either an interception mission to
take active air security measures, or an aid mission to an aircraft in difficulty.
The events of 9/11 underlined the relevance of Frances air security apparatus,
acknowledged as one of the best-adapted to counter terrorist threats. Stability,
reactivity, rules of engagement and mission success all go to build a firm back-
ground in the development of the airman, acquired through his experience of the
air security mission.
Similarly, the Air Force rapidly integrated the new dimension of space acti-
vity in the daily life of the nation and its security. It has extended its surveillance
and situation analysis capabilities to this new area and has created a system of alert
warning, based on recognised threats (such as space debris falling to earth or obser-
vation satellite tracking)
53
54
Recent conflicts have led to the build-up of expertise
in the conduct of large-scale air operations in overseas theatres
The geopolitical upheavals of the nineteen-nineties have led France to inter-
vene more and more frequently beyond its borders in a joint-service and inter-allied
framework. Air missions now mobilise fleets of aircraft that are complex in number,
diversity and the multiplicity of effects to be achieved against an adversa ry percei-
ved as a global entity and with vulnerabilities.
The French Air Force is adapting to change. With its experience of
com mand acquired from the air defence role and with a staff trained in similar
pro cesses, it bracketed onto its existing structure in metropolitan France the skills
and tools dedicated to overseas air operations. The Air defence and air operations
command centre (Commandement de la dfense arienne et des oprations ariennes
CDAOA) came into being: apart from its air defence mission, the com mand
maintains and develops Air Force expertise in the command of air operations; it
trains its staff,
(1)
provides fixed and mobile reception structures with adapted pro-
cedures offering all the flexibility needed for operations in hand.
This parallels NATO conceptual and doctrinal development. The imple-
mentation of a reaction force decided at the Prague Summit in 2002 constitutes a
powerful tool for the development of interoperability between member states. The
credibility of the Air Force, recognised by the allies, and supported by the techni-
cal expertise that French industry has developed in matters of command and
com munications networks has given it the right to claim command of the NATO
Reaction Force (NRF). It is today an essential contribution to the Alliances ope ra-
tional capability.
Lyon, a strategic heartland for supervision of air missions
in France and overseas
The ability to command and control air operations is the essential condi-
tion for operational effectiveness of an air force, and confers on the country that
possesses it a real capacity for influence and a training capability that benefits any
coalition set up to deal with crisis or emergency situations.
The development of information technology today opens even wider pers-
pectives. In the medium term we can see new balances emerging in operational
command, conjugating more closely the synergies between the resources deployed,
ever lighter, and the permanent Command and Control Centre in Lyon. This
centre is progressively developing its capabilities to supervise, direct and coordinate
the Strategic Heart of National Defence and Security
(1) The Air Operations Preparation Analysis and Simulation Centre (CASPOA), created in 1997, has become a NATO
centre of excellence, and apart from training French staff, trains a number of foreign personnel in air operational
command and control.
55
the Strategic Heart of National Defence and Security
(2) These include air photo reconnaissance missions in advance of police intervention; surveillance of the airspace around
sensitive installations, (nuclear power stations, petrochemical sites and prisons, for example); surveillance of demonstra-
tions surrounding high-visibility events (Heads of State Summits or the Olympic Games); monitoring flight plans by air-
craft suspected of illegal activity.
on a permanent and reactive basis the whole panoply of air missions that France
may have to undertake above or beyond its national territory. Mastery of a projec-
table C2 capability allows France to assume its role in a coalition as a cadre nation.
Expanded cooperation for the benefit of national security
The capability to evaluate the air situation has also led to an opening
bet ween ministries. This has developed into cooperation between the Customs
authorities, civil aviation, police and gendarmerie, and missions are regularly
conducted in their support.
(2)
These examples of fruitful cooperation open perspectives that have not yet
been fully explored. What potential has a tool as effective as the Lyon Centre to
offer national security in its widest sense, not merely limited to military threats?
In the event of natural or industrial catastrophes, the Defence Minister could be
able, at short notice, to put at the disposal and under the authority of a Prfet the
Lyon C2 Centre and some of its human and materiel resources, so that the latter
could exercise his responsibilities in evaluating the situation and coordinating
national resources committed to rescue operations. As a way of optimising State
resources on a routine basis, training missions for Air Force drones, with their sur-
veillance capabilities, endurance and discretion could be enhanced by the choice of
zones of specific interest to a Ministry, controlled from the C2 centre in Lyon,
where air missions are programmed.
The optimisation of its human and materiel resources is leading the Air
Force to concentrate its decision-making structure while maintaining the decen-
tralisation of its operational capabilities: a strong C2 in Lyon based on a network
of air bases in France, the Overseas Territories or in foreign countries, as departu-
re points for any air mission. This new C2 Air structure is a strategic heartland
where greater cooperation between the Ministries involved in national security
matters can be encouraged. Opening towards Europe is also foreseeable, and would
add another advantage. It could contribute to the development of European plan-
ning and civil-military operational conduct in response to crises and emergency
situations.
The Only Machiavellian Aspect
of the Drone is its Human Element
Air Force Lieutenant Colonel, graduate of the French War
College, Second in Command of 1/33 Drone squadron
Belfort.
Christophe Fontaine
Editors note: Fisrt published in Revue Dfense Nationale on line (Tribune n 358, www.defnat.com), April 9, 2013.
A
ccording to a number of writers who specialise in law or in modern conflict,
drones are the new danger that everyone should fear. Aside from ethical
questions about their use, and the moral aspects of their commitment, they
could constitute a grave danger, should they fall into the wrong hands. Needless to
say, the aeroplane is quite the opposite: it is more human and more civilised, and is
less prone to error. The proliferation of such extravagant terminology is designed to
make us think that the drone is nothing other than a robot that goes around killing
automatically according to some mechanised form of decision-making, and in the
process making blunders right, left and centre whilst willy-nilly eliminating those
citizens declared undesirable according to processes or actions unrelated to any form
of legal framework. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Permanent surveillance and real-time dissemination of data
The main reason for using drones (or Unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs)
today is certainly not to deliver weapons onto targets secretly from the other side of
a border. It is, first and foremost, to try to compensate for the intrinsic weakness of
air power, which is the inability to assert long-term control over captured airspace in
order to conduct surveillance of activity on the ground. Whatever its role, be it air
defence, bombing or reconnaissance, an aircraft cannot fly indefinitely.
It has to land to change pilots, since not only are long flights testing for the
aircraft, but also, and especially, for the aircrew. Because of this, drones are mainly
used on missions that cannot be performed by crewed aircraftthose long sur-
veillance missions using a variety of optical, radar or laser sensors. Freed from the
major handicap to endurance in flight, the human on board, the drone becomes the
ideal machine to maintain a potential target and its environment under constant
surveillance. But therein lies the paradox, for man remains firmly in the decisional
and operational cycle. Satellite transmission technology allows us to have a sentinel
57
58
permanently in the air, whose electronic eyes transmit real-time information on
what they see to the decision-makers.
Once the surveillance process is completedand remember that intelli-
gence gathering is the primary role of dronesa decision may be made to strike.
However, the French Male drone (Moyenne altitude, longue endurance medium
altitude, long endurance) does not always carry weapons, since being armed
drastically reduces its time on task: for a given total weight, the more armament
carried, the less fuel. Moreover, during the surveillance phase, and the attack phase
if there is one, the drone is not a robot. Quite the contrary.
The cockpit is the real nerve centre of an aircraft, and it is from there that
an entire human crew directs it. The aircraft has to be piloted, its sensors directed
correctly, intelligence analysed and classified, targets identified, checks made with
the headquarters regarding the legal position on the targets and the missions objec-
tives, and the most appropriate weapons chosen for the mission. After all that, it
requires a human being to give the order to launch a precision weapon onto the
target. All of this is performed with a transparency to which no other weapon sys-
tem is constrained. The transparency is aided by the filming of every phase, from
intelligence gathering to firing, and the live pictures are sent to the decision-
making level in real time, are recorded and saved. The process is supervised by legal
advisors and conducted under the direction of military or political chiefs. It is the-
refore easy to imagine the members of parliamentary enquiry committees consul-
ting the recordings of these firings, in order to verify all the legal elements of their
planning, organisation and activation.
A few words on the main criticisms of the use of drones
Issues of ethics and morals
The fact that pilots are at the controls of drones ought to put an end to the
rumour of the marauding killer robot that assassinates brutally and without restraint.
In the end, drones are only aircraft like any other with the exception that they are
piloted from the ground. Hard though it might be to accept, no system is more
humanised in its operation and in the control of its action than a drone. It is true
that the crew acts via a digital eye and a satellite link, and is not physically commit-
ted in the field, yet for war to be ethical, were that even possible, are we really expec-
ted to return to the olden days of sword fights and hand-to-hand combat? Is it not
entirely legitimate to operate remotely from an adversary who uses improvised explo-
sive devices or human suicide bombers? At every stage in the process man is, and
remains, in the loop, right up to the terminal guidance phase of the weapon.
As for the decision to kill this or that person, it is not taken by the drone, nor
by the pilot, nor even by the commander of the mission: it is taken by the political
59
leader. The same process is followed, whether the action is overt (that is, a legitimate
action from the legal point of view) or covert (in which the state decides to act
outside any legal framework and use secret assets to achieve certain effects on targets).
In the past, some used poisoned umbrellas; today, others use a different weapon, the
drone. Despite all that, and unless they are stealth machines (and the American
Predator and Reaper drones are not), for drones to fly in any given airspace they must
at least have the tacit agreement of the overflown state in order to operate. Otherwise,
how do we suppose that aircraft that fly barely faster than modern private light planes
could remain for hours above a territory in complete impunity?
The belief that use of drones is against the law
There are those who claim that drones act, or even assassinate, outside any
judicial and legal framework. If we accept as a premise that drones are subject to
the same rules as other military aircraft operating in an airspace governed by a defi-
ned judicial framework, then any question of the legality of their use is irrelevant.
If they are used according to an agreement between two countries, one the user of
the drones, the other possessing the territory overflown, once again the question is
irrelevant. No, the real challenge lies in ensuring that those who govern the pro-
cesses of decision-making and use of weapons, and those appointed to piloting and
putting the policy of the nations elected representatives into effect, are made abun-
dantly aware of the ethical issues involved, and receive training in the legal aspects.
Additionally, the notion of parliamentary control of the actions of the armed forces
in general, and of special forces in particular, is a vital issue for any self-respecting
democracy, and it is precisely that which must guard against any inhuman use of
a weapon system. Whether it is a drone, a sniper, a GPS or laser-guided bomb, a
cruise missile, a mortar round or a torpedo is not the issue. The tool has no value
without the human will and decision to use it. On the other hand, the introduc-
tion of artificial intelligence into future combat systems is something altogether
different: it raises real ethical and moral questions. Nevertheless, the drones which
are being described here, and which France wishes to procure in the short term, do
not fall into that category.
The belief that drones are dangerous
Drones could fall into the wrong hands, they say, or even be used by belli-
gerent powers or armed terrorist groups. Apart from the vulnerability of the plat-
form itself, that has already been mentioned, the weakness of drones lies in their
dependence on multiple satellite links. These links are needed to pilot it remotely
and to transmit the information gathered by its various electronic eyes and ears.
Although it is theoretically possible to intercept a drone and take control of it
remotely, actually doing it requires complex technology, if only because its cockpit,
or rather, the place from which the pilot controls the system, is elsewhere and is
60
manufactured to very specific industrial standards. And although information tech-
nolo gy has advanced in massive strides which, paradoxically, is exactly what gives
hackers the technology to penetrate computer networks, the fact remains that to
intercept a drone, take control of it and reprogram its mission and trajectory is for
the moment pure science fiction. If a drone were stolen, when its owner knows it
has been lost, would not alter the fundamentals of air warfare, because any uniden-
tified object would be intercepted and, if it did not respond to orders or to flight
directions, it would be shot down.
It is of note that what frightens the average person is not necessarily what the
terrorist sees as the most effective means of action. The 9/11 attacks are a good
example of the fears of the former and the achievements of the latter. There have long
been fears of a terrorist strike with nuclear weapons stolen from the former Soviet
Union, and yet al-Qaeda used civil airliners as missiles against the twin towers of the
World Trade Center. That action was also a demonstration that, for Islamic terrorism,
the dimension of dying a martyrs death remained fundamental. Everyone would
agree on the impossibility of achieving such a goal from the cockpit of a drone
which, by definition, is on the ground. Contrary to a widespread belief, drones still
remain extremely dependent on humans, and so paradoxically no other weapon sys-
tem is more humanised in its deployment and in control of its action, than the drone.
Its remote eye transmits constantly, and in real time via a digital umbilical cord which
links the real world to the team that looks at it, and the information gathered to the
political authorities who decide whether or not to use a weapon.
Any attack is considered long and hard and is therefore never a sort of
robot-driven assassination simply as a result of using a drone, for there are always
humans behind these futuristic-looking flying objects. And these humans work
within a political and legal structure, which conforms to the laws of armed
conflict. The moral values on which their training is based guard against inhuman
actions. The current priority for France is to increase effort on the multi-sensor
Male surveillance drone component, rather than to procure a new strike capabili ty.
The Air Force has enviable knowhow and expertise in all theatres of operation, and
it would be to its great detriment to lose them because of some gap in capability.
The checks and balances ensured by parliamentary enquiry committees should in
any case assure the citizen that the use of Male drones for surveillance or, in the
longer term, armed attack, is conducted within the law. Above all, it is the politi-
cians who decide whether to kill, using the hands of responsible, professional, mili-
tary personnel to act for them, not the drones.
So if there really is anything Machiavellian about the use of drones, it is
that man remains its instigator.
A Case
for the Dynamic Management
of French Overseas Bases
French Air Staff.
EMAA
T
he geostrategic and geopolitical developments that are foreseeable in the
short, medium and long term will not fundamentally affect Frances conti-
nuing role as a major influence in world affairs. This influence is the result
of a mix of factors: a culture of international responsibility; an independent nuclear
deterrent; her place in a globalized economy; multilateralism underpinned by a
strong diplomatic network; a worldwide network of friendships and alliances; and
the wide geographic spread of her overseas departments, administrations and econo-
mic zones, among others. This discussion paper concentrates more on the question
of the depth and intensity with which France should fulfil her role of influence in
the world, rather than the questioning of any worldwide ambition.
All that said, the evolution of many factors, whether they be economic,
diplomatic, political, societal, technological or military, obliges us to define the
innovative options which will allow France to fulfil her worldwide role and
concentrate on her new strategy of access. At the same time these options must be
realistic with regard the resources available.
New technical factors
In this context, our thinking must lean towards how diversification of
certain elements might increase force mobility. By their very nature they must
integrate the increased reach which we can now give to our interventions (which
is a function of our projection capability), but equally on our forces in theatre so
as easily to increase their range of action. This thinking is made even more urgent
by the impending arrival of new equipment such as the A400M from 2013
onwards, and then the MRTT (Multi Role Tanker Transport) in 2017: these will
bring step improvements in speed, range and carrying capacity.
Not only will their new capabilities facilitate direct interventions mounted
from France itself, but they will also create the major political advantage of
61
62
rein for cing the visibility and flexibility of independent French action: potentially,
France will instantly have a significant worldwide presence. The changes will be
revolutionary, in the true sense of the term. Currently three days are needed for a
Transall to reach La Runion with 7 tons of freight; an A400M can do this trip
with three times the load in only fourteen hours. It will also be possible to do a
return journey from France to Djibouti in a day. Similarly, when France partnered
Australia in Operation Santal in West Timor in 1999, the speed of our interven-
tion and the volume of materiel initially deployed were constrained by the range
and capacity of our C130s, which needed four days to reach Darwin. In an iden-
tical scenario, from now on France will be able to deploy two to three times more
materiel in less than 24 hours.
Extension of our strategic space
With this new capability of moving more, further and quicker, we are wit-
nessing a real expansion of our strategic space, leading to an increase in our diplo-
matic influence. It will create a physical, rather than a virtual, link between the
French homeland and its overseas possessions on the other side of the world in an
even more dynamic way. In this way, and as a complement to the French mariti me
presence, the Air Force will be able to add its quick reaction capability directly
from Paris itself. It will reinforce our credibility, and above all it will further under-
pin Frances presence in the many regional forums in which the country partakes
as a function of its economic exclusion zones, particularly in the Pacific and Indian
Oceans. Defence cooperation, such as the FRANZ Agreement with Australia and
New Zealand, will gain in substance.
Finally, Alain Boinet and Benot Miribel remind us of humanitarian action in
crisis and post-crisis situations: The armed forces have an important role to play in
disaster situations with their transport and logistic capabilities. They can also help
effectively with the evacuation of French and other countries citizens in emergencies,
such as from Lebanon in the summer of 2007. Furthermore, in sudden medical
emergencies such as that in Kashmir in the autumn of 2005, field hospitals can deal
with casualties and save lives.
(1)
These new characteristics will give us an increased
intervention capability, which will further give backing to French influence and the
countrys role as a permanent and responsible player on the world scene.
The case for the dynamic management of French bases overseas
The added boost that this will give to French foreign policy will only be
seen if the nature and use of these new resources are looked at in a way which takes
advantage of their intrinsic qualities, and which can also be based on a new and
A Case for the Dynamic Management
(1) Report made in March 2010 to Bernard Kouchner, the then Foreign Minister.
63
dynamic hub and spoke arrangement to give the country the ability to intervene
and exert influence from overseas bases at minimum cost.
It is obvious that the conditions necessary for rapid intervention include,
among others, the existence of a solid overarching infrastructure which adds fur-
ther, complementary solutions to our traditional overseas bases, thus increasing
our guarantee of easy access. Our forces currently pre-positioned overseas, whilst
already contributing significantly to international security and stability, do not
fully fit in to these future requirements. We need to develop further the relevance
of this network in a win-win way by establishing individual partnerships whose
objective must be to allow deployments of military or civil assistance in very short
reaction times from staging points which can be rapidly brought up to fighting
standard. This arrangement, which must offer a variety of solutions, has to begin
with the negotiation of diplomatic agreements designed to accelerate the deploy-
ment of French and/or allied resources. This non-constraining approach can be
adapted easily to any strategic development. It must be complemented by the pre-
positioning of materiel and the establishment of carefully positioned, permanent
staging points of varying size.
In this respect, France has the good fortune to hold many trump cards
which will allow the country to meet this requirement at minimum cost.
She has close relationships with a number of states close to areas of strate-
gic interest, whose potential can be further exploited. Countries such as Singapore
(whose pilot training takes place in Cazaux), and India are partners upon whose
services we can call increasingly. Beyond the fruitful operational cooperation with
these countries, the local programmes of joint exercises must help to prepare and
perfect procedures for establishing these potential bases should the need arise, even
to the extent of to pre-positioning materiel in them.
The benefits of allied networks
Our British and American allies, both powers with global interests, are sup-
ported by networks which are complementary to our own. We could possibly take
advantage of these either by using our bases as bargaining counters, or by contribu-
ting to their running costs. The British and, especially, American bases open doors to
the routes to South East Asia and the Pacific. Use of them would allow us to develop,
and even facilitate, our zone of action towards new areas of interest. As far as our tra-
ditional French operating zones are concerned, they would offer case-by-case projec-
tion facilities (for both deployments and support activities), and allow us to consider
new areas of cooperation, notably in the field of operational preparation.
The same applies to our partners in the European Air Transport Centre and
the Multimodal Coordination Centre for European Transport, who share our
com mon problems of force projection. The joint development of a worldwide
64
net work must be a key area of work which will among other things contribute great-
ly to cementing the construction of European defence. There is a real strategy to
develop here, dealing with both equipment and deployment, one which should
result in economy of resources and concentration of effort.
Furthermore, the airlines which fly Airbus (and that includes our A400M
and MRTT) offer potential worthy of exploitation. On the basis of obvious
com mon interests, partnerships could be built to contribute to the creation of a
network based around hubs, to broaden our worldwide coverage. They would
also allow us to share our spare parts, technical support and staging points, or even
assistance to, and reinforcement of, our own aircrews.
Raising Frances profile
Finally, the development and maintenance of such a secured network,
encouraged by regular personnel exchanges or joint exercises with the host nations,
would contribute to Frances reputation and international influence. It cannot be
denied that this will require a major diplomatic effort to establish cooperation
which will be sufficiently robust in the longer term.
To conclude, the new systems which are about to enter service will lead to an
expansion of our strategic sphere of influence. They will give us a virtually instant
response capability and demand a dynamic approach to a renovated network of over-
seas bases. When considered in parallel with the complementary networks of our
British and American allies, a new dimension will be added to Frances capability for
action, rendering it even more visible, more flexible and more all-encompassing.
Immediate Action:
the Contribution of Rafale
to recent Operations
Captain, researcher at Centre for strategic aerospace studies.
Yohan Droit
For airmen and the Rafale community, 19 March 2011 was a great unknown.
At the time we didnt know the full Libyan order of battle,
but we did know that there were active ground-to-air missiles.
And yet we sent our pilots thousands of kilometres from their bases,
with rules of engagement practically made up on the spot.
Put yourself in the mind of the pilot taking off at that time
General Denis Mercier, Chief of Staff of the French Air Force.
T
he Rafale is the emblematic programme and backbone of the French figh-
ter force. It is special because of its total versatility and its destiny as the
sole fighter aircraft of the French armed forces. It entered service with the
Air Force in June 2006 and has already acquired considerable operational expe-
rience from its participation in operations in Afghanistan, Libya and Mali. Its
deployment in these different theatres has enabled us to foresee its development
possibilities, both operationally and in capability, and to appreciate its relevance to
service in recent operations.
Operational build-up in Afghanistan
Immediately after its entry into operational service, the decision was taken
to deploy the Rafale to the Afghan theatre. It was deployed in four phases, in 2007,
2008, 2009 and 2011, initially at Dushanbe and subsequently to Kandahar.
Operations in Afghanistan required the Rafale for a specific part of the spectrum
of operations, namely, close air support in a counter-insurgency environment.
In the first phase, the Rafale to F2 standard, was employed in mixed patrols
with the Mirage 2000D, armed with GBU-12 laser-guided bombs. In this F2
ver sion, the Rafale has ground attack capability but was originally limited by the
absence of a laser designation pod and of AASM.
(1)
It was therefore assisted by the
65
(1) Armement air-sol modulaire a precision air-to-ground, propelled, GPS-guided bomb. Two AASM bombs were laun-
ched in Afghanistan by a Rafale B on 20 April 2008, less than six days after its entry into operational service.
66
Mirage 2000D in the designation of ground targets. During its various detachments
the Rafale gained in operational maturity, in which the entry into service of AASM
in 2008 was an important step. The AASM afforded an all-weather capability at a
safe distance and complemented laser-guided munitions. Its use in Afghanistan
allo wed the validation of the Rafale/AASM combination on operations.
At the time of its latest deployment in 2011, as well as carrying the GBU- 12
and AASM, the Rafale was equipped to F3 standard with the Damocles pod, the
ROVER video system and an integrated air-to-ground fire control system for its can-
non, which gave it maximum operational effectiveness. These considerable improve-
ments confirmed the self-sufficiency of the Rafale in ground attack missions.
Operations in Afghanistan also confirmed the effectiveness and reliabili ty of the
Rafale system for operations in a harsh environment. Although the practicalities of
operations in Afghanistan are far from requiring all the Rafales operational capabili-
ties, the versatility of the aircraft and its crews have been validated in an operational
theatre. The integration of air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities in the same air-
craft confers a very significant operational bonus. In particular, the merging of data
from the Link 16 data link, the air-to-air mode of the electronic sweep radar RBE2,
improved optronics and the Spectra (Systme de protection et dvitement des conduites
de tir du Rafale) threat warning system, provides the crew with an excellent appre-
ciation of the tactical air situation.
The engagement in Afghanistan marks the first use of Rafale on operations.
After a build-up phase, involving an eight-month period between its entry into
ser vi ce and its first deployment, the F3 Rafale has now reached its full operational
sta tus.
Rafale first in the skies over Libya
This battle-hardening proved its value at the start of Operation Harmattan
and enabled Rafale to be deployed quickly in the Libyan conflict. In accordance with
the orders given by the President following the vote on the UN Security Council
resolution on 17 March 2011, the French Air Force was ready to interve ne 48 hours
later at the time of the international summit in Paris on 19 March. In order to put
the political decision into effect, a first raid on Benghazi was organized to end attacks
on the population.
For this strategic mission, the aircraft had to operate against a defended
theatre more than two thousand kilometres from their home bases in mainland
France. This first mission to Benghazi, on 19 March 2011, was organized in three
waves of aircraft, each including Rafales. The first wave had the mission of impo-
sing the no-fly zone, the second carried out a reconnaissance mission to determi ne
the situation on the ground and the third wave had the objective of striking mili-
tary resources threatening the population of Benghazi. This first raid, whose story
Immediate Action:
the Contribution of Rafale to recent Operations
67
Immediate Action:
has been widely publicised, achieved all its objectives in that the installation of the
air exclusion zone prevented any Libyan air attacks on the population, and the
des truction of six armoured vehicles threatening Benghazi led the pro-Gaddafi
forces to withdraw.
For the Air Force, the large distance to cover, the unknown situation in
Libya and the presence of active ground-to-air systems in the area of operations
give an idea of the achievement of the airmen on this very first penetration of a
defended theatre more than two thousand kilometres from their bases. This was a
major first for the Air Force, which demonstrated its ability to project force over a
long distance and make the first incursion into a theatre without any support. This
rare and demanding military capability places the French Air Force among the air
forces of the world that count. The success of this mission validated the organiza-
tion as well as the training and preparation of the personnel. At the strategic level,
the close interlocking of the political timing and the tempo of air operations
enabled the Presidents will to be turned into reality immediately and thus ensure
the credibility of France on the international scene. The Air Force demonstrated
that it is capable of responding to political requirements, in just a few hours.
At the heart of this perilous strategic mission the Rafale is literally in the
front line. Sending the aircraft in first on an air superiority mission demonstrates
once more the confidence the Air Force has in its versatile fighter. The perfor-
mance of its weapon systems, especially of its SPECTRA self-defence system, the
best in the Air Force, and of the GPS-guided AASM, enabling it to be fired at a
safe distance, mark out the Rafale as an effective and dependable tool, well adap-
ted to the mission. What is more, the Rafales sent to Libya on 19 March achieved
three different missions: air superiority, reconnaissance and the attack of opportu-
nity targets, demonstrating the range of their versatility.
The whole of the air campaign demonstrates the flexibility of the Rafale in
its final F3 Standard form. It successfully carried out all the missions devolved to
the fighter force: air superiority, ground attack on planned or opportunity targets,
and reconnaissance of a demanding theatre of operations not entirely devoid of
an air threat. The engagement of Rafale in Libya also saw the first use of the
SCALP- EG cruise missile in a strategic depth strike mission. The Libyan air cam-
paign was proof of the technical and human maturity of the Rafale system within
the French Air Force.
Apart from the operational effectiveness that the adaptability of Rafale brings
to aerial manoeuvre, the savings in resources which it makes possible is also conside-
rable. The same Rafales which carry out an air superiority mission one day can
conduct a ground-attack mission the next. And, beyond the aircraft themselves, it is
the same pilots, crews and ground technical support staff who operate the aircraft.
This versatility allows the deployment of fewer aircraft to carry out a wide range of
missions. How many specialised aircraft, with their dedicated equipment and
68
per sonnel, would it take to conduct the same missions? And at what cost? Savings in
technical and human resources have turned out to be a major parameter for the Air
Force in the maintenance of a rapid operational tempo over a long period.
Compared with its usual role in Afghanistan, Rafales engagement in Libya
is distinguished by a more uncertain environment, the confirmed presence of
ground-to-air threats and the use of a wider spectrum of capabilities. During
Operation Harmattan, French aircraft destroyed more than 1,000 targets and car-
ried out around 5,600 sorties, of which more than 4,000 were for the Air Force.
(2)
For their part, Rafales made 1,039 sorties, totalling 4,539 flight hours. Air Force
Rafales contributed 20 per cent of French combat sorties and 25 per cent of all
combat sorties, providing an essential part of the French participation in opera-
tions over Libya. The participation of French air assets in Libyan operations is a
hallmark of the excellence of French aviation in Europe. At a time when the
American air resources we have become used to are being reduced, we must not
underestimate the contribution of Rafale. Its effectiveness and unique capabilities
greatly enhance the credibility of French action in support of our allies, and clear ly
demonstrate to everyone that France possesses a powerful military tool.
Rafale and power projection
At the start of Operation Serval in Mali, a flight of four Rafales was
dis pat ched from its base in St Dizier to carry out a bombing mission on the rear
bases of the terrorist groups.
The four Rafales, armed with AASM and GBU-12, and accompanied by
C-135 tanker aircraft, took off from the St Dizier air base on 13 January 2013 on
a journey of over 6,000 kilometres. During this mission, which took 9 hours
40 minutes flying time, the crews targeted and destroyed training camps, infra-
structure and logistic depots of the terrorist groups, before landing at the
NDjamena air base.
This Rafale bombing mission was historic by virtue of its range, its dura-
tion and the demonstration it provided of the projection capability of air power.
For all that, such combat aircraft only constitute the final essential link in a cohe-
rent operational chain. This chain is constructed around essential capabilities such
as an aptitude for the command and control of air operations, intelligence and
in- flight refuelling, which enables combat aviation to carry out its bombing
mis sions more than six thousand kilometres from home territory.
Taken overall, the development of Rafale in Afghanistan and Libya has been
impressive. The aircraft underwent a major capability revolution between its first
Immediate Action:
(2) Libye: les aviateurs dans lopration Harmattan, Air actualits, hors srie 2012, pp. 72-73.
69
Immediate Action:
deployment in Afghanistan and its engagement in Libya in 2011. It evolved from the
F2 standard, limited to launching the GBU-12 with the aid of laser designation from
a Mirage 2000D, to the F3 standard, capable of carrying laser-gui ded weapons and
launching them independently using its Damocles pod, as well as carrying AASM
and SCALP missiles. This as much due to lessons learnt from operations as from the
normal development of standards and planned equipment upgrades.
The contribution of Rafale from the point of view of immediate action is
evidenced by two firsts for both the aircraft and the Air Force: our capability for
initial entry to a non-permissive theatre in Libya, and the completion of the lon-
gest bombing mission in the history of the Air Force in Mali. This guarantees
France a capability of action over very long distances and at very short notice.
Simulator Training
for Future Combat Pilots
The authors are Doctors in experimental psychology and
researchers in the Human factors and operational environ-
ments team at the Air Force research centre (Crea).
Colin Blttler
Cyril Camachon
T
oday, more than ever, combat pilots need the best tools available to learn
their trade as quickly as possible and to get the best out of the latest gene-
ration of combat aircraft, such as the Rafale, A400M, MRTT (Multi Role
Tanker Transport) and NH90. In this context, methods of simulation, on the
ground or in-flight, are presented as the answer to all these challenges. Where are
we in fact? This article will shine some light on the value and limitations of these
training methods.
Introduction
Budgetary constraints, reorganisations of air bases and units, training airspa-
ce restrictions and the level of deployment of the forces throughout the world all
combine to make the preparation of pilots increasingly difficult. They have the effect
of considerably reducing flying hours in combat aircraft, and additionally, combat
aircraft of the latest generation are more difficult to master because their on- board
systems are more comprehensive and the missions more varied. As a result, the trai-
ning time required is increased. In these conditions, how is it possible to train high ly-
qualified pilots as quickly as possible to operate the ultra-technological systems of the
latest-generation aircraft, in order to meet operational demands? And all this while
keeping costs under control and ensuring safety for all.
In aeronautics, the usual answer to cope with a lack of flying hours is
ground-based simulation. It may seem superfluous to specify ground-based when
it appears self-evident, but it is nevertheless a necessary distinction given that tech-
nological innovation has made in-flight simulation available. This apparent contra-
diction in terms is a powerful tool for the current and future training of combat
pilots. In-flight simulation enables some or all of the functionalities of a combat
aircraft to be reproduced but at a much lower operating cost. It allows training in
the manoeuvres and tactical procedures used in operational combat situations to
take place at the flying school level. Also, as we will see later, embedded (that is,
70
71
Simulator Training
in-flight) simulation allows certain limitations of ground-based simulation to be
overcome, so these two training aids would appear to offer a panacea to respond
to the drastic limitation of flying hours in operational combat aircraft. Of course,
this assertion is only partly true, and the object of this article is to show how these
tools should be used to squeeze extra value from military aviation training.
Ground-based simulation: not a real Swiss Army knife
Ground-based simulation is a preferred resource in pilot training in order
to reduce the number of flying hours required. This reduction is only possible if
the skills acquired in the simulator can make the transition positively to actual
flying or, in other words, if a skill learnt in the simulator is reused effectively in real
flight so that the consequence is that fewer actual flying hours are necessary to
learn this skill. The risk, though, with ground simulation is twofold: either no
transfer takes place, so there is no saving in flying hours, or a negative transfer takes
place and more flying hours are needed to compensate for it. The object of this sec-
tion is to suggest considerations for limiting the potential negative aspects of simu-
lation, namely bad lessons.
It is widely recognised that the technical side of simulation design has recei-
ved the most attention, to the detriment of the teaching aspect. It has to be accep-
ted that technological development does not necessarily result in better training,
for everything depends on the type of skills it is required to instil, and they do not
always transfer effectively. Moreover, the dilemma which confronts all trainers is
that of finding the ideal balance between the number of flight hours and the num-
ber of hours in the simulator, the aim being to find the best compromise between
efficiency and finance. Firstly, we will consider the relation between the types of
skills to be learnt in the simulator and their transferability. Secondly, we will see
that to find the ratio between the number of flying hours and the number in the
simulator, we have to evaluate the efficiency of the simulators in service.
The appropriate use of the ground-based simulator
For a number of years it has been accepted that training which combines
simulation with true flying saves money. However, most scientific research on the
subject concentrates almost exclusively on skills connected with the on-board instru-
mentation, which amounts to knowing how to use the instruments in the cockpit.
The technical limitations of simulators in the past meant they did not offer a good
quality view out of the cockpit. With improved technology, this problem was largely
overcome and research also sought to improve the quality of training over a wider
range of skills. Recent research has enabled us to assess the effectiveness of simulator
training for skills running from the use of on-board instrumentation to visual flight,
and even to simulate aircraft manoeuvring, which involves psycho-motor skills.
72
Simulator Training
Research indicates that the acquisition of the skills involved with system
management, (when the display is not composed of instruments with needles but of
on-board computers) are those which transfer best. Positive transfer is systematical ly
observed even with a low cost simulator such as an ordinary personal computer
using commercial software. On the other hand, the results are mixed in the case of
the motor skills involved in manoeuvring the aircraft. A simulator which reproduces
the movements of the aircraft increases the realism and the sense of immersion in
the virtual world. Although immersion is desirable in simulation there are much
cheaper ways of achieving this, for example, to put the training into the context of
a scenario, the better to introduce the trainee into the virtual world. However, this
effect is not clearly apparent in the case of motor skills. For these skills it is prefe-
rable to train them in real flight and not in a cheap, or for that matter even a sophis-
ticated, simulator. For the last category of skills, those involved in visual flight, there
is no definitive answer. Research shows that some visual flight skills can be taught
effectively with a rudimentary visual input (for example, landing) whereas others
require high-quality visual effects (for visual navigation, as one example).
The quality of simulator training is therefore largely a function of the skill
being learnt. This is why it is necessary to evaluate the simulators objectively when
they are in service to decide which skills are effectively transferred and which pro-
vide no, or even negative, benefit.
Beware of the trap!
This is a matter of evaluating the effectiveness of the simulator. This eva-
luation has two objectives. The first is to find out if the training on the simulator
can be transferred, skill by skill, to actual flight. The second objective is to deter-
mine the best ratio of flight hours to simulator hours during training.
Usually, this evaluation is subjective, based on the opinions of the users.
Objective measurements now exist such as the Per cent transfer (PT) and the
Transfer effectiveness ratio (TER). The PT enables the number of flying hours
saved by the use of the simulator to be calculated, while the TER allows a more
accurate measurement of the simulators contribution for each type of skill taught
on it. If a skill is not, or is badly transferred to real flight, the simulator can be
abandoned for that task. This means that the simulator can eventually be used to
best effect.
The next step is to calculate the optimal ratio between the hours of real and
simulated flight. The cost effectiveness ratio is an extension of the TER by inclu-
ding the cost dimension for the simulator and for real flight. Finally, it is possible
to calculate the amount of simulator time required at its maximum efficiency and
the amount of flight time to just meet the need, in order to arrive at the optimal
amount of training at the least cost.
73
Simulator Training
The sensible use of these objective methods of the evaluation of the trans fer
of training and thus, of the effectiveness of the simulator, allows:
l avoidance of the risk of negative transfer;
l direction of the use of each simulator towards its potential maximum;
l calculation of an optimal ratio of simulator hours to actual flying hours
in a training programme.
Taken overall, these measures also enable the effectiveness of different
trai ning methods to be compared.
Ground-based simulation has made great strides over recent decades. It has
established itself as a serious solution for certain types of training. For all that,
pilots are unanimous as to the limitations of ground-based simulation, unreal
bodily sensation and stress reaction amongst others. A new form of simulation
could overcome these deficiencies. Aircraft fitted with modern all-screen cockpits
are capable of accepting embedded simulation. This affords the possibility of
injecting virtual situations into their displays which present the illusion of a realis-
tic tactical environment to the pilot. The second part of this article will deal with
this capability in more detail.
Embedded simulationthe way of the (near) future
Embedded simulation works by generating a virtual tactical situation in
which artificial threats or other incidents are simulated and presented on the cock-
pit interfaces. For example, a cockpit screen can show movement tracks represen-
ting adversaries or allies as would the radar of an operational combat aircraft, even
though no radar may be fitted to the training aircraft. It thus becomes possible for
the pilot to use the training aircraft in simulated operational tactical conditions.
This increases the effectiveness of the training by providing a simulated rich tacti-
cal environment in real flight conditions.
Several advantages result from this technology. Firstly, it will be possible to
surpass current levels of tactical complexity in training, since the embarked simula-
tion will reduce the cognitive load on the pilot by relieving him of some mental cal-
culations. This will promote his ability to divide his attention and cope with more
tasks of increased complexity than he can at present. In addition, the possibility of
enriching the tactical environment in training will enable the pilot to accumulate
experience in conditions very close to the operational ones he will experience later.
This will be to his advantage when he joins the forces as a pilot.
Of course, not all activities can be reproduced by embedded simulation. For
example, it will be difficult to train for missions during which the pilot has to inter-
act with other aircraft by visual contact through the canopy when in fact they exist
74
Simulator Training
(1) J. Donnot and V. Ferrari, Loptimisation de la formation du pilote de combat par downloading: limites et risques, Research
report EMAA/B Plans, 2012.
only on his computer screen. For this reason, while waiting for certain technologies
such as augmented reality to arrive at maturity, it seems reasonable for the moment
to train only in activities requiring interactions with objects beyond visual range. In
these conditions, the risk of contradictions between what appears on the embedded
simulator screen and what can be seen from the cockpit is reduced. Other limitations
shared with ground-based simulation also exist, such as the degree of artificial intel-
ligence of the virtual entities or the fidelity of the behaviour of the virtual threats.
However, the risks posed by this new tool are difficult to anticipate by vir tue
of a severe lack of scientific research or lessons learnt by experience. The newness of
this technology within the forces, and even more so its application to training,
means that thinking must be based on existing technology which approaches the
characteristics of embedded simulation as closely as possible. This includes moder-
nising the cockpits of training aircraft, such as the Technically Advanced Aircraft
(TAA). In fact, while this technological modernisation is supposed to reduce the
risks of flight, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has noted a higher attri-
tion rate for the previous generation of these aircraft. The factors producing the
most errors come under two headings: an increase in the quantity of information to
absorb and the automating of systems. The FAAs recommended solution to reduce
these problems is to greatly increase pilot training in the new skills required by sys-
tems management. It seems that in order to promote the efficient use of embedded
simulation while limiting the risks, it may be necessary to include the acquisition of
new kinds of basic skills very early in a pilots training. While the previous genera-
tion of aircraft demanded more training in the basics of flying, the new systems
need more in systems management skills. Inevitably the training of future pilots will
have to incorporate these two types of basics.
To sum up, the Air Force must confront a reduction in training on operatio-
nal combat aircraft. The aim is therefore to train young pilots in the particular skills
required by the operational aircraft before they begin to fly this type of aircraft.
(1)
Three major areas of skills are needed:
l flying skillsthe basics;
l systems management skills;
l tactical combat skills.
Ground-based simulation is powerful and reliable for developing the last

two of these. However, it is not so effective in creating flying skills. Real flying is
75
Simulator Training
the most efficient training for this type of skill. This is why embedded simulation
in flight represents such an asset as it provides training in all three classes of skills.
Nonetheless, to acquire the ability to master embedded simulation the pilot must
first be able to master systems management. It is therefore through progressive trai-
ning, based on sound knowledge and carefully integrating these new tools, such as
ground-based and embedded simulation, that the Air Force will be able to deal
with current and future issues regarding the training of the combat pilot.
(2)
(2) C. Camachon and C. Blttler, La simulation embarque: limites et risques pour la formation et lentrainement du PN,
Research report EMAA/B Plans, 2012.
The Men and Women
of the French Air Force
French Air Staff.
EMAA
T
he airman, like his brothers in arms, is first and foremost a combatant, fully
aware that his duty may involve the deaths of others, as well as his own. He
must face up to difficulties with the same bravery and the same dedication as
his illustrious forbears. Both at home and overseas he has to deal with increasingly
complex situations, frequently dangerous and with a minimum of notice.
He faces ingenious adversaries who are capable of varying their tactics both
in the air and on the ground. In order to meet these threats he needs to possess intel-
lectual, technical and moral dynamism to arm himself for the different challenges
which he may have to meet. He also needs to develop the qualities of respect,
integrity, service and excellence which will guide him on an everyday basis.
Training to develop values and a sense of mission
For the Air Force, training is a vital element of the quality of excellence that
it seeks in order to execute its missions. The technical and human demands of the
aeronautical environment form the basic framework of this excellence, and maste ry
of this framework guarantees the coherence of the Air Forces everyday activity.
With this in mind we have to bring together three separate aspects of trai-
ning, which must join to form a coherent whole: training the combatant; training
the aeronautical specialist, and the level of skill required. This concept fundamen-
tally shapes an organisational model which is peculiar to the Air Force.
The men and women of the Air Force thus represent a real team with some
fifty different skills, who are federated by their joint activity in the third dimen-
sion. Whatever their individual responsibilities or their field of activity, they share
a unique culture which allows them to work together smoothly and achieve suc cess
in their missions.
Their training enables aviators to think for themselves in the midst of doubt
and stress, while remaining true to their values. They know how to operate in
situations of extreme autonomy which are further complicated by the constraints of
individual responsibility. It is always a question of serving, of striving for excellence;
76
77
The Men and Women
this implies a sense of duty and a continuous effort to dedicate ones efforts to the
service of the Nation.
Values which extend beyond the Air Force
Inseparable as they are from the performance of the Air Force, the aviators
values inspire performance in any organisation.
The technical skills acquired and the qualities developed by aviators (such
as rigour, the willingness to accept responsibility, the taste for command, and ins-
tructional aptitude) are further elements which can be highlighted as experience-
based skills. Greater emphasis should be placed on these values, which are so easi ly
transferable to the wider world of government and business.
At each level of responsibility, from the lowest to the highest, a career in the
Air Force can be the key to success in life. An Air Force career can not only be attrac-
tive to young French people, but its training can also make an enormous social and
economic contribution to the country. A large number of companies recruit their
skilled technicians from the Air Force, valuing their wide-ranging professional skills,
and many officers possess the management skills and experience so vital to the
suc cess of French enterprise, and, where appropriate, to their recovery. For many the
Air Force is one of the last places where the social elevator still functions.
In this way, through their education and training, the men and women of
the Air Force bring these values to the entire Nation.
Where do we go from here?
Human resource management in the Air Force must pursue its modernisa-
tion process. It needs to be particularly flexible, and use training to guarantee that
operational objectives are attained while at the same time keeping costs under control.
The Air Forces mission is characterised by its everyday activities, so vital to
the security and defence of the French people; its quick reaction capability is impli-
cit. This is why its personnel must acquire a broad, common base of operational
preparation appropriate to these requirements.
In addition, when the most difficult and ambitious missions are demanded
of it, such as initial entry to a theatre of conflict, the Air Force must be capable of
providing the highest standards of operational preparation for a more limited sec-
tion of its resources.
Finally, it must be able to undertake long term tasks by careful manage-
ment of the different training and skill levels of its personnel.
78
The Men and Women
It is a corollary that, in this period of overall force reductions, to be able to
call on reservists to fill the gaps when generating forces is essential to operational
flexibility. The objective of a size of reserve force that was set out in the last Livre
blanc (2008), has not been achieved. It is vitally important to implement a cohe-
rent overall policy which encourages enterprises to commit themselves to suppor-
ting national defence, and defines appropriate financial arrangements to recognise
the economic value of the reservists to civil society.
Modernity is also a synonym for the ability to escape from the straitjacket
of regulations which have hitherto constrained the career management of our offi-
cers and NCOs. It is vital to be able to change the specialisation of our personnel
in mid-career. Adopting this organisational model means we need to think serious-
ly about the training and direction of senior officers into one of two streams:
towards senior command appointments for some, or towards their transfer to other
government departments or industry for others.
The Air Force gives France a remarkable military tool which is has a firm
eye on the future. It has a rich supply of dedicated personnel, and exemplary moti-
vation. Widely dispersed in many different stations, it is composed of French citi-
zens who are proud of their commitment to serving their country, whose colours
they hold high. The Air Force continues to give them the high quality training
which allows them to serve the Nation at the highest level. In return, the benefits
to the Nation go way beyond the mere results of operational tasking.
R
D
N
Looking to the future
The Battlefield and Air Power
15 Years From Now
Doctor of public law, Captain Boutherin is Head of the
Prospective et tudes de scurit (Forecasting and security
studies) team at the Air Force research centre. Doctor of
political sciences and authorised researcher, Christophe
Pajon is a researcher in this team.
Grgory Boutherin
Christophe Pajon
Preliminary note: The ideas and opinions in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of
the French Air Force or Ministry of Defence.
T
he Ministry of Defence in general, and the armed forces in particular, have
begun a process of transformation and adaptation to the international
environment in which they will be called upon to operate in the future.
The Air Force is, of course, involved in this evolution, and in the same vein has
begun its own transformation process, intended to carry it beyond 2025. It is quite
logical that this transformation should occur hand in hand with a broader consi-
deration of how the battlefield is likely to change over the same period. The ideas
proposed in this article are intended to add to this broader consideration.
Recent interventions have borne witness to the role played by aerospace
power in the nature of conflicts, the environment of interventions and the adver-
sary, and, as a result, to the ways of using that power. The latter point shows a clear
break from its use during operations in the nineteen-nineties. Should we therefore
see this evolution as some defining trait in the character of our future commit-
ments? Do all changes in the nature of the battlefield have a causal effect on the
characteristics and use of aerospace power? The aim of this article is to detect the
current and future changes in the battlefield which could have an impact on the
exercise of aerospace power.
An increasing number of players on the battlefield
To say that the number and type of players on the battlefield is increasing
is hardly new, and yet the changes in, and complexity of, this veritable mosaic of
networks have accelerated since the phenomenon was identified several decades
ago. On a wider scale, the state is no longer the sole organisation to possess the
resources needed for acting internationally. Non-governmental organisations
81
82
(NGOs), international organisations, trans-national movements, private compa-
nies and private military and security providers have also become significant
players. Even those working in international relations have seen the collective
natu re of their vocation demolished. The role of the individual, be he tourist or
terrorist, would seem to be the final sign of the blowing apart of international
society. Through his action (perhaps an attack, or by posting a video on Internet)
or simply by his presence (as a victim of some action, or of a kidnapping), the indi-
vidual becomes a player in international relations. From a domestic point of view,
each state is aware of competition from collections of players acting within that
same state, who call into question the legitimacy of the political structure
some times to the extent of its collapse.
Are conflicts necessarily counter-insurgency in nature?
The battlefield therefore becomes a smaller reflection of the questioning of
two conventional state monopolies: that of control of international relations, and
that of domestic political legitimacy. The form taken by players on the battlefield
confirms this fogging of the boundary between domestic and external issues, and
is exemplified by those NGOs concerned with international solidarity, which
appear on the battlefield via their operational divisions. They are financed by states
and inter-governmental organisations by the action of their supporters and struc-
tures established principally in Western countries. They are not necessarily trans-
national: indeed, they are occasionally identifiable with a single nation.
Communication aimed at promoting their action on the battlefield has a two-
pronged aim: fundraising, and expanding their media value for presentation to
Western audiences. The legitimacy thus acquired helps them in their negotiations
(mainly financial) with national and/or international public authorities. Private
companies providing military support act on the ground and also develop contrac-
tual relations with some countries according to distinct systems of regulation and
legal issues which are defined with each country concerned and which to some
extent they bring onto the battlefield. Those two examples well illustrate how the
state has lost its monopoly of control of the battlefield, a symptom of one of the
consequences of the multiplicity of actors thereon. The other consequence which
carries with it a growth in the complexity of the battlefield, is the confrontation
between a similar multiplicity of and divergence in rationale. Each rationale iden-
tifies its own priorities and stakes, and each is different, be it based on, for example,
military, political, media or regulatory issues.
From the belligerent parties point of view, one of the main, and perhaps
most notable, developments on the battlefield in recent years clearly relates to the
non-state nature of the adversaries that Western forces have to face. With the
exception of the conflict between Georgia and Russia in August 2008, contempo-
rary conflicts for the most part cast a collaboration of conventional forces against
insurgents or non-state movements. Iraq, Afghanistan, south Lebanon, Libya and
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Mali are cases in point. The dominant question in many current analyses is that of
the adaptability of aerospace power, which is essentially designed for confrontation
with a state actor. This latter form of military engagement was formalised by
Warden, in his theory of five concentric circles, in which he envisaged the adver-
sary as a pseudo-organic decision-making system with the capacity for making
decisions and action. How, then, do we organise ourselves when facing an adver-
sary who, in principle, has no centres of gravity? Firstly, buy not having too trun-
cated a vision of Wardens model, which defined a strategic entity in terms of an
organisation capable of operating autonomouslythat is, of moving and sup-
plying itself. If, as the Belgian political analyst, Joseph Henrotin, wrote, Wardens
typical adversary were a state, then one could identify a system which allowed
understanding of insurgent groups rationale, since they, too, function with forms
of leadership (leaders and ideological advisors), communication services (on-line
media, for example), infrastructure (a financial system or smuggling network),
population to support the insurgents, and deployed forces. Todays crying need to
design ways of responding to these situations will be no less crying fifteen years
from now, when we can be sure that the non-state adversary will still be in a posi-
tion of indirect action, fleeting in his appearances and hence fast, unpredictable,
lightweight and difficult to identify and discriminate. These are of course the very
things that characterise what Clausewitz referred to as irregular warfare. In postu-
lating the existence of such conflict in the future, there must automatically be a
supposition that an adversary might display these traits. That being so, we should
also beware of another danger, which would be to consider counter-insurgency
inevitably and invariably as the only form of warfare over the next fifteen years.
Non-belligerent players
The nature of the adversaries aside, this type of conflict has put the spot-
light on the importance of other, non-belligerent players. Among them figure prin-
cipally the local or national population, the media and NGOs. Depending on the
type of analysis undertaken these groups of individuals, whether or not they live in
the theatre of operations, can be considered in three different ways yet simulta-
neously: as a tool, an objective or even a centre of gravity; as an autonomous
player; or as a context in itself.
Territory can be held, but not a population. A population is not an inert
object: it possesses its own character and advanced thought processes. And becau se
it is a player it is susceptible to persuasion by one or other of the parties.
Considering it solely as an object, or as an element of the physical landscape, risks
its conversion into a willing ally of the asymmetric adversary, in terms of logistic
support and as a recruitment pool, at least. Hence the population, or rather the
support of that population, becomes a strategic objective for the parties in conflict.
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The ways of gaining popular support, be they by persuasion or terror, vary
from one protagonist to another and with their value systems, but the population
nevertheless remains an element of conquest. The need to win hearts and minds is
real and an important development on the battlefield. As General Sir Rupert Smith
highlighted in his book The Utility of Force., the end states for which we fight today
have changed, and the population has become the centre of gravity of contempo-
rary operations. As a strategic goal, winning over the support of the population
calls for a redefinition of the use of force and especially an evaluation of its impact
on the population seen from the point of view of public opinion.
From this goal flows a number of constraints, principles and models, which
can be summed up as follows:
l Understand the population in order to understand better how it perceives,
or might perceive, the actions of conventional forces;
l Ensure the aims are understood, and gain the support of the population
for them;
l Support the population, and bring it wide-ranging structural and medi-
cal assistance, (it seems evident here that air-mobility assets play an essential role
in this support, in particular in bringing in supplies and in medical evacuation);
l Control violence, maintaining proportionality in the use of force and
avoiding civil casualties. Possess in advance a strict set of rules of engagement and
a wide range of weapons for progressive use if needed, so as to avoid the insurgents
using such an armoury as an argument in their struggle for influence;
l Respond to the adversarys persuasive arguments and actions point by
point.
These rules and objectives make the population a significant constraining
factor for Western forces, a situation the adversary will seek to turn to his advantage.
Air power and the population
On first sight, a number of factors might lead one to think that aerospace
power is little concerned by this strategic focus on the population, and yet such a
view is clearly erroneous. Preservation of the population and limitation of collate-
ral damage have become a central challenge for aerospace power because of several
factors: the major principles of the law of armed conflict (distinction, necessity,
proportionality and humanity); the increasing recourse to judicial proceedings
within warfare; the importance that has to be given not only to the legitimacy of
action, but also to the perception of it by public opinion; and information warfa re,
and therefore, to a certain extent, the spin that can be put by the adversaries on the
results of non-discriminatory strikes.
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Additionally, it is clearly essential to keep in mind how political effects are
taken into account, as we now have to remember that a tactical success can easily
end up as a strategic failure. The destruction of an electricity distribution grid
could, for example, lead to loss of power to a water treatment plant. Such failures
could have consequences on the day-to-day life and health of the local civilian
population.
These different aspects confirm that, if air power was once the central wea-
pon in industrial warfare and of a North American concept of confrontation, deve-
lopments (both technological and in use) have made it particularly appropriate to
action within the population. Far from a rather Orwellian conception of techno-
logy that would lead to centralisation and to a break with operational reality, its
sophistication is in fact bringing it back down to earth and to a human level
through decentralisation of decision-making, reinforcement of horizontal links
and a short decisional cycle, and close and discriminatory observation of the
pattern of life of both population adversary by drones. It seems somewhat odd,
perhaps, that the technology now used by air power offers substantial savings in
men and machines.
The multiplication of players of many and varied nature, together with an
ever-present state actor whose own methods may equally be broadly derived from
methods of irregular warfare, form the main strong trend in the evolution of the
battlefield.
Aerospace power and a complex adversary: rustic with high-tech
In a similar way that has been outlined for the players involved, it is not
possible to understand technological change in just one single context. Air power
is going to have to remain in a position to confront adversaries who possess
comparable technological potential, others who may be technologically asymme-
tric, or yet others who, depending on the time and the place, ally the high-tech
with the completely out-dated.
That said, and on the assumption that technological advance remains a key
factor in the conduct of warfare and central to the third dimension, in which the
law of survival of the fittest applies, the issue remains of the number of competi-
tors and of exactly how they challenge the air superiority of the most advanced
armed forces. It comes down to considering two sources of tension: their financial
backing and availability of material (which to some extent brings us back to the
state or non-state nature of the adversary in question), and their level of technolo-
gical sophistication.
Because of the ever-increasing costs of research and development of sophisti-
cated technology, and of the numerous fields of expertise that have to be coordina-
ted, the entry fee to the air power club is very high. It follows that the only members
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are state actors, with the exception, perhaps, of embryonic air forces such as that of
the Tamil Tigers. But to be a state actor is not a sufficient condition: the number of
members is even smaller if one only counts those states that can generate an air force
capable of doing something other than conducting purely self-defence missions. Seen
from this angle, the landscape shows a dramatic contrast between a reducing num-
ber of credible competitors (because of escalating costs) and a sort of technological
desert. The broader reality of the situation is much more complex.
First of all, there is, and will continue to be, proliferation of aeronautical
technologyprincipally Russian and Chineseeven if the proliferation of those
countries aircraft does not necessarily or inevitably call into question Western
forces air superiority, since it is more an issue of quantity than quality. This deve-
lopment is directly linked to the entry into service of fourth generation aircraft
and, not so far off, the arrival of the fifth generation, even though the latter will be
limited to just a few states.
Next, we should note that, between 2005 and 2015, 4,000 combat aircraft
(including light aircraft) will be produced across the world, of which two-thirds
will be multi-role combat aircraft. This will be followed between 2015 and 2025
by the replacement of third generation fleets. There will probably be a global
reduction in the total number of combat aircraft as a result of research into grea-
ter multi-use of equipment and better overall performance. Moreover, research
into the advantages of drone systems will not only increase but also be more gene-
ralised and will certainly no longer remain the privilege of high-tech forces.
Aerospace power will therefore have to develop highly effective detection
and identification systems in order to face up to the simple systems that are
deployed in particular by non-state adversaries. That being so, the statement regar-
ding the proliferation of aerospace technology does not automatically mean that
credible competitors will emerge, and even less that they will be numerous and
widespread fifteen years from now, essentially for three reasons:
l These weapon systems require very specific competencies, which are
acquired through initial training, the acquisition and transmission of significant
operational experience and the maintenance of such expertise through regular par-
ticipation in joint and combined exercises. The fact is that there are few states
capable of combining advanced technology with all of these requirements;
l These weapon systems must additionally be integrated within a high-
performance C2 system in order for their full potential to be exploited;
l Finally, apart from the fact that these weapon systems must of course
have adequate armament, they must also be closely linked to an efficient and effec-
tive network of air surveillance and air defence.
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Despite all that, it is right to consider the trend towards proliferation of
anti-air systems as well, even if, once again, ground-to-air missiles are likely to pose
less of a threat if they are distributed piecemeal, than if they are integrated into a
defence structure.
To sum up this review of technology on the battlefield, three potential axes
of development become apparent:
l Pursuit of, and acceleration in the proliferation of weapon systems, inclu-
ding those of the latest generation;
l Proliferation to the advantage of non-state actors;
l The ever more striking capability of actors, non-state in particular, to
adapt, convert and divert weapon systems and/or civilian technology.
Air power therefore has to account for a wide range of threats and great
unpredictability. Quite apart from responses in terms of strategy, assets and action,
it seems essential that we remember that the adversary is not necessarily our tech-
nological inferior at all times and in all places on the battlefield, and also that even
if he were, he could still have considerable nuisance value.
Aerospace power on the battlefield and the front line
Complex environments
In addition to looking at the players and assets, analysis of evolution of the
battlefield has to look in depth at the terrain on which armed forces in general, and
air power in particular, are engaged. Such analysis will then bring out the resulting
constraints on the assets deployed and their desired and actual effects. Once again,
recent events highlight the evolution of one particular spacethe town, more
generally referred to as the urban environment. Again, our initial reservation, that
current developments are not necessarily tomorrows realities, leads us to maintain
a certain distance from an all urban perception: confrontation in mountainous
regions, for example, calls for the application of certain aerospace assets in man-
ners peculiar to that complex environment. This has very clearly been demonstra-
ted in operations in Mali, especially in the offensive phases which targeted the
strongholds of armed groups in the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains. They led to the
mobilisation and coordination of a large number of different types of aircraft
(including Rafale, Mirage 2000D, C135 Stratolifter, Harfang drones and
Atlantique 2) in order to conduct simultaneous strikes on several targets.
Moreover, confrontation of the willing is no longer limited to the surface of the
earth, and does not necessarily imply the use, even limited, of armed force. Any
physical space, like cyberspace, is now a space for confrontation, an extension or
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component of the battlefield, whose resident nature and threats, and those transi-
ting through it, call for very special consideration.
Contemporary conflicts show a shift of the battlefield in the general direc-
tion of complex, especially urban, environments. Afghanistan, Iraq, Israeli confron-
tations with Hezbollah and Hamas in southern Lebanon and Palestinian regions,
and, of course, Libya, all bear witness to this trend. For sure, neither town nor
mountain is new to fighting forces: indeed, can there be any environment in which
man has not already fought? Military history is full of examples of battles or wars
waged in such environments as a direct consequence of the fact that a town has an
intrinsic value because of the concentration of political, economic, social and cul tu-
ral bodies within it, which endow it with symbolic status. It is natural that towns
will continue to represent an important stake in future conflicts, but more than
that, the urban battlefield will certainly become more usual, not only because of
the predicted increase in urbanisation throughout the world, but also because of the
deliberate choice of certain actors. Adversaries of Western forces are therefore incli-
ned to seek a position of better balance in this environment by turning the milita ry
technology of those same Western forces against them. Urban combatfighting in
built-up areas, in an enclosed spaceis now tending to become a preferred mode
for the weaker party because, for one thing, the adversary has far better knowledge
of the environment in which he lives and in which he has been able to prepare for
his fight, and, for another, the other partys intervention is made infinitely more
complex. The town environment therefore offers great advantages to the defender:
refuges, mixing with the population, obstacles to the deployment of armoured
vehicles and to the use of air power. Moreover, apart from the geographical location
of the town itself (in a dip, on a summit or on a plain, for example), the geography
within it can be very varied, with perhaps a Western-style centre, an ancient one,
residential suburbs, housing schemes, industrial zones and so on. In a broad sense
the town is therefore tending to become a more complex physical environment as a
result of its own evolution.
In his treatise on air power and the urban environment, Olivier Zajec points
out that urban combat will unquestionably be the most likely type of combat in the
future, and the most demanding for Western armed forces. Air power is not the only
force to try to resolve the difficult problems it raises: for both aviation and ground
forces, says Zajec, the complex and changing urban theatre presents a major chal-
lenge. That being so, aerospace power plays an eminent role in the urban milieu for
several reasons. On one hand its permanent ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance) capability provides fundamental situational knowledge of the
com plex environment via the use of drones. The advantage of drones is that they can
be kept out of range of threats from lightweight ground-to-air weapons and
MAN PADS, unlike rotary-winged aircraft, which find it difficult to hover in that
environment without being exposed. The use of drones here, but in advance of
armed action is equally justified, as was illustrated particularly well during the four
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months of intelligence gathering and mapping that preceded the second offensive on
Fallujah in November 2004, and also during the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in the
summer of 2006. On the other hand, aerospace power allows for atypical modes of
action in order to limit collateral damage, such as the use of non-explosive munitions
to penetrate concrete, as used by the French Mirage 2000Ds in Libya.
Dematerialisation of the battlefield
But once again, we must recognise that the urban environment is not the
be-all and end-all: it does not represent the sole stage on which future confronta-
tions will be played out. Any attempt to define the battlefield would tend to
expo se just how difficult it is to map it out, partly as a result of its intangible cha-
racteristics. The latter have not suddenly appeared, but are the result of the deve-
lopment, and now maturity, of technology with increasingly high performance.
Digitisation of the battlefield, and its key advantage of linking players in a
single network, is proof of another confrontation in which the adversaries seek to
gain control or, at least, to challenge our control, over the advantages it offers. This
prime space, generally known as cyberspace, is an increasingly strategic environ-
ment in which threats are growing, and upon which military operations are increa-
singly dependent, as, in a more general sense, are our modern societies. For this
reason it is also important to have a clear grasp of this sphere of confrontation. In
other words, even if the Air Force is to a very large extent dependent on this sphe re,
and even if it falls to that Force to ensure the security of its own information
net works and systems, cyberspace itself nevertheless remains a domain common to
the various military players and, more broadly, to everyonecivil and military.
Furthermore, acknowledgement of vulnerabilities and threats, and therefore appli-
cation of surveillance, results from cooperation between authorities, including
forces, agencies, services and ministries.
Extension of the battlefield
Exo-atmospheric and extra-atmospheric space is also emerging as an envi-
ronment in which rivalries and power struggles are being played out: they are cur-
rently embryonic in terms of threat, but are nevertheless a cause for concern. This
is understandable, given the vital nature of space both to the conduct of military
operations, and to its strategic importance to the development of our societies.
One of the main reasons is linked to the fact that mastery of space, rather like mas-
tery of nuclear weapon technology, represents high stakes for any country. The race
between the United States and the USSR to launch the first satellite, unmanned
then manned, then the conquest for the moon, is just such an example. Such moti-
vation is still with us today, and can be seen in the debates over the space
pro grammes of certain countries such as Iran, now the tenth space power in the
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world, following the launch of its satellite Omid (Hope) on 4 February 2009,
during the celebrations of 30 years of the Islamic Republic.
Beyond issues that guide space programmes, such as sovereignty and
influence, there are also strategic, tactical and operational interests which encou-
ra ge countries or groups of countries to gain access to space, to try to control it and
even to go as far as preventing others from having access to it. Because of this, the
spatial domain as an extension or development of cyberspace has become essential,
something no military operation can do without, by virtue of its use in the fields
of telecommunications, observation, navigation and advance warning. In the same
way that they are dependent on cyberspace, modern armed forces are obliged to
use space in broad support of ground-based military operations. Space capability
now appears as a sensitive issue, given that its neutralisation in the broadest sense
would undoubtedly hinder the conduct of operations. It therefore seems logical to
incorporate it into the overall analysis of the battlefield and hence to try to iden-
ti fy future developments.
More than any other force component, the Air Force has a special respon-
sibility here, albeit one that might seem natural for that service. It is simply a prac-
tical reality, in spite of the scientific debate regarding the physical continuity (or
not!) of the third dimension into space.
The adaptations needed can be summed up as the development and harde-
ning of satellite fleets, either on a strictly national level or, more likely, on a
European level. The effort already made this field has promoted France and Europe
into top-ranking space powers. Continuing effort is needed if we are to have true
and total autonomy of decision-making and conduct of operations. In light of the
rate of technological and political developments, and of what has been achieved by
some countries, the least budgetary and technologicaland even doctrinal
retrenchment risks highly prejudicial consequences. With the Graves system (Grand
rseau adapt la veille spatiale), France now enjoys a real advantage in spatial situa-
tional awareness. It is, of course, important not only to maintain and protect this
advantage but also to expand it in order to be in a position to anticipate any risk of
threat in this domain, which is likely to see considerable challenge in the next fif-
teen years. Thought needs therefore to be given to responses and mechanisms for
spatial deterrence, in the event that certain states start working towards possible
arming of space. Strengthening surveillance and detection capabilities would have a
deterrent effect in that they would allow pinpointing of the origin of an attack
against a satellite body.
Timethe central element on the battlefield
When examining developments in the battlefield and the effects they are
likely to have in the coming years, one unavoidably comes back to the age-old
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cen tral notion of time. And central is indeed the right idea, since it has become a
significant factor in conflicts in which each party seeks to control it and to impo se
his rhythm on the other. To maintain a temporal advantage over the adversary, to
keep a step ahead of the game and to retain the initiative all relate to one of the
classic conditions for military success. And yet the acceleration of time, the evolu-
tion in the nature of the adversary and the way in which he acts, are all imposing
a slight change in this basic tenet.
Permanence, or mastering long time
One of the challenges for aerospace power in a future environment notable
for the fleeting nature of targets and the avoidance by adversaries of direct confron-
tation, would seem to be that of bringing together control of force, situational
knowledge and reactivity. The last two of these brings us back to the need for
aerospace power to have mastery of long (permanent air patrols) and short periods
of time. From this point of view, recent operations have shown the central role
given to drones for this task. Apart from the fact that they remove man from risk
zones, they offer the special advantage of mastering long periods of timeon-task
endurance. In other words, they have the advantage of permanence, a characteris-
tic that is even more vital, given that time has become a significant factor in
contemporary conflicts, and is likely to form a structural element of future ones.
The adversaries operate on two different timescales: on one hand they seek
to stretch out the commitment of forces in order to exhaust them while benefit-
ting more and more from media channels in their long-term strategy of influen-
cing public opinion, of steering perceptions on the legitimacy of the intervention,
or even attempting to gain an advantage from their weak capacity for resistance.
On the other hand, they operate on a short timescale, tactical level: having no
assets with which to confront the force head-on, they prefer, as we have seen, to
play the transient cardto merge into the physical environment, benefitting as
they do so from its complexity. The deployed force therefore needs to know how
to master the short term, and this is where permanence brings sure operational
gain. Permanent occupation of the sky, together with a network of sensors and
receivers opens up full situational awareness, an overall view of the battlefield and
a common picture of the operational situation. It offers tactical and operational
mastery of the long term, which in turn allows action in the short term to catch
that transient moment. Whilst the war around Kosovo revealed a number of limi-
tations in this field, permanence of all-weather ISR platforms, appears today as
a real tactical and operational innovation in the geographical coverage and the
instantaneous and continuous intelligence picture it offers to ground and air forces
alike. Numerous examples bear witness to this: in Lebanon or Gaza, Iraq or
Afghanistan, no force committed to a conflict can henceforth do without the
permanence that drones bring into play.
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These permanent platforms can offer more advantages than intelligence
alone. In a similar manner to the shorter-term show of presence and show of force
operations, drones have a deterrent role on the tactical level in terms of presence, and
contribute to controlled use of force. In making a presence, but not necessarily a
threat, fly around over an area, and in making the adversaries understand that they
are under constant observation and that the reaction time of the force is getting shor-
ter and shorter, drones contribute to influencing the adversaries decision-making and
inciting them not to act. This deterrent function of drones, which is further reinfor-
ced if the aircraft are armed, offers an extra step in the graduated use of force, which
is of great value in counter-insurgency and stabilisation operations, in which the
protection of, and assistance to, the populationand, indeed, the support of the
population for the actionare determining factors.
Adapting to a faster rhythm
Implicit in the advantages offered by drones in intelligence and control of
information is the notion of reactivity. There is nothing new to this, of course, as
it is at the heart both of the OODA loop (Observation, orientation, decision,
action) and of the target indication cycle, called F2T2EA (Find, Fix, Track, Target,
Engage, Assess). Contemporary operations, such as those conducted by Israel, or
those in Afghanistan and Iraq, reveal the central nature of this aspect and the
important of being able to go for opportunity targets as well as Time sensitive
targets (TST).
In recent counter-insurgency operations, opportunity targeting has been
the mainstay of offensive aerospace missions. The necessity to have control over
what we are calling short time, and, in extremis, over real time, is one of the main
consequences of developments on the battlefield. By melting into the background
of population and shadowy urban areas, the adversaries attempt to impo se their
rhythm. We need, therefore, to have mastery of long time, permanence, in other
words, and to shorten the period between observation and action. It is in this that
drones offer an immeasurable advantage: their permanence and their ability to
transmit information directly, constantly and in real time allows the rhythm to be
increased and hence control of time.
The need to control the tempo arises from the delay between the observa-
tion and strike parts of the cycle, since it is critical to the reactivity factor when ini-
tiating an operation. Yet it also requires a high level of decentralisation, which is
now having quite an impact in organisational terms. The Air Forces capacity for
this was illustrated well in the Mali operations, particularly in terms of reactivity:
they showed the value of being able to conduct operations from the National air
operations centre (CNOA) at Lyon Mont-Verdun.
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Changes in the battlefield come in many shapes and sizes, of which only a
fewthose which are likely to have a direct with air powerhave been exposed
here. We have described a complex environment with the aim of outlining an
admittedly subjective landscape, yet not exhaustively. If a single trend, or evolu-
tionary path, emerges from this analysis of the battlefield, it is the continued grow-
th in its complexity, closely linked to the increase in the tempo and the changing
rhythm of the battlefield.
This central trend leads to a number of sometimes contrasting consequen-
tial effects on aerospace power. In amplifying these consequential effects, the trend
may well give a boost to its own role on the battlefield. The widespread differences
in the nature of the battlefield (for example, if it is spread out or confined, or even
devoid of space; without human life or peopled; with diffuse or permanent threats
and so on) give voice to the traditional cry of higher, faster, further which cha-
racterises aerospace power.
That said, to maintain this initial advantage, and even to multiply the
effects and benefits achieved by this trinity of characteristics, it is perhaps wor-
thwhile emphasising more strongly the qualities brought by operating in the third
dimension: flexibility (or adaptability) and permanence. These qualities have alrea-
dy been defined in the French Forces Instruction 1000, which sets out joint doc-
trine for the use of forces on operations, and should become the defining charac-
teristics of aerospace power. The quintet of higher, faster, further, more flexibly,
for longer, would now be more appropriate to the increasing complexity of the
battlefield and to the intensification of its rhythm. Although time will remain the
central element of future, armed engagements, it is the ability to take control of it
that will be the measure of operational success.
Bibliography
Joseph Henrotin, Peut-on penser une campagne coin en strategie aerienne ? Lapport de Warden, Dfense & scurit
internationale No. 54, December 2009, p. 29.
Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force. The Art of War in the Modern World, Vintage, February 2008, 448 pages.
Olivier Zajec, Puissance arienne et milieu urbain, Compagnie europenne dintelligence stratgique, 10 July 2007,
p. 5-6.
Adapting
Military Capability
French Air Staff.
EMAA
W
hile the nature of war remains constant, its forms are fluid and
frequently complex. The conflicts in which our armed forces have been
regularly involved are proof of this, covering a particularly wide range
of warlike activity, from inter-state wars to both high-tech and low-tech asymme-
tric confrontation with sub-state actors.
A quick historical perspective reminds us that the domination of Western
powers in many conventional state conflicts in the past (such as the Korean, Vietnam,
Falklands, Israeli-Arab, Gulf and Kosovo Wars) has been due to the superiority of
their aviation in general. That air superiority was achieved through tactical innova-
tion (such as Mig Alley in Korea and Operation Bolo in Vietnam), and through tech-
nical innovation (superior speed prior to the nineteen-seventies, and manoeuvrabili ty
and stealth since the nineteen-eighties). That same air superiority was threatened
by the introduction of missiles during the Vietnam War, but has been thoroughly
re-established with mastery of electronic warfare, and by substantial improvements in
preparation and training techniques (Red Flag exercises, for example).
Since the beginning of this century successive conflicts in Iraq (the Second
Gulf War in 2003) and Afghanistan have focused strategic thinking on asymme-
tric models and counter-insurgency approaches which tend to minimise the role of
air power. However the lessons learned from these two experiences demonstrate to
us that as far as air power is concerned there is continuity of risk between the
phases of coercion and stabilisation. There are no frontiers in the sky, and in it the
strongest wins: in Lebanon in 2006 Israel had the painful experience of its strate-
gic planning being confounded by paramilitary units equipped with modern and
powerful weapons.
Operations Harmattan and Serval remind us of the difficulty of planning
for future conflicts. It was the preparation and adaptability of our armed forces
which allowed us to respond to both crises.
In parallel with this, the economic expansion of Third World countries,
together with their access to technology, increases the risk that we may find our-
selves facing adversaries equipped with militarily significant forces. While Western
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Adapting
Military Capability
defence budgets are reducing, emerging countries are in the throes of an arms race
and investing heavily in advanced military technologynotably military aviation
and the many advanced technologies which accompany anti-air and anti-ship ope-
rations. These weapons can range from the semi-obsolescent to those of the latest
generation, such as the Russian S300. They offer good value for money to the
countries concerned, and can deny free access to a more powerful attacking force.
If there is no counter-strategy, these capabilities confer on an ill-intentioned
state the ability to deny access to a common space such as a strait or air route, with
obvious economic implications. To respond effectively to this type of challenge the
armed forces must be capable of action in all the spaces involved: air, sea, land, cyber
and extra-atmospheric space. The air sea battle concept developed in the United
States seeks to frustrate the anti-access/air denial strategy of a peer competitor and
favours an integrated, inter-connected system of forces with a resilient communica-
tions network, capable of launching multiple attacks on both physical key points and
the control of enemy weapons systems. For the foreseeable future this will form the
concept of operations of all coalitions led by the United States, and to which we will
need to adapt ourselves.
The question at issue is this: how do we adapt our capabilities and our mili-
tary structures to the evolution of todays way of warfare? The concentration upon
asymmetric threats which has dominated our planning over the past ten years
could still lead to results in the strategic short term; it could also be dangerously
inappropriate when faced with a possible brutal resurgence of high intensity war.
Moreover, budget cuts must not be allowed to lead to rivalry between these two
paradigms, giving the impression that an exclusive choice has to be made between
the two.
In this context we must drive change in our military capabilities to allow
us to carry out missions (probably with reduced resources), while at the same time
minimising the impact on the degradation of our operational tasking. If we can
succeed in identifying the way ahead, our key objective must be to preserve our
overall capability. France currently fields a solid, highly credible military machine:
a significant force offering a wide spectrum of military options, possessing the rare
capability for initial entry, to act as an influential partner in a coalition, and to
maintain its shape.
The fundamental capabilities needed to retain Frances influence
At all costs, France must retain its capability to react quickly and effective ly,
and to effect initial entry into a theatre. To do this, the exploitation of air power is
primordial. Control of air space is the precursor to any operation; it guarantees to
the Government the ability to make decisions and to exert influence in the decision-
making of a coalition, and offers freedom of action. This is a French sphere of
96
Adapting
Military Capability
excel lence shared by only two other Western powers, the United States and the
United Kingdom. The capability is based on the sharing and mastery of informa-
tion in real time, on being able to set in motion complex command and control
structures, and on quick implementation of strategic reach.
It is the overall coherence of air power that allows government authorities
to benefit from a wide spectrum of crisis management options until the last
pos sible moment, so allowing them to retain an acceptable measure of autonomy
to express our national will. This coherence is the product of both complementa-
rity and the close interdependence of separate capabilities, which include planning,
command and control of operations, situation evaluation, varied modes of action
producing a wide range of military effects, logistic and other support of the forces
engagednotably air-to-air refuelling and electronic warfare, both home-based
and local. Among other constraints, this implies the need to maintain a consis-
tently high level of personal qualification and training standards, for French Air
Force equipment demands a high level of technical ability, and considerable auto-
nomy for its operators.
While major budgetary constraints legitimise a tendency to revise formats,
Frances credibility and its capability to influence events make it essential for the
country to maintain a certain level of capability, not only over the operational spec-
trum concerned and the force levels which can be committed, but in particular in
the domains which are most critical at the European level: AWACS, in-flight
refuelling and strategic transport.
What to adapt to achieve savings
While France must to retain its fundamental capability of autonomous
intervention in a state of interest, it can nevertheless draw upon a new approach to
its existing reach capabilities in order to extend them. Extended reach and upgra-
ded performance of equipment and infrastructure, together with the dynamic
management of a network of overseas bases (yet to be set up), will enable the coun-
try to respond to the increasingly distant areas of major crisis.
Further study is needed in order to adapt our modes of operation, parti-
cu larly those which involve the generation and maintenance of capabilities deman-
ding major effort, such as air combat capability. We need to adapt the systems we
use and the entire process of maintaining capabilities to new requirements. There
is more than one way of achieving this, and we might consider broadening the
scope of training using simulation, or shifting a proportion of the basic and conti-
nuation training currently being carried out in busy frontline units to less expen-
sive virtual reality platforms, in order to preserve the value and the quality of trai-
ning hours. This principle should allow us to preserve our high intensity initial
97
Adapting
Military Capability
entry capability, and also a long-term endurance capability based on a force trai ned
in a different way, and at lower cost.
We could also look at pooling certain capabilities with our principal
part ners. The first possibility is to exploit the synergy that already exists between
members of NATO, with the aim of having a common finance pool, which could
be to our advantage. One example already in existence is infrastructure financing
for some of our bases through the Air Basing project.
A second approach is to establish convergence in operating procedures, for
example the development of European structures based on existing cooperation in
the fields of strategic transport and in-flight refuelling. These new structures would
be flexible, evolutionary and have strong growth potential, and would allow us to
identify mutual interests and savings, and favour cooperative agreements.
Ultimately, they could lead to the sharing of tools and structures on the basis of a
common range of applications: these might include maintenance, training, flight
security or mission preparation. They would avoid sensitivities affecting national
sovereignty, since each state would retain operational control over its own
resources.
In this context of cost savings through adaptation of capability while at the
same time ensuring that impact on operational tasking is minimised, we could also
examine making increased use of our reserve forces. Reserve units could usefully
compensate for reductions made in capabilities which are particularly vulnerable
to peaks of activity: an example of this would be the mobilisation of C2 structures.
There are other possibilities available to us in the search for new sources of
finance outside the main budget. We could consider further sales of radio fre-
quencies, notably in the field of telemetry. Another idea might be to make the case
for European financing for those dual capabilities which support European securi-
ty; R&D expenditure in the civil and military aircraft industry, for instance, repre-
sents the major proportion of the European and French defence industrial and
technological base, researching 20 of the 27 areas of technology defined as critical.
Furthermore, the side effects and other benefits which these technologies bring to
the industrial sector are many, and go well beyond benefiting just the aerospace
industry. Moreover, since R&D is an area well suited to supporting the construc-
tion of European defence, this all bodes well for the future.
Finally, it would be fruitful to consider exploring new concepts (within rea-
sonable cost constraints) which would be distinct from those developed by our
American partners. The use of gliding bombs or cruise missiles associated with new
ISR capabilities (such as satellite navigation combined with Rafales Spectra electro-
magnetic sensors) is a promising approach to the suppression of enemy air defences.
Franco-American
Space Cooperation
Lieutenant (air), Researcher with the Future and security
studies team at the Air Force research centre (Crea);
Doctor in political science from the University of Paris II
Panthon-Assas.
Batrice Hainaut
I
t is hard to miss the signs: the French and the Americans have been quietly
getting closer together. Primarily, this involves collaboration in the area of
general foreign policy. As recently as 2003 Dominique de Villepin, Foreign
Minister at the time, delivered a hard-hitting speech on 14 February of that year
before the Assembly General of the United Nations, opposing armed intervention
alongside the Americans in Iraq. This diatribe contributed to tension in Franco-
American diplomatic relations. To make matters worse, it was based on Frances
possession of an independent decision-making capability, thanks to the optical
sensors of its Hlios satellites, whose images did not support the American claim
that weapons of mass destruction were present on Iraqi soil. But time passed and
the diplomats did their work. The election of a new French President in 2007
ushered in a new era in Franco-American relations. The two states worked toge-
ther on many issues brought to the United Nations and, in some cases, to the
Security Council. In time, the rift of 2003 was forgotten and confidence was gra-
dually restored. The apt expression used by Hubert Vdrine sums up the relations
between the two states: friends and allies but non-aligned.
Although the space dimension can be the source of profound diplomatic
disagreement (for example, involvement in a theatre of operations with the aim of
conducting a war), it can also prove to be a fruitful area of cooperation between
states. France and the United States are both space powers and share a certain mutual
confidence. These two elements constitute a fundamental base for cooperation.
Long-standing and fruitful inter-agency cooperation
Franco-American cooperation between their respective space agencies is a
long-standing reality: NASA and the French centre for space studies (Centre national
des tudes spatiales Cnes) have established solid partnerships in the various
domains. Two important examples are the Jason programme and cooperation on
orbiting space debris. Although this inter-agency cooperation may be seen as
98
99
Franco-American
Space Cooperation
exclusively civilian, the military applications are apparent in both cases. The
success of the Topex-Poseidon experimental programme in 1992 opened the way
to long-term cooperation in the field of radar altimetry. The aim is to capture pre-
cision data on ocean currents and their variations as well as measuring sea levels.
This CnesNASA cooperation continues today, especially in connection with the
planned launch in 2014 of a third satellite (Jason 3).
A second area of cooperation symptomatic of good inter-agency relations
is that concerning space debris. Although this is a long-standing problem, it is
taking on a more strategic dimension thanks to the growing interest which the
problem is creating within multilateral groupings. Initially, NASA scientists grew
concerned about the creation of debris resulting from anti-satellite trials by the
American Defense Department, in particular one in September 1985. The NASA
experts at the time tried to alert the international scientific community to this
question of debris via the national space agencies. The explosion of an Ariane stage
on 26 November 1986 also motivated NASA to make contact with the European
Space Agency and to set up working groups on space debris. The problem also
struck a chord with Cnes. Informal contacts were later institutionalized in 1993
with the creation of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee
(IADC), a technical organisation which brings together analyses on the topic.
A recent example of this fertile collaboration was the construction and
dispatch to Mars of the Curiosity rover, whose mission was to analyse the soil of the
planet. The fact that it was the fruit of collaboration between France and the United
States, and in particular between Cnes and NASA, is however relatively little-known.
From these examples it is clear that cooperation was made possible by the
pursuit of common scientific interests and the fact that scientists on either side of
the Atlantic were able to establish durable and mutually confident relationships by
virtue of their many exchanges.
Military cooperation through exchange of information and practices
This type of relationship is more difficult to establish on a military level
because the areas of cooperation tend to affect national sovereignty and are there-
fore generally the province of political decision-makers. France made the choice,
more than half a century ago, to become a space power. Owing to its connection
with the nuclear deterrent, space has since acquired a strategic dimension. Around
this original ambition France has gradually developed the full spectrum of space
capabilities (telecommunications, observation, navigation, monitoring and early
warning). The use of space has therefore become a key component of military acti-
vities and a force multiplier, especially in external operations. In July 2010 France
created a unified command centre, the joint space command (Commandement
100
Franco-American
Space Cooperation
interarmes de lEspace CIE), which constitutes the point of contact for any mili-
tarily-relevant space matter.
To be considered as a complete space power, France must fulfil four indis-
pensable criteria: have independent access to space, have an industry capable of
designing and building launchers and satellites, be capable of operating a ground
control system and, finally, be able to monitor space. The first three exist and the
ability to monitor space is in full development. The Defence Code includes the lat-
ter capability in wider air defence coming under the air defence and operations
command (Commandement de la dfense arienne et des oprations ariennes
CDAOA) and in particular its space surveillance division. The Air Force, under the
direction of the CIE, is responsible for the surveillance of extra-atmospheric space.
The responsibility attributed to the Air Force is expressly military and touches on
the intelligence area. The sensitivity of this sector makes the establishment of
cooperation more difficult but not impossible.
Intelligence is by far the most sensitive area. The Americans are Frances allies
in space matters and we are often dependent on American data. Although a channel
exists it is nonetheless very restricted. France does not belong to the intelligence-
sharing community known as five eyes. This community consists of a remarkable
forum for information sharing headed by the United States and including the United
Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. These states are clearly not renow-
ned for their space capabilities, but the existence of the community is based prima-
ri ly on the historical links which they share, and the alliance benefits from total confi-
dence between the members. The United States have thus recently (in 2010) signed
a cooperation agreement with Australia concerning space surveillance. This agree-
ment is all the more useful for the United States because it gives it coverage of the
southern hemisphere, a region which is otherwise out of their reach.
Although France does not belong to this intelligence community, which
nevertheless allows it to preserve a certain independence of view of a situation, one
development has promoted Franco-American relations in intelligence matters. This
is the acquisition by France of the space surveillance radar network (Grand
rseau adapt la veille spatiale Graves). It was delivered to the Air Force in
December 2005 and is capable of detecting any object larger than one square metre
overflying French territory at between 400 and 1000 km altitude. The acquisition
of this capability, originally conceived as a demonstrator, has given France eyes in
space. The radar has performed beyond expectations. According to American and
European estimates dating from 2012, more than 23,000 objects larger than 10 cm
are currently circling the Earth at an average speed of 25,000 kph. In watching
low-earth orbit, which is the most crowded orbit for satellites and debris, the
Graves system can catalogue some 3,000 objects.
An operational tool has therefore been transformed into a diplomatic one,
able to detect hitherto unknown satellites. With the acquisition of this technical
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Franco-American
Space Cooperation
capability, French credibility as a space power was reaffirmed. From the moment
that France possessed something with a trading value, it became a credible partner
with which it was worth cooperating, if only to find out what it was able to see.
This event sparked off Franco-American cooperation and, after two years of infor-
mal existence, the Franco-American space cooperation forum was formalized on
14 May 2009. Later, on 8 February 2011, a declaration of principles was signed by
Alain Jupp, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs and Robert Gates, the United
States Secretary for Defense, in order to improve Franco-American cooperation in
space surveillance.
Another sign of openness was the historic participation of France in the
Schriever Wargame in 2012. The 2012 version of this simulation, organised by the
US Air Force Space Command, was the first open to NATO member countries.
The object of this exercise is to plan and coordinate the space and cyber capabili-
ties of the member states in a specific scenario. Although NATO is only in the early
stages of its involvement in space matters, the development possibilities are impor-
tant. Participation in this simulation should not be considered mere window dres-
sing. It is an opportunity to rub shoulders with allies, to compare points of view
and procedures, and thus to enhance the coordination of space capabilities bet-
ween states. In addition, it is likely that the reintegration of France into the NATO
Integrated Military Command in 2009 will allow these developments to be opti-
mized. Finally, it is possible that the Franco-American space relationship could use
the privileged NATO structure to reach its full potential.
Changing American spatial diplomacy
This recent rapprochement also owes much to Barack Obamas arrival in
power in January 2009. Even though a turning point in the space dimension
occurred at the end of George W. Bushs term of office, it did not lead to a real
renewal of cooperation. On the other hand, the 2010 publication of the US
National Space Policy (NSP), marked a change, at least in tone. The previous
NSP (2006) had raised concerns as to the possible design and use of anti-satellite
weapons, and its tone reflected the unilateralist, if not militarist approach of the
Bush administration. The 2010 NSP contrasted sharply in its tone with the 2006
version, particularly in that it emphasized that the space systems of all nations
should be able to develop without interference from other states. In addition, it
clearly emphasized cooperation, including in the military sphere. The goal was to
avoid misunderstandings or miscalculations in space, which had become an increa-
singly sought after, congested and contested domain. The calls for cooperation
were of course not directed solely at France, but the fact remains that they consti-
tuted a window of opportunity to achieve closer collaboration. This opportunity
was seized by France and Europe, which decided to promote a Code of Conduct
in space. This project, aimed at avoiding any conflict in space by sponsoring
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Franco-American
Space Cooperation
contact between the increasingly numerous space countries, is an initiative
promoted under the French presidency of the European Union during the second
half of 2008. While the United States habitually opposes on principle any text
capable of limiting their freedom of action in space, this project was not rejected
out of hand. It was, of course, the subject of lively internal debate. Nonetheless,
the American presidential will inclined more towards declared support for the
development of the Code, and the status of the text of a code of conduct allows
the American President to adopt it without having to have it ratified by the Senate,
which is much more cautious on these questions. In the case of a treaty, the Senate
would have had to ratify it with a two thirds majority. The code of conduct for
space approach was therefore supported in the main by the American administra-
tion, subject to a few modifications.
This diplomatic and political approach incorporated an inter-agency rap-
prochement and military collaboration. International consultations on the Code
were initiated, which also aimed at promoting the Code internationally. Although
the project was supported by various United Nations agencies, it was discussed
outside all the multinational fora, especially UN ones, in order to avoid any of the
usual stumbling blocks such as those which routinely occur in disarmament nego-
tiations. A Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) has recently been set up: repre-
senting a dozen countries, it is charged with discussing the possibilities of regula-
ting inter-state relations in space. This group is quite active and can advance the
cause of the Code. Within the GGE, France, the United States and Great Britain
consult prior to the meetings in order to adopt a common position with the other
partners. Although this approach culminates at the level of foreign ministers and
departments of state, it is symptomatic of a certain renewal of transatlantic rela-
tions. It is also interesting to note that the air forces of these three states have crea-
ted a privileged partnership in the trilateral strategic studies group, whose objecti-
ve is to strengthen mutual comprehension and understanding to ensure greater
interoperability. Space is naturally involved because of its operational applications,
which directly involve the aerospace resources of these three forces.
The French and the Americans thus have more opportunities to meet and
exchange ideas. This has the effect of homogenizing ideas, preferences and beliefs
before the development and dissemination of rules and multilateral policies. But
the existence of a common objective (principally, not to turn space into a battle-
field) must not hide the fact that the two space powers have a different strategy for
the occupation of space. The United States has developed the doctrine of space
dominance which still guides their actions today. Nevertheless, there exists bet-
ween the two states great potential for future cooperation, especially in space sur-
veillance, a domain in which the French Air Force has sole responsibility for these
questions. It therefore plays a pre-eminent role, since beyond these exchanges of
data it also enables France to keep a sufficient degree of sovereignty to ensure auto-
nomy in situational appreciation and decision-making.
Pour livrer un combat, prvenir une guerre ou porter
secours. Vos quipements doivent rapidement tre
achemins sur de longues distances et vous les voulez
prcisment l o vous en avez besoin, mme si vous
ne disposez que d'une courte piste sommaire. L'A400M
devient alors votre meilleur alli. C'est aussi un avion
ravitailleur pour les hlicoptres, les avions de chasse
et les avions de transport. A400M ou comment changer
radicalement les rgles habituelles d'intervention.
C AN O N S AU T O MO T E U R S
V H I C U L E S B L I N D S L O U R D S
H L I C O P T R E S L O U R D S
E N G I N S L O U R D S D E C O N S T R U C T I O N
V H I C U L E S L G E R S
T R O U P E S
P AR AC H U T I S T E S
P AL E T T E S E T C O N T E N E U R S
VAC U AT I O N S AN I T AI R E
MAT R I E L M D I C AL
R AVI T AI L L E ME N T E N VO L airbusmilitary.com
D LI VR E R
LE NC ESSAI R E
L' E NDR O I T
PR C I S
O I L E ST
I N D I SPE NSAB LE
12:02
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