1. Ladera v. Hodges G.R. No. 8027-R, September 23, 1952, Vol. 48, No. 12, Official Gazette 5374Reyes,J.B.L.

, J. FACTS: Paz G. Ladera entered into a contract with C.N. Hodges. Hodges promised to sell a lot with an area of 278square meters to Ladera, subject to certain terms and conditions. The agreement called for a downpayment of P 800.00 and monthly installments of P 5.00 each with interest of 1% per month, until P2,085 is paid in full. Incase of failure of the purchaser to make any monthly payment within 60 days after it fell due, the contract may be considered as rescinded or annulled. Ladera built a house on the lot. Later on, she defaulted in the payment of the agreed monthly installment. Hodges filed an action for the ejectment of Ladera. The court issued an alias writ of execution and pursuant thereto, the city sheriff levied upon all rights, interests, and participation over the house of Ladera. At the auction sale, Laderas house was sold to Avelino A. Magno. Manuel P. Villa, later on, purchased the house from Magno. Ladera filed an action against Hodges and the judgment sale purchasers. Judgment was rendered in favor of Ladera, setting aside the sale for non-compliance with Rule 39, Rules of Court regarding judicial sales of real property. On appeal, Hodges contends that the house, being built on a lot owned by another, should be regarded as movable or personal property. ISSUE: Whether or not Laderas house is an immovable property. HELD: YES. The old Civil Code numerates among the things declared by it as immovable property the following: lands, buildings, roads and constructions of all kind adhered to the soil. The law does not make any distinction whether or not the owner of the lot is the one who built. Also, since the principles of accession regard buildings and constructions as mere accessories to the land on which it is built, it is logical that said accessories should partake the nature of the principal thing. 2. Mindanao Bus Company v. The City Assessor and Treasurer G.R. No. L-17870, September 29, 1962,6 SCRA 197Labrador, J. FACTS: Petitioner Mindanao Bus Company is a public utility solely engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks, over its authorized lines in the Island of Mindanao, collecting rates approved by the Public Service Commission. Respondent sought to assess the following real properties of the petitioner; (a) Hobart Electric Welder Machine, (b) Storm Boring Machine; (c) Lathe machine with motor;(d)Black and Decker Grinder; (e) PEMCO Hydraulic Press; (f) Battery charger (Tungar 1 charge machine)and (g) D-Engine Waukesha-M-Fuel. It was alleged that these machineries are sitting on cement or wooden platforms, and that petitioner is the owner of the land where it maintains and operates a garage for its TPU motor trucks, a repair shop, blacksmith and carpentry shops, and with these machineries,

which are placed therein. Respondent City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City assessed at P4,400 petitioner's above-mentioned equipment. Petitioner appealed the assessment to the respondent Board of Tax Appeals on the ground that the same are not realty. Respondents contend that said equipments, though movable, are immobilized by destination, in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article415 of the New Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether the equipment in question are immovable or movable properties. HELD: The equipment in question are movable. So that movable equipment to be immobilized in contemplation of the law, it must first be "essential and principal elements" of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be "unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose forw hich it was established." Thus, the Court distinguished those movable which become immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry from those which may not be so considered immobilized because they are merely incidental, not essential and principal. The tools and equipment in question in this instant case are, by their nature, not essential and principle municipal elements of petitioner's business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely incidentalsacquired as movables and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service. Even without such tools and equipment, its business may be carried on, as petitioner has carried on, without such equipment, before the war. The transportation business could be carried on without the repair or service shop if its rolling equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop belonging to another. 3. Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation v. Wearever Textile Mills, Inc. G.R. No. L58469, May 16,1983, 122 SCRA 29De Castro, J. FACTS: To obtain financial accommodations from the Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation, the Wearever Textile discounted and assigned several receivables with them under a receivable purchase agreement. To secure the collection of receivables assigned, Wearever Textile executed a chattel mortgage over certain raw materials inventory, as well as machinery described as an aero dryer stentering range. Upon default of Wearever Textile, the Makati Leasing petitioned for extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties mortgaged to it. When the sheriff failed to enter Wearever Textiles premises to seize the machinery, Makati Leasing applied for a replevin. Wearever Textile contended that it cannot be a subject of replevin or a chattel mortgage because it is a real property as it is attached to the ground by means of bolts and that the only way to remove it is to destroy the concrete floor. ISSUE: Whether or not the machinery is real or personal property. HELD: The machinery is a personal property. The Supreme Court explained that if a house of strong materials may be considered as personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage, there is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which

is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such. 4. Santos Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. G.R. No. L-11139, April 23, 1958, 103 Phil.401Concepcion, J. FACTS: On June 4, 1949, Santos Evangelista instituted a civil case for a sum of money. On the same date, he obtained a writ of attachment, which was levied upon a house, built by Rivera on a land situated in Manila and leased to him. In due course, judgment was rendered in favor of Evangelista, who bought the house at public auction held in compliance with the writ of execution issued in said case. When Evangelista sought to take possession of the house, Rivera refused to surrender it, upon the ground that he had leased the property from the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. and that the latter is now the true owner of said property. It appears that on May 10, 1952, a definite deed of sale of the same house had been issued to Alto Surety, as the highest bidder at an auction sale held. Hence, Evangelista instituted an action against Alto Surety and Ricardo Rivera, for the purpose of establishing his title over said house, and securing possession thereof, apart from recovering damages. After due trial, the CFI Manila rendered judgment for Evangelista, sentencing Rivera and Alto Surety to deliver the house in question to Evangelista and to pay him, jointly and severally, P40.00 a month from October, 1952, until said delivery, plus costs. ISSUE: Whether or not a house constructed by the lessee of the land on which it is built, should be dealt with, for purposes of attachment, as immovable property or as personal property. HELD: The house is not personal property, much less a debt, credit or other personal property not capable of manual delivery, but immovable property. As explicitly held, in Ladera vs. Hodges (48 OG 5374), "a true building (not merely superimposed on the soil) is immovable or real property, whether it is erected by the owner of the land or by a usufructuary or lessee. The opinion that the house of Rivera should have been attached in accordance with subsection (c) of said section 7, as "personal property capable of manual delivery, by taking and safely keeping in his custody", for it declared that "Evangelista could not have validly purchased Ricardo Rivera's house from the sheriff as the latter was not in possession thereof at the time he sold it at a public auction is untenable. 5. Tsai v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 120098, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 324Quisumbing, J. FACTS: On November 26, 1975, respondent Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX) obtained a three million peso(P3,000,000.00) loan from petitioner Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom). As security for the loan, EVERTEX executed in favor of PBCom, a deed of Real and Chattel Mortgage over the lot where its factory stands, and the chattels located therein. On April 23, 1979, PBCom granted a second loan to EVERTEX. The loan was secured by a chattel mortgage over personal properties

enumerated in a list attached thereto. After April 23, 1979, the date of the execution of the second mortgage mentioned above, EVERTEX purchased various machines and equipments. Upon EVERTEX's failure to meet its obligation to PBCom, the latter commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against EVERTEX. On December 15, 1982, the first public auction was held where petitioner PBCom emerged as the highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor on the same date. On March 7, 1984,PBCom consolidated its ownership over the lot and all the properties in it. In November 1986, it leased the entire factory premises to petitioner Ruby L. Tsai. On May 3, 1988,PBCom sold the factory, lock, stock, and barrel to Tsai, including the contested machineries. On March 16, 1989, EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and damages with the Regional Trial Court against PBCom. EVERTEX claimed that no rights having been transmitted to PBCom over the assets of insolvent EVERTEX, therefore Tsai acquired no rights over such assets sold to her, and should reconvey the assets. ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of the questioned properties in the foreclosed properties is proper. HELD: Yes. While it is true that the questioned properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties gives a contrary indication. In the case at bar, the true intention of PBCOM and the owner, EVERTEX, is to treat machinery and equipment as chattels. Assuming that the properties in question are immovable by nature, nothing detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel. It has been held that an immovable may be considered a personal property if there is a stipulation as when it is used as security in the payment of an obligation where a chattel mortgage is executed over it, as in the case atbar.4 6. Sergs Products, Inc. v. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. G.R. No. 137705, August 22 , 2000, 338 SCRA499Panganiban, J. FACTS: Respondent PCI Leasing and Finance Inc. filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for sum of money, with an application for a writ of replevin. A writ of replevin was issued, directing the sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after five days and upon payment of the necessary expenses. The sheriff proceeded to petitioner's factory and seized one machinery. Petitioner filed a motion for special protective order invoking the power of the court to control the conduct of its officers and amend and control its processes, praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin. The motion was opposed by PCI on the ground that the properties were personal and therefore still subject to seizure and writ of replevin. In their reply, petitioners asserted that the properties were immovable as defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code, the parties' agreement to the contrary notwithstanding. Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals via an original action for certiorari. The Court of Appeals ruled

that the subject machines were personal property as provided by the agreement of the parties. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject machines were personal, not real, property, which may be a proper subject of a writ of replevin. HELD: The contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein. In the present case, the lease agreement clearly provides that the machines in question are to be considered as personal properties. Clearly then, petitioners were estopped from denying the characterization of the subject machines as personal property. Under the circumstances, they are proper subject of the writ of seizure. Accordingly, the petition was denied and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. 7. Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP G.R. No. 64261, December 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 800Escolin, J. FACTS: On December 7, 1982, two search warrants where issued and the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6,Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers were searched. Office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "WeForum" newspaper, were seized. ISSUE: Whether or not real properties were seized under the disputed warrants. HELD: No. Under Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code, "machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, it was said that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. The machineries, while in fact bolted to the ground, remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

8. Lopez v. Orosa, Jr., and Plaza Theatre, Inc. G.R. No. L-10817-18, February 28, 1958, 103 Phil. 98Felix,J. FACTS: Lopez was engaged in business under the name Lopez-Castelo Sawmill. Orosa approached Lopez and invited the latter to make an investment in the theatre business he was forming, the Plaza Theatre. Lopez expressed his unwillingness to invest. Nonetheless, Lopez agreed to supply the lumber for the construction of the theatre. Lopez further agreed that that the payment therefore would be on demand and not cash on delivery basis. Lopex delivered the lumber which was used for the construction of the Plaza Theatre. However, of the total cost of materials amounting toP62, 255.85, Lopez was paid only P20, 848.50, thus leaving a balance of P 41, 771.35. Due to Lopez demands, Orosa issued a deed of assignment over his shares of stock of the Plaza Theatre, Inc. As there was still an unpaid balance, Lopez filed a case against Orosa and Plaza Theatre. He asked that Orosa and Plaza theatre be held liable solidarily for the unpaid balance, and in case defendants failed to pay, the land and building should be sold in public auction with the proceeds to be applied to the balance, or that the shares of stock be sold in public auction. ISSUE: Whether or not the lien for the value of the materials used in the construction of the building attaches to said structure alone and does not extend to the land on which the building is adhered to. HELD: No. While it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties could only mean one thingthat a building is by itself an immovable property. In view of the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, a building is an immovable property irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner. The lien so created attaches merely to the immovable property for the construction or repair of which the obligation was incurred. Therefore, the lien in favor of appellant for the unpaid value of the lumber used in the construction of the building attaches only to said structure and to no other property of the obligors. 9. Yap v. Taada G.R. No. L-32917, July 18, 1988, 163 SCRA 464Narvasa, J. FACTS: Goulds Pumps International (Phil.), Inc. filed a complaint against Yap and his wife seeking recovery of P1,459.30 representing the balance of the price and installation cost of a water pump in the latter's premises. Goulds presented evidence ex parte and judgment by default was rendered by Judge Taada requiring Yap to pay to Goulds the unpaid balance of the pump purchased by him and interest of 12%per annum. Thereafter, the water pump in question was levied by the sheriff and by notice dated November 4, 1969, scheduled the execution sale thereof. But in view of

the pendency of Yap's motion for reconsideration, suspension of the sale was directed. It appears however that a copy of the order suspending the sale was not transmitted to the sheriff Hence, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff went ahead with the scheduled auction sale and sold the property levied on to Goulds as the highest bidder. Yap argues that "the sale was made without the notice required by Sec. 18, Rule 39, of the New Rules of Court," i.e., notice by publication in case of execution sale of real property, the pump and its accessories being immovable because attached to the ground with character of permanency (Art. 415,Civil Code). ISSUE: Whether or not the water pump in question is an immovable property. HELD: No. Yap's argument is untenable. The Civil Code considers as immovable property, among others, anything "attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object." The pump does not fit this description. It could be, and was in fact separated from Yap's premises without being broken or suffering deterioration. Obviously, the separation or removal of the pump involved nothing more complicated than the loosening of bolts or dismantling of other fasteners. 10. Machinery and Engineering Supplies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-7057, October 29, 1954,96 Phil. 70Concepcion, J. FACTS: Petitioner Machinery and Engineering Supplies filed a complaint for replevin for the recovery of the machinery and equipment sold and delivered to Ipo Limestone Co. An order was issued to seize and take immediate possession of the properties specified in the order. Upon carrying out the courts order, Roco, the companys President, along with a crew of technical men and labourers, proceeded to the factory. The manager of Ipo Limestone Co. and Torres protested against the seizure of the properties on the ground that they are not personal properties. However, since the sheriff contended that his duty is purely ministerial, they all went to the factory and dismantled the equipment despite the fact that the equipment could not be dismantled without causing damage or injuries to the wooden frames attached to them. Consequently, they had to cut some of the supports of the equipment which rendered its use impracticable. ISSUE: Whether or not the machinery and equipment in question could be the subject of replevin. HELD: No. Replevin is applicable only to personal property. The machinery andequipment in question appeared to be attached to the land, particularly to the concrete foundation of said premises, in a fixed manner, in such a way that the former could not be separated from the latter without breaking the material or deterioration of the object. Hence, in order to remove the said outfit, it became necessary not only to unbolt the same, but also to cut some of its wooden supports. Moreover, said machinery and equipment were intended by the owner of the tenement for an

industry carried on said immovable. For these reasons, they were already immovable pursuant to paragraphs 3and 5 of Article 415 of the Civil Code LAUREL V. GARCIA 187 SCRA 797 FACTS: The subject Roppongi property is one of the properties acquired by the Philippines from Japan pursuant to a Reparations Agreement. The property is where the Philippine Embassy was once located, before it transferred to the Nampeidai property. It was decided that the properties would be available to sale or disposition. One of the first properties opened up for public auction was the Roppongi property, despite numerous oppositions from different sectors. HELD: The Roppongi property was acquired together with the other properties through reparation agreements. They were assigned to the government sector and that the Roppongi property was specifically designated under the agreement to house the Philippine embassy. It is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. The respondents have failed to do so. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and payment, in application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as the juridical person but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation. The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service doesnt automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such. Benjamin Rabuco, et. al. vs. Hon. Antonio Villegas G.R. No. L-24661. February 28, 1974. Teehankee, J. Doctrine: When a property is owned by a political subdivision in its public and governmental capacity, the Congress has absolute control as distinguished from

patrimonial property owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity of which it could not be deprived without due process and without just compensation. Facts: In the early morning of April 19, 1970, a large fire of undetermined origin gutted the Malate area including the lot on which petitioners had built their homes and dwellings. Respondents city officials then took over the lot and kept petitioners from reconstructing or repairing their burned dwellings. At petitioners instance, the Court issued on June 17, 1970 a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents city officials from performing any act constituting an interference in or disturbance of herein petitioners possession of Lot No. 21-B, Block No. 610, of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila as safeguarded them under the Courts subsisting preliminary injunction of August 17, 1965 pursuant to RA 3120. Issue: Whether RA 3120 is unconstitutional as it infringes the right to due process. Held: No. The Court herein upholds the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 on the strength of the established doctrine that the subdivision of communal land of the State (although titled in the name of the municipal corporation) and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots by sale on installment basis to bona fide occupants by Congressional authorization and disposition does not constitute infringements of the due process clause or the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution but operates simply as a manifestation of the legislatures right of control and power to deal with State property. Macasiano vs Diokno Posted on October 19, 2012 211 SCRA 464 G.R. No. 97764 August 10, 1992 Facts: Respondent Municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the closure of J.Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets and the establishment of a flea market thereon. This was passed pursuant to MMC Ordinance No.2 and was approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority on July 20, 1990. On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and Palanyag entered into a contract agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain & manage the flea markets and/or vending areas in the aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Paraaque.

On September 13, 1990 Brig. Gen. Macasiano ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz & Gabriel Street in Baclaran. He also wrote a letter to Palanyag ordering the destruction of the flea market. Hence, respondent filed a joint petition praying for preliminary injunction. The trial court upheld the assailed Ordinance and enjoined petitioner from enforcing his letter-order against Palanyag.

Issues: WON an ordinance/resolution issued by the municipal council of Paraaque authorizing the lease & use of public streets/thoroughfares as sites for the flea market is valid. Held: No. J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the local government devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority to control/regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress. Sec. 10, Chapter II of the LGC should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already established by law. The closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended/necessary for public use/service. Once withdrawn, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the LGU concerned and only then can said LGU use the property as an object of an ordinary contract. Roads and streets available to the public and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. The LGU has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons. Also, the disputed ordinance cannot be validly implemented because it cant be considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance with the conditions it imposed for the approval of said ordinance. The powers of an LGU are not absolute, but subject to the limitations laid down by the Constitution and laws such as the Civil Code. Every LGU has the sworn obligation

to enact measures that will enhance the public health, safety & convenience, maintain peace & order and promiote the general prosperity of the inhanbitants pf the local units. As in the Dacanay case, the general public have the right to demand the demolition of the illegally constructed stalls in public roads & streets. The officials of the respondent municipality have the corresponding duty arising from public office to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific public purpose. The ordinance is void and illegal for lack of basis in authority in laws applicable during its time. REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS 281 SCRA 639 FACTS: Morato has filed for patent over a parcel of land, of which was granted under the condition that he would not encumber it for a period of 5 years from issuance of patent. It was then found out that he mortgaged and leased the lots. The government sought for the revocation of the patent issued. The trial court and appellate court decided in favor of the respondents. HELD: Foreshore lands have been defined to be that part of the land which is between the high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. This is the strip of land that lies between the high and low watermarks and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. Foreshore lands may not anymore be the subject of issuance of free patents. Under property of public ownership or dominion are foreshore lands, as provided for in the Civil Code. It is to be noted that when the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore land and passed to the realm of public domain. PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE VS. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, digested Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011 GR# L-24440 March 28, 1968 (Constitutional Law Just Compensation, Patrimonial Property) FACTS: After the incorporation of the Municipality of Zamboanga as a chartered city, petitioner province contends that facilities belonging to the latter and located within the City of Zamboanga will be acquired and paid for by the said city.

However, respondent city avers that pursuant to RA No. 3039 providing for the transfer free of charge of all buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga to the said City. ISSUE: Whether or not facilities which the province shall abandon will be acquired by the city upon just compensation. HELD: Yes, If the property is owned by the municipality in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and can be transferred free of charge. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and can be expropriated upon payment of just compensation. Francisco I. Chavez vs. Public Estate Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation G.R. No. 133250. May 6, 2003 Carpio, J. Doctrine: In the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still public, not private lands. Facts: On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the ManilaCavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land. On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, and to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP). On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project. On April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the Freedom Islands located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City. On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands.

Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations. On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement. On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA. Several motions for reconsideration of the Supreme Courts July 9, 2002 decision which declared the amended JVA null and void ab initio were filed. The conclusions of said decision were summarized by the Court as follows: The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Issue: Whether or not the July 9, 2002 ruling of the Supreme Court should be reversed.

Held: No. Amari cannot claim good faith because even before Amari signed the Amended JVA on March 30, 1999, petitioner had already filed the instant case on April 27, 1998 questioning precisely the qualification of Amari to acquire the Freedom Islands. Even before the filing of this petition, two Senate Committees had already approved on September 16, 1997 Senate Committee Report No. 560 which concluded that the Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the public domain. Thus, Amari signed the Amended JVA knowing and assuming all the attendant risks, including the annulment of the Amended JVA. Amari has also not paid to PEA the full reimbursement cost incurred by PEA in reclaiming the Freedom Islands. Moreover, Amari does not claim to have even initiated the reclamation of the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas covered in the Amended JVA, or to have started to construct any permanent infrastructure on the Freedom Islands. In short, Amari does not claim to have introduced any physical improvement or development on the reclamation project that is the subject of the Amended JVA. PEA cannot claim that it is similarly situated as the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) which under R.A. No. 7227 is tasked to sell portions of the Metro Manila military camps and other military reservations is incorrect. PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of other alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public domain. Only when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private lands. In the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still public, not private lands. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn around and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Francisco I. Chavez vs. National Housing Authority G.R. No 164527. August 15, 2007. Velasco, Jr., J. Doctrine: There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession.

Facts: Petitioner Francisco Chavez in his capacity as taxpayer seeks to declare null and void the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) between the NHA and R-II Builders Inc (RBI) for being unconstitutional and invalid, and to enjoin respondents particularly respondent NHA from implementing and/or enforcing the said project and other agreements related thereto. On March 1, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 161 (MO 161) approving and directing the implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. Specifically, respondent NHA was ordered to conduct feasibility studies and develop low-cost housing projects at the dumpsite and absorb scavengers in NHA resettlement/low-cost housing projects. Pursuant to MO 161-A, NHA prepared the feasibility studies which resulted in the formulation of the Smokey Mountain Development Plan and Reclamation of the Area Across R-10 or the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP). SMDRP aimed to convert the Smokey Mountain dumpsite into a habitable housing project, inclusive of the reclamation of the area across R-10, adjacent to the Smokey Mountain as the enabling component of the project. Once finalized, the Plan was submitted to President Aquino for her approval. On January 17, 1992, President Aquino proclaimed MO 415, approving and directing the implementation of the SMDRP through a private sector joint venture. Said MO stipulated that the land area covered by the Smokey Mountain dumpsite is conveyed to the NHA as well as the area to be reclaimed across R-10. In the same MO 415, President Aquino created an Executive Committee (EXECOM) to oversee the implementation of the Plan and an inter-agency technical committee (TECHCOM) was created composed of the technical representatives of the EXECOM. Based on the evaluation of the pre-qualification documents, the EXECOM declared the New San Jose Builders, Inc. and RBI as top two contractors. Thereafter, TECHCOM submitted its recommendation to the EXECOM to approve the RBI proposal which garnered the highest score. On October 7, 1992, President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a JVA with RBI. Afterwards, President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 465 increasing the proposed area for reclamation across R-10 from 40 hectares to 79 hectares. On September 1, 1994, pursuant to Proclamation No. 39, the DENR issued Special Patent No. 3591 conveying in favor of NHA an area of 211,975 square meters covering the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite. The land reclamation was completed in August 1996. Sometime later in 1996, pursuant likewise to Proclamation No. 39, the DENR issued Special Patent No. 3598 conveying in favor of NHA an additional 390,000 square meter area. After some time, the JVA was terminated. RBI demanded the payment of just compensation for all accomplishments and costs incurred in developing the SMDRP plus a reasonable rate of return. In a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed by NHA and RBI, both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and other subsequent agreements, which stipulated, among others, that unpaid balance may be paid in cash, bonds or through the conveyance of properties or any combination thereof.

Issues: 1. Whether RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged land areas because they are allegedly inalienable lands of the public domain 2. Whether RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no declaration that said lands are no longer needed for public use. 3. Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred from the Constitution to acquire lands of the public domain. Held: 1. Yes. The reclaimed lands across R-10 were classified alienable and disposable lands of public domain of the State. First, there were three presidential proclamations classifying the reclaimed lands across R-10 as alienable or disposable hence open to disposition or concession. These were MO 415 issued by President Aquino, Proclamation No. 39 and Proclamation No. 465 both issued by President Ramos. Secondly, Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598 issued by the DENR classified the reclaimed areas as alienable and disposable. Admittedly, it cannot be said that MO 415, Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are explicit declarations that the lands to be reclaimed are classified as alienable and disposable. We find however that such conclusion is derived and implicit from the authority given to the NHA to transfer the reclaimed lands to qualified beneficiaries. In line with the ruling in Chavez v. PEA, the court held that MO 415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 cumulatively and jointly taken together with Special Patent Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598 more than satisfy the requirement in PEA that [t]here must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession. 2. Yes. Even if it is conceded that there was no explicit declaration that the lands are no longer needed for public use or public service, there was however an implicit executive declaration that the reclaimed areas R-10 are not necessary anymore for public use or public service. President Aquino through MO 415 conveyed the same to the NHA partly for housing project and related commercial/industrial development intended for disposition to and enjoyment of certain beneficiaries and not the public in general and partly as enabling component to finance the project. Also, President Ramos, in issuing Proclamation No. 39, declared, though indirectly, that the reclaimed lands of the Smokey Mountain project are no longer required for public use or service. In addition, President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 465 increasing the area to be reclaimed from forty (40) hectares to seventy-nine (79) hectares, elucidating that said lands are undoubtedly set aside for the beneficiaries of SMDRP and not the public. MO 415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are declarations that proclaimed the non-use of the reclaimed areas for public use or service as the SMDRP cannot be successfully implemented without the withdrawal of said lands from public use or service.

3. Yes. When Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 were issued, inalienable lands covered by said proclamations were converted to alienable and disposable lands of public domain. When the titles to the reclaimed lands were transferred to the NHA, said alienable and disposable lands of public domain were automatically classified as lands of the private domain or patrimonial properties of the State because the NHA is an agency NOT tasked to dispose of alienable or disposable lands of public domain. The only way it can transfer the reclaimed land in conjunction with its projects and to attain its goals is when it is automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State. Being patrimonial or private properties of the State, then it has the power to sell the same to any qualified personunder the Constitution, Filipino citizens as private corporations, 60% of which is owned by Filipino citizens like RBI.

G.R. No. 136438. November 11, 2004 TEOFILO C. VILLARICO, petitioner, vs. VIVENCIO SARMIENTO, SPOUSES BESSIE SARMIENTO-DEL MUNDO & BETH DEL MUNDO, ANDOK'S LITSON CORPORATION and MARITES' CARINDERIA, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner's lot is separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue (highway) by a strip of land belonging to the government. As this highway was elevated by four (4) meters and therefore higher than the adjoining areas, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) constructed stairways at several portions of this strip of public land to enable the people to have access to the highway. Sometime in 1991, Vivencio Sarmiento, his daughter Bessie Sarmiento and her husband Beth Del Mundo, respondents herein, had a building constructed on a portion of said government land. In November that same year, a part thereof was occupied by Andok's Litson Corporation and Marites' Carinderia, also impleaded as respondents. In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, petitioner acquired a 74.30 square meter portion of the same area owned by the government. The property was registered in his name as T.C.T. No. 74430 in the Registry of Deeds

of Paraaque City. In 1995, petitioner filed with the RTC, Branch 259, Paraaque City, a complaint for accion publiciana against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 95044. He alleged inter alia that respondents' structures on the government land closed his "right of way" to the Ninoy Aquino Avenue; and encroached on a portion of his lot covered by T.C.T. No. 74430. Respondents, in their answer, specifically denied petitioner's allegations, claiming that they have been issued licenses and permits by Paraaque City to construct their buildings on the area; and that petitioner has no right over the subject property as it belongs to the government. ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff-appellant has acquired a right of way. HELD: Considering that the lot on which the stairways were constructed is a property of public dominion, it cannot be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in favor of herein petitioner. In fact, its use by the public is by mere tolerance of the government through the DPWH. Petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself. Verily, he cannot claim any right of possession over it. This is clear from Article 530 of the Civil Code which provides: "ART. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of possession." However, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that defendants' buildings were constructed on the portion of the same lot now covered by T.C.T. No. 74430 in petitioner's name. Being its owner, he is entitled to its possession. Neither petitioner nor respondents have a right of possession over the disputed lot where the stairways were built as it is a property of public dominion.
REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS GR Nos. 103882, 105276 November 25, 1998 FACTS:

On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project. Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a foreshore land. Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce of man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term foreshore land than that in the definition provided by the dictionary. RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was affirmed by the CA with modifications. ISSUE: I. Whether or not the term foreshore land includes the submerged area. II. Whether or not foreshore land and the reclaimed area is within the commerce of man. HELD: The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the respondent court that the term foreshore land includes the submerged areas. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to: The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm. (Webster's Third New International Dictionary) The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term foreshore lands. It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void.

Francisco I. Chavez vs. National Housing Authority G.R. No 164527. August 15, 2007. Velasco, Jr., J. Doctrine: There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession. Facts: Petitioner Francisco Chavez in his capacity as taxpayer seeks to declare null and void the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) between the NHA and R-II Builders Inc (RBI) for being unconstitutional and invalid, and to enjoin respondents particularly respondent NHA from implementing and/or enforcing the said project and other agreements related thereto. On March 1, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 161 (MO 161) approving and directing the implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. Specifically, respondent NHA was ordered to conduct feasibility studies and develop low-cost housing projects at the dumpsite and absorb scavengers in NHA resettlement/low-cost housing projects. Pursuant to MO 161-A, NHA prepared the feasibility studies which resulted in the formulation of the Smokey Mountain Development Plan and Reclamation of the Area Across R-10 or the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP). SMDRP aimed to convert the Smokey Mountain dumpsite into a habitable housing project, inclusive of the reclamation of the area across R-10, adjacent to the Smokey Mountain as the enabling component of the project. Once finalized, the Plan was submitted to President Aquino for her approval. On January 17, 1992, President Aquino proclaimed MO 415, approving and directing the implementation of the SMDRP through a private sector joint venture. Said MO stipulated that the land area covered by the Smokey Mountain dumpsite is conveyed to the NHA as well as the area to be reclaimed across R-10. In the same MO 415, President Aquino created an Executive Committee (EXECOM) to oversee the implementation of the Plan and an inter-agency technical committee (TECHCOM) was created composed of the technical representatives of the EXECOM. Based on the evaluation of the pre-qualification documents, the EXECOM declared the New San Jose Builders, Inc. and RBI as top two contractors. Thereafter, TECHCOM submitted its recommendation to the EXECOM to approve the RBI proposal which garnered the highest score. On October 7, 1992, President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a JVA with RBI. Afterwards, President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 465 increasing the proposed area for reclamation across R-10 from 40 hectares to 79 hectares. On September 1, 1994, pursuant to Proclamation No. 39, the DENR issued Special Patent No. 3591 conveying in favor of NHA an area of 211,975 square meters covering the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite. The land reclamation was completed in August 1996.

Sometime later in 1996, pursuant likewise to Proclamation No. 39, the DENR issued Special Patent No. 3598 conveying in favor of NHA an additional 390,000 square meter area. After some time, the JVA was terminated. RBI demanded the payment of just compensation for all accomplishments and costs incurred in developing the SMDRP plus a reasonable rate of return. In a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed by NHA and RBI, both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and other subsequent agreements, which stipulated, among others, that unpaid balance may be paid in cash, bonds or through the conveyance of properties or any combination thereof. Issues: 1. Whether RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged land areas because they are allegedly inalienable lands of the public domain 2. Whether RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no declaration that said lands are no longer needed for public use. 3. Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred from the Constitution to acquire lands of the public domain. Held: 1. Yes. The reclaimed lands across R-10 were classified alienable and disposable lands of public domain of the State. First, there were three presidential proclamations classifying the reclaimed lands across R-10 as alienable or disposable hence open to disposition or concession. These were MO 415 issued by President Aquino, Proclamation No. 39 and Proclamation No. 465 both issued by President Ramos. Secondly, Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598 issued by the DENR classified the reclaimed areas as alienable and disposable. Admittedly, it cannot be said that MO 415, Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are explicit declarations that the lands to be reclaimed are classified as alienable and disposable. We find however that such conclusion is derived and implicit from the authority given to the NHA to transfer the reclaimed lands to qualified beneficiaries. In line with the ruling in Chavez v. PEA, the court held that MO 415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 cumulatively and jointly taken together with Special Patent Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598 more than satisfy the requirement in PEA that [t]here must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession. 2. Yes. Even if it is conceded that there was no explicit declaration that the lands are no longer needed for public use or public service, there was however an implicit executive declaration that the reclaimed areas R-10 are not necessary anymore for public use or public service. President Aquino through MO 415 conveyed the same to the NHA partly for housing project and related commercial/industrial development intended for disposition to and enjoyment of certain beneficiaries and not the public in general and partly as enabling component to finance the project. Also, President Ramos, in issuing Proclamation No. 39, declared, though indirectly, that the reclaimed lands of the Smokey Mountain project are no longer required for

public use or service. In addition, President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 465 increasing the area to be reclaimed from forty (40) hectares to seventy-nine (79) hectares, elucidating that said lands are undoubtedly set aside for the beneficiaries of SMDRP and not the public. MO 415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are declarations that proclaimed the non-use of the reclaimed areas for public use or service as the SMDRP cannot be successfully implemented without the withdrawal of said lands from public use or service. 3. Yes. When Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 were issued, inalienable lands covered by said proclamations were converted to alienable and disposable lands of public domain. When the titles to the reclaimed lands were transferred to the NHA, said alienable and disposable lands of public domain were automatically classified as lands of the private domain or patrimonial properties of the State because the NHA is an agency NOT tasked to dispose of alienable or disposable lands of public domain. The only way it can transfer the reclaimed land in conjunction with its projects and to attain its goals is when it is automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State. Being patrimonial or private properties of the State, then it has the power to sell the same to any qualified personunder the Constitution, Filipino citizens as private corporations, 60% of which is owned by Filipino citizens like RBI.