Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS)

The Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) and Its Third Underground Period, 1973-1980 Author(s): Carmelo Furci Source: Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Oct., 1982), pp. 81-95 Published by: Wiley on behalf of Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS) Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3338391 . Accessed: 10/05/2013 19:10
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The Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) and its third underground period, 1973-1980
CARMELO FURCI London School of Economics INTRODUCTION This paper examines the third undergroundperiod of the ChileanCommunist Party, 1973-80; the Party's analysis of the Allende years, the post-1973 Party structure both in Chile and in exile, and its present political strategy for a returnto democracyin Chile. The Chilean Communist Party was founded in 1912 by Luis Emilio Recabarren.1After an early period of relatively insignificantpolitical influence it was banned and forced to go undergroundin the late 1920s, re-emerging legally in 1931.2 After the sectarianismof the CommunistInternational'third period'-which the PCCh,like all Communistforces at the time, obeyed blindly -the PCCh was reduced to a small sect. It then gained considerablesupport with the formation of the Popular Front in 1938.3 But in 1948, during the climax of the Cold War, the Radical governmentof Gonzalez Videla launched the Ley Permanenteen Defensa de la Democracia, and the PCChwas forced to go undergroundfor the second time.4 Once more it re-emerged legally in 1958, and acted openly until 1973. Thus, the coup d'etat of September 1973 was the beginning of the third undergroundperiod for the PCCh. In both earlierinstances the official policy of the PCChat the beginningwas to 'retreatin orderto save the cadresand the organization'. In terms of repression suffered, the 1973-80 period has been (and continues to be) the most difficult one because its clandestine nature is absolute and the repression is always there. Converselyduring the period 1948-58 there had been periods of acute persecution (1948-50, 1955), but also periods when the PCChwas only semi-clandestine, and it was able to take part in two political alliances (1952-Frente del Pueblo; 1956-Frente de Accion Popular). When the PCChwas undergroundin 1949 there was a dispute between the Luis Reinoso group5 and the rest of the leadership regarding political strategy. During the period 1973-80 there was never a major split or strongdebate. The crucial differenceduringthe third underground period lies in the tremendous number of Communistsand other left-wing militants and leadersin exile. This is a new experience, not only for the PCChbut for all the Left. For the first time in its history the PCChis 'divided'into two majorgroups:the underground one in Chile and the legal one in exile. In some Communist parties during the Nazi-Fascist period (where there was a similardivision between the party undergroundand in exile) there were debates, organizationalproblems

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and different interpretationsof the political line, aggravated by the lack of communication and differencesin experienceand politicalambitions. AND UNDERGROUND COMMUNIST PARTIES PERIODS In comparisonwith other Communistparties that have suffered underground periods the PCCh is in some respect unusual, as the cases of Spain, Brazil, Italy and Portugalindicate. After the Communistpartieswere declaredillegal in Spain and Italy, a seriesof damaging splits followed. In the case of the Italian CommunistParty(PCI) these relatedto the disputebetweenStalinandTrotsky as well as (later on) to the Russian-German non-aggression pact.6The Spanish CommunistParty (PCE) suffered a split (almost a vertical division) between the party undergroundin Spain and the party in exile that lasted for years; because of this split, plus the repressionthat the PCE suffered while underground,it becamea 'partyin exile'. Only by the late 1960s was the underground The PortugueseCommunistParty (PCP) was a very apparatusre-established.7 small organizationwithout a consistent influence in society, but it managed to survive.Although it also had a split and severaldisputes over its political strategy, it was one of the few Communistparties that by 1965 still openly considered the possibility of following a strategy of armed struggle.8The Brazilian CommunistParty is the only one considered here that attempted an armeduprisingand failed.9In its early years it oscillatedbetween an armed strategy and a peaceful one and has been dominatedby the role of its leader, CarlosPrestes. But again, although the PCB has also sufferedsplits and strong debates,it has managedto survive. Analysingthese cases we can tracea commonpattern:(a) while underground the Communistparties tend to be dominatedby splits, and strongdebateson their political strategies;(b) they tend to be divided into two major groups, undergroundand exile; (c) the armed strategy tends (in the long run) to be the predominant strategy. The PCCh follows the last two characteristics of the pattern but after the did not it the While in coup split. previousunderground periods (1927-31; 1948-58) there were splits, in this period of illegality(from 1973 up to now) there areno signsof division. It is interestingto note how, in spite of operatingin different countries,all illegal Communistparties work within more or less the same type of organizational structure.For example, in the above-mentionedcases, the organization is divided into two centres: undergroundand exile. It maintainsat the same time the cell system, which has always been its basic feature.Once the party is declaredillegal, the organization tends to be reducedin size and function in such a way as to surviveratherthan provokefrontal attacks and consequently be destroyed. This has been the case with the Italian and PortugueseCommunistsin particular. Thus the cell system and the reducedsize of the organization, plus the priority given to the protection of the small underground as a body in itself, are the basic featuresof clandestineCommunists. apparatus These aspectsof organi7.ation shouldbe taken into accountif we want to understand how they have always managedto survive.It could be suggestedthat a more rigid, vertical and smallerorganizationsurvivesthe severecircumstances of being underground better than other kinds of party structure.But there are

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THECHILEAN COMMUNIST PARTY(PCCh)

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problems when the same principles of organization and party discipline are maintained in normal circumstances, as has been the case with the Chilean CommunistParty. THEMILITARY JUNTAAND THEPOLITICAL PARTIES A major aspect of the 1973 coup d'etat was the speed with which the military severely repressedthe leftist parties by means of detention, the disappearance of numerous militants and frequent summaryexecutions.?1One of the reasons for the success of the coup lay in the military'sability to destroy any possible resistance by 'cutting off the head' of the political parties of Popular Unity. According to Robert J. Alexander three stages can be seen in the action of the junta against the political parties.1l On 22 September 1973, the military outlawed the Marxist parties. All the parties forming part of Popular Unity were banned, even non-Marxistones, like the Radical Party and the Christian Left, and also the MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria). On 27 September 1973 Pinochet declared that all remainingparties had to be considered 'in recess'. This was a curious measure.In fact, although the junta did not outlaw the centre and right-wing parties with this step, these were not allowed to hold any kind of public activity. In practice they were bannedfrom politics as long as they acted as organizedparties but not repressedin the way that PopularUnity was. In March 1977, the military decreed the dissolutionof the parties 'in recess'. Since then, no political party has been able to participate in Chileanpolitics. Only the right-wingfraction of the CDP has played a public role, not by appearing as a party but through its leader, Eduardo Frei. For example, on the occasion of the Referendumon the new Constitution elaborated by the military (4 April 1980), Frei challengedAugusto Pinochet to a public debate 'Americanstyle'. Of course this debate did not take place.12 The position of the CDP, in relation to its position in September 1973when the majority of its leadershipsupportedthe coup-has changed.They are against the junta and support the idea of a civil-militarygovernmentof transition leading to a return to parliamentarydemocracy.13 There are no signs of activity from the National Party and Patriay Libertad in terms of organization and political activity except in terms of declarationsin favour or against the
junta.14

The small parties of Popular Unity and the MIR continue to exist, particularly in exile where most of their leaderslive. In Chile it is not inappropriate to assert that although still existing they were crushedby the militarybetween 1973 and 1976. Because of their lack of experience of illegal political activity they have been preventedfrom organizingan effective undergroundapparatus. It seems that during the last four years there have been signs of persistent activity from these small parties, particularlythe Radicalsand MAPU,but it is evident that their role is a minor one.ls The other small organizationof the Left, USOPO (Union Socialista Popular) led by Raul Ampuero, joined the SocialistParty in 1979.16 The MIR, with some experience of illegal activity (under Frei'sgovernment) has an undergroundapparatus,armed and trained for urban guerrillaactions, but this extreme left-wing group has been severelydamaged,particularly during the period 1973-74. In the first two years the MIR sufferedtwo majorsetbacks.

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In 1974, its GeneralSecretary,MiguelEnriquez,was killed in an armedconflict In 1975, four membersof the CentralCommittee with the police in Santiago.17 of the MIR, appearingat a news conference,urged their comrades'to give up the struggle'againstthe military.'8The militaryjunta has alwaysrepressedthe MIR because of its armed apparatus.Even before the coup security police officers had infiltrated into its ranks;their role was decisiveand the MIR was heavilyaffectedby their action.19 The Socialist Party (PSCh) presents a more complex situation.Priorto the After coup this party was a federation of groupsand ideologicaltendencies.20 the coup, with the party already dividedand with a lax internalorganization, it suffered tremendous repressionand entire local secretariatswere killed.2' The party was left without a link between the militantswho survived.Only by in its rankswithin early 1976 were there signs of some kind of reorganization Chile. Subsequently, through a series of disputes, splits and a lack of communication between the party in Chile and the leadershipin exile, in April 1979 the PSCh experiencedthe most serious crisis of its history. Whatis left now of the old Socialist Party is a majoritygroup led by ClodomiroAlmeyda and at least seven small organizations.22 to assert that It is not inappropriate the PSChhas now disintegrated. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THEPCCh,1973-80 The position of the PCCh is much better than that of the PSCh. While the Socialistsdid not unite after the coup d'etat, the PCChlooks more united than ever, or so its leaders and militants claim. Although there has been a debate within the party about its rigid structure,23 the PCChretainsa high degreeof organization.This is mainly because in the first days of the coup the PCCh gave a political directive to its militants to retreat and save the organization, 'becauseit was not right to throw all forcesinto an unequalmilitaryconfrontation'.24 Looking back, the PCCh and PopularUnity had no chance at all of defeating the military. A different political directive(fighting the military,as the MIR suggested)would have meant political suicide. If we want to understand why the PCChsurvivedthe repressionwe have to take this directiveinto account.25 Even so the PCChhas sufferedheavily;for example, six membersof its CentralCommittee were killed by the militaryand eleven were arrestedin Another six who died of naturalcauses 1976 and are now desaparecidos.26 mainly because of their age did not survivethe illegal status or the problematic situation of exile.27Only two-thirdsof the CentralCommitteeof 1973 are alive. It is very difficult to establishhow many Communistmilitantsdied duringthe coup d'etat, or are in jail. The PCCh assertsthat 'thousandsof militantshave been killed, put in jail or are in exile'. Certainlythe junta severelyrepressed the but it did to it. This that new not means a PCCh, manage destroy generationof of the PCChin Chile,particularly young cadresis directingthe illegal apparatus or sent into exile. becausemost of its well-knownleaderswere arrested In terms of organizational structurein the underground conditionswe can two from and from to 1976 1977 1973 distinguish periods: up to now. The first is the period in which the party tried to adapt its structuresto the new circumstancesof illegality, and to organize and prepareitself for a long-term battle. It seems that even before the coup d'etat the PCChhad a clandestine

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THECHILEAN PARTY(PCCh) COMMUNIST TABLE 1 structuresof the PCCh,in Chileand in exile Organizational
GeneralSecretary I Political Commission In exile

85

in Chile Underground

I Political Commission

I
ComComit directivo Comite central | '

I
Comit directivo Comiti central

I
Regional

1
Regional

Comite
loclocal Cell

Comite
local Cell

Source: PCCh, Estatutos del Partido Comunista de Chile (Texto aprovado en el XIV Congreso Nacional en Noviembre 1969, con la modificaciones aprobadas por unanimidad en la session plenaria del Comite Central en Agosto 1977 y Abril 1979), in Boletin del exterior, no. 42 (Julio-Agosto 1980), pp. 80-102. In the condition of exile the Regionals are constituted by the cells of each city in the countries where the PCCh is organized (Cfr. Ibid., p. 102). 2 Because of the difficulties of organizing a General Congress of the Party, the Central Committee will make important decisions of political strategy and organizational problems. The Political Commission, Comite Directivo and Central Committee act as in normal circumstances, with the exception that the members of these structures are in Chile (underground) and in exile.

Direcci6n in case it was outlawed.28The PCCh adopted the same policy as in 1948, since once again the conditions were not favourablefor a frontal attack against the military. Principally, after the coup the PCCh maintained a rigid structure based on the cell system. Cells are vertically organized,so that militants are isolated from each other and contact is maintainedby the leader of each cell. The main source of communication between militants is the newspaper El Siglo, which was the PCCh daily before the coup. The theoretical review of the party, Principios, also circulated. Another journal of the underground apparatusof the PCCh is Frente Antifascista. Naturally,because these publications are illegal, their circulationis limited. Moreover,in order to avoid treason the party isolates a militant from the organizationfor a period, once he has been in jail, to make surehe is not followed by the secret police. The major crisis in the undergroundapparatuswas in 1976, when almost the entire clandestine Direccion of the party was captured, apparently because a militant talked under torture. Apart from the arrestof the GeneralSecretary, Luis Corvalan,in October 1973, this was the most serioussetback for the PCCh. The party existed for a short period with only those few members of the Direcci6n who survivedthe arrest.But when Victor Diaz was arrestedin 1976

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the majortask of the (he was in chargeof the party'sunderground apparatus) had almost been illegal apparatus,trying to organizean effective organization, accomplished.By then the party had alreadyreacheda good level of organization and the arrest of the head of the underground provedthat the apparatus the of the could reach Direccion PCCh only by treacheryfrom its own military members.Moreover,the arrestsdid not allow the militaryto touch the rest of The names of the the apparatusbecause of its rigid and vertical organization. new leadersof the PCChin Chile(after 1976) arekept secretfor securityreasons. Thepartyin exile is organized into cells andverticallydividedinto Regionales. There operates a sector of the Central Committee and a Comite Directivo, plus all the features of organizationthat the PCChhad before the coup. The in Chile and exile are maintainedby memcontacts between the underground bers of the Comisi6nPolitica, Comite Directivo and a section of the Central Committee(see Table 1). The GeneralSecretary,Luis Corvalain, has lived since in the Soviet Union, where the centreof the PCChin exile is estabhis release29 lished. The activity of the section of the party in exile has two basic tasks: apparatus. organizingthe solidarity campaignand financingthe underground of organizing the sessionsof the CentralCommittee It also has the responsibility the security of its memberswhen they travelto take part in and guaranteeing with the rest of the leadershipin exile. It seems that the socialist meetings countries (particularlyCuba and the Soviet Union) play an importantrole in this last procedure.In generalterms, the activity of the PCChin exile depends every day from heavily on the socialist countries.There are radio programmes and the of officials live in Eastern and its leaders Moscow, party's majority The a and regular and the maintains house USSR. publishing party Europe periodicals,such as Boletin del Exterior-the official publicationof the PCCh in exile-and Araucaria, whichhas a culturalratherthan politicalapproach. In terms of political activity the PCChin Chile, like the other partiesof the Left, has not led any major political event. Its activity is mainly underground and only occasionallyappearsopenly. Its actions are mainly concentratedin The PCChhas a considerable the unionsand other semi-legal structures. presence in the Coordinadora Nacional Sindical (CNS) which represents the united structure of various local and regional unions.30Although the PCCh never appearsas such (otherwise it would be repressed)there are sectors where the PCChis visible, particularlywithin the mining,textile and buildingindustries. Accordingto membersof various parties of the ChileanLeft, the PCChis the strongest political influence in the unions.31Another sector where the PCCh is presentis the Uni6nNacionalde Estudiantes Democraticos(UNED), although here it seemsto play a less importantrole. Because of clandestinityit is impossible to know the size and effectiveness of the PCCh influence in the antijunta movement, but there are indications from which its 'political presence'can be traced. For example, for five or six years there have been celebrationson May Day, in which PCChbannershave been shown. On various occasions the PCChhas organizedsmall meetings in strategic places (bus stops, parks) where they have launched slogans and in the massive recordedspeeches against the military.32 They also participated demonstrationat the CaupolicanTheatre where the formerleader of the CDP and former Presidentof Chile (1964-70) EduardoFrei made a historic speech

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on 27 August 1980, calling upon the Chileanpeople to vote NO in the Referendum on the new Constitution.33 Opposition cannot be expressedopenly, nor be 'evident' since repressionis always there. But the undergroundactivity of the PCChis persistent;the PCCh'spublicationscirculate,even if amonga restricted circle; acts of sabotagehave been performed.Yet, if they are to move from this first stage of political 'presence'to a more aggressive form of political activity, the PCCh-and the Left in general-will have to accomplish a long and difficult task. THEPCChANALYSISOF THEPOPULAR UNITYEXPERIENCE The coup d'itat of 1973 representedthe defeat of a political strategy that was basically implemented by the CommunistParty. The coup ended twenty-one years in which the PCChworked and struggledfor the realizationof its political aims based on three main tasks: firstly, the formation of a broad allianceof all progressiveforces under the hegemonic role of the CommunistParty and the Socialist Party; secondly, the implementation of a programmeof 'transition' to socialism; and thirdly, the carrying out of this process by the 'peaceful road'. By 1970, the PCCh had achieved the first two tasks. However, in the space of three years the organized labour movement and the political system of Chile collapsed under the interventionof the Armed Forces. 'Ourdefeat has been the expression of the isolation of the working class. This led to victory for the counter-revolution in the strugglefor power. This meansthat more than a military defeat, it was a political one.'34This was one of the first official statements of the PCCh analysing what happened during the Allende years. From the official documents and articleswritten by leadersof the PCChwe can discusstheir analysisunderthree headings. THE ROLEOF U.S. INTERVENTION IN CHILE Accordingto the PCChthere is evidence of U.S. interventionduringthe Allende years, in order to destabilize the Popular Unity government.In short, there was U.S. intervention in Chile but this was certainly not the most important reason for the defeat of Allende. The interventionof the U.S. was not a direct one, nor a military one. Unless there is direct military interventionthe reason for the defeat of a regime in a particularcountry must be found within the political forces of that country and their actions, including the role of the military, and its degree of intervention in politics. This does not mean that U.S. intervention in Chile was inconsiderable,35 but it was certainly not the most important reason for the coup, as some Chilean politicians(particularly the SocialistParty)suggest.6 THE ABSENCEOF A MOREUNITEDDIRECTIVE AMONG POPULARUNITY All the leaders of the PCChand of other political partiesof PopularUnity agree that 'one of the most important factors in the defeat was the absence of unity (in tactics and strategies) between its political forces; the absence, therefore, in crucial moments, of a united direction to the revolutionaryprocess'.37 It is very difficult to achieve a high degree of unity in an alliancewhere different political forces are taking part with their consequently distinct approaches.

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After 1956, there were within the Chilean Left two political programmes. Although these aimed for the same result-the construction of a Socialist society-their strategiesand tactics were different.8 This presenceof a duality of strategieswithin the revolutionaryprocesswas, accordingto the PCCh,the most important reason for the defeat of 1973. The absenceof a more united directionwas clear from the role playedby the extremeLeft,39and its influence in some sectorsof PopularUnity. meansthe MIRin particular,and The PCCh,when to the ultraizquierda referring a 'revolutionary its claims to represent the reformist pole'thatcouldhavechanged policiesof a Popular Unity dominated by the PCCh.40 Accordingto the PCCh,this tendency took dogmaticpositions. For example, it consideredall social sectors that were not proletarianor semi-proletarian to be enemies. This approach pushed the middle class into the forefront of the opposition, and contributed to isolatingthe workingclassand the government.41 Meanwhilethe PCChsupporteda more moderateapproachin orderto avoid creating the conditions that would facilitate an intervention by the Armed Forces. Its moderate approachwas even more evident on the issue of Poder Popular and all the spontaneousorganizationsthat emergedin Chile after the strikesof October1972-Cordones Industriales, Comandos Comunales, Consejos The Socialist Party and other groups of the Left maintained Campesinos.42 their conviction that the 'bourgeois State' should be replacedtout court by The CommunistParty conceivedthe Poder implementingthe Poder Popular.43 that the PCCh'supportedthe CorLuis declared Corvalan Popular differently; dones Industriales,Consejos Campesinos,Comandos Comunales,but believes . . . cannot be regarded that these new organizations and orientatedin opposition to the governmentof Allende . . . nor should they be consideredalterof other structures of the peope'.44Accordingto the PCCh, native organizations the more radicalconception of the ultra-Left contributedto the hostile reaction thus creatingconflict from the centre-rightparties,and the CDP in particular, isolabetween PopularUnity and the middle class which led to the progressive tion of the government. It seems to me that althoughthe problemsmentionedby the PCChwere real, the Party places the responsibilitiestoo much on other political forces and their policies, without analysingits own inability to implement its policies in the political circumstancesof the time, i.e. the high expectations of Popular Unity after winning the election of 1970. For example the responsibilityfor with the CDP was not only the result of the ultra-Leftand the non-agreement SocialistParty, but was also due to the complexity of the CDPas a party,with one sectorwillingto have dialoguewith PopularUnity, and another(particularly the wing dominated by Frei) having no intention of establishinga working with Allende. relationship In politics it is not alwayspossible to act in accordancewith a set of plans sometimes there is an urgent need to or stages in carryingout a programme; react quickly to circumstancesthat the originalpolitical strategydid not contemplate. This is where the PCChfailed, in being unable to adapt its original programmeto a new situation. For example when it was clear that the agreement with the CDP had no future, by the summerof 1973, the PCChstill when it was clear, after the attemptedcoup continued to pursue it. Moreover,

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PARTY(PCCh) THE CHILEAN COMMUNIST

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of June 1973, that the Army was preparingto overthrow Allende, the PCCh still insisted in its slogan,No a la guerracivil. In generalterms its failure lay in its rigidity in a rapidly changing situation, particularlywhen it became clear that the next objective of Popular Unity could not be the next presidential election (1976) but a solution to secureits immediatesurvival. THE LACKOF A DEFENSIVEAPPARATUS One of the striking aspects of the coup d'etat was the absence of effective resistance from the political parties of the Left. No serious attempt to defeat the military was possible, partly because of the unpreparedness of the Left to oppose them, but mainly because of the isolation of the PopularUnity government from the military leadership,with the exception of a handful of senior generals,alreadyisolated from command,like CarlosPrats. There is no doubt that in spite of the previouscoup attempt by the military in June 1973, Popular Unity did not organize itself for possible resistance. Although the PCChassertsthat it had an armed apparatus (a very modest one), it was certainly committed to the 'peaceful road' as the only realistic strategy in Chile at the time. While the MIR and the Socialist Party stated the necessity of 'armingthe masses', the PCChmaintainedthat it was possible to defend the governmentonly through constitutional means, i.e. through the isolation of the reactionary forces, an alliancewith the CDP, and support from the democratic wing of the Army. 'The decisive aspect, in the defence of the revolution,is the Armed Forces, and in generalterms the balanceof forces at the militarylevel.'45 The PCCh finds two reasons for the behaviour of the military: firstly, the absenceof a correctpolicy from PopularUnity towardsthe Army;and secondly, the alarm of the Armed Forces at attempts by the MIR, MAPUand PSCh to infiltrate its rank and file. Moreover,the PCChassertsthat 'in the relationship between PopularUnity and the Armed Forces errorspredominated. We refer to the belief that the Armed Forces were different (in Chile), that they would be subordinate to the civil power'.46In synthesis, the PCChbelieves that only an integration of the Armed Forces in the process of political change could have led to a different role for them, and thus to a possibility of survivalfor Allende's government. THE 1977 CONFERENCE OF THEPCCh The session of the Central Committee of the PCChin August 1977 (at an unknown venue) was a historic one for three reasons.Firstly, it was the first to follow the coup d'tat; secondly, it providedan analysisof the PopularUnity period; and thirdly, it proposed a programmefor the reconstructionof Chilean democracy. Although almost five years have gone by, that programmeis still in force. The PCChproposes immediatelythe military is defeated, to establish a Gobiemo Provisional (ProvisionalGovernment)made up of Popular Unity, the Christian Democratic Party, and the democratic sectors of the Armed Forces. This ProvisionalGovernmentwould preparea Constitution that would set up guidelines for the democraticrevivalof Chile. The central point of this is that the PCChdoes not intend to replacePinochet with 'the formation of a socialist state nor with a typically bourgeois one. In other words, the dilemma is not fascism or bourgeois democracy. What is needed is a new democratic,

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popular, national regime,which would favourand promote the changeswhich arise out of the objectiveneeds of social progress'.47 This conception of a progressivedemocracyas a stage between the bourgeoisstate and a socialist state is a plan that the PCChpromoted from the early 1950s,48with its elaboration of an 'anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchic,anti-feudal revolution'. The proposed new democracyby the PCChis distinct from the SocialistParty'sBloque por el Socialismo, in which it states that the struggleagainstthe militarydictatorship must be part of a struggleto construct a socialist society. The Socialist Party denies the validity of a policy that promotes a stage in between, consideringit instead as one process.Once again,the SocialistParty'sapproachis in line with the strategyof the 1950s Frentede Trabajadores.49 The PCChis again proposinga strategy on the basis of a broad allianceof political and social forces within Chileansociety.50It is in favourof the formation of a Frente Antifascista that would achieve the defeat of the military dictatorship,the disruptionof the 'totalitarian'state and the constructionof a new state of law-democratic, anti-fascist,national,popularand pluralist.51 The central issue in this strategy is the relationshipwith the Christian Democratic Party. From the original formation of the alliance of the Left to the present,the relationshipbetween the left and centre-rightpartieshas remained The PCChnow assertsthat 'from the point of view of the contricontroversial. bution of politicalpartiesto unity, the mainissue is the alliancewith the CDP'.52 Within the SocialistParty there is a less favourableapproachon this. Certainly the CDP could not accept an alliancewith PopularUnity if the latter were to try to implement fully socialist policies after defeatingthe militaryjunta. For the moment there is agreementbetween Popular Unity and the CDP on the need to replacePinochet with some kind of provisionalgovernment.But the formation of an alliance in terms of a long-termstrategyis more complicated. The Left and the CDP have different conceptions of the means by which to achieve the defeat of the junta. It is very difficult to foresee a strategicrather than tacticalalliance,as the PCChwants. OF A STRATEGY THEEMERGENCE OF ARMEDSTRUGGLE? The PCCh has never adopted the armed struggleas its official line, nor considered this possibility to be realisticduring the developmentof its political programmeover the period 1912-80. But, since the end of 1980, for the first time, the PCCh has put forward a proposition that could be interpretedas a novelty in the recent development of its strategy. Some statements from leaders of the PCChand official documents of the party releasedin Santiago suggest this change of line.53These statements representthe first attempt by to defeat thejunta. This creates the PCChto adopt a strategyof armedstruggle a new phase in the political debate of the PopularUnity alliance, and at the same time could push the CDP and its strategy(peaceful and moderateopposition within 'legality') into a decision: whetherto commit itself to a definitive alliancewith the Left, or to seek an alliancewith conservative political-military forces opposed to the junta. The debate to come will be interestingand will be of substantial importanceto the futureof Chileandemocracy. But, is there really a new strategy within the PCCh?Apparentlythere is. Various militants maintainthat after the session of the CentralCommitteein

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1977 there was some dissatisfactionwithin the party, because the leadership still preferreda more moderate line in the struggle against the junta. In fact some statements by Luis Corvalanmight suggest this. Speaking before the Regional Conference of the party in Sweden (November 1980) he referredto this by saying that 'the party must give an answerto the doubts of the militants. First of all the comrades have the right to state them. They can do it in their cells. They can, according to our Estatutos, state them directly to the Central Committee. Even more, the party can and must organizespecial conferencesin He even suggested order to analysespecific issues on which there exist doubts'.54 a revision of the strict internal organizationalstructureto give greaterinfluence to forces within the Party.55Although there is no direct evidence of conflict in Chile and the leadershipin exile, there have between the party underground been rumoursof conflict over the resolutionsof the CentralCommitteein 1977. Criticism of those resolutions should be regardedas one of the reasonsfor the new strategy. With the new Constitutionapprovedby plebiscitein 1980, AugustoPinochet's term of office lasts until 1989. This developmentof the Chilean junta is perhaps the most important reason for the PCCh'smove towards armed struggle.Until 1980 the PCCh preferredto seek a common non-violent position that could unite the CDP, the MIR, the 'non-fascistforces', the 'democratic'military and Popular Unity. This kind of democratic alliance (Frente Antifascista) was to unify different political forces with opposing political strategiesand aims (the CDP and the MIR, for example), in order to achieve as a common objective the defeat of the military dictatorship.But, with the new Constitution, and the consequent institutionalization of the junta, political changes are only dictated by the military, i.e. there is no possible within the Constitucionalidad room for manoeuvrefor the traditionalpolitical parties, because they continue to be illegal. Once the PCCh realized that all possibility of the 'liberalization' of the military regime was at an end, it stated that 'the right of the people to rebellion is even more indisputable'.56The official document of the PCCh goes beyond this, it states that 'there is no road other than the frontal struggle Accordingto the PCCh,the time has come when the againstthe dictatorship'.57 use of violence is necessary. If we look at the theoretical elaborationof the 'peaceful road' made during the 1960s,58we realize that the PCChconsideredthe possibility of adoptingan armed struggle,or rather,the PCChnever stated a priori a rejectionof it. When the Sino-Soviet dispute started (1960) and the consequent conference of the 81 Communistpartiesmet to discuss the Chinese 'heresy'(the theory of 'both legs') the PCChsupportedthe 'peaceful road' as its official line, but considered The conditions armed struggle as a possibility in exceptional circumstances.59 imposed by the military regime prevent, according to the PCCh, a peaceful solution, and thus the right of the popularmovement 'to rebellionand violence' has come. There is evidence that the PCChis carryingout the armedstrategy.One sign is its new relationshipwith the MIR-formerly considered by the PCChas a group of extremists, adventuristsand terrorists.The MIR has advocatedarmed strugglefrom the time of its foundation(1965). Also, accordingto reportsfrom Chileanparty membersin exile, there have been severalacts of sabotagecarried

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out together, by the MIR and the PCCh.This new approachby the PCChhas provokedcriticismon the Left, mainly for the suddenchangeof strategyfrom massive peaceful opposition (in order to attract the CDP) to armed struggle. There is scepticism(particularlyin the Socialist Party) about whether such a The other small partiesof the Left are strategy will work in the short term.60 dividedon this issue. In the short term the Left is not prepared, nor arethere appropriate political conditions, for a frontal attack on the junta. What is not clear in the PCCh's approachis the timing of the armedstruggle,i.e. is it going to be a long-term venture or a short-termtactic? The cases of other countries(like Nicaragua) suggest that such a strategy could work only in the long-term.In any case, such a strategyraisesquestions.The Chileanmilitary junta looks well established in power and institutionalized;thus, is the armedstrugglestrategydestined to be defeatedwith the consequentstrong repressionthat would follow, or is the armedstruggleonly a declarationuntil the conditions are right-a crisisof the junta and readinessof the Left in militaryterms-for a militaryconfrontation? Is there a possibility that dissatisfiedgroups within the military would join the popular movement? It is too early to answerthese questions, but there movement certainlyis a risk that the PCChstrategycould relegatethe anti-junta to obscurityfor a long time. There are alreadyconflicts between PopularUnity and the CDP in terms of the future organization of the Chileanpolitical system, if the junta is defeated. The CDP will not accept a Marxist government.The move towards armed struggleby the PCChwill create more problemswithin the FrenteAntifascista. Two different anti-militaryalliancesmight emerge following the adoption of a strategy of armed struggleby the PCCh.The first would be PopularUnity and the MIR joined together in a radicalpolicy carryingout armed struggle and the second would involve the CDP and civil-military moderatesopposing the junta within 'legality',lookingat opportunities that the junta may offer. The latest developmentin the political strategyof the PCChmay have been influencedby other LatinAmerican movements.The triumphof the Nicaraguan of the revolution,for example, provedthe viability, in particular circumstances, armed struggle.The case of El Salvadormay also have influencedthe PCCh's new strategy. If this is the case, then it will be interestingto know what kind of position the Soviet Union takes on this issue. Certainly,a CommunistParty like the Chileanwill not take such a step, without at least some kind of consultationwith the USSR. If the Soviet Union officially endorsesarmedstruggle in Latin America, this would be the result of the triumph of the Nicaraguan revolution and the new conflict in international will propolitics. Its approval duce new motives for conflictwith the USA and this could pushthe U.S. government to give more support to the military regime in Chile. If the Chilean CommunistParty and PopularUnity adopt, as seems likely, the armedstruggle, the result is very difficult to foresee, but certainly the system of class and politicalalliancein Chilewill changeconsiderably. NOTES
1. There is some dispute about the date of foundation of the PCCh. I have tried to demonstrate why the date of foundation of the PCCh should be considered as 1912

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2.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

10.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

23. 24. 25. 26.

and not 1922 (CarmeloFurci, 'The politicalstrategyof the ChileanCommunist party, 1950-1980', Ph.D.thesisin progress.) On the period 1912-47, see Heman-Ramirez-Necochea (1965), Origeny formacion del Partido Comunistade Chile, Editorial Horizonte (Santiago de Chile); Andrew Bernard(1978), 'The ChileanCommunistparty, 1922-1947', Ph.D. thesis, University of London;and (1981), 'Chilean RadicalPresidents and Chileanrelations Communists, with United States, 1940-1947', Journal of Latin AmericanStudies, vol. 13, pt. 2, pp. 347-74. On the CommunistInternational 'thirdperiod', see Jean Elleinstein(1975), Storiadel fenomeno Staliniano,EditoriRiuniti(Rome). On the secondunderground period(1948-58), see C. Furci,op. cit. in Chile,M.I.T.Press. ErnestHalperin and Communism (1965), Nationalism Paolo Spriano(1969), Storia del Partito Comunista Italiano, Giulio EinaudiEditore, 5 vols. (Torino). Also Umberto Terracini(1978), Intervistasul Comunismo difficile, Laterza(Bari);GiorgioAmendola(1974), Letterea Milano,EditoriRiuniti(Rome). Eduardo C. Colomer (1965), Historia del Partido Comunistade Espaia, Editora Nacional(Madrid); en Espagne,Armand Guy Hermet(1971), Les Communistes Colin, Foundationdes SciencesPolitiques(Paris). RichardA. H. Robinson(1979), Contemporary Portugal,GeorgeUnwin(London). Thomas Skidmore (1970), 'Failurein Brazil: from PopularFront to armedrevolt', Journalof Contemporary History, vol. 3, p. 141. For a historyof the PCB,see Ronald H. Chilcote (1974), The BrazilianCommunistparty, 1922-1972, Oxford University Press(London). Accordingto sources releasedby the Ministerof Interior,41,359 people have been arrested between September 1973 and March 1975, of whom 36,605 have been released.The numberof people executed is not known (see LatinAmericanPolitical Report (11/4/1975), vol. IX, no. 14, p. 104). Robert J. Alexander (1978), The Tragedyof Chile, GreenwoodPress (Westport, London),p. 357. Hoy (1980), afio IV, no. 162, pp. 12-17. EduardoFrei (1975), El Mandatode la Historia del Porvenir, Editorial y las exigencias del Pacifico(Santiagode Chile). RobertJ. Alexander (1978), op. cit., p. 358. underauthorAlthoughsome social scientists(e.g. Gonzalo Falabella(1980), 'Labour itarianregimes:the Chileanunion movement, 1973-1980', Ph.D. thesis,University of these minor parties, in relationto Sussex) present a more optimistic view regarding theirpoliticalimportance. PSCh(25/3/1979), Declaraci6n publica,Comisi6nPolitica (Santiagode Chile). CarmenCastillo (1980), Un jour d'Octobrea Santiago, Voix de Femmes, Stock 2 (Paris). LatinAmerican PoliticalReport (28/2/1975), vol. IX, no. 9, p. 72. Ibid. On the organizational structureof the PSCh,see Benny Pollack(1978), 'The Chilean Socialist party: prolegomena to its structure and organization',Journal of Latin AmericanStudies,vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 117-52. RobertJ. Alexander (1978), op. cit., p. 359. On the crisis of the PSCh, see Le Monde (28/4/1979 and 5/5/1979); PSCh (April 1979), Resolucionesdel Pleno del ComiteCentral,Santiagode Chile;PSCh(8/5/1979), La opinion del Partido sobre un relevo y expulsion, ComisionPolitica (Santiago). Also Chile-America (1979), nos. 53-4 (Rome). Hints of this criticismcan be traced in Luis Corvalan(1980), 'Discursoemitido en la Conferencia Regionalde Suecia',TallerRicardoFonseca(London). Rene Castillo (1974), 'Chile: ensefianzasy perspectivas de la revolucion',in PCCh (1975), Documentos oficiales del Partido Comunistade Chile emitidos en Santiago despuesdel golpe militarfascista,pp. 122-3. JorgeMontes(n.d.), La luz entrelas sombras,p. 172. There are around 2,500 desaparecidos. They have been arrestedand no one knows if they are alive,dead or wherethey are.Amongthe desaparecidos are ExequielPonce,

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of the PSCh(Latin CarlosLorca,RicardoLagos,head of the underground apparatus to the United AmericanPoliticalReport (1976), vol. X, no. 43, p. 338). According in exile, both NationsCommission for refugeesthere are aroundone millionChileans for political and economic reasons.In Europeare the more politicizedones, about PoliticalReport(1977), vol. XI, no. 23, p. 180). 18,500 (LatinAmerican Membersof the CentralCommitteeof the PCChkilled: Isidoro Castillo, Enrique Paris, David Miranda, Alberto Molina, Juan Lopez, Marta Ugarta. Members of the partyandheadof the underVictorDiaz(Vice-General Secretary desaparecidos: in Chile until 1976), Mario Zamorano,UldaricoDonaire,Jorge ground apparatus Mufioz, Jose Weibel, Fernado Ortiz, Jaime Donato, FernandoNavarro,Bernardo Araya,CesarCerda,ManuelVargas.Anothersix died of naturalcauses:the poet and Nobel PrizewinnerPabloNeruda,OscarAstudillo,HectorCorbalan, Vallejas, Eugenio LuisFigueroa(formerPresident of the CentralUnicade Trabajadores, CUT).Another memberof the Central died in Parisin 1980. Committee,Herman Ramirez-Necochea, He is the author (1965) of the only history of the PCCh(1922-36), Origen y Formaciondel PartidoComunista de Chile, EditorialHorizonte(Santiago).(See PCCh, El Pleno de Agosto 19 77 del ComiteCentral del PartidoComunista de Chile,Ediciones Colo-Colo (Barcelona), p. 3.) JorgeMontes(n.d.), p. 172. Luis Corvalan was releasedin December1976, exchangedwith the Soviet dissident Vladimir PoliticalReport(1976), vol. X, no. 50, p. 393). (LatinAmerican Bukovsky The majorevent performedby the CNSwas a PliegoNacional,directedto Pinochet in June 1981, requesting in the economyandlabourorganizations democratic reforms Nacional Sindicala la opinion publica (June 1981), pamphlet (CNS, Coordinadora of the PliegoNacional,the leadersof the CNS, (Santiago)).Followingthe presentation ManuelBustos (President)and AlamiroGuzman(GeneralSecretary)were arrested. (Boletindel Exterior(Sept.-Oct.1981), p. 2.) Carlos October1981, London. Marino, interview, Youth Organization Comunistas) (Juventudes Recently, for example,the Communist of its foundationby organizing a demonstration in the celebratedthe anniversary werearrested. AfterSeptember militants Several 1980, and parkin Santiago. O'Higgins the adoption of armedstruggle,there have been acts of sabotagecarriedout by the PCCh andthe MIR. del Exterior(Nov.-Dec. 1980), no. 44, pp. 8-9. Boleti'n Ren6Castillo(1974), op. cit., pp. 120-1. ITT-CIA: in Chile(1973), Spokesman RussellFoundaSubversion Books,the Bertrand tion Ltd. Also UnitedStatesand Chileduringthe Allendeyears, 1970-1973 (1975), Office(Washington, U.S. Government D.C.). Printing Carlos Altamirano(1974), 'Riflessionicritiche sul processo rivoluzionario Cileno', in Questioni Attualidel Socialismo(Belgrade). Volodia Teitelboim,memberof the PoliticalCommission of the PCCh(1975), interview, Florence. C. Furci,op. cit., chap.III. PCCh(1975), El ultraizquierdismo official docucaballode Troyadel imperialismo, ment (Santiago de Chile). See ReneCastillo(1974), op. cit., p. 113.

27.

28. 29. 30.

31. 32.

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41. Ibid. 42. On these structures see Alan Angell (1980), Political mobilization and class alliances

in Chile,1970-1973, Institutefor the New Chile(Rotterdam). 43. AlainTouraine (1975), Vida y muertedel Chilepopular,SigloXXI(Mexico),p. 13. 44. ChileHoy, no. 43 (April1973) (Santiago). 45. Jorge Insunza(1978), 'La dialecticade las vias revolucionarias', in PCCh,Los 1000 dias de revolucion,EditorialPaz y Socialismo, et al. p. 83. See also Ian Roxborough Press(London),pp. 187-203. (1977), Chile:the State and the Revolution,Macmillan
46. Luis Corvalin (1977), op. cit., pp. 27-8. 47. Luis Corvalin (1979), Our democratic project, Taller Ricardo Fonseca (London), p. 1. project, 1951-1956, paper, Institute for the New Chile (Rotterdam).

48. C. Furci(1980), The ChileanCommunist and the originsof its political party (PCCh}

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49. ClodomiroAlmeyda(October1979), Carta Publica,p. 20. 50. LuisCorvalan (1977), op. cit., p. 58. 51. PCCh(December1974), Al partidoy al pueblo de Chile, official document(Santiago de Chile). 52. LuisCorvalan (1977), op. cit., p. 59. 53. Luis Corvalan(3/9/1980), 'Discursodel SecretarioGeneraldel PartidoComunistade General del Partido Chile',Moscow;PCCh(1980), 'Discursoemitido por el Secretario Comunistade Chile Compaiero Luis Corvalin,en la Conferencia Regionalde Suecia', Taller Ricardo Fonseca (London). PCCh (23/11/1980), Declaracion del Partido de Chile (Santiago).Also PCCh(1981), 'El enriquesimiento Comunista y eldesarrollo de la linea politica del Partido',in Boletin del Exterior, pp. 14-43. The speechesby Luis Corvalin related to the armed strugglehave been edited in Luis Corvalan, La rebeli6npopularse abrecaminoen Chile(no date or publisher given). 54. PCCh(1980), 'Discurso... en la ConferenciaRegionalde Suecia',op. cit., p. 9. On the criticism and doubts which emerged after the launch of the new strategy, see Boletin del Exterior,no. 49, pp. 84-98. 55. LuisCorvalan (1980), op. cit., p. 11. 56. Ibid. 57. PCCh(1980), Declaracion del PartidoComunista de Chile(Santiagode Chile),p. 15. 58. ErnestHalperin (1965), op. cit. 59. Ibid.,p. 68. 60. CarlosMarino (October1981), interview,London.

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