Analytic Psychology. by G. F. Stout Review by: J. Mark Baldwin International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Jul., 1897), pp.

522-524 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2375773 . Accessed: 09/07/2013 13:00
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InternationalYournal of Ethics.

be of a social sort, resultingin every case fromthe acquaintance of the individual's companion with his actions. Publicity will be the source of both rewards and punishmentsfor the individual, and hence the importance to the individual (unemphasized by ethical writers before) of publicity of conduct. The law of Kant, " So act that the principleof your conduct may be fitforuniversallaw," is to the individual, subjectively speaking, so act that all the members of the social group to which you belong-i.e., all your other selves-may know your conduct without pain to yourself. This publicity factor of the ethical consciousness is to be emphasized, I am informed,in the author's forthcoming work called " Inter" pretations. Finally, what of the imperativenatureof duty as a psychological phenomenon? As all concepts-i.e., all organized systems of motor discharges-are prior to any particulardischarge and determine its form,and as all beliefs are motor attitudes prior to any action in accord with those attitudes,so the sense of self and the feeling that an unconditional duty is real, are prior to any specific movement in accord with or in opposition to the self-feeling; so faras any particular instance of conduct is concerned, the feeling in of the realityof an unconditional duty is a priori,fora priority this view has just, this genetic meaning, that present motor discharges, whether reactions of the attentionor movements,can be assimilatedthroughtheirresonance to old reaction copies; our feel ing of theirworthis determinedby the question whether any particular action can or cannot be so assimilated. The theoryleaves entirelyout of discussion the epistemological question of the validity or the nature of the sense of duty, as also the same question in regard to other conscious processes.
G. A. TAWNEY.
BELOIT COLLEGE, WISCONSIN.

ANALYTIC

PSYCHOLOGY. By G. F. Stout. 2 vols. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Macmillan & Co., I896. Pp. xV., 289, and v., 314.

In these two finevolumes we have a thorough,interesting, and of general psychologyapproached by the comprehensivetreatment traditional Britishmethod,-analysis. Mr. Stout proposes, however, to supplement it later by another work on " Genetic Psychology," in which, indeed, he declares his main interestto lie.

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Book Reviews.

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The work is devoted so largelyto questionsof purelypsychological value, and has so littleimmediateinterestforstudentsof ethics, that I shall content myselfwith recommending it to the readers of this JOURNAL, with certain leading indications merelyas to its teachings. The first thing that strikesthe studentis its fundamentaldivergence fromBritishtraditionin the matterof the great law of Association. The last few years have seen the lines drawn sharply between the older Associationismand the newer Apperceptionism. The latterhas gained the ascendency,and is likelyto hold it as conof the Associationists.' There is trasted with the earlier statements now, however,a tendency,underthelead of certainimportant men, a new Associationismwhich will be true to the facts to reconstruct of " apperceptivesynthesis," and yet not go over to a doctrine of " mentalactivity" as revealing itself in consciousness by a special "sense of activity as such." In this discussion, it was Ward's cyclopedia articlewhich firstbroke ground in England forthe reception of Apperception,and Mr. Stout, growingup in Cambridge, naturallyfollowsWard in discarding the tenetsof the Associationism of the Britishschool, led to-day still by Professor Bain. Mr. Stout has an original and interestingattemptto interpret mental of the apperceptionists activity-using in part the terminology of the Herbartian school-which goes, as it seems to me, beyond the position of Ward. It is true that Mr. Stout stops with what he calls " noetic synthesis," as a final term of description of the union of elementsin a single cognitive state of consciousness. In this, as I said, his doctrine seems only to emphasize the break with Associationism; but yet he does not fullyappreciate the resources of the later developmenton the motor side of mental life, with the help of which a certainsensational basis may be found for synthesis,and in so fara naturalistic account be given of it. It would be hardlywell to call such a doctrine Associationism,and, he is himselfshortof it, Mr. Stout is, no doubt, wise in seeing thatclinging to the termapperception. It is interestingto note, with this doctrine of noetic synthesis, a decided tendency to treasure empirical investigation.seen in the genetic intentions and the anthropological impulses which Mr. Stout reveals. This will save him no doubt in such a stronghold of Associationism as Aberdeen University,to which he has now gone as Lecturer on Comparative Psychology. Possibly it is this contrastbetweenthe higherand the lower-the noetic and the

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International-ournal of Ethics.

genetic-which has caused the omissionfromthe workof Mr. fruitful would havehad very topicswhich Stoutof all thosehigher the noetic side, butwhichmighthave imperilled from discussion when he comes to writehis book on the the author'sfreedom mainpoints writer's genetic. At anyrate,it is one of thepresent to see what Mr. Stout will do withhis doctrineof of curiosity the mindsof the animals,the whenhe interprets activity mental himself and theamoebae. And if he had onlycommitted insects, it in this workto viewson theethical,thesocial,and thereligious, laterapplication to see their wouldhaveexcitedthesamecuriosity a free in the fieldsof ethnology. But here he has left himself work, as it must of thepresent hand,to thegreatimpoverishment be confessed. on Attention, in thechapters will be interested Ethicalreaders where the best the levelof among which are and Belief, Conation, and Pain, which in thaton Pleasure all is high,and less interested none are poor. where is thepoorest
J. MARK BALDWIN.
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT. Translated by S. W. Dyde, M.A., D.Sc., Professorof Mental Philosophy, Queen's UniverPp. xxx., 365. sity, Kingston, Canada. Bell, i896. Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" or "of Law," the work here translated,formsthe eighth volume of the collected worksas published afterHegel's death. It consists,as the translator'spreface us (why, however,is not the original " editor's preface" reinforms ?), of "paragraphs" and "notes," produced in the translation the work as published by Hegel's own hand, constituting both from togetherwith "additions," drawn fromstudents' Hegel in i820; notes of the lectures,which appeared forthe firsttime in the posthumousedition of i833. The work of i820 was itself a reproduction in fuller formof a portionof the thirddivision of the " Encycloptedia of Philosophical Sciences," which appeared as a whole in i8I 7. Its threedivisions were the Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, and the Philosophy of Mind. The last of these fell into three portions or subdivisions: Mind Subjective (what we mightcall Mental Philosophy,-Anthropology and Psychology), Mind Objective, which coincides with the Philosophy of Right, including what we might call Jurisprudence and Moral and Political Philosophy; and Mind Absolute, covering

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